BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN THE NORTH-EAST NIGERIA

BY

ABERAGI EMMANUEL TERYILA
POS/Ph.D/17/013

A DOCTORATE DEGREE DISSERTATION CARRIED OUT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR

SUBMITTED TO

POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR
CALABAR – NIGERIA

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Ph.D) IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (POLITICAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES)

SEPTEMBER, 2021.

DECLARATION

I, **Aberagi Emmanuel Teryila**, with the Registration Number: **POS/Ph.D/17/013,** hereby declare that this thesis on "Boko haram insurgency and political instability in the north-east Nigeria", is original, and has been written by me. It is a record of my research work and has not been presented before in any previous publication.

Aberagi Emmanuel Teryila   --------------------------

(Student)   Signature & Date

CERTIFICATION

We certify that this thesis titled: "Boko Haram Insurgency and Political Instability in the North-East Nigeria, 2011-2020" by Aberagi Emmanuel Teryila, POS/Ph.D/017/013 carried out under our supervision, has been found to have met the requirements of the University of Calabar. We, therefore recommend the work for the award of Doctorate Degree in Political Science (Political Economy and Development Studies).

Prof. Maurice Ayodele Coker
(Chief Supervisor)
Qualification
B.Sc., M.Sc., Ph.D
Status: Professor

Sign: ....
Date: 28/09/2021

Dr. A.G. Atelhe
(Supervisor)
Qualification
B.Sc. M.Sc., and Ph.D (ABU)
Status: Senior Lecturer

Sign: ....
Date: 28-9-21

Dr. Atelhe George Atelhe
(Ag. Head of Department)
B.Sc. M.Sc., and Ph.D (ABU)
Status: Senior Lecturer

Sign: ....
Date: 28-9-21

Prof. S. B. C. Iheanacho
Graduate School Representative
Qualification
Dip. NCE. B.Sc. M.Ed. Ph.D
Status: Professor

Sign: ....
Date: 28/09/2021

Prof. Adagba Okpaga
(External Examiner)
Qualification
B.Sc. (Hons). M.Sc., and Ph.D (UNIMAID)
Status: Professor

Sign: ....
Date: 28/9/2021

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

This study is on Boko Haram Insurgency and Political Instability in North East Nigeria. The violent extremism and kidnapping of Citizens, cattle rustling and banditry among others has become part of our daily life experience that have affected every part of our national life. Herdsmen and farmers' crisis have remained the most predominately resource-use security challenges in Nigeria. The necessity to provide good governance has been hampered by the activities of Boko Haram Terrorist, Herders, Banditry and kidnapping among others. This study x-rayed the approaches adopted by the Nigeria government to combat the insurgency ravaging the country for almost two decades. This research sought answers to these questions that served as preview for the study; To what extent does lack of political will by the Nigerian government significantly affects the fight against Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East? How does poor funding significantly influence Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East? To what extent does lack of capacity by the Nigerian military significantly affects the fight against Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East? Does the approach used in counter Boko Haram campaigns significantly affect the fight against Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East? And finally, to what extend does poor intelligence gathering significantly influence the fight against Boko Haram insurgence and political instability in the North East? To address the above questions and the objectives of the study concentrated on the North East region of the country. The research adopted triangulation and observational survey method; drew a sample of 230 respondents and closed ended interview, questionnaire was used as data collection method and tested using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) to calculate the percentage analysis and Correlation analysis was utilized to find out relationship between the variables of the study. The study findings revealed that, the level of poor infrastructural development, poor military approaches, lack of commitment, political will and moles among the security agents of the Nigeria government is contributing to the protracted insurgency and political instability in the North East. Poor funding and political instability significantly influenced Counter-Boko Haram insurgency. The study recommended adequate funding to Counter-Boko Haram Insurgency, adoption of ultra-modern military hardware, use of modern equipments in intelligent gathering and the government should demonstrate concerted political will by procurement of military hardware that will be effective in Counter-Boko Haram Insurgence. Lastly the study recommends that, government should procure Ultramodern Intelligence gathering equipments and effectively deploy same to elicit requite intelligence for the Counter-Boko Haram campaign.

(WORD COUNT: 425)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1   Background to the Study

Insurgency in recent times has become a threat to global peace and security due to the fact that it constitutes the highest contributor to humanitarian crises in the form of regional instability, rise in human casualties, internally displaced persons, refugee crises resulting to food insecurity and the spread of various diseases (Omilusi, 2016). There are also more complex interactions between events associated directly with insurgency (fighting, movement of people, deaths, physical destruction, international embargoes, and military expenditures) and developments in the macro and micro economy which mostly lead to adverse changes in individual entitlements. Insurgency is globally becoming a household word as there is no nation that is completely absolved from its effects. Rourke (2008) observes that war, terrorism and other forms of transnational political violence are in many ways more threatening today than ever before as civilian causality has been on the increase. Indeed, the world-wide manifestation of terrorism and insurgency has been evident in Africa, and especially in Nigeria.

Scholars whose works centered on insurgency and political instability have outlined their position of Nigeria situation in this manner, that Nigeria is a multi-ethnic and a multi-religious state with a population estimated to be about 200 million people cutting across the divides of ethnicity and religious beliefs. Comprising 36 states, and federal capital territory (FCT) and 774 local government councils, it is a complex, multi-religious and multi-ethnic nation state according to (Oyeniyi 2012). The complexity of Nigeria as a nation state is centred on its political formation, economic, social and religious inclinations. As a nation state, the country since independence has experienced several ethnic and religious crisis of various degrees and magnitude (Gilbert, 2013). Grappling

with such political and economically motivated crises, successive administrations in Nigeria have been criticized by either the Muslim or Christian faithful when they are not favoured. The current Boko Haram insurgency in the North-east geopolitical zone of Nigeria that originally took the form of sectarian religious violence has escalated into terrorist activities with international linkages and affiliations making it a relatively difficult nut for the Nigerian government to crack (Gilbert, 2014). Consequently, Nigeria has not known peace for about four years now. The emergence of the fundamentalist Islamic sect, has led to the flight for safety and security of most Nigerians residing in the North East, especially Christians. Since the commencement of the terrorist operations of the sect, they have adopted several methods to unleash terror on the people. And most states of Northern Nigeria have experienced their dastardly activities, but the worst hit has been Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, FCT (Abuja), Kaduna, Kano, Plateau and Yobe (Nwakaudu, 2012).

The Nigerian State is currently facing very serious multiple security threats ranging from kidnapping, militancy, ethnic militias, insurgency, cattle rustlers, herdsmen/farmers and terrorism. Each of these aforementioned threats has adverse effect on the social, economic and political space of the country which, in turn, is affecting the nation's stability and its existence as a single state. With particular reference to the North-east region, the most affected area, the phenomenon has found expression in the emergence of Boko Haram (Jama'atulAhlis Sunnah Lid Da'awatiwal Jihad), which means: (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad). Since its advent, the sectarian insurgency has wreaked havoc in the North-East Nigeria particularly, Borno state with gruesome fatal consequence (Awake, 2008).

The situation has become worrisome in view of the persistent spate of insurgency threats, kidnapping, killings, and suicide bomb explosions, leaving unpalatable effect on

the socio-economic and political sphere of the country in general and North-east region in particular. Despite concerted and committed efforts by the nation's security agencies to contain them, the troubling situation has degenerated irretrievably to the extent that hardly a day passed without national dailies reporting of mass killings of defenseless Nigerians. Though, the situation has improved considerably between 2015 and now, Boko Haram still constitutes significant threat to the nation's security and development particularly in the North-Eastern part of the country.

The emergence of Boko Haram insurgency in the country with a religious, political, and social background and way of thinking has created serious socio-political challenges for the country. It is religious but more of a class struggle for power, which is politically driven and that developed an ideological dimension. Some scholars trace the origin of the sect to 1995 with Mallam Lawan Abubakar as its founder, operating under the name Shabaab (Muslim Youth Organization) (Ehusani 2005 and Campbell, 2012). In 1999, Abubakar left for further studies in Saudi Arabia, thereby relinquishing the leadership of the group to the man known as Mustapha Modu Jon popularly and commonly called Mohammed Yusuf. The group, which called itself the Yusufiyya, aka' Nigerian Talibanwas later renamed Boko Haram by Mohammed Yusuf in the early 2000s in Maiduguri the Borno State capital. It was a religious group, but the leadership of late Mohammed Yusuf opened the group into politics (Ogege, 2013).

Boko Haram is a terrorist group which enjoys sponsorship from international terrorist groups, religious leaders, allies, admirers of their ideology and highly placed politicians in the North and other individuals working against the nation state (Adesoji, 2011). Recently, revelations and security investigations into the activities of the sect affirm that the group is also sponsored from within the country. This simultaneously transpired within the period when a serving Senator from the North-East was on trial for

aiding the activities of Boko Haram. Thus, a senior official of Boko Haram allegedly granted an interview detailing how the sect had been on the payroll of a few political leaders of the North (Okpaga, Chijioke&Eme,2012).

Since the Boko Haram started their atrocities, the North-east region began to lose its glory with business and commercial activities taking a turn for the worse in the area. Investors that have been carrying out business in the region for ages began relocating their businesses due to the unending security challenges in the area. About 35 per cent of the over five hundred thousand Igbo businessmen and traders in the area who engaged in both small and medium scale businesses are reported to have fled to North-central and South-east region due to the growing insecurity posed by the Boko Haram (Awojobi, 2014).

Political activities in the North-east have been affected by Boko haram activities. The group's activities have been escalating steadily in Nigeria; the abduction of over 600 schoolboys in the region last year (2020) being the most recent indicator of the group's growing threat to Nigeria's political stability. Government on its part is making concerted effort to curtail the activities of Boko Haram and its implication for political stability of the nation. However, despite this federal effort to reduce the political threat posed by Boko Haram, many experts argue that the group's political influence has only been on the rise (Bouchat, 2013, Ijtemaye, 2014). Notably, the group has been able to acquire access to better weapons while external fighters are increasingly opting to join the group in order to conduct political jihad against the Nigerian government. Despite the increased state effort to contain the political violence, the group has been increasingly successful in its operations and its member base has expanded beyond the borders of Nigeria.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Nigeria as a country is faced with many developmental problems that include endemic corruption, political, ethnic and religious violence, militancy, and crime across the region. The recent violence by Boko Haram, an Islamic sect that uses bombings, targeted assassinations, and violent crime, is a type of religious extremism experienced in Nigeria. Boko Haram's actions have resulted in an unprecedented level of insecurity and political instability. A military operation conducted by security agencies since the violence has had little success despite a massive budgetary allocation. This questions the ability of the military-driven strategy to combat the group. More so, the strategy has exposed the security agencies to accusations of highhandedness and allegations of atrocities, both of which have initiated an action-reaction cycle of violence. Although a military response remains indispensable in Counterinsurgency operations, it has remained incapable of addressing the root and immediate causes of insurgencies all over the Nigeria.

The past administrations viewed it as a routine law enforcement issue and therefore treated insurgents as ordinary criminals even though their crimes were beyond ordinary crimes. A number of military joint tasks forces (JTFs) were established across the country to help mitigate the violence and bring about peace. A few proactive measures were taken to defeat this group, but these measures achieved only limited results and thus indicated the need for an effective strategy that will compliment military efforts to deal with the crisis.

On the state of the country, when people feel insecure, their appetite to invest reduces; and that is why all over the world, any country that radiates an environment of political instability naturally repels socioeconomic development. Hence, Boko Haram (Jama'atulAhlis Sunnah Lid Da'awatiwal Jihad), is a threat to the economic, political and social security of a nation and a major factor associated with underdevelopment in the

region, because it discourages both local and foreign investments, reduces the quality of life, destroys human and social capital, damages relationship between citizens and the states, thus undermining democracy, rule of law and the ability of the country to promote development (Adebayo, 2013).

The present-day structure of the Nigerian government is viewed by the Boko Haram Sect as fundamentally illegitimate, corrupt, and prone to catering to the economic and political interests of the country's population as especially in the area of accommodating the Christians Folks. As such, the only viable solution is the establishment of an Islamic state that will adhere to the codes of Sharia Law.

The Boko Haram insurgency remained pervasive despite enormous investment, increased budgetary allocation, military campaigns and onslaughts, rehabilitation of repented members, and host of other governmental and non-governmental interventions, yet the ceaseless killings of the Nigerian citizens especially in the North East of Nigeria continue to make news headline in both foreign and local media. These indices have raised questions by scholars and researchers on peace and conflict resolutions, insurgency and polity instability to question not only the capacity of the government but also the mode of intervention, policy and decision-making body of the Nigerian government and the Nigerian military strategies and intelligences if it is as per with the present-day terrorism challenges of the world.

The Nigerian government seems to be overwhelmed; giving the recurrent reprisal attacks on humans and property by insurgency and terrorism that has even metamorphosed into diverse security challenge in Nigeria. These insurgency and polity instability has now manifested in diverse ways of operation ranging from, suicide bombing, cattle rustling to hostage taking/Kidnapping, framers/herders clash, banditry, terrorism and insurgency of the Boko Haram sects has no doubt manifested horrible security breaches especially in the North East of Nigeria. To this end, this research examined the Boko haram insurgency and

political instability in the North-East region of Nigeria in order to proffer solution to the lingering political instability in the region.

1.3   Objectives of the study

The broad aim of this work is to examine Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in North-East region of Nigeria. It is in line with these that the following specific objectives were sought:

1.   To examine if there exist any relationship between Nigerian governments political will on counter-Boko Haram insurgency and the political instability in the North east.

2.   To ascertain whether they exist any relationship between poor funding of Boko Haram insurgency and the prolonged political instability in the North East.

3.   To ascertain whether lack of capacity by Nigeria. Security in the counter-Boko Haram insurgency has any relationship with the perverseness of political instability in the North East.

4.   To investigate if there exist any relationship between the appropriateness of the approaches used by the Nigerian government in the counter-Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East.

1.4   Research Questions

The following research questions were raised to guide this study

1.   Is there any relationship between Nigerian governments' political will on counter-Boko Haram insurgency and the political instability in the North east.

2.   Is there any relationship between poor funding of Boko Haram insurgency and the prolonged political instability in the North East.

3.   Does lack of capacity by Nigerian security in the counter-Boko Haram insurgency has any relationship with the perverseness of political instability in the North East.

4.   Does any relationship exist between the appropriateness of the approaches used by the Nigerian government in the counter-Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East?

1.5   Research Hypotheses

For the purpose of this study, the following null and alternate hypotheses were formulated to serve as a framework for the study:

1.   There is no relationship between Nigerian governments political will on counter-Boko Haram insurgency and the political instability in the North east.

2.   There is no significant relationship between poor funding of Boko Haram insurgency and the prolonged political instability in the North East.

3.   The lack of capacity by Nigerian security in the counter-Boko Haram insurgency has no significant relationship with the perverseness of political instability in the North East.

4.   No significant relationship exists between the appropriateness of the approaches used by the Nigerian government in the counter-Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East?

1.6   Scope and Limitations of the Study

This study focuses on the Counter-Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North-East region of Nigeria; the investigation covered why the pervasiveness of activities of Boko Haram in the North-East and its effect on the political stability in the area from 2011-2021.

It observed that the activities of the sect became more deadly within the period under review. The study evaluated the magnitude of damaged done to insecurity victims of the Boko Haram insurgents. Various factors contributed in affecting the comprehensiveness of this research work. For a comprehensive research work, the study is delimited on the most affected state of the North-east region which is Borno State, Nigeria.

It also covered Nigerians and foreign nationals' victims who have live as residents in the North East within the years under review.

1.7   Significance of the Study

This study seeks to enlighten the general public on the magnitude of damage being done by the activities of Boko Haram in North-east Nigeria and its effect on the political instability of the region. Beyond serving as an addition to already existing literature, it also served as a practical guide for those in the field of criminal investigation andCounter insurgence. It is therefore, hoped that this study will be relevant and of benefits to the inhabitants of North-east, Government officials, NGO's, students and scholars of political economy and conflict.

The causes, effect and implications of this study will be beneficial to paramilitary and other security network in expanding strategies that are in line with world best practice. The study also offered to students, policy makers, research institutions and corporate social organizations (CSO) a research material and a reference book on insurgency and political instability.

Also, with the end of the last decade (2010-2019) and the emergence of another (2020-2029), it is pertinent to understudy the dynamics that played out in the previous decade by way of exploiting knowledge of past experiences to shape the course and direction of the present and future by way of reviewing collective inactions, methods, policies, strategies and models that had intangible results in the penultimate decade and further building on or developing areas that had remarkable or positive results.

This study therefore, is useful to security experts, development consultants and institutions, international organizations, government agencies, research institutions, the Nigeria Immigration Service NIS, the Nigerian Custom Service (NCS), Maritime

border commissions and members of the diplomatic corps, and the Border Community Development Agency (BCDS).

Last but not the least, this study provides a ready source of secondary source of data to compliment the stock of knowledge currently available on this subject. It is a source of tangible gains and insights to future researchers who seek to research on this topic.

1.8   Limitation of the study

All levels of research have their peculiar pot holes, since this is an academic research concern with complex human behaviour with its attendant psycho-social reaction to stimuli this study cannot claim to have accounted for all confounding and intervening variables. Therefore, the conclusion of this study is considered in the light of the fact that time factor, difficulties in sourcing materials, financial constraints and others psychological problem was encountered.

Financial constraint- Insufficient fund tends to impede the efficiency of the researcher in sourcing for the relevant materials, literature or information and in the process of data collection (internet, questionnaire and interview).

Time constraint- The researcher engaged in this study with other academic work. This consequently cut down on the time devoted for the research work.All levels of research have their peculiar pot holes, since this is an educational research concern with complex human behaviour with its attendant psycho-social reaction to stimuli, the researcher overcome this challenges through assistance from families, friends and colleagues in both finance, critiques and reference materials to make this project a success.

1.9   Clarification of concepts

Boko Haram: - (Jama'atulAhlis Sunnah Lid Da'awati Wal Jihad), which means: "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad." Is generally known

as western education is forbidden, but it is interpreted as meaning that Christian evangelism deceptively camouflaged as Western education is Islamically unacceptable.

Boko Haram: Boko Haram is a terrorist group which enjoys sponsorship from international terrorist groups, religious leaders, allies, admirers of their ideology and highly placed politicians in the North and other individuals working against the nation state (Adesoji, 2011). Recently, revelations and security investigations into the activities of the sect affirm that the group is also sponsored from within the country.

IED: Improvised Explosive Device. It's a locally made bomb(s).

IFP: Identified Flash Point; A place identified as Boko Haram hot zone.

Insurgence: This is a political battle waged among a cooperative or acquiescence populace in order for a group of outsiders to take over (or at least undermine) the government of a state. In this study the concept insurgency refers to organized armed uprising by a non-state militia group against state authority, usually involving unconventional violence and insecurity, violence and arms activities that are geared toward achieving mischievous goals of few criminals.

Islamic Fundamentalism: Islamic Fundamentalism is a religious ideology seen as advocating a return to the fundamentals of Islam, the Quran and the Sunnah, it is deemed problematic by those who suggest that Islamic belief requires all Muslims to be fundamentalists. Islamic fundamentalist opposes the infiltration of secular and westernizing influences and seek to institute Islamic law including in Muslim and strict code of behaviour.

National Security: National security is best described as a capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions that the public opinion of a given community believes necessary to enjoy its own self-determination or autonomy, prosperity and wellbeing.

North East: The north east refers to the northern part or region in Nigeria that is most hit by the insecurity and Boko Haram insurgency. It includes states like Maiduguri, Gombe state, Yola, Katsina, Zanfara and Sokoto states.

Political instability: in the study it refers to down ward progression of economic activities and social unrest or youth restiveness in the north east, that have consistently bring political instability in the northern region of Nigeria.

Political will: It is refers in this study as the inability and unwillingness of the political class or government of the day to seriously combat the situation with all sense of seriousness, commitment and resources etc. to win the war against insurgency in the north east.

Poverty: Poverty is the deprivation of basic needs which commonly known as to food, clothing, shelter, healthcare and education.

Sect: Sect can be seen as a body of persons distinguished by peculiarities of faith and practice from other bodies adhering to the same general system. Specially, the adherents collectively of a particular creed or confession a domination or older form of faith or believe

Security: Security is seen here as the total sum of action and measures, including legislative and operational procedures, adopted to ensure peace, stability and the general wellbeing of a nation and its citizens.

Terrorism: is the use of violence to instill fear on the people in pursuit of political goals. The use of violence with the aim of creating fear in the populace, in order to achieve some set objectives, is as old as mankind. Such use of violence has been employed by states and

various regimes over the years for the purpose of achieving some national interests, and in some cases personal interests of the ruling elites camouflaged as national interests.

Violence: The intentional use of physical force of power, threatened or actual against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injuries, death psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation.(Wikipedia, WHO).

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1   General overview: this looks at literature on a global perspective

2.2   Comparative review: this looks at the works of scholars in comparative manner

2.3   Case study review: Nigeria terrorism insecurity as a case study

2.4   Institutional review:this looks at the work on regional; such as West Africa, Algaeda, Middle East etc.

2.1   General overview

This particular section of the research looks exactly at several review of related literature concerning Counterterrorism effectiveness and insurgency not only in Nigeria but look at the critical literatures on a global perspective. There is a long tradition of self-criticism within the literature on terrorism that began soon after the field's emergence in the 1960s and 1970s. According to the study by Schmid (2004), he asserted that in a 1977 book review, Bell lamented that there were "no agreed definitions, no accepted bounds to the subject, no very effective academic approach, no consensus on policy implications." Schmid's 1982 book Political Terrorism found that "despite its volume much of the writing [on terrorism] is impressionistic, anecdotal, and superficial and at the same time often also pretentious, venturing far-reaching generalizations on the basis of episodical evidence."

Boko Haram has intensified its operation in the North-East of Nigeria despite the state of emergency that was declared by the federal government in the three states in the northern region where Boko Haram activities are concentrated. The activities of the sect have been of concern to scholars who have written various academic papers on the modus

operandi of Boko Haram. Eme and Ibietan (2012) analyze the origin and ideology of the sect, from their analysis they posit that Jama'atuAhlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad better known as Boko Haram is an Islamic terrorist group that has a strong operational based in the northeast of Nigeria. The ideology of the sect according them is to bring to an end the secular system of government and introduce sharia law in Nigeria.

However, Lister (2012) did not subscribe to the notion that the Boko Haram aim is to Islamize Nigeria through the introduction of sharia law. According to him, the foot soldiers of the sect are disgruntled youths who have been paid by unscrupulous Northern politicians to cause mayhem in the country because of their selfish ambitions. The is this assumption from the southern part of Nigeria, where the incumbent president comes from that the activities of the sect was more intensified because of the emergence of the current president who is a southerner. The high rate of poverty, unemployment and political corruption has been blamed on the elongation of the conflict. Most of the foot soldiers of Boko Haram are youths that are frustrated because the lack employment, income and they have been disdained by politicians after being used by these politicians for their elections victory.

Cook (2011), Awojobi (2014) and Onuoha (2014) all assert that the youths enlisted into Boko Haram because of the prevalence of poverty in the North. The poverty profile of Nigeria that was released in 2012 by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) indicated that the northern region has more poor people than people in the south. Aside the killings, kidnapping and bombing of the sect, their activities constitute a hindrance to the socioeconomic development of the northeast where their operation is focused and Nigeria as a whole. Eme and Ibietan (2012),Ogochukwu (2013),Odita and Akan (2014) andOvaga (n.d.) agree with their study on the Boko Haram insurgency that the sect heinous crimes hinder socioeconomic development in Nigeria.

Scholars have argued that terrorism originates from various sources. It is therefore important to investigate this at both individual and group levels. At the individual level, some experts have distinguished rational, psychological, and cultural origins of terrorism. According to Simonsen and Jeremy (2000) rational terrorists think through their goals and options, making a cost-benefit analysis. Psychological motivation for resorting to terrorism derives from the terrorist's personal dissatisfaction with his or her life and accomplishments. At the group level, terrorism can grow out of an environment of political activism, when a group's goal is to redirect governments or society's attention toward the grievances of an activist social movement.

Other causes of terrorism and insurgency include the following:

Corruption: The corrupt ridden nature of Nigerian society is found in all sectors of the economy (both private and public). The ruling government has failed to perform its duties because officials are busy amassing wealth at the detriment of the society. The pervasiveness of corruption in Nigeria has made the Transparency International in 2012 to rank Nigeria as one of the most corrupt nations in the world, ranking8 as 139most corrupt out of the 176 countries measured.These are terrorism, insurgency and Boko Haram. Due to the prevalence of the deadly Islamic sect in Nigeria, the global community tends to perceive the word "Nigeria" as synonymous with "Boko Haram". It is therefore very important to have a vivid understanding of these three concepts.

2.2   Concept of terrorism

Terrorism is defined as the systematic use of violence and intimidation to coerce a government or community into acceding to specific political demands (Pearsall & Trumble, 2006). Article 2 of the draft comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism defined terrorism as: any person who commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes: death

or serious bodily injury to any person; or serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a state or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate e a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act (Schmid & Graaf, 1980).

The United Kingdom legislation as contained in the Terrorism Act (2000) defined terrorism as the use or threat of action where the action falls within subsection, the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. The Act states further that action falls within this subsection if it involves serious violence against a person, involves serious damage to property, endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action, creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system (Terrorism Act, 2000).

2.3   Concept of Insurgency

Insurgency has been defined as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (Haviland, 2012).The Counter-Insurgency Initiative (2009) has defined insurgency as the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgents seek to subvert or displace the government and completely or partially control the resources and population of a given territory. They do so through the use of force (including guerrilla warfare, terrorism, coercion or intimidation, propaganda, subversion, and political mobilization).

Boko Haram which in general terms, simply means "western education is forbidden" was founded in 2002 in Maiduguri in northeastern Nigeria by a charismatic Muslim cleric, Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf. The sect's philosophy is rooted in the practice of orthodox Islam, and the group's official name in Arabic, Jama'atu Ahlissunahlidda 'awatiwal Jihad, translates to "people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and Jihad" (Chothia, 2012). Boko Haram is an islamist movement that is tied to Al-Qaeda and its followers forbid Muslims or its groups to be involved in any political or social activity that is related to western education or ideology. The Islamic sect beliefs that Nigerian society is so corrupt that it is necessary for a devoted Muslim to migrate to a society that is free from deprivation. Akanji (2009) observes that the goals of Boko Haram are to overthrow the Nigerian government, incite religious tensions by acts of terror and eventually declare an Islamic state in Nigeria.

2.4   Institutional review

This review looks at the works of scholars in comparative manner, it reviews related literature on Counterterrorism effectiveness of various countries in terms of capacity building, intelligence sharing, strategy and technological transfer, nongovernmental organizations impact and capital inflow to sustain and win the war against terrorism in the world. Boko Haram ideologically opposed to any rule of other than its interpretation of sharia. Boko Haram is a violent Sunni jihadist group founded by cleric Mohammed Yusuf, who was previously a leader within a Salafist group in the 1990s, and was inspired by 14th century fundamentalist scholar Ibn Taymiyyah. As Boko Haram's alliances with al-Qa'ida–linked groups, such as al-Qa'ida in the Land of Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM), have strengthened, its interpretation of violent jihad has changed, increasing the scope of its targets and areas of activity beyond the borders of Nigeria.

2.4.1 Religious terrorism

Nigeria is undoubtedly home to a variety of religions which tend to vary regionally. This situation intensifies regional and ethnic distinctions and has often been seen as a source of sectarian conflict amongst the population (Osita, 2004). Various surveys however give slightly differing figures for the size of religious groups in Nigeria, which by 2010 appears to be roughly split half and half between Muslims and Christians with a very small minority who practice traditional religion. Osaghae and Suberu (2013) has also noted that, of these three religious' identities in Nigeria – Muslim, Christian and Traditional, the latter is the least politically active; numbering several hundreds of ethnic groups and subgroups, kin groups, clans and villages; and, involving the worship of several gods and goddesses alike.

According to a 2003 Nigerian Demographic and Health Survey which interviewed a nationally representative sample of 7,620 women (aged between 15 and 59) and 2,346 men (aged 15 and 49), 50.4% of Nigeria's population are Muslims, 48.2% are Christians and 1.4% adheres to other religions (Nigeria National Population Commission and ORC Macro, 2004). Few years later, these figures seem not to change much as a 2009 National Religious Survey on Nigerian Christians reported 15% Protestants, 13.7% Catholics, and 19.6% other Christian denominations. Similarly, a 2009 survey by Pew on Nigerian Muslim population still claimed 50.4%.22 By 2010 however, numerical figures seem to favour the Christian population as a 2011 study conducted by same Pew saw an increase in Christian population at 50.8% (80,510,000), 23 while the total number of Muslim was reported at 75,728 000 (Pew Forum & Public Affairs, 2011) as against its 2003 population of 78,056,000 making up the earlier 50.4% of Nigeria's total population. The majority of Nigerian Muslims are Sunni, 24 though a significant Shia primarily located in the north-western state of Sokoto (Nigeria National Population Commission and ORC Macro, 2004)

and a Sufi minority exists alongside a small minority of Ahmadiyya. It needs be added that other minority religious and spiritual groups in Nigeria include Judaism, Hinduism. The Rosicrucian Order, Freemasonry,25Grail Movement,26 Hare Krishnas (Ebonugwo, 2004), Eckankar,The Bahá'í Faith, and Chrislam which is a syncretic faith melding elements of Christianity and Islam (McConnell, 2009) aimed at controlling feuds among Nigerians.

2.4.2 Religious institution

Religion remains a powerful source of individual and group social identity. McGuire (1992) argues that, 'religion is one of the most powerful, deeply felt, and influential forces in human society. It has shaped people's relationships with each other, influencing family, community, economic, and political life. Religious values influence their actions, and religious meanings help them interpret their experiences. Eitzen and Zinn (2010) identify three core aspects of religion. First, religion is a social construction: 'it is created by people and is a part of culture'. Second, religion is an 'integrated set of ideas by which a group attempts to explain the meaning of life and death.' Third, religion is a 'normative system defining immorality and sin as well as morality and righteousness.'

The nexus between religion and terrorism dates back to Rapoport (1984) seminal Paper – entitled 'Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions' – which analyses the use of terror in three religious' traditions: Judaism, Hinduism and Islam. Rapoport's paper provides 'detailed analyses of the different doctrines and methods of the three well-known groups: the Zealots-Sicarii', Thugs and Assassins (Rapoport 1984). Despite a primitive technology, Rapoport argues that these groups 'each developed much more durable and destructive organizations than has any modern secular group'. Rapoport's influential paper inspired many similar works, primarily in the field of terrorism studies, which sought to explain 'why violence and religion has re-emerged so dramatically at this moment in history and why they have so frequently been found in

combination' (Juergensmeyer 2003). As argued by Hoffman (2006), this new type of terrorism produces 'radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimating and justification, concepts of morality and, worldview', and 'it represents a very different and possibly far more lethal threat than that posed by more familiar, traditional terrorist adversaries. The claim about the specific nature of religious terrorism rests on a number of arguments.

First, it is argued that religious terrorists have anti-modern goals of returning society to an idealized version of the past and are therefore necessarily anti-democratic and anti-progressive. Cronin (2003), for example, argues that 'the forces of history seem to be driving international terrorism back to a much earlier time, with echoes of the behaviour of 'sacred' terrorists... clearly apparent in a terrorist organization such as Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab, Janjawi, Boko Haram'. For his part, Juergensmeyer (2003) contends that religious terrorists work to 'an anti-modern political agenda'. In his words: 'They have come to hate secular governments with an almost transcendent passion... dreamed of revolutionary changes that would establish a godly social order in the rubble of what the citizens of most secular societies have regarded as modern, egalitarian democracies.

2.4.3 Christianity

. Theological and political issues are closely bound up with each other in Islam. This distinctive aspect of Islam can be traced to its early days, when the high chief to draw on more familiar vocabulary was both religious and political leader, as Time is like a sword, time is like a treasure. But the priority concerns of Christianity have always been theological, as evidenced by the countless disputes that have punctuated its history. The evident synergy in Islam between religion and politics is the outcome of its historical origins. In the tribal political context of the Arabian Peninsula, the first Muslims found it necessary, for reasons of pure survival, to organize themselves into a group similar to the tribal model, an organization in which religious and political power were held in the same

hands. It is this primordial model that shaped Islam. The dichotomy separating Christianity and Islam is fundamental. It gives the understanding of how a sect like the Assassins could emerge in the Islamic world, while we find no trace of any such movement in the history of Christianity. The example of Islam, and in particular that of the Assassins, also gives a grasp to the logic of violence in the modern context of the major contemporary universalist ideologies. The history of the Assassins logically encourages the establishing comparisons between it and the terrorist organizations of the modern world, including those that have emerged from and are ideologically modelled by the Islamic world. The Assassins employed terror against figures associated with power precisely because they were figureheads and not because they had cause against any particular individual, as in the case of the assassinations of political leaders such as Henri IV, Lincoln, or Kennedy. The Assassins were rooted in two regions, Iran and Syria. They cooped the use of terror to psychological ends and targeted, among others. The terrorists themselves were animated by an unshakable faith that allowed them to sacrifice themselves willingly in the course of a mission in the certainty that they would ascend directly to paradise. And yet some of these similarities are fortuitous. The fight against the Crusaders, which is strongly emphasized in Western accounts, was in fact a very minor aspect of the Assassins. The history of the sect opens a window onto certain mechanisms underlying all forms of terrorism practiced in the name of Religion (Chaliand& Blin, 2007).

2.4.4 Judaism Terrorism

According to Brandon (1967) as cited in Chaliand & Blin (2007), history records one of the first manifestations of organized terrorism in the Middle East in first-century Palestine. The Zealot sect was one of the very first groups to practice systematic terror of which possesses a written account. The knowledge of Zealots' struggle is based on the reporting of Flavius Josephus in his Jewish Antiquities, published in 93–94 C.E., and in

his account of the Jewish War, a shorter work published between 75 and 79, to the greater glory of Vespasian and Titus, for whom he worked as an advisor on Jewish affairs. Josephus uses the word sicarii a generic Latin term derived from sicarius, "dagger-man" to denote the Zealots. The immediate cause of the Jewish rebellion against Rome was the census taken by the Roman authorities throughout the empire in the early years of the Common Era. The Jews resented it and were humiliated by its clear reflection of their submission to a foreign power. The situation turned incendiary in the year 6 B.C., some eight years after the death of Herod the Great, an event that marked a decisive turning point in the history of the Jews, who had enjoyed more than a century of relative independence and prosperity since 129 B.C. The first rumblings of revolt were heard in 4 B.C, but it was in the year 6 that the Zealots launched an organized campaign against the imperial authorities. Under Herod, the Jews had chafed under their circumscribed independence, and they had no intention of passing up the opportunity to win genuine self-determination. Instead, they found themselves forced into a situation that represented the very antithesis of their aspirations. Spontaneous hotbeds of insurrection arose throughout the region. In modern terms, we might say that the Jews were caught up in the anti-colonial dynamic of a war of liberation.

Following the first riots, Varus, the governor of Syria, sent two Roman legions in support of the garrisons beleaguered by the revolt. Varus crushed the rebels and made an example of them by crucifying over 2,000 of their number. The idea was to deal a psychological blow strong enough to dissuade the populace from further rebellion. It was the first use of terror in a war that was to last several decades. According to Josephus, the Zealots were one of the four "philosophical" sects of Judea and the most popular among the younger generation. Their philosophical doctrine was similar to that of the Pharisees, who lived in the strictest observance of the Torah and are accused of dogmatism and

hypocrisy in the Gospels. The Zealots were reformers; believing that they had to account to God alone, they had an unquenchable thirst for freedom. The founder of the sect was a certain Judah of Galilee; whose early activities came to naught under Roman repression. The Zealots had announced their two-fold objective right from the start. As a religious organization, they sought, often by force, to impose a degree of rigor in religious practice. For instance, they attacked other Jews whom they felt to be insufficiently scrupulous in their piety. They took up terror as an instrument. As a political organization, they sought to wrest their country's independence from Rome. The party's religious aims were inseparable from its political objectives. It is here that the idea of purity religious and political begins to emerge (Brandon, 1967).

2.4.5 Islamic Terrorism

According to Fadl Allah (1986), The Prophet Muhammad (SAW) was born in 570A.D. into the Quraysh tribe. However, his early life was not one of privilege; his parents belonged to a weak dan called Hashim and died when he was young, leaving his uncle Umar Ibn Habidale in a Bedouin warrior tribe in the territory of what is now Saudi Arabia to raise him. The tribes of the Hijaz and surrounding regions deposited their idols in a square temple called the Ka' ba, located in the village of Mecca. Every year they would come on pilgrimage to worship at the temple and then take the opportunity to engage in commerce. Thus, whoever controlled the temple controlled the revenues from the pilgrimage trade. When Muhammad was born, the powerful tribe that controlled the temple was the Quraysh. However, this forms the birth of Islam. At the time, most Arab tribes were polytheistic and had a superstitious respect for genies. Others had been converted to one of the two major monotheistic religions, Judaism and Christianity. Mecca was the religious center of that pre-Islamic pagan world, which Muslim authors later denounced as a product of the age of ignorance (jahiliya). Idol worship was common

place, as evidenced by the presence of a carved Black Stone, said to have fallen from the sky, in the Ka'ba, which at the time was filled with pagan idols.

From 610 on, Muhammad decided to follow the example of Jews and Christians he knew and go into periods of solitary retreat and reflection. Therein he

place, as evidenced by the presence of a carved Black Stone, said to have fallen from the sky, in the Ka'ba, which at the time was filled with pagan idols.

From 610 on, Muhammad decided to follow the example of Jews and Christians he knew and go into periods of solitary retreat and reflection. Therein he received divine revelations from the Archangel Gabriel, a well-known warrior figure in the Christian imagination. Muhammad thus became the guardian of the new principles of the Law of God, which he conveyed in a language that would later become the standard for classical Arabic. Those teachings formed the moral and political foundation of the new religion, which was viewed as the final form of monotheism. Islam, meaning surrender to God, was for that reason considered to be closely related, but superior to, Judaism and Christianity.

According to The Muslim calendar began in 622 with the Hijra. The new Prophet and his followers' al-Ansar were driven out of Mecca by the city's inhabitants, who wanted nothing to do with a new religion. Muhammad took refuge in Yathrib, which became the city of the Prophet (Medinatal-nabi, or Medina), and began to put in place the normative structures of Islam (Marquardt and Heffelfinger, 2008). In 628, after a peaceful march failed to win over the inhabitants of Mecca, he organized an army which, through an all-out strategy of threats and warfare, succeeded in 632 in conquering Mecca and in obtaining the surrender of the Arab tribes. The spread of Islam, the superior religion, remained linked to the force of the sword (Chaliand and Blin, 2007).

The Prophet's death in 632 stunned not only the Muslim community but especially his closest companions, who were unprepared and had to make a quick succession decision. They decided to choose from among his oldest companions' one who they deemed qualified to carry on his work, but stipulated that he could not be from the same tribe. Abubakar, Muhammad's father-in-law, was thus chosen to succeed him over other family members, who then initiated a struggle for succession. Abubakar eventually won

and a few months later became caliph. Like the Prophet, the new caliph had full religious and political powers. Three of the first four caliphs were assassinated, falling victim to intra- Islamic rivalries. After Umar and Uthman, the fourth caliph elected wasAli, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, who many Muslims had hoped would directly succeed the Prophet (Chaliand and Blin, 2007).

2.5 Political Terrorism

According to Schmid and Jongman, (1988), terrorism is a mode of warfare. Insurgents' mode of struggle is dictated by circumstances, and whenever possible, they adopt a variety of strategies. Terrorism, which is the easiest form of insurgency, is almost always one of these, delineating the main strategic ideas by which terrorists have hoped to realize their objective, and evaluating their successes.

"Political Terrorism" This term has been used by governments, the media, and even academics to denote phenomena that have very little in common. Thus, for some, terrorism means violent acts of groups against states; for others, a state's oppression of its own citizens; and for still others, war like acts of states against other states. A major hindrance in the way of achieving a widely accepted definition of political terrorism is the negative emotional connotation of the term. "Terrorism" has become merely another derogatory word, rather than a descriptor of a specific type of activity. Usually, people use the term as a disapproving label for a whole range of phenomena that they do not like. As mentioned above, "terrorism" has different meanings for different people. Terminology is always a matter of agreement for the purpose of common understanding. There is no point in searching for logic-based definitions of terms that belong to the realm of political or social science especially when the term in question carries a negative emotional connotation.

As according to Schmid and Jongman, (1988), terrorism is above all a tool or, if you will, a technique. This technique is as old as warfare itself, contrary to the widespread

notion that terrorism was the offspring of nineteenth-century nationalist movements. This may be a result of the late appearance of the term in the French Revolution and its Terror. Like all political phenomena, terrorism is defined by the duality between professed ideas and their implementation. And, like all political phenomena, terrorism exists only in a cultural and historical context. For three decades, the activities of terrorist movements were closely linked to Marxist ideology; Marxist terrorist groups are in the minority today, whereas they predominated in the 1970s and 1980s. The same applies to the entire history of terrorist movements, shaped by the political context in which they are born, live, and die. While terrorism is a phenomenon that is continuously reinventing itself, the lack of continuity between each generation of terrorists often entails a signal break with the past. It should be noted that the early phase of Palestinian terrorism was essentially political, the idea that the terrorist act is by definition one aimed at civilians. The civilian population becomes a target of the indirect strategy when its fate as a potential victim can influence the decisions taken by its leaders. The notion that the fate of civilians automatically sways the political leadership represents a contemporary, contingent understanding of politics.

In the West, political structures have evolved toward democracy since the late eighteenth century. The modern media, a critical component of liberal democracy, emerged in tandem. Now, the political legitimacy of a democracy and its elected representatives lies by definition with its citizens, which is why terrorism is more effective against democratic countries than against dictatorships. This is not, as is widely thought, because dictatorships are more efficient at finding and punishing terrorists although they do have greater leeway than democracies in doing so but because the impact of an attack is broader in a free country than in one whose people have no voice in government and the media controlled by the state. It is therefore not inaccurate to affirm that modern terrorism is in part a consequence of democracy (Schmid and Jongman, 1988).

2.6   International Collaborations against Boko Haram

Most modern terrorism has international outlook and this has called for international dimension towards curbing terrorism. International collaborations against Boko Haram have taken the form of international support for Nigerian government which aimed at putting an end to terrorism. This support is in form of manpower, fund, intelligence, arms and ammunitions (Mishal & Sela, 2000). Terrorism can be curtailed by cutting off their sources of contact and identify their sources of supply of arms and basic essential to terrorists. Counter terrorism strategies as per US government are effective democracy, denying of weapons, and sanctuaries of rogue states, building institutional structures, control of base and landing pads of terrorists. For government, effective use of resources (power, military, land reforms, finance, external alliances and hierarchical structure of organization) determines their Countering success (Baylis; Wirtz & Colin, 2006). There are series of international legal measures at global, regional and bilateral levels aimed at facilitating and strengthening international cooperation against such activities as aircraft hijacking, attacks on open source etc.

The U.S. intelligence community is "monitoring the expanding scope and diversity of 'facilitation networks,' which include semi-legitimate travel experts, attorneys, and other types of professionals, as well as corrupt officials, who provide support services to criminal and terrorist groups. In addition, repressive responses in form of covert operations which are secretive operations that include a number of possible Counter terrorist measures, such as infiltration, disinformation, and cyber war. Nonviolent covert programs require creative and imaginative methods that are adapted to each terrorist environment. The international community also employs economic sanctions to punish or disrupt state sponsors of terrorism. Sanctions can either selectively target specific economic sector or generally restrict trade. The purpose is to pressure state sponsors to

modify or end their support for terrorism. Lastly is the deployment of security assets abroad, these deployments can include ground, air, or naval forces in large or very small operational configurations (Martin, 2010).

2.7   Mode of Operation of Boko Haram

Boko Haram *modus operandi* includes Arson, mass killing by gunfire, jail break, recruitment of combatant, use of impoverished explosives, kidnapping, media propaganda and advocacy (Okoli & Iortyer, 2014). Other techniques are the use of motorcycles for dive-by- shootings, early morning raid of villages and the killing of unarmed citizens found there; car bombs, suicide bombings, targeting churches, police stations, military establishment and personnels and issuance of ultimatum as a means of destabilizing social cohesion (Guardian, 2015).

2.7.1   Funding of Boko Haram

For more than 10 years of existence of the radical Islamist movement, BokoHaram, has significantly worsened the socio-political and economic situation in Nigeria. Since its formation in the early 2000s, the insurgents have been carrying out violent attacks around the country. Since 2009, when the group's founding leader Mohammed Yusuf was killed and replaced by his second-in-command, the attacks have grown significantly, became more violent and intense. Despite the poverty in northern Nigeria, where 70 per cent of people live on less than □100 a day, the Boko Haram terrorist group has at its disposal a seemingly limitless amount of heavy weaponry, vehicles, bombs and ammunition which it uses to kill with unfathomable wantonness. Boko Haram is very well funded, with the ever-increasing cash flow.

The Global Terrorism Index (2015) reported that, Boko Haram worth $25 million. This group gets money from Kidnapping, drugs, robbery, trafficking among others. Boko Haram raised fund through kidnapping; Kidnapping has become one of Boko Haram's primary funding sources. For instance, recently, Boko Haram secured $3 million

(☐493,650,000) and the release of 16 prisoners in exchange for a French family of seven it seized in northern Cameroon. Also, they are suspected of carrying out dozens of other abductions-for-ransom in northern Nigeria. Apparently, most of the kidnap victims were mid-level officials, or their relatives, who were not wealthy enough to have security details, but could afford modest ransoms of about $10,000 (☐1, 645,500).

Similarly, Abducted Chibok schoolgirls, spokesman of JTF, Mr. Musa, states that intelligence available to the Task Force has indicated that Boko Haram terrorists have resolved to concentrate more on kidnappings than robbery. The terrorists realized that kidnapping is more lucrative, less dangerous and requires short time to plan and execute. Similarly, a special kidnapping squad has been earmarked and tasked by the Boko Haram sect to kidnap people who could be wealthy relations, politicians, business women/ men, traditional rulers, senior civil servants and foreigners alike. Again, robbery is another means of getting money by the group. Along with ransom money, Boko Haram has partly financed its militant operations by attacking and robbing banks. The group has robbed hundreds of banks in its home province of Borno and two other northern regions of Nigeria, mainly Yobe and Adamawa, and nabbed convoys and extorted from successful businesses. Boko Haram is widely believed to have received funding from regional and international Islamist terrorist organizations, though how much and from which groups is in dispute.

The Daily Beast's Eli Lake reports that the group received some early seed money from Osama bin Laden in 2002, through a disciple named Mohammed Ali, whom bin Laden sent to Africa with $3 million (☐493, 650,000) for like-minded militant organizations. The connection between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda and its money perhaps deepened when Yusuf fled to Saudi Arabia to escape one of Nigeria's first crackdowns on the terrorist group. It remains unclear what happened while he was in Saudi Arabia, or

The ongoing insurgency has had a significant negative impact on the regional economy. Lebanese and Indian expatriates who have established businesses in Kano going back decades have relocated to Abuja and the south. A good number have left the country altogether. Hotels, banks and other business sectors have witnessed significant reductions in their activities. The border towns that have thrived on trade with neighbouring countries have also seen their businesses curtailed because of increasing restrictions on cross-border traffic. In Kano alone, an estimated 126 industries have recently closed down (Sunday Trust, 2012; Abbas, 2016). One of the noticeable effects has been the tendency to worsen unemployment and lead to youth restiveness, thereby making crime a profitable venture and attractive.

It has also led to near collapse of tourism industry as the nation loses huge foreign currency that could have accrued from this sector (Abbas, 2016). Boko Haram insurgent threaten the viability of Nigerian state, bringing about economic crises, political instability and destruction. Boko Haram insurgency poses serious dangers to Nigeria's nascent democracy and economic development (Isyaku, 2013; Oviasogie, 2013; Abbas, 2016). Insurgency in the region paves ways for vicious political violence in Nigeria and lack of legitimacy of government. Terrorism affects voting behaviours and access to life satisfaction (William,Wardle & Wahl-Jorgensen, 2012; Abbas, 2016). Northeast (mostly Adamawa, Yobe and Borno) the centre of the activities of the sect have crippled economically.

Thousands of people have died in the sect bloody campaign. Boko Haram insurgency led to closure of business activities within Northeast. The insurgents caused migration of people from North to Southern part of the country (Dauda, 2014; Abbas, 2016). The mass emigration of Nigerians citizen, who are non-indigene to northern region of the major conflict affected cities posed a serious threat to political economy of Nigeria.

The rush to escaped from the north affecting the profitability of business establishment in the region (Abbas, 2016).

The contradictions caused by Boko Haram insurgency in the area of social relations of production and productive forces in Nigeria's political economy are very obvious. In 2014, Economist shown that banks have closed down their business outlets due to a decrease of economic activities in the volatile areas. The employees of these institutions are increasingly demanding that they be posed to less volatile branches. Indeed, a mass departure from the northern region will not only constitute a depletion of economy but also caused those departing from the region into financial and psychological pressure (Abbas, 2016).

2.8   Case study review of Boko Haram invents in Nigeria

2.8.1   Nigeria as case study

Police Headquarters Bombing (16 June 2011)

Following the death of Yusuf, Boko Haram was temporarily "inactive" due to the clampdown on its members by security forces. In fact, official reports claimed its current leader, Abubakar Shekau, was killed at the time (Akinyelure, 2017). From 2010, under the new leadership of Shekau, the group adopted a more violent approach to its agitations with the police as its primary target, partly in revenge for the killing of Yusuf and other commanders of the group. One of its earliest definitive shows of power especially over the security architecture of the state was the bombing of the police headquarters in Abuja. The suicide bomber gained entrance into the police headquarters by tailing the convoy of the Inspector General of police and with fake identity cards. The bomb was detonated at the visitor's car park as the bomber was turned back from the car park reserved for the IGP (Ajani & Omonobi, 2011). There were about six confirmed deaths during this attack with the police chief narrowly escaping.

The 16 June 2011 bombing of the police headquarters is significant for at least three reasons. First, it was acclaimed to be the first suicide attack in Nigeria; second, it was targeted at the heart of Nigeria's security architecture only days after the IG of Police had visited Maiduguri and assured residents of the impending defeat of Boko Haram, and finally it proves the reach and capacity of the group which was questioned by many people at that point (BBC, 2011).

2.8.2   UN House bombing (26 August 2011)

The United Nations house bombing was orchestrated through another car explosion in Abuja on 26 August 2011 in which at least 21 people died and 60 people were injured. In this case unlike the police headquarters bombing that had the semblance of elaborate planning, on how to beat security, for instance, a Sedan simply rammed its way through two gates into the building. Like the police headquarters attack, this attack was very symbolic. One of the witnesses said: "If they can get into the UN House, they can reach anywhere" (Guardian, 2011). Boko Haram claimed that it attacked the UN House because the United Nations and the United States were supporting the Federal Government in the persecution of Muslims in Nigeria (Marama, 2011).Thus, adding a religious undertone to what might simply be understood as political or even criminal. The UN house bombing is also one of the earliest evidences of the group's aims to internationalize its acts (Onuoha, 2012).

2.8.3   Christmas Day (Madalla) bombings – 25 December 2011

The Christmas Day bombings was a coordinated attack on at least four churches on 25 December 2011 by Boko Haram, with the highest fatality count at St. Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla in which at least 32 people died (Mark, 2011). This violent act of Boko Haram is significant as it was understood as Boko Haram attempting to stock the embers of a "sectarian civil war" (Onuah & Eboh, 2011). Other churches bombed on the same day

and audience reach, such that the success of Nigeria's Counter Boko Haram drive is largely predicated on the successful rescue of the schoolgirls.

On the night of 14 April 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped 276 schoolgirls from a secondary school in Chibok, Nigeria. They have since been held hostage and only some of them released. There are a few speculations as to why the schoolgirls were kidnapped among which are Boko Haram's insistence on western education as haram (forbidden) especially for girls (BBC, 2012) and Boko Haram's retaliation for government's arrests of wives of members of the group (Zenn and Pearson 2014). During the reporting around the Chibok abduction, Chibok was presented as a Christian town and Shekau, in a video, claimed that several of the kidnapped girls were Christians and had converted to Islam and married off (BBC, 2012). This attack also reflects the religious undertones present in news reporting of activities involving Boko Haram and adds to the suitability of the inclusion of this attack in the dataset used in this study, in addition to its popularity as a news event.

2.8.6   The Baga massacre (3 January 2015)

The Baga massacre refers to a series of mass killings between 3 January 2015 and 7 January 2015 carried out by Boko Haram in the northeast towns of Baga and Doron Baga in Borno state. The exact number of fatalities remains unknown and ranges from 150 (the official number given by the military) to 2000 (a figure supported by Amnesty International). Boko Haram at this stage even annexed parts of northern Nigeria as part of its caliphate. Soldiers were reported to drop their weapons, strip off their military garb to avoid recognition, and flee during battles with Boko Haram. Eyewitnesses spoke of the corpses during the Baga massacre as "too many to count", and more than 15,000 villagers fled into neighbouring Niger and Chad, the highest mass displacement of people as a result of one single event since the Boko Haram conflict (Fessy, 2015). Members of the group set houses ablaze and drove over corpses and people in their way.

The number of houses destroyed is estimated at about 3,700. The Baga massacre and the subsequent annexation of Baga are also crucial in analyzing the evolution of Boko Haram because Baga is the headquarters of the Multinational Joint Military Taskforce comprising soldiers from Nigeria, Chad, and Niger. In overpowering the security machinery in this area, Boko Haram made a statement as to its strength and resourcefulness. This attack, dubbed Boko Haram's deadliest by Amnesty International (Shearlaw, 2015), did not receive a lot of international media attention for several reasons, one of which is the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris which happened at almost the same time.

Terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria started with an Islamist fundamentalist, Boko Haram who regarded western education as forbidden. The first attack of Boko Haram came in September 2010 in the Northern part of the country where many lives were lost and properties worth millions were damaged. Band (2005) stressed that insurgency unleashed a wave of violence in northern Nigeria, mostly targeted against government personnel and security officers, Muslim politicians and traditional Muslim religious leaders, and Christians.

Since August 2011, there have been increasing signs of international collaboration between Boko Haram and militants outside Nigerian territory, such as in Borno State's border region, northern Mali, the Sahel, Somalia and other countries in the Muslim world. As a result of these international connections, Boko Haram, which in 2009 was known as a "machete-wielding mob," has now matched and even exceeded the capabilities of some al-Qaida affiliates, while also incorporating al-Qaida ideology into the locally driven motives for the insurgency in northern Nigeria (Zenn, Barkindo & Heras, 2013). For example, in Mali 100 Boko Haram militants reinforced MUJAO's positions in the battle for Gao and that Boko Haram helped MUJAO raid the Algerian consulate in Gao and kidnap the vice-consul, who was executed by MUJAO on September 2, 2012, and that Boko Haram

supported MUJAO, AQIM and Ansar Eddine in their January 8, 2013, attack on Kona, central Mopti region.

On May 1, 2014, a car bomb blast in Abuja killed at least 19 people at a bus station. The summer of 2014 has been especially violent, with bombings, massacres, and mass shootings being committed on a near weekly basis. In July 2014, Human Rights Watch estimated that 2,053 people had been killed in 95 separate Boko Haram linked attacks in the first half of 2014 alone, and the number is likely much higher by now (Uzochukwu, 2014). The unprecedented activities of Boko Haram may not be unconnected with the porous nature of our borders which has made them to take advantage of countries like Chad, Niger and Cameroon as places of settlement, training, transit, attack planning and recruitment. Boko Haram appears to have a "diplomatic" presence in Saudi Arabia, in addition to other militant connections. In August 2012, a Boko Haram faction led by Abu Muhammed negotiated in Mecca with a Nigerian government team led by National Security Adviser Sambo Dasuki and advised by General Muhammed Shuwa. President Jonathan has rejected new talks with this faction, however, on the ground that "there can be no dialogue" with Boko Haram because it is "faceless" (Singer, 1992).

2.9   Comparative review of countries, Nigeria vs Iraq, United States, Saudi Arabia and Turkey

2.9.1   Nigerian Government Attempts at Combating Terrorism and Insurgency

Since the inception of terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria, government has developed various strategies towards curbing the activities of Boko Haram. First is the use of brute military force against insurgent groups and deployment of over 8000 troops into affected parts of northern Nigeria, but with no clearly defined Military Code of Justice for the operation. For example, the invasion of and killing in the Baga community in Bornostate on Sunday, April 21, 2013 by Nigerian soldiers. The Nigerian soldiers in a

single operation killed over 200 civilians suspected to be members of Boko Haram in the aftermath of an attack (Akande, 2013). In the recent time, the federal government deployed the specially trained anti-terrorism combat squad to the terrorist zones in order to suppress the activities of Boko Haram (Okupe, 2015). Second is the acquisition and development of more sophisticated, adequate and appropriate military hardware and the recent approval by the African Union and the violations of a broad-based international coalition to collaborate with our military. Third is the approval given by the international bodies that give authority to neighbouring countries (Chad, Niger and Cameroon) to lawfully deploy troops on Nigerian soil. Nigerian military also operate beyond borders to hunt fleeing terrorists, thus removing their safe haven. Fourth is the declaration of a state of emergency in the three most affected northern states, namely Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. Although, the absence of a specific Military Code of Justice to clearly identify intended targets and protect civilians has further increased the number of casualties in Northern Nigeria. Fifth is that government encourages both public and media support to provide intelligence regarding terrorist groups or their activities.

2.9.2 Irag comparative analysis of insurgency

In Iraq, AI Qaida has been heavily involved in fomenting violence between various sects and ethnic groups. In that latter role, and unlike insurgencies, it works against the local population and thus cannot look to locals for any sort of support. The reality of that sort of terrorism, whether directed against the local population, the local government, or a foreign occupier, is that it is a movement that lacks local support. That makes dealing with terrorism significantly more straightforward than dealing with insurgencies and explains why terrorist movements are considerably shorter-lived and less successful than insurgencies (Wilkinson, 2006).

2.9.3 The United States of America insurgence case and approach

The United Kingdom legislation as contained in the Terrorism Act (2000) defined terrorism as the use or threat of action where the action falls within subsection, the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of

the public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. The Act states further that action falls within this subsection if it involves serious violence against a person, involves serious damage to property, endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action, creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system (Terrorism Act, 2000).

2.9.4 United States of America

The 9/11 attacks and the global war on terrorism that followed brought new funding and researchers to the field. Yet, these changes do not appear to have significantly addressed the various concerns outlined above. Reviews published in the late 2000s, especially Silke's 2007 and 2009 work, highlighted positive developments in terms of increased collaboration among scholars, a somewhat higher frequency of statistical analyses, and more critical analytical perspectives, yet also noted that the reliance on secondary sources and literature review-based methods remained essentially unchanged (Silke, 2009).

Emphasizing this last point, a 2006 literature review by Lum, found that only 3% of the 6041 peer-reviewed articles on terrorism published between 1971 and 2003 that the authors had studied, were based on any kind of empirical data. While a 2008 study found that circa 20% of articles provided new knowledge, the scarcity of empirical work remains clear. Moreover, in a 2007 article, Gordon underlined that most publications on 1012 B. SCHUURMAN terrorism continued to be the work of "one-timers." (Gordon, 2007). In

2.9.6 Counter-terrorist sanctions

Saudi Arabia maintains a national list of individuals and entities involved in terrorism pursuant to UNSCR 1373 in addition to those on the UNSCR 1267 lists. Freezing, seizure and confiscation of assets associated with terrorism and terrorist financing is authorized by the Anti-Money Laundering Law and its implementing regulations. No provision for humanitarian exception is applicable in the law related to seizures and implementing regulations.

2.9.7 Crimes of support to terrorism

On 15 February 2013 the Law on Prevention of the Financing of Terrorism (Law No. 6415) entered into force.101 It was adopted in part to implement the Terrorism Financing Convention and Turkey's responsibilities under UNSC sanction regimes and also in response to pressure from FATF to address shortcomings they had identified in Turkey's previous definition of a terrorist financing offence. Turkey had defined the crime of terrorism in its Law to Fight Terrorism (1991) in terms of acts directed against the Turkish state and did not include the targeting of other entities such as foreign states or international organizations.

Any persons who provide or collect funds for a terrorist or terrorist organization "with the intention that they are used or knowing and willing that they are to be used"104 in a terrorist crime will be guilty under the new law. Funds include money, property, rights and other claims which could be represented by money. The nature of the offence and level of intent make it unlikely to apply to humanitarian action. There have been no prosecutions under the new law. The crime is punishable by between five and ten years in prison.

2.9.8   Counter-terrorist sanctions

Turkey implemented UNSCR 1267 sanctions in December 2001 through an asset freezing decree issued by the Council of Ministers and published in the Official Gazette. The list is regularly updated. No additional national terrorist list is maintained for sanctions purposes, although four organizations– the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C), Hezbollah and Al Qaeda – are described by the Turkish police on its website as "Terrorist Organizations in Turkey", though other organizations may also be designated as such.

The 2013 Law on the Prevention of the Financing of Terrorism references relevant UNSC Counter-terrorism sanctions resolutions and also the freezing of assets in response to requests from foreign countries and on the basis of Turkey's own decision to list individuals based on an "Assessment Commission" established under the law. A government department, the Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) within the Ministry of Finance, is responsible for executing asset freezing decisions. The 2013 law authorizes MASAK to take steps to ensure "the subsistence of the person about whom a decision on freezing of asset has been made and of the relatives of who he/she is obliged to take care of.

Romero (2007) (as cited in Agbiboa 2013), Islamic terrorist connections can provide 'social backing, meaning to life (to compensate for the spiritual emptiness felt), and a social or collective identity mainly based on the pride of forming part of the jihad as the only way of reaching the power and glory of Islam.' Already, Knuston identified three important factors in the formation of a terrorist identity. First, there is one's socialization toward a basic set of beliefs, attitudes, sociocultural/political values, and favoured perspectives in which to see the world. Second, identification is influenced by the psychological needs intensively pressing (on the individual) for actualization through

behaviour and commitment.' Third, some catalytic event must transpire (cited in Arena and Arrigo, 2006). Piazza (2009) explains the interpretation of certain doctrines and practices within Islam, including the concept of 'lesser jihad,' the practice of militant struggle to defend Islam from its perceived enemies.

2.10 Nigerian and Boko Haram

2.10.1 Government Attempts at Combating Terrorism and Insurgency

Since the inception of terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria, government has developed various strategies towards curbing the activities of Boko Haram. First, is the use of brute military force against insurgent groups and deployment of over 8000 troops into affected parts of northern Nigeria, but with no clearly defined Military Code of Justice for the operation? For example, the invasion of and killing in the Baga community in Borno state on Sunday, April 21, 2013 by Nigerian soldiers. The Nigerian soldiers in a single operation killed over 200 civilians suspected to be members of Boko Haram in the aftermath of an attack (Akande, 2013). In recent times, the federal government deployed the specially trained anti-terrorism combat squad to the terrorist zones in order to suppress the activities of Boko Haram (Okupe, 2015). Second, is the acquisition and development of more sophisticated, adequate and appropriate military hardware; the recent approval by the African Union and the violations of a broad-based international coalition to collaborate with our military. Third, is the approval given by the international bodies that give authority to neighboring countries (Chad, Niger and Cameroon) to lawfully deploy troops on Nigerian soil. Nigerian military also operate beyond borders to hunt fleeing terrorists, thus removing their safe haven. Fourth, is the declaration of a state of emergency in the three most affected northern states, namely Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. Although, the absence of a specific Military Code of Justice to clearly identify intended targets and protect civilians, has further increased the number of casualties in Northern Nigeria. Fifth,

is that government encourages both public and media support to provide intelligence regarding terrorist groups or their activities.

2.10.2 International Collaborations against Boko Haram

Most modern terrorism has international outlook and this has called for international dimension towards curbing terrorism. International collaborations against Boko Haram have taken the form of international support for Nigerian government which aimed at putting an end to terrorism. This support is in form of manpower, fund, intelligence, arms and ammunitions (Mishal & Sela, 2000). Terrorism can be curtailed by cutting off their sources of contact and identifying their sources of supply of arms and basic essential to terrorists. Counterterrorism strategies as per US government are effective democracy, denying of weapons and sanctuaries of rogue states, building institutional structures, control of base and landing pads of terrorists. For government, effective use of resources (power, military, land reforms, finance, external alliances and hierarchical structure of organization) determines their Countering success (Baylis; Wirtz & Colin, 2006). There are series of international legal measures at global, regional and bilateral levels aimed at facilitating and strengthening international cooperation against such activities as aircraft hijacking, attacks on open source etc.

The U.S. intelligence community is "monitoring the expanding scope and diversity of 'facilitation networks,' which include semi-legitimate travel experts, attorneys, and other types of professionals, as well as corrupt officials who provide support services to criminal and terrorist groups. In addition, repressive responses in form of covert operations which are secretive operations that include a number of possible Counter terrorist measures, such as infiltration, disinformation, and cyber war. Nonviolent covert programs require creative and imaginative methods that are adapted to each terrorist environment. The international community also employs economic sanctions to punish or

important to investigate this at both individual and group levels. At the individual level,

some experts have distinguished rational, psychological, and cultural origins of terrorism. According to Simonsen and Jeremy (2000) rational terrorists think through their goals and options, making a cost-benefit analysis. Psychological motivation for resorting to terrorism derives from the terrorist's personal dissatisfaction with his or her life and accomplishments. At the group level, terrorism can grow out of an environment of political activism, when a group's goal is to redirect a governments or society's attention toward the grievances of an activist social movement.

Other causes of terrorism and insurgency include the following:

Religious motivation: Hoffman (2006) observed that religion has become the key motivator for several terrorist organizations in Africa. Among the organizations and individuals who have been religiously inspired to adopt terrorist violence, those who espouse a radical interpretation of Islam are predominantly singled out. However, the relevance of extreme-right Christian groups is also underscored. According to Gurr and Cole (2005), the proliferation and significance of religiously motivated terrorist groups is notable in the period of time commonly assigned to the emergence of the new terrorism. Evidence of this claim is supported by trends that refer to the percentage of religiously inspired groups in relation to the total number of terrorist organizations. This literature indicates that numbers grew from less than 4% in 1980 to 42% by the mid-1990s (Lesser, Arquilla, Ronfeldt, Hoffman, Zanini& Jenkins, 1999). Substantiating this, Zalman (2014) opined that religion fanaticism creates conditions that are formidable for terrorism.

Proliferation of weapons of war: The availability and the use of weapons of mass destruction and or disruption, namely, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons have continued to fuel terrorism. Some argue that the increasing desensitization of audience caused by media trends have forced terrorists to become more violent and spectacular (Neumann, 2009). A point of divergence from the above analysis

interview military base and other institutions such as the ECOWAS Headquarters in Lagos to get all necessary information concerning the adoption and implementation of the Strategy. Since the researcher is resident in Nigeria the researcher will have access to Ecowas headquarters in Nigeria, united Nations and Military institutions and authorities in the course of this study were visited based on the timeline set with the supervisors.

2.12.2 Terrorist Groups-Al-Qaeda

The review looks at the works done so far on regional; such as West Africa, Al-gaeda, Middle East etc. Besides drugs trafficking according to Levi and Gilmore (2002), Schneider (2004, 2008a, 2008b) and Yepes (2008) arms trafficking, and illegal diamonds trade are some of the most important illegal sources of funding of terrorist groups. Raphaeli (2003) reports the activity of some Al Qaeda operatives based in Liberia in gem business in Africa. Passas and Jones (2006), highlight the role of commodities in the financing of terrorist groups by covering many areas of legal and illicit trade, foremost among these diamonds. Even the linkage between Al Qaeda and illicit diamond market is analyzed. In particular, in recent years some journalistic inquiries under covered the links between al-Qaeda and the illicit trade in so-called "blood diamonds" bought from rebel groups in Africa. Hübschle (2007) reports also about Al qaeda interest in Tanzanite. The illicit arms trade demonstrates how comparatively easy it is to obtain false documentation accompanying arms shipments, especially end-user certificates.

Inconsistent documentation requirements between states, and inefficient control in customs and port authorities in many states, have created an environment in which the illicit arms trade does not need to rely entirely on criminal activities: (1) When a state is involved in supplying arms to an embargoed state, payments often come in the form of commercial payments, such as an "oil for arms" deals to avoid bank involvement. (2) When an arms broker supplies an embargoed state of an insurgent/terrorist group, banks

bankers are financial service providers who carry out financial transactions without a license and therefore without government control. They accept cash, cheques or other valuable goods (diamonds, gold) at one location and pay a corresponding sum in cash or other remuneration at another location. Unlike official banks, Hawala bankers disregard the obligations concerning the identification of clients, record keeping, and the disclosure of unusual transactions, to which these official financial institutions are subject.

To sum up, through the Hawala system that forms an integral part of the informal black-market economy, underground bankers ensure the transfer of money without having to move it physically or electronically. When a payment needs to be made overseas, the underground banker will get in touch with a courier (or more recently using email, fax or phone) in that country informing him of the details of making the payment. If the recipient of the payment wishes to personally obtain the money, a code referring to the underground banker in the country of payment is given to the recipient. Such a system is almost untraceable since it leaves little if any paper trail. Transaction records are, if they are kept at all, being kept only until the money is delivered, at which time they are destroyed. Even when there is a paper or electronic record of sorts it is often in dialects and languages that serve as de facto encryption system.

To our knowledge there is no comprehensive study on the global flows of money related to Hawala system. Wilson (2002) reports the difficulty to produce a quantitative assessment of Hawala transfers. In order to capture the magnitude of the phenomenon, it is necessary to refer to different sources. According to Fischer (2002), the annual turnover of the Hawala banking system in the early seventies was already 60 billion USD in the Arabic countries; e.g., six million foreign labourers in Saudi Arabia, who are sending home 40 billion USD a year home, make substantial use of the "ethnic" Hawala system. Fletcher and Baldwin (2002) estimate with regard to Pakistan that 2.5 billion USD inherit

In 2014, Boko Haram had its most expansive media coverage in the international press. The group, at that time, kidnapped more than 200 schoolgirls from a secondary school in Chibok, northeast Nigeria. News of the abduction trended on Twitter with the *hashtag #Bring Back Our Girls which also became a movement, outside the online space,* that demanded answers from the government relating to the safe rescue of the abducted schoolgirls. At the time, prominent political figures and celebrities including the United States President Barack Obama and the British Prime Minister David Cameron supported the online movement using the hash tag. The massive media attention given to this Boko Haram attack has since placed the schoolgirls at the centre of the conflict involving Boko Haram, such that any claim by the government as to the subduing of Boko Haram is critiqued with the continued detention of the schoolgirls.

Consequently, Nigeria's current president Muhammadu Buhari insists that Boko Haram cannot be said to be defeated until the schoolgirls are rescued (Guardian, 2017). The number of kidnapped girls and the fact that they were schoolgirls are undoubtedly important factors that make the Chibok schoolgirls' abduction central to the Boko Haram conflict, but so also is the media attention the abduction received (especially internationally) which arguably amplified its importance. To put this in context, the military has rescued more than 700 women and children kidnapped by Boko Haram – 234 of them in one operation-who were not prioritized as much as the Chibok schoolgirls (Guardian, 2015). There have also been other severe acts of violence committed by the group that are not as referenced because they did not enjoy wide international publicity as much as the Chibok schoolgirls' abductions. For instance, while there is a daily countdown of days the Chibok schoolgirls have been abducted and yearly remembrances since 2014, there is no yearly commemoration of the victims of the Madalla Christmas

of ethnic conflicts and politics (Ojo 2003, Yusha'u 2015). In fact, Ojo (2003) suggests that the southern-based news press, prevalent in the southwest, is biased in favour of the southwest especially on issues of politics. For example, in 2000, the southwestern-dominated media disparaged an MP, Senator Arthur Nzeribe, referring to him as having 'devilish antecedents,' for initiating impeachment proceedings against the then President Olusegun Obasanjo because "Mr President comes from the south-west, which dominates the 'commanding heights of Nigeria's mass media" (Ojo, 2003). Thus, scholars of the Nigerian media ecology mostly agree that the southwest controls the mainstream news media in Nigeria as currently structured. As a political scientist puts it, "the mass media is neither pluralistic nor complex; it is an institutional monopoly of the south-west" (Oyovbaire, 2001; Ojo, 2003). The newspaper most radicalize as representing northern views, Daily Trust (Yusha'u 2015), is widely circulated in print form in the north but not in the south. Thus, the 'northern views' presented by this newspaper might not be accessed in the south.

The online media has changed some of these realities especially in terms of access to multiple news media organizations online because in theory one might be able to access any newspaper's website online; however, the trend observed in the print media continues in the online space. For instance, web ranking of newspapers shows that the southern-controlled press is the most visited in the country. For example, data from alexa.com (Appendix A), show that the website of Daily Trust is not even among the 10 most visited online newspapers in Nigeria. In fact, the southern-based newspapers Vanguard (vanguardngr.com) and Punch (punchng.com) are the fifth and sixth most visited website in Nigeria respectively (Appendix B). Daily Trust, again, is not in the top 50 most-visited websites. Thus, the mainstream press is influential, at least in terms of audience reach both offline and online.

The new media ecology has created room for various forms of alternative media which are mostly online-based. These, however, do not still have the reach, prestige, size or budget to compete with the mainstream especially in matter relating to politics. The mainstream also utilizes the online environment and most news stories radicalize in these newspapers appear online first, especially breaking news. In most cases, the content of print and online versions of the same newspaper are the same, including headlines.

2.13 The military and police

2.13.1 The military perspective

Measuring military effectiveness constitutes a difficult task in light of the lack of definition surrounding the term. Indeed, it is a complex multi-layered concept and as John E. Jessup points out, finding a universally applicable definition would be near enough impossible because military effectiveness is made up of a group of intangible variables that can be defined with some precision only when a sufficiently large data base has been amassed (Millet & Murray, 2010). Some authors have nevertheless attempted to develop coherent frameworks for its conceptualization.

One of the most interesting approaches to defining and measuring military effectiveness can be found in Risa Brooks' *creating military power: The sources of military effectiveness*. Brooks developed an explicit definition of military effectiveness, posing it in terms of "the capacity to create military power from a state's basic resources in wealth, technology, population size, and human capital". She identified four characteristics to assess military effectiveness which are: integration, or the ability to ensure consistency in military activity, create synergies within and across levels of military activity, and avoid Counterproductive actions ; responsiveness, which is the degree to which a state accommodates both internal and external constraints and opportunities in preparing itself for armed conflict; skill, including the capacity to ensure that military personnel are motivated and prepared to execute tasks on the battlefield; and

quality, or the capacity of the state to supply itself with essential weapons and equipment (Brooks & Chorev, 2007).

Moreover, Brooks stresses that all four attributes are essential to military effectiveness as a state that has shortcomings in just one attitude is likely to be handicapped in generating power (Brooks & Chorev, 2007). Molly Dunigan's approach is quite similar as she drew on the same four attributes to construct her conception of military effectiveness and also considers a military to be effective when it displays high levels of all four. But the author also took into account tactical, strategic, operational, and political outcomes of warfare » in the definition (Dunigan, 2011). According to her, an effective military is considered to be one that displays high levels of integration, responsiveness, skill, and quality, while: (a) accomplishing its tactical goals, or the maneuvers pertaining to the most immediate battlefield goals; (b)accomplishing its operational goals, or the sum of the tactical goals pertaining to a particular theater of operation; (c) accomplishing its strategic goals, or the broader politico-military goals equaling the sum of its tactical goals across various theaters of operation; and (d) accomplishing the political goals of its government (Dunigan, 2011).

Dunigan additionally included a fifth element to be considered when trying to measure military effectiveness, which is the degree of compliance to the laws of war (Dunigan, 2011: 35). She considers the conflicting views on strategies supposed to maximize military effectiveness in the context of insurgency warfare. On the one hand, some scholars support a hearts and minds strategy that emphasize compliance with the laws of war to achieve better fighting efficiency, but, on the other hand, others argue in favor of a draining-the-sea strategy stating that reliance on brutality towards civilians and non-compliance with the laws serves better military effectiveness (Dunigan, 2011). She concludes that the draining-the-sea approach decreases military effectiveness. Brooks and

north is already depleting due to a massive departure of people and financial institutions from the northern region.

But if the government delays in the implementing comprehensive plans to tackle insecurity from its roots, then not only will the northern region be economic desolation, the country as a whole risk losing billions of dollars in foreign direct investment" The business activities of telecom operators have not been left out from the attacks of Boko Haram. For instance, some telecom masts belong to some major mobile telephone operators were destroyed by Boko Haram and the banning of telephone services by the military affected the income generation of some of the mobile phone operators.

Just as the economic implications of Boko Haram atrocities cannot be quantified, the social costs are enormous. The church, school, market, clinic and mosque are potential targets of Boko Haram. For example, in April 2014, a federal government girls' college was attacked which subsequently led to the abduction of over 250 female students. Attacks on these social places have prevented people from going to these places. Some students have stopped going to school, others have been transferred to the southern part of the country to continue their education. Christians are afraid to go and worship in the church on Sundays due to the fear of being attacked by the sect. Same for the Muslimfaithful's who abandon their worshiping centers because of Boko Haram attacks. The markets have become deserted. The National Youth Service

Corps (NYSC) that was created by the government after the end of Nigerian civil war to foster unity among Nigeria is under threat due to Boko Haram attacks.

The NYSC directorate posted 4171 corps members to Adamawa state, 1041 of the corps members have to abandon their national duty due to the precarious security situation (Ovaga (n.d.). Some parents from the south of the country have protested vehemently against the posting of their children to the northeast. Aside the socioeconomic

implications, the human cost is more worrisome, more than 10.000 have been killed, a lot of people have been maimed and women have been kidnapped and raped these have left the family of the dead, the injured, the raped and the kidnapped in agony. In a nutshell, most of the family members of Boko Haram victims are going through a traumatized period. Many have left their homes and over 650 thousand Nigerians have been displaced according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCH). Educed from eight hours to three hours (Mohammed, 2012). "In Maiduguri, Borno state, where the sect originated, the frequent bombings and clashes between Boko Haram and the security agents have weighed down seriously on the commercial and businesses activities in the city as many businesses have reportedly crumbled while many people have fled the state" (Shiklam, 2012).

There is already a dichotomy in the north and south development in Nigeria. The poverty profile released by the National Bureau of Statistics illustrates that there is the prevalence of poverty in the north as compared to the south. It is in this data that the Business Day newspaper predicted if the insecurity situation continues development in the northern part will remain static and the gap between the north and south will broaden further (BDN, 2012). "The region needs peace and stability more than any region in the country, particularly because the region clearly lagging behind in term of infrastructure, education and other development indices" (Minster of Information, Labara Maku cited in Ogochukwu,2013).

Prominent Nigerians who have bemoaned the economic impact of Boko Haram insurgency in northeast Nigeria including the President Goodluck Jonathan and Northern Governors Forum According to Obaremi (2014) "Economic affairs in the north is already depleting due to a massive departure of people and financial institutions from the northern region. But if the government delays in the implementing comprehensive plans to tackle

insecurity from its roots, then not only will the northern region be economic desolation, the country as a whole risk losing billions of dollars in foreign direct investment" The business activities of telecom operators have not been left out from the attacks of Boko Haram. For instance, some telecom masts belong to some major mobile telephone operators were destroyed by Boko Haram and the banning of telephone services by the military affected the income generation of some of the mobile phone operators.

Just as the economic implications of Boko Haram atrocities cannot be quantified, the social costs are enormous. The church, school, market, clinic and mosque are potential targets of Boko Haram. For example, in April 2014, a federal government girls' college was attacked which subsequently led to the abduction of over 250 female students. Attacks on these social places have prevented people from going to these places. Some students have stopped going to school, others have been transferred to the southern part of the country to continue their education. Christians are afraid to go and worship in the church on Sundays due to the fear of being attacked by the sect. Same for the Muslimfaithful's who abandon their worshiping centers because of Boko Haram attacks.

The markets have become deserted. The National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) that was created by the government after the end of Nigerian civil war to foster unity among Nigeria is under threat due to Boko Haram attacks. The NYSC directorate posted 4171 corps members to Adamawa state, 1041 of the corps members have to abandon their national duty due to the precarious security situation (Ovaga, n.d.). Some parents from the south of the country have protested vehemently against the posting of their children to the northeast. Aside the socioeconomic implications, the human cost is more worrisome, more than 10.000 have been killed, a lot of people have been maimed and women have been kidnapped and raped These have left the family of the dead, the injured, the raped and the kidnapped in agony. In a nutshell, most of the family members of Boko Haram victims are

dislocations and political upheavals. Boko Haram have led to closure of many industries resulting in loss of employment, eradication of middle class and erosion in purchasing power of an average worker (Izah, 2014; Shambahavi and Samuel, 2014 cited in Titus, 2016). Indeed, the civil society is becoming high restive and confrontational to the Nigerian state expressing their discontent by carrying arms and explosives to destroyed lives and properties due to the mode of social production and productive forces. Therefore, it is the aim of this paper explores the impacts of Boko Haram Insurgency on Nigeria's political economy.

2.16   Configurative review
2.16.1 Guerrilla Warfare in Nigeria

Guerrilla warfare is a diminutive meaning "small war." This form of warfare is, perhaps, as old as mankind, certainly older than conventional war. Guerrilla war is a diffuse type of war, fought in relatively small formations, against a stronger enemy. In numerous instances guerrilla warfare has merely served as an auxiliary form of fighting, especially behind enemy lines, with the main military effort taking the form of conventional war. In many insurrections, however, guerrilla warfare has been the main form of struggle, at least for a while. As a strategy, guerrilla warfare avoids direct, decisive battles, opting instead for a protracted struggle consisting of many small clashes. In some guerrilla doctrines, final victory is expected to result from wearing out the enemy (Clutterbuck, 1990). Other doctrines, however, insist that guerrilla war is only an interim phase of the struggle, intended to enable the insurgents to build a regular army that will, eventually, win through conventional warfare. Guerrillas try to compensate for their inferiority in manpower, arms, and equipment by adopting a very flexible style of warfare, based on hit and-run operations, the guerrillas utilize the terrain to their advantage, blend into the population, or, sometimes, launch their attacks from neighbouring countries (Praeger, 1992). The Boko Haram guerrilla warfare attacks has been going on since its inception, on the 14th may, 2013 president Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in Northeast Nigeria including Borno State, due to the activities of Boko Haram.

Table 1: Series of BH Guerrilla Attacks in Maiduguri between 2011 and May 2015

S/n	Month/Year	Places of Attacks
1.	January 21, 2011.	The Brono State Governorship candidate of All Nigeria Peoples Party ANPP, for the 2011 election, Alhaji ModuGubio, was killed by Boko Haram along-side with 6 others.
2.	April 26, 2011.	3 people killed and scores injured in an IED bomb attack.
3.	May 15, 2011.	IED exploded early morning on Baga road, 13 dead and 40 injured. Bomb explosion at Lagos street, 5 people injured including 2 soldiers and 3 policemen.
4.	May 30, 2011.	Series of IED bomb blasts occurred, claiming 5 lives and several injured.
5.	June 7, 2011.	4 children killed in an IED bomb blast.
6.	June 16, 2011.	A clash between Boko Haram and the military left 31 people dead.
7.	July 9, 2011.	An IED was thrown on a military patrol vehicle by Boko Haram claiming 5 lives.
8.	July 12, 2011.	Explosions in West-end injured 5 people.
9.	July 15, 2011.	An explosion close to the palace of ShehunBrono, Alhaji Abubakar Garbai El-Kanemi, injured 3 soldiers.
10.	July 23, 2011.	Bomb explosion near the palace of a traditional ruler, claimed 8 lives.
11.	July 25, 2011.	Boko Haram shouts and injured 4 soldiers.
12.	Septembe13, 2011.	Boko Haram attack Baga fish market in Maiduguri 3 killed and many injured.
13.	October 3, 2011.	Bomb detonated in Shuwari, Maiduguri 3 sect members died.
14.	December18, 2011	6 people killed in Maiduguri including 2 Air force officers.
15.	January 30, 2012.	5 people killed in Maiduguri metropolis.
16.	February 17, 2012.	Boko Haram clashed with soldiers, 30 people killed in the market.
17.	February20, 2012.	5 worshippers including a pastor killed.
18.	April 29, 2012.	An IED exploded again in West-end killing 3 soldiers.
19.	May 6, 2013.	Boko Haram attacks a school in Mafoni killing 9 students.
20.	June 18, 2013.	Boko Haram attacked a settlement killing 46 people in a mosque.

21.	September 4, 2013.	Boko Haram attack a settlement, Jidari Polo in Maiduguri killing 6 people
22.	December 2, 2013.	Boko Haram attack 333 Artillery Barracks and 72 Composite Group, of Nigerian Air force, burning down the whole of the 333 barracks, 3 Alpha jets, 2 Helicopters while a total of 115 were killed and 13 injured.
23.	January 14, 2014.	An IED bomb exploded in front of Maiduguri Handset market popularly called Jagwal, 17 people killed and 28 injured.
24.	March 16, 2014.	An IED exploded in Bintansigar, in a viewing centre killing 98 people and 17 injured.
25.	March 15, 2014.	An attempted attack on Maimalari barrack, 2 people killed.
26.	April 18, 2014	Boko Haram attacks Giwa Barracks, hundreds of people killed and several others injured.
27.	May 27, 2014.	Another IED exploded at Bulunkutu railway crossing cattle market, 11 people killed and 4 injured.
28.	June 13, 2014.	An IED exploded at Monday market 47 people killed and 44 people injured.
29.	July 3, 2014.	Another IED exploded in the same Monday market in a pick-up laden with char-coal, 18 people killed.
30.	January 25, 2015.	Boko Haram attacked in the early hours of the day, killing 67 people.
31.	January 26, 2015.	A report from CNN that attack by hundred gunmen had been repelled.
32.	February 1, 2015.	Sector six sub-sector at Njimtilo was attacked leaving 5 soldiers injured.
33.	February 8, 2015.	The same place at Njimtilo was attacked with 333 Artillery Barracks leaving 187 killed and 14 injured.
34.	May 30, 2015.	Attack in Dala-lawanti, killed 13 people.

Source: Adopted in Ovaga(n.d). The Socio-Economic Implication of Boko Haram

Activities in Northern Nigeria. Review of Public Administration and Management. Vol.1, No.2

2.16.2 Police Headquarters Bombing (16 June 2011)

Following the death of Yusuf, Boko Haram was temporarily "inactive" due to the clampdown on its members by security forces. In fact, official reports claimed its current leader, Abubakar Shekau, was killed at the time (Akinyelure 2017). From 2010, under the new leadership of Shekau, the group adopted a more violent approach to its agitations with the police as its primary target, partly in revenge for the killing of Yusuf and other commanders of the group. One of its earliest definitive shows of power especially over the security architecture of the state was the bombing of the police headquarters in Abuja. The suicide bomber gained entrance into the police headquarters by tailing the convoy of the Inspector General of police and with fake identity cards. The bomb was detonated at the visitor's car park as the bomber was turned back from the car park reserved for the IGP (Ajani and Omonobi 2011). There were about six confirmed deaths during this attack with the police chief narrowly escaping.

The 16 June 2011 bombing of the police headquarters is significant for at least three reasons. First, it was acclaimed to be the first suicide attack in Nigeria; second, it was targeted at the heart of Nigeria's security architecture only days after the IG of Police had visited Maiduguri and assured residents of the impending defeat of Boko Haram, and finally it proves the reach and capacity of the group which was questioned by many people at that point (BBC, 2011).

2.16.3 UN House bombing (26 August 2011)

The United Nations house bombing was orchestrated through another car explosion in Abuja on 26 August 2011 in which at least 21 people died and 60 people were injured. In this case unlike the police headquarters bombing that had the semblance of elaborate planning, on how to beat security, for instance a Sedan simply rammed its way through two gates into the building. Like the police headquarters attack, this attack was very symbolic. One of the witnesses said: "If they can get into the UN House, they

can reach anywhere" (Guardian, 2011). Boko Haram claimed that it attacked the UN House because the United Nations and the United States were supporting the Federal Government in the persecution of Muslims in Nigeria (Marama, 2011); thus, adding a religious undertone to what might simply be understood as political or even criminal. The UN house bombing is also one of the earliest evidences of the group's aim to internationalize its acts (Onuoha, 2012).

2.16.4 Christmas Day (Madalla) bombings – 25th December, 2011

The Christmas Day bombings was a coordinated attack on at least four churches on 25thDecember, 2011 by Boko Haram, with the highest fatality count at St. Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla in which at least 32 people died (Mark, 2011). This violent act of Boko Haram is significant as it was understood as Boko Haram attempting to stock the embers of a "sectarian civil war" (Onuah & Eboh, 2011). Other churches bombed on the same day were the Mountain of Fire and Miracles Church in Jos and a church in Gadaka, northern Yobe. There were at least two other bombing incidents in Yobe, of which one targeted the State Security services in the north-eastern town of Damaturu (BBC, 2011, Onuah and Eboh 2011). Of these, the church attacks were more significant, at least in the news reports, and were very instrumental in cementing Boko Haram's posturing as anti-Christian and anti-south.

2.16.5 The Chibok schoolgirls' abduction (14th April, 2014)

The Chibok schoolgirls' abduction is one of the well-known attacks of Boko Haram. Commonly associated with the #BringBack Our Girls hashtag, used by celebrities and popular global politicians, it gave Boko Haram an unprecedented level of coverage and audience reach, such that the success of Nigeria's Counter Boko Haram drive is largely predicated on the successful rescue of the schoolgirls.

On the night of 14th April, 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped 276 schoolgirls from a secondary school in Chibok, Nigeria. They have since been held hostage and only some of them released. There are a few speculations as to why the schoolgirls were kidnapped among which are Boko Haram's insistence on western education as haram (forbidden) especially for girls (BBC, 2012) and Boko Haram's retaliation for government's arrests of wives of members of the group (Zenn and Pearson 2014). During the reporting around the Chibok abduction, Chibok was presented as a Christian town and Shekau, in a video, claimed that several of the kidnapped girls were Christians and had converted to Islam and married off (BBC, 2012). This attack also reflects the religious undertones present in news reporting of activities involving Boko Haram and adds to the suitability of the inclusion of this attack in the dataset used in this study, in addition to its popularity as a news event.

2.16.6 Suicide Operations

It is no accident that we have a meagre ability to describe this phenomenon. It is beyond the ordinary imagination; language fails us. Generally, the word "kamikaze," is often used since it describes the one spectacularly famous class of suicide operations. Homicidal self-sacrifice is when human beings intentionally kill themselves in the process of killing other human beings. It occurs in two contexts: in declared, open war in which regular combatants target other soldiers their uniformed enemies and equipment and installations bearing flags, insignia, or other identifying markings; and in undeclared conflicts, which can also be civil, ethnic, or religious in nature. Suicide attackers are indistinguishable from the rest of the populace and are capable of indiscriminately striking military targets or civilian populations and sites (Farhad, 2015).

On the cusp of the new millennium, suicide attacks stamped a new, grimly stunning mark on world conflicts. That is why so many references were made to the apocalypse. The collapse of New York's twin towers was an effective metaphor that

etched our collective memory. But it took neither 9/11 nor indeed the final decades of the twentieth century in Palestine for suicide attacks to become a strategic weapon in our planet's wars. It is true that in a very short period following the summer of 2000, the phenomenon saw unprecedented acceleration: Israel, Palestine, and a detour to Manhattan and Washington; then Russia, Chechnya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, where 2003 ended with the foiling of two suicide attacks against the head of state, General Pervez Musharraf. The infection spread through the world along a line of crises stretching from Bosnia to Kashmir, with tangents into the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Of course, these did not all involve the same people or the same goals, but the procedure was identical: human beings transforming themselves into weapons in order to kill other human beings. Suicide attacks are a Trans historical, transnational, and transcultural phenomenon, spanning time and place. This is a constant phenomenon, though not a regular one: it appears in one place, and then disappears; then it re-emerges somewhere else and for other reasons.

Raphael Israeli, a knowledgeable specialist on terrorism, recently coined the term "Islamikaze." He justifies the coinage in this way: "Islamic suicide attackers are not suicides . . . they are similar to kamikaze pilots in their motivation, organization, and ideology and in the way they perform their task." It is true that this form of suicide is altruistic and is carried out in the service of a cause viewed as infinitely more important than an individual human life (Khosrokhavar, 2002).

Table 2: Suicide operation of BH in Maiduguri Town From 2011 to March 2015

1.	November 4, 2011.	Suicide attack targeted at the Operation Restore Order (ORO) JTF commander at Pompamari, 2 soldiers killed, six injured.
2.	July 13, 2012.	Suicide attack targeted Shehun Borno Alhaji Ibn Abubakar Umar Garbai Elkanemi and the deputy governor of the State, Alhaji Zanna Umar Mustapha. Six people died in a central mosque in Maiduguri.
3.	August 16, 2012.	JTF patrol vehicle hit by a suicide bomber in the Custom area of Maiduguri killing 2 civilians and injuring 4 including a soldier.
4.	April 5, 2014.	Suicide attack targeted at NNPC deports on Damboua road but ended up at a check point before the Deport killing 2 soldiers.
5.	January 10, 2015.	Suicide attack in Monday market killing 19 people.
6.	March 7, 2015.	Five random suicide attacks in the town leaving 54 dead and 143 injured.

Source: *Adapted from Ovaga (n.d); Onuoha (2012).*

Fig 2: Death by Perpetrator

Notes

Hover over a point in the graph to view the number of deaths on that date.

Specific date can be viewed using the slider above

Fig 3: Monthly Deaths of Boko Haram and State Actors

the only actors in international politics and got transnationalism on the agenda. However, the concepts and approaches developed in this phase were relatively abstract, and resulted in little empirical research (Risse-Kappen 1995). The second phase began in the 1990s, sparked by end of the Cold War and a renewed interest in non-state actors (Jackson and Sørensen 2003: 129). Scholars now began examining when and under what conditions transnational actors and relations have an effect on domestic policy. In particular, the strength of state institutions was found to an important determinant, as we saw in the previous section (Risse-Kappen 1995; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999). Currently, a third generation of work is disaggregating and questioning some of the key assumptions about transnational actors, such as NGOs, exploring their motivations and why they focus on some issues and not others (Schmid, 2004; Carpenter, 2007).

Mercenaries, militarized refugees and foreign fighters: Members of rebel groups and participants in violent conflicts often move from one conflict-ridden region to another, serving various groups and causes. Fighters migrating between conflicts make recruitment of experienced militants easier, and are a major cause for regional instability in West Africa (Dokken 2008: 59-60). Dokken focuses on mercenaries and militarized refuges, but in relation to Boko Haram, it is noteworthy that Islamist insurgencies also attract so-called "foreign fighters": unpaid non-citizens who have no ties to the conflict except religious affinity with one of the parties. Since 1980, between 10,000 and 30,000 such fighters have inserted themselves into religious conflicts from Bosnia in the West to the Philippines in the East (Hegghammer 2010: 53, 57-58).

2.17.1 "Ordinary" refugees:

Human displacement can be both a consequence and a cause of conflict within and among societies. Large numbers of refugees moving across borders have adverse

economic impacts on the states were they settle, and may create humanitarian crises and export instability (Dokken 2008: 60). According to Lohrmann (2000: 4), migration affects international security relations at three levels: First, it affects the security agendas of transit and receiving states, as well as of groups within these countries, which may perceive the migration as a threat to economic welfare, social order and political stability. Second, it may affect the bilateral relations between the states, as migration often creates tensions and can threaten regional stability. Third, migration has effects on the "individual security and dignity of refugees and migrants, which may render them, inter alia, unpredictable actors in international relations" (Lohrmann 2000: 4).

2.17.2 Trade in natural resources:

Trade in natural resources is both an element of transnationalism in itself, as well as one of the most important fueling mechanisms for other aspects of transnationalism in West Africa" (Dokken 2008: 61). Dependence on trade in primary commodities such as diamonds, oil and timber has been found to substantially increase the risk of violent conflict in and between countries (Collier 2007: 21). Natural resource abundance can contribute to violent conflict in at least two ways: First, it can be a cause of violence by making the control of a territory or industry worth fighting for, and second, it can sustain violence by covering the expenditures of actors engaged in conflict (Le Billion, 2001 and; Collier, 2007).

2.17.3 Personal relationships:

In line with the neo-patrimonial nature of most West African states, personal alliances between central actors of the various states are of considerable importance to the formation of foreign policy in the region. There are several examples of personal ties

This theory, in relation to the crisis in the North East, especially when itBoko Haram insurgency political instability have a goal which is to attain a better life, yet they are unable to achieve it. This is due to the insurgency and political instability they suffer at the hands of government and its agencies which are rather concerned about the Counter-insurgency approach. The lack of capacity and poor intelligence gathering, poor approach and lack of will to Counter insurgency campaign is steering instability in the North Eastern region is steeped in abject poverty and their residents suffer poor living standards coupled with low life expectancy. This ugly scenario has remained a trigger that pushes the youths into the insurgency and hostage taking as well as engages in banditry activities to earn a living because they are not employed by in the region.

The second aspect of the strain-inducing stimulus, according to Agnew, is the removal of positive stimulus. This can be likened to unemployment, deprivation and lack of clear-cut inclusiveness. This resulted in the uprising of Boko Haram insurgents (BHI) whose main aim was to cripple the economy of the North East Nigeria by insurgence. The addition of negative stimulus here is the Counter-insurgency campaigns.

ii)   **Frustration Aggression Theory** by **Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer and Sears (1939)**

Notwithstanding, Frustration Aggression theory was founded by notable psychologists in the Yale Institute of Human Relations in 1939, namely: J. Dollard, L. Doob, N. Miller, O. H Mowrer, and R. Sears. They published a Monograph which contained the experiment carried out by them that birthed the theory. The theory was developed by Berkowitz in 1989 when he published the frustration aggression hypothesis; the theory has become useful to disciplines including Psychology, Anthropology, Political Science, Economics and Sociology (Ted, 2013). The central argument of this theory is that persons who are under undue pressure become frustrated by the happenings around them.

Haram. Demands made upon the political system by the political elites and leadership is with-in inputs. Meanwhile, supports entail the structures that enable the political system to manage demands put on it, while outputs relate to those demands that are converted into authoritative policies and decisions. Importantly, obtaining a balance among these critical variables of the political system is germane to its capacity to overcome inevitable challenges pose by the various forces from within, as well as the maintenance of stability and survival of the polity. Conversely, the inability of the political system to address critical demands from the Boko Haram, or respond positively to important feedback from its policy outputs have the capacity to undermine support for it. Moreover, intra-elite conflicts regarding policy articulation or allocation of scarce resources, preference for elite's demands and inability of the structures and institutions of the system to manage citizens' demands equitably can engender popular distrust, instability and stresses of the political system (Johari, 2011).

The political leadership is characterized by blatant personalization of power, predatory, parochial, prebendal and patrimonial dispositions (Jega, 2007). These ills no doubt undermine popular participation and the critical role of the masses in setting the agenda of governance. The dominant role of the political elites in setting, shaping and articulating governmental policies at the expense of the general interests of the populace erodes public support in democratic governance and policies as the masses perceive and equate democratic governance with representing the interest of the ruling elites (Olaniyi, 2001). The fact that in most cases the outcome of the elitist imposed policies consists of widespread unemployment, corruption and poverty tend to worsen the peoples' sense of alienation and frustration in the political system, which often translate into disobedience of the state and the resort to violence as a means to challenge the legitimacy of the state. This explains in part the Boko Haram militancy in the North. It is within this context that the

worsening social tensions, economic inequality, poverty and increased spate of insecurity in the country since President Jonathan's administration.

Relative deprivation is the experience of being deprived of something to which one believes to be entitled. It refers to the discontent people feel when they compare their positions to others and realize that they have less of what they believe themselves to be entitled than those around them (Davis, 2011). Some scholars of social movements explain their rise by citing grievances of people who feel deprived of what they perceive as 'values' to which they are entitled. Similarly, individuals engage in deviant behaviour when their means do not match their goals. Relative deprivation theory holds that instead of an absolute standard of deprivation, a gap between expected and achieved welfare leads men to violence (Claire, cited in Taydas, Enia and James, 2011). Claire went further to provide a psychological approach to explain how collective discontent is manifested in violence. According to him, the primary source of human capacity for violence appears to be the frustration aggression mechanism. The anger induced by frustration is a motivating force that disposes men to aggression, irrespective of its instrumentalities.

In the words of Taspinar cited in Chukwurah, Eme and Ogbeje, (2015), relative deprivation is the gap between high expectations and missing opportunities. To him, social, cultural, political and economic awareness grows at the heart of relative deprivation and this in turn fuels expectations. When these expectations are not forthcoming, the deprived could resort to violence to seek redress. All the views expressed boils down to the major thrust of the relative deprivation theory which holds that 'when people are deprived of things which they deem valuable in the society whether money, justice, status or privilege join social movements with the aim of redressing their grievances'.

When applied to the Boko Haram insurgency in the north, it could be fathomed that the loss of a spiritual leader in the person of Mohammed Yusuf deprived the sect

members of a role model, source of inspiration and a spiritual guide whom the sect boldly needed at the formative stage to nurture and grow the new faith. The arrest and subsequent death of some sect members in the hands of security agents was to the group, a deprivation of the right to life of their loved ones and brotherly love and affection which those deceased provided while they were still alive. Furthermore, the refusal of the Federal government to fully abolish western education and allow for an Islamic model was to the sect, a deprivation of the right to home grown model of education which will conform to the custom and tradition of the Islamic faith (Zumve, Ingyoroko & Akuva, 2015). The refusal of Dr. Goodluck Jonathan led federal government to sign and thus make way for the immediate establishment of the Islamic state for the entire north was to them, a deprivation of the right to self-rule as Jonathan's presidency was seen by them as an imposition of an unbeliever to rule over the Muslim territory. Also, the refusal of Christian minority to leave the north was to the sect, a deprivation of the right to a territorial integrity devoid of sinful infidels who according to the sect pollute and profane a holy territory of 'Allah' the only God (Zumve, Ingyoroko & Akuva, 2013).

Relevance of the three theories to the study:

i)   General Strain Theory (GST).

ii) Frustration Aggression Theory

iii) Systems and Relative deprivation theories

The Boko Haram Insurgent it believes by the researcher to have succeed because of vices such society embedded by poverty, illiteracy, ineptitude, corruption in governance, discrimination to modernization and globalization, which create artificial poverty to many underdeveloped countries, such countries like Nigeria would become recruitment target of the terrorists.

As postulated by Liolio (2012), the author stated that, it is significant to know that the root causes of the insurgency often relate to a long cloudy set of problems culminating into uncontrolled grievances and exploding violence. Such problems are socio-economic and political, that is why insurgencies are more rampant in underdeveloped countries or countries engulfed by corrupt regime, ethnicity, social prejudices religion and disparities in the distribution of resources or even lack of it. The above variables addressed and justify the variables identified by the researcher in this study; and as discussed below;

1. To investigate whether the Nigerian government has the political will, by employing every sincere purpose, show commitment and adopt modern approach of Counter-insurgency strategy in addressing political instability in the North East. There is a paradigm shift that has created room for betrayers and encourages insincerity of purpose which Frustration Aggression Theory seeks to address.

2. Poor funding of Counter-Boko Haram Insurgency, inadequate welfare of the security personnel and the inability of the government to procure necessary ultramodern military hardware to address political instability in the North East. Here the researcher adopts Frustration Aggression Theory to serve a framework guiding the study.

3. Lack of capacity by the Nigerian military greatly affects Counter-insurgency strategy and political instability in the North East. The lack of technology such as unman area surveillance cameras, drones, trackers for intercepting calls from the terrorist, robotics in bomb detecting and detonation, intelligence gathering sharing among others affects the morale of the security agencies, therefore Systems and Relative deprivation theories best address this phenomenon.

4. The Counter-Boko Haram insurgency approach and political instability in the North East. According to Agnew, people who engage in criminal activities have

low social control due to the pressure that society places on them. Use of appropriate approach is key to extermination of Boko Haram insurgency. If security personnel adopt only a particular approach rather than kinetic and non-kinetic approach, seeking intelligence from other countries that have absolute advantage in Counter terrorism. Nigeria will continue to be a save heaven for insurgency to thrive.

5. To find out whether poor intelligence gathering significantly influence Boko Haraminsurgency and political instability in the North East.

Also, Olojo (2013) contends that one significant factor that has stimulated the drive towards violent extremism, recruitment and support for Boko Haram are economic deprivation. Several scholars believed that poverty and longstanding economic disparities in the northeast part of the country made the youth join the sect.

Similarly, Adesoji (2010) stresses that, In Nigeria the marginalization and imbalance distribution or implementation of the resources made some radicalized scholars to preach against the government and democratic setting, which later gave birth to the present Boko Haram insurgency.

The Poverty Theory further explains that domestically the politicization of religious traditions and the radicalization of religious communities are especially likely in times economic decay, social integration or state collapse. Hopeless people below the poverty line; people who are marginalized or physical threat turn to their religious in search for an alternative political order that satisfies their need for welfares, recognition, and security (Hasenclever & Rittberger, 2005). In present time, there are many violence uprisings around the world, some transformed into full terrorist organizations like the

Boko Haram. The theory shows the significance of socioeconomic factors in explaining religious insurgency like Boko Haram.

Furthermore, Nigeria a country with more than 160 million people nearly 330 ethnics more than 250 languages with 50% Muslim and 40% Christian as well as 10% traditional belief were very poor. Poverty is what is seen by many observers and analysts as the root that causes most of the ethno-religious crisis in northern Nigeria which Boko Haram insurgency is among. With the death of infrastructure development, 90% of Nigerians are permanent of crippling poverty. In 2008, the country was ranked 153th out of 177 poor economic countries on the human development index, despite its rich cultural endowment and abundant human and natural resources (Adenrele, 2014). Northern Nigeria in particular has the highest figure of relative poverty in comparison with south-west and south-east zones that have relative poverty of 67.0% and 59.1% respectively. The northeast and north-west zones have the higher figure of 76.3% and 77.7% relative poverty respectively (NBS, 2012).

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This section explains the methodology employed in accomplishing the aims and objectives of the study. In this section, the research outlines the methods employed in obtaining data from respondents to answer research questions formulated.

3.1   Research Design

3.2   Data Needs

3.3   Sources of Data

3.4   Study Population

3.5   Sample Size and Sampling Techniques

3.6   Study Area

3.7   Instrument of Data Collection

3.8   Data Analysis

3.1   Research Design

The study employed the use of triangulation design involving survey and observational methods. Triangulation is described as a methodological representation for drawing inferences from qualitative and quantitative findings using two or more research methods (Erzberger & Kelle, 2003). The design potentially offers opportunity for depth of qualitative understanding with the reach of quantitative techniques (Nigel, 2012). Triangulation's design has been found useful to the study for three reasons. First, it has provided cross validation of findings. Second, since the study is both qualitative and quantitative in nature, triangulation design is most useful for arriving at more robust result. Third, the design has also provided complementary results from various methods. By this advantage, the researcher is of the opinion that the strength of one method can be used to improve the other, especially as the study is set to establish the relationship that exists

between Boko Haram Insurgency and political instability in the north east region of the country.

3.2   Data Needs

The data required for this study include information on the following:

i.   Political will in Counter-Boko Haram.

ii.   lack of capacity for Counter-Boko Haram activities

iii.   Poor founding of Counter-Boko Haram insurgency

iv.   Appropriateness of Counter-Boko Haram insurgency approach

v.   Poor intelligence gathering and Counter-Boko Haram insurgency

vi.   Sustainable policy option for Counter Boko Haram insurgent

3.3   Sources of Data

Data in respect of this study was obtained from primary and secondary sources. Primary data source was gathered through administering of questionnaires, observations and focus group discussions by the researcher while the secondary data source was obtained from already existing literature including text books, journals, magazines, newspapers, theses, seminar publications, ministries (Education, Religious Affairs, Commerce, Tourism, Investment, Works and Transport, SEMA) and internet materials.

3.4   Study Population

The study population of this research is the whole population of Borno state which is 5,860,183(NPC, 2016) people. However, due to safety measures, the study is limited to Maiduguri town with estimated population of 1,197,497 (NPC, 2007). The town has 34 communities that make up the metropolis which includes: -Njimtilo, Jouney, Bulumkutu, Federal Low Cost, Shagari Low Cost, Abujan-Talkawa, Dala, Gomari, Pompamari, Moduganari, Umalari, Wulari, Bolori, Maimalari, Mairi, Dalori, Judumari, Ajilari,

Shuwari, Shehuri, Hausari, Zabarmari, Old Maiduguri, Custom, Ruwan-zafi, London-Ciki, Kumshe, Usmanti, Sulemanti, Gwenge, Bulabulin, Abbaganaram, Old GRA and New GRA.

The researcher purposively selected only five communities that constituted the Identified Flash Points (IFP) of Boko Haram activities and the communities are; Moduganari, Monday market, Maimalari, Ruwanzafi and Jouney for the purpose of administration of questionnaires, field observation and focus group discussion (FGD). The justification for selecting these communities is based on the fact that these locations constituted the Identified Flash Points (IFP) of Boko Haram activities particularly when it was at its peak. Therefore, focusing on these locations added a more accurate picture of its effect of political stability in the region. However, the population of the five selected communities is unknown even though that of Maiduguri town is known.

3.5   Sample Size and Sampling Techniques

The sample size of this study was drawn from the five selected communities (Moduganari, Monday MARKET, Maimalari, Ruwan Zafiand Journey) of the study area. Forty-six (46) respondents were selected in each community making a total of 230 respondents for the questionnaire administration. Also, five (5) focus group discussion

3.6   Study Area

Bomo has been the epicenter of the Islamist group Boko Haram since it began its insurgency in 2009. The conflict in Borno drew media attention in 2009 after clashes between Boko Haram and government security forces in which the founder of Boko Haram Mohammed Yusuf was reportedly captured alongside 300 of its members. Days later Mohammed Yusuf was announced dead after he reportedly attempted to escape from detention. After a decade of protracted conflict that has destroyed economic activities and normal life, the governor of the state Babagana Umara Zulum in 2019 commenced a multi-pronged strategy of his own recruiting 10,000 hunters to help government forces root out the insurgents.

The state has a predominance of Kanuri people. Other ethnic groups such as Lapang, Babur/Bura and Marghi are also found in the southern part of the state. Shuwa Arabs are mainly the descendants of Arab people and is an example of the endurance of traditional political institutions in some areas of Africa, where the emirs of the former Kanem-Borno Empire have played a part in the politics of this area for nearly 1,000 years. The current Kanemi dynasty gained control of the Borno Emirate in the early 19th century after the Fulani jihad of Usman dan Fodio. Conquered by Rabih in 1893, Borno was invaded by the British, French and Germans at the beginning of the 20th century. In 1902, the British officially incorporated Borno into the Northern Nigeria Protectorate and-established a new capital at Maiduguri or Yerwa in 1907, which remains the capital.

After Nigerian independence in 1960, Borno remained fairly autonomous until the expansion of the number of states in Nigeria to 12 in 1967. Local government reform in 1976 further reduced the power of the emirs of the former dynasty, and by the time

of Nigeria's return to civilian rule in 1979, the emirs' jurisdiction has been restricted solely to cultural and traditional affairs. The emirs still exist, and serve as advisers to the local government. Mala Kachallah was elected governor of Borno State in 1999 under the flagship of the then APP (All Peoples Party) later ANPP. Ali Modu Sheriff was elected governor of Borno State in Nigeria in April 2003. He is a member of the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP). Ali Sheriff was the first governor in Borno state to win the seat two consecutive times.

Boko Haram's insurgency began in 2009, with Borno being the worst-affected area. On 14 May 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in northeastern Nigeria, including Borno State along with the neighboring states of Adamawa and Yobe. This happened after fighting between Boko Haram and the state armed forces killed 200 people in the town of Baga. A spokesman for the armed forces declared that the offensive would continue "as long as it takes to achieve our objective of getting rid of insurgents from every part of Nigeria". In July 2014, Bomo State governor Kashim Shettima said that "176 teachers had been killed and 900 schools destroyed since 2011. After the Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping in April 2014, most schools in Borno State were closed. They were scheduled to reopen in November 2014.

In November 2014, UNICEF reported it has increased its Community Management of Acute Malnutrition (CMAM) centres in Borno State "from 5 to 67 and is planning to increase this to 100. In Borno State, the agricultural sector has suffered mostly because of the insurgency and many people experienced acute food insecurity. Borno State consists of twenty-seven (27) Local Government Areas, grouped into three Senatorial Districts (shown below with their areas and 2006 Census population figures).

Table 3 below, in addition, there are eight Emirate Councils (Bomo, Damboa, Dikwa, Biu, Askira, Gwoza, Shani and Uba Emirates), which advise the local

governments on cultural and traditional matters. Languages. A wide variety of Biu-Mandara languages are spoken in Borno State, particular in the Mandara Mountains Languages of Borno State listed by Local Government Area.

Table 4 below, other languages of Borno State are Lala-Roba, Tarjumo, Yedina, and Tedaga. Religion Islam continues to be the dominant faith practiced in Borno State, with equally large number of adherents of Christianity and other faiths spread throughout and living within the region. Sharia operates as the primary foundation for the development, interpretation, and enforcement of most civic codes and laws. The Roman Catholic Diocese of Maiduguri has its seat in the state. EkklesiarYan'UwaA Nigeria (EYN) - in Maiduguri were destroyed by Boko Haram as a part of their uprising which was later rebuilt.

Table 3: Local Government Areas

Borno Central Senatorial District	Area in km^2	1,666,541	Borno South Senatorial District	Area in km^2	1,245,962	Borno North Senatorial District	Area in km^2	1,238,390
Maiduguri	137.36	540,016	Askira/Uba	2,431.83	143,313	Abadam	4,172.27	100,065
Ngala	1,519.82	236,498	Bayo	985.78	79,078	Gubio	2,575.09	151,286
Kala/Balge	1,962.13	60,834	Biu	3,423.86	175,760	Guzamala	2,631.44	95,991
Mafa	2,976.99	103,600	Chibok	1,392.00	66,333	Kaga	2,802.46	89,996
Konduga	6,065.89	157,322	Damboa	6,426.18	233,200	Kukawa	5,124.41	203,343
Bama	5,158.87	270,119	Gwoza	2,973.15	276,568	Magumeri	5,057.61	140,257
Jere	900.72	209,107	Hawul	2,160.99	120,733	Marte	3,280.02	129,409
Dikwa	1,836.89	105,042	KwayaKusar	754.69	56,704	Mobbar	3,280.02	116,633
			Shani	1,238.93	100,989	Monguno	1,993.20	109,834
						Nganzai	2,572.35	99,074

Source: 2006 Population Census

Table 4: Local Government and Languages in Borno State

LGA	Languages
Askira-Uba	Putai; Bura-Pabir; Gude; Kibaku; Marghi Central; Marghi South; Nggwahyi; Nya Huba
Bama	Shuwa Arabic; Yerwa Kanuri; Wandala; Mafa
Biu	Bura-Pabir ; Dera ; Ga'anda ; Jara ; Putai
Chibok	Kibaku; Putai
Damboa	Kibaku ; Marghi Central ; Putai ; Mulgwai ; Kanuri
Dikwa	Shuwa Arabic
Gwoza	Cineni; Dghwede; Glavda; Guduf-Gava; Gvoko; Hide; Yerwa Kanuri; Lamang; Mafa; Sukur; Waja; Wandala
Hawul	Bura,Hwana, Putaimafa
Jilbe town	Jilbe
Kaga	Yerwa Kanuri; Putai
Kala/Balge	Shuwa Arab; kanuri; Afade
Konduga	Shuwa Arabic; Yerwa Kanuri; Maffa; Putai; Wandala
Kukawa	Yerwa Kanuri
Kwaya-Kusar	Bura, Putai, Marghi South
Maiduguri	Yerwa Kanuri; Mafa
Monguno	Yerwa Kanuri; Mafa
Ngala	Shuwa Arabic; Yerwa Kanuri

Source: Field work 2021

3.7 Instrument of Data Collection

The instrument for data collection in this study was a total of 230 copies of modified structured questionnaires, field survey and a camera was utilized to capture observations (Photographs) at the identified flash points (IFP). Five field assistants were employed to assist in administering the questionnaires. Also, Focus Group Discussions were conducted to ascertain the perception and experiences of community members affected by Boko Haram insurgency. The purpose was to interact with groups and to identify the joint construction of meaning made by the people regarding the research questions (Bryman, 2012). Here, FGD was held with the community members, security members, and the political class in the area. The researcher and research assistants served as the moderators in these discussions and made sure that no one person dominated the discussion. With this method, my informants were very instrumental in gathering the respondents.

3.8 Validity of research instrument

The instrument used for data collection in this study was constructed by the researcher validated through the traditional vetting process by my project supervisors and other experts for face and construct validity. This was to ensure that the instrument measures what it was designed to measure, and that the items conformed to objectives of the study. After much criticisms and contributions by the experts, both face and construct validity were obtained.

3.8.1 Reliability of the instrument:

Reliability refers to the degree or extent to which an instrument measures whatever it is measuring consistently. To establish the reliability of this instrument a trial test was carried using 30 respondents from Bulumkutu community who were not part of the study. Cronbach alpha reliability method was used to determine the internal consistency of the

instrument. The coefficients of the overall instrument reliability was 0.82, which is considered high enough for the instrument to be adjudged as reliable.

3.9   Data Analysis

The quantitative data collected was analyzed using a simple descriptive statistic, a modified 5-point Likert Rating Scale in descending order and a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) (a data reduction technique) with the aid of SPSS 20.0.was utilized for analysis.

Also, the qualitative data was analyzed using thematic, narrative and qualitative content analysis. According to Bryman (2012), thematic analysis is one of the most common approaches to qualitative data analysis, and involves the search for recurrent themes that are of significance to the research question. A theme represents a category of indicators built on coded transcripts and notes, identified through data that relates the research question and provides the study with a theoretical understanding of data. The themes in this study included; Boko Haram Insurgency (political will, funding, approaches and capacity), and Political instability in the North-east region. Under this, data gathered from questionnaires and focused groups discussions was transcribed verbatim into English, together with observational notes. Further, the data was "sifted and sorted", classified into meaningful set and recurring themes. The essence was to code, identify theory related material, as well as recurring themes. Finally, the interconnections from the themes and theories were analyzed in relation with the existing literature and theories.

Narrative analysis, then, is an approach to the analysis of qualitative data that emphasizes the stories that people employ to account for events. Specifically, narrative analysis was employed to analyzed the historical sections of the data collected; history of Boko Haram Insurgency, political instability, after transcribing, the data was classified

into meaningful set and recurring themes. From these themes, the researcher engaged in a critical reflection and description of findings.

Qualitative content analysis is probably the most prevalent approach to the qualitative analysis of documents. It involves searching out of underlying themes in the materials being analyzed. This was employed to analyze the various documents gathered from the security members tackling Boko Haram insurgency.

3.10   Ethical consideration

In exercising the responsibility to carry out this research, the researcher made effort to educate his research assistant on what the investigation is all about. The researcher introduced himself with the team of research assistant to the various community leaders with a letter of consent. The purpose of the visitation was explained and permission sought to collect the data from the respondents. The permission was granted and the administration of instrument was carried out by the researcher and the research assistants. Respondents were treated with respect and their rights to privacy and freedom of self determination to obtaining informed consent was granted. The respondents were allowed to exercise the freewill to accept or refuse involvement in the studies. The researchers explained in details all aspect of the research to the respondents, and they fully understood the nature of the study including the purpose, content, and methods. The participants' privacy and confidentiality was guaranteed and kept as stated in the questionnaire; as information about the participant, enjoyed anonymity, and used only for the purpose for which the permission was given. Again, matters that were controversial were handled with greet confidentiality and sensitivity.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

4.1   Data presentation

The first table below shows the distribution of questionnaire; the second table shows the bio-data of the respondents then followed by the rest of the tables.

SECTION A: BIO-DATA

TABLE 4.1

Distribution of Questionnaire

Questionnaire	Respondents	Percentages
Number returned	230	89%
Number not returned	15	8%
Invalid questioning	5	3%
Total	250	100%

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.1 shows that 230 questionnaires were returned by the respondents, the 230 copies of valid questionnaires were completely filled.

Primary data elicited in this study were based on the responses of the 230 responses designed in line with the variables of this study.

SECTION ONE

TABLE 4.2

Distribution of respondents by sex

Sex	Respondents	Percentages %
Male	180	78.26%
Female	50	21.74%
Total	230	100%

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.2 shows that 180 of the respondents were male representing 78.26% and 50 were female representing 21.74%. This was to avoid gender bias in the survey data gathering.

Depicts the appropriateness of the sex disposition of the respondents. The males are known to be the most dominant actors in violent or conflict related phenomena and their responses could be in line with the vast experiences while the female responses representing 21.74% served as a supportive experience hence, they are also part of the society as they often stay with the males and also know what the males do.

TABLE 4.3

Distribution of respondent by age

Agee	Respondents	Percentages %
18 -30	130	56.52%
31-60	70	30.43%
60 and above	30	13.04%
Total	230	100%

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.3 shows that 130% of the respondents were between the ages of 18-30 i.e. 56.52% 70% of the respondents were 31-60 years old i.e 30.43%, 30 of the respondents were between 60 years and above i.e 13.04.

The above data supposed that, the active age of 18-30 years which represent 56.52% are the most vulnerable and information from these range of age disposition will be relatively valid.

TABLE 4.4

Distribution of the population on marital status

Marital Status	Respondents	Percentages %
Married	120	52.17%
Single	70	30.43%
Divorce	30	13.04%
Widow	10	4.35%
Total	230	100%

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.5 shows that 120 of the respondents were married; 52.17%, 70 of respondents were single, 30.43% ,30 of respondents were divorce 13.04%, 10 of respondent's widow 4.35%.

The tables disposition of the responses marital status which was dominated by 120 respondents and 52.17% respondents were married and it is believed that 52.17% being married men are believe to be more rational and responsible and may not easily indulge in terrorism.

TABLE 4.5

Distribution of the population on educational qualification

Educational qualification	Respondents	Percentages %
First school leaving certificate	95	41.30%
Senior School Certificate	80	34.78%
Bachelor degree	55	23.91%
Graduate degree	30	13.04%
Total	230	100%

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.5 shows that 95 of the respondents were first school leavers; 41.30%, 80 of respondents have SSCE, 34.78% ,55 of respondents have B.Sc. 23.91%, 30 of respondent's post graduate 13.04%.

From the above educational disposition of the respondents, it depicted that majority of the respondent posed only first school leaving certificate. This means that, the region is educationally disadvantaged.

TABLE 4.6

Distribution of respondent by employment status

Status	Respondents	Percentages %
Employed	60	26.08%
Self-employed	40	17.39%
Unemployed	50	21.74%
Retired	30	13.04%
Total	230	100%

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.6 shows that 60 of the respondents were employed, 26.08% 40 of the respondents were self -employed; 17.39% 50 of the respondents were unemployed and 21.74% 30 of the respondents were retired indigene of 13.04%.

The statistics of the respondents depicts how grossily inadequate is unemployment ravaging the region and as such the relationship between unemployment and insurgency as a popular saying that "and idle man is a devil's workshop".

TABLE 4.7

Distribution of respondents' nationality

Nationality	Respondents	Percentages %
Nigeria	195	84.78%
Non-Nigeria	35	15.22%
Total	230	100%

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.7 shows 195 of the respondents were Nigerians and 84.78% and 35 of the respondents were non indigene 15.22% responded to the questionnaires.

Giving the disposition of the respondents, 15.22% of the respondents were non-Nigerians, this could admit the possibility of non-Nigeria participating as member of the insurgents.

Table 4.7 shows 195 of the respondents were Nigerians and 84.78% and 35 of the respondents were non indigene 15.22% responded to the questionnaires.

Giving the disposition of the respondents, 15.22% of the respondents were non-Nigerians, this could admit the possibility of non-Nigeria participating as member of the insurgents.

SECTION B

SECTION B: PHENOMENA DATA

SECTION TWO

TABLE 4.8

Boko Haram Insurgency is an Islamization agenda and purely for political gains by Nigerian elites?

Options	Respondents	Percentages %
Yes	170	73.91%
No	40	17.39%
Not sure	20	8.69%
Total	230	100%

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.8 shows that 170 of the respondents say yes which is 73.91% a, 40 of the respondents say no i.e. 17.39% and 20 of the respondents were not sure i.e. 8.69% that Boko Haram Insurgency is an Islamization agenda and is purely for political gains by the Nigerian elites. However, the overwhelming majority of the respondents number 73.91% asserted their voices that, Boko Haram Insurgency is purely for political gains and it is partly meant for the purpose of Islamizing.

TABLE 4.9

Are the following groups the major promoters of Boko haram insurgency and political instability in the North East

Options	Respondents	Percentages %
Politicians	130	56.52%
Fulani herders	70	30.43%
Security operatives	30	13.04%
Total	230	100

Source: field survey, 2021

TABLE 4.10

How does the Boko Haram insurgency and political instability impact the socio-economic

life of the North East?

Options	Respondents	Percentages %
Political will	130	56.52%
Lack of capacity	10	4.35%
Lack of military hardware	20	8.69%
Moles in the security agents	70	30.43%
Total	230	100

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.10 shows that 130 of the respondents agree that is political will, 56.52% and 10 of the respondents agree that it is cause by lack of capacity i.e. 4.35%, 20 of the respondents say it is lack of military hardware i.e. 8.69% and 70 of the respondents agree to the fact that moles in the security agents that is causing the protected Counter-Boko Haram insurgency and political instability.

Table 4.11 shows that 90 of the respondents representing 39.13% strongly accept that the crisis affect them positively who are conflict entrepreneurs while 140 of the respondents rejected assertion and reported that the Boko Haram Insurgency benefited them. The 60.86% of the respondents maintained that the Boko Haram Insurgency affected them. There is a strong understanding that conflicts exists positively and negatively while many people immensely benefit from the benefit.

TABLE 4.12

Do you consider that there is a close relationship between Boko Haram insurgency and poverty, insurgency and unemployment?

Options	Respondents	Percentages %
Yes	140	60.85%
No	40	17.39%
Not sure	50	21.74%
Total	230	100

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.12 shows that 140 of the respondents strongly agree that is strong relationship between Boko Haram Insurgency and political instability while 40 of the respondents representing 17.39% refuted the notion that, poverty and unemployment are responsible for the rising cause of BHI. While 50 of the respondents representing 21.74% of the respondents were not sure if the poverty and unemployment have positive relationship with the Counter-Boko Haram Insurgency in the North East Nigeria and 50 of the respondents were not sure and were indecisive of the questions i.e. 21.74%.

TABLE 4.13

Does the Boko Haram Insurgency affect the cultural, political and socio-economic lives of the people around your area?

Options	Respondents	Percentages %
Yes	150	65.21%
No	40	17.39%
Not sure	40	17.39%
Total	230	100

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.13 shows that 150 of the respondents representing 65.21% strongly agree that is Boko Haram crisis affects cultural and socio economic lives of the people of North East while 40 of the respondents representing 17.39% to exception to this and finally 40 (17.39%) of the respondents were not sure if Boko Haram affects cultural and socio-economic lives of the people of the North East.

The overwhelming number of respondents agreed to this. The summation of the respondents with 65.21% were so sure and consented that, in the North Eastern region, Boko Haram Insurgency is one of the major factors aggravating cultural and socio-economic encumbrances on the lives of the people living in the region.

TABLE 4.14

Do you think the root cause of Boko Haram insurgency and instability are idleness,

unemployment and poverty among the north East youths

Options	Respondents	Percentages %
Yes	160	69.56%
No	40	17.39%
Not sure	30	13.04%
Total	230	100

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.14 shows that 160 of the respondents strongly agree that the root cause of Boko Haram insurgency and instability are idleness, unemployment and poverty among the North East youths, while 40 (17.39%) of the respondents say no to the question i.e. 17.39% and 30 of the respondents representing 13.04% did not know the sure reason to the root cause of Boko Haram Insurgency and Political Instability in the North East Nigeria.

TABLE 4.15

What aspect(s) of our national life is mostly affected by Boko Haram insurgency?

Options	Respondents	Percentages %
Political	30	13.04%
Cultural	50	21.74%
Socio economic	70	30.43%
All of the above	20	8.69%
Military	60	26.08%
Total	230	100

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.15 shows that 30 of the respondents strongly agreed that Boko Haram insurgency and political instability our political life i.e., 13.04% while 50 of the respondents say it affects cultural life style i.e., 21.74% and 70 (30.43%) of the respondents say it affects socio economic activities i.e., 30.43% and 20 of the respondents concluded that, it is all of the factors above affected them collectively while 60 (26.08%) of the respondents say it expose our military weakness.

70 of the respondents representing 30.43% of the respondents consented those socio-economic activities of the area are the most affected. That Boko Haram Insurgency is responsible for the reason while light, good schools, socio infrastructural gap etc. in the area. In the same vein, political instability also was blamed by Boko Haram Insurgency. 13.04% of the respondents lend their consent that, Boko Haram Insurgency is the major contributor to political instability in the North East Nigeria.

While 60 (26.08%) of the respondents were of the opinion that, the Boko Haram Insurgents exposed the weakness of our military, the lack of clear-cut strategy for the Counter-Boko Haram Insurgency. And the inability of the military to deal with the issues of military hardware, moles in the system and lack of capacity by the security operatives.

TABLE 4.16

Does the Boko Haram Insurgency and political instability breed intolerance among people due to political interest?

Options	Respondents	Percentages %
Yes	120	52.17%
No	40	17.39%
Not sure	70	30.43%
Total	230	100

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.16 shows that 120 of the respondents strongly agree that Boko Haram Insurgency and political instability breed intolerance among people due to political interest i.e., 52.17% 40 of the respondents say no to the question i.e. 17.39%, and 70 of the respondents say not sure to the above assertion which is 30.43%.

TABLE 4.17

Boko Haram insurgency has multiplier effects in form of political instability, and crime

such as banditry, thuggery and proliferation of small arms and light weapon(SMLW)

Options	Respondents	Percentages %
Yes	140	60.86%
No	30	13.04%
Not sure	60	26.08
Total	100	100

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.17 shows that, 140 (60.86%) of the respondents strongly accepted that assertion that Boko Haram insurgency and political instability give room to crime and criminality such as banditry, kidnapping, bombing, mass killing and proliferation of small arms and light weapon, i.e 60.86% and 30 of the respondents refuted thee assertions while 60(26.08%) where not sure if it is Boko Haram Insurgency that is responsible for banditary, kidnapping and small arms and light weapons (BALWs) proliferation.

TABLE 4.18

Government and or relevant agencies lack the capacity to Counter-Boko Haram

insurgency and political instability in North East

Options	Respondents	Percentages %
Yes	40	17.39%
No	160	69.56%
Not sure	30	13.04
Total	230	100

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.18 shows that, 40 of the respondents representing 17.39% agree that government and relevant agencies lack adequate capacity to carry out Counter-Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in North East, and 160 of the respondents i.e., 69.56% say no to the question and 30 of the respondents say not sure, 13.04%.

From the above responses, 40(19.39%) asserted that, the government and their relevant agencies lack adequate capacity to carryout a robust Count-Boko Haram Insurgency campaign because of lack of ultramodern military equipments, intelligence gathering and sharing equipments, moles in the system and lack of modern strategies powered with Hitechnology is responsible for the pervasiveness of the Counter-Boko Haram Insurgency campaign.

While majority of the respondents representing 69.56% refuted the claims that the reason while the Counter-Boko Haram Insurgency is still pervasive may not be lack of capacity but may be as a result of other factors. In the same, vein, 133.04% of the respondents were undecided. This connotes that, they were not sure of the actual cause that is fueling or protracting the Counter-Boko Haram Insurgency campaign.

TABLE 4.19

Do you think negligence and lack of political will on the part of government is giving rise to Boko Haram insurgency and political instability?

Options	Respondents	Percentages %
Yes	140	60.86%
No	30	13.04%
Not sure	60	26.08
Total	230	100

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.19 shows that, 140 of the respondents i.e., 60.86% agree that it is negligence and lack of political will on the part of government that is giving rise to Boko Haram insurgency and political instability and 30 of the respondents i.e., 13.04% say no to question and 60 of respondents i.e. 26.08% responded not sure.

Depicting from the above responses, 140 of the respondents representing 60.86% asserted that negligence and lack of political will on the part of the government that is giving rise to Boko Haram Insurgency and Counter-Boko Haram Insurgency that is responsible for political instability and the negligence on the part of the government has series of multiplier effects in terms of mass killings, targeted assassinations of people, bombing of target Very Important Targets (VIT). While 26.08% responses depicted that, the 26.08% lack the knowledge of what actually is responsible for the protracted Counter-Boko Haram Insurgency.

TABLE 4.20

Do you accept that poor funding to relevant agencies and Counter-Boko Haram insurgency is contributing to the lingering political instability in the North -East?

Options	Respondents	Percentages %
Yes	180	78.26%
No	20	8.69%
Not sure	30	13.04%
Total	230	100

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.20 shows that 180of the respondents i.e.78.26% agree that poor funding to relevant security agencies contributed immensely the pervasiveness of Counter-Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North -East and 20 of the respondent i.e. 8.69% say no and 30 of the respondents responded not sure to the question.

Overwhelmingly, 78.26% represents were of the view that, poor funding stands out to be the reason behind the protracted Counter-Haram Insurgency. While merely 8.69% of the respondent denial knowledge of what is the causal factors responsible for the protracted Counter-Boko Haram Insurgency.

TABLE 4.21

Do you think that lack of capacity by the Nigerian military and the police is responsible for the continuous dominance of Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North-East?

Options	Respondents	Percentages %
Yes	110	52.17%
No	80	34.74%
Not sure	40	17.39%
Total	230	100

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.21 shows that 110(52.17%) of the respondents agree that lack of capacity by the Nigerian military and the police is responsible for the continuous dominance of Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North-East and 80 of the respondent say no to the question and 40 of the respondents really were not sure.

TABLE 4.22

Do you think that lack of qualified military personnel's and modern military weapon is responsible for the persistence of the Counter-insurgency and political instability in the North-East?

Options	Respondents	Percentages %
Yes	130	56.52%
No	20	8.69%
Not sure	80	34.78%
Total	230	100

Source: field survey, 2020

Table 4.22: Shows that 130 of the respondents' i.e. 56.52% agree that lack of qualified military personnel's and ultramodern military weapon is responsible for insurgency and political instability in the North-East and 20 of the respondent i.e. 8.69% and 80 of the respondents say not sure to the questions.

Table 4.23: Shows that 90 of the respondents' i.e. 39.13% accepted that, lack of credible intelligence collaborated with ultramodern intelligence gathering equipment like drones etc. are responsible for the slow pace of Counter-Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East and 110 of the respondents i.e. 52.17% say no to the question and 20 of respondents i.e. 8.69%.

TABLE 4.24

Do you think the root causes of Boko Haram insurgency and instability are idleness,

unemployment, poverty among the North East youths?

Options	Respondents	Percentages %
Yes	190	82.61%
No	10	4.35%
Not sure	30	13.04%
Total	230	100

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.24: Shows that 90 of the respondents' i.e., 82.61% agree that the root causes of Boko Haram insurgency and instability are idleness, unemployment, poverty among the North East youths and 10 of the respondents i.e., 4.35% say no to the question and 30 of respondents i.e 13.04% say not sure.

SECTION THREE

TABLE 4.25

Is it true that our national life is mostly affected by Boko Haram insurgency?

Options	Respondents	Percentages %
Yes	120	52.17%
No	30	13.04%
Not sure	80	34.78%
Total	230	100

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.25: Shows that 120 of the respondents i.e., 52.17% agree that, it is true that our national life is mostly affect by Boko Haram insurgency and 80 of the respondents i.e., 13.04% say no to the question the insurgency does not affect our national life and 80 of the respondents were unsure.

TABLE 4.26

Boko Haram insurgency and political instability breeds intolerance among the people of

the North East

Options	Respondents	Percentages %
Yes	140	60.86%
No	30	13.04%
Not sure	60	26.08%
Total	230	100

Source: field survey, 2021

TABLE 4.27

Does Boko Haram insurgency and political instability give room to crime and criminality such as violence, thuggery, and proliferation of small arms and light weapon (SMLW)?

Options	Respondents	Percentages %
Yes	190	82.61%
No	10	4.35%
Not sure	30	13.04%
Total	230	100

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.27: Shows that 190 of the respondents' i.e 82.61 agree that Boko Haram insurgency and political instability give room to crime and criminality such as violence, thuggery, and proliferation of small arms and light weapon and 10 of respondents' i.e 4.35% and 30 of respondents 13.04%.

TABLE 4.28

Is government and/or relevant MDA's unaware of the rising spate of Boko Haram

insurgency and political instability in the North-East?

Options	Respondents	Percentages %
Yes	150	65.21%
No	50	21.74%
Not sure	30	13.04%
Total	230	100

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.28 Show that 150 of the respondents 65.21% agree that government and relevant MDA's unaware of the rising spate of Boko Haram insurgency and political instability across the borders in North-East and 50 of respondents i.e., 21.74% say no to the questions and 30 of the respondents 13.04% say not sure.

TABLE 4.29

Do you think negligence on the part of government is giving rise to insecurity across the

Northern Nigeria?

Options	Respondents	Percentages %
Yes	190	82.61%
No	30	13.04%
Not sure	10	4.35%
Total	230	100

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.29 Shows that 190 of the respondent's representing (82.61%) agree that negligence on the part of government is giving rise to insecurity across the Northern Nigeria and 30 of respondent's i.e 13.04 say no to the question and 10 of the respondents 4.35% say not sure.

Table 4.30 shows that 40 of the respondents 17.39% agree that, Counter-Boko Haram insurgency by the relevant security agencies is proactive and timely in the fight against criminality in the North East and 180 of the respondents i.e. 78.26% say no and 10 of the respondents 4.35% remain neutral to the assertions.

TABLE 4.31

Do you think the ungoverned spaces around border communities if adequately policed and
secured might lead to blocking invaders and ending insurgency?

Options	Respondents	Percentages %
Yes	194	84.35%
No	6	2.61%
Not sure	30	13.04%
Total	230	100

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.31 shows that 194% of the respondents i.e. 84.35% agree that the ungoverned spaces around border communities if adequately policed might lead to blocking invaders and ending insurgency and 6 of the respondents 2.61% say no to the question and 30 of the respondents i.e. 13.04% remain neutral.

TABLE 4.32

Do you think that leveraging on relevant military weapon and modern technology like drones will contribute immensely to timely eradication of insurgency and instability in North East?

Options	Respondents	Percentages %
Yes	170	73.91%
No	30	13.04%
Not sure	30	13.04%
Total	100	100

Source: field survey, 2021

Table 4.32 shows that 170 of the respondents i.e. 73.91% agree that, that leveraging on relevant military weapon and modern technology like drones will contribute immensely to eradication of insurgency and instability in North East and 30 of the respondents say no to the question and 30 of the respondents 13.04% remain neutral by saying not sure.

Table 4.33: Shows that 195% of the respondents 84.78% agree that, that the rising of crime and criminality playing out in the North is promoted by the JTF operations and 5 of the respondents say no and 30 of the respondents remain neutral to the question by saying not sure.

4.2   Test of hypotheses

Hypotheses 1

Ho$_1$:   There is no significant relationship between lack of political will in Counter-insurgency and political instability in the North East.

The summary of results presented in table above shows that the calculated value of = 6.166, is greater than the tabulated r -value of = 0.72, at .05 level of significance with 228 degrees of freedom. On this note, the null hypothesis was rejected while the alternate hypothesis was upheld. This means that, there is a significant relationship between lack of political will by the Nigerian government and Boko Haram insurgency and polity instability in the North East.

Hypothesis II

Ho $_{ii}$:   There is no significant relationship between poor funding of Counter-insurgency and political instability in the North East.

TABLE 4. 35

Pearson product moment correlation analysis of the relationship between poor funding of

Counter-insurgency and political instability in the North East

(n =230)

Variable	$\sum x$	$\sum x^2$	$\sum xyr$-Cal	
	$\sum y$	$\sum y^2$		
Poor funding of Nigerian security	1537	7262	98.121	0.51
Political instability	1623	4218		

X=.05, critical r=0.198, DF=228

The summary of results presented in table above shows that the calculated value of = 98.121 is greater than the tabulated R-value of = 0.51 at .05 level of significance with 228 degrees of freedom. On this note, the null hypothesis was rejected while the alternate hypothesis was upheld. This means that, there is a significant relationship between poor funding and Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East.

Hypothesis III

Ho iii   There is no significant relationship between lack of capacity by the Nigerian military and Counter-Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East.

TABLE 4.36

Pearson product moment correlation analysis of the relationship between lack of capacity

in Counter-insurgency and political instability in the North East

(n =230)

Variable	$\sum x$	$\sum x^2$	$\sum xyr$-Cal
	$\sum y$	$\sum y^2$	
Lack of capacity by the Nigerian military	1425	52418.621	0.95
Political instability	1623	4218	

X=.05. critical r=0.198. DF= 228

The summary of results presented in table above shows that the calculated value of = 8.621, is greater than the tabulated r-value of= 0.95 at .05 level of significance with 228 degrees of freedom. On this note, the null hypothesis was rejected while the alternate hypothesis was upheld. This means that, there is a significant relationship between lack of capacity by the Nigerian military and Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East.

Hypotheses IV

Ho iv: There is no significant relationship between appropriate approach in Counter-Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East.

TABLE 4.37

Pearson product moment correlation analysis of the relationship between approach used in

Counter-insurgency and political instability in the North East

(n =230)

Variable	$\sum x$	$\sum x^2$	$\sum xy$	r-Cal
	$\sum y$	$\sum y^2$		
Approach used in executing BHI	1537	7262	98.12	10.51
Political Instability in the NE	1623	4218		

X=.05. critical r=0.198. DF= 228

The summary of results presented in table above shows that the calculated value of = 98.121 is greater than the tabulated r-value of = 0.51 at .05 level of significance with 228 degrees of freedom. On this note, the null hypothesis was rejected while the alternate hypothesis was upheld. This means that, there is a significant relationship between appropriate approach in Counter-Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East.

Hypothesis V

Ho v: There is no significant relationship between poor intelligence gathering and Counter-Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East.

TABLE 4.38

Pearson product moment correlation analysis of the relationship between poor intelligence

gathering in Counter-insurgency and political instability in the North East

(n =230)

Variable	$\sum x$	$\sum x^2$	$\sum xy$	r-Cal
	$\sum y$	$\sum y^2$		

Poor Intelligence Gathering	1537	7262	98.1210.51	
Political Instability in the NE	1623	4218		

X=.05. critical r=0.198. DF= 228

The summary of results presented in table above shows that the calculated value of = 98.121 is greater than the tabulated r-value of = 0.51 at .05 level of significance with 228 degrees of freedom. On this note, the null hypothesis was rejected while the alternate hypothesis was upheld. This means that, there is a significant relationship between poor intelligence gathering and Counter-Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East.

CHAPTER FIVE

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter is concerned with the presentation of results, and the discussion of the findings. The chapter is presented under the following sub-headings:

5.1   General description of the data/variables

5.2   Presentation of results

5.3   Discussion of findings

5.1   General description of data/variables

This study is on Boko Haram Insurgency and Political Instability in North East Nigeria covered the period 2011-2021.The independent variable in this study which is Boko Haram Insurgency was split into five research hypotheses. The dependent variable for this study being it impact on political instability North East was restricted to Borno State as the study area. The result is presented in hypothesis by hypothesis.

5.2   Presentation of results

Ho_i: There is a significant relationship between lacks of political will by the Nigerian government in addressing Counter-insurgency and political instability in the North East. From this result it shows that null hypothesis was rejected and the alternate hypothesis was accepted.

H_{0ii}: There is a significant relationship between poor funding and Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East. The null hypothesis was rejected and the alternate hypothesis retained.

H_{0iii}: There is no significant relationship between lack of capacity by the Nigerian military and Counter-Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East. The null hypothesis was rejected and the alternate retained.

H_0iv: There is no significant relationship between appropriate Counter-Boko Haram insurgency approach and political instability in the North East. The null was rejected and alternate retained.

H_0v: There is no significant relationship between poor intelligence gathering and Counter-Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East. The null was rejected and alternate retained.

It shows that poor intelligence gathering, such as non-used of unman area vehicle or drones, tracking of sponsors and tips about operations of the sects, restructuring of the security architecture as modern way of Counter-insurgency is responsible for the prolong Counter-Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East. The null was rejected and the alternate retained.

5.3   Discussion

Hypotheses 1

The decision rule of X^2 state that if the calculated value of X^2 is equal or greater than the table value at a given significant level we reject the null hypothesis. But if it is less than the table value we accept the null hypothesis.

The summary of results presented under hypothesis one that the calculated value of = 6.166. is greater than the tabulated r-value of = 0.72, at .05 level of significance with 228 degrees of freedom. therefore the null hypothesis is rejected (H_0) i.e. out of the sample of 230 respondent's opinion. That insecurity affects the socio-cultural life of border communities in Borno State. The implication of the result is that there is a significant

relationship between lack of political will by the government in Counter-insurgency strategy and political instability in the North East. The null hypothesis was rejected and the alternate hypothesis retained. There is need to improve on the security architecture of the place. retrain the personnel to be more strategic in their dealings. The government and the personnel need to show more commitment and sincerity to help in ending the insurgency and political instability in the north east. The Nigerian government lacks the political will and sincerity of purpose, not showing commitment in terms of adopting ultramodern approach and military hardware for Counter-insurgency strategy in addressing political instability in the North East. There should be paradigm shift that would decisively deal with issues like moles and betrayers in the security architecture of the country. The security should be systemized in handling all issues and also the system should introduce rewards system to encourage gallant and commitment of the security personnel.

Hypothesis II

The decision rule of X^2 state that if the calculated value of X^2 is greater or less than table value at a given significance level we reject the null hypothesis.

The summary of results presented under hypothesis two shows that the calculated value of = 98.121 is greater than the tabulated r-value of = 0.51 at .05 level of significance with 228 degrees of freedom , we therefore reject the null hypothesis (H_0) i.e. out of the sample of 100 respondents who answer to the questionnaires distributed, their responses indicate that; There is a significant influence of factors such as boundary/land disputes etc fueling insecurity in border communities of the North East. The implication of the results shows that. there is a significant relationship between poor funding by government which adversely affects the Counter-insurgency strategy adopted to end the war on Boko Haram

insurgency and political instability in the North East. The null was rejected and the alternate retained, issue such as banditry and kidnapping is encouraged by ransom payment by government and individuals etc. it is no longer news that the Nigeria military do not have modern hardware of the 21st century to degrade the Boko Haram fighters in the north east. The large sum of budgetary allocation is either misappropriated by top personnel or at most time use to fund the insurgents in order to prolong the war and continue to enrich few. Therefore, the findings of the hypotheses agree to the fact that poor funding is a major issue in the fight against book haram insurgency in the north east.

Funding of all security agencies in order to re-equip the security architecture in Nigeria according global best practices of Counter-insurgency to address political instability in the North East is highly recommended.

Hypotheses III

The decision rule of X^2 state that if the calculated value of X^2 is greater or less than table value at a given significance level we reject the null hypothesis.

The summary of results presented under hypothesis three above shows that the calculated value of = 8.621, is greater than the tabulated r-value of= 0.95 at .05 level of significance with 228 degrees of freedom, we therefore reject the null hypothesis (H_0) i.e. out of the sample of 100 respondents who answer to the questionnaires distributed, their responses indicate that: There is root causes of insecurity and political instability in Borno State. The implication of this result means that there is no significant relationship between lack of capacity by the Nigerian military in their Counter-insurgency strategy to win the war against book haram and political instability in the North East. Lack of capacity by the Nigerian military greatly affects Counter-insurgency strategy and political instability in the North East. The lack of technology such as unman area surveillance cameras or drones, modern riffles, rocket launchers, bomb detonators and trackers for intercepting

calls from the terrorist, among others affects the morale of the security agencies, therefore Systems and Relative deprivation theories best address this phenomenon.

Hypotheses IV

The decision rule of X^2 state that if the calculated value of X^2 is greater or less than table value at a given significance level we reject the null hypothesis.

The summary of results presented under hypothesis four shows that the calculated value of = 98.121 is greater than the tabulated r-value of = 0.51 at .05 level of significance with 228 degrees of freedom (H_0) i.e. out of the sample of 230 respondents who answer to the questionnaires distributed, their responses indicate that; There is a significant relationship between approach used in executing war, Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East. The implication of this result reveals that, there are several causes of insecurity other than the ones mention in this study, whose root causes are not readily known by the security personnel operating in various communities. There should be change of tactics and approach if Counter-insurgency strategy must be flexible to meet the present realities of modern day dynamism of terrorism and political instability in the North East. According to Agnew, people who engage in criminal activities have low social control due to the pressure that society places on them. If the security personnel adopt only a particular approach rather than kinetic and non-kinetic approach and seeking intelligence from other countries that have absolute advantage in terrorism war, Nigeria will continue to be a save heaven for insurgency to thrive.

Hypothesis V

The decision rule of X^2 state that if the calculated value of X^2 is greater or less than table value at a given significance level we reject the null hypothesis.

The summary of results presented in table above shows that the calculated value of = 98.121 is greater than the tabulated r-value of = 0.51 at .05 level of significance with 228 degrees of freedom. On this note, the null hypothesis was rejected while the alternate hypothesis was upheld. This means that, there is a significant relationship between poor intelligence gathering and Counter Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East. The Nigeria military intelligence, directorate of state security services, DSS, NIA and others security consultants and experts and not fully involve and as well the issue of sabotage, ethnicity, corruption and political agitations and regional interest are all the intervening variables alluding to the fact that Nigeria as a country is not ready to end the war against Book Haram Insurgency and political instability in the North East.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Summary

This study is on Boko Haram Insurgency and Political Instability in North East Nigeria 2011-2021. The violence extremism and kidnapping of Citizens, cattle rustling and banditry among others has become part of our daily life experience that have affected every part of our national life. Herdsmen and farmers' crisis have remained the most predominately resource-use security challenges in Nigeria. The necessity to provide good governance has been hampered by the activities of Boko Haram Terrorists, herders, banditry and kidnapping among others. This study tries to x-rays the strategy and approaches adopted by the Nigeria government to combat the insurgency ravaging the country for more than a decade. To address the above questions and objectives of the study concentrated at the North East region of the country, the research adopted triangulation and observational survey method, draw a sample of 230 respondents and closed ended interview questionnaire was used as data collection method and tested using SPSS statistical package to calculate the percentage analysis and correlation analysis was done to find out the relationship between variables of the study which is Boko Haram Insurgency and political instability in the North East.

6.2 Conclusion

The present study concludes that the level of poor infrastructural development, poor military strategy and approaches, lack of commitment and political will and moles among the security architecture of the Nigeria government is contributing to the protracted insurgency and political instability in the North East.

In Borno State, officials of the Nigeria immigrations and customs Service have virtually deserted their posts in the border town of Banki due to threats from the Boko Haram franchise in the area. The officials have resorted to going about in mufti in order to make the less vulnerable to attack. What is happening in Kaduna and Banki can be replicated across Northern Nigeria and to a lesser extent, across the country public and private business are becoming much weary of when, where are how they conduct their affairs. Some parts of the country have become no' go areas because they are perceived to be high risk locations. Hotels, guest houses and other tourist locations are being given a wide berth by a clientele that has suddenly realized that discretion is the better part of flavour.

There is an evident gap in the North East of security breaches and sabotage and the barriers pose a threat to sustainable development. This is a focal point that public security architecture should be seriously be revisited and government should focus on improving security personnel's welfare.

6.3   Recommendation

Based on the findings made in this investigation, the research recommends robust intelligence gathering and multi-agency collaboration in fighting against the sect. It has been asserted that lack of capacity by the Nigerian military significantly influenced Counter-Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East.

Appropriate and modern approach should be used in Counter-Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East. Also Poverty in the region should be reduced by creating jobs and youth empowerment schemes. If the Counter-Boko Haram insurgency must be won, it should be anchored on high technology and knowledge-based approach.

There are concerns that lack of political will is affecting the fight against Boko Haram insurgency in the North East. The government should demonstrate concerted political will inform of procurement of the required military hardware, declare full state of emergency in the Boko Haram epicenter to enable proper military onslaught.

Poor funding significantly influences Counter-Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East. Government should collaborate with internal and external partners in funding the military offensive against Boko Haram insurgency, procurements and appropriation, allocations should be carried out share resources and in the transparent and efficient manner.

Poor intelligence gathering significantly influence Counter- Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East. The anti-terrorism laws should be enforced and the law enforcement agencies fully equipped and trained on how to combat terrorism according to international best practices. Ultramodern military equipment should be procured and utilized effectively to achieve credible intelligence.

6.4 Recommendations for further research

Further research in this area should be conducted in the following areas:

1) A study to examine Nigerian governments political will on counter-Boko haram insurgency and the political instability in the north east and north central.

2) Whether the level of poor infrastructural development, poor military strategy and approaches, lack of commitment and political will and moles among the security architecture of the Nigeria government is contributing to the protracted insurgency and political instability in the North East. And north central

3) Whether Poor intelligence gathering significantly influence Counter- Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East.

4) An investigation on the Appropriate and modern approach that should be used in Counter-Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North East

REFERENCES

Abbas. T. (2016). Interview. In T. Abbas (Ed.). Muslim Britain: *Communities under Pressure*. London: Zed.

Adebayo, A. A. (2013). Youths' Unemployment and crime in Nigeria: A nexus and implications for national development. *International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology, 5*(8), 350-357.

Adesoji. A. (2010). The Boko Haram uprising and Islamic revivalism in Nigeria. *Africa Spectrum, 45*(2), 103 – 118.

Adesoji. A. (2011). Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic fundamentalism and the response of the Nigerian state. *Africa Today, 57*(4),101 – 112.

Agbiboa, D. E. (2013). The Nigerian Burden: Boko Haram and Religious Terrorism in Nigeria. *Conflict, Security and Development, 13*(1) 1-29.

Ajani. J. & Omonobi. K. (2011). Force Hq Bomb Blast: How Rimgim. 7 Storey Building Were Saved. *Vanguard* [online], 19 June 2011.

Akande. O. K. (2013) The Boko Haram uprising and Islamic revivalism in Nigeria. *Africa Spectrum, 45*(2), 95-108.

Akanji, O. O. (2009). *The politics of combating domestic terrorism in Nigeria*. In W. Okumu and A. Botha (eds), Domestic terrorism in Africa: Defining, addressing and understanding its impact on human security, 54–65. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Akinyelure, Y. (2017) Nigeria: Jonathan-police underfunding, cause of insecurity. Retrieved from www.allAfrica.com/stories/202008100119.html

Ali, M. A. & Fahmy, N. K. (2013) War against terrorism and its impact on children's academic performance in district Swat Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pakistan. *Journal of Management Info, 9*(1), 12-20.

Arena. N. G. & Arrigo. M. H. (2006). Social Identity Theory for Investigating Islamic Extremism in the Diaspora. *Journal of Strategic Security, 6*(4), 67-91.

Atta. G. (2013). Wartime faith-based reactions among traumatized Kosovar and Bosnian refugees in the United States. *Mental Health, Religion & Culture, 8*(4), 291-308.

Awake. S. (2008). When will terrorism end? Toward a theology of peace: A panacea to terrorism and violence. *Jos studies, 20,* 1-24.

Badejogbin, O. (2013). Boko Haram: An enquiry into socio-political context of Nigeria's Counter –terrorism response. *Law Democracy & Development, 17*, 226-252.

Baiyewu. L. (2012). Boko Haram, Bad Signal to Foreign Investors. Retrieved from http://www.punchng.com/news/Boko-Haram-Bad-Signal-to-Foreign-Investors/*Sunday Punch,* January 29, Pp.9.

Band, M. K. (2005) Should Private Security Companies Be Employed for Counterinsurgency Operations? *Journal of Military Ethics, 12*(3), 201-224

Baylis. J.. Wirtz, J. J. & Colin. S. G. (2006). *U.S. government's national strategy of combating Terrorism.* Washington, D.C., U.S.A.: White House.

BBC (2011). Nigeria churches hit by blasts during Christmas prayers. *BBC News* [online], 25 December 2011. Available from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16328940.

BBC (2012). Nigeria's Boko Haram militants claim This Day attacks. *BBC* [online], 2 May 2012. Available from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17926097.

BDN (2012), "Business Day Staff: Boko Haram: What Cost for the Northern Economy" Business Day, Lagos, Wednesday, 18th April, 20

Bouchat. C. J. (2013). *The causes of instability in Nigeria and implications for the United States.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army College Press.

Brandon. S. (1967). Outsourcing war: mercenaries and the privatization of peacekeeping. *Journal of International Affairs, 1*, 303-329.

Brooks. D. & Chorev. M. (2007). Ruthless humanitarianism: Why marginalizing private peacekeeping kills' people: Private Military and Security Companies. *Ethics, Policies and Civil-Military Relations, 1*, 116-30.

Bryman. A. (2012). *Social Research Methods*. Oxford University Press.

Bunt, H. D. (2007). *The Relation between Organized Crime and Informal Markets: The Role of Hawala Bankers in the Transfer of Proceeds from Organized Crime, CRIMPREV*. Belgium: Gant University Press.

Campbell. H. (2012). Understanding the Relationship between Religion Online and Offline in a Networked Society. *Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 80*(1), 64-93

Carpenter. S. (2007). U.S. elite and non-elite newspapers' portrayal of the Iraq war: A comparison of frames and source use. *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, 84 (4), 761–776.

Chaliand. T. & Blin, G.C. (2007). Problems of Peace Enforcement: Lessons to be Drawn from Multinational Peacekeeping Operations in Ongoing Conflicts in Africa. In T. Zack-Williams and A. Thomson (eds). Africa in Crisis: *New Challenges and Possibilities*. Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, pp. 196-215.

Checkel. P. (2012) Violence, Power and Rationality: A Political Analysis of Conflict in Contemporary Africa.' In P. Chabal, U. Engel, and A. Gentili, eds., *Is Violence Inevitable in Africa: Theories of Conflict and Approaches to Conflict Prevention*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 1-8.

Chothia. F. (2012). Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists? British Broadcasting Corporation. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501

Clutterbuck. R. (1990). *Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare*. New York: Routledge.

Collier. P. and Hoeffler. A. (2007). "On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa," Journal of Conflict Resolution46, no. 1 (2002): 13–28

Cook, D. (2011). The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria: Combating Terrorism Centre. Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko_Haram. Accessed on 20-10-2020.

Counter-Insurgency Initiative (2009). *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide*. Washington. D.C.: Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

Cronin, A. (2003). 'Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism.' *International Security*, *27*(3): 30-58.

Dauda, M. (2014). The effect of Boko Haram crises on socio-economic activities in Yobe State, *International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Invention*, 1(4), 421 – 435.

Dokken, C. (2008). The Myth of Global Islamic Terrorism and Local Conflict in Mali and the Sahel.' *African Affairs*, *112*(448): 498-509.

Dunigan, P. (2011). Islamic fundamentalism and sectarian violence: The Maitatsine and Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. Paper presented at the 2009 IFRA (French Institute for Research in Africa) Conference on Conflict and Violence, Zaria, Nigeria. http://www.ifra-nigeria.org.spip.php?article156 [Accessed 16 June 2020].

Ebonugwo, M. (2004). *Domestic terrorism in Africa: defining, addressing and understanding its impact on human security.* Available onhttps://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/08/is-shekau-really-dead/

ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2013). ECOWAS political declaration and common

position against terrorism. Available at https://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/ 2019/05/POLITICAL-DECLARATION-ENG..pdf

Ehusani, G. E. (2005). Inter-religious Dialogues in Nigeria: Present Challenges and Future Prospects. Report Presented at the Conference Organized by MISSIO in Stuttgart, Germany, March 25.

Eitzen, S. & Zinn, M. B. (2010). Religion in Conflict and Order. In S. Eitzen, M. B. Zinn and K. E. Smith, *Understanding Society* (ed.). Boston, MA: Pearson Allyn and Bacon, pp. 487-520.

El-Quorchi, M., Maimbo, S. & Wilson, J. (2003). *Informal Funds Transfer Systems: An Analysis of the Informal Hawala System.* Washington, DC, U.S.A: IMF

Eme, O. I. & Ibietan, J. (2012). The Cost of Boko Haram Activities in Nigeria. *Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review (OMAN Chapter)*, *2*(2), 10-32.

Erzberger, C. & Kelle, U., (2003). Making inferences in mixed methods: The rules of integration. In: Tashakkori, A., Teddlie, C. (Eds.), *Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioural Research.* Sage, Thousand Oaks, pp. 457-488.

Fadl Allah, A. M. H. (1986). Islam and violence in political reality. *Middle East Insight, 4,* 4 - 5.

Farhad. B. (2015). Nigeria's Boko Haram attacks are misunderstood as regional Islamist threat. *Christian Science Monitor*, *3*(1), 21 – 33.

Farhad. K., (2015).Suicide Bombers: *Allah's New Martyrs.* London: Pluto Press

Fessy, T. (2015). Africa: Gaddafi's influence in Mali's coup. *BBC News Africa*. Retrieved from www.bbcnews.co.uk

Fischer J. (2002) "Are Nigeria's Boko Haram getting foreign backing?", *BBC News.* URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13843967 [Accessed June 8, 2020].

Fletcher, N. and Baldwin, J. (2002), Money Laundery Counter Measures with Primary Focus upon Terrorism and the U.S. Patriot Act 2001, *Journal of Money Laundering Control,6(2), 105-136.*

Friedrich, H. G & Raul, M. F. (2011) The state of social equity in American public administration. *National Civic Review, 94*(4), 31–38.

Ghana Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Law (2008). National anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism and proliferation (aml/cft&p) policy (2019-2022): Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2008 (Act 749) and Anti-

Terrol(Act. 762). Available at https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2019/09 /NATIONAL-POLICY-AML-CFT-POLICY-AND-ACTION-PLAN-1.pdf.

Ghana Anti-Terrorism Law (2005). Anti-Terrorism Bill. Available at http://www.vertic.or g/media/National%20Legislation/Ghana/GH_Anti-Terrorism_Bill.pdf.

Gilbert, L.D. (2013). Ethnic Militancy in Nigeria: A Comparative Re-appraisal of three Major Ethnic Militias in Southern Nigeria. *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS), 17*(6)1-9.

Gilbert, L.D. (2014). Prolongation of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: The International Dimensions. *Research on Humanities and Social Science, 4*(11) 150-156.

Global Terrorism Index (2015). *Measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism.* New York: Institute for Economics and Peace.

Gordon, A. R. (2007). Holy Terror and Mass Killings? Re-examining the Motivations and Methods of Mass Casualty Terrorists. *International Studies Review, 7*(1): 153-155.

Guardian (2011). Deadly bombing at UN building in Nigeria's capital. *The Guardian* [online], 26 August 2011. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/202 0/aug/26/explosion-nigeria-un-building-bomb.

Guardian (2015). Nigerian army frees hundreds more women and girls from Boko Haram. *Guardian* [online], 2 May 2015. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/worl d/2015/may/02/nigerian-women-girls-boko-haram-rebel.

Guardian (2017) Boko Haram not defeated without rescue of Chibok girls, says Buhari. *Guardian (Nigeria)* [online], 12 January 2017. Available from: https://guardian.ng/news/boko-haram-not-defeated-without-rescue-of-chibok-girls-says-buhari/.

Gunning, J. & R. Jackson (2011). What's so religious about religious terrorism? *Critical Studies on Terrorism, 4* (3): 369-388.

Gurr and Cole (2005). *Why Men Rebel.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Haviland, S. (2012). *Defining terrorism.* New York: American Diplomacy Publishers Chapel Hill NC

Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Horgan. T. E. (1997). Issues in terrorism research. *The Police Journal, 70*(3), 193 – 202.

Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2015). Arrested war: the third phase of mediatization. *Information, Communication & Society*, *18*(11), 1320–1338.

Hübschle A., (2007), Terrorist Financing in Southern Africa: Are we making a mountain out of a molehill, ISS paper 132

IFAD. (2007). *IFAD's new strategic framework 2007-2010: Six objectives to enable poor rural people overcome poverty.*

Ijtemaye, L., (2014). Backgrounder: Boko Haram and Political Instability in Nigeria. Retrieved from http:/www.ssrreseurcecentre.org/20/07/29/backgrounder-boko-haram International Terrorism Index.

Isyaku, A. (2013) Terrorism: A New Challenge to Nigeria's Stability in the 21st Century. *International Affairs and Global Strategy, 11*(2), 16-24.

Izah, P. P. (2014) Political Economy of Nigeria: Understanding the Contemporary Challenges, Lecture Note for Masters Student, UDUS (Unpublished).

Jackson. R. J. &Sørensen, S. M. (2003). *Terrorism: A critical introduction.* Basingstoke: Palgrave- Macmillan.

Johari, J. C. (2011) Comparative Politics, New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Private limited.

Juergensmeyer, M. (2003). Terror in the Mind of God: *The Global Rise of Religious Violence.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kaempf. S. (2013). The mediatisation of war in a transforming global media landscape. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 67 (5), 586-604.

Keohane. R. O. & Nye, J. S. (1972). Transnational Relations and World Politics. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.

Le Billon. P. (2001). The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed conflicts, *Political Geography, 20*, 561-584.

Lesser, I.. Arquilla, J., Ronfeldt, D., Hoffman, B., Zanini, M. & Jenkins, B. (1999). *Countering the New Terrorism.* Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation.

Levi, M. & Gilmore. W. (2002). Terrorist Finance, Money Laundering and the Rise and Rise of Mutual Evaluation: *A New Paradigm for Crime Control in Financing Terrorism.* Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 87-115.

Liolio. S. E. (2012). Rethinking Counter insurgency: A case Study of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Austria: European Peace University Slacklining.

Lister, Q. (2012). Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents? *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49*(2), 278-297.

Lohrmann. R. (2000). Migrants, Refugees and Insecurity. Current Threats to Peace? *International Migration, 38,* 3 - 22.

Marama. N., (2011). UN House bombing: Why we struck - Boko Haram. *Vanguard* [online], 28 August 2011. Available from: https://www.vanguardngr.com/20/08/un-house-bombing-why-we-struck-boko-haram/.

Mark, M.. (2011). After Nigeria's Church Bombings: The Advent of Christian-Muslim Conflict? *Time* [online], 27 December 2011. Available from: http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2103163,00.html.

Marquardt. E. & Heffelhinger, C. (2008). Terrorism and Political Islam: *Origins, Ideologies and Methods; A Counterterrorism Textbook* (2nd Edition). West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, Department of Social Sciences

Martin. G. (2010). *Understanding terrorism: Challenges, perspectives, and issues.* Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications Ltd.

McConnell, M. W. (2009) Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding of Religion. *Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 33*, 944 – 952.

McGuire. M. (1992) *Religion: The Social Context,* 3rd ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Millett. A. R. & Murray, W. (2010). *Military Effectiveness.* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Mishal. J. S. & Sela, N. O. (2000). Strong societies and weak states: *State-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Mohammed. M. (2012). Violence and Threat to Yobe's Economic Growth. The Moment, Wednesday, March 7.

Musa. A. & Yusha'u. M., (2013). Conflict reporting and parachute journalism in Africa: A study of CNN and Al Jazeera's coverage of the Boko Haram insurgency. *Journal of Arab & Muslim Media, 6*(2-3), 251 - 267.

NBS (2012). "Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010." Abuja: National Bureau of Statistics.

Neumann. S. K. (2009) "How Rigorous Is Radicalization Research?" Democracy and Security 9, no. 4 (2013): 360.

Nigeria National Population Commission & ORC Macro (2004). *Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey 2003.* Calverton, Maryland, USA: National Population Commission (NPC) and ORC Macro.

Nwakaudu, M. (2012). Boko Haram and National Development. Retrieved from http://www.vanguardngr.com; Accessed on 25/03/20.

Obaremi. O. (2014) Economic implications of Boko Haram. Retrieved from http://blog.policyng.com/read.php?rid-154.

Odita, A. O. & Akan, D. (2014). Boko Haram Activities: A Major Set Back to Nigerian Economic Growth. *IOSR Journal of Economics and Finance (IOSR-JEF), 3*(5), 01-06.

Ogege. S. O. (2013) Insecurity and Sustainable Development: The Boko Haram Debacle in Nigeria. *American International Journal of Social Science, 2*(7), 82-88.

Ogochukwu, E. O. (2013). Socio-Economic Implications of the Boko Haram Insurgence in Nigeria: 2009-2013. Thesis. Department of Political Science Caritas University, Amorji-Nike. Enugu.

Ojo, E. (2003). The Mass Media and the Challenges of Sustainable Democratic Values in Nigeria: Possibilities and Limitations. *Media, Culture & Society*, 25, 821–840.

Okereocha. C. (2012). Heartache for the Economy. *TELL*, May 14, Pp. 46 – 47.

Okoli, A. C. and Iortyer, P. (2014). Terrorism and humanitarian crisis in Nigeria: Insights from Boko Haram insurgency. *Global Journal of Human-Social Science, 14*(1), 40 – 50.

Okpaga, A., Chijioke, U. S. & Eme, O. I. (2012). Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurit Question in Nigeria, *Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review, 1*(9), 121 - 135.

Okupe. D. (2015). Military will degrade Boko Haram capabilities in six weeks. Retrieved from https://www.channelstv.com/2015/02/14/military-will-degrade-boko-haram-capabilities-six-weeks-okupe/ (Accessed on 14-09-2020).

Olaniyi. J. O. (2001) Introduction to Contemporary Political Analysis, Lagos: Fapsony Nig. Ltd

Olojo, A., 2013. Nigeria's Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support for Boko Haram. Http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT

Omilusi, M. (2016). The multi-dimensional impacts of insurgency and armed conflicts on Nigeria. *Global Journal of Human-Social Science and Political Science, 16*(2), 222 – 236.

Ong, A. (1999). *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logic of Transnationality*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Onuah. F. & Eboh, C., (2011). Islamists kill dozens in Nigeria Christmas bombs. *Reuters* [online], 25 December 2011. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/artic le/us-nigeria-blast/islamists-kill-dozens-in-nigeria-christmas-bombs-idUSTRE7BO 03020111225.

Onuoha, F. C. (2012). *(Un)Willing to Die: Boko Haram and Suicide Terrorism in Nigeria* [online]. Available from: http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2012/12/201212249 1416595337.html.

Onuoha. F. C. (2014). *Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?* NW, Washington DC: United States Pace Institute Constitution Ave.

Oriyommi. R. (2011). Nigeria Boko Haram on Islam. Available at http://www.onislam.net/english/news/africa/455146-nigeria-boko-haram.

Osaghae. E. & Suberu, T. (2013). *A History of Identities, Violence, and Stability in Nigeria*. Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE).

Osita, A. (2004). *Ethnic militias and the threat to democracy in post-transition Nigeria*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Research Report No. 127.

Ovaga. O. (n.d). The Socio-Economic Implications of Book-Haram Activities in Northern Nigeria. *Review of Public Administration and Management, 1*(2).

Oviasogie. S. O. (2013). Insecurity and Sustainable Development: The Boko Haram Debacle in Nigeria. *American International Journal of Social Science, 2*(7), 321 - 331.

Oyeniyi, B. A. (2012). Political narratives as historical realities: Is Jos conflict and ethno-religious conflict. In I. O. Albert (ed), *A history of social conflict and conflict management in Nigeria*, (pp. 35-51) Ibadan: John Archers.

Oyovbaire, O. F. (2001). State Failure, Terrorism: An Appraisal of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria. *Journal of Sustainable Society, 2*(1), 20 – 30.

Passas (2003). The use of force and firearms by private maritime security companies against suspected pirates. International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 62(3), 667-701.

Passas, N. & Jones, K. (2006), Commodities and terrorist financing: Focus on Diamonds, *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 12*(1), 1 – 33.

Passas, U. (2005). The Impact of Mercenaries and Private Military and Security Companies on Civil War Severity between 1946 and 2002. *International Interactions, 40*(2), 191-215.

Pearsall, J. & Trumble, B. (2006). Outsourcing the responsibility to protect: humanitarian intervention and private military and security companies. *International Theory, 2*(1), 1-31.

Pew Forum & Public Affairs (2011). Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life Poll: *The World's Muslims' Religion, Politics and Society*. New York: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

Piazza, J. (2009). Is Islamist terrorism more dangerous? An empirical study of group ideology, organization, and goal structure. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 21*(1), 62-88.

Praeger. J. S. (1992) Migration Remittances and Development: A review of Global evidence. *Journal of African Economies, 15*(2), 245 – 336.

Raphaeli, N. (2003): Financing of Terrorism: Sources, Methods and Channels, *Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, 15*(4), 59-82.

Rapoport. D.C. (1984). Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in three religious' traditions. *American Political Science Review, 78*(3): 658-677.

Reese, S. (1995). Finding Frames in a Web of Culture: The Case of the War on Terror. In P. D'Angelo and J. Kuypers, (ed). *Doing News Rraming Analysis: Empirical, Theoretical and Normative Perspectives.* New York: Routledge, pp. 17-42.

Risse. T., Sikkink. K. S Ropp. S. C. {1999]. The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices. *Domestic Politics and Norms Diffusion in International Relations, 117,* 222 – 232.

Risse-Kappen, T. (1995). Democratic peace-warlike democracies? A social constructivist interpretation of the liberal argument. *European Journal of International Relations, 1*(4), 491 – 517.

Rogin, J. (2014). Hillary's State Department Refused to Brand Boko Haram as Terrorists. *Daily Beast* [online], 7 May 2014. Available from: https://www.thedailybeast.com/h illarys-state-department-refused-to-brand-boko-haram-as-terrorists.

Romero, A. J. (2007). The different faces of Islamic terrorism. *International Review of Sociology, 17*(3), 443-458.

Rourke. J. (2008).*International Polities on World Stage*. London: Mahram Hill Publications.

Schmid, A. & Jongman, A. (1988). *Political Terrorism*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction

Schmid. A. P. & Graaf, J. (1980). *Insurgent, terrorism and the western news media.* Leiden: COMT.

Schmid, A. P. (2004). Frameworks for conceptualizing terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 16*(2), 197-221

Schneider, F. (2004): The financial flows of Islamic Terrorism, in: Masciandaro, Donato (ed.), *Global Financial Crime: Terrorism, Money Laundering and Offshore Centres,* Aldershot (Great Britain): Ashgate, 2004, pp.97-126.

Schneider, F. (2008a): Turnover of Organized Crime and Money Laundering: Some Preliminary Empirical Findings, *Discussion Paper,* Department of Economics, University of Linz.

Schneider, F. (2008b): Money Laundering from Revenues from Organized Crime: Some Preliminary Empirical Findings, *revised version* of a *paper* which was presented at the Conference "Illicit Trade and Globalization", CES-ifo Venice Summer Workshop, Venice National University, San Servolo, July 14-15, 2008.

Shearlaw. M. (2015). Why did the world ignore Boko Haram's Baga attacks? *Guardian* [online], 2015. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/wo rld/2015/jan/12/-sp-boko-haram-attacks-nigeria-baga-ignored-media.

Shiklam (2012) *Terrorism: Nigeria and Global Dimension,* Golden-Gems Unique Multi ventures, Ibadan.

Silke. A. (2007). The psychological impact of the continued terrorist threat. *National Strategy Forum Review, 17*(1), 13-16.

Silke, A. (2009). Contemporary terrorism studies: Issues in research. New York: Routledge, pp. 34-48.

Simonsen, C. E. & Jeremy, R. S. (2000). *Terrorism today: The past, the players, the future.* Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. pp. 22-24

Singer. M. (1992). The application of relative deprivation theory to justice perception of preferential selection. *Current Psychology, 11*(2), 128-145.

Smillie. I., Gberie. L. & Hazleton, R. (2000). *The heart of the matter Sierra Leone, diamonds & human security: Complete report.* Collingdale, USA: Diane Publishing.

START Background Report, (2014). Boko Haram: Assessment of Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and Policy Options. Available at http://www.start.umd.edu/news/ba ckground-report-boko-haramrecent-attacks, Accessed on May 9, 2020.

Sunday Trust (2012). Shettima Monguno to FG: Boko Haram members aren't faceless, talk with them. Retrieved from http://www.dailytrust.com/news/Shettima-Monguno-To-FG-Boko- Haram-members-aren't-faceless-talk-with-them, Daily Trust, 29 January, 2020 pp. 7 – 8.

Taydas. Z., Enia. J. & James, P. (2011). Why Do Civil Wars Occur? Another Look at the Theoretical Dichotomy of Opportunity Versus Grievance, *Review of International Studies.* 37, 2627-2650.

Terrorism Act (2000). *Anti-terrorism law, criminal justice and terrorism.* United Kingdom: National Legislative Bodies / National Authorities.

......, ... Darkindo, A., & Heras, N. A. (2013). The Ideological Evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria: Merging Local Salafism and International Jihadism. *The RUSI Journal,* 158(4), 46–53.

Zumve. S., Ingyoroko, M. & Akuva, I.I. (2013) Terrorism in Contemporary Nigeria: A Latent Function of Official Corruption and State Neglect, *European Scientific Journal* March edition Vol 9 No 8

APPENDIX

RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

ON

BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN THE NORTH-EAST NIGERIA - QUESTIONNAIRE

All correspondence to

Hello,

My name is Aberagi, Emmanuel Teryila, a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences   University of Calabar, Calabar. I am undertaking a study with an objective to investigate Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North-East Nigeria, 2011-2021.

The purpose of this study is purely academic, kindly feel free and be rest assured that every information provided here shall be used **ONLY** for academic purposes and shall be treated with utmost confidentiality and professionalism. This questioner is going to take a maximum of twenty (20 minutes).

Thank you.

SECTION ONE - Demographic

1.   What is your gender
   ( ) female
   ( ) Male

2.   Which category below includes your age
   ( ) 17 or younger
   ( ) 18-20
   ( ) 21-29
   ( ) 30-39
   ( ) 40-49
   ( ) 50-59

   ( ) 60 0r older

3. Marital status

( ) married

( ) single

( ) divorce

( ) widow

( ) widower

4. What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?

( ) Fist School leaving certificate

( ) Senior School Certificate (WAEC/NECO certificate)

( ) Bachelor degree

( ) Graduate Degree

5. Which of the following best describes your employment status?

( ) Employed

( ) Self-employed

( ) Unemployed

( ) Retired

6. What is your nationality

( ) Nigerian

( ) Non-Nigerian, (kindly specify)

SECTION TWO-INSECUIRTY

7. Boko Haram Insurgency is an Islamization agenda and purely for political gains by

    Nigerian elites?

    ( ) yes

    ( ) no

    ( ) not sure

8. Is Boko Haram Insurgency an Islamization agenda or purely for political gains by

    Nigerian elites?

    ( ) yes

    ( ) no

    ( ) not true

9. Are the following groups the major promoters of Boko haram insurgency and

    political instability in the North East?

    ( ) Politicians

    ( ) Fulani herders

    ( ) Security operative

10. How does the Boko Haram insurgency and instability impact the life and survival

    of people of the North East?

    ( )   positively

    ( )   Negatively

11. How does the Boko Haram insurgency and instability impact the life and survival

of   people of the North East

    ( )   yes

    ( )   No

    ( )   Not Sure

12. Do you consider that there is a close relationship between Boko Haram insurgency and poverty insurgency and unemployment?

( ) yes

( ) No

( ) Not Sure

13. Does the Boko Haram affect the cultural political and socio-economic lives of the people around your area?

( ) yes

( ) No

( ) Not Sure

SECTION THREE-

14. Do you think the root cause of Boko Haram insurgency and instability are idleness unemployment poverty among the North east youths?

( ) Political

( ) culturally

( ) Socio-economic

( ) All of the above

15. What aspect (s) of our national life is mostly affected by Boko Haram insurgency?

( ) yes

( ) No

( ) Not sure

16. Does Boko Haram insurgency and political instability breed intolerance among people due to political interest?

( ) yes

( )No

( ) Not sure

17. Do Boko Haram insurgency and political instability give room to crime and criminality such as banditry thuggery and proliferation of small arms and light weapon (SMLW)

   ( ) yes

   ( ) No

   ( ) Not sure

18. Is government and relevant agencies aiding the rising spate of Boko Haram insurgency and political instability across the borders in North East?

   ( ) yes

   ( ) No

   ( ) Not sure

19. Do you think negligence and lack of political will on the part of government is giving rise to Boko Haram insurgency and political instability?

   ( ) yes

   ( ) No

   ( ) Not sure

20. Do you think that poor funding to relevant agencies such as security agencies at the borders communities affects the fights against Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North –East.

   ( ) yes

   ( ) No

   ( ) Not sure

21. Do you think that lack of capacity by the Nigerian military and the police is responsible for the continuous dominance of Boko Haram insurgency and political instability in the North-East?

( ) yes

( ) No

( ) Not sure

22. Do you think that lack of qualified military personnel and modern military weapon is responsible for insurgency and political instability in North East?

( ) yes

( ) No

( ) Not sure

23. Do you think that the pressure of crime and criminality playing out in the borders is a reflection of poor intelligence gathering and the failure of government in the North East?

( ) yes

( ) No

( ) Not sure

24. Do you think the root causes of Boko Haram insurgency and instability are idleness unemployment poverty among the North East youths?

( ) yes

( ) No

( ) Not sure

25. Will be true that our national life is mostly affected by Boko Haram insurgency?

( ) yes

( ) No

( ) Not sure

26. Does Boko Haram insurgency and political instability breed intolerance among people of the North East?

( ) yes

( ) No

( ) Not sure

27. Does Boko Haram insurgency and political instability give room to crime and criminality such as violence thuggery and proliferation of small arms and light weapon (SMLW)?

( ) yes

( ) No

( ) Not sure

28. Is government and or relevant MDAs unaware of the rising spate of Boko Haram insurgency and political instability across the borders in the North East?

( ) yes

( ) No

( ) Not sure

29. Do you think negligence on the part of government is giving rise to insecurity across the Northern Nigeria?

( ) yes

( ) No

( ) Not sure

30. Do you think relevant agencies such as security agencies at the borders are being proactive in the fight against criminality and border related crimes?

( ) yes

( ) No

( ) Not sure

31. Do you think that the ungoverned spaces around border communities if adequately police might lead to blocking invaders and ending insurgency?

( ) yes

( ) No

( ) Not sure`

32. Do you think that leveraging on relevant military weapon and modern technology like drones will end insurgency and instability in the North East?

( ) yes

( ) No

( ) Not sure

34. Do you think that the pressure of crime and criminality playing out in the North is promoted by the JTF operations

( ) yes

( ) no

( ) not sure