

**ELECTION AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN  
NIGERIA: AN EVALUATION OF POST 2019  
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION IN OGUN STATE**

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# **CERTIFICATION**

This is to certify that this project work was carried out **by**  
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POL/SOS Combination, under my supervision in the Department of  
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## **DEDICATION**

This work is dedicated to Almighty Allah who gave me the wisdom, knowledge, health, grace and a sound mind throughout my course of study and the completion of this project.

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## **ABSTRACT**

*The history of human existence is replete with one form of violence or another. Violence is therefore not a recent development. It has occurred and may occur whenever and wherever there is a clash of interest between individuals and or groups. Violence is also used as a weapon by some people to realize or achieve certain ends. This implies that violence manifests in different forms and dimensions. The phenomenon that is associated with the Nigerian electoral process is violence in Nigeria is characterized by thuggery, intimidation, molestation and assassination. Against the prevalence of electoral violence, this research examined the factors responsible for the outbreak of violence in the 2019 Gubernatorial Elections in Ogun State. The researcher used the group theory as its theoretical framework because of group and individual interest used in achieving their political ambitions. Data for the research were collected from primary and secondary sources. Relevant information gathered from primary sources involved the use of structured questionnaire and oral interviews were conducted among the politicians. The data from primary and oral interviews were analyzed using simple percentages. The analysis of the result shows that; ethno-religious consideration, lack of political will by government in implementing committee recommendations have impacted negatively on the electoral process in the 2019 gubernatorial elections in Ogun State. Based on these findings it is recommended that there should be more enlightenment campaigns to sensitize Nigerians on the dangers of electoral violence.*

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Background to the Study**

Violence is an ubiquitous phenomenon in every society and every sphere of social life. It is not restricted to the political sphere alone. It cuts across every aspect of human existence. This means that political violence is just a subset of violence. It takes many forms including kidnapping, assassination, arson, thuggery etc. This shows that we are in a violent world and the tendency to be violent increases by the day. Violence has no territorial boundary. It is as universal as it predates modernity. For instance, Ekiran (2006) notes that both the Biblical and Quaranic accounts of creation and the events that followed in the Garden of Eden particularly Adam and Eve's refusal to obey God's simple instruction, amounts to violence of a sort. Rejection of a superior's injunction is tantamount to violent behavior; because the word violence has its roots from violation or infringement (Ninalowo, 2004). So when one violates or infringes on a laid down principle, it amounts to violence. Therefore violence can be described as an unruly behavior perpetrated to express anger and dissatisfaction over some social issues which the perpetrators felt have affected or likely to affect them in one way or another (Ekiran, 2006). It is an aggressive behavior which more often than not involves physical combat which could inflict bodily injuries on both perpetrators and innocent people. It is an ill wind that blows no one any good.

With some degree of accuracy or certainty one could say that one type of violence or another is to be found in every human society. In other words, even the advanced countries and developing countries alike are not immune to violence. In Nigeria, violence is commonly used as a political tool to achieve the perpetrators' selfish ends. This usually occurs during elections when one government is about to hand over power to another. The use of violence during elections has become a common feature of the Nigerian electoral process.

Elections are regarded as the hallmark of democratic governance in every democratic society. This is because elections are one of the ways through which people engage in political participation. Elections have become the most acceptable method by which citizens of an ever increasing number of political systems choose their leaders. The appeal of elections lies principally in the opportunity that it provides for an entire electorate to participate in choosing those that should govern them in a simple and peaceful exercise (Momoh, 2005). Elections also provide the people with the opportunity to indicate their preference among the policies and programmes presented to them by the rival leadership elements contesting for political power (Ayeni – Akeke, 2008). Elections may also enable the people to



remove unpopular leaders or force elected officials to listen to their grievances, particularly between elections. Most elected public officers are always conscious of when their terms are over, they would need to fall back to the people to renew their mandate. Therefore, the fear that they might be rejected if they fail to heed to the complaints of the people in non-election years, makes them to pay attention to the views and aspirations of the electorate.

Of all the functions that elections perform, it is the opportunity that it provides for the people to choose their leader that is most emphasized. Yet the extent to which it provides this opportunity varies from one political system to another. For example, in totalitarian political systems, election is the means by which the leadership seeks to confer legitimacy on the regime and government as well as the contestants nominated to face the electorate for approval (Lipjhart, 1994). It also serves as one of the means by which the government socializes the masses and mobilizes them to support its policies. In contrast, democratic political systems that permit open competition use elections to provide the people with the chance to choose between alternative leadership candidates and policies. This does not however mean that it is in all open and competitive political systems that election performs this function effectively and to some extent the effectiveness of elections as a vehicle of choice for the ordinary citizen is influenced by various factors e.g. whether the political parties provide distinct alternative leadership materials and programs etc. (Lipjhart, 1994).

The foregoing indicates that elections are a complex set of activities with different variables that act and feed one another. It involves the participation of the people in the act of choosing their leaders and their own participation in governance (T.M.G., 2003). Elections are not necessarily about Election Day activities although it forms an important component. It encompasses activities before, during and after elections. It involves the legal and constitutional framework of elections which are the registration of political parties, party campaigns, the activities of electronic and print media in terms of access; it includes campaign financing, the activities of security agencies and the government in power. It includes the authenticity and genuineness of voters register; the independence or lack of it of electoral agencies and organs. It includes the liberalism or otherwise of the political process in the country and the independence of adjudicating bodies of elections (T.M.G., 2003).

During the last sixty years, General Elections have been conducted eleven times in Nigeria at irregular intervals: 1951, 1954, 1959, 1964, 1979, 1983, 1991/1993, 1997, 1998/99, 2003, 2007, 20011, 2015 (Kurfi, 2005;:xi) and 2019. The first four were conducted under the parliamentary system while the rest were held under the Presidential system of government. It is also important to state here that elections in Nigeria have always been characterized by several irregularities, which have always been politically

motivated and these have led to violence which has taken an appalling toll on human lives and property. There have always been widespread administrative failings, procedural irregularities, and intentional efforts to carry out ballot fraud etc. The result of these is that the general public's faith and confidence in the fairness of the country's electoral process suffers (TMG, 2003).

According to their report on the 28 March 2015 and 11 April 2015 elections in Nigeria, the European Union Election Observation Mission (EOM) states that the elections were marred by incidents of violence, abuse of incumbency at state and federal levels, and attempts at manipulation. Systemic weaknesses leave the process vulnerable to abuse by political contenders. Procedural shortcomings were evident, in particular during collation and from analysis of polling unit results, however, no centralised systemic fraud was observed. (EU July 2015, 4)

A 12 April 2015 article in Vanguard, a Nigerian newspaper, similarly reports that "violence and voter apathy characterised the gubernatorial and National Assembly elections held across the country yesterday" (Vanguard 12 Apr. 2015). According to the EU report, "at least 30 people were killed" on election day, "predominantly from inter-party clashes and attacks on election sites, with problems being most pronounced in Rivers and Akwa Ibon states" (EU July 2015, 6). The source further states that since the official launch of the presidential campaigns in early January the EU EOM noted reports of 114 election-related violent events with more than 157 persons killed, although the actual number of incidents and casualties is likely higher. Both PDP and APC were accused of deploying thugs to intimidate opponents and attack party rallies, convoys, members and offices. There have been reports of at least 56 cases of shootings at rallies and convoys, polling units and voters; 19 cases of stoning/mob attacks on campaign convoys; 7 cases of bomb explosions at party offices; and 16 cases of destruction of vehicles, bill boards and other properties of parties. (EU July 2015, 20)

An April 2015 article in the Global Press Journal, published by the Global Press Institute, a Florida-based organization which aims to "create a more just and informed world by employing local women journalists to produce ethical, accurate news coverage from the world's least-covered places" (Global Press Institute n.d.), reports that "as Nigeria gears up for a general election on March 28 many regions of the country are experiencing politically motivated violence. In two months, 58 people have died in the violence, according to the Nigerian National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)" (Global Press Journal 20 Apr. 2015).

## **Incidents of Violence and Election Interference in Ogun State**

A 2 March 2015 Vanguard article reports that the "re-election campaign of Governor Ibikunle Amosun of Ogun State turned bloody during his visit to Remo North Local Council of the state, when the supporters of the [APC] and [PDP] clashed leaving some people injured" (Vanguard 2 March 2015).

According to the April 2015 Vanguard article, in Ogun State, "there were reports of snatching of ballot boxes in various parts of the state" (Vanguard 12 Apr. 2015). The EU report indicates that the Nigerian Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) "referred to 66 reports of violent incidents targeting polling units, INEC officials, voters and election material," throughout Nigeria, including one incident in Ogun state (EU July 2015, 30). The report further explains that such incidences were predominantly inter-party clashes and attacks on election sites by hoodlums, often involving ballot box and essential material snatching. Both the main parties [APC and PDP] made many accusations of rigging, intimidation and violence by opponents. (EU July 2015, 30)

The Guardian, an "independent Nigerian newspaper" (The Guardian n.d.), reported on 11 April 2015 that a "detachment of personnel from the various security agencies arrived yesterday in Ogun State ahead of today's Governorship and State House of Assembly election" and that this might not be unconnected with allegations and counter allegations by the two major political parties [APC and PDP] accusing each other of "importing" thugs into the State to disrupt today's election. While the APC accused the PDP of "importing" thugs and cultists into the State to cause violence during the election, the PDP also accused the APC of a plot to use "State government vehicles and security personnel attached to the State Governor to hijack voting materials in the rural communities." (The Guardian 11 Apr. 2015)

The EU report indicates that in Ogun state, EU EOM monitors "observed misuse of government vehicles and offices for campaign activities" as well as "inducements of voters (money payments, distribution of food and goods)" (EU July 2015, 20). The 12 April 2015 Vanguard article also states that a "fight broke out" at one ward in Obafemi Owode Local Government Area of Ogun State, as APC agents accused the PDP of offering money to people queuing to vote (Vanguard 12 Apr. 2015). According to the same source the APC agent at the polling station "accused the PDP of attempting to disrupt the electoral process," after which security guards arrested a PDP agent (Vanguard 12 Apr. 2015). Vanguard further reports that a "PDP former Chairman" of the Local Government Area "alleged that the "arrest was a ploy to silence PDP members at the polling unit" (Vanguard 12 Apr. 2015).

The 2019 Gubernatorial Elections were one of the most contentious elections. Results from the entire exercise were probably the most contentious and most lingering. Long after the events, there were still

litigations after litigations. This was so because those who emerged victorious did so through irregular activities, i.e rigging and violence. The elections conducted in Ogun State cannot be said to have occurred without electoral violence. The events which trailed the Gubernatorial Elections in Ogun State form the focus of this research.

## **1.2 STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM**

Elections are the central processes of democratic representative government because in any democracy the authority of government derives solely from the consent of the governed. The principal mechanism for translating the consent into governmental authority ideally is by holding free and fair elections. In Nigeria, elections have become an avenue for legitimization of bad governance. This assertion hinges on the fact that incumbent government holds on to power at all cost while opposition parties in a bid to capture state power, resort to all manner of irregularities. The result of this is usually violence of one sort or the other.

Events which unfolded in Ogun State during the last election show that the most contentious issues about the election have to do with electoral violence which hitherto, is unheard of in Ogun State politics. The political atmosphere in the state became unusually tensed while many interest groups emerged with the intent to capture power.

Presently the problem in Ogun State seems to have assumed a different dimension. For instance, one group of politicians have continued to accuse the other on various issues. One of such issues is about transparency in leadership.

The overall consequence of these developments is that the political atmosphere in Ogun State remains tense. Politically, Ogun State is like a ticking time bomb and a political catastrophe waiting to be unleashed. This work therefore sets out to assess the post 2019 gubernatorial election in Ogun State, the factors responsible for the outbreak of violence in Ogun State politics. Furthermore, this work also examines the challenges which these developments pose for Nigeria's electoral process and democracy.

## **1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The research questions are follows:

- I. what are the factors that generated violence during the 2019 Gubernatorial Elections in Ogun state?
- ii Did Ethnic and Religious considerations influence the electoral process in Ogun state?

iii What are the ways of reducing electoral violence in Ogun State?

The researcher intends to answer these questions using the aims and Objectives stated below

#### **1.4 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH**

The specific objectives are as follows:

- i. To examine factors responsible for the outbreak of violence in the 2019 elections in Ogun state.
- ii. To identify and discuss the reasons why politicians in Ogun State resorted to violence in the quest for the governorship seat
- iii To appraise the 2019 Gubernatorial Elections in Ogun State with a view to identifying its challenges to Nigeria's electoral process.
- iv To proffer workable recommendations on ways of improving the electoral process in Ogun State and Nigeria in general.

#### **1.5 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS**

The following hypotheses are hereby put forward:

- i) Ethno- Religious considerations contributed to the spate of violence in the 2109 Governorship Elections in Ogun State.
- ii) Lack of political will by government in implementing committee recommendations have affected the electoral process in Ogun State.

#### **1.6 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS**

It has been observed that violence is a common feature /occurrence in the conduct of elections in Nigeria. This has, often times, imparted negatively on the credibility of the Nigerian electoral process. The scope of this study therefore covers the Gubernatorial Elections held in 2019 in Ogun State.

Major problems encountered were time constraints, bureaucracy and reliability of the sources or materials. Notwithstanding, the researcher came up with findings that would be worth making reference to in future.

Problem Encountered in The field

During the field Work, the problems encountered in the study include the following:

- i, Politicians were very reluctant in completing the questionnaires.
- ii. There was also the problem of finances as the researcher hired research assistants.
- iii. Some respondents collected the questionnaires and failed to return them.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical foundation of the research rests on the Group theory. As a tool for political analysis, this theory shows a great deal of interest in the internal organization and processes of various groups and discusses questions relating to their boundaries, size, territoriality and other forms of integration. Under this theory, society is taken as a mosaic of groups living in interaction with one another, and the government is described as a forum within which the group struggle can proceed in the presence of certain overreaching boundaries and limits.

According to the group theorists, the government can be distinguished from other groups in terms of the mechanics and processes of adjustment they provide for the purpose of handling the ongoing struggle for political interest group. The government thus 'comprises of groups representing within its framework broader social processes, as well as interest and claims, thus making available to outside groups a number of points of access, at which it is open to influence'(Varma,1975).

Against this backdrop, it becomes pertinent to explain the term 'group'. It simply means a collection of individuals. However, in terms of group theory, it connotes a different thing. According to Bently, the author of group theory, a group means a certain portion of the men of a society, taken however not as a physical mass cut off from other masses of men, but as a mass of activity, which does not preclude the men who participate in many other group activities.(Bently,1952).

A group has an interest of its own and it represents a pattern of process rather than a static form. As such a group can emerge only when the interactions among members are relatively frequent and sufficiently patterned to produce directional activity. It should be noted that groups are different from each other as regular and coincidental or categorical and the fact that the same individuals may belong to various groups and they also do so, makes it clear that the activity particular to the group is more important than its structural composition.

What binds the individuals of a group is the interest, a shared attitude concerning a claim or claims to be made by one group upon certain other groups in the social system. it is because of this very element that one can imagine a large number of interest that have not found expression in any other group and for this reason , they remain unprecedented until they find such expression. The group theory thus leads logically to particular concept of the social system and political behaviour and it is through the social system the

various groups seek to realize or maximize their interest. The society 'is a single universe of groups which combine, break, and federate and form coalitions and constellations of power and in a flux of restless alterations is and it is kept going by the push and resistance between groups.

Furthermore, according to the theory, society is made up groups and the government is represented by them as playing the role of mediator in the struggle among groups and the source of rules and restraints. The government functions to establish and maintain a measure of order in the relationships among groups.(Johari, 1972) Action according to the proponents of the group theory is always invariably a group process, never found in one man himself, it cannot be stated by adding men to men . it must be taken as it comes to in many men together by men in groups , society, nation, government, legislation, politics, administration, all are comprised of groups of men, each cutting across many others moreover, these groups are in a state of perpetual interaction with each other, and politics consist in the shunting by some men of other men's conduct along changed lines, the getting of forces to overcome resistance to such alterations or the dispersal by one grouping or forces by other grouping or forces by other grouping (Varma 1975).

The group theorist find a great establishing force in the operation of several social groups. The competing groups that make the society are seen as participating in an unconscious balancing process. The vast mass of groups involved in the process of interaction and competition and the existence of divergent lines of conflict guarantee that all individual groups will be kept in check by simultaneous activities of other groups. Another stabilizing force also stems from the phenomena of overlapping or cross cutting memberships. The individuals belong to various groups and they are at the expense of their association with all other groups. Above all, the balance within a society is powerfully supported by what the group theorist call the rules of the game. These are seen as unorganised through widely accepted interest that set up certain criteria of acceptability for the conduct of inter group conflict and that are capable of active organization in the events that these criteria are widely violated (Johari 1975).

The group theory as presented above leaves certain loopholes. One of such may be taken as partially correct. All the decisions of government are not taken under the pressure of groups. While some decisions are definitely made on the account of pressure of the interest of the groups, others are not. Other factors like consideration of the good of the people, ideas of the people, the general interest of the society, or character and temperament of the nation may not be entirely discarded.

Another loophole of the theory is that it lacks the quality of a good orientation. It simply tries to study things as they are without telling us what should be the goals of our social life. It also tells us how



changes take place in the social and political system. In spite of the foregoing and other criticisms leveled against the group theorist, it remains relevant in this study as it examines the groups or factions that have emerged on intra and inter party basis in Ogun state; also, it tries to find out if the assassination, humiliation, molestation, rigging recorded during the 2019 elections were deliberately carried out by any of the groups to pursue their interest. Therefore the group theory is a veritable tool for the analysis of electoral process in 2019 governorship elections in Ogun state.

## **Conceptual framework**

### **2.1 VIOLENCE**

The word “violence” defies any precise, commonly, accepted definition. The concept often serves as a catch all for every variety of protest, militancy, coercion, destruction, or muscles flexing which a given observer happens to fear or condemn. (Anifowose 2006).

Violence therefore is a universal phenomenon which has been viewed differently by scholars; it is, however, seen as an act of causing pain to one’s self or others. Violence has been pursued in the defense of order by the privileged, in the name of justice by the oppressed, and in fear of displacement by the threatened (Anifowose 2006).

Gatlung (2004) identifies three types of violence, as physical, psychological and structural. He states that physical violence involves a situation of physical assault whether mild or hard. To him psychological violence is the kind that places a person in a state of perpetual fear of what could happen to him as a result of his participation in an activity of being a member of a community. While structural violence is an indirect and embedded in structures of the society but could be worse than physical and psychological violence. It takes place when people are politically repressed, causing them to live miserably because they are politically repressed, economically exploited, deprived of the freedom to be close to those with whom they identify or forced to be close to those they do not like.

Violence manifests itself in various forms according to the society by which it is perpetuated. For instance, in Nigeria the most common forms through which it manifests is ethnic, domestic, religious, political or electoral patterns (Ugboaja n.d). This thesis focuses on electoral violence.

### **2.1.1 Electoral Violence**

Electoral violence can be defined as any random or organized act of threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a political stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay, or to otherwise influence an electoral process (IFES 2002).

Ugboaja (2007) sees electoral violence as one form of organized act or threat which is physical, psychological and structural aimed at intimidating, harming, blackmailing political opponents before, during and after election geared towards influencing the electoral process to one's selfish desire.

Electoral violence can be categorized into three types namely; Pre-election violence, Election Day violence and post-election violence. These three categories of violence can manifest in different forms such as torture, extra judicial executions, arbitrary detention, and abduction and kidnapping, arrest without warrant, beating, personal humiliation, killing, shooting, death threat, burning of houses, chasing of voters from polling station/unit and malicious damage of property.

The pre-election violence is usually caused by powerful individuals within the party and they use various ways through achieving their goals. For instance, they select their own candidates to run for elections using all the machinery of the party. The selection process usually causes friction within the party, and sometime leads to factions within the party. Loyalist of such powerful individuals tends to humiliate, intimidate their political opponents.

The Election Day violence is the most occurred and documented electoral violence in Nigeria. It includes deliberate use of security or thugs to hijack electoral materials molest and intimidate electoral officers. Powerful politicians use youths, unemployed to cause electoral violence in order to achieve their selfish political objectives. During election, thugs are used to prevent voters perceived to be in support of their opponents from voting. Opponents are sometimes kidnapped or eventually killed on Election Day.

Post-election violence takes place immediately the result of election is announced or even counting of votes starts. This violence includes killing of opponents, burning of their properties etc. conversely thugs of the losing party demonstrate and attack electoral personnel, publish offensive articles and use of inciting statements on the opponents. Post-election violence also includes petition and rejection of results by party or opponents that loose election.

According to Ekiran (2006) violence of any type whether political or otherwise has more negative than positive results on the society. To him, in the first instance, it does not project a good image of the country outside it borders. It implies that the country is still politically immature and democracy is still a

mirage. He argued further that violence usually scares away foreign investors from any nation. Before any foreign investor can invest his hard earned money in any society there must be guaranteed safety of life and property. Ekiran noted further that violence is no respecter of nationality, creed, religion or race. Perpetrators of political violence and their god fathers do not put into consideration the safety of innocent people particularly of children and women. Ekiran further argued that by implication, political violence is one of the bane of development. For any nation to develop, foreign investment cannot be dispensed with. Any nation that is an island to itself risks stagnation and even retrogression. People flock to developed countries particularly United States and Western Europe because of relative peace and security of life and property.

In a similar position Jega (2008) pointed out that political violence or any other type of violence usually leads to loss of innocent life's and destruction of property. It is an uphill task to give an adequate statistics of lives that have been lost as a result of violence in the conduct of politics since Nigeria's independence in 1960. Jega further noted that violence more often than not makes people internally displaced particularly violence that involves arson. It is always a forced displacement which is a process, status and consequence of being involuntarily compelled to leave one's place of domicile or habitual abode.

For Fagbemi and Nwankwo (2002), a painful consequence of electoral violence with special reference to Nigerian experience is military intervention in the social and political administration of the nation. Without any contradiction of truism the first military coup d'état in the country on January 15, 1966 was orchestrated by electoral violence which was as a result of election malpractices in the 1964/1965 polls. Although there were remote and other causes of the military takeover, the fact remains that the immediate cause of the coup d'état was the protracted and uncollable political violence in many parts of the country.

Fagbemi and Nwankwo noted further that armed troops, police and other security operatives were sent to quell the violence, the attempt failed to sustain the unpopular regime in the defunct Western region. This motivated some military officers to intervene and seize power at the centre which led to the collapse of the first republic. They noted that the death of many notable and highly placed Nigerians could not be unconnected with electoral violence in Nigeria.

Fagbemi and Nwankwo further argued that the military coup of December 1985, was not unconnected with electoral violence which was on wider territorial spread across the nation than the 1965 political uprising which had main base in the then Western region.

Popoola (2004) remarked thus: The violence that attended the conduct of the 1983 election was therefore one of the identified reasons for the military takeover of government again in December 31, 1983; thus ending the second republic attempt at civil rule. The successful execution of the coup d'état ushered in one of the perceived harshest military regime in the history of the country. Popoola argued further that as usual, the nation's Constitution was one of the first victims as it was suspended and replaced by decrees which are more or less draconian rules. To Popoola, democracy suffered a setback and dictatorship was enthroned and enforced. Politicians found themselves running from pillar to pole under the mercy of the military. Popoola insisted that all these were the consequences of electoral violence.

Ajagbe (2006) went on to posit that electoral violence undermines the political process, threatens political stability and negatively affecting transition to consolidate democracy. To him, it imposes enormous cost on the political system ranging from loss of lives, destruction of property and erosion of confidence of the voters as well as undermining the legitimacy of governments. In his view, the aftermath of the annulment of the 1993 general election validates this assertion. Following the annulment of the election, there was a tensed political atmosphere. It was a period of uncertainty, insecurity of life and property and indeed a state of anarchy. Ajagbe lamented that electoral violence thus amounted to a situation in which the planned transition to civilian rule was derailed.

### **2.1.2 Root Causes of Electoral Violence**

A common adage says “there is no smoke without fire”, events and things do not just happen. People make things happen. History is a byproduct of human behaviour. So electoral violence does not just fall from the sky, there are some underpinning antecedents. From observation and research, electoral violence is rooted in the following among others:

#### **i. Natural Tendency:**

Research and experience show that some individuals are naturally prone to violent behaviour due to their upbringing. There is no doubt that individuals who have been exposed to violence from infancy will most likely perfect the culture of violence at a latter stage of life. Researchers of human behaviour assert that people who have been exposed to violence will more likely than those who have not been exposed to violence to employ violent strategies to manage conflict either on the micro or macro level. Ugoh(2004)

#### **ii. Cultural Trait:**

Some cultures are said to be prone to and committed to the use of violence to maintain or achieve a desired goal. In a similar vein the pattern of child rearing in some societies endorse violence. Most children in such a culture have at one time or another been slapped by either or both parents at least in a minor way. Such action meets the approval of the society and it is not even thought of as violence against the child since it is by the parents (Anderson and Sabatelli, 1999). Children with this type of upbringing are a ready tool in the hands of violent god fathers at a later stage of life particularly for political ends.

### **iii. Political Intolerance:**

Most political parties in power are intolerant of opposition. They put all necessary and all possible machinery to frustrate opposing parties or even to eliminate them. Ugoh (2004) maintains that this is the order of the day in many African countries. To him, the result is one party system. Here in Nigeria, the opposition parties are only vocal without any effectiveness. The ruling party usually intimidates and silence them. For instance Ugoh recalled that when Chief Obafemi Awolowo went to the Northern region to campaign for his party candidates, he was attacked and an attempt was made to set his helicopter ablaze.

### **iv. Unpopular Politicians:**

Violence is also caused by unpopular politicians who usually employed political violence through paid thugs to turn the table in their favour. These are individuals who cannot win election but want to win by all means. Furthermore, election results are changed in favor of a particular political party at the detriment of other parties. This is usually the case when incumbent governments want to retain power by all means.

More often than not, supporters of some political parties are denied the exercise of their voting rights by the powers that be at the polling booths. All of the above always lead to electoral violence in Nigeria.

## **2.1.3 ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW**

Political crisis, conflict tension and electoral violence is rampant in sub-Saharan Africa and this had generated equal passion among development practitioners, professional conflict management and peace building experts and political scientist. Elections were held in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Kenya Zimbabwe, Ghana, Uganda, Lesotho all were characterized by pre and post-election violence. Studies indicate that violence in African elections affects between 19 and 25 % of elections (Dorina 2009). These crisis and electoral violence consequently lead to an unfavorable democratization in most African countries. Violence is so infused in political processes of African countries that almost all elections are characterized by crisis and violence.

These can be seen in the Nigerian elections held in 2003, 2007, Lesotho in 1998 and 2007, Zimbabwe 2008. Specifically in the case of Nigeria, during the 2019 International observers said thus: “the electoral violence left more than 100 people killed and many injured” many politicians took advantage of the rampant poverty and unemployment to recruit young men, who intimidate and even kill their opponents. Many politically motivated killings and attacks occurred in many other areas. In central and northern states, some politicians used religion and ethnicity to galvanize political support and opposition. For instance In kwara state (2002) the leading gubernatorial candidates were in conflict with each other and during that period the party chairman was assassinated in addition to a bombing of the news paper office, all these were believed to be politically motivated.

In 1998 elections in Lesotho lead to post elections conflict bringing the country to the brink of a civil war. This situation was contained by the diplomatic and military intervention of South Africa and Botswana. The 2008, Zimbabwean elections were marked by violence against opposition forcing the opposition presidential candidate (Morgan Tsvangirai) to pull out of the run off election. It is believed that electoral violence, rigging, molestation and killing in African countries is greatly carried out by youths and teenagers. Youths are frequently seen in the scene of political, electoral and religious violence leading to death or injuries by youths.

Giddado (2009) stated that “the nature and extent of youth involvement in electoral violence and magnitude associated with electoral rigging in Nigeria is posing a threat to the national quest for stable democratic transition as attainment of consolidated democracy” the political and democratic transition has constituted a threat to a fulfilled democratic transition and youths are channels through which political and electoral violence can be stopped.

African countries elections have often ended up in electoral violence which tends to uphold the Long held afro- pessimist notion that African soil is not conducive for democracy, in 2007, Kenya was thrown into post election violence which, in a space of two months, claimed more than 1,200 lives and displaced an estimated 350,000 thousand people: This Kenya post election violence was fuelled by deep ethnic division and economic frustration. Nathan (2008) observed that “where underdevelopment is coupled with inequality violence may occur as expression of anger frustration and fear”.

Violence is likely to erupt where the state fails to meet the popular demands, leaving the masses in grinding poverty. Election violence may be erupted by a disputed election but its root causes may lie in historical marginalization and exclusion. Sisk (2006) stated that “When parties are quite certain of loss or exclusion in an electoral contest, especially when they expect to be permanent minorities (to lose not just

once, but again and again), the certainty of outcomes is also a strong casual driver of violence”. He observed that the stakes of winning and losing valued political post is in many situations, especially in condition of high scarcity and underdevelopment incredibly high” in light of this is a state with a weak political, economic, and social systems is more prone to plunge into electoral violence.

Kambudzi (2005) asserts “election tension and explosion into violence are event grown out of period of gestation” Thus, the outbreak of violence during elections or in reaction to an announced outcome should be seen as symptoms of deep rooted centrifugal factors ingrained in the society. It is a result of long neglected or very important issues. The serious election violence in the south- south region of Nigeria can be traced to the issue of marginalization and neglect of the oil producing states. During the April election in Rivers state there were open intimidation, molestation and serious assault of INEC staff and voters by electoral thugs which could be traced to unresolved differences in the south.

In many instances of electoral violence, humiliation and killing, the perpetrators are not charged, the victims receive little or no redress and the cause of the violence remain unexamined. Some recent actions taken by the government and the civil society may offer insights into the trend of reversing violence.

Conclusively, it can be said that the reoccurrence of electoral violence is an indication of wild spread grievances and tension. Tension from land rights, lack of employment, ethnic marginalization etc and for any meaningful progress to be made in these areas these issues must be addressed.

#### **2.1.4 Electoral Systems**

According to Duverger (1964), elections are the central institution of democratic representative government. In his view, this is so because in a democratic setting the authority of the government derives solely from the consent of the governed and that the principal mechanism for translating the consent into governmental authority is the holding of free and fair elections. Duverger further asserted that all modern democracies hold elections but that not all elections are democratic. He maintained that democratic elections are not merely symbolic, but that they are competitive, periodic, inclusive, definitive elections in which the chief decision makers of a government i.e. the public representatives are selected by citizens.

Duverger maintained that free and fair elections held at regular intervals are fundamental in democratic transitions. In his position, elections provide an opportunity for examining how a range of institutions is functioning in a transitional setting and whether fundamental rights are being promoted and protected. Duverger insisted that for democracy to flourish, elections must reflect the will of the people. In order for election to fairly reflect the will of the people, the citizens must perceive that they are free to

exercise their rights, adequately informed to do so, and have confidence that the electoral process will accurately reflect their choice.

He therefore concluded that elections are essential to democracy and development. To him, meaningful elections can only be realized in an environment conducive to clean, free and honest elections. Such an effort, to him, is premised on a well educated citizenry, vigilantly assertive of their right to a free, fair, clean and meaningful electoral exercise. Duverger's opinion as reviewed above clearly presents the importance of elections to democratic governance all over the world. His opinion above may however be said to speak for what transpires in the advanced countries of the world and not what obtains in the third world where Nigeria conveniently falls. Since elections are not what they ought to be in the third world, Duverger's opinion rather sounds utopian.

Andrew (2005) posited that in a market electoral democracy, the vote is not only supreme, it is sacred; to him the vote is to politics what money is to the market. In his opinion, in societies or democratic environments, people are first and foremost commodity bearers even if the only commodity they bear is their labour power and market norms such as individualism, profit motive, competition, formal freedom and equality. Being socially atomized, formally free, equal and self-interested proprietors, Andrew noted that these commodity bearers evolve a political architecture that is akin to the market. To him the most critical aspects of this political architecture are elections and the rule of law. While the market finds political expression in elections, market forces are incarnated politically in the rule of law. To him this explains why the laws of market societies generally provide for the freedom of individuals to vote and be voted for, the equality of votes and freedom to choose between political platforms.

Furthermore, Andrew argued that just as money is the medium of exchange in the economic market, the ballot (vote) is the medium of exchange in the political/electoral market. To him, respect for the rules guiding elections, particularly as contained in the constitution and electoral law, expresses the collective subjugation of all candidates, electors and regulatory bodies to the rule of law. He posited that these rules of the game define the conditions on which candidates are to be supplied (the party list) and demanded (willingness of the electorate to support the platform of a candidate or party), as well as the prices (investment the electorate are willing to make in the candidate or party measured in votes). Consequently, he maintained, the regulatory regime, like the forces of demand and supply, are seemingly dissociated from the interest of one party or the other and all are equally liable to the rules of the game.

Andrew (2005) linked the process to a market situation equating the vote of the individual with money used as a medium of exchange, but Andrew fails to point out problems that can be created which



tempers with the right to vote i.e that even in the market there are saboteurs these could be referred to as the electoral fraudstars who go to any length to win elections, he fails to link his analysis with the situation in most third world countries

According to Grazia (1962) the administration of elections in most jurisdictions of the world is a technical operation, publicly operated and directed with no relationship to the political parties. In the advanced countries like the United States, according to him, the administration of elections is partly in public hands and partly in party hands. To him, three criteria are commonly used to determine the efficiency of elections administration. The efficient system allows the voters to participate with a minimum of personal inconvenience by providing them with convenient polling places, easy registration and identification procedures and in some case a legal holiday from work to cast their votes.

To Grazia, efficient systems prevent frauds. He cited an example with the US which operates on the principle that by using officials of the major parties to conduct the polling, each will watch the other and fraud will be prevented. He added that the English systems have non-partisan state employees doing the work.

Furthermore, Grazia maintained that electoral systems are also efficient if they get the job of balloting done in the shortest possible time with the least expenditure of money. To him, using untrained personnel as in many American jurisdictions also means greater expense.

Grazias work present an ideal situation in the developed world whereby party representatives are seen as watch dogs over other parties, he fails to point out that flaws are recorded in all elections , that it is not the absence of fraud that makes an election perfect but the degree to which fraud was reduced or treated justly is what makes a good election, he tries to give the impression that America has a perfect electoral system but events that led to the reelection of George Bush in 2004 shows that even in the advanced electoral systems there could be fraud, this contradicts Grazias Analysis.

For Nettles (1977), elections have generally come to play a central role in the structuring of the political process in western societies today i.e. they are a crucial component in any analysis of function in the political subsystem. He likened elections as possessing the quality of volcanoes i.e. they bring to the surface, knowledge about wishes and attitudes both primary (the result of electing someone) and secondary (the deeper analysis and the attempt where made, to disentangle confusion between views held and votes cast). He noted that elections are occasional through reliable and at least regular means of geological enlightenment.

To Nettles, it is noticeable that there is in most countries with democratic elections a containing and unresolved debate as to whether elections ratify existing or proffered policies and the people that go with the policies or whether they provide clues which future policies and people must take into account. Nettles analysis did not consider situations where electoral rigging or manipulation is the order of the day, in a situation where citizens are mostly illiterates or citizens are intimidated enlightenment cannot take place effectively, He lays less emphasis on election credibility and conduct of a free and fair elections.

According to Banks and Textor (1988), many of African states that exhibited competitive or partially competitive electoral systems shortly after independence have been moving at varying rates, toward the adoption of one party or fissional single list systems. To him practices vary all the way from the arresting of particular opposition leaders to the wholesome banning of opposition parties. They argued that only few African polities do there seem to be much doubt that this process will go on.

Banks and Textor argued further that virtually any restraint on political activity by opposition or potential opposition groups is likely to be justified by the government concerned as being in the “national interest”. This argument, by these scholars indicates one point i.e. that there is a clear distinction between the electoral systems of the western nations and those of the third world, Africa in particular. While there is a general regard for electoral laws and procedures in the advanced countries in Africa particularly these laws usually suffer disregard and manipulation to suit the elites selfish political ambitions.

The analysis of Banks and Textor made comparison between Western countries electoral system and Third World countries bringing out Africa as a total failure in its electoral process. The failure to bring out instances such as countries that practice monarchial systems or some countries in Africa who have shown some high level of credibility in Africa

According to Katz (1980) elections are properly regarded as the central institution of democratic government. This argument, to him, is because in a democracy, the authority of the government derives solely from the consent of the governed. He maintained further that the primary mechanism for obtaining and translating that consent into governmental authority is the holding of genuinely democratic elections. All modern democracies hold elections but not all elections are democratic, he added.

Katz further specified that a democratic election would characteristically be competitive, periodic, inclusive, definitive and free and fair. However, he noted that achieving this is not an easy task nonetheless. To him, to bring this about, an independent electoral process is a necessary precondition and a cardinal requirement of such a process that those charged with the responsibility of conducting and supervising the process must be independent of the players in the system. This to him means a

body/commission that will not surrender to the whims and machinations of those in power at the expense of their opponents and the people themselves. Such a body in his operation must be independent in order to be able, at all cost, maintain the sanctity of the electoral process.

From the analysis of Katz he mentioned the functions of elections in a democratic environment, but he did not explain vividly what to him is genuine democratic election, this argument fails to capture the position of electorates i.e there could be situation where the electorates would frustrate the electoral process even if the electoral commission was truly an independent commission, the citizens must also have a high level of political awareness for the electoral process to be smooth.

Yaqub (2007) posited that the crucial nature of elections in democracy is underscored by the requirement that the following minimum features must accompany their conduct. To him, in the first place there must be in existence an independent electoral body. This body must be a legal entity that can sue and be sued especially in relation to the conduct of the elections. Secondly, the elections must be seen as free and fair i.e. that the electoral body must create a level playing ground for the parties and the candidates involved in the electoral process.

Thirdly, in Yaqub's analysis the electoral body must issue guidelines that are clear, unambiguous and objective. Such guidelines to him must also be seen to have been applied fairly and equally. As an umpire, the electoral body must not be seen to be partisan in favor of any party in contest. Fourthly and lastly, as elections are likely to create some controversies either in their conduct or the results, Yaqub argued that there must be opportunities for the courts to arbitrate the expected legislations, should they ultimately occur.

Yaqub maintained that the essence of election to democracy should also be seen in the civic education role it performs. To him, indeed during elections, it is not just the party's manifestoes that are explained to the electorate, but also in the general education in respect of the role of the parties in democratic politics, the knowledge of the candidates given the exposure as well as the pressure that they have to go through. He added that actually, the electorate would get to know how and whether or not the candidates would act in a particular way at crucial moments of decision while in office. Yaqub gave analysis of the roles and responsibilities of the electoral commissions in the conduct of a free and fair elections, however like Katz, Yaqub fails to capture the roles and functions of the electorates in the conduct of a free and fair elections.

According to Ugulu (2003), in many electoral systems, world and the electoral management bodies operate on the assumption that people are expected to be honest and to behave honestly and

objectively, To him, elections in such countries are run manually with pencils, paper and good organisation using honest and socially mature individuals. He admitted that however, some activities of the electoral process can be abused by dishonest and biased individuals. He suggested that the application of appropriate technology to these activities by these systems thus reduce if not eliminate the impact of malpractices. Again, he asserted that relying on human beings alone, a lot of time is needed to achieve tasks that would otherwise take a few minutes, a few hours or a few days to accomplish. Expectations for speed, accuracy and efficiency of the process make it imperative to use not only machines to aid human effort, but to also automate many aspects of the process. It is at this point that Ugulu brought in the issue of technology in elections. He argued that the use of appropriate technology in elections is not only for the purpose of enhancing the integrity of the electoral process but is also supported by economic arguments and factors of state security. This argument advocates for the application of technology in achieving free and fair elections but fails to look at the situation in third world countries especially in Nigeria where people, to a large extent, are not exposed to the usage of technology i.e computers to vote.

According to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IIDEA) (2002), electoral systems translate the votes cast in a general election into seats won by parties and the candidates. The key variables in its view are the electoral formula (whether the system is majoritarian or proportional, and what mathematical formula is used to calculate the seat allocation) and the district magnitude (not how many voters live in a district, but how many member of the parliament that district elects).

The Institute further noted that electoral system design also affects other areas of electoral laws, the choice of electoral system has an influence on the way in which district boundaries are drawn, how voters are registered, the design of ballot papers, how votes are controlled, along with numerous other aspects of the electoral process.

Furthermore it added that the type of electoral system a country adopts would ultimately depend on the depth of the divisions in the political community, the prevailing political culture as well as its political history. One thing therefore comes to light at this juncture i.e. that electoral process of the advanced countries are nothing but orderly and all embracing. The electoral systems of these countries operate like a system with each playing its statutorily stipulated function. This is not to imply however that these systems are perfect.

Having pointed these facts, the institute however did not consider the role of political parties in power (incumbency) in manipulating elections through hoarding of ballot papers, delaying electoral materials to favor them, control of electoral officers.

### **2.1.5 ELECTORAL SYSTEM IN NIGERIA**

According to Kurfi (2009) though democracy has generally been accepted the world over as the best form of government, like all good things, it has its own conditions, rules and procedures. To him democracy can thrive and flourish only under certain conditions, one of which is general elections in which the people are given the opportunity to freely choose their own leaders through secret ballot. He added that this vital exercise is usually carried out from time to time through the process of adult suffrage.

After this analysis of the desirability of elections, Kurfi came down to Nigeria and lamented the various vices which marred Nigeria's electoral process. In his opinion, electoral malpractice are many and varied in many countries including some of the very advanced democracies, however the case of Nigeria is said to be peculiar because of the fact that things seem to be getting worse rather than better as the nation moves ahead. In Kurfi's opinion, this is a serious phenomenon which does not auger well for the future of democracy in Nigeria.

Kurfi went further to note that even though there are various problems militating against Nigeria's electoral process, chief among them are bribery and corruption which grow and flourish under the debilitating influence of poverty and ignorance. To him, no amount of effort that ignores these evils can effectively deal with the situation. There is no doubt that virtually all the elections conducted in Nigeria from independence to date have been characterized by one form of electoral fraud or the other. It is therefore not out of place to state that Kurfi's summation clearly describes the Nigerian electoral system. Kurfi succeeded in examining the various problems inherent in the Nigeria's electoral process, but he fails to make recommendations as to what should be the guiding principles for a free and fair elections, he failed to mention the fact that in some states no matter how government intends to manipulate elections, citizens do not allow that to happen, for instance kano 2003, lagos 2003 is an example.

In his opinion, Chukwu (2007) lamented that despite strident attempts at electoral reforms, experience of electoral commissions in Nigeria has shown that they are not really independent. To him they rather operate like parastatals of the executive and party in power, being frequently influenced, controlled and directed by them in the exercise of their powers and performance of their functions. He asserted that the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) characteristically typifies a body fettered or tied to the strings of the executive and the ruling party, the All Progressive Congress APC. Consequently he lamented, the Nigerian electoral process has been subjected to gross abuses and its sanctity violated.

Chukwu contended further that the constitutional provisions for the independence of INEC are grossly defective. Consequently, the requisite independent status of the commission is not properly safeguarded.

Again he argued that the defect reflects the lack of a clear and universal political will to protect the integrity of the electoral process in Nigeria. The analysis makes a critical analysis of the of INEC, it points out how the electoral commission has been used by the ruling party to clinch to power, the analysis however did not proffer solutions as to how best it feels INEC can be independent.

In a similar vein, Okorie (2003) argued that the Nigerian experience as concerns elections teaches that the electoral process is not fully democratic and free. The engine wire of the process, the INEC is not independent as one would tend to believe given its name. He maintained that the constitutional provisions on the commission, beginning with the locus of authority for its establishment and composition of its membership, down to its enabling powers and responsibilities etc, are quite defective.

Furthermore, Okorie argued that given the nature of those provisions, INEC can best be regarded as quasi autonomous commission like a parastatal, dependent on the presidency and the ruling party for its existence, direction and control. He thus lamented that such a situation has robbed INEC of its essence and quality of being an impartial umpire in the electoral process. Therefore the future and survival of democracy and the electoral process itself is not assured under controlled operational environment.

In Okorie's opinion, the independence of INEC cannot be achieved by mere wishful thinking or changing its name from time to time and prefixing "independence" to it. To him there is need for positive actions to be taken towards the constitutional reform. He recommended that in order to guarantee and protect the independence of INEC, the relevant sections of the constitution pertaining to establishment and appointment of members of the commission as well as its independence, have to be amended.

Okorie's analysis makes a good dissection of INEC, i.e comparing it to a parastatal under the government, but he fails to explain what he means by INEC working in an 'operational environment' listing what constitutes an operational environment would go a long way in making the reader understand what he feels is an operational environment.

According to the International Republic Institute (IRI) on the 2003 elections in Nigeria, the electoral process in Nigeria as shown by the conduct of the 2003 elections leaves substantial room for improvement. They noted serious lapses at critical levels of the election administration structure. They noted that on election days, the vast majority of polling stations failed to open on time because essential materials such as ballot boxes and ballots were delivered well after time. They also noted that many polling centers did not open until early in the afternoon or in some cases, the end of the day. They observed that as a result, a substantial number of citizens were either discouraged from voting or denied the opportunity to vote.

The institute further observed that shortages of ballot and permanent voter cards in several areas had the same effect as did problems with ballot design and insufficient voter education. The result of these they maintained was the relatively high percentage of invalidated ballots being reported at several polling stations visited by their observers. The institute further added that badly over subscribed and poorly arranged voting stations slowed the balloting process and rendered it less than orderly. Many voters were said to be forced to spend very long time at the polling stations, resulting in frustration with the delay.

They also observed a general lack of observance of the prescribed procedure for securing ballot boxes or for providing voters with a private space to record their vote. Irregularities were most dramatic and also of greatest concern in the vote tabulation and collation processes. These and many other irregularities were recorded by the IRI even though these were occurrences during the 2003 elections, yet they conveniently describe or depict how the Nigerian electoral system looks like. This analysis fails to give reasons for the late arrival of the electoral materials; it fails to identify which groups are involved in the delay of these materials, and what reasons are responsible for this apparent sabotage.

For Iwu (2007), elections are made to be conducted in systems where order prevails. To him, this is the marked difference between competition for power in civilized setting and that within Thomas Hobbes' state of nature where the only recognized interest is self interest and the struggle for power that does not make room for restraint and respect for constituted authority is bound, sooner or later, to do damage either to the self or to the system. He lamented that as it turns out unfortunately in the case of Nigeria, the system rather than the individuals has been bearing the brunt of the unbridled pursuit for power. In his view, in such environment of individual and group excesses, in which the mechanism for state control is weak or compromised, expectation of an ideal electoral contest is often unrealistic.

Iwu added that the pressure on the Nigerian political system was compounded by the emergence of a class of super rich citizens under the prolonged reign of military dictatorship. To him, this category of the new rich obviously has no regard for such apparently belittling doctrine as equality of citizens, nor do they have patience for such measured processes as democracy carries along. With a combination of stupendous wealth, limitless access to authority and influence which literally placed them above the law, Iwu lamented that Nigeria's latter day politicians are at once a threat to such fundamental ingredient of democracy as electoral contests. To him, within this context, it is not difficult to see the root of electoral problems in contemporary Nigeria.

Iwu's analysis explains what is inherent in the Nigeria electoral process, however Iwu fails to explain why the mechanism for state control is weak, is it because it is the same group of individuals that control

power? Or this group has a grip on the government in power? Iwu fails to proffer solutions to the problem of electoral violence, malpractice, is it that the situation is hopeless?

For Nnanna (2003), the general elections so far held in Nigeria have made it clear that even in the matter of elections, the federal government in Nigeria determines who wins, where and how. To him, election in Nigerian democracy at this moment is not yet a game of the electorate, but a game of the government and the federal government. He argued that power resides with the government and not the people and that once government gives power to whom it wishes, it rolls out the instruments and agents of state coercion to crush anyone who might wish to protest the rape of democracy. For this reason, Nnanna maintained that it follows that whenever the federal government makes any serious breakthrough, the ripple effect reaches every corner of the country.

Nnanna went on to state that most of the reports from local and international observer groups on the general elections in Nigeria, have always raised concerns about serious irregularities perpetrated by the Nigerian ruling class in their bid to steal the mandate of the people. He lamented that the reactions from government and INEC spokes persons and some media practitioners to these reports tended to be generally that of criticism of the accusations as unfounded or at best as lacking in objectivity. Nnanna deplored this situation and pointed out that no patriotic Nigerians would object to the view that we need to ensure that the country's march towards democratic rule is jealously guarded against any factor that may return the nation to the woeful years of military misrule.

In his position, Jinadu (2003) noted that competitive elections designed and administered in such a way that the outcome are uncertain in the sense of the possibility of today's losers, tomorrow's winners, under conditions of competitive party politics, are at the heart of liberal democratic practice and culture. He maintained further that the future of democratic politics therefore is inextricably bound up with the conduct of free and fair elections and a responsible party system.

To him, although the recognition and registration of more political parties constitute a welcome to the further opening of the competitive party political space, Nigeria needs to consider the consequences of its past. The electoral system and the zero sum, winner takes all approach to competitive electoral politics it engenders, for the viability and survival of small parties. All in all, in his view, Nigeria's experience in recent times with regard to elections generally and party politics must be a cause for concern. He added that while there may be some points in Nigeria's self congratulatory effusion about having successfully effected transition from one democratic civilian administration to another, perhaps for the first time in our



independent exercise, sober reflection and assessment shakily leads us to the realization that our electoral process is fundamentally flawed and that something profound must be done to set it right.

For Onu (2004), we live in one of the most violent nations on earth. The reason for his assertion is that elections are now held in the homes of private citizens. Election fraud and malpractices, have been elevated to a new art where fairness and justice are sacrificed at the alter of expedience to satisfy the greed of those who want to control political power at all cost. To him, Nigerians now know that they have to cheat in order to get anything. He noted that Nigeria's experience in the recent past has shown that the way we conduct elections has grown worse. It has been stripped of any transparency in addition to being associated with all forms of fraud, malpractice and irregularities. To him, the way elections are conducted can best be described by the comments of Justice Anthony

The foregoing review highlighted electoral processes across the world and Nigeria in particular. The centrality of elections to democratic governance cannot be overemphasized, nether can it be ignored. It is recognized that not all electoral systems of the globe are flawless; however, it is the extent or gravity that matters. What obtains in Nigeria has already been commented upon in the review hence there is no need to over flog the issue. Much of the review done emphasized on the process of elections and election procedures, problems methods, electoral malpractices etc.

This Research work reviewed the works of various writers on the subject violence, Electoral violence, and Electoral process; however, these authors failed to capture the uniqueness of the situation in Ogun State, it is the intention of this work to fill in the gaps by capturing the uniqueness of the situation in Ogun State.

## **2.2 ELECTIONS IN THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE YEARS**

Before the attainment of political independence, Nigeria which existed as an amalgamation of northern and Southern protectorates since 1914, had witnessed three general elections i.e. 1923, 1946 and 1951/1954, all under the colonial governments. (Crowther,1962).

Electoral politics is almost as old as Nigeria. Not quite long after the amalgamation 1914, by the 1922 Clifford Constitution, Nigeria and certain sections of Nigerians (those who lived in Lagos and Calabar) were introduced to electoral politics, after they might have met the conditions for participation. While it could be said that the Clifford Constitution did not give much space for democratic politics (only four people were to be elected from these two cities and at the same time the number of elected versus official members of the legislative council was skewed against the former), subsequent colonial constitutions tried to remedy the anomaly. All the same and until adult suffrage was introduced in the East and in the West

in the early fifties and in the North in 1959 (women were still excluded in this region until 1979), democratic space was still very much scrambled (Yaqub, 2007).

It is correct to argue that it is not only the limited number that could participate in electoral politics in Nigeria at the beginning that was much the matter or problem, but that from one election to another during and after colonialism the country's electoral politics has always deviated from the norm. The norm of elections, particularly in the advanced liberal democratic systems is characterized by the following: issues based on electioneering campaign; elections devoid of substantial rigging and violence such as killings, maiming and the destruction of property; respect for the sanctity of the votes; impartial conduct of the elections by the electoral body; and the quick release of results (Beetham, 1993). Because this is often the norm, the results are more often than not accepted and both the victor and the defeated tend to exhibit much respect for one another.

### **2.3 ELECTIONS DURING THE FIRST REPUBLIC**

Nigeria's political independence was ushered in by the December 12, 1959 general elections into local councils, regional and federal legislatures (Beetham, 1993). Before the elections and based on the federal department of statistics projection of Nigeria's population to be 31,559,026, the political parties all agreed that there should be approximately one seat in the House of Representatives to every 100,000 persons in Nigeria. (Omotosho, 1988).

Elections were therefore held in 312 single member constituencies nationwide; but with the vacant seats allocated regionally thus:

Northern Nigeria: 174

Western Nigeria: 62

Eastern Nigeria: 73

Lagos Federal Territory: 3

(Source: kurfi, 2005).

Voting was by secret ballot and all registered adults in Western and Eastern Nigeria were eligible to vote. In Northern Nigeria only registered adult males were however eligible to vote. Twenty six political parties

were registered to contest the elections. Yet a tri-regional party system had begun to emerge by common consent among the parties albeit reflecting the dominant ethnic group in each region. These parties were: Northern People's Congress (NPC) representing Northern Nigeria, Action Group (AG) representing Western Nigeria and National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) representing Eastern Nigeria. Other political parties included, Northern Elements Progress Union (NEPU), United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), Borno Youth Movement (BYM) and United National Independence Party (UNIP).(Omosho 1988).

The political leaders who led the campaigns on behalf of the three dominant region and ethnic based political parties were Sir Ahmadu Bello of the NPC, Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe of the NCNC and chief Obafemi Awolowo for the AG. They campaigned vigorously across the length and breadth of Nigeria. The parties traded charges of hooliganism at each other. Issues hardly formed the messages of the campaigns rather; abusive language, ethno-religious (tribal) slurs and violence featured prominently. Chief Awolowo added the helicopter offensive to the drama and excitement of the election; penetrating the remote villages where other major political leaders had never been.

At the close of nominations, a total of 953 candidates stood elections in the 312 constituencies. In the North, 581 nominees contested for the 174 seats, in the East, 186 nominees contested for the 173 available seats, in the West, 178 people contested for the 62 available seats while in Lagos 3 people contested for the 2 available seats (Kurfi, 2005).

Beyond the symbols and messages, ethnicity and religion were to play dominant roles in the results of the 1959 general elections. A little over seven million Nigerians<sup>7</sup>, 185,555 turned out to vote at the general elections that ushered in the new government at independence in 1960. The NPC and NCNC had to go into a coalition to form the federal government on 20 December 1959 in a ratio of 10 NPC ministers of 7 NCNC Cabinet members the AG led by Awolowo formed the opposition in the parliamentary (West minister) system of government (Kurfi 2005:23).

At the compilation of the voters register, eligible voters employed the secret ballot system to cast votes (using ballot papers and ballot boxes) for election into the 312 Federal House of representatives. Results of the election reflected ethno-religious sentiments of the dominant political party in a region. In the regional elections which followed early in 1960, the dominant political party and by extension, the largest ethnic group in each region, reflected in the voting pattern. The winning party readily swallowed up the smaller minority parties within its region. So that NPC was dominant in the North despite the existence of NEPU, UMBC and BYM in the region. AG was dominant in the west despite the existence of NDC and

other smaller parties. NCNC was the leading party in the East overshadowing the DPNC and UNIP (crowther, op cit).

Leadership and influence still resided largely in the leading political figures. Ahmadu Bello (NPC), Nnamdi Azikwe (NCNC) and Obafemi Awolowo (AG) held sway in the regions but had to cede some power to their deputies when it was expedient to do so. Thus, Dr. Michael Okpara took charge as president of the NCNC even as he had assumed the premiership of the Eastern Region in Enugu after Azikwe became the Governor-General of the federation. Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola took over as premier of the Western region in Ibadan when Awolowo became the leader of the opposition in the federal House of Representatives. Ahmadu Bello the Sarkin of Sokoto, remained in Kaduna as premier of the Northern Region; while Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was the Prime Minister of the federation in Lagos, the capital of Nigeria.

## **2.4 THE 1964 – 1965 GENERAL ELECTION**

The second general elections in Nigeria took place from December 1964 into 1965. The federal parliamentary election campaign in December 1964, the first since independence, was contested for by two giant political alliances: the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). The NNA was a conglomeration of the following hitherto disparate political tendencies:

- The Northern Peoples Congress (NPC)
- Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), led by Western Region Premier Samuel Ladoke Akintola, who had indeed earlier formed the United Peoples Party (UPP) in protest against perceived injustices in the AG.
- Midwest Democratic Front (MDF) which was an offshoot of the Midwest Peoples Congress and elements of the AG and UPP in the new Midwest region.
- Dynamic party which was led by Dr. Chike Obi
- Republican Party led by Dr. J. O. J Okezie
- Niger Delta Congress
- Lagos State United Front

On the other hand, the UPGA comprised of:

- The NCNC now known as National Convention of Nigerian Citizens led by Dr. Michael Okpara, Premier of Eastern Regions.
- Action Group (AG) now led by Alhaji Dada Adebgenro since Awolowo and others were serving certain jail terms.
- Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) led by Mallam Aminu Kano.
- United Middle Belt Congress led by Joseph Tarka, and
- Northern Progressive Front NPF (<http://www.dawodo.com> )

Not surprisingly, the NNA adopted a platform that reflected the views of the northern political elite and hence, was an attempt by the NPC to gain firmer control of federal politics through an alliance with the Western region. Its appeal to voters outside the North was based essentially on the advantages to be gained from associating with the party in favour. The NNA preyed on Yoruba fears of Igbo domination of the federal government.

The UPGA on the other hand was employed in an attempt by the NCNC to use the two regional governments that it controlled as a springboard to domination of the federal government. Strategically it offered a reformist programme, combining a planned economy that endorsed increased public spending while also encouraging private enterprise. UPGA proposed to divide the country into states that reflected ethnicity. Its proposal were intended to undermine the existing regional basis of political power by creating a sufficient number of states in each region so that none of the major ethnic groups, Hausa, Yoruba or Igbo, could dominate any region.

The UPGA presented itself as an alternative to northerners and more specifically, to Hausa-Fulani domination of the federal government. Convinced that it would win if the elections were conducted in an area free from interference by ruling parties in the Northern Region and the Western region, the UPGA spent most of its efforts exposing what it regarded as NNA intentions to rig the election in those regions. (Adamu and Ogunsanwo, 1982).

The tone was thus set for an election that appeared programmed to plunge the nation into crises, the seeds of which had been sown by events in the young nation which had barely a year earlier, become a sovereign republic. The crises generating issues were:

i. The jail terms given to Chief Obafemi Awolowo and his AG members on charges of sedition and treasonable felony in November, 1962.

ii. The 1963 census which put Nigeria's population at about 55.6 million but remained controversial because the Northern region was half the country's population, a development forcefully challenged by the NCNC and the AG. Thus the two grand alliances that emerged pitched the Northerners against the south in the election.

Chief Eyo Esua, Chairman of Federal Electoral Commission came out with the election guidelines to ensure free and fair and non-violent elections by the 22 million registered voters of Nigeria's 55.6 million. Ballot boxes were designed to bear the symbols of each party in the election slated for December 30, 1964 into the 312 seat-

House of Representatives.

The election was postponed for several weeks because of discrepancies between the number of names on voting rolls and on census returns. Even then UPGA was not satisfied and called on its supporters to boycott the election. The boycott was effective in the Eastern region where polling places did not open in fifty one constituencies that had more than one candidate running for office. In other constituencies in the region, UPGA candidates ran unopposed.

Nationwide only 4 million voters cast ballots, out of the eligible voters. The NNA elected 198 candidates, of whom 162 represented the NPC, from the 261 constituencies returning results. After an embarrassing delay, president Azikiwe agreed to ask Balewa to form a government with the NNA majority. The boycott had failed to stop the election and in March 1965 supplementary elections were held in those areas in the Eastern Region and in Lagos where the boycott had been honored. UPGA candidates were elected in all these constituencies, bringing the NCNC dominated coalition to a total of 108 seats in the House of Representatives. UPGA became the official opposition (Ojiako, 1982).

After this decisive defeat, the UPGA prepared for the November 1965 legislative election in the Western Region in an attempt to gain control of the three southern regions and the Federal Territory of Lagos. If successful, the NPC dominated NNA still would have controlled the House of Representatives, but it would have given the predominantly southern UPGA a majority in the senate, whose members were chosen by the regional legislatures.

Once more NCNC strategy failed and widespread charges of voting irregularities, Akintola's NNDP supported by its NPC ally, scored an impressive victory in November. There was extensive protest

including considerable grumbling among senior army officials, at the apparent perversion of the democratic process. In the six months after the election, an estimated 200 people died in the violence that erupted in the western region.

In the face of the disorders, the beleaguered Balewa delegated extraordinary powers to the regional governments to deal with the situation,. By this time, Azikwe and the Prime Minister were scarcely on talking terms and there were suggestions that Nigeria's armed forces should restore order (Omotosho 1988).

## **2.5 THE 1979 ELECTIONS**

After thirteen years in power, the military government finally lifted the ban on political activities in 1978. Before then, General Obasanjo who became Head of State on the assassination of General Murtala Mohammed, had inaugurated a Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) and the Constituent Assembly which later fashioned the Draft constitution which was signed into law by Decree No. 25. The Constitution which came into effect on October 1, 1979 stipulated conditions for the formation of political parties, principal among which was that a party must have a national spread i.e. it must not be limited to an ethnic group or its activities defined by purely ethnic considerations (constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979).

Five parties emerged to contest the 1979 general elections: The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) with Adisa Akinloye as chairman, Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) with Obafemi Awolowo as chairman, Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) with Aminu Kano as chairman, Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP) with Waziri Ibrahim as chairman and Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) with Adeniran Ogunsanya as National Chairman. Another political party, the Nigerian Advance Party (NAP) led by Tunji Breithwaite was registered later to contest the 1983 elections ([www.dawodu.com](http://www.dawodu.com)). Symbols and slogans apart, it soon became obvious that the new parties were a reincarnation of the tri-regional parties of the first republic. The same actors, manifesting tendencies that threw up deep-rooted ethnic sentiments, were back on the political turf in a fierce struggle for the control of the reins of power in a federal republic; even though a 19 state structure had emerged in Nigeria.

The elections were conducted for positions in the local councils, state assemblies, governorship, the Federal House of Representatives, the Senate and the presidency. Another remarkable constitutional departure from the first republic was the existence of a senate into which elections would be conducted. Besides, the governor was the chief executive of the state assisted by a deputy and the president as the

chief executive of the nation; the president also had an assistant as a vice-president. Results of the elections in the states confirmed the ethnic coloration of the parties.

The NPN was dominant largely in the North; the UPN controlled the Yoruba south west while the NPP was the leading party in the Igbo states. The PRP held on to its traditional NEPU stronghold of Kano and Kaduna while the GNPP made a statement in Borno and Gongola States in the North East more or less indicating Kanuri independence of Hausa –Fulani domination (Nnadozie, 2007). The pattern of voting was finally reflected in the presidential election of the 47, 433, 757 registered voters, 16,846,633 Nigerians voted in the 11 August 1979 presidential elections. The NPN polled 5, 688, 857 votes, the UPN polled 4, 916,651 votes, the NPP polled 2, 822, 533; the GNPP polled 1,686,489 votes while the PRP polled 1,732,113 votes (Nnadozie, 2007). Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the NPN was the eventual winner out of the elections on 26 September 1979 after a supreme court had interpreted the provisions of the constitution on what constitutes two- thirds of 19 states, critical requirement to ascertain overall winner. He was sworn in as Nigeria's first executive president on October 1, 1979 despite a legal challenge instituted by chief Awolowo of the UPN, on the FEDECO declaration of Shagari as president elect claiming that Shagari could not have won the elections because he did not get the 25% of votes cast in the 13 states of the federation.

## **2.6 THE 1983 ELECTIONS**

During the 1983 general elections, the Nigerian Advance Party (NAP) of Tunji Braithwaite joined the existing five political parties to contest the elections. The NPN consolidated its hold on the polity, breaking into the traditional strongholds of the UPN and NPP. The gubernatorial election results provided the first indication that the NPN had transformed itself into a super power, as its new slogan indicated, albeit the other parties alleged that the process was massively rigged.

This time, the NPN controlled Anambra, Bauchi, Bendel, Benue, Borno, Cross River, Gongola, Kaduna, Niger, Oyo, Rivers, and Sokoto State. The UPN controlled Lagos, Ogun, Kwara and Ondo State. The GNPP this time was not in control of any state, the PRP controlled only Kano State while the NAP controlled no state (Kurfi op cit).

In the presidential elections, Shehu Shagari of the NPN again emerged winner defeating Awolowo of the UPN, Nnamdi Azikwe of the NPP Aminu Kano of the PRP, Waziri Ibrahim of the GNPP and Tunde Braithwaite of the NPP.

## **2.7 THE 1989 TO 1993 GENERAL ELECTIONS**



After five years of another military government, the Babangida led administration promulgated the 1989 constitution into existence. Babangida went on to create two political parties and compelled the politicians to work with them. He called the politicians “equal founders and equal joiners” of the two political parties which were a little to the left and little to the right of the centre (Nnadozie op cit).

The influence of the federal military government was obvious in the design, membership, structures and infrastructures of the two grassroots parties. Government provided the funds, influenced the appointment of their leadership, and provided buildings and logistics for the parties.

The constitution would not come into effect during the life of the regime because handover date to a civilian president was frequently shifted from 1990 to 1992 and then to January 1993 and finally August 1993; this spate of postponements which appeared like an endless transition program. It is noteworthy that a civilian government had been installed at the local governments, States House of Assembly and the National Assembly. Civilian governors had also taken charge as chief executives in the 30 states of the federation. The states and their governors were under the authority of General Babangida who styled himself president.

The presidential elections of June 12 1993 pitched the Social Democratic party’s Moshood Abiola against National Republican convention’s Bashir Tofa. It was an election adjudged the freest and fairest in the annals of the National Political history. It was also an election that promised to erase the hosts of ethnicity and religious intolerance which had, for so long, heated the political landscape.

The results of the elections were inconclusive as the Babangida regime annulled the results which Abiola in was adjudged the winner, promising another presidential election before October 1993. Instead, by August 27 1993 an interim National Government headed by chief Ernest Shonekan was put in place.

## **2.8 THE 1999 GENERAL ELECTIONS**

General Abdusalam Abubakar succeeded Late General Sani Abacha as Head of State on 9 June 1998 and he announced a transition that would end on May 29, 1999. Local Government Councils, State and National Assemblies, elected during Abacha’s regime were dissolved, as well as the NECON which supervised the elections. A new Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was established to conduct and supervise series of elections preparatory to the military disengagement from governance.

As in 1979, the military rulers were not interested in perpetuating themselves in office and were desirous of supervising the organisation of free and fair elections. Three political parties; People’s Democratic Party (PDP), All Peoples Party (APP), and Alliance for Democracy (AD) were registered by INEC and

permitted to sponsor candidates for elections. The APP and AD decided to contest the presidential election on a joint ticket choosing Olu Falae of the AD pairing him with Umaru Shinkafi of APP as running mate while the PDP sponsored Olusegun Obasanjo with Atiku Abubakar as running mate.

Although there were hitches, complaints, mishaps etc here and there, generally speaking, the elections were free and fair as attested by foreign observers and domestic election monitoring groups (TMG, 2003). At the end of the elections, the power structure which emerged was as follows:

PDP: The Presidency, 21 state governors and control of 21 state Assemblies

APP: 9 states governors and control of 9 state Assemblies

AD: 6 states governors and control of 6 state Assemblies

In the senate, PDP had 67 members APP, 23 members and AD, 19 members. In the House of Representatives PDP had 214 members, APP 78 members and AD 67 members (Kurfi, op cit).

## **2.9 THE 2003 ELECTIONS**

The Nigerian nation began preparations to usher in the fifth republic at the end of general elections billed for April, 2003. It was widely held that the elections were crucial to the survival of the Nigerian state. This was more so given the fact that the nation was yet to experience a successful civilian to civilian transition, in addition to the fear that elections conducted and supervised by civilian governments have often been fraught with fraud and irregularities. Others even wallowed in the belief that election years ending with the figure three in the nation's political history have always ended in turbulence. The general elections in 1963, the argument goes, the 1983 and 1993 had variously ruptured the political setting of the nation (TMG, op cit).

While 1963 was largely characterized by electoral malpractice, violence, declaration of a state of emergency in the western region, which may have set the stage for eventual military take over and a harrowing 30 month long civil war, the 1983 elections were no less different. Perceived electoral injustices and brazen manipulation of election results, again perhaps created the enabling environment for another military takeover. Then, in 1993, the presidential elections were officially declared inconclusive even when it was obvious to the majority of Nigerians that a winner had emerged in Chief Moshood Abiola.

During the 2003 election, the Nigerian people trooped out in large numbers to cast their votes, they demonstrated patriotism and resilience in some states, gun men tried to chase them away from polling stations. In other states, political thugs simply made away with the ballot boxes and or stuffed the ballot boxes with unlawful votes. Yet again in some states, ghost and under aged voters took the centre stage while in others, community leaders and other leaders of thought did the voting on behalf of their communities (The Guardian, April 27, 2003).

While the voters waited and persevered in the polling stations to cast their votes, the political class and the political parties had different ideas. The voters wanted their votes to determine the winner of the elections while the ruling class wanted to corrupt the process and rig their way into elective office.

The 2003 general elections were generally believed to have been massively rigged and were not considered to be free and fair as testified by both international and domestic election monitoring groups including Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), European Union, Catholic Church groups as well as a host of other civil society groups, advocacy groups and NGOs. It was reported that only commonwealth election monitoring team had something good to say about the elections although partially. (Analysis Magazine, NOS, May 2000).

Twenty-nine of the registered political parties that either contested or did not contest the elections, variously rejected the results as announced by INEC declaring the results as fraudulent. Both the domestic and international election observers documented massive irregularities that characterized the elections and refused to endorse the elections as free and fair. The National Assembly elections were generally peaceful in most parts of the country, though significantly marred by incidents of violence, intimidation and killing of voters in many states. For the presidential and general elections, there were substantial flaws in some of the critical stages leading up to the elections which tended to undermine the credibility of the process.

The foregoing issues can be considered as a fair assessment of what took place in Nigeria's political landscape during the elections which held on 12, 19 April and 3rd May, 2003, Obasanjo was re-elected as president for second term.

## **2.10 THE 2007 GENERAL ELECTIONS**

This was a culmination of a series of activities and events which included the passing of the electoral act that set the basis for the contest, the delimitation of electoral districts, the registration of voters as well as the political parties and finally the fixing of dates for the elections.

There were a few complaints here and there; especially people queued for long hours before they could be registered. Secondly there was an allegation that the registration exercise of Nigerian voters took place in the house of a chieftain of the ruling party, chief Adedibu. Elections were held into the national assemblies and the state assemblies as at when due. There were also the elections conducted into gubernatorial as well as presidential offices. These were equally held as when due. However the election days witnessed confusion galore and it became a joke whether or not INEC was fully prepared for the exercise in the first place. The results released were highly contentions. One after the other, elections was now held in many states.

## **2.11 THE 2011 GENERAL ELECTIONS**

Presidential elections were held in Nigeria on 16 April 2011, postponed from 9 April 2011. The election followed controversy as to whether a northerner or southerner should be allowed to become president given the tradition of rotating the top office between the north and the south after the death of Umaru Yar'Adua, a northerner, when Goodluck Jonathan, another southerner assumed the interim presidency. According to a gentlemen's agreement within the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) power is to rotate between the predominantly Muslim north and Christian south every two terms; this meant the flag bearer of the party for the 2011 election was scheduled to be represented by a Northerner. After the death of one term President Umar Yar'Adua, a Northern Muslim, his Vice President Goodluck Jonathan, a Southern Christian, took over as acting president. The suggestion that Jonathan was considering running for the presidency in his own right was controversial as Yar'Adua had only served one of the two possible terms as president after Southerner Olusegun Obasanjo.

Due to the zoning system, a Northern Muslim candidate, Ibrahim Babangida, a former general and military ruler, and Atiku Abubakar, a former vice president, ran for the presidency. After initial doubts, the interim president Goodluck Jonathan declared his intention to run for the presidency on 18 September 2010. Muhammadu Buhari was seen as the principal opposition to Jonathan besides Nuhu Ribadu.

In 2011, sixty-three political parties were registered in Nigeria Online newspaper Naija Gist reported that twenty-one parties were fielding candidates, but listed only 19. Only one woman, Ebiti Ndok, was running. Following a bombing in Abuja during Nigeria's 50th anniversary of Independence celebrations and the arrest and interrogation of the Director General of Babangida campaign, Raymond Dokpesi, there were calls for him to quit the race. In addition, others who linked his affiliates to the blasts. He responded in saying it would be "idiotic to link" him with attack. Even before the blasts, however, some of his former loyalists, popularly called "IBB Boys," apparently asked him to quit the presidential race so as not

to avoid being rubbished by a non-General. In September 2010, the election commission requested a postponement of the polls citing the need for more time to overhaul the national electoral register. Critics were upset over the proposal. The election was postponed from January to April 2011 due to the release of a new electronic voter registration software.

In December 2010, bombs went off in Yenegoa, Bayelsa State during a gubernatorial campaign rally. Politicians and police said that the campaign of violence aimed to disrupt the election. There had been bombings and shootings in the north blamed on Boko Haram since 2009, intensifying during 2010. On 1 October 2010, the "Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta", a militant group, claimed responsibility for dual car bombings during Nigeria's 50th independence anniversary celebrations in the capital that had killed at least 12. On Christmas Eve, 24 December 2010 a series of bombs went off in villages near Jos, the main city of the Plateau state, killing 32 people and leaving 74 others in critical condition, and on 31 December 2010 a bomb exploded in an open-air beer garden and market at army barracks in Abuja, killing at least four and wounding at least 21.

The elections were reported in the international media as having run smoothly with relatively little violence or voter fraud in contrast to previous elections, in particular the widely disputed 2007 election. Indeed, at least one observer pronounced them the most smoothly run elections held since the restoration of democracy 12 years earlier.

The United States State Department said the election was "successful" and a "substantial improvement" over 2007, although it added that vote rigging and fraud also took place. The Guardian also noted that irregularities, such as underage voting and snatching of ballot boxes were reported. Buhari claimed that his supporters in the south were not allowed to vote.

The election sparked riots in Northern Nigeria. According to Human Rights Watch about 140 were killed in political violence before the election alone, between November 2010 until 17 April 2011, the day after the election. According to the head of a leading Nigerian civil rights group living in Kaduna, more than 500 mostly Muslim people had been killed in three villages just in Kaduna since 16 April 2011. A speaker for the "Open Society Justice Initiative" stated the only comparable episodes of violence occurred in the mid-1960s and early 1980s, which both led to government overthrow. Buhari had refused to condemn possible violent reaction to the election result, which has been interpreted as an invitation to his supporters to riot. Up to 1,000 people could have died in post-election violence.

## **2.12 THE 2015 GENERAL ELECTIONS**

General elections were held in Nigeria on 28 and 29 March 2015, the fifth quadrennial election to be held since the end of military rule in 1999. Voters elected the President and members to the House of Representatives and the Senate. The incumbent president, Goodluck Jonathan sought his second and final term.

The elections were first scheduled to be held on 14 February 2015. However, the electoral commission postponed it by six weeks to 28 March, mainly due to the poor distribution of Permanent Voter Cards, and also to curb ongoing Boko Haram insurgency in certain north-eastern states. The government closed its land and sea borders from midnight on 25 March until the end of the polling date. The election was extended to 29 March due to delays and technical problems with the biometric card readers.

It was the most expensive election ever to be held on the African continent. Nigeria is the continent's most populous country, has the largest economy and is its leading oil producer. Opposition candidate Muhammadu Buhari won the presidential election by more than 2.5 million votes. Incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan conceded defeat on 31 March, before the results from all 36 states had been announced. The election marked the first time an incumbent president had lost re-election in Nigeria. The President-elect was sworn-in on 29 May 2015, marking the first time since Nigeria gained independence in 1960 that a sitting government peacefully transferred power to an elected member of the opposition.

After a botched governor's election in Anambra State, there were serious concerns that the election would not go smoothly. The country's election commission had promised a better election process, hoping that combating electoral fraud would prevent the violence that had plagued previous Nigerian elections. Despite this, a pre-election poll by Gallup noted that only 13% of Nigerians had confidence in the honesty of elections.

The Socialist Party of Nigeria filed for registration as a political party to contest the election, but the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) refused the registration. The SPN sued the INEC at the Federal High Court, claiming that INEC had failed to respond to their petition within 30 days as prescribed by law and that thus it would have to be registered automatically.

The presidential election was a trending topic in Nigeria on Twitter, one social media platform reflecting public opinion; although PDP/GEJ may simply have had better support on social media, which is not representative of the population as a whole. According to Impact Social, based on data from 40,000 tweets, Facebook messages, blogs, and other internet outlets that mention PDP or GEJ, 70% of public opinion toward President Jonathan is positive, but messaging on the economy has taken up 6% of election conversation and was seen as a key PDP strength. Social media support for Buhari/APC was a bit

"noisier" without a single issue leveraged by the campaign to gain traction: there was general frustration that the campaign lacked consistency, content and focus on the important issues at hand. Social media also played a vital role in serving as a watchdog for the integrity of the election process, as results from polling stations were quickly posted, thus preventing electoral officials from announcing different results from the ones already publicised online.

In January 2015, the #bringbackourgirls campaign raised alarm over plans by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to exclude Chibok and some communities currently under the control of the Boko Haram from getting the permanent voter cards (PVCs) for the February elections. Jonathan's already controversial handling of the situation was exacerbated by the Twitter campaign that was launched in mid 2014, #BringBackJonathan2015, which was widely considered to be insensitive to the victims and their families. Jonathan eventually called for banners containing the hashtag to be taken down and asked for the hashtag to not be used.

On 8 February 2015, the Independent National Electoral Commission announced that "presidential and national assembly elections will now hold on 28 March while the governorship and state assemblies election will take place on 11 April," mainly due to the poor distribution of Permanent Voter Cards, and also the security concerns related to the Boko Haram insurgency in certain north eastern states.

The postponement was called on the grounds of the INEC failing to deliver Permanent Voters' Cards to millions (around 34%) of voters – reportedly only around 45.1mn of 68.8mn registered voters had received PVC's. Additionally, on 5 February, the National Council of State (chaired by President Jonathan) told INEC that it had just launched a major, decisive offensive against Boko Haram for six weeks. Due to the assets and resources that would go into this offensive, the military would be unable to provide security and logistics support for elections. This is a disputable claim, since election security is the primary responsibility of not the military (which should only act as support) but the police and civil defence corps. There is speculation over whether or not the postponement was motivated by politics rather than security and has raised questions over the political neutrality of the military as well as the independence of INEC.

Sambo Dasuki, Nigerian national security advisor, told the commission "that operations against Boko Haram militants meant the military "will be unable to provide adequate security" for the 14 February vote." "Seventeen out of the 28 registered political parties" supported postponing the elections; 12 opposed, "including the leading opposition party, All Progressives Congress". By 30 January, "Boko Haram was in total occupation/complete control of 13 local governments (and other swathes of land) in Borno and 2 each in Yobe and Adamawa." Critics of the postponement view it as a political move on

behalf of GEJ/PDP rather than one made in the interest of national security. GEJ/PDP are losing traction due to gains by Boko Haram in January, economic strains from the slide in global oil price (Nigeria's key export), and GEJ/PDP's slow progress on fighting corruption and improving infrastructure. According to primaries in December 2014, Buhari/APC is viewed as more equipped to fight insecurity and corruption.

Critics have pointed out that even with the postponement, the Nigerian government is unlikely to re-establish control in all the affected areas by the date of the election. Distribution of the Permanent Voters' Card (PVC) has begun in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the three affected states. Estimates of the number of IDPs range from 868,235 to 1.5 million people, and is not yet clear how successful efforts will be to organise elections under these circumstances. Key Government officials in Nigeria are publicly stating their opposition to the postponement. Senator Chris Ngige, for example, has accused the PDP of pressuring INEC to postpone the general elections.

In addition to growing criticism within Nigeria, on 8 February Vanguard reported that "the United States said it was 'deeply disappointed' by the delay." US Secretary of State John Kerry, who had urged that elections be held on time, "[warned] the Nigerian government against using 'security concerns as a pretext for impeding the democratic process.'" Additionally, the British Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, has revealed that he, too, is disgruntled by the news: "The security situation should not be used as a reason to deny the Nigerian people from exercising their democratic rights. It is vital that the elections are kept on track and held as soon as possible". Deutsche Welle reported that "The postponement has been seen by critics as a ploy by President Goodluck Jonathan and the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) to buy time to sway support from the popular main opposition candidate and former military dictator, Muhammadu Buhari."

By 7 February 2015, threats of post-election violence from both sides remained a concern, given that hundreds of people died in the rioting that followed the 2011 Nigerian presidential election, and rhetoric was running high. It was reported that "the Council of Imams and Ulama in Kaduna State ... told the Niger Delta militants threatening chaos if President Goodluck Jonathan loses the presidential election that they stand to lose if there is a war." The GMB Volunteers, a group described as a "frontline voluntary organization made up of professionals, ethnic and religious groups," has criticised hate advertisements directed against APC candidate General Muhammadu Buhari.

On 9 February, although "Nigerian civil society" was "in uproar" over the postponement, the north east remained calm, and voters there appeared willing to wait. Groups such as the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) have "advised political parties to stop making hate speeches against



opponents." The Nigeria Women Platform for Peaceful Election (NWPPE) is collaborating with United Nations Women to hold training sessions for journalists on gender-based violence and gender sensitive reporting. A "women situation room", similar to a "civil society situation room" is planned for monitoring violence against women during the elections.

Senator Abubakar Bukola Saraki, who has called the postponement "an obstruction of democracy", nonetheless released a statement saying "I charge Nigerians to be calm, non-violent and steadfast. We must be determined to make sure postponement does not demoralize or disenfranchise us. We must see this as a challenge for us to remain resolute in yearning for a new democratic government; one that will not see itself as above the people."

On 31 January, a concert was held in Owerri, Imo State, as part of the RSVP concert series, urging young people to RSVP – Register, Select, Vote and Protect. "Register – pick your Permanent Voters' card-PVC, Select (select your candidates), and Vote – vote not Fight, and Protect – protect your mandate." A second RSVP concert was planned for Lagos on 8 February.

The postponement was the topic of a Council on Foreign Relations online conference call with John Campbell on 28 February 2015. According to the Nigerian Constitution, the presidential election must be held by 28 April. As Section 25 of the 2010 Electoral Act states, the date is to be no later than 30 days before the expiration of the previous office holder's term of office.

## **2.13 THE 2019 GENERAL ELECTIONS**

General elections were held in Nigeria on 23 February 2019 to elect the President, Vice President, House of Representatives and the Senate. The elections had initially been scheduled for 16 February, but the Electoral Commission postponed the vote by a week at 03:00 on the original polling day, citing logistical challenges in getting electoral materials to polling stations on time. In some places, the vote was delayed until 24 February due to electoral violence. Polling in some areas was subsequently delayed until 9 March, when voting was carried out alongside gubernatorial and state assembly elections.

The President of Nigeria is elected using a modified two round system, to be elected in the first round, a candidate must receive a majority of the vote and over 25% of the vote in at least 24 of the 36 states. If no candidate passes this threshold, a second round is held. The 109 members of the Senate were elected from 109 single-seat constituencies (three in each state and one for the Federal Capital Territory) by first-past-the-post voting. The 360 members of the House of Representatives were also elected by first-past-the-post voting in single-member constituencies.

Immediately following the elections there were claims of widespread fraud by the opposition. The claims included accusations of ballot box snatching, vote-trading and impersonation. There were also claims that caches of explosives were found by police. Losing candidate Atiku Abubakar filed a case in the Nigerian supreme court citing widespread irregularities in the polls. However the court dismissed his case, saying that Atiku has failed to prove widespread fraud committed by the electoral team of Buhari. The court also dismissed an allegation which said that Buhari lied about his academic background.

The African Union said the elections were "largely peaceful and conducive for the conducting of credible elections." The electoral commission also described the elections as mostly peaceful. On the contrary, US-based organisation freedom house severely criticised the conduct, saying that they were marred by irregularities and intimidation.

Having reviewed the Nigerian electoral process from 1960 to 2019, it becomes apparent that the conduct of elections in Nigeria has always been marred by various forms of violence and malpractices thereby undermining the validity and integrity of the process. The seeds of dialogue can be said to have been sown since the colonial era when electoral corruption was aided and abetted. Compounding this situation is the apparent absence of the political will by our politicians, to redress the problem. There is also the implication of the electoral system that we have been using in Nigeria. The First Past the Polls (FPTP) electoral system is also known as the winner takes all system, whereby the candidate with the highest number of votes could take the available seat, even if the totality of the opponents' votes may be higher than their own.

The only exceptions where there are only two candidates for the election; then the candidate with the higher votes would naturally win with simple majority. The same thing could be said about the political parties; except where there is a two party system and a clear winner could emerge, a multiparty system can only throw up a winning party that may have been voted in with majority votes, as compared with those cast against it.

It is this situation of winner takes all that brings the ferocious and vigorous electoral contest in which every candidate thinks he/she can win. Because offices are often occupied not with the intention to serve but to enjoy the spoils of office, every contestant believes that if all manners of methods are not adopted to win; there will be no other elections to contest for thereafter. Such a presumption can only be borne out of frustration. This has become the staple of Nigerian politics. Put in other words, violence, chicanery, rigging etc, have all become the hallmarks of Nigeria's electoral politics and it appears that nobody or state agency is strong or determined enough to confront them.

## **2.14 VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA: A RETROSPECTIVE SURVEY**

Electoral violence in Nigeria could be said to be obscene. In the words of Popoola (2004) the horrifying and distasteful scenario which has characterized the electioneering process in Nigeria since independence in 1960 is that of violence. In a similar assertion, Awonusi (2004) noted that by the dawn of independence, violence had emerged as one of the features of electoral campaigns. The above statements are justified by the fact that all elections in the country so far are marred by one type of violence or another.

Ugoh (2004) also opined that election malpractice and violence have been burning issues in both the developed and developing societies. Their trademark include riots, thuggery, looting, kidnapping, arson and political assassinations. In a retrospective analysis, Ugoh asserted that even the 1959 elections on the eve of the nation's independence had some reported cases of violent incidents before, during and after the elections. Political parties employed or hired thugs to intimidate their political opponents.

Political violence was at its peak before, during and after that 1964 general election. The situation became uncontrollable after the 1965 Western regional election. The situation in the region which was christened "WETE" could be described as anarchy, a state of lawlessness. The situation came to a climax when the military came in to save the situation. Thus, political violence was one of the main reasons why the military terminated the first republic. The 1979 general election did not go scot free as many people lost their lives across the country before, during and after the exercise.

The 1983 general election witnessed one of the worst political violence in the history of the nation. According to Ugoh, the violence which greeted the election resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives and properties. He added that dissatisfaction with the results of the election reflected in the level of protest and violence from all over the country. Intra- ethnic clashes were reported Southeast in which many people lost their lives and property worth millions of naira destroyed. There was also inter ethnic violence between the Igbo and Kanuri tribes in Borno State when the presidential candidate of a political party was denied entry into the state. In a nutshell, the 1983 general elections were marred by irregularities and violence to the extent that both the local and foreign press criticized the conduct and outcome of the election.

Contributing, Olorode (1987) asserted that there was no doubt that law and order had virtually broken down well before the election of 1983. The situation, he continued, was similar to that of 1965 of Western region election. The situation at that time was thought to be what one can describe to be a state of incipient civil war. That is, the 1983 ruling class was not significantly different from that of 1965.

The 1993 election which should have escaped the scourge of violence had the orgy of the hallmark of Nigerian elections following its annulment. According to Popoola (2004) the freest and fairest election in Nigeria took place in 1993, and yet it ended in serious violence when the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida annulled the election. Even in the 1999 election, as observed by Ugoh, the malpractices witnessed were a replica of the 1979/1983 elections. All the political parties were allegedly involved in massive rigging, hiring of thugs and conniving with security agents to perpetrate electoral malpractice, chaos and violence. There was also alleged use of thugs and security agents by the ruling party, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) to harass opposition party members.

In conclusion this chapter looked closely at Nigerians elections since the first Republic and some of the reoccurring characteristic then features of the electoral process since independence in that it has been marred by one form of irregularity or the other; also, violence, it can said has been a major part of the process. In summary, many writers had a retrospective survey in which they all agreed that not only has violence manifested it self in all facets of Nigerian elections has become a culture of Nigerian politics.

## **2.15 EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF OGUN STATE**

Ogun state was created on the 3rd of February, 1976. It was carved out of the old Western State of Nigeria and named after the Ogun River which runs across it from North to South. Abeokuta, the capital and largest urban centre, is about 90 kilometers from Lagos and 740kilometers from Abuja, the capital of Nigeria. The state is strategically located, bordered to the East by Ondo State, in the North by Oyo and Osun States and in the South by Lagos State and the Atlantic Ocean and in the West by Republic of Benin, which makes it an access route to the expansive markets of the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS).

Ogun State is peopled predominantly by the Egbas, Ijebus, Yewas, Remos and Aworis who belong to the main Yoruba ethnic group. It also has sub-groups, namely, Ketu, Ikale, Ilaje, Ogori, Anago and Egun. There are also significant numbers of Nigerians from other parts of the country as well as foreign nationals. The State has abundant natural resources that include forest and water bodies as well as large quantities of mineral deposits, such as limestone, phosphate, granite stone, gypsum, bauxite, bitumen, feldspar, clay, glass sand, kaolin, quartz, tar sand, gemstones and crude oil are available in commercial quantities. The State is the largest producer of cement in the country with 13 million metric tonnes per annum.

Ogun State is the cradle of education in Nigeria and has very high literacy rate coupled with a skilled workforce. There are 21 tertiary institutions both public and private, in the State, making it the highest in

the country. Out of the State's total projected population of 7.1 million people as at 2014, fifty-seven (57) percent are of working age. Its people are very industrious and are found in all walks of life. The State is a major economic hub. It has one of the largest concentration of industries in the country and serves as the major corridor for transportation of goods, services and people between the nation's commercial center Lagos, and the rest of the country as well as the large West African markets.

Ogun State consists of twenty local government areas. They are:

Abeokuta North

Abeokuta South

Ado-Odo/Ota

Ewekoro

Ifo

Ijebu East

Ijebu North

Ijebu North East

Ijebu Ode

Ikenne

Imeko Afon

Ipokia

Obafemi Owode

Odogbolu

Odeda

Ogun Waterside

Remo North

Sagamu

(Shagamu)

Yewa North

(formerly Egbado North)

Yewa South

(formerly Egbado South)

Ogun state is divided into 3 (three) senatorial district: Ogun Central, Ogun East and Ogun west.

Ogun Central is majorly comprises of the Egbas that occupied 6 local governments like: Abeokuta North (Akomoje), Abeokuta south (Ake), Ewekoro (Itori), Ifo (Ifo), Obafemi owode (Owode ẹgba) and Odeda (Odeda).

Ogun East is majorly comprises of the Ijebus and the Remos that occupied 9 local governments like: Ijebu East (Ogbẹre), Ijebu North (Ijebu Igbo), Ijebu North East (Attan), Ijebu ode (Ijebu ode), Ikenne (Ikenne remo), Odogbolu (Odogbolu), Ogun waterside (Abigi), Remo North (Israel Remo) and Sagamu (Sagamu).

Ogun west is majorly comprises of the Yewas (formerly Egbados) that occupied 5 local governments like: Ado odo Ota (Ota), Imeko Afon (Imeko), Ipokia (Ipokia), Yewa North (Ayetoro) and Yewa South (Ilaro).

### **2.15.1 BRIEF HISTORY OF VIOLENCE IN OGUN STATE**

There have been several confrontations between Owu and Awori residents of the area. In April, 2008, violent clashes left at least six people dead when Awori and Owu fought over the Olowu of Owu's installation of an Oba in Awori land. The governor of Ogun State, Gbenga Daniel, declared a dusk-to-dawn curfew in the Ado-Odo/Ota Ota local government area.

Footballer Kazeem Tiyaṁiyu, whose death sparked protests in south-western Nigerian city of Sagamu, has been buried but question remain about his death. ... "We lit up Kazeem Tiyaṁiyu (Kaka)'s path to Al-Jannah yesterday night and he was buried today at his family house in Ajaka, Sagamu, Ogun State," Remo Stars announced.

About three persons were killed during a clash between some suspected smugglers and operatives of the Nigeria Customs Service attached to Ogun State Command. It was gathered that NCS officials invaded

the area on the trail of some smugglers; a clash broke out between the customs officers and owners of some bags of smuggled rice who were trying to remove the items from a building.

The Abeokuta Women's Revolt (also called the Egba Women's Tax Riot) was a resistance movement led by the Abeokuta Women's Union (AWU) in the late 1940s against the imposition of unfair taxation by the Nigerian colonial government. The women of Abeokuta believed that, under colonialism, their economic roles were declining, while their taxes were increasing.[1] Additionally, they argued that until they were granted representation in local government, they should not be required to pay taxes separately from men. As a result of their protests, four women received seats on the local council, and the taxation of women was ended.

### **2.15.2 Report of Commissions of Enquiry into the Crises in Ogun State**

The Ogun State government about a week after a traditional ruler in Ado-Odo in Ado-Odo-Ota Local Government Area of Ogun State was attacked and stripped naked, the state government has constituted a Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the crisis. The government, which made this known through a statement by the Secretary to the State Government, Taiwo Adeoluwa, said the Commission had six weeks to submit its report.

Adeoluwa said the Chairman and members of the Commission were expected to function within the powers conferred on them by Section 7 of the Commission of Inquiry Law of Ogun State. It will be recalled that there was pandemonium last Monday in Ado-Odo, when a traditional ruler of the town, Oba Lateef Adeniran, was attacked and stripped naked in public by some hoodlums. According to the government, “the constitution of the commission is in fulfillment of its earlier promise to find a lasting solution to the crisis which broke out in Ado-Odo community on the April 14 and 15.

“The Judicial Commission has as its Chairman Hon. Justice Elizabeth Osinuga. Other members are Immam Soliu Abanigbe, Elder Samuel Agogo, Prophet J. O. Alabode, while Mr. Johnson Ojo is to serve as its Secretary.

“The Terms of Reference of the Commission are: to establish the remote and immediate causes of the April 14 and 15 Ado-Odo crisis.

“To identify individuals, groups of persons and institutions directly or indirectly responsible for the unrest and their roles in precipitating the unrest and recommend appropriate sanctions.

“To ascertain the extent of loss of lives and damage to property and to recommend ways of avoiding the re-occurrence of such unrest in future and to make any other recommendations incidental to the Commission’s terms of reference.”

The commission had weeks to investigate the crises and come up with recommendations. Although the commission discovered various reasons for the crisis, of note are claims made by various groups relating to the political dominance.

### **2.15.3 Specific Manifestations on the Ogun**

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#### **2.15.4 Electoral Violence and the 2019 Elections in Ogun State**

A 2 March 2015 Vanguard article reports that the "re-election campaign of Governor Ibikunle Amosun of Ogun State turned bloody during his visit to Remo North Local Council of the state, when the supporters of the [APC] and [PDP] clashed leaving some people injured" (Vanguard 2 March 2015).

According to the April 2015 Vanguard article, in Ogun State, "there were reports of snatching of ballot boxes in various parts of the state" (Vanguard 12 Apr. 2015). The EU report indicates that the Nigerian Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) "referred to 66 reports of violent incidents targeting polling units, INEC officials, voters and election material," throughout Nigeria, including one incident in Ogun state (EU July 2015, 30). The report further explains that such incidences were predominantly inter-party clashes and attacks on election sites by hoodlums, often involving ballot box and essential material snatching. Both the main parties [APC and PDP] made many accusations of rigging, intimidation and violence by opponents. (EU July 2015, 30)

The Guardian, an "independent Nigerian newspaper" (The Guardian n.d.), reported on 11 April 2015 that a "detachment of personnel from the various security agencies arrived yesterday in Ogun State ahead of today's Governorship and State House of Assembly election" and that this might not be unconnected with allegations and counter allegations by the two major political parties [APC and PDP] accusing each other of "importing" thugs into the State to disrupt today's election. While the APC accused the PDP of "importing" thugs and cultists into the State to cause violence during the election, the PDP also accused the APC of a plot to use "State government vehicles and security personnel attached to the State Governor to hijack voting materials in the rural communities." (The Guardian 11 Apr. 2015)

The EU report indicates that in Ogun state, EU EOM monitors "observed misuse of government vehicles and offices for campaign activities" as well as "inducements of voters (money payments, distribution of food and goods)" (EU July 2015, 20). The 12 April 2015 Vanguard article also states that a "fight broke out" at one ward in Obafemi Owode Local Government Area of Ogun State, as APC agents accused the PDP of offering money to people queuing to vote (Vanguard 12 Apr. 2015). According to the same source the APC agent at the polling station "accused the PDP of attempting to disrupt the electoral process," after which security guards arrested a PDP agent (Vanguard 12 Apr. 2015). Vanguard further reports that a "PDP former Chairman" of the Local Government Area "alleged that the "arrest was a ploy to silence PDP members at the polling unit" (Vanguard 12 Apr. 2015).

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

This research is primarily undertaken to appraise the 2019 Gubernatorial Elections in Ogun state. To do so, this section presents the research design, data collection procedure, research instruments, population, sample size, and sampling technique, analytical procedure and validation of research instruments.

#### **Design of the study**

Research design for this work is ex post facto design method. The justification for the choice of this design is due to the fact that this study attempt to explore causes and effects relationships where cause already exist and cannot be manipulated. It uses what already exist and looks for backward to explain why. Ex post facto research is ideal for conducting social research when it is not possible or acceptable to manipulate the characteristics of human participants.

#### **Population of the study**

The target population, as noted earlier, was made up of INEC officials, Political party agents, and the electorate in three Local Governments Areas in Ogun state

#### **Sample size and Sampling Techniques**

The target population of this study is made up of two sets of respondents' i.e politicians, drawn from the three senatorial zones, INEC officials and members of the Electorate . The Total number of respondents in this study was made up of one hundred and sixty five members of the electorate (165) i.e the distribution is as follows: Electorate, INEC officials , i.e fifty (50) from each local government while the remaining people are politicians (15) i.e. three each from the Three Local Governments areas.

The number was arrived at by using the convenience sampling method, this method is known as the grab, opportunity or accidental method with this method the researcher used subjects that are easy to reach. However the thesis relied on Qualitative Analysis for discussion of its findings.

#### **Instrument for Data Collection**

#### **Data collection procedure**

The data needed for this research were collected from identified primary and secondary sources. The primary data were collected from electoral districts, offices and individuals in the three senatorial districts of Ogun state, and INEC officials. Oral interview was conducted with respondents (politicians) drawn from the three senatorial zones in Ogun State; structured questionnaires were administered to respondents in order to illicit responses aimed at the assessment of elections and compilation of results.

Secondary sources i.e textbooks, newspapers, conference /seminar papers etc, were also consulted and relevant information extracted.

### **Validation of the instrument**

The extract and the rating scale used were presented for validation to the supervisor of this thesis and an expert from Educational Management. Their observation helped in adjusting the extract and the scale to achieve adequate content/ face validities. Their recommendations were used in arriving at the final draft of the rating scale used.

### **Method of Data Collection**

The Method adopted for primary data collection are interviews and questionnaires.

#### **(a) Interviews**

This is the usual method of collecting data in a social survey. Interviews are conversations carried out with the definite aim of obtaining certain information. It is designed to gather valid and reliable information through valid responses of the interviewee to planned sequence of questions (Maceby and Maccabby;1984). The interview can either be structured or unstructured depending on the extent to which the context and procedure involved are prescribed and standardized.

#### **(b) Questionnaires**

This constitutes the first attempt at true scaling. They are particularly advantageous whenever the sample size is large enough to make it uneconomical for reasons of time or funds to observe or interview every subject (Maccoby and Maccoby,1986).

In administering the questionnaire, the major target were politicians, INEC officials, and security men who were conveniently selected, including voters from three Local Governments Areas representing each of the three constituencies in Ogun State.

Interview were carried out in areas not covered by the questionnaires.

### **Method of Data analysis**

The information gathered was analyzed by means of tabulation, known in statistics as simple percentage analysis

## CHAPTER FOUR

### ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN OGUN STATE

#### 4.1 DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

A total of 150 administered questionnaires for electorates and 15 for politicians were retrieved and used for the analysis.

##### SECTION: Analysis of Politicians' Opinions

The respondents (politicians) were first asked to indicate if they are of Ogun State origin or not. Table 1 below provides their responses.

Table 1

| S/N | Response | Number | %   |
|-----|----------|--------|-----|
| 1   | Yes      | 15     | 100 |
| 2   | No       | —      | —   |

Source: Field Work

The data above indicates that the politicians contacted are all indigenes of Ogun State i.e. there were no non indigenes.

Table 2: Duration of Residence

| SN | Duration       | Number | %    |
|----|----------------|--------|------|
| 1  | 2—4 years      | —      | —    |
| 2  | 5— 7 years     | 1      | 6.7  |
| 3  | 8— 10 years    | 3      | 20   |
| 4  | Above 10 years | 11     | 73.3 |

Source: Field Work

The table above indicates that none of the respondents indicated having been resident for a period of between 2 – 4 years, 6.7% of the respondents have resided in their areas for a period of 5 – 7 years. Another 20% indicated having lived in their places of residence for a period of between 8 – 10 years and 73.3% of them indicated having lived in their area of residence for a period of above 10 years.

The respondents (politicians) were then asked to assess the politics or political atmosphere of Ogun, in the first and second republics. Of the 15 politicians, some of them were of the opinion that the elections were peaceful and free of rigging. Some of the respondents were of the position that the elections were free and fair. The others were of the view that the elections were dominated by rigging, molestation and humiliation. Some opined that the elections were characterized by killing of political aspirants and members of the electorate the opinion of this group if considered in comparison with the contrary, one comes to the conclusion that the elections in Ogun in the period under examination were marred by violence.

Furthermore, the respondents were asked to state their opinion on the 2019 gubernatorial election in Ogun State. Some of them were of the view that the 2019 gubernatorial election in Ogun State can be described as an ethno-religiously motivated election i.e. voting was done along ethnic and religious lines. Some also joined others to indicate that the elections were dominated by rigging, One of the respondents maintained that the elections were characterized by violence and crisis. Only a few of the respondents chose to indicate none of the above stance in their various local governments.

As a follow up to the above the politicians were requested to state the major reasons for the violence in the gubernatorial election of 2019. One of the respondents stated that the emergence of party factions accounts for the ugly trend. Some of them maintained that the ethno-religious differences in the state is a major cause of the violence. The remaining of the respondent was of the view that the electoral violence in the 2019 gubernatorial elections in Ogun State was motivated by political leaders and the party in power. This indicates that most politicians agree on the fact that the elections in Ogun State were characterized by one form of violence.

The respondents were furthermore asked to identify the reasons for the assassination of governorship aspirants prior to the 2019 election in the country. Some of the respondents choose not to comment on the issue, some claimed that there was no case of assassination prior to the elections or that they were not aware of any case of assassination. The remaining had various issues to write on. Their opinion hinges on the role of the politicians whom they blamed for being doubtful of themselves and their capabilities with regards to the conduct of elections. These respondents noted that the ruling class is full of greed and lust

for power, a desire which drives them into all manner of electoral malpractices. Politicians were accused of conducting themselves as if established procedures for political contest do not exist due to their selfish political ends. Respondents were asked to mention other factors that caused electoral violence, analyses of the responses given on the questionnaire indicate that some of politicians stressed the fact that lack of political will by government in implementing committees report and recommendations have affected the electoral process in Ogun State.

The respondents were then asked to proffer solutions to avoid recurrence of electoral violence in future elections. It was suggested by the respondents that there should be electoral reforms in Nigeria in general as a sure way to address electoral violence. Some of them maintained that subsequent elections in Ogun state should be made as free and fair as possible, some of them was of the view that the electoral body the INEC should be granted more autonomy or independence so that it can effectively carry out electoral activities in Nigeria. Some suggested that awareness campaigns should be initiated to help members of the electorate in Ogun State to learn to shun religious extremism and ethnic chauvinism and be peaceful citizens of the country. Another maintained that politicians in Ogun state need to realize that the imposition of candidates on the people has political consequences and so should be transparent in selecting candidates. Politicians were also called upon to steer clear of parochial interests. Another person called on government to do something about youth unemployment because it is the unemployed youth are always the ones used by selfish politicians in Ogun state to foment trouble and mar the electoral process. The remaining respondents maintained that Nigerians in general need to start seeing themselves as one and also learn to coexist and respect each other. They indicated that with this the problem of violence will be largely addressed in the state and Nigeria at large.

#### **4.1.2 Section B: Analysis of views of the electorate**

Table 3: Sex of Respondents

| SN | Sex    | No  | %    |
|----|--------|-----|------|
| 1  | Male   | 130 | 86.7 |
| 2  | Female | 20  | 13.3 |

Source: Field Work

Table 3 above shows us that respondents under the section can be grouped under 86.7% males and 13.3% females. This implies apparently that males have more representation than females.

Table 4: Age of Respondents

| SN | Age       | Number | %    |
|----|-----------|--------|------|
| 1  | 20-25     | 6      | 4    |
| 2  | 26-30     | 28     | 18.7 |
| 3  | 31-35     | 43     | 28.7 |
| 4  | 36-40     | 70     | 46.7 |
| 5  | 41- above | 3      | 2    |

Source: Field Work

The breakdown in table 4 above shows that age bracket 20 – 25 has a representation 4%, age bracket 26 – 30 has 18.7% representatives, age bracket 31 – 35 represented by 28.7% respondents, age bracket 36 – 40 follows with 46.7% representatives while age bracket 41 and above is represented by only 2% respondents. Age bracket 36 – 40 has the highest representation while 41 and above, has the least.

Table 5: Educational Qualification of Respondents

| SN | Qualifications | Number | %    |
|----|----------------|--------|------|
| 1  | FSLC           | 1      | 0.7  |
| 2  | SSCE           | 32     | 21.3 |
| 3  | NCE            | 39     | 26   |
| 4  | HND            | 68     | 45.3 |
| 5  | OTHERS         | 10     | 6.7  |

Source: Field Work

Table 5 above indicates that 0.7% of the respondents hold the Primary School Leaving Certificate, 21.3% of them hold either the SSCE, WASC or HSC, 26% of them are either NCE or Diploma holders, 45.3% of



them are either.Degree or HND holders. Others with higher qualifications are 6.7% This means that all of the respondents hold one form of educational qualification or the other. This.places them in a position to make informed contributions to this study.

Table 6: Status of Respondents

| SN | Status         | Number | %    |
|----|----------------|--------|------|
| 1  | Electorate     | 110    | 73.3 |
| 2  | Part chieftain | 25     | 16.7 |
| 3  | INEC           | 15     | 10   |

The table above indicates that 73.3% of the respondents under this section were drawn from the electorate. 16.7% of them are party chieftains while the remaining 10% are INEC officials. Majority of them are members of the electorate.

**Perception of politicians on the role of INEC in the emergence of electoral violence in Ogun state.**

| <b>VARIABLE</b>   | <b>Number</b> | <b>%</b>    |
|---|---------------|-------------|
| <b>INEC contributed to electoral violence in the 2019 governorship election</b> | <b>5</b>      | <b>33.3</b> |
| <b>INEC activities did not contribute to electoral violence in Ogun State.</b>  | <b>10</b>     | <b>66.7</b> |

Source: Field work 2021

The table shows that 32.3% of the politician agreed that the activities of the INEC has contributed to emergence of electoral violence in Ogun State while 66.7% disagreed that the activities of INEC have not contributed to the emergence of electoral violence in Ogun State.

Table 7: Respondents' Opinions on the Causes of Electoral Violence in Nigeria

| SN | Opinion brackets                      | Number | %    |
|----|---------------------------------------|--------|------|
| 1  | Zero summative of Nigerian politics   | 5      | 3.3  |
| 2  | Unwillingness to accept defeat        | 25     | 16.7 |
| 3  | Poor implementation of electoral laws | 10     | 6.7  |
| 4  | Lack of discipline among politicians  | 10     | 6.7  |
| 5  | All of the above                      | 100    | 66.7 |

Source: Field Work

The data in table 7 above indicates that 3.3% of our respondents opined that the zero sum nature of Nigerian politics accounts for electoral violence in Ogun state, 16.7% of them maintained that electoral violence in Nigeria is caused by the unwillingness to accept defeat on the part of politicians, 6.7% attribute it to poor implementation of electoral laws, another 6.7% opined that electoral violence is caused by lack of discipline among the politicians. 66.7% of the respondents however maintained that all the factors itemized above put together, account for electoral violence in Nigeria.

The respondents were then requested to state how they would describe the 2019 gubernatorial elections in Ogun State. Their views on the matter were more of recommendations rather than opinions on the elections in the state. The respondents were then asked to identify the factors which best explains the eruption of violence in Ogun State politics. The following factors were identified;

- i. Non-acceptance of defeat
- ii. Disenfranchisement
- iii. Lack of contentment, satisfaction and understanding
- iv. Ethno-religious intolerance
- v. Godfatherism
- vi. Injustice
- vii. Rivalry among politicians
- viii. Inordinate ambitions of Politicians
- ix. Lack of understanding of the electoral process

#### **4.1.3 ORAL INTERVIEW FOR POLITICIANS**

This interview was conducted in the three senatorial zones of Ogun state and it was done among politicians. The interview questions were asked using structured questions and had the following classification of respondents

I, the first group agreed to grant the interviews with their names published.

Ii, the second group agreed to grant the interview only on condition of anonymity.

Iii, the third group agreed to grant interview on the condition that their names and interview would not be published but only analyzed, however all the views of politicians was analyzed above.

#### **4.1.4 OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS**

Having administered the questionnaires among politicians, party chieftains, INEC officials and members of the electorate in three local governments of Ogun State, it has been discovered that the 2019 Ogun State gubernatorial election was characterized by violent activities which no doubt marred the electoral process. It was also found out that the causes of the electoral violence include unwillingness on the part of politicians to accept defeat, poor implementation of electoral laws, lack of internal democracy in the political parties' lack of discipline among politicians, greed, ethno-religious intolerance, etc. These factors were brought to bear on the electoral process in Ogun State. The result of this being that peace and

security which was part of the beauty of the state, have now eluded the entire state due to the frequent cases of molestation, assassination, killing, humiliation, etc. This means that the indigenes and residents of Ogun State are now obviously at daggers drawn.

It has been noted that this development will not augur well for the conduct of free and fair elections in Ogun state and also for the peace and economic development of Ogun State hence the need for urgent measures to address the situation.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS**

Ethno religious considerations contributed to the spate of violence in the 2019 Governorship Elections in Ogun State. The inference drawn from books journals and interviews conducted is that the crises that engulfed Ogun State in the past years has actually affected the electoral process thereby making electorates vote along ,ethnic and religious lines . Many politicians was of the view that the ethno-religious crises in Ogun State over the years had awoken consciousness in the electorates, therefore people now vote along so called “indigene-settler” dimension. This position was earlier on highlighted by Dunmonye(2008) when he states that Controversies and contestations over citizenship rights in the Nigerian federation have become sources of conflicts that have threaten the corporate existence of Nigeria .

Ayorinde (1983) also mentioned earlier that the stratification of these groups has been accompanied by continued identity formation and a desperate search for ethnic security self or group preservation can take the form of sub ordination or domination or fighting to preserve ones independence, teaming with others to increase chances of survival.

This has provided answer to the research question which states; what were the factors that created violence during the 2019 Gubernatorial elections? It also measures up with one of the objectives of the study which tries to examine the reasons for the outbreak of electoral violence during the 2019 Gubernatorial elections. Therefore, the afore-mentioned reason affirms the proposition that ‘Ethno-religious considerations contributed to the spate of violence in the 2019 Governorship Elections in Ogun State’

Again, Lack of Political will by government in implementing committee recommendations affected the electoral process in Ogun State during the 2019 gubernatorial elections in Ogun State. The various committee reports reviewed, newspaper reports, interviews conducted, journals and other publications agreed to the fact that the inability of government to effectively implement the findings and recommendations of the numerous committees set – up by either the Ogun State government or the Federal government has affected the electoral process in Ogun State. In effect, if people who are either the sponsors or prosecutors of electoral violence in Ogun State are brought to book it will serve as a deterrent to others.

In a related development, some of the people interviewed were of the opinion that ethnic or religious sentiments are not principally the cause of electoral violence but rather, they are used as catch – all approach to generate public sympathy which is sensitive in a multi – ethnic and religious state like Ogun, in particular, and Nigeria at large.

## **5.2 CONCLUSION**

The 2019 gubernatorial elections in Ogun state was placed under examination as the backdrop of the prevalence of electoral violence, this was done through identifying the factors which accounted for electoral violence in Ogun state, the Identification was strategically done through employing quantitative and qualitative means to analyze people’s views on the situation, the work further reviewed existing views of scholars on the subject electoral violence, electoral processes and Ogun state which gave a clearer view on the subject under investigation(electoral violence). To do this questionnaires were administered among politicians, party chieftains, INEC officials and it captured the views of the various respondents who gave answers on issues concerning prevalence of violence, reasons and solutions, also politicians numbering fifteen were sampled from three senatorial zones which were the most populated in Ogun State according to the National Population Census of 2006, one important area examined was the various committee reports released, the reports indicated clearly that government’s lack of will to implement reports was a major factor to the prevalence of electoral violence.

Conclusively, various opinions suggested the worrying state of Electoral Violence and agreed that Both citizens and Government Need to rise up to the Challenge because failure to do that would Continue to disrupt the electoral process which would hamper the Democratization process in Ogun State in particular and Nigeria in General.

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## APPENDIX 1

### QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear respondents, I am a NCE student of the Department of Political Science, Tai Solarin College of Education Omu Ijebu Ogun State , currently undertaking a research on “Violence and the Electoral Process: A case study of the 2019 Gubernatorial Elections in Ogun State”. Your opinion on the following issues is hereby sought. You are assured that your response will be treated as confidential. Thank you.

#### SECTION A:

##### BIO-DATA

1. Sex: Male { } Female { }
2. Age: 20 – 25 { } 26 – 30 { } 31 – 35 { } 36 – 40 { } 41 and above { }
3. Educational Qualification :{ } Primary school certificate { } SSCE/WASC/HSC { } Diploma/NCE { } Degree/HND { } others specify.....

Tick your status among the following options:

4. Electorate { } party chieftain { } INEC Official { }
5. Indicate your experience in the electioneering process: 1–5 years { } 6 – 10 { } 11 – 15 years { } 16 – 20 years { } 21 years and above { }
6. State your perception of electoral .....
7. Indicate your opinion on the cause of electoral violence in Nigeria. Zero sum nature of Nigerian politics { } unwillingness to accept defeat { } poor implementation of electoral laws { } lack of discipline among politicians { } all of the above { }
8. How would you describe the 2019 gubernatorial elections in Ogun State.....
9. What in your opinion best explains the eruption of violence in Ogun State politics?.....
10. Were there cases of violence in the conduct of the elections?  
Yes { } No { }
11. Give reasons for your response to 10 above.....
12. If yes to 10 above, state the types of violence noticed during the elections .....
13. What other factors do you think affected the electoral process in Ogun

state? .....

14. What does the violence portend for the conduct of free and fair elections in

Ogun State.....

15. What are the implications of electoral violence on Nigeria's  
democracy? .....

16. In the light of your experience, freely suggest possible solutions to electoral  
violence in Ogun State and Nigerian in general.

## APPENDIX 2

### QUESTIONNAIRE FOR POLITICIANS IN OGUN STATE

1. Are you from Ogun State? (Yes or No)
2. Where do you live/Stay in Ogun State?.....
3. How long have you been in your stated area?
  - 2 – 4 years
  - 5 – 7 years
  - 8 – 10 years
  - Above 10 years
4. How do you assess the politics or political atmosphere of Ogun in the first and second republic.
  - a. Very peaceful and absence of electoral rigging
  - b. It was generally free and fair
  - c. Dominated by rigging, molestation and Humiliation.
  - d. Killing of political aspirants and electorates.
5. How do you rate the last gubernatorial election in Ogun state (2019)?
  - a. Characterized by violence and crisis
  - b. Dominated by rigging
  - c. Ethno – religiously motivated election.
6. What do you think are the major reason(s) for the violence in the Ogun gubernatorial election of 2019.
  - a. The emergence of political party factions
  - b. The ethno – Religions differences
  - c. Motivated by political leaders and the party in power
7. Could you Asses the Role of INEC in the 2019 Gubernatorial Elections In Ogun State? .....

8. Could you please state other factors that cause violence? During the 2019 elections in Ogun State.....  
.....

9. Could you please proffer solutions that would avoid the reoccurrence of the problem again? ..... (You may choose more than one option in questions 4, 5 & 6)