

**ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT AMNESTY PROGRAMME TO NIGER DELTA STATES
OF NIGERIA**

BY

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JUNE, 2017.

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation entitled “Assessment of the Implementation of Federal Government Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta of Nigeria” has been written by me and it is a report of my research work. It has not been presented in any previous application for M.Sc. in Public Administration or any other degree.

All quotations are indicated and sources of information specifically acknowledged by means of bibliography.

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CERTIFICATION

This dissertation report entitled “An Assessment of the Implementation of Federal Government Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta of Nigeria” meets the regulation governing the award of M.Sc. in Public Administration of the School of Post-graduate Studies, Nasarawa State University, Keffi for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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ABSTRACT

One of the most current and topical issues within the context of peace and conflict resolution in Nigeria, borders on the lingering militancy and the subsequent President Yar'Adua's (2008) amnesty programme in Niger Delta. The objective of this study is to assess the implementation of the Federal Government Amnesty programme with a view to resolving the Niger Delta crisis. Primary and Secondary data were used for this study. Primary data were collected through the survey method with the instrumentality of the questionnaire, while the secondary data were generated through the reading of relevant documents. The data were converted into percentage and analyzed. The findings of this study revealed that the implementation of Amnesty Programme is a strong tool in the development of Niger Delta Region. It was also concluded that the implementation of Amnesty programme will engender integrity, fairness objectivity that will culminate in a robust good decision making in order to enhance good objectives on the implementation of Amnesty Programme. Taking into consideration all the challenges the researcher encountered on this study, he however, came up with recommendations that could enable the Federal Government in the implementation of Amnesty Programme.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The conflict in the Niger Delta first arose in the early 1990s over tensions between foreign oil corporations and a number of the Niger Delta's minority ethnic groups, who felt they are being exploited, particularly the Ogoni and the Ijaw. Ethnic and political unrest has continued throughout the 1990s, despite the transition to democracy government in 1999. Competition for oil wealth has fueled violence between ethnic groups, causing the militarization of nearly the entire region by ethnic militia groups, Nigerian military and police forces, especially, the Nigerian Mobile Police. From 2004 violence began to hit the oil industry, the most prominent being piracy and kidnapping. In 2009, a presidential amnesty program accompanied with support and training of ex-militants proved to be a success. Thus until 2011, victims of crimes were fearful of seeking justice for crimes committed against them because of a failure to prosecute those responsible for human rights abuses. Nigeria, after nearly four decades of oil production, had by the early 1980s become almost completely economically dependent on petroleum extraction, which at the time generated 25% of its GDPC.

This portion has since risen to 60%, as of 2008. Despite the vast wealth created by petroleum, the benefits have been slow to trickle down to the majority of the population, who since the 1960s have increasingly been forced to abandon their traditional agricultural practices. Annual production of both cash and food crops dropped

significantly in the later decades of 20th century. Cocoa production dropped by 43% for example; Nigeria was the world's largest cocoa exporter in 1960. During the same period rubber production dropped by 29%, cotton by 65%, and groundnuts by 64%, while many skilled, well-paid Nigerians have been employed by oil corporations, the majority of Nigerians and most especially the people of the Niger Delta states and the far north have become poorer since the 1960s. The Delta region has a steady growing population estimated at more than 30 million people in 2005, and accounts for more than 23% of Nigeria's total population. The population density is also among the highest in the world, with 265 people per square kilometer, according to the Niger Delta Development Commission. This population is expanding at a rapid 3% per year and the oil capital, Port Harcourt, and other large towns are also growing quickly. Poverty and urbanization in Nigeria are growing, and official corruption is considered a fact of life. The resulting scenario is one in which urbanization does not bring accompanying economic growth to provide jobs. Notwithstanding, the amnesty has guaranteed negative peace in the region with its high skepticisms of transforming it to enduring and lasting peace. This paper will make a brief overview of the Niger Delta crisis, for a proper understanding of the different opinions of the actors. It will discuss the amnesty programme as a means to peace building, in post conflict Niger Delta. According to the United Nations Development Programme, (UNDP, 2008) Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor and economic conflict.

It is against this background that various leaders of the region have been calling for a redress of this socio economic situation of the region in various fora. These include Ogoni Bill of Right (1990), the Kaiama Declaration (1998), among others as a consequence of the above stated poor socio-economic conditions of the people of Niger Delta over their impoverished existence. Gowon (2008), concedes that there are justifiable feelings by the communities in the area that much is taken out from them without a corresponding return of benefits to the area. In a detailed affirmation of the imperatives of a development oriented approach to the increasing poverty in the Niger Delta, Gowon (2008), did state that: “Niger Delta is overdue for development. The plans earlier put in place during my administration, which could have addressed the problems, were not only implemented but totally abandoned by successive federal administration to the detriment of the region and the nation”. This is unlike what transpires in the Middle East countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE (Dubai) etc, where the desert is turned into green vegetation and a massive physical and infrastructural development. In spite of this clarion call by Gowon (2008), and a whole lot of other similar “save our soul” (SOS) calls to the federal government of Nigeria for urgent development of this area, not much was done by the federal government. These observed inadequacies on the part of the federal government, towards the development of the Niger Delta communities, gave rise to community agitations mainly championed by the youths. However, all these agitations hardly resulted to any positive response on the part of the central government. Instead, the agitation was met with state violence that has resulted in the militant approach by the youths in the region (Nwaodike and Ebienfa, 2010).

Since 2006, these little known militant groups have emerged in Nigeria's oil Niger Delta, making life difficult for the Nigerian government and the oil companies in the region. Their activities include errant violent movement, sea piracy and bunkering clashes, among others. The implications of these militant activities, among others, are social instability, tension in the region and loss of oil and gas resources by the Federal Government of Nigeria and the oil and gas companies. To curb this militancy in the region the government of President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, introduced the amnesty programme in order to ensure peace and security. After several weeks of preparation, characterized by crucial meeting at both committee and presidential levels, President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua proclaimed the much touted declaration of amnesty as recommended by the Presidential Panel on Amnesty and Disarmament for Militants of the Niger-Delta, thereby legalizing the government's grant of amnesty to the youth.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

There are some previous works on the subject matter like the work undertaken by Edoror (2010), in his work titled "The Federal governments' Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta which is similar to this research work. Edoror centred on three states- Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa and Crose River states. The findings from his study indicate that the programme succeeded in provision of roads and health care facilities but could not provide electricity and quality education. Kuku (2013), in his study titled 'The Politics of Amnesty in Niger Delta' the scope of his study was on four Niger Delta States namely Edo, Ondo, Bayelsa and Akwa Ibom. The study shows that the programme failed in provision of electricity

and water but succeeded in provision of roads and education. The findings from the previous works as stated above is grossly inadequate to properly assess the impact of the amnesty programme in Niger Delta states. This study will examine the programme in the remaining four States namely Abia, Imo, Delta and River which previous researchers did not cover in order to find out if the other specific objectives of Amnesty programme like provision of electricity, roads, health facilities and employment will be a success. In terms of methodology, the previous researchers made use of content analysis while the researcher adopted survey method, which led to the design and distribution of questionnaires among the staff of the Presidential Amnesty Unit and the end users. Again, it was found that non-availability of job opportunities creates the leeway for robbery and kidnapping in the region. Furthermore, this work differs from the previous researches in terms of its findings, the research question therefore becomes, has the Federal governments' amnesty programme in Niger Delta states achieved its objectives?

1.3 Research Questions

To guide this study, the following research questions were formulated.

1. To what extent has Federal Government Amnesty Programme solved the security in the Niger Delta States of Nigeria?
2. To what extent has Federal Government Amnesty Programme solved the problem of electricity supply in the Niger Delta States of Nigeria?
3. To what degree has Federal Government Amnesty Programme impacted on the provision of Health care facilities in the Niger Delta States of Nigeria?

4. To what magnitude has Federal Government Amnesty Programme solved the problem of poor Education in the Niger Delta States of Nigeria?
5. To what extent has Federal Government Amnesty Programme solved road challenges in the Niger Delta States of Nigeria?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The main objective of this study is to examine the Federal Government Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta States of Nigeria. Other specific objectives are:

1. To assess the effect of Federal government Amnesty programme in provision of electricity supply in the Niger Delta States of Nigeria.
2. To assess the Federal Government Amnesty Programme in provision of security in the Niger Delta States of Nigeria.
3. To determine the Federal Government Amnesty Programme in the provision of health facilities in the Niger Delta States of Nigeria.
4. To assess the Federal Government Amnesty Programme in the provision of Education in the Niger Delta States of Nigeria.
5. To assess the Federal Government Amnesty Programme in the provision of roads in the Niger Delta States of Nigeria.

1.5 Significance of the Study

This study assessed the Federal Government's perceptions on the implementation of Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. Thus, its significance lies on the fact that it will assess the level of implementation of the Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta states of Nigeria, thereby opening up the Programme for further review and reorganization by policy makers responsible for it.

Again, this study will educate the general public and people of the affected state on the implementation and challenges of the Amnesty Programme. This would enable them make contribution to ensure its success where necessary.

This research will also serve as a resource base to scholars, students and researchers interested in carrying out further research in the field, which when applied will go a long way in providing new explanations and ideas on the topic.

Equally, the study will be useful to the officials of the Federal Government because it will unveil the impact and challenges militating against the implementation of the Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta region of the country.

Finally, it will be of benefit to multi-national companies operating the Niger Delta area of the country because of its immense economic benefits to all stakeholders.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The purpose of this study is to assess the Federal Government Amnesty Programme in Niger Delta States of Nigeria which comprises of Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers. For the purpose of this study, the scope of the research will be restricted to four (4) of the nine (9) states in the affected region namely Abia, Imo, Delta and Rivers. This is to give the study focus and provide ease of data collection.

1.7 Operational Definition of Terms

Amnesty: Amnesty is a situation in which a government agrees not to punish or to no longer punish people who have committed a particular crime against the state. A period of time during which people can give something illegal such as weapons to someone in authority or can admit that they have been involved in something illegal without been punished. The Amnesty already presented to repentant militants in the Niger Delta region is a package that includes rehabilitation and capacity-building programme to equip the militants with necessary skills for reintegration into various industries.

Niger Delta: The Niger Delta is in the south-south geographical zone of Nigeria. This area covers a geographical distance of approximately 85,000 square kilometers are along the coast and stretches in land forming its delta estuary, Niger Delta is the third largest

wetland in the world and cover an area of over 70,000 square kilometers comprising sandy coastal ridge barriers and brackish or saline mangrove.

Programme: This means a plan of things that will be done or included in the development of something.

Implementation: This means to make something that has been officially decided start to happen or be used.

Role: This means the degree to which somebody or something is involved in a situation or an activity and the effect that they have on it.

DDR: This stands for Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration.

PIB: This means Petroleum Industry Bill

TNOC: This is the abbreviation for Transnational Oil Companies

NDDC: This means Niger Delta Development Commission.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This chapter deals with the review of works by various researchers related to the topic of this research work. Equally, all the literature is described and explained in order to build a theoretical background for the study.

2.1 Conceptual Framework

2.1.1 Concept of Amnesty

The word amnesty has its root from a Greek word *amnestia*. Amnesty is defined as: "A pardon extended by the government to a group or class of persons, usually for a political offense; the act of a sovereign power officially forgiving certain classes of persons who are subject to trial but have not yet been convicted" (Bryan Gardner, 2009).

It includes more than pardon in as much as it obliterates all legal remembrance of the offense. The word has the same root as *amnesia*. Amnesty is more and more used to express 'freedom' and the time when prisoners can go free. Amnesties, which in the United Kingdom may be granted by the crown or by an act of Parliament, were formerly usual on coronations and similar occasions, but are chiefly exercised towards associations of political criminals, and are sometimes granted absolutely, though more frequently there are certain specified exceptions.

Thus, in the case of the earliest recorded amnesty, that of Thrasybulus at Athens, the thirty tyrants and a few others were expressly excluded from its operation; and the amnesty proclaimed on the restoration of Charles II of England did not extend to those who had taken part in the execution of his father. Other famous amnesties include: Napoleon's amnesty of March 13, 1815 from which thirteen eminent persons, including Talleyrand, were exempt; the Prussian amnesty of August 10, 1840; the general amnesty proclaimed by the emperor Franz Josef I of Austria in 1857; the general amnesty granted by President of United States, Andrew Johnson, after the American Civil War (1861-April 9, 1865), in 1868, and the French amnesty of 1905. Amnesty in U.S. politics in 1872 meant restoring the right to vote and hold office to ex-Confederates, which was achieved by act of Congress (Robert Burg, 2003). Those were true amnesties, pardoning past violations without changing the laws violated. The last act of amnesty passed in Great Britain was that of 1747, which pardoned those who had taken part in the 1745 Jacobite Rising. An amnesty may be extended when the authority decides that bringing citizens into compliance with a law is more important than punishing them for past offenses. Amnesty after a war helps end a conflict. While laws against treason, sedition, etc. are retained to discourage future traitors during future conflicts, it makes sense to forgive past offenders, after the enemy no longer exists which had attracted their support but a significant number remains in flight from authorities. Amnesty is often used to get people to turn in contraband, as in the case of China's gun restrictions, (BBC News. July 5, 2006) or the Kansas City bank on Pit bulls. Advantages of using amnesty may include avoiding expensive prosecutions (especially when massive numbers of violators are

involved); prompting violators to come forward who might otherwise have eluded authorities; and promoting reconciliation between offenders and society. An example of the latter was the amnesty that was granted to conscientious objectors and draft dodgers and in the wake of the Vietnam War in the 1970s, in an effort by President Carter to heal war wounds. (There was no longer a war to protest, and there was no longer a draft to dodge) An example of an argument made for amnesty for undocumented immigrants is that they would be allowed to qualify for higher paying jobs, scholarships, and other services. According to the Center for Study of Immigration Integration, if California alone were to adopt an amnesty program, they would benefit by \$16 billion (Pastor, 2010). With amnesty, immigrants can seek out higher education. A RAND study found that, by the age of 30, a Mexican immigrant woman who becomes a legal resident can obtain a college degree. With a college degree she will pay \$5,300 more in taxes and cost \$3,900 less in government expenses each year compared to a high-school dropout with similar characteristics. Workers who lacked a high-school diploma in 2006 earned an average of only \$419 per week and had an unemployment rate of 6.8 percent. In contrast, workers with a bachelor's degree earned \$962 per Aweek and had an unemployment rate of 2.3 percent, while those with a doctorate earned \$1,441 and had an unemployment rate of only 1.4 percent (Gonzales, 2010). Changing a law is a better way to achieve whatever benefits amnesty offers, if a nation determines that the law has made criminals of people who have done no harm, or deprived the nation of a benefit, and will in the future. Changing a law allows new conditions and requirements, offering more control over the results of any change, than amnesty. The term amnesty is also any initiative where

individuals are encouraged to turn over illicit items to the authorities, on the understanding that they will not be prosecuted for having been in possession of those items. A common use of such amnesties is to reduce the number of firearms or other weapons in circulation. Several public schools with a zero-tolerance policy on drugs or weapons have an "amnesty box" in which students may dispose of contraband objects brought to school without consequence. Amnesty was used in South Africa, during the 1990s, as part of the TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission), an amnesty law is any law that retroactively exempts a select group of people, usually military leaders and government leaders, from criminal liability for crimes committed. (William 2013). In the illegal immigration debate, allowing illegal immigrants to legally remain in the United States is often called amnesty. Some observers contend that the word amnesty is improperly applied here. One reason for this contention is that the proposals under consideration include financial penalties for illegal immigrants. Another reason is that the government's current practice is generally to deport but not to prosecute illegal immigrants and there is sometimes no legal adjudication of "guilt" to be forgiven.

Many libraries have an amnesty week where people can return late library books and they will not be charged a fine for having them out. At the United States Military Academy and the United States Naval Academy, any head of state visiting the academy may ask the Superintendent to grant amnesty to members of the Corps of Cadets with outstanding punishment tours, freeing the restricted cadets from further punishment tours. In the past this was for all offences, but in recent times, only cadets with minor offenses (company

board) are eligible for amnesty, while cadets with major offenses (regimental or higher board) are ineligible.

2.1.2 Funding of the Amnesty Programme

Concerning the funding of the amnesty programme, there is a juxtaposed opinion of underfunding and over funding. However, it will be appropriate to share the latter opinion and amend the former. The amnesty is not underfunded but has been misappropriated funds leading to delays, diversions and reductions of the stipulated amounts. This is not under funding. In fact, the programme appears to be a new largess, lucrative business for militant leaders, NGOs and politicians alike. While in camps they were paid N 1,500 per day feeding allowance and N 20,000 per month for a maximum of three months for the period of demobilization. This monthly stipend has since been increased to N 65,000. Comparatively, graduates in National Youth Service Corps orientation camp are fed on N 100 per meal three times a day and for the twelve months of service are paid about N 19,975 per month, thus the amnesty is not in any way underfunded. This is about the militants not to talk about their leaders who have become billionaires overnight. According to Oluokun (2012), about N 127 billion was budgeted for the Niger Delta amnesty programme from 2009-2011. A further analysis indicated that of the amount, N 3 billion was spent in 2009 as take-off grant for the initiatives, while N 30 billion and N 96 billion were spent respectively in 2010 and 2011 for payment of stipends and training of the ex-militants; N 74 billion, equivalent to the budget of some states in the country, was allocated for the programme in the 2012 budget... N 15 billion contracted awarded

to the Global West Vessel Specialist Limited GWVSL, a firm widely believed to be owned by Tompolo, to supply 20 vessels for the use of the nation's military authorities to secure the waterways... the federal government maintain an annual pipeline and maritime security contract with Asari Dokubo for US \$ 9.5 million, or N 2 billion, ...Boyloaf and Ateke Tom are annually being paid US \$3.8 million (N 1.2 billion) each to protect pipelines in the Niger Delta. However, the above does not suggest under funding but reckless and senseless spending which has created problem for the amnesty. The amnesty has sharply deviated and has culminated into bribery of militants for peace. The effect is already manifesting as many jobless youths in the region and outside have taken the title of ex-militants and are agitating to partake in the amnesty banquet. Apart from the 6,166 militants who were incorporated into the programme in November 2010 after the October 4, 2009 deadline another 3,642 persons have formed the third phase making up the number to 30,000 ex-militants now in the programme (Ibid). This is a product of over funding and deviation from the objectives of the programme. It will not be a surprise that fourth, fifth and sixth batches will soon follow. Opeyemi (2012) states "this has made even the non-militant youths to begin to indulge in militancy in order to become beneficiaries of such economic packages that accompany the amnesty programme".

2.1.3 Economic Impact of Amnesty Program in Nigeria

To Midgley and Hall (2004), empowerment refers to 'the acquisition of power to control or influence the course of events, often assumed to be a sine qua non of authentic development, especially at grassroots level'. The value that the Nigeria amnesty business

setups attach to increased industrialization in the region is assumed by the OSAPND to reduce poverty, dependence on subsistence agriculture, and social ills. Furthermore, winter (2001) describes empowerment as a component of education which is likely by its nature to subvert established interest. Winter added that project implementers could try empowering communities by funding local assemblies, train local leaders and hold warlords to account, invest in schools, start adult education classes and so on. Generally, DDR is a development intervention that is meant to transform the Niger Delta oil conflicts, build sustainable peace, and foster resilience. One striking benefit of the amnesty program is stability in the oil and gas revenue as against the pre-amnesty period. Stability brought back the oil production at 2.4million bpd which is the main source of revenue in the country. Decreasing militancy which is demonstrated in Ariyol et al (2013) remains vital economic element which assumes far greater importance in the post amnesty period in Nigeria. Ariyol et al found the Niger Delta to appear peaceful and this is a precondition for sustaining a long term and sustainable growth in the artisanal fishing business. In addition, this stability has also brought about speedy completion of infrastructures by both the Federal and State Governments in the region. This process brings about industrialization and creation of jobs which overall brings about wealth generation and employment thereby impacting on the economy of the region. Similarly, (Eteng et al 2013) found that the issue of post-amnesty in Nigeria have led to some developmental activities around the Niger Delta states hence the peaceful state improved oil exploration which brings in revenue to the government Thus, from Ariyoh et al (2013) view, the amnesty policy intervention has yielded progressive impacts on artisanal fishing

agribusiness based on field works conducted in ten (10) different rural riverine communities in the Niger Delta region during which data collection was distinguished between pre and post amnesty periods. For Ariyoh et al (2013), fish out-put among fisher-folks have increased significantly with average income from USD\$17.46 (pre amnesty) to USD\$63.227 per week. This means that fish farmers could earn an average of USD\$242.51 per month instead of USD\$69.84 which leaves a generous surplus of USD\$172.67. Linking this fish-output finding to the economic developmental impact of the PAP project; one would argue that amnesty program contributes to increase in productivity. Given the more encompassing analysis that fishing is an important livelihood activity in most villages in the Niger Delta region because of its geographical nature that favours small scale fisher-folks; its impact to local community internal revenue cannot therefore be overemphasized. Setting up five-point training agenda, Kuku placed agriculture as among his priority areas (Amnesty News 2013). To emphasis this, in the Amnesty News (2013), skills acquisition in field of agriculture is part of the training programs for the 4,608 delegates both in onshore and offshore. This demonstrates the position agriculture occupies in the country.


Nagpaul (1991), suggest that ‘it has become a universally accepted fact that vast inequalities in incomes, opportunities and levels of living continue to exist between the rural and urban sectors in almost every society in the Third World’. Nigeria happens to be among the Third World countries and the vast beneficiaries of the Nigeria Amnesty project dwell in the rural areas whose ultimate impact will contribute immensely to rural

reconstruction of Niger Delta region. The Amnesty program sees education and training, and engagement/empowerment as upper toolkits for the reintegration of ex-agitators. This approach agrees with Nagpaul who stipulates that human development and mobilization through education and employment is one of the strategic programs that will promote reduction and resolution of conflicts (1991). A strong livelihood activity is most likely to improve the community development. If the communities in the region through the amnesty program are witnessing a relatively peaceful environment for their daily economic activities, ultimately, the business output will increase which will obviously strengthen the livelihood activities. There has been relatively systematic research on community development by Midgley and Hall (2004), and they present local community as a vital resource for development effort. They also posit rural community development programmes as making a major contribution to agricultural production, and that small scale community development projects also contributes to poverty eradication because they generate human capital through development of skills, literacy and job experience. According to Amnesty News (2013), 4,608 delegates are on skills acquisition, 2500 delegates on formal education, 2000 delegates on entrepreneurial skills/business empowerment, and 222 delegates on direct employment totaling 9330 delegates. This figure represents 31% of the 30,000 delegates that have received a reintegration package which habitually reinforces human and socio-economic capitals of the beneficiaries' communities. In Ejovi and Ebie (2013), they argue that the Amnesty programmes skill acquisition packages promises a better future for both local populations and the oil companies. Looking at 2014 budget for instance, a total of USD\$ 385,978,011.25 has

been budgeted for the 2014 amnesty programmes, a sum most likely to impact on the development of skills and wealth creation in the region. Kuku (2014a&b) in a press briefing stated that OSAPND is currently ‘setting-up 2,000 of the graduates of skills acquisition programme in small scale businesses’. It should be noted here that small scale businesses are elements of private sector. According to Hall and Midgley (2004), private sector comprises areas of activity in formal economy of firms and enterprises, and the informal sector in the south have social policy implications to the extent that they create employment, generates wages, salaries and other benefits. Hall and Midgley added that people in the private sector engage in activities that have other profound economic, social, and environmental impacts. Therefore, the outputs of the PAP project help to engage people on activities that have profound economic, social and environmental impacts in the Niger Delta region. In addition, Ejovi and Ebie (2013) added that the trained ex-agitators in oil related skills should be engaged in the oil industry through the reservation of employment quota as this will make the locals operating in the region to feel themselves as stakeholders. Obviously, this is favourable to conflict prevention. There is much to believe that constituting the ex-agitators into the oil company workforce will create company-ownership mentality among them thereby reducing the issues of conflict escalation that are associated with oil companies-local-communities precarious relationship. There has, thus, been a shift in the thinking of Nigerians towards what some see as a new economic development in the Niger Delta region aiming at achieving amnesty program objectives that will strengthen social and cultural capacities to economic empowerment. The varied training programmes in the reintegration packages

are linked to develop trust, safety, and social cohesion within and between communities which will improve business relations in the region. Furthermore, the business setups by the OSAPND are structured in such a way that once an ex-agitator is empowered; there is a tendency that it will create jobs for at least five (5) apprentices or family members. Below is chart 1 which clearly illustrates the spending pattern by the amnesty office and the nine (9) Niger Delta States on education.

Chart 1: Federal Government of Nigeria budgetary allocation from 2010 – 2014



Source: Author's compilations from Kuku (SAPND) press briefing, and Federal Government of Nigeria Budget Office⁸. Currency conversion by the author on USD\$1 = N163.95 (Naira) accessed on 03/03/2014

2.1.4 Prospects and Challenges Facing the Implementation of the Amnesty Programme in Nigeria

Reports from the government indicate that following the relative peace ushered in by the Cease-fire as a result of the amnesty declaration, the country's oil output had risen to 2.3 million barrels a day from 800,000 barrel per day (in the 2006–2008 period) as a result of

the improvement in security in the oil region (Igwe, 2010). An increment of 1.5 million barrels per day indicates 120.45 million dollars of revenue to national coffers every day (Igwe, 2010). Some companies also took the opportunity to repair some of their damaged oil facilities. Without doubt, the Amnesty programme is expected to improve the human capital development of the country which is presently low. Nigeria's Human Development Index (HDI) Value (Comprising Home basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living) for 2011 stands at 0.459, positioning the country at 156 out of 187 countries and territories (UNDO, 2011). If well implemented, the Amnesty programme in Nigeria could serve to negate the 'resource curse' theory that resource-rich economies such as Nigerian, Congo, Angola, etc. are more prone to mismanagement, underdevelopment and violence. Examples of UK and Norway, both major oil exporting countries, reveals that resource curse is avoidable with functioning institution and good governance in place. Notwithstanding the achievement of the programme, reports from the panel set up in January 2010 to review the rehabilitation aspect of the DDR revealed some inadequacies thus leading to calls by elders in the Niger Delta region for the dissolution of the Presidential Amnesty Committee. Some of these include the fact that about 80 percent of the budget had gone on payments of consultants and contractors, with 20 percent committed on rehabilitation of the ex-militants; the over bloating of the numbers of registered ex-militants; the continued detention of several militants; some of the training centers falling short of acceptable standards and Operating with inadequate facilities (Obi & Rustad, 2011). Community on the flaws of the Amnesty programme, Nwajiaku– Dahou

(2010) stated that; allowance unpaid or not paid regularly, huge disparities between payments made to foot soldiers and former militants commanders, limited access to rehabilitation training and allowances for those who surrendered weapons after the deadline, inappropriate training provision, limited employment prospects, the absence of a broader political settlement involving the broader Niger Delta population that has born the costs of conflict, and the politically motivated staffing of bodies responsible for implementing and coordinating the amnesty programme, are among the numerous flaws of the amnesty' (Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2010). The Federal Government on 2nd December 2009 scrapped the Presidential Committee on Disarmament and Amnesty for Militants in the Niger Delta, and in its place are five new committees put in place to handle the Post-Amnesty Programmes and fast track development challenges in the region (Adebayo, 2009). These were the Presidential Monitoring Committee on Amnesty; the infrastructural Committee; the Disarmament and Reintegration Committee; the oil and Gas Assets Protection Committee; and the Environmental Remediation Committee. One of the major challenges of the amnesty package is in the area of poor implementation. The amnesty programme was not implemented as recommended in the report of the Niger Delta Technical Committee. Rather than engage in Open negotiations or a formal agreement with the militants, the consultations were at the highest levels of Federal government, involving Niger Delta elites/elders and top government officials of Niger Delta origin negotiating with the militants Commanders (Obi & Rustad, 2011). This top down non-inclusive approach, through the militants commanders who are only interested in what comes into their pockets, or for their own personal aggrandizement is a serious

challenge to the Amnesty programme as the militants on ground felt cheated and sidelined by the government. It shows that Nigerian government has not really learnt any lesson from the previous failed development programme such as the Niger Delta development Board (NDDDB), Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA), Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC), which failed to deliver on the basis of top-down approach. For sustainable peace and development in the Niger Delta to be achieved, there is need for the adoption of bottom-up approach through the inclusion of elements of democracy, accountability, equity and active public participation of all stake holders including the grassroots people (Ako, 2011), militants, youth organizations, women groups and civil society. Furthermore, the total number of ammunitions/weapons handed in by the militants totaling 1,798 riffles, 1981 guns of various types, 70 RPGs, 159 Pistols, one spear and six cannons (Agbo, 2011) are certainly low when compared with 26,358 militants that registered for the amnesty programme. The region is still ridden with arms and this is evident in the various attacks that have been carried out even after the disarmament exercise. The disarmament programme needs to be firmed up because as long as many arms are still at large, the region remains very unsafe and at risk of relapsing into violence (Joseph, 2010). The recent spate of bombings across the region shows that all is not well with the Amnesty programme. For instance, MEND set off two car bombs on 15 March, 2010 in Warri, the Delta State Capital, where a post amnesty dialogue was being held and this left one person dead and several others injured (Ofete, 2010) Also important is the October 1, 2010 Car bombing that killed about 12 people and disrupted the Nigeria 50th anniversary celebrations. This led to the trail and conviction of

the leader of MEND; Henry Okah in South Africa. His brother Chares Okah also suffered the same fate alongside three others before the Abuja Federal high Court on suspicion of involvement (Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2010) Also on 4th February, 2012, the militant group also bombed a trunk pipeline at Brass in Bayelsa state belonging to Italy's Eni, ENS from which it lost 'around 4,000 barrels per day of 'equity production' from the incident (Mamah & Ameize, 2012). The group further claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Ogbogbabere country home of the Minister for Niger Delta, Elder Godsdan Orubebe in Burutu local government area of Delta State on 28 January 2012. (Mamah&Amaize 2012) Importantly, "the Amnesty is exclusive, it targets only militants without consideration for the Victims of militancy and hostage taking in the region (Akinwale, 2010) Mothers and Children who had lost fathers and sons and homes and have been displaced by the conflict were not included in the amnesty package presumably as a result of their lack of means of violence (Nwajiaku- Dahou, 2010). The empowerment policy of the government through the training programme and job opportunities must not be limited to the militant. It must be extended to all the local inhabitants in the region, otherwise, it could send a wrong signal to others who have been excluded from the exercise that crime pays and may serve as a driving force for others to want to take arms for recognition. The amnesty package should not be implemented as a standalone act, but must be carried out within a comprehensive peace process, as recommended by the technical committee (International Crime group 2009). Thus, government must not only publish the white paper on the recommendation of the Niger Delta Technical committee but also embark on a holistic rather than the current fractured approach to the

implementation of the report. This report is believed “Offers an opportunity to reduce the violent conflict significantly and begin long term regional development in the oil – rich region and could help to ‘save the region from further violence and organized criminality. (International Crisis Group, 2009). Addressing the militants alone while neglecting the deplorable situation, the underdevelopment and poverty, governmental and corporate mis-governance, all of which led to the militancy and later criminality in the region will no doubt spell doom for the amnesty programme. this is because the number of militants presently being reintegrated under the programme constitute only a small percentage of the Niger Delta population, which under the 2006 population figure is 31,224,577 million people (Nigerian News Census, 2006) Efforts must be taken to remove the Niger Delta people from what Sacs (2005 refers to as poverty trap – a situation in which degraded environment, poor health, poor education, poor infrastructure and poor standard of living reinforce one another (Ogege, 2011). In addition, it was revealed that some of the rehabilitation centers and demobilizing campus are lacking in even the basic facilities for proper impartation of knowledge and skills. Shortages of bed spaces beds and other basic facilities in some of the centers made only few militants to be accommodated (Ikelegbe 2010). Also in compliance with the UN code of DDR, it is expected that in the implementation of the DDR programmes, the ex-militants must be taken away from their natural habitats for transformation and reintegration purposes.

2.2.1 Niger-Delta Conflict and the Establishment of Amnesty Programme

The struggles over oil, particularly the quest to correct the perceived injustice embedded in the separation of those that profit from the oil production and commoditization (MNCs and the Nigerian ruling elites), from the others (dispossessed local inhabitants) whose land and waters the oil is extracted, has led to the violent agitation in the Niger-Delta region (Obi, 2010) the publicity and tempo of the agitation for environmental justice increased in the region with the formation of the movement for the survival of Ogoni people (MOSOP) in August 1990; the November, 1995 hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight Ogoni compatriots; the punitive expedition against the inhabitants of Odi in February, 2002; the formation of the famous Kaima Declaration in 11 December, 1998. Other groups that were formed during these periods include the movement for the survival of Ijaw Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEN), Community rights initiative (CORI) Niger-Delta women for justice (NDINJ), Chiiccoco Movement, Ijaw National Congress and Egbema National Congress.

These groups have continued to criticize the government and the oil MNCs for the environmental damage caused due to the oil exploration activities by the MNCs. This situation in the Niger-Delta is well captured by Ken Saro-Wiwa in his presentation on why he championed Ogoni cause; in this way “I looked at Ogoni (Niger Delta) and found that the entire place was now a waste land and that we are the victims of ecological war

that is very serious and unconventional. It is unconventional because no bones are broken, no one is maimed. People are not alarmed because they can't see what is happening. But human beings are at risk, plants and animals are at risk. The air and water are poisoned. Finally, the land itself dies. Oil has brought nothing but disaster to oil people" (Niger Delta) (Saro-Wiwa 1998), what can be inferred from this is that the failure of the Nigerian government to address the development needs of the region and to address the environmental damage caused by the oil exploration activities of the MNCs created a feeling of injustice in the Niger Delta people and led to the conflicts and insecurity in the Niger Delta region. It then became clear that the struggle is for an end to injustice, discrimination, exclusion, oppression, domination and exploitation, systematic destruction of the ecosystem, corporate and environmental bad governance, a call for equitable federation of Nigeria's economic policy. It is sad to note that since around 2005, the pattern of unarmed peaceful protests and demonstrations used by these groups against the unwholesome activities of the MNCs operating in the Niger Delta region has been shifted to a violent one by the armed groups like the movement for the emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Egbesu boys, Niger Delta people volunteer force (NDPVF). And others to the extent that the whole region had become highly militarized. The rise of groups like MEND is said to be traceable to the lack of space for peaceful opposition movements and the failure of the government and the MNCs in ensuring that the Niger Delta people enjoy the benefits of oil production (Bassey, 2008). The response of the government to the claims of the oil producing areas has been classified by Suberu

(Suberu, 1996) into three forms: redistributive, reorganizational and regulatory state responses.

According to Suberu, “redistributive policies are state decisions that consciously dispense valued resources to one group at the expense of other claimants to state resources. Reorganizational policies refer to state efforts to restrictive or reconfigure political or administrative institutions and relationships, in order to accommodate groups demands or strengthen the efficiency of centralized state power. Regulatory policies entail the mandatory imposition of sanctions or restrictions on individuals or groups that are perceived to pose a threat to state cohesion and order. These included the creation of separate federal states in the Niger Delta viz: Akwa- Ibom, Delta and Bayelsa states in 1987, 1991 and 1996 respectively (reorganizational policies) Omotola, 2007), the increase in the percentage of revenue allocation based on deviation from 1.5% to 3% in 1992 and 13% in 1999 (Osaghae, 2008) The installation of his Excellency Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, the former governor of Bayelsa state, an Ijaw man, as Vice-president in Nigeria in 2007 under the people’s Democratic Party (PDP) (now president of the federal Republic of Nigeria in May 2010 following the death of president Umaru Yar’Adua on the 5th of May, 2010) and his subsequent election in May 2011 for another four years term and the establishment of development agencies as NDDB, OMPADEC, NDDC etc. (redistributive policies). The repressive response of the state includes the execution of Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders in 1995 by the military government of Late Gen. Sani Abacha, the Umuechem Massacre of 1990 (African concord, 1990, Seberu,

1996) the Ogoni genocide (The News, May 1993) the Odi Massacre of 1999 (Aghalino, 2009) among several communities in the Niger Delta. The protesters in these communities not only have their properties destroyed but were also killed, maimed, raped, displaced or forced into exile (Oshionebo, 2009, Ekine 2008). The local inhabitants see these as a form of repression to keep them minorities from voicing even the most moderate claims. These responses from the government and the oil MNCs elicited violence from the Niger Delta people in the form of kidnapping, hostage taking, bunkering and oil theft, pipeline vandalization, bombings, oil facilities Sabotage, destruction of properties and even killings of people in pursuance of the struggle.

Swartz (2009), wrote that a high-profile government amnesty program aimed at stopping militants in Nigeria's oil-rich delta region from bombing pipelines are coming under fire for not seeking permanent solutions to the area's underlying problems. The amnesty program, scheduled to begin Thursday and run two months, is the biggest public effort yet by President Umaru Yar'Adua to ease the unrest in the Niger Delta that has cost the country billions of dollars in lost oil revenue. But Nigerian state governors, analysts, and the militants themselves have criticized the plan because it does little to address the core causes of the militancy and criminality that have plagued the Niger Delta for decades, such as the lack of education, jobs and basic services. State governors from the Niger Delta region, a powerful group but rarely in agreement, threatened to withdraw from the amnesty program because it lacked a definite post amnesty plan arrangement for the region. Alaiye (2011), argued that the Amnesty programme has been a resounding

success. I make bold to assert that the programme will go down in history as the sincerest effort by the Federal Government to address the Niger Delta question. You would recall that the late President Umaru Yar'Adua had on June 25, 2009, proclaimed a 60-day unconditional amnesty period for militants in the Niger Delta, as a step towards resolving the protracted insecurity in the region. The terms of the amnesty included the willingness and readiness of militants to surrender their arms, and unconditionally renounce militancy and sign an undertaking to this effect. In return, the government pledged its commitment to institute programmes to assist their disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and provision of re-integration assistance to the ex-militants. In other words, the programme was structured to have three broad components. One, a security component dealing with the disarmament and demobilization of the various militant groups in the Niger Delta; two, an economic component with commitment to provide access to reintegration opportunities for the ex-militants; and three, to promote the economic development of the Niger Delta. Flowing from this, we proceeded to execute what has become, perhaps, the most successful disarmament exercise in the history of DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) in Africa. By October 2009, (some) 20,192 ex-militants had willingly disarmed, turned in huge cache of arms and ammunition to security agencies and got enrolled in the programme. Going back to your question, I insist that the Amnesty programme has been a resounding success. Where we are currently would be better appreciated when viewed from the pedestal of where we were prior to the amnesty proclamation. Furthermore, let me clarify that while it is true that the late Yar'Adua initiated the Amnesty programme, it is important to place on record that

when it seemed that the programme was floundering, it was President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan that revved it up, gave it fresh impetus and provided all that was needed to attain the success that we are talking about today.

Oladoyinbo (2012), argued that, to the people of the Niger Delta region in Ondo State, one of the best things that ever happened to them under this democratic dispensation was the granting of amnesty to the militants that participated in the struggle for their emancipation. For him, Prior to the granting of amnesty by the administration of the late President Umaru Yar'Adua, the region was very volatile with thousands of youths up in arm against the government, arguing that their region was so backward despite being the goose that lay the golden eggs. The youths from various camps and under the control of their leaders threatened oil companies, corporate organizations, wealthy individuals and expatriates among others. Kidnapping, killing, violence attack, vandalisation of oil installations and other vices were the order of the day with all these activities seen as those needed to ensure that government listen to them and address the imbalance in the polity. However, when the agitation got to a stage, government in its wisdom offered amnesty to everybody that took part in the struggle and following consultation and deliberation, the militants agreed to the idea and they surrender their arms and ammunition, signaling the end of the struggle. Olatoke and Olokooba (2012), examined the amnesty granted to militants of Niger Delta from the legal perspective, questioning the legality of the amnesty programme. He argued that the amnesty programme is yet to be passed into law and as such unconstitutional. Furthermore, he queries if the amnesty

programme is a lasting solution to the problem in the region considering the unabated activities of the militants. Finally, he urged the presidency to approach the National Assembly to make law permitting the president to grant amnesty to the militants and other related groups and other related groups who are willing to voluntarily make peace.

Nwachukwu and Pepple (2011), wrote that with the successful disarmament of the militants in the Delta, the federal government, the Niger Delta region and, indeed, the entire Nigerian state has been reaping the gains of the disarmament programme. The first gain of the disarmament programme is that there is a visible reduction in the quantity and volume of arms and ammunition in the region and this has, no doubt, gone a long way in enhancing national security in the country. The booming of guns in the creeks of the Niger Delta with their harrowing human and economic calamities has been replaced by peaceful environment conducive for normal living and doing business.

Dakolo (2011), argued that Late President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua went all out to confront the problem with all sincerity through the Amnesty initiative in June 2009. When the Federal Government announced the Amnesty programme for the militants not a few persons took it with a pinch of salt. With the Amnesty programme now in full swing and ex militants receiving rehabilitation, reintegration, training and certification at Obubura, Cross River State since June 28th, 2009, it is important that the issues which led them to take up arms, in the first place are frontally addressed. At the last count, over 20,000 militants were said to have thrown in the towel. No doubt, the success of the Amnesty programme is underscored by the large turnout of militants at the various arms

collation centres across the Niger Delta and the staggering trench of ammunitions recovered so far. Equally commendable is the fact that since the commencement of the programme sporadic outburst of violence in the region has been drastically reduced. But the Stakeholders must never rest on their oars as there is still a lot of work to be done. Government and those entrusted with the arduous task of prosecuting the Amnesty programme must be seen to be transparent and credible in discharging their mandate. There is a whole world of difference between actual militants and miscreants who cash in on the volatility to perpetrate heinous crimes. This group of people should not be included as militants. What is important now is for the ex-militants to be properly and effectively demobilized and adequate training given to them to make them beneficial to the society. But beyond that, there should be a mechanism to ensure that new militants are not created in the future. Effiong (2011), wrote that President Goodluck Jonathan, represented by Minister of State for Niger Delta Affairs, Hajiya Zainab Ibrahim-Kuchi, declared that the amnesty programme had succeeded well beyond initial expectations. “I make bold to say that after today’s event, our great country, Nigeria, will be entering the annals of history as one of few countries in the world that achieved a successful closure to the disarmament and demobilization phases of its Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration (DDR) programme. Accordingly, the programme indeed saw some challenges right from inception. Observers recall that though the presidential amnesty programme had been viewed with some skepticism at the onset, the situation is quite different today, considering the impact it has made on the circumstances of youths in the region. As attested to by Jonathan, the core essence of the amnesty proclamation was to

stabilize, consolidate and sustain security conditions in the Niger Delta, as a prerequisite for promoting economic development in the area in particular and the nation as a whole. Though Yar' Adua died in office after a protracted illness, the programme remained on course, being vigorously prosecuted by Jonathan, his successor. Accordingly, not many believed that the goals of the programme would be met at some point, recalled Jonathan, who expressed satisfaction that two years after, the programme had aided speedy return of safety, security and sustainable development in the region. We have achieved 80 per cent in this amnesty programme. This is the only DDR programme that is solely funded by the country itself. This is Nigerian-made amnesty. Pepple (2012) accessed the reintegration of the militants and state that no fewer than 300 ex-militants from the Niger Delta region were yesterday empowered with business set up materials and finance to start their small and medium scale businesses as part of efforts to reintegrate them into society. The delegates are beneficiaries of empowerment programmes initiated by the Presidential Amnesty Office for ex-militants of the region, which include sales of building materials, electronics, fisheries, super markets. The ex-militants were also urged to learn how to plough back profits into their businesses. According to him, the empowerment scheme was aimed at assisting the trained delegates and equips them to be the new generation of entrepreneur. He recapped the successes of the years past, according to him, over 13,000 delegates, had been deployed to local and foreign training, skill acquisition and other formal education.

2.3 Empirical Review

2.3.1 The Niger Delta Amnesty: A True Model On 25th June 2009, the late former President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Musa Yar'Adua, in exercising his constitutional power under Section 175 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 71JTR, Volume 5, Issue 1 (Special Issue) - February 2014 granted amnesty and unconditional pardon to the Niger Delta militants. The pardon was effective for a period of 60 days (25th June-4th October, 2009), requiring the militants to surrender every weapon and ammunition in their possession and to publicly denounce militancy. With constant increase in oil production and consequently increase in oil revenue, and a significant reduction in violence in the region, many commentators have described the amnesty programme in glowing terms. Interestingly, supporters of amnesty for the Boko Haram insurgent group have referenced the Niger Delta amnesty. It becomes therefore crucial to evaluate the implication of this connection between the Niger Delta and Boko Haram, especially in the light of perceived differences in their motivations. The Niger Delta conflict, for several decades, was sustained by a socio-economic drive. This, as stated earlier, includes resource control, equitable wealth distribution and protest against the environmentally-damaging activities of the oil MNCs. This obviously appears different from the self-acclaimed motivation by Boko Haram to transform Nigeria into an Islamic state. The comparison of the proposed Boko Haram amnesty with the Niger Delta amnesty seems insensitive to the plight of the victims and ignorant of growing evidence that group ideology and motivation are crucial to an effective counterterrorism (CT)

measure (Miller, 2007; Forest, 2009; Crenshaw, 2007; Sederberg, 1995; Abrahms, 2008). Arguably, the demand for amnesty for the Boko Haram insurgents comes short of an attempt at political correctness, and, significantly, reveals a Nigerian State that is politically divided along ethnic and religious lines and biases. The argument put forward by supporters of amnesty for the Boko Haram insurgents fails to conceal the divisive tendencies within the ethnic and religious composition of Nigeria that play out in its political space (Fayemi, 2003). The argument of “what is good for the goose is also good for the gander” undermines the rule of law, victim’s right and the state’s duty to prosecute (Slye, 2002). More so, the Niger Delta amnesty programme may not after all be a correct model for the proposed Boko Haram amnesty. The Niger Delta amnesty programme has been hailed by local and international commentators as largely successful. It is tempting to accept this popular view, especially when we compare the relative peace in the Niger Delta region to the incessant violent attacks and militancy from 2000 to 2009. Since 2009, relative peace has returned to the region and there is an increase in the production of oil (from 700,000 barrels per day to between 2.4 million and 2.6 million barrels per day) and, consequently, increase in the generation of oil revenue (Jamestown Foundation, 2013; Alike, 2013). The federal government recovered arms from the militants who surrendered and renounced violence during the first stage of the amnesty programme-disarmament and demobilization. The militants surrendered in return for formal education and vocational skills training and monthly stipends for a period of 5 years. This explains the second phase of the programme-rehabilitation and reintegration. Mr Kingsley Kuku, the chairman of the Presidential amnesty programme

argues that over 16,000 out of the over 30,000 enrolled Niger Delta youths have received training in different fields within and outside Nigeria (Jegede, 2013). There is no doubt that the Niger Delta amnesty programme presents some great merits. What is rather doubtful is whether the militants surrendered all the arms in their possession, as is the case with most armed insurgents, and especially evident in the rising violence in the region and the growing threat from militants' chiefs (Muggah & Batchelor, 2002; Gilbert, 2010). Hence, we may not have seen the end of violence in the Niger Delta region, as there is an increase in piracy in the region and other violent incidents that are largely unreported. In 2013 alone, out of about 34 piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea, 30 are related to Nigeria, with "29 piracy incidents, including two hijackings, 11 ships boarded, 13 vessels fired upon and three attempted attacks" (Anaesoronye, 2013; International Chamber of Commerce, ICC, 2013). Also, on the 24th of October 2013, Niger Delta pirates attacked a United States (US) vessel and kidnapped two US nationals.

2.3.2. President Yar'Adua Amnesty Declaration

President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua introduced the amnesty programme in order to ensure peace and security. After several weeks of preparation characterised by crucial meeting at both committee and presidential levels, President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua proclaimed the much touted declaration of amnesty as recommended by the Presidential Panel on Amnesty and Disarmament for Militants of the Niger-Delta, thereby legalising the government as grant of amnesty to the youth. In a statement: Amnesty Proclamation personally signed by President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, the government stated that in

pursuant to section 175 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Whereas the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria acknowledges that the challenges of the Niger Delta arose mainly from the inadequacies of previous attempts at meeting the yearnings and aspiration of the people, and have set in motion machinery for the sustainable development of the Niger Delta States; Whereas certain elements of the Niger Delta populace have resorted to unlawful means of agitation for the development of the region including militancy thereby threatening peace, security, order and good governance and jeopardizing the economy of the nation; militants Whereas the Government realizes that many of the militants are able-bodied youths whose energies could be harnessed for the development of the Niger Delta and the nation at large; Whereas the Government desires that all persons who have directly or indirectly participated in militancy in the Niger Delta should return to respect constituted authority; and Whereas many persons who had so engaged in militancy now desire to apply for and obtain amnesty and pardon; Now therefore, President Yar'adua stated thus:

I, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, after due consultation with the council of States and in exercise of the powers conferred upon me by the provisions of Section 175 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, make the following proclamation: I hereby grant amnesty and unconditional pardon to all persons who have directly or indirectly participated in the commission of offences associated with militant activities in the Niger Delta; The pardon shall take effect upon the surrender and handing over of all equipment, weapons, arms and ammunition and execution of the renunciation of Militancy Forms specified in the schedule hereto, by the affected persons at the nearest collation centre established for the purpose of Government in each of the Niger Delta States; The unconditional pardon granted pursuant to this proclamation shall extend to all persons presently being prosecuted for offences associated with militant activities; and this proclamation shall

cease to have effect from Sunday, 4th October 2009 (source: Daily Trust May 10, 2009).

2.4 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical foundation on which this study is based is the Co-operative Approach to conflict resolution by Morton Deutsch. According to Deutsch (2000), when individuals or parties enter into a negotiation process to resolve conflict, they will bring a certain orientation to the table in their effort to settle the conflict. The two most basic orientations people adhere to when entering into negotiations are cooperative or competitive.

A cooperative approach aligns with the process of interest-based or integrative bargaining which leads parties to seek win-win solutions. Disputants that work cooperatively to negotiate a solution are more likely to develop a relationship of trust and come up with mutually beneficial options for settlement. The mutual gains approach is considered a constructive resolution process. Options for a negotiated settlement are limited in some cases by a fixed pie (a set amount of rewards) that must be divided one way or the other.

Such situations leave no alternative for mutual gains and therefore parties must utilize competitive negotiation tactics to pursue their goal(s). Competitive approaches align with the process of distributive bargaining, which result in win-lose outcomes. A competitive approach to conflict tends to increase animosity and distrust between parties and is generally considered destructive.

At its core, negotiation involves a fundamental tension between whether parties feel they need to cooperate or compete in order to achieve their goals. It is important to remember though, that negotiating an acceptable agreement always includes common and conflicting goals. Therefore, both cooperation and competition are necessary to some extent in order to reach resolution. In other words, "negotiators must learn, in part from each other, what is jointly possible and desirable. To do so requires some degree of cooperation. But, at the same time, they seek to advance their individual interests. This involves some degree of competition (David Lax and Sebenius, 1986). Finding a balance between these two approaches is the key to successful negotiation. This basic tension between cooperation and competition in negotiation is known as, "The Negotiator's Dilemma." How a party approaches resolving a conflict depends on many factors. Scholars in the field of social psychology, particularly Morton Deutsch, have developed theories about factors that influence whether a person approaches a conflict cooperatively or competitively. The most important factors are the nature of the dispute and the goals each side seeks to achieve as a result of it. Deutsch's theory centers on the relationship between the two sides' goals, which he calls interdependence. According to his theory, the type of interdependence existing between negotiating parties will largely guide how they interact. Deutsch identifies two basic types of goal interdependence -- positive and negative. Positive interdependence means that each side's goals are tied together in such a way that the chance of one side attaining its goal is increased by the probability of the other side successfully attaining its goal (Deutsch, 2000).

Positively interdependent goals normally result in cooperative situations because any participant can "attain his goal if, and only if, the others with whom he is linked can attain their goals, (Deutsch, 1973). On the other hand, negative interdependence means that each side's goals are tied together in such a way that the probability of one side attaining its goal is decreased by the probability of the other side successfully attaining its goal. (Deutsch, 2000). Negatively interdependent goals force competitive situations because the only way for one side to achieve its goals is for the other side not to.

The approach or conflict style a negotiator chooses to take when entering negotiations may be based on rational criteria, such as selecting the style that will most likely lead to the desired goals. However, the personalities of the people involved may also play a significant role in which conflict styles are brought to the negotiating table. Thus, it is also possible that some people consistently use a certain style "because they have a personality predisposition to do so, (Lewicki, Saunders and Minton, 1999).

Deutsch distinguishes between two key dimensions of personality: assertiveness in the pursuit of one's own goals, and cooperativeness in pursuit of mutual goals. Researchers have identified five major conflict management styles based on a continuum from assertive (competitive) to cooperative:

A competing style -- high on assertiveness and low on cooperativeness.

A collaborating style -- high on both assertiveness and cooperativeness.

A compromising style -- moderate on both assertiveness and cooperativeness.

(Lewicki, Saunders and Minton, 1999: 359)

Morton Deutsch's theory of cooperation and competition includes predictions about what sort of interactions will occur between negotiating parties as a result of their disputing style. Cooperative styles are characterized by:

1. "Effective communication" where ideas are verbalized, group members pay attention to one another and accept their ideas and are influenced by them. These groups have less problems communicating with and understanding others.
2. "Friendliness, helpfulness, and less obstructiveness" is expressed in conversations. Members tend to be generally more satisfied with the group and its solutions as well as being impressed by the contributions of other group members.
3. "Coordination of effort, division of labor, orientation to task achievement, orderliness in discussion, and high productivity" tend to exist in cooperative groups.
4. "Feeling of agreement with the ideas of others and a sense of basic similarity in beliefs and values, as well as confidence in one's own ideas and in the value that other members attach to those ideas, are obtained in cooperative groups."
5. "Willingness to enhance the other's power" to achieve the other's goals increases. As other's capabilities are strengthened in a cooperative relationship, you are strengthened and vice versa. "Defining conflicting interests as a mutual problem to be solved by collaborative effort facilitates recognizing the legitimacy of each other's interests and the necessity to search for a solution responsive to the needs of all." This

tends to limit the scope of conflicting interests and keep attempts to influence each other to decent forms of persuasion, (Deutsch and Coleman, 2000).

In resolving the Niger Delta problem, the government of President Shehu Musa Yar'adua and later, President Goodluck Jonathan adopted the Co-operative Approach to conflict resolution. This involved granting amnesty or state pardon to all the militants agitating for better improvement in the living condition of the inhabitants of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. After the granting of amnesty, a good number of the former militants were encouraged to surrender fire arms in their possessions to the government. They were eventually rehabilitated and reintegrated into the society. Not only were the ex-militants the beneficiaries as the government trained a good number of them in one life skill or the other, the government equally developed a Niger Delta Development Master plan, aimed at transforming the region infrastructural. Again, a Ministry-the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs was created, to cater to the accelerated development of the region. In exchange, the militants became repentant and gave up the vandalization of pipe-lines and the destruction of other facilities used in the exploration and refining of petroleum products which nearly crippled the nation's economy. Through this, the government and the ex-militants reached a win-win situation through the adoption of the Co-operative Approach to conflict resolution.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter discussed the various methods used in the study. It contains and explained the following: Research design, population of the study, sampling technique and sampling size, description of research instrument, validity of the instrument, method of data collection and method of data analysis.

3.1 Research Design

Research design is the “framework” or “blueprint” for collecting the information needed for your project in the best possible way (Malhotra et al) in Aruwa&Akinwumi (2015). In research design, what is expected of the researcher is to mention what he would use to collect his data. This is the specification of procedures for collecting and analyzing the data necessary to help solve the problem at hand; such that the difference between the cost of discover the relative incidence, distribution and interrelations of sociological and psychological variables obtaining various levels of accuracy, and the expected value of information associated with each level of accuracy is maximized.

The research design adopted by the researcher was Descriptive research design, based on Cross-sectional studies. According to Akinwumi (2015), descriptive research is designed to provide further insight into the research problem by describing the variables of interest. The major purpose of descriptive research is the description of the state of affairs as it

exists at present. This was chosen because representative samples of the populations were used and the characteristics of the elements were measured once.

To achieve this, the researcher used questionnaire and interviews as the major instrument of data collection, the Taro Yamani formula was used to determine the actual number of respondents that were given the questionnaires out of the total population of twenty million, one hundred and ninety-two (20,192) ex-militants that were captured under the federal governments amnesty programme, the Amnesty Unit at the Presidential Villa and the staff of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs.

3.2 Population, Sample Size and Sampling Techniques

3.2.1 Population

Population simply means the aggregate number of persons from whom data to the study were collected. The population of the study is restricted to four (4) States in the Niger Delta region which comprises of (Abia, Imo, Delta and Rivers) . This is to give the study focus and provide ease of data collection. The sample size is the ex-militants captured in the amnesty programme. In each of the four states, a total of 180 ex-militants and thirty (30) staff of Presidential Amnesty Unit were selected for the study. Altogether, two hundred and ten (210) questionnaire items were produced and distributed among the aforementioned groups.

3.2.2 Sample Size

To choose a sample size for this study, a total of 45 ex-militants were selected from each of the four States in Niger Delta states for the study, totaling one hundred and eighty and thirty (30) staff from Amnesty Unit at the Presidential Villa. Altogether, a total number of two hundred and ten (210) questionnaire items were produced and distributed among the respondents.

3.2.3 Sampling Techniques

There are two types of sampling techniques, i.e. probability and non-probability sampling techniques. In this study, the purposive sampling which is a non-probability sampling techniques was adopted. This means the procedure of selection will be deliberately carried out by the researcher. The study will employ the purposive sampling techniques whereby the researcher will issue questionnaires to those respondents.

3.3 Method of Data Collection

Survey method was used with the instrument of secondary data method.

Primary data was collected through the use of structured and unstructured questionnaires. The researcher constructed some structured and unstructured questionnaires and distributed them personally to the ex-militants in the nine Niger Delta states, and the Presidential Amnesty Committee at the Villa. The method that was employed in the distribution of the questionnaire was the face-to-face distribution technique, the researcher distributed the questionnaires and waited there for the ex-militants, the

Amnesty Committee members to fill and return the questionnaires that same day; a sizeable data was also accumulated, through this method.

On the Secondary data, the researcher made use of some libraries like the Faculty of Administration, Nasarawa State University library, the National library Abuja and The University of Abuja library, from where he collected facts and data, relevant to the topic being researched.

3.4 Technique for Data Analysis

Data collected were converted into simple percentages for analysis. The returned questionnaires contained the respondents' responses or opinions to the questions on various aspects of the Assessment of Amnesty programme by the Federal Government.

3.5 Justification of Methods

According to Osuala, (1982: 186), instrument reliability refers to the consistency of a measurement, or has to do with the consistency in which the instrument works.

The establishment of validity as done by the use of pilot-test, in the process, the researcher carried out a trial study as if he was carrying out the actual study, by administering the questionnaires to a group of thirty staff and ex-militants, which constituted about ten percent (10%) of the number of the sample size but have the same characteristics with the actual people being studied.

The trial study was able to disclose how the respondents in the main study will react or understand the contents. The researcher then distributed the questionnaire to ten (10) staff

and ex-militants, identical with the proposed sample group of the main study from a population other than the main study. After the distribution, the questionnaire was collected; the researcher evaluated them one by one. The evaluation technique used was the simplest form. The researcher took an ideal one scored by him in the way he expected every one of the pilot sample group to score the questionnaires, side by side with each respondent's own scored questionnaire. During this process, the researcher found out that the correct scored questionnaire was one hundred percent (100%), indicating that the instrument is valid.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter was to analyze the data collected in a systematic way so as to facilitate verification and authenticity of the prepositions that were stated earlier on. Test of the prepositions will provide the much needed answer to the research questions and also form a basis of goods and reliable recommendations. The primary objectives on the Assessment of the implementation of Amnesty Programme by the Federal Government as already elucidated upon to impact positively for optimum performance, to achieve corporate goals on the Federal Government Assessment towards Amnesty implementation. Based on this, a total number of two hundred and ten (210) questionnaire items were designed to obtain the needed data and out of the two hundred and ten (210) questionnaires distributed, all were duly filled and returned.

Being a survey research, the data was interpreted and the result of the findings is presented in percentages below.

4.1 Data Presentation

The data collected were based on the responses of respondents. Respondents are the ex-militants and staff of Presidential Amnesty Unit.

To what extent would you assess the performance of the Amnesty programme in the Niger Delta Region?

Respondents table 1

| Options | Respondents | Percentage (%) |
|--|--------------------|-----------------------|
| It has gradually returned Peace to the region | 40 | 19 |
| It has brought development of roads | 80 | 38.1 |
| It encourages training and retraining of militants | 60 | 28.7 |
| Unemployment has reduced | 30 | 14.2 |
| Total | 210 | 100 |

Sources: Field survey, 2016

From the table above, 40 respondents constituting 19% responded that the programme has been a resounding success as it has gradually returned peace in the region. 80 respondents which constitute 38.1% say that it has brought infrastructural development. Furthermore, 60 respondents constituting 28.7% said it encouraged training and retraining of repentant militants while 30 respondents constituting 14.2% are of the opinion that unemployment has reduced.

Are the Amnesty implementers properly organized for the implementation of Amnesty Programme?

Respondents table 2

| Options | Respondents | Percentage (%) |
|--|--------------------|-----------------------|
| They lack policies that could help them to function well | 25 | 11.9 |
| They lacked some administrative principles | 45 | 21.4 |
| They are implementing the programme base on the set objectives | 80 | 38.1 |
| They are economically and materially organized | 60 | 28.6 |
| Total | 210 | 100 |

Sources: Field survey, 2016

The result of the table shows that 25 respondents constituting 11.9% are of the opinion that the implementers lacked policies that could help them to function well. 45 respondents which are 21.4% say that they lacked some administrative principles. On the other hand, 80 respondents which constitute 38.1% maintained that they are implementing the program based on the set objectives while 60 respondents which are 28.6% say that they are economically and materially organized.

Do you think there is need to put in place central task force on the implementation of Amnesty programme in the region?

Respondents table 3

| Options | Respondents | Percentage (%) |
|---|-------------|----------------|
| It will fish out the militant who are yet to surrender arms | 75 | 35.7 |
| It will reduce oil pipeline vandalization and kidnapping | 35 | 16.7 |
| It will monitor the installation of electricity supply | 100 | 47.6 |
| Total | 210 | 100 |

Sources: Field survey, 2016

The table above indicates that 75 respondents representing 35.7% believes that the central task force will help to fish out the militants who are yet to surrender arms as required by the programme. More so, 35 respondents representing 16.7% believes it will reduce the oil pipeline vandalization and kidnapping while 100 respondents which constitutes 47.6% says it will monitor the installation of electricity supply.

Would you recommend advisory committee on the implementation of Amnesty programme in the Niger Delta Region?

Respondents table 4

| Options | Respondents | Percentage (%) |
|---|--------------------|-----------------------|
| It will hasten the Amnesty implementation | 40 | 19 |
| It will enable experts/professionals to participate | 65 | 30.9 |
| Good policies will be unfolded | 105 | 50 |
| Total | 210 | 100 |

Sources: Field survey, 2016

The table above indicates that 40 respondents constituting 19% are of the opinion that advisory committee is needed in order to hasten the amnesty implementation. Also 65 respondents which are 30.9% say that it will enable experts/professionals to participate while 105 respondents representing 50% are of the view that it will bring in good policies.

Do you support committee on the implementation of Amnesty programme in Niger Delta Region?

Respondents table 5

| Options | Respondents | Percentage (%) |
|---|--------------------|-----------------------|
| To foster peace | 70 | 33.3 |
| To promote cooperation | 60 | 28.6 |
| To enhance rapid socio-economic development | 80 | 38.1 |
| Total | 210 | 100 |

Sources: Field survey, 2016

The table above shows 70 respondents which constitute 33.3% are of the view that committee on implementation of Amnesty programme in Niger Delta Region will foster peace in the region. 60 respondents which constitute 28.6% believe that it will promote cooperation while 80 respondents i.e. 38.1% says it will enhance rapid socio-economic development.

Would you recommend Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations to contribute on the implementation of Amnesty programme in the Niger Delta Region?

Respondents table 6

| Options | Respondents | Percentage (%) |
|---|--------------------|-----------------------|
| Due to Oil exploration | 120 | 57.1 |
| Help in solving ecological problems | 40 | 19 |
| To facilitate the implementation exercise | 50 | 23.8 |
| Total | 210 | 100 |

Sources: Field survey, 2016

The above shows that 120 respondents which constitute 57.1% believe that purpose is due to oil explorations. 40 respondents which are 19% say it helps to solve the ecological problems while 50 respondents which constitute 23.8% believe it will facilitate the implementation of Amnesty programme in the region.

What are the reason for incessant and treat militancy attack in Niger Delta Region?

| Options | Respondents | Percentage (%) |
|------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| Failed government promise | 70 | 33.3 |
| Insincerity of the mediators | 25 | 11.9 |
| Abandonment of the programme | 115 | 54.8 |
| Total | 210 | 100 |

Sources: Field survey, 2016

The respondents were asked how effective is the amnesty programmes in containing security challenges in Niger Delta, the data obtained revealed that 87 respondents representing (41.4%) of the respondents said that the amnesty programmes has enhance youth empowerment thus bringing about effectiveness in the security challenges within the Niger Delta, while 68 respondents representing (32.3%) of the respondents said reduction of militancy has been effective and thus contains security challenges in Niger Delta and 55 respondents representing (26.2%) of the respondents said improved monthly payment for the ex-militants contain security challenges in the Niger Delta.

Why are some militants yet to key into the amnesty programme?

Respondents table 7

| Options | Respondents | Percentage (%) |
|--------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| Ex-militants not being paid | 128 | 60.9 |
| Reduction on the budget | 35 | 16.7 |
| Failure in government promises | 47 | 22.4 |
| Total | 210 | 100 |

Sources: Field survey, 2016.

The data revealed that 128 respondents representing (60.9%) of the respondents said ex-militants not being paid while 35 respondents representing (16.7%) of the respondents said reduction on the budget by the federal government for the programme and 47 respondents representing (22.4%) of the respondents said failure in government promises are reasons why some militants are yet to key into the amnesty programmes in the Niger Delta region.

4.1.1 Research Question one: To what extent has Federal Government Amnesty solved the security in the Niger Delta States of Nigeria?

Table 1: Respondents view on the Government yet to achieve the objectives of sustained security in the Niger Delta Amnesty.

| Options | Respondents | Percentage (%) |
|---------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| Inadequate personnel | 30 | 14.3 |
| Inadequate funding | 110 | 52.4 |
| Non-cooperation of ex-militants | 70 | 33.3 |
| Total | 210 | 100 |

In order to answer this question, question number one in the questionnaire was used. The respondents were asked what in their opinion is the reason government is yet to achieve the objective of sustain security of the amnesty programme in the Nigeria Delta, the data obtained revealed that 30 respondents representing (14.3%) of the respondents said inadequate personnel were the reason why the objective of sustain security of the amnesty programme is yet to be achieved, while 110 respondents representing (52.4%) of the respondents said inadequate fund and 70 respondents representing (33.3%) respondents are of the opinion that non-cooperation of the ex-militants is the reason for

not yet attaining the sustain security objective of the amnesty programme in the Niger Delta.

Sources: Field survey, 2016

4.1.2: Research Question two: To what extent has the Federal Government's amnesty programme solved the problem of electricity supply in the Niger Delta states of Nigeria?

Table 2: Respondents view on the extent of the above question

| Options | Respondents | Percentage (%) |
|---------|-------------|----------------|
| High | 89 | 42.4 |
| Low | 53 | 25.2 |
| Medium | 68 | 32.4 |
| Total | 210 | 100 |

The respondents were asked the extent has the Federal Government's amnesty programme solved the problem of electricity supply in the Niger Delta states of Nigeria. The data obtained above, revealed that 89 respondents representing (42.4%) of the respondents said that it was high while 53 respondents representing (16.7%) of the respondents maintained that it was low and 68 respondents representing (32.4%) of the respondents said that it was at medium level.

Sources: Field survey, 2016.

4.1.3: Research Question three: To what degree has Federal government amnesty programme impacted on the Niger Delta States of Nigeria

Table 3: Respondents view on the degree Federal government's amnesty programme has impacted on the Niger Delta States of Nigeria.

| Options | Respondents | Percentage (%) |
|----------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| High | 90 | 42.9 |
| Medium | 73 | 34.8 |
| Low | 47 | 22 |
| Total | 210 | 100 |

The respondents were asked to what degree has Federal government's amnesty Programme has impacted on the Niger Delta States of Nigeria.

The data obtained on the table above, revealed that 90 respondents representing (42.9%) of the respondents said that it was high, 73 respondents representing (34.8%) of the respondents said that the extent of the performance was at the medium stage while 47 respondents representing (22%) of them maintained that it was at lowest level.

Sources: Field survey, 2016

4.1.4: Research Question Four: To what magnitude has the Federal government's amnesty programme solved the problem of poor standard of education in the Niger Delta states of Nigeria?

Table 4 Respondents view on the magnitude the Federal government's amnesty programme has solved the problem of poor standard of education in the Niger Delta states of Nigeria

| Options | Respondents | Percentage (%) |
|----------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| High | 89 | 42.4 |
| Medium | 63 | 30 |
| Low | 58 | 27.6 |
| Total | 210 | 100 |

The respondents were asked what in their opinion the extent the Federal government's amnesty programme has solved the problem of poor standard of education in the Niger

Delta states of Nigeria. The data obtained from the table above, revealed that 89 respondents representing (42.4%) of the respondents said that the extent was high, 63 respondents representing (30%) of the respondents were of the view that the performance of amnesty programme on education are the medium stage while 58 respondents representing (27.6%) of the respondents maintained that the extent were relatively low.

Sources: Field survey, 2016.

4.1.5: Research Question 5- To what extent has the Federal government amnesty programme solved road challenges in the Niger Delta States?

Table 5 The respondents view on extent the Federal government amnesty programme has solved road challenges in the Niger Delta States

| Options | Respondents | Percentage (%) |
|----------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| High | 75 | 35.7 |
| Medium | 70 | 33.3 |
| Low | 65 | 31 |
| Total | 210 | 100 |

When opinion of respondents were sought on the extent Federal government's amnesty programme has solved road challenges in Niger Delta states, the table above indicates that 75 respondents constituting 35.7% responded that it has gone high, 70 respondents representing 33.3% were of the view that it was at the medium level while 65 respondents which constitutes 31% maintained that the extent of Amnesty Programme in solving unemployment in the region was at the low rate.

Sources: Field survey, 2016.

4.2 Data Analysis and Result

Analysis are based on the data presented from the data presentation section, From table one in research question one, the data obtained revealed that majority (110) of the

respondents attested that inadequate funding is the major issues to the achievement of sustained security objectives of the amnesty programme in the Niger Delta.

On the respondent's table one research question one; inadequate personnel serves as a major reason for incessant attack by the militants hence majority of the respondents attested to that fact.

Conclusively, the research question one which state that why has federal government not achieve the objective of sustain security in the Niger Delta amnesty programme can thus be regarded as a result of inadequate personnel and inadequate fund. The result from table one in research question one, the data obtained revealed that majority (89) of the respondents attested that failure of government promises pushed the militants back to the creek thereby defying the amnesty programme in the Niger Delta.

From table five research question one; ex-militants not being paid as stipulated in the amnesty programmes serves as some reasons some of the militants are yet to keyed into the amnesty programmes.

4.2.3 Research Question three

Table 2 and 3 from the data presentation to research question 2 answered the research questions thus revealing that majority of the respondents attesting to the fact that the implementers of the programme restricted their activities on the set objectives of the Amnesty programme and supervision of the installation of electricity supply, expresses the extent they have solved the electricity challenges in the region.

4.2.4 Research Question four

Table 1 and 3 from the data presentation to research question four answered the research question thus revealing that 89 respondents (42.4%) attested to the fact that scholarship for education, training and retraining of ex-militants, provision of skill acquisition centre and implementation of recommendations of the technical committee on how the amnesty programme should be implemented will help to improve the problem of poor educational standard in the Niger Delta States of Nigeria.

4.2.5 Research question 5 Table 1 and 2 from the data presentation to research question five answered the research question thus revealing that provision of sufficient funds, fulfillment of Government promise on infrastructural developments in the region and compliance to specific objectives of Amnesty programme will solve road challenges in the Niger Delta States of Nigeria.

4.3 Discussion of Findings

The study found out that there is a high level of awareness of the existence of the implementation of Amnesty Programme from the Federal Government; there is a significant relationship between the existence of the implementation of Amnesty Programme and the Federal Government. It was also discovered that the level of the implementation of Amnesty Programme is high. This is evidence by the research and findings carried out. The implementation of Amnesty Programme is typically deemed to be very relevant in the Niger Delta Region.

The results analyzed also shows that the implementation of Amnesty Programme has its challenges and effects. Thus the implementation of Amnesty Programme techniques can be applied to meet up necessary aims and objectives as required by the Federal Government. The respondents are of the opinion that since implementation of Amnesty Programme had a good role to play then good policies and strategies should be put in place in this regard.

Findings from this study reveal that the implementation of Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta Region can enhance good development in areas of electricity supply, good road networks, provision of health facilities and Education in the region. The study also finds out that most respondents believe that there is need to accept the implementation of Amnesty Programme in order to upgrade the standard of living of the people in the region. The study finds out that there are a lot of factors hindering the application and implementation of Amnesty Programmes in the Niger Delta. This factor includes insufficient personnel, funds and material resources and untimely payment of stipends to the militants.

The Presidential Amnesty Program (PAP) proved to be a success, with violence and kidnappings decreasing, electricity supply and employment of Niger Delta indigenes into Federal Government sectors on the increase followed by the infrastructural development and good standard of education already provided. Petroleum production and exports have increased from about 700,000 barrels per day (bpd) in mid-2009 to between 2.2 and 2.4 million bpd due to high level of security checks.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

The primary purpose of this research is to assess the role of Federal Government towards the implementation of Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta States of Nigeria. Based on the objectives of this research work, the researcher made some findings which include the following:

From the responses of majority of the respondents, it was clear that inadequate personnel and insufficient funds was one of the major obstacles to the achievement of sustained security objectives of the amnesty programme in the Niger Delta. This on many occasions led to abandonment of the amnesty programme, thereby serving as a major reason for the incessant attack by the militants and general insecurity of lives and properties in the Niger Delta region.

Another finding from this research work is that some of the ex-militants are not being paid as stipulated in the amnesty programme, this serves as one reason some of the militants are yet to key into the amnesty programmes. This could be attributed to lack of trust on the government by the ex-militants. They do not have the trust and faith that the government will keep to its own part of the bargain by paying them their monthly stipends and training those selected for various types of training both here and overseas. They therefore kept back some of these weapons to go back to militancy and agitations

should government renege on its decisions and promises concerning the amnesty programme.

Again, another finding from this research work according to the majority of the respondents is that the major challenges concerning the implementation of the amnesty programme by the Federal Government includes lack of political will. It was revealed that because the government lack the political will to pursue the implementation of the programme, funding became a herculean task and the fulfillment of the promises to the ex-militants like training in one vocational skills or the other and even scholarship to some of them became a mirage. These problems made the implementation of the amnesty programme not to actualize all the purposes for which it was established up until now.

5.2 Conclusion

This study which assessed the implementation of Amnesty Programme by the Federal Government has achieved some of its aims and objectives as it has been able to make provisions of good road networks in the region. The training and retraining of the ex-militants indicated at the appendix at local and International levels on various skills like Pilots, Agriculture, automobile engineers and the provision of skill acquisition and health centers in the region are a success. Although this study has its own limitations, it has contributed in making the findings to see whether the role of Federal Government in the implementation of Amnesty Programme has any great significance. However, the researcher wishes to state here that most of the problems that were lingering prior to

embarking on this study have been solved to an extent. A lot needs to be done for the improvement of the implementation of Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta especially in the motivation, training and retraining of new convert on the current practice of the implementation of Amnesty Programme and enacting policies that would mandate Government to fully implement Amnesty Programme.

Finally, considering the findings of this study, it is concluded that the implementation of Amnesty Programme is a strong tool in the development of Niger Delta Region. It is also concluded that the implementation of Amnesty programme will engender total cleaning and rehabilitation of the region especially the Ogoni lands that has suffered developmental problems since the demise of their famous leader king Saro Wiwa.

5.3 Recommendations

Taking into consideration all the challenges the researcher encountered on this study, however, came up with recommendations that could enable the Federal Government in the implementation of Amnesty Programme. Below are the various recommendations:

- i. The Amnesty programme has gone a long way in bringing peace in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria and therefore, should be sustained and not abrogated.
- ii. That management and policy makers in the Government sectors should enhance the implementation of Amnesty Programme.
- iii. That the Federal Government should send implementers for further training in order to acquire the necessary skills and experience in handling the Amnesty Programme.

- iv. To further ensure the total harnessing of the benefits of the implementation of Amnesty Programme, Government should employ experts to handle the exercise.
- v. The government should consider absorbing some of the ex-militants who had acquired skills under the amnesty training programmes into the relevant agencies of government.
- vi. Funds should equally be made available to those that have completed their training programmes, to enable them set up their respective businesses.
- vii. Government should live to the promise as stipulated in the programmes so as to make amnesty programme in the Niger Delta region a success.

5.4 Limitations to the Study

In the achievement of this task, the writer experienced so many constraints and obstacles which manifested as limitations.

The first limitation of this study was that the empirical analysis is based on the opinions of the respondents.

The second limitation of this study was that this population might have provided biased answer because of preconceived notions about discrimination.

The third and related limitation was that it was difficult to get respondents to fill the questionnaires, as most people were not interested in sharing their opinions.

Another major limitation or constraint has been shortage of time, as well as inability to get certain documents which are considered to be secret document or information. The numbers of government officials visited have been limited in numbers due to time factors and lack of fund.

5.5 Suggestions for Further Study

The understanding of the role played by Federal Government in the implementation of Amnesty Programme cannot be overemphasized, hence the need for implementers and the various agencies and units to understand the aims of Federal Government towards the implementation of Amnesty Programme. Based on the above, the researcher hereby suggests that further research be carried out in the following area to complement the existing one.

1. Paths to Peace building: Amnesty and the Niger Delta Violence.
2. Culture and the Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta.

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**SCHOOL OF POST GRADUATE STUDIES,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
NASARAWA STATE UNIVERSITY KEFFI**

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ACADEMIC RESEARCH

Dear respondent,

I am a post graduate student in the department of Public Administration, Nasarawa State University Keffi. This questionnaire is a prerequisite demand for research on a topic, An Assessment of Amnesty Programme by Federal Government.

Your total honesty is required in answering the questions beneath. Be sure that your information would be treated with confidentiality.

Thank you for your co-operation.

Tick appropriately your desired answer

| S/N | | | | | | |
|-----|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| 1 | To what extent would you assess the performance of the Amnesty programme in the Niger Delta Region? | | | | | |
| 2 | Are the Amnesty implementers properly organized for the implementation of Amnesty Programme? | | | | | |
| 3 | Do you think there is need to put in place central task force on the implementation of Amnesty programme in the region? | | | | | |
| 4 | Would you recommend advisory committee on the implementation of Amnesty programme in | | | | | |

| | | | | | | |
|----|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| | the Niger Delta Region? | | | | | |
| 5 | Do you support committee on the implementation of Amnesty programme in Niger Delta Region? | | | | | |
| 6 | Would you recommend Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations to contribute on the implementation of Amnesty programme in the Niger Delta Region? | | | | | |
| 7 | What are the reason for incessant and treat militancy attack in Niger Delta Region? | | | | | |
| 8 | Nations and non-Governmental Organization need to contribute on the implementation of Amnesty Programmes in the Niger Delta Region. | | | | | |
| 9 | The role of Federal Government on the implementation of Amnesty Programme has an impact. | | | | | |
| 10 | The Federal Government participation on the implementation of Amnesty Programme can enhance the control mechanism of Amnesty Programmes in the region. | | | | | |
| 11 | There is the need to put in place central task force on the implementation of Amnesty Programmes in region. | | | | | |
| 12 | The Amnesty unit at Presidential Villa is required to play the major role in the implementation of Amnesty Programmes. | | | | | |
| 13 | There are prospects on the implementation of Amnesty Programmes in the Niger Delta region. | | | | | |

| | | | | | | |
|----|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 14 | Positive response is required by government on the implementation of Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta Region. | | | | | |
| 15 | Advisory Committee is needed on the implementation of Amnesty Programmes in the Niger Delta Region. | | | | | |
| 16 | The term Amnesty, includes the willingness and readiness of implementing the Programme. | | | | | |
| 17 | There are underlying problems associated with the implementation of Amnesty Programmes in the Niger Delta Region. | | | | | |
| 18 | The Amnesty Programmes has been a resounding sources in the Niger Delta Region. | | | | | |
| 19 | Are the Amnesty implementers properly organized for the implementation of Amnesty Programmes? | | | | | |
| 20 | The implementation of the Amnesty programmes is mainly made for the militants in the Niger Delta Region? | | | | | |
| 21 | Training and re-training of militants is required alongside with the implementation of the Amnesty Programmes in the region. | | | | | |
| 22 | There is the need for the stakeholders to look into the implementation of the Amnesty Programmes in the region. | | | | | |
| 23 | The Amnesty Programmes did not make provision for settlement of peace in the Niger Delta Region. | | | | | |
| 24 | Does enrollment of militants required for the implementation of Amnesty Programmes in the Niger Delta Region? | | | | | |
| 25 | Through the Implementation of Amnesty Programme, violence can be drastically reduced? | | | | | |