

**SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CROP PRODUCERS AND PASTORALISTS  
CONFLICTS IN BARKIN LADI LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA OF PLATEAU  
STATE. (2015-2018)**

**BY**

**UMAR, ADAMU MUHAMMAD**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,  
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE,  
AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY,  
ZARIA**

**AUGUST, 2021**

**SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CROP PRODUCERS AND PASTORALISTS  
CONFLICTS IN BARKIN LADI LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA OF PLATEAU  
STATE. (2015-2018)**

**BY**

**Umar, Adamu Muhammad**

**P15SSPS8040**

**A MASTER DEGREE (M.Sc.) DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT  
OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, AHMADU BELLO  
UNIVERSITY ZARIA, IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER  
DEGREE (MSc) IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES.**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,  
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE,  
AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY,  
ZARIA**

**AUGUST, 2021**

## **DECLARATION**

I hereby declare that this dissertation titled “conflicts between crop producers and pastoralists and its effects on socio-economic development of BarkinLadi Local Government Plateau State. (2015-2018)” has been written by me and it is a record of my research work. No part of this work has been presented in any previous application for another Degree or Diploma in this or any other institution. All borrowed information has been acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided.

.....  
**Umar, Adamu Muhammad**  
Student

.....  
Date

**CERTIFICATION**

This dissertation titled “conflicts between crop farmers and pastoralists and its effects on socio-economic development ofBarkinladi local government plateau state. (2012-2015)” by Umar, Adamu Muhammad meets the regulation governing the award of the Degree of Master of Science of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

.....  
**Dr. Edgar Agubamah** Date  
Chairman, Supervisory Committee

.....  
**Prof. Umar Muhammad Ka’oje** Date  
Member, Supervisory Committee.

.....  
**Dr. RaihanatuLawal** Date  
Head of Department Political Science  
And International Studies.

.....  
.....**Prof. Sani Abdullahi** Date  
Dean, School of Postgraduate Studies,  
Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

## **DEDICATION**

This Dissertation is dedicated to my parents Alhaji Muhammad Umar (DanjumaTela) and Hajiya Fatima Muhammad Sani and to Alhaji (Dr.) AhamadMuazu, theformer Governor of Bauchi State (1999-2007).

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

All thanks and praise to Almighty God, the beneficent and the most merciful who protected and guided me throughout this programme. Peace and blessings of Allah be upon the Noble Messenger, Prophet Muhammad. Let me specifically thank my supervisors; Dr. Edgar Agubamah and Prof. Umar Muhammad Ka'oje who in spite of their tight schedule carefully supervised my work to completion.

I am obliged to my supervisors Dr. Edgar Agubamah and Professor Umar Muhammad Ka'oje for their enormous support, I also appreciate the effort of my internal examiner Dr. M. M. Nuruddeen inspiration and useful input toward seeing the completion of this programme.

I also like to acknowledge my external examiner Prof. Azeez Olaniyan and my internal external examiner Prof. Oluwabamide Abiodun Johnson for their support and encouragement in making sure the work has taken shape.

I also appreciate the efforts of all members of staff, Department of Political Science And International Studies, A.B.U. Zaria, most especially the Head of Department, Dr. Raihatu Lawal, Postgraduate Coordinator, Dr. Muhammad Lawal Tafida and all members of staff Department Political Science and International Studies for their immense contribution to the realization of this objective. Worthy of appreciating also are, my Wife (Badariya), my Daughters (Amatullahi and Sumayya), the Dagwom Rhei of Barkin Ladi (paramount ruler of Berom in Barkinladi) the chairman Meyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) Barkin Ladi LGC, Maijuju Youth Development Association (MYDA), Boto Unity and Development Association (BUDA), My immeasurable thanks goes to my parents, family, friends and associates too numerous to mention special thanks is due for my course mates especially to Gushem Pannan Kammoh who happened to be my research assistant in areas I could not assess for their support, encouragement and prayers.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Content</b>	<b>Page</b>
Titlepage.....	ii
Declaration.....	iii
Certification.....	iv
Dedication.....	v
Acknowledgements.....	vi
Tableofcontents.....	vii
ListsofTables.....	x
ListofAppendices.....	xii
Abstract.....	xiii
<b>CHAPTER ONE GENERAL INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 BackgroundoftheStudy.....	1
1.2 Statement ofProblem.....	3
1.3Research Question.....	4
1.4 Objectives of the Study.....	4
1.5Significance of the Study.....	5
1.6Scope and limitation of the study.....	5
1.7.1Conceptual Definition.....	6
1.7.1Conflict.....	6
1.7.2Socio-economic Development.....	7
1.7.3 Social Development.....	11
1.7.4Economic Development.....	11

<b>CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW</b> .....	12
2.1 Reviw of Related Literature.....	12
2.2 Cattle Rustling and Banditry.....	17
2.3 Overview of Herders and Farmers Conflicts in Nigeria .....	17
2.4 The Variety of Pastoral Group.....	30
2.5 Economic Effects of the Fulani Herdsmen-Crop Producers Clashes .....	36
2.6 Theoretical Framework.....	45
2.6.1 Realistic group conflict theory.....	46
2.6.2 Criticism of the theory .....	48
<b>CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY</b> .....	49
3.1 The Study Area.....	49
3.2 BarkinLadi Local Government Area.....	49
3.3 Subsistence system on the Plateau State .....	49
3.4 Sampling procedure and Sample Size.....	54
3.5 Sources of Data Collection.....	54
3.6 Methods of DataAnalysis.....	55
<b>CHAPTER FOUR: SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CROP PRODUCERS AND PASTORALISTS CONFLICT IN BARKIN LADI: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS</b> .....	56
4.1 Data Presentation and Analysis.....	56
4.2 Bio-Data of the Respondents.....	56
4.3 Causes of the Conflict.....	67
4.4 Socio-Economic effects of the conflictt.....	76

4.5 Solution to the Crisis.....	78
4.6 Major Findings.....	80
4.7 Contribution to knowledge.....	80
<b>CHAPTER FIVE SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....</b>	<b>82</b>
5.1 Summary.....	82
5.2 Recommendations.....	82
5.3 Conclusion.....	83
References.....	84
Appendix.....	90

## LIST OF TABLES

<b>Tables</b>	<b>Page</b>
Table 4.1: Age Distribution of the Respondents.....	57
Table 4.2: Gender Distribution of the Respondents.....	58
Table 4.3: Distribution of Respondents by Religion.....	58
Table 4.4: Educational Qualification of Respondents.....	59
Table 4.5: Ethnicity of Respondents.....	60
Table 4.6: Nationality of Respondents.....	61
Table 4.7: Respondent's Years of Residence in the Community.....	62
Table 4.8: Marital Status of Respondents.....	63
Table 4.9: Number of Wives of Respondents.....	64
Table 4.10: Number of Children of Respondents.....	65
Table 4.11: Occupation of Respondents .....	65
Table 4.12: Respondent's Number of Cattle.....	66
Table 4.13: Respondent's Farm Size.....	67
Table 4.14: Causes of the conflicts.....	70
Table 4.15: Size of the Grazing Area.....	72
Table 4.16: Grasses/fodder in the grazing area.....	72
Table 4.17: Public water points in the area.....	73
Table 4.18: Things that hinder free access to these resources.....	73
Table 4.19: Involvement in Government development plans in the community.....	74
Table 4.20: Frequency of Conflicts.....	74
Table 4.21: Apart from disputes resulting from animal rearing, have you ever had any problem with your host community before.....	75

Table 4.22: Other Causes of Conflict between Pastoralists and Crop producers.....	75
Table 4.23: Other Causes of Conflict between Pastoralists and Crop producers.....	77
Table 4.24: Solutions to the Crisis.....	79

**LIST OF APPENDICES**

Appendix I: Research Questionnaire..... 90

## **ABSTRACT**

This study investigated the socio-economic effects of the crop producers and pastoralists conflict in BarkinLadi Local government of Plateau State. The study specifically examined the causes of herders and farmers conflict in the area, and the socio-economic effects of the conflict in BarkinLadi LGA. The sample of the study consisted of 120 farmers and 120 respondents from herders selected from affected Districts via purposive sampling technique. A questionnaire titled Socio- Economic Effects of crop producers and pastoralists Conflicts Questionnaire (SEEHFCQ) was used to collect data. Descriptive statistics and inferential statistics were used to analyze the data generated from respondents. The findings revealed that the major cause of the conflict was the issue of cattle rustling followed by ethnic and religious differences. The social effect of the conflicts are reduction in quality of social relationship, while the economic effect of the conflict are reduction in output and income of crop producers and pastoralists, scarcity of agricultural products, reduction in the number of herds by the pastoralists, the study also recommended the establishment of the RUGA settlement and fairness in justice as means of mitigating the conflict. The findings also revealed that crop producers and pastoralists views of the causes crop producers and pastoralists of conflicts are not different while crop producers and pastoralists perception of the social effects and economic effects of Fulani pastoralists and crop producers conflict in BarkinLadi LGA are almost same. Based on the findings, it was suggested among others that representatives of the crop producers and pastoralists should be conveyed under a public forum and involved in the decision making and permitted to take part actively in the planning procedure of restoring peace to most of the affected communities, the respondents also suggests that fairness and justice as another means of ending the crises.

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Background of the Study

In recent years there have been records of fluctuating conflict, competition and cooperation between settled crop producers and pastoral or herders in Plateau State. These series of crises between crop producers and pastoralists in Plateau State resulted in wanton destructions of lives and properties worth huge amount of monies and caused socio economic backwardness among the people that have coexisted for many decades or even centuries. Violent conflict between crop producers and pastoralists usually has grievous effects on socio-economic development of any society. These negative effects have hampered development of both human and material resources in plateau state today. It is important to note that these conflicts have direct impact on the lives and livelihoods of those involved (Ibrahim et al, 2015).

The humanitarian effects of crop producers and pastoralists conflicts in Plateau State have led to loss of lives, population displacements, human injury and livelihood crisis, in addition to scores of people who have been rendered morbid, homeless, displaced and destitute by the conflicts. Psychologically, the conflicts have created an atmosphere of mental siege and terror among the populace in such a manner that threatens public peace and tranquility (Okoli and Atelhe, 2014). These conflicts reinforce circles of extreme poverty and hunger, and destroy social status, food security and affect mostly the most marginalized groups that include women and children. This affects education of children leading to obstacles in their development and mass displacement (Ibrahim et al, 2015).

Socially, the conflicts have led to tense and volatile inter-group relations amongst the various people of the State. This manifests in mutual mistrust and animosity which are often misplaced.

The pastoralists see the farmers as enemies of their collective survival and destiny, and vice versa. This creates an ambience of mutual suspicion and perpetual tension that threatens peaceful coexistence, security and stability of society (Okoli and Atelhe, 2014). Consequently, this debilitates the once mutually existing farmer-pastoralist relationships. This awful situation becomes worst, especially when either the farmer or the pastoralist is categorized into a group relating to religion, tribe or region as experienced in Plateau State (Ibrahim 2014).

The economic impact of the conflict situation under review could be seen in terms of losses associated with destruction of homes, farmlands, community assets, and household properties. Adding to this is the diminishing fortunes of agricultural productivity in the State. When the conflicts occur during the farming season, the tendency is that most farmers would not go to farm for fear of being attacked. The implication of this is the possibility of low agricultural productivity in the following harvest season. Besides, the conflicts have resulted in actual damage of farmlands and volumes of farm crops and produce. On the other hand, it has also led to cattle rustling and killing of cows from the Fulanis' herd. All these damages translate into real and quantifiable material losses (Okoli and Atelhe, 2014 et. al). In addition, thousands of Nigerians make a daily living from the sale, transport, processing and marketing of livestock products that include meat, milk, butter, hides and skins, bones and as ploughing power to farmers (Ibrahim et al, 2014). Hence, these economic benefits are threatened by the conflict.

The socio-economic impacts of the conflicts are evident in the glaring level of rural impoverishment and destitution in the hinterlands of the State. The internecine violence associated with the conflicts has tended to exacerbate hunger and human insecurity. This does not augur well for sustainable socio-economic and livelihood wellbeing of the people. On the whole, the conflicts have engendered outcomes that impede sustainable societal peace and

development. These rounds of strife disrupt community life and solidarity and destroy local and national economies with negative consequences on general social and economic development (Okoli and Atelhe, 2014).

Crop production and pastoralism have coexisted side-by-side for long time in BarkinLadi. Over time, many herding and farming communities in the area have developed interdependent relationships through reciprocity, exchange, and support. Recently, a small number of these disputes have escalated into widespread violence and displacement of people. In some cases, herder-farmer conflicts articulated with other ethnic, political, and religious conflicts. In 2004, President Obasanjo of Nigeria declared a state of emergency in Central state of Plateau, when herder-farmer conflicts resulted in “near-mutual genocide” of Christians and Muslims

## **1.2 Statement of Problem**

In recent years, there have been a number of conflicts between farmers and Fulani herdsmen in many parts of plateau state which have culminated into violent conflicts and the loss of lives and properties. This resulted to a serious socio-economic upheaval in many local governments of the state including our study area -BarkinLadi local government between 2015 to 2018, this study therefore seeks to examine the underlying causes and socio economic effects of the conflicts between crop producers and pastoralist in Barking Ladi Local Government. The increasing number of reports and incidence of violence between crop producers and herders makes understanding pastoralists-crop producers conflicts essential. We need to know not just why friction begins, but also why and how, as some conflicts unfold they articulate with religious, ethnic, and political conditions. Perhaps the most crucial question is why some conflicts between herders and farmers escalate into widespread violence.

## **1.3 Research Questions**

The main questions of this research is to examine the conflict between farmers and herdsmen and how it affects socio-economic development in BarkinLadi local government Plateau state.

To answer this overarching question, the study seeks to provide responses to the following specific research questions:

- i. What was the level of socio-economic interaction between crop producers and pastoralist prior to the conflict in BarkinLadi local government of plateau state?
- ii. What accounts for the frequency of the crop producers and pastoralists conflict in BarkinLadi local government of plateau state?
- iii. What are the effects of the conflict crop producers and pastoralists on socio-economic development of BarkinLadi local government of plateau state?
- iv. What are the solutions to the increasing crises between crop producers and pastoralists in BarkinLadi LGA

#### **1.4 Objectives of the Study**

The objectives of this research are:

- i. To examine the level of socio-economic interaction between crop producers and pastoralist prior to eruption of violence the conflict in BarkinLadi local government of plateau state
- ii. To assess the reason for the increase in the incidence and or prevalence of the conflict.
- iii. To examine the effects of the conflict between producers and pastoralists on socio-economic development of BarkinLadi local government of plateau state.

- iv. To find ways of eradicating the negative effects of the conflict between producers and pastoralists on socio-economic development of BarkinLadi local government of plateau state.

### **1.5 Significance of the Study**

The significance of this study includes the following:

The outcome of this study will provide insight on conflict between crop producers and herdsmen particularly in BarkinLadi local government and it has changed social interaction and retards economic growth. The outcome of this study in the body of knowledge will be of great intellectual and useful importance to a generation of stakeholders, academia, scholars, and agriculturists amongst others since at end we will provide some possible solution on how to curb the possibility of future occurrence. Is to look at how the conflict between the farmer and herdsmen affected the socio-economic development of BarkinLadi local government because from the literature available there is no one that look into the socio-economic effect of the conflict in BarkinLadi local government.

### **1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study**

The scope of this study is limited to the issues of conflict between farmers and herdsmen and its effects on socio-economic development in Plateau state, which is consist of 17 local government areas. However, the study was restricted to Barkin-Ladi Local Government Area of the state between 2012 and 2015. The study also faced some limitations in terms of difficulties in accessing some communities because of security treats, some of the respondents were skeptical on answering the questions on the questionnaire, However all these limitations encountered were all overcome, accessing the communities was overcome through employing the services of indigenous research assistants, the skepticism of the respondents was dealt with through the

intervention of their traditional rulers- DagwomRwei, the Berom paramount ruler in BarkinLadi and the chairman of Meyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria, Barking ladi LGA.

## **1.7 Conceptual Definitions**

### **1.7.1 Conflict**

Conflict is a struggle or contest between people with opposing needs, ideas, beliefs, values, or goals. Defined in broadest terms, conflict denotes the incompatibility of subject positions (Diez et al, 2006). This definition emphasises the opposition or incompatibility at the heart of the conflict, and initially leaves open the exact nature of these incompatibilities, i.e. whether they are between individuals, groups or societal positions; whether they rest in different interests or beliefs; or whether they have a material existence or come into being only through discourse.

Given this initial definition, conflict is not always characterised by violence. Yet, conflict might escalate and lead to destructive results, in particular in the form of physical violence that is increasingly seen as legitimate as conflict intensifies. However, conflict can also lead to a new social or political organisation and therefore be productive if the parties involved are able to deal with their incompatibilities so that such a new organisational form is achieved. Conflict is present in generally peaceful situations, but

(a) Remains confined to isolated instances and so does not take on societal significance, or

(b) Is dealt with within clearly defined and observed societal rules, or (c) is dealt with productively so that it generates a new form of socio-political organisation through peaceful change. This is not to say that violent conflict cannot eventually lead to productive change, but in order to do so, it ultimately needs to be desecuritized and therefore at least lead to peaceful change.

### **1.7.2 Socio-economic Development**

In order to understand this concept, let us begin by defining development. Generally, development is defined as a state in which things are improving. But it is defined in different ways in various contexts, social, political, biological, science and technology, language and literature. In the socio-economic context, development means the improvement of people's lifestyles through improved education, incomes, skills development and employment. It is the process of economic and social transformation based on cultural and environmental factors.

In order to understand the concept of socio-economic development, let us begin by defining development, social development and economic development. These concepts, which make up the ingredients of socio-economic development, will naturally lead us to the meaning of socio-economic development as used in this context.

Generally, development is defined as a state in which things are improving. It has been defined in different ways in various contexts such as; social, political, biological, science and technology, language and literature. In the socio-economic context, development means the improvement of people's lifestyles through improved education, incomes, skills development and employment. It is the process of economic and social transformation based on cultural and environmental factors (Module – 4, contemporary India: issues and goals, 2001). Fritz define development as a planned and comprehensive economic, social, cultural, and political process, in a defined geographical area, that is rights-based and ecologically oriented and aims to continually improve the well-being of the entire population and all of its individual. This comprehensive definition has three components; social development, economic development and environmental protection (Fritz, 2004).

Social development is a process which results in the transformation of social institutions in a manner which improves the capacity of the society to fulfill its aspirations. It implies a qualitative change in the way the society shapes itself and carries out its activities, such as through more progressive attitudes and behaviour by the population, the adoption of more effective processes or more advanced technology (Module – 4, contemporary India: issues and goals, 2001). Social development also refers to the complexity of social dynamics (the interplay of social structures, process and relationships) and focuses on (1) the social concerns of the people as objectives of development and (2) people-centered, participatory approaches to development. Social development is about inclusiveness, social justice and the common good. Indicators of social development provide comparative information about areas such as income, poverty, employment security, education, health, crime and civic participation. Sometimes social development indicators list also has information about the environment (Fritz, 2004).

Economic development on the other hand is the development of economic wealth of countries or regions for the well-being of their inhabitants. Economic growth is often assumed to indicate the level of economic development. The term “economic growth” refers to the increase (or growth) of specific measures such as real national income, gross domestic product, or per capita income. The term economic development on the other hand, implies much more. It is the process by which a nation improves the economic, political, and social wellbeing of its people (Module – 4, contemporary India: issues and goals, 2001). Economic development is the process of raising the level of prosperity through increased production, distribution and consumption of goods and services (Fritz, 2004).

Socio-economic development, therefore, is the process of social and economic development in a society. It is measured with indicators, such as gross domestic product (GDP), life expectancy,

literacy and levels of employment. Thus, it is a process of improvement in a variety of ways. It has to influence all aspects of human life in a country (Module - 4, contemporary India: issues and goals, 2001). Socio-economic development also emphasizes progress in terms of economic and social factors within a geographical unit (Fritz, 2004).

The purpose of economic development is to improve the social and natural well-being of all individuals and social institutions with the goal of achieving the highest possible level of human development. Socio-economic development, therefore, requires the integration of economic and social development. Progress in the quality of social and economic life should only be seen as progress if it is rights based and minimally affects, conserves or improves the natural-environment (Fritz, 2004).

It is a truism that whenever conflict escalate it tends to affect the socio-economic wellbeing of the people. Conflict between farmers and herdsman is not an exception, because it adversely affects socio-economic development. Those affected include the belligerent groups, the inhabitants in the conflict area, and the state at large. The social and economic lives of the people remain stagnant and even degenerate. Socially, the conflict has far reaching effect on the relationship between the two groups involved in the conflict. It also leads to mutual mistrust and volatile intergroup relations. The conflict also affects the living standard of the people, leading to unemployment, hunger, poverty and misery. Vulnerable groups like women and children bear the full brunt of the conflict; the woman is totally left helpless while the child's education is affected. The conflict also leads to displacement of people from their homes as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). More worrisome is the casualty rate in the form of physical and psychological injuries and above all, the loss of human lives. The conflict has also affected economic development in Plateau state. For example, it has far reaching effect on commercial

activities like trading, markets, agricultural productivity, and farming activities. It also leads to cattle rustling and in extreme case, killing of livestock in general. More disheartening is its effect on livestock productivity like meat, milk, hides and skin, born, butter and the like.

Socio-economic development is a key concept central to any problem of change in the socio-economic sphere. Its significance is aptly expressed by Stemplowski (1987), who states that “the concept of development functions as both, a product of an optimistic vision and an articulation of social interests, and a tool of analysis.”

Socio-economic development embraces changes taking place in the social sphere, mostly of an economic nature. Even though economic aspects come to the fore in the research on change in the economy (a study of economic phenomena and processes), they cannot be isolated from social aspects. Hence a more apt term for the change and the development is ‘change and socio-economic development’ combining the two aspects. It is worth noting that, according to Cholaĵ (1998), the science of economics distinguishes political economy in the classic sense. “It preserves its functions concerning the economic aspects of a society’s life. This domain of economic theory is interested in the types of socio-economic systems, ownership relations, and interests and motivation behind economic activity”.

Socio-economic development, therefore, is the process of social and economic development in a society. It is measured with indicators, such as gross domestic product (GDP), life expectancy, literacy and levels of employment. For better understanding of socio-economic development, we may understand the meaning of social and economic development separately.

### **1.7.3 Social development**

Is a process which results in the transformation of social institutions in a manner which improves the capacity of the society to fulfill its aspiration. It implies a qualitative change in the way the society shapes itself and carries out its activities, such as through more progressive attitudes and behavior by the population, the adoption of more effective processes or more advanced technology. As you see in the illustration below, there is a close relation among environments, ways of living and technology.

### **1.7.4 Economic development**

Is the development of economic wealth of countries or regions for the well-being of their inhabitants' Economic growth is often assumed to indicate the level of economic development. The term "economic growth" refers to the increase (or growth) of a specific measures such as real national income, gross domestic product, or per capita income. The term economic development on the other hand, implies much more. It is the process by which a nation improves the economic, political, and social wellbeing of its people.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section of the study is divided into three parts. The first focuses on literature review of related literature by various scholars which explain the issues of farmers and herdsman conflict in the continent of Africa and in some parts of Nigeria. The second part focuses attention on the theoretical perspective, Conflict theory will be employ, its application to the study will also examine. The literature to be review will be based on the contributions of scholars in this area. This part concludes by stating the gap this study intends to fill that has not yet been studied.

#### 2.1 Review of Related Literature

Scholars from divers discipline have carried out studies of conflict between farmers and herdsman in West Africa and Nigeria.

The conflict between farmers and pastoralists goes back to the earliest written records and is mythically symbolized in many cultures. The association of highly mobile pastoralists with raiding and warfare has been crucial in establishing negative stereotypes throughout history. In West Africa, farmers formerly associated pastoral peoples with large-scale military conquest. But with the coming of the colonial regimes and the collapse of indigenous states, conflict between farmers and herders took on a different coloring, becoming more associated with competition for natural resources. Nigeria, however, presents a very special situation quite unlike other West African countries, for two reasons; most notably, the ambiguous prestige of pastoral culture particular to *Fulbe* pastoralists but also because of its large and comparatively wealthy population. Conflict was transformed by key changes attendant on the demographic and veterinary revolution of the colonial era and again by the flow of oil revenues from the 1970s onwards which increased the market for pastoral products. However, in recent years, Nigeria has

been constantly racked by civil strife, particularly across the religious divide, and this has reconfigured farmer/herder conflict in new and striking ways. The absence of any concerted government response is a matter for concern in terms of rural development, but also because it is noted by the participants who take it as an opportunity to increase the tension still further (Blench and Dendo, 2003). Conflicts between crop farmers and cattle herders in search of pasture and water has been in a record for long in West Africa (Tonah, 2006).

However, Farmers-pastoralists clash has remained a major crisis, claiming hundreds lives of people and causing destruction to thousands of animals and farm produce worth millions of Naira in the northern part of Nigeria (Adamu, 2011). Similarly, Abdulkadir (2011) reported in daily trust that, between May and June violent conflicts between the farmers and cattle-rearing nomads in the Benue-Nasarawa states borders resulted in the loss of lives, destruction of property and displacement of several communities. Blench and Dendo (1994) observed that, fatal conflicts between farmers and pastoralists are reported almost daily in the newspapers, but no effective action has yet been taken by Government to analyze or remedy the causes of these conflicts.

Many communities of farmers and herders have built interdependent relationships with one another through emergent processes of exchange. Such interdependence has often been described as symbiotic, in which the two communities form host-client or host-stranger relationships with one another (Bassett 1986; de Haan, van Driel, and Kruithof 1990; Diallo 2000; Tonah 2006). A good example of a host-client relation is that between Mbororo herders and Gbaya farmers in the Adamawa Province of Cameroon (Burnham 1980). The basis of this long-term symbiotic relationship is reciprocity, which either party may initiate with small gifts of, for example, kola

nuts and later exchange more substantive gifts and commodities. Gbaya may give sacks of manioc and maize, while Mbororo may give calves, radios, or bicycles.

Both men and women in the respective households engage in reciprocal exchanges. Mbororo women first exchange milk for vegetables with their Gbaya female friends before they sell the remainder on the local market. Mbororo men take entrusted animals from their Gbaya friends with them on transhumance, while the Gbaya build wet season huts for their Mbororo friends on their fallow fields.

Host-client relations have been considered critical to integrating Fulbe pastoralists into agricultural societies and to preventing and resolving herder-farmer conflicts across West Africa (Breusers, Nederlof, and van Rheenen 1998; Dafinger and Pelican 2006). Dafinger and Pelican (2006) consider the host-client relations a structural factor that explains variation in herder-farmer conflicts between Central South Burkina Faso and Northwest Cameroon. But the Gbaya-Mbororo ex-ample also shows that host-client relations can be studied as a process in which the relationship is strengthened over time through reciprocal exchange of goods and services.

These symbiotic relationships usually facilitate dispute resolution between herders and farmers. The Mossi and Fulbe in Central Plateau of Burkina Faso also have long standing host-stranger relations that involve reciprocal gift-giving, grazing of stubble, manure for fields, entrustment of animals, milk for millet, godparent hood, and friendships (Breusers et al. 2000). The historical context is critical in that it sets the stage for reconciliation and maintenance of the peace. In one case, described in detail by Breusers et al. (1998), Mossi farmers accompanied by a village official went to the cattle owner the day following the crop damage to negotiate compensation. Existing relations of animal entrustment between the negotiators was key to the resolution of the conflict. Breusers (1999) argues that most conflicts in the Central Plateau are settled quickly

without major complications and rarely are cases brought to administrative authorities, but that this is and has not always been the case (Breusers et al. 2000; Oksen 2000). Sometimes, however, the symbiosis breaks down and minor conflicts escalate into deadly violence between communities. Barrot (1992), for example, reflects on the massacre of Fulbe in Toda, Niger on October 30, 1991, in which 103 people were killed, mostly women and children:

It all began with a commonplace quarrel over stray cattle, in which a Hausa farmer lost his temper and opened fire on a Fulbe bystander. He missed and was killed by a cudgel blow. The punitive expedition that followed was out of all proportion. The “army of farmers” (four or five hundred men) was raised by a few hot-heads, who passed around amphetamine tablets to rouse their troops. The manhunt began, ending in the most appalling blood bath.

The underlying or structural reasons for the conflict, according to Barrot, quoting André Marty, is the demise of the symbiotic relations between herders and farmers across West Africa. As livestock ownership among farmers has increased, they no longer need manure contracts. Moreover, farmers now compete directly with herders for grazing lands, which have been slowly disappearing due to population growth and agricultural expansion.

Barrot’s analysis is representative of studies that examine herder-farmer conflicts in order to identify the structural conditions under which they occur. Such studies under-theorize processual variables, which are often glossed over by reference to chance or “luck.” Barrot (1992) addresses the question of why this particular conflict escalated by stating that it was “simply bad luck that one of these mundane scuffles between farmers and herders ended in a death,” i.e., the farmer’s death by cudgel blow.

The two main theoretical approaches in the study of herder-farmer conflicts in West Africa are both structural: environmental scarcity and political ecology. Environmental security scholars,

like Thomas Homer-Dixon, have emphasized the role of resource scarcity and increasing competition for these scarce resources as the primary, though not the only reason for more frequent and more frequently violent conflicts over natural resources (Homer-Dixon 1999). Political ecologists have challenged Homer-Dixon's thesis that there is a causal link between resource scarcity and violent conflicts (Hartmann 2001). Basset (1988) observes, for example, that herder-farmer conflicts are equally intense in Cote d'Ivoire and Central Cameroon, where grazing areas are relatively abundant.

For example, in the same areas in Nigeria and Burkina Faso where herder-farmer disputes have recently escalated, hundreds of herder-farmer disputes are peacefully resolved every year.

The literature reviewed above on the farmers and herdsman conflict discourse the historical ramification of the conflict. The causes, nature, dynamics, consequences and solution to the conflict have also being looked at.

Even though it can be argued that scholars have written on the socio-economic dimension of the farmers and herdsman conflict. Most of the scholars situating their studies in the northern region and specifically selected states in the middle belt region of the country (Garba et al, 2015; Okoli&Atelhe 2014; Olabode&Ajibade, 2010 ;). While Umeh&Chukwu, (2015) and Ofuoku&Isife (2009) studied the socio-economic effect of the conflict in Ebonyi and Delta states respectively all from southern Nigeria. However, to the best of my knowledge, there is yet to be any literature that systematically approached the conflict situation in BarkinLadi Local government of Plateau state from an empirical premise that exposes farmer herdsman discourse. Therefore, there is an urgent need to critically examine the socio-economic perspective of the conflict, which is the main thrust of this study.

## 2.2 Cattle Rustling and Banditry

The Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary of Current English stressed that the word bandit is coined from the Italian word bandito and it denotes banned. The word is synonymic to wordings such as thieving, robbery, violence, and lawlessness. Fulani bandits according to Stevenson (2016) are a group of persons from the Fulani ethnic group or Fulfulde speaking group who are into the act of rustling of cows of both Fulani herders and other herders from other ethnic groups. They are called in Fulfulde as Bigol and in Hausa language Dabalde. In an interview with the secretary of MACBAN, Mangu Branch, the Fulani bandits are into groups and operate with strategies and planned skills. He went to say:

The Fulani bandits are in peers and mostly come in groups. They are into different setup. First, they will set certain parts of the groups that would act as spies, then after spying where livestock like cows are kept; they will come either in the night or daytime with three other divisions. The first division would be in a group of four persons with sophisticated ammunition like guns and machetes to send away the herders and after which, a ritual will be done to aid them to run with the stolen cattle. The last division or group would stay put to fight the police or the herder if he/she attempted to run after them. Sanni (2016:56) advocated that the Fulani bandits rustled cows of both Fulani herders and non-Fulani herders (i.e. herders from other ethnic groups). He went further and buttressed that the herders have certain persons or dealers who often act as a link between the Fulani bandits and the buyers of the rustled cows. He went further to stress that most of the people involved in the act are young men who have either lost their cattle or persons of dubious character. Anderson (2016: 34) also advocates that the Fulani bandits are specialists in cow rustling and robbery of people in the highways, market, business ground and other places where money can easily be gotten. He enthused:

The Fulani bandits operate a kind of systematic practice that it would only take the grace of God for ordinary police officers to track down their activities. They operate hand in hand with a group of agents such as those that can act as mediators between the persons whose cows were rustled and the Fulani bandits. The mediator, when contacted would demand a ransom and seek the indulgence of the persons whose cows were rustled to keep the act in secrecy and devoid of the security forces.

When the mediator by chance meet the rustlers before the cattle were disposed, he or she would be sent to tell the owners to pay the amount they demanded and after fulfilling their conditions, the mediators would be given the rustled cows for onward return to the owner.

This type of practice is common in BarkinLadi, Mangu, Jos South, all of Plateau state, Bauchi state, Gombe and most states in the Northern part of the country. The act is purely practiced by Fulani and Nigerian Fulani ethnic groups. Persons that are mostly involved in the act are young groups of persons and most of them are heartless, non-tolerance and usually under the influence of drugs.

Cattle rustler in Nigeria is a generic name for any persons or group of persons that rustle livestock, such as cows, sheep, goat, Camel, donkeys and a lot of others. What differentiates Fulani bandits from cattle rustlers is the ethnic background. The cattle rustlers can be comprised of persons with Fulfulde's background and other persons from different ethnic set up. The Fulani bandits are purely people who are from the Fulani ethnic groups. They shared the same attributes such as rustling of cows, usage of guns and also robbed people (Nathan, 2001). With the increasing cases of herders and farmers' conflicts in Nigeria, some persons or group of persons often hide under the auspice of the herders and farmers' conflicts to rustled livestock during such skirmishes. A cross-sectional interview with both Fulani herders and herders from another ethnic

groups in Plateau State and Nasarawa shows that the ethno-religious conflicts and farmer-herders confrontations in the state had open way to an organized and planned system of cattle rustling in the state. Danladi (2016: 67) enthused:

We cannot actually say that the rustlers are from this ethnic group or the other. Police have caught persons from different ethnic groups. For instance, in Plateau state, a lot of Fulani persons were caught, some Berom people were caught, some Ngas and Taroh peoples were also caught and in Bokkos, the Ron and Kulere people were also found involved in the act. In Benue and Taraba, some people from the Tiv ethnic group and a lot of others were also found among the rustlers. It cut across different states and communities.

This continued to be a problem in Nigeria and has created a lot of distrust and hatred among ethnic groups in society. The Nigeria Fulani ethnic group mostly becomes irritated when cases of rustling affect them or is linked to their ethnic group. They often argued that it is not all the Fulani speaking people that herd and so also, they are not the only group of people that herds cows in the society. The issues of pointing accusing fingers like the usage of wording such as “suspected” Fulani herders in recent time has received renunciation and rebuff from the Fulani in Nigeria.

MACBAN, for long has been defending the Fulani herders and stressing the need to differentiate between activities of societal miscreants and Hoodlums in the society who often rustled livestock, loot and robbed people of their belonging than always labeling the Fulani people as suspects whereas, the actual perpetrators are in the dark.

The several peace advocacy programmes by government, traditional rulers, Non-governmental agencies, religious institutions, and the State Task Force deployed to maintain peace in the state have not done the magic. Rather, the problem appears to be spreading to areas hitherto seen as

peaceful. The Plateau State Special Task Force (STF) charged with the responsibility of maintaining peace in the State stated in a special report released in 2015 that the genesis of the Fulani and Berom conflict especially, the recent ones are solely cattle rustling. The State Task Force also blamed the availability of arms in the hands of civilians as one of the critical factors that allowed the escalation of the crisis in the areas (Cinjel&Akende, 2015). Stephenson [2015] argued that the crisis is predominantly between Berom who are Christians and Fulani who are predominantly Muslims on the other hand. He went further and stressed that there were several accusations and counter-accusations by the warring parties where Berom often accused the Fulani herders of grazing on their farmlands and the Fulani, on the other hand accused Berom of rustling their cattle. In 2010, the conflict was not too pronounced. It was predominantly within few localities in the area. These are Kassa, Marit, Fan and Mazat areas. On 10<sup>th</sup> April, 2010, a group of unknown gunmen attacked the central area of Kassa village.

This attack resulted to the death of five [5] persons and twenty-one (21) houses were razed down. The gunmen were said to have dressed as soldiers. This thus created a room for hostile confrontation between the two groups in the above-mentioned communities. The violence was characterized by the destruction of houses, cattle and denial of access to communities of the warring groups (Cinjel&Akende, 2015). On 24<sup>th</sup> November, 2011, there was another outbreak of hostility between the Berom and the Fulani in Hiepang areas.

This conflict resulted in the death of twelve (12) persons, destruction of several houses and properties. A 24-hour curfew was imposed as a result of the conflict in the local government and this affected movement on the highway which links the central and Southern local government areas to the State Capital(Jos) situated at the Northern Zone of the State (Cinjel, Interview in BarkinLadi, October 2, 2015)

In 2012, BarkinLadi witnessed another outbreak of hostility in Kakuruk village and Matse, a border area of Riyom Local Government. On 9<sup>th</sup> July, 2012, Kakuruk, a village under Gashish was stormed with violence. According to Lomang (2013), sixty-three (63) persons were killed at the early part of the conflict and at the ground of their mass burial, forty-three (43) persons were also killed along with the then-Senator representing the constituency (GyangDantong) and the then member serving and representing BarkinLadi at the State House of Assembly (Gyang Fulani). He asserted further that a day after the orgy of hostility, One hundred and fifty (150) dead bodies were discovered linked to the Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN) building and the victims died in an ensuing inferno as the attackers were said to have stood by to shoot anybody that tried to escape. STF spokesman at that time, Capt. Salihu Mustapha also acknowledged that the attackers dressed in military uniforms and were heavily armed and also wore bullet proof vests. He went further and admitted that twenty-one (21) of the assailants were killed and two soldiers were also killed in the shoot-out (Turaki, 2015). The Meyeti-Allah Cattle Breeders Association dismissed the act as propaganda. The group repeatedly denied the allegation that they were behind the frequent attacks. They also denied the allegation that some of them were among the cattle rustlers. In an interview with the then Secretary, Plateau State Chapter of The Meyeti-Allah-Cattle Breeders Association (MACBAN), MohamaduNuruAbdulahi alleged that the crisis of BarkinLadi Local Government Area had continued because those who were benefiting from it would not give up. On 18<sup>th</sup> May, 2013, GanaRopp witnessed another hostile attack which resulted to a lot of deaths and destruction.

The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) accused the Muslim of igniting the violence. In their narratives, they argued that twenty-two (22) persons died on the first day of the attack and a day after, another twenty (20) bodies were confirmed dead by the attack. Furthermore, the

organization accused the State Securities of bias, alleging that it always acted in the interest of the Fulani Muslims. They observed that it was a failure of the securities to fetch and punish the perpetrators of the previous violence that encourages the attacks. However, Muslim groups in the community denied these accusations and, in turn accused the Christians of intolerance and deliberately trying to undermine Islam through their hatred for anything Islamic.

The Plateau State government under the immediate past governor, Jonah Jang after an exceptionally long Security Council meeting on the series of confrontations that took place in 2013, reached the conclusion that cattle rustling was behind the communal clashes between the Fulani and most communities in BarkinLadi Local Government of Plateau State. These also flow with the view of the then leader of the Special Task Force of the State, Capt. IkedichiIwela who equally asserted that the problem in BarkinLadi was obviously cattle rustling and reprisal attacks. He went further and cited instances where cattle rustling had become an occupation for some people, a development being resisted by herders in a bloody manner. On the 26<sup>th</sup> November, 2013, four (4) communities were attacked in one night. In the attack, thirteen (13) persons were killed in KatuKapang, eight (8) persons were killed at Daron, nine (9) persons at Tul and seven (7) persons at Rawuwu. A week after, the Chairman of Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Plateau State Chapter, SojaBewarang officiated a mass burial of 51 persons, killed at Talu area of the same local government and the victims were predominantly pregnant women, children, and aged persons who could not run. A statement signed by Captain Salihu Mustapha, the then media officer of the StateTask Force at the time, alleged that the coordinated attacks were carried out at night and he asserted further that the prime cause was cattle rustling. On 20<sup>th</sup> June, 2013, there was also a hostile confrontation in the central area of the Local Government Area, one (1) person was killed and thirteen 13 others were injured and on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of July, two (2) weeks after

the incident, two (2) women were killed at Gwarang. On the 20<sup>th</sup> of April and 3<sup>rd</sup> May, 2013, Lukfie and Ruku were attacked respectively by unknown gunmen. The whole of the villages were ransacked, six (6) persons died in the attack and most of the houses in the two communities were razed down including two churches and a public-owned school. Kantoma (Ladi) and GananDaje were also attacked on the 3<sup>rd</sup> August. In the attack, ten (10) persons were killed, seven (7) houses were also razed in the attack and plethora of crops were destroyed (Turaki, 2015).

Plateau State and specifically BarkinLadi local government areas situated in the northern senatorial district that is conflict-prone has enjoyed significant level of peace in the latter part of 2015 and 2016. The rates of attacks were minimal and the state governor was applauded for sustaining peace unlike it was in the time past. It was toward the latter part of 2017 that the state began to witness another phase of attacks. It first started in Bassa on 3<sup>rd</sup> October, 2017, where a young Fulani herder was murder by a native of Irikwe (Danladi, 2017). Drastic action was taken by the state government and the securities apparatus in the state and the culprit was arrested. Despite the arrest, there was a reprisal attack in the community and 11 persons were confirmed dead, securities were mounted to avoid further attacks.

After a relative peace of a month and some week, the attack in BarkinLadi erupted. It started with the incidences of cattle rustling and then the attack in Foron where 11 people were found dead and several houses were set ablaze. The situation was controlled with the intervention of the state government and the joint task force in the state. Peace restored and people returned to their normal business. No arrest was made to ascertain the culprit behind the odious act.

In that same month, there was a confrontation between police officers of Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) and youth of the main town over an alleged arrest of youths that the officers acclaimed to be suspected robbers (Nathan, 2017).

In 2018, there were several cases of cattle rustling and pocket of attacks in the villages in the Local Government Area. The Fulani herders in villages such as Gashish, Sho, Foron complained of the continuous increases in the incidences of cattle rustling in their domain. Meyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association in Nigeria (MACBAN), a religious turned socio politico-economic ethnic pressure organization of the Fulani in the state pay a solidarity visit to be the governor and complained of the menace of the increased incidence of cattle rustling in the state. The group accused the Berom youth as the suspects carrying out such Act (Interview on 15<sup>th</sup> September, 2018). The Berom native situated in areas such as: Fan, Foron, Dorawa, Bishichi also complained of how their cattle were rustled and accused the Fulani herders as the suspects too. The incidence became a blame game where each division is pointing accusing finger on the other.

The state government and the securities apparatus in the state did all they could to arrest persons perpetrating the act but all to the contrary (Cinjel, Interview on 15<sup>th</sup> September, 2018).

On 12 April 2018, there was a report on the missing of 200 cows. 36 cows were also killed and 100 were rustled. The herders report the scene to the Joint task force and in attempt to pursuit the rustlers, three soldiers got missed. Their corpses were not seen and their phone numbers after some days were tracked around an open space in SabonGari but their corpse were not seen. On 30<sup>th</sup> April of 2018, a butcher who went to collect his debt from a Berom woman was machete to death in Fan. He was a Muslim and a native of Mangu but was erroneously killed because of his long bear (Interview on 15<sup>th</sup> September, 2018). One week after the incidence, a Fulani

commercial motorcyclist took a Berom native in a village in Foron and later was not seen. These developments continue to spur distrust and hatred among the Berom and the Fulani in the local government Area. There was accumulation of tension and grievance among the two groups. It was widely speculated that there will be attacks after the celebration of Ramadan. The incidences of cattle rustling kept re-occurring among the two groups and no person was caught as culprit behind the ugly scene (Cinjel, Interview on 15<sup>th</sup> September, 2018).

A Week after the Ramadan celebration that was on the 24<sup>th</sup> of June, 2018, over 150 corpses were found following the 48 hours siege in five villages of Gashish District of BarkinLadi. The villages were Xland, GindinAKwati, Ruku, Nghar, Kura falls and Kukuruk. Other affected are Rakok, Kok, Razak and Ndin, all in Ropp District. The Plateau State governor in person of Bar. Simon Lalong had to cut short the APC convention he was attaining in Abuja in order to come and take charge of the security situation in the affected areas. The attackers were said to be the suspected herders and there were variations in the number of persons killed as the police public relations officer adduced 11 and other groups such as Berom Economic and Cultural organization, Berom Youth Movement, and Church of Christ in Nations were stressing 200 and more. There were reprisal attacks on the 25<sup>th</sup>, 26<sup>th</sup>, and 27<sup>th</sup>. Federal high ways and other routes in the affected areas were not only blocked but a lot of innocent persons based on religious pigmentation were killed as projection (Cinjel, Interview on 15<sup>th</sup> September, 2018). 11 of the suspected Fulani herders were arrested along with 13 Berom youths who projected and as well were found with sophisticated weapons were arrested. On 29<sup>th</sup> August, 2018, there was also an attack in Abonong village and Dorawa of BarkinLadi Local Government Area. In the attack, a pastor and his wife and other three persons were killed. A church was set ablaze and three other persons were missed. On 6<sup>th</sup> of September, there was also a fresh attack in BarkinLadi Local

Government Area. The affected communities are NdingSuisut village. According to the police public relations officer of the state, TyopTerner, two persons were killed, four injured and 12 houses were set ablaze. The attackers came two days after 5 local miners were killed in GanaRopp of the same BarkinLadi Local Government Area (Cinjel, Interview on 15<sup>th</sup> September, 2018).

### **2.3 Overview of Herders and Farmers Conflicts in Nigeria**

Confrontation of *herders* and *Fulani* continues unabatedly in Nigeria despite the effort of government to promote unity in Nigeria. The conflicts of farmers and herders in Nigeria are now a recurrent nightmare and despite all the effort of government to put an end to the issue, the situation is escalating to an austere level. It started in North east, and then it shifted to the Middle belt areas such as *Plateau, Nasarawa, Benue* and *Taraba*. It has now spread down to both south east and South West of the country. It involves a lot of issues and it has being interpreted in different ways by different persons (Obateru, 2000).

There are plethora of variations among scholars as related to the conflicts of herders and farmers in Nigeria. There are a lot of connotations as relate to the differences between a *Fulani, Fulani herders, herders* and *Fulani bandits*. In the word of Aliyu (2014), a Fulani is a person whose root and origin is traced from the Fulfulde speaking groups of the *Nilo-Sahara* family of *West Africa* and *Fulani herders* are Fulani persons that herd livestock like cows and other animals. There are also the *Fulani bandits* who are into the act of rustling, attacking communities and looting their belongings. He went further to stress that the *Fulani bandits* not necessarily made up of *Fulani ethnic group*. He enthused: This group of persons can come or be from different background. They are just hoodlums and miscreant who move from one area to the other to wreaked havoc

and loot the belonging of people. They, rustled, rape, kidnap and abduct people for ransom. They also appear on our highways to rob people of their belongings.

Saleh (2016) also advocated that a lot of person wrongly assumed that all attacks are carried away by the Fulani ethnic groups not knowing that there are other ethnic groups that herd livestock like the *Fulani group* and it is not all *Fulani* persons that herd. Some are into sedentary lifestyles and sumptuous of profession to earn their living. It is common that most of the attacks are labeled as *Fulani herders* and this is because it is the Fulani ethnic groups that are commonly known as herders. In the word of Davidson (2016), Fulani who often come to communities to attack are those that have lost their livestock to either rustlers or to community clashes. He advocated that even the *Fulaniherders* knew within themselves that some of them were into rustling.

The emergency of urbanization, climatic changes and variation in seasons has opened ways to the *herders* and *Fulani* conflicts in Nigeria. This is based on the thinking that a lot of herder's route and areas which they were previously being used as grazing land have turned to either farmland or residential homes. This development led to the shortage of resources such as land for grazing and for cultivation. The effect of this is manifested in the clash between the *farmers* and the *herders* (Cinjel&Akende, 2015).

The incidence of *herders* and *farmers* confrontation kept worsening despite several attempts by the Nigerian Police and Military to quell down the issues. The Meyetti Allah cattle breeder Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) continued to reject those claims that the attacks are from Fulani herders and precisely, Nigerian Fulani herders. They kept projecting that perpetrators are both societal hoodlums and miscreant or from other countries (Cinjel&Akende, 2015).

This suggestion was further supported by the *Sultan of Sokoto* who on several occasions blamed the scene to the activities of rustlers, reprisal attacks and loses border control in the country. A lot of states in Nigeria have suffered from series of attacks which are mostly labeled as Fulani herders' attacks. It has affected states such as Plateau state, Benue, Nasarawa, Enugu, Anambara, Edo, Ondo and a lot of others. In 2015, Lamorde Local Government Area and *Gerie village* precisely in Adamawa state was attacked by suspected herders in the communities. In the attack, 60 persons were found dead and the police DPO was also killed (Sanni, 2016).

In Benue state, a lot of persons and properties worth billions of naira were destroyed as a result of the attacks. The attacks have spread in Local Government Areas such as Agatu, Bukuru, Guma, Gwer West, Gwer East, Logo, Kwande and Katsina Allah. Between 2011 to 2014, suspected *herders* had attacked dozens of communities in four local government areas of Benue State – Gwer-West, Gwer-East, Bukuru and Agatu. In December 2015, six people were killed at *Idele* village in *Oju* Local Government Area. In the same month, a reprisal attack by youth in the area saw three (3) *Fulani herdsmen* killed and beheaded. The *Oju* killings were followed by an attack in January at *UhaNyiey*. Between 10 to 20 March, 2016, there were series of attacks in Benue state (Cinjel&Akende, 2015).

The attack on Friday March 10 begun in *Mkgovur village* on the outskirts of *Buruku* town when the *Fulani herders* were prevented from grazing their cattle on the farm lands owned by indigenous Christian community. This later resulted to a serious confrontation in the evening in which 10 people were killed and on the 20<sup>th</sup> of the same month, 6 people were killed in *Tarkara* Local Government Area of the state. In one of the attacks, the then chairperson – *Mrs. Phoebe Akoom* narrowly escaped from the attackers. On the 10<sup>th</sup> April, 2016, *Kwande* Local Government Area was attacked and 10 persons were reportedly confirmed death and 20 days after,

*Burukuwas* attacked and another 20 persons were confirmed death. In *Agatu*, a territory occupied by citizens of both *Nasarawa* and *Benue* State, there was an attack on September 2016, in the confrontation, a lot of houses were set ablaze and a lot of persons were killed in the *Fulani herders* and *farmers* confrontation. On March 24<sup>th</sup>, 2017, 5 herders were also killed and over 500 cows were rustled. These incidents led to the displacement of thousands of persons to other neighbouring communities. Keana Local Government Area of Nasarawa State was also attacked by unknown gunmen (Johnson, 2016).

In Enugu State, 40 persons were killed in *Uzo – Uwam*. The attack took place on April 25, 2016. This led to the transfer of the state commissioner of police in the state. An eye witness to the scene – *John Eze* narrated that he had just returned to the community the weekend the incident happened. He ascribed in an interview granted to *Naija.com* that: As early as 6:30 am that morning, there was this loud noise and many of us rushed out, we saw the *Fulani herders* with guns and machetes moving toward us. We ran into the bush while some of us ran into the bush while other move to nearby villages. I lost two of my brothers and my in – law in the attacks.

Honourable *Chukwemakwe Ujam* raised the issue in the National Assembly and blamed the *Fulani* as the *casus belli* of farmers versus *Fulani* conflicts in Nigeria but the motion was kicked by Honourable *Aminu Shagari* who sees it as an insult on the *Fulani* ethnic groups. It was in the same year, the former secretary to the Federal Government – *Olu Falae* was abducted in his resident by the *Fulani herders*. In another comment on the persistent attacks of the herders attacks in Nigeria, *Senator Ben Bruce* acknowledged that the attacks of the herders in the country was very common and had claimed a lot of lives and properties than the *Boko Haram* attacks. He urged the government to adopt a drastic action to control the spread of the conflict across other states in the country (Johnson, 2016).

In 2017, there was plethora of the herders and farmers confrontations across different states in the federation. In *Southern* part of *Kaduna*, a lot of houses, lives and properties valued at billions of naira were destroyed by the herders. The state governor in a comment subscribed that the herders were compensated not to attack and he stated that the attack were as a result of the cattle of the herders which were rustled in the time past in the affected communities. The attack further spread to state like *Taraba* and *Benue* State (Cinjel&Akende, 2016).

Jos for long has being a scene for the hostile confrontation of farmers and herders. The frequent attacks have paralyzed sumptuous of economic and social activities in Jos South, BarkinLadi, Riyom and Bokkos Local Government Area. In Riyom, Jos South and Bokkos Local Government Area, a lot of communities were deserted as a result of the persistence attacks of the herders in the areas. Stevenson (2017) enthused: In Jos South, a lot of villages along Bishichi, DogoNahawa, and Fan have being deserted. In BarkinLadi, Sho, Marit, GanaRop and a lot of others are isolated as a result of the attacks. In Bokkos, Majahota, Kuba, Yirpya and a lot of others are also deserted. The economic and social activities in the area are at their ebb as a result of the frequent attacks.

#### **2.4 The Variety of Pastoral Groups**

Nigeria has a restricted inventory of pastoral peoples, the Fulbe, the Kanuri-related groups, the Shuwa, the Yedina and the Uled Suleiman. The most numerous and widespread are the Fulbe [Fulani] who have expanded eastwards from the Gambia river over the last thousand years and probably entered Nigeria in the fourteenth century. The Nigerian Fulbe are described in a number of classic monographs, most notably St. Croix (1944), Hoppen (1958), and Stenning (1959) all of whom studied pastoral clans in semi-arid areas. For the humid and sub humid regions there is relatively little descriptive material. Awogbade (1983) described the Fulbe on the

Jos Plateau, while some of the papers in Kaufmann, Chater & Blench (1986) deal with pastoralists in southern Zaria.

By contrast, the other pastoral groups of Nigeria are barely described. The Koyam, Shuwa and related peoples have remained in the semi-arid zone around Lake Chad. With a very few exceptions, they do not come into contact with cultivators, except for their own ethnic group, cultivating in river valleys or catch-cropping at the foot of dunes.

However, ecological change and pressure on grazing has produced some surprising adaptations among the UledSuliman, camel-herders of Libyan origin who now migrate between Niger and NE Nigeria. The desiccation of many former wetland areas combined with pressure on grazing resources has led to them exploring ever further south, and the high levels of water-abstraction that are causing the HadejiaNguru wetlands to dry up (Blench et al.2003) have benefited the UledSuliman by making parts of the zone accessible to camels in the dry season. Since camels exploit vegetation (especially acacias) that is little used by farmers, the potential for conflict is reduced. None of the other pastoral peoples in Nigeria have expanded in the same way as the Fulbe. As a consequence, conflict of the sort common among the Fulbe is not usually perceived as a problem.

The cattle-based pastoralism of the Fulbe has thus been the most significant focus of herder/farmer conflict in Nigeria. For a long period, the Fulbe were confined to the edge of the desert. During the twentieth century, Fulbe herders began to migrate through and settle in whole zones that were previously inaccessible to pastoralists, bringing them into contact with previously unknown peoples, cultures and production systems. The consequences of this were a raft of untested interactions between all parties and considerable space for misunderstandings and conflict. The factors preventing their southern expansion in a previous era remain

controversial, but it is likely that a move out of the semi-arid region would have resulted in major losses from the trypanosomes (Blench 1994). Before the spread of firearms in Nigeria, human population densities were low and wild animal numbers (and thus tsetse vectors) still high. This would have created a high level of tsetse challenge for the non trypanotolerant zebu owned by the Fulbe (Blench 1999). The classic stereotype of Fulbe migration in the colonial period common was a seasonal movement between the semi-arid north and the dry-season pastures along the Niger-Benue system. As the rains gathered pace, tsetse populations expanded and herders were driven back northwards. Despite this, the gradual exploration of southern pastures led to individuals seeking methods of remaining in these regions all year round. Fricke's (1979) study of livestock production in Nigeria concluded from an analysis of tax and slaughterhouse records that there had been a general shift southward of pastoral herds.

The conventional stereotypes of the Fulbe as living in Northern Nigeria are becoming less and less true, year by year. Two major surveys commissioned by the Nigerian government have contributed to a major reformulation of the conventional stereotypes of Fulbe pastoralism (RIM 1984, 1992). The movement into the south-west was markedly earlier than in the centre and south-east of the country for both ecological and religious/cultural reasons. The climatic regime of the south-west is such that the derived savanna loops southwards west of Oyo, almost reaching the coast in Benin and the Togolese Republic. This creates relatively open land without the high humidity associated with forest proper and therefore reduces the disease risk to zebu cattle.

The second impetus to southward expansion of the pastoralists was the unaccustomed security of the colonial era. One reason pastoralists so often become militaristic is because they are comparatively vulnerable. Stocks are susceptible both to one-off theft and large-scale cattle-

rustling. In an economy where land is not at a premium, it is difficult to deprive a farmer of his working capital. But herders can easily be overwhelmed, especially as so much of their day is spent virtually alone with the animals. For example, until the colonial era, grazing herds avoided the otherwise attractive Jos Plateau because of the threat of armed raids (Awogbade 1983). The relative peace and security in rural areas from 1910 onwards encouraged exploratory movements towards new pastures.

This southward movement has not been without costs to the Fulbe. Two features of their present society reflect this; extensive sedentarisation and an increase in conflict with the agrarian societies on whom they have traditionally depended for their supply of cereal staples. The Fulbe and the arable farmers among whom they move have traditionally had an interdependent relationship, based both on the local exchange of dairy products for grain, and the periodic sale of animals to provide cash for domestic purposes, such as cloth or marriage payments. Moreover, in many regions, Fulbe management strategies depend on access to cereal crop residues - something arable farmers may encourage because of the perceived advantages of manure as fertilizer. However, in no case are the goods or services pastoralists have to offer essential to the farming community, and therefore the pastoralist is obliged to remain on good terms with farmers if he wishes to continue to exploit the same locale in successive years. If Fulbe herders are unable to build up exchange relations with the farming communities, they can only survive either by settling, by flexible movement patterns that involve encountering new arable communities every year, or by intimidation of the farmers. All of these strategies occur in Nigeria, sometimes practiced simultaneously by different Fulbe subgroups. Understanding the structural elements underlying conflict is thus essential to interpreting its recent transformations.

There is little doubt that zebu cattle are progressively threatened by disease in more humid regions, however, the exact diseases and factors responsible remain disputed. The colonial regime instituted both tsetse control measures and made available a range of new veterinary medicines. The tsetse control programmes themselves may have opened new pastures or alternatively, the expansion of population in the Middle Belt coincidentally acted to eliminate both the vectors (by hunting out the wild animals) and the forest habitats of the tsetse fly (cut down for agricultural land) (Bourn1983). Pastoralists are constantly exploring new terrain, initially on a seasonal basis. In particular, pastoralists are driven not only by the nutritional needs of their herd but by fear of epizootic and chronic disease, particularly skin problems such as dermatophilosis (Wosu 1989).

Within Nigeria, one of the keys to the gradual insertion of pastoral nuclei in high-rainfall areas is the increasing availability of drugs. To keep their stock alive in the humid areas, herders need access to trypanocides and remedies for skin diseases. Up to the 1980s these were not easily available from traders and the prestige of the veterinary services still sufficiently high as to discourage individual medication of stock. The failure of official sources to supply and administer drugs and the development of a more knowledgeable and streetwise network of traders has both given livestock producers a skepticism about the skills of veterinarians and the confidence to use drugs they buy on the open market. In particular, the 1990s have seen trypanocides that pastoralists can administer directly by pouring on the skin of threatened animals spread rapidly throughout the region, making possible year-round settlement in quite humid areas.

The benefits of keeping cattle alive in humid areas are considerable. The high price of meat in southern towns such as Port Harcourt makes it worthwhile for Fulbe to bring animals by truck to

the edge of the city and fatten them there, even on such marginal grazing as the verges of motorways, by using significant quantities of drugs. This practice has arisen because of the premium price of fat stock, rising transport costs and the economies of scale in herding close to markets. Apart from pastoralists, traders have also realized the potential of the humid zone. There are now recognized locations for 'fattening herds', grassy patches within the forest zone where cattle are fattened for the market.

Azarya opines that pastoralism refers to an economy that is based on raising livestock, which could be undertaken by sedentary or nomadic groups. Nomadism as an integral part of pastoralism refers to the extent of spatial movement of the pastoralist in question. Thus it is generally acknowledged in literature that the question of pastoral production is conceptually different from the extent of residual mobility (Azarya, 1996 in Abba and Usman, 2008). Hence, Mobility is a key feature qualifying pastoralism. The term *nomadic* is used when mobility of pastoralist is high and in irregular patterns; *transhumant* when there are regular back-and-forth movements between relatively fixed locations (Antonio, 2009).

Researchers have emphasized that it is possible to have a multi-resource pastoralism, that is, mobile groups who may combine cultivation, hunting, gathering, sale of labour as well as livestock herding. Pastoralism, on its part, involves management of domesticated animals from which food is extracted and it can also be carried out from a fixed location. While nomadism and pastoralism are not necessarily mutually inclusive, it is important to note that nomadism represents an integral social political and environmental dimension of pastoralism (Abba and Usman, 2008).

Pastoralism is therefore an economic and social system well adapted to dry land conditions and characterized by a complex set of practices and knowledge that has permitted the maintenance of

a sustainable equilibrium among pastures, livestock and people (Antonio, 2009). Today there are nearly 200 million pastoralists in the world generating income where conventional farming is limited or not possible (Antonio, 2009).

Pastoralism, as shown in this study focuses on the activities of the Fulani Herdsmen. Basically, they are a nomadic group that moves from one place to the other in search of grazing field for their livestock. As witnessed in recent times, due to climate change and desertification in the core northern region of the country, they have tended to migrate to other parts of the country. The north central zone and Plateau state in particular is one of their preferred locations. Whenever they find a fertile land and friendly environment, as in plateau state, they tend to engage in multi-resource ventures. Such ventures include cultivation of crops, livestock herding, hunting etc., which makes them become sedentary (not migrating).

## **2.5 Economic Effects of the Fulani Herdsmen-Crop Producers Clashes**

These conflicts have exacted a heavy humanitarian toll with thousands killed and tens of thousands displaced. Some estimates suggest about 2,500 were killed country-wide in 2016 – a toll higher than that caused by the Boko Haram insurgency over the same period. In Benue, one of the hardest-hit states, Governor Samuel Ortom reports more than 1,878 people were killed between 2014 and 2016.

Tens of thousands also have been displaced. From January 2015 to February 2017, at least 62,000 people were displaced in Kaduna, Benue and Plateau states; in the absence of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, most seek shelter in other poor, rural communities, straining their already scarce resources. The fear of conflict alone can drive residents to relatively more secure urban and semi-urban areas.

Since both authorities and donors often ignore these conflicts, affected localities receive far less support from the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and international agencies than those impacted by the Boko Haram insurgency. For women and girls, the impact is frequently magnified. The relatives of men killed in the violence often evict widows from their farmland. Moreover, post-conflict economic and social disenfranchisement renders women and girls even more vulnerable to sexual and economic predation.

The economic toll has also been huge. According to a 2015 study, the federal government was losing \$13.7 billion in revenue annually because of herder-farmer conflicts in Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa and Plateau states.

It is noted that on average these four states lost 47 per cent of their internally-generated revenues. In March 2017, Benue state Governor Samuel Ortom asserted that attacks by herders coming from more northerly states, and possibly also from Cameroon and Niger, had cost his state N95 billion (about \$634 million at that time) between 2012 and 2014.

Communities and households also pay a heavy price. The ethnic Nzor-Tiv Global Association estimated its Agatu communities in Benue state lost N65 billion in property (\$204 million) during the early 2016 herder attacks. (CGA 2017)

The loss of large cattle herds, crops (due to population displacements and damage to irrigation facilities), as well as increases in transport and labour costs in post-conflict environments all increase poverty and food insecurity in affected communities – and beyond.

The conflicts, particularly herder attacks on farming communities, have spawned dangerous political and religious conspiracy theories. One is that the attacks are part of a longer-term Fulani plot to displace indigenous populations and seize their lands. Among Christian communities, herder attacks are widely seen as a subtle form of jihad.

In March 2016, the prelate of the Methodist Church of Nigeria, Dr Samuel Uche, said: “We are aware there is a game plan to Islamize Nigeria, and they are using the Fulani herdsmen to initiate it”. In the south east, Biafra separatist groups describe the attacks as part of a northern plot to overwhelm the peoples of the south and forcefully convert them to Islam.

Some southerners accuse President Buhari of deliberately failing to stop herder aggression, pointing to his pastoral Fulani background and his position as life patron of the cattle breeders’ association, (MAC-BAN), to buttress their charges.

These charges are not supported by any solid evidence, but they are aggravating inter-faith distrust and undermining the country’s fragile unity. The Sultan of Sokoto, Mohammed Sa’adAbubakar III, spiritual head of Nigerian Muslims and a prominent Fulani, has repeatedly stressed that Fulani herdsmen who kill should be prosecuted as criminals and even terrorists, but many remain unconvinced in a country with deep inter-faith suspicions.

Communities in the middle belt and south have formed self-defense vigilante groups, some of which have threatened organised reprisals. In March 2014, Leonard KarshimaShilgba, an ethnic Tiv academic and thought leader, warned that if the federal government could not stop the attacks, “the Tiv people would also demonstrate that they equally have the right and also the capacity to raise a standing army of thousands from each ward and kindred”.

Following an April 2016 attack on Nimbo, in Enugu state in the south east, the separatist Movement for Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) ordered “Fulani herdsmen to leave Biafra land or ... face our wrath”. In May 2016, Ekiti state Governor AyodeleFayose warned of possible attacks on Fulani herdsmen if their alleged predatory behaviour vis-à-vis locals continued.

And the president of the Christian Association of Nigeria, Reverend Olasupo Ayokunle, warned: “If the government fails to stop the provocation by the Fulani (herdsmen), they should be prepared for war. No ethnic group has a monopoly of violence and no ethnic group should be a monster to others”. To date, these reprisals against northern herders have not materialised. But signs are ominous. The interplay of herders’ attacks on farming communities and inflammatory rhetoric by ethnic and Christian leaders in the south could spark even more violence. The geographic spread or escalation of the conflicts could put Nigeria’s military and other security forces under greater stress, diverting the resources they need for operations against Boko Haram in the north east, militants in the Niger Delta and other security challenges. (CGA 2017)

There may also be wider regional implications. A major confrontation involving Fulani herders could draw in their brethren from beyond Nigeria. A retired Nigerian military officer told Crisis Group that the Fulani could mobilise support, including fighters, from several West and Central African countries, which would worsen the security situation in two already fragile regions.

As a result of the growing fears of insecurity in the country fuelled by lack of stable supply and rising food prices, prices of essential commodities and food products have skyrocketed making them unaffordable to the common man, caused by well-meaning but seemingly impractical policies of the federal government in these segments. Prices of rice, for instance, has been hitting historic highs of N12, 500 per bag, triggering a panic amongst the people across the country. Persistent increase in prices of other staple products such as fish, bread, meat, cereals, chicken, yam, onions, beans, vegetable oil, tomatoes, groundnut oil and others have aggravated the continued woes of the common man.

Shortage of products and ever-increasing prices has created unsettling sentiments across communities, dampening the country’s efforts to end poverty. There are estimates that more than

65 per cent of the Nigerian population is food insecure (Osagie, 2013). Nowadays, soaring food prices in major cities across the Nigerian states are being reported with adverse impact on household budgets. The Boko Haram insurgency in the North-east and pockets of conflicts in some states where basic food items for the nation come from are making food commodity prices to rise for a range of foodstuffs, from beef to fruits and vegetables, thus squeezing consumers still struggling with modest wages.

It is apparent to posit that the Northern region of the country has remained a major source of food supply to other parts of the country, especially the South. To be sure, about 90 per cent of food items consumed in Lagos and other South-west states come from the North. For example, Ketu, Mile 12 and Oyingbo markets in Lagos, all get supplies from the North on a daily basis as countless trucks are seen unloading quantities of onions, tomatoes, pepper, fruits, potatoes, yams, vegetables and the likes at these markets.

But this is no longer the case as the general insecurity in the Northern part of Nigeria is adversely affecting farmers in the area. Fewer trucks now come down to the South these days, because of the crisis and this is its effects on prices of food. The effects of the crisis in the North is already being felt, not only by the consumers but the traders as well who depend on supplies from the North for their business. Expectedly, the cost of foodstuffs, especially pepper and tomatoes has hit the roof. Housewives now complain that N500.00 worth of pepper for instance is no longer enough for a pot of soup for a family of four. While transporters are afraid to go to the North because of insecurity, Northern farmers are groaning too as traders from the South have not been going up North to buy the produce. Most crop farmers and those dealing in livestock in the North are fleeing their land en masse and migrating to neighbouring countries because of the crisis.

In September 2013, the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) had warned that Sahel States in Northern Nigeria as are faced with severe food insecurity. The release mentions, “Poor families have used up their food stocks and are facing high food prices awaiting the next harvest.”

Alarmingly, it points out that over 1.4 million children in the region are at risk of severe malnutrition in 2013. In certain products regrettably, the country’s ambitious Agricultural Transformation Agenda (ATA) seems to have been hijacked by unscrupulous operators across the country’s borders.

According to released World Bank’s Food Price Watch, (2014), Food price hike can be responsible for the origination and continuation of conflict and, more generally, political instability.

Increasing empirical evidence shows that international food prices and the domestic pass through to local markets of these international prices has a significant role in all types of conflict, from interstate wars to civil wars, regime breakdowns, and communal violence.

The World Bank reports that in 51 riots in 37 countries over the last eight years, food was the principal consideration. In the February 2008 food riot in Cameroon, for example, between 24 and 100 individuals were killed and 1,671 were arrested in riots that reportedly paralyzed the capital. The riot was triggered by frustrations over rising food and fuel costs. In Buenos Aires in 2012, teenagers ransacked and robbed working-class neighborhood grocery stores in rioting that left 22 dead and more than 200 injured. In 2009, 20 people were trampled to death in a food riot in Pakistan. And as Nigerian farmers in the North are having difficulty accessing their farms owing to insurgency in that part of the country coupled with climate change effect on agriculture produce, there may be reason for fear of the unknown.

Since the livelihood and predominant occupation of the affected people is farming, these crises have affected food production in the states. For instance In 2011 when the coordinated attacks began in Gwer West, Guma, Makurdi, AgatuKwande and Logo Local Government Areas, most farmers who produced large crops annually which had earned h sate the acronym, 'Food Basket of the nation' have either been exterminated or displaced.

The situation has grossly reduced the level of food production and as well the activities of small-scale entrepreneurs in the affected areas. Farmers, artisans, as well as businessmen who are supposed to be in their farms to tend their crops or look after their businesses have been forced out of their residents by the insurgents, thereby pushing the state to the precipice of famine, poverty and crime.

With sustained violence in the northern part of the country and climate change, major cities like Enugu, Port Harcourt, Ibadan and Lagos are getting food price shocks as rising food prices bite into household budgets.

The nation is also reeling from the severe impact caused by the Boko Haram and Fulani-farmers activities. It has been reported that in Borno, MuhammedNamadi, the Borno State Farmers Association chairman said: "Hundreds of farmers have been killed or forced to abandon rice and other crops ready for harvesting or just planted" (The Sun editorial,2014:14).

He spoke in Maiduguri, the Borno state capital and a former insurgent stronghold. Without immediate relief, farmers in Borno, who already live with abject poverty, insecurity and isolation, could also face widespread hunger. "We have suffered a great deal as farmers in the last three years," Namadi said, asking the state to provide farmers with money and equipment. "Many young and old farmers have been forced to leave their farms." Nearly 20,000 farmers have been driven from their land by both the insurgency and the military crackdown since then

Nigerian President Good luck Jonathan in May 2014 declared a state of emergency in Borno and two other northeastern states, according to the Borno state agriculture commission. Entire villages have been cut off from their farmlands by military roadblocks and insurgents increasingly operate in the countryside.

In June 2014, the Chad Basin Development Authority reported that 10,000 hectares (24,700 acres) of rice paddies had been abandoned at the peak of harvesting season. Large-scale investments made into the farming and milling industries by private businesses are also jeopardy, following Customs' inability to protect the industry from the vagaries of smugglers.

Small farmers consume most of the paddy produced in the nation on a sustenance basis. Several rice mills in the country have been fully or partially shut down due to lack of paddy supply, leading to unemployment and mounting losses for the entrepreneurs. These include Olam Nigeria, Ebonyi Agro Industries Limited, Ashi, Mewa, and Umza rice processing mills, and Popular Foods (Ekah, et.al, 2014).

Combined with persistent constraints, from fiscal to physical, Nigeria's dependence on agriculture results in food insecurity for large sectors of the population, particularly the urban poor (Singer, 1997). Population growth has also been linked to food insecurity. The current population of the Horn of Africa (HOA), currently at over 100 million, has doubled since 1974 and is expected to increase by 40% by 2015. The increase is putting intense pressure on scarce natural resources and has resulted in growing urban migration. Despite this, vulnerable people experiencing food insecurity live primarily in rural areas. They have little political leverage, live in scattered and difficult to reach rears, and are left to deal with extreme climate conditions and a fragile ecosystem (Eme, et.al, 2014).

The Search for Common Ground (SCG) has said that Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa and Plateau states are losing 47 percent internally-generated revenue annually to farmers and herdsmen conflicts.

The organization's Research Fellow Dr. Chris Kwaja, stated this in Abuja while presenting a draft at a Technical Validation Meeting on "Implications of Open-Grazing Laws on Relations between Farmers and Herdsmen in the Middle Belt Region of Nigeria".

Kwaja said that the data was provided by a research the group conducted in collaboration with former Head of State, Gen. AbdulsalamiAbubakar's Institute for Peace and Sustainable Development Studies (AAIPSDS)

"In fact, challenges relating to access to and control of natural resources such as water, arable land, obstruction of traditional grazing routes, livestock theft and crop damage are the issues that trigger the conflicts. The most affected states are in Nigeria's middle belt – Benue, Kaduna, Nassarawa, Plateau and Taraba. It was estimated that the Nigerian Government loses 13.7 billion dollars annually as a result of conflicts between farmers and herders in these states," Kwaja said.

According to him the fragile relations between farmers and herdsmen were having a direct impact on the lives and livelihoods of those involved, and that it had also disrupted and threatened the sustainability of food and livestock production in the country.

While saying that one of the profound responses to the lingering conflict was the enactment of a law against open grazing which Benue adopted on November 1, he said that the rationale for the law was to curb the menace of destruction of farmlands, attacks on farmers and threats against food security and development in a state.

He however noted that the passing of the law in Benue which was already having ripple effects in Nasarawa, Kaduna, Plateau and Taraba was met with resistance by herdsmen because they view it as discriminatory. (Daily Trust 2/2/2018)

## **2.6 Theoretical Framework**

One of the challenges facing the researchers is the difficulty in relating to and understanding the role and importance of theory in research. Consequently, the concept of theory necessitates some clarification. In this regard, Verma and Malick (1999) as well as Blumberg, Cooper and Schindler (2011) are of the opinion that the main role of theory is to help and guide the researcher. In the social sciences, it usually implies a set of statements describing and explaining the relationship between human behaviour and the factors that affect or explain it. To rephrase Best and Khan (2006), a theory could best be described as an attempt to develop a general explanation for some phenomenon. More specifically, a theory, according to these authors, defines non-observable constructs that are inferred from observable facts and events, and are thought to have an effect on the phenomenon under study. It further implies that a theory describes the relationship among key variables for explaining a current state or predicting future concurrences.

Thus, one could easily come to the conclusion that a theory is primarily concerned with providing an explanation; and that it therefore focuses on determining cause-and-effect relationships. On the whole a theoretical framework, consequently, helps the researcher summarise any previous information and to guide the future course of action. Simultaneously, the formulation of a theory may indicate missing ideas or links and the additional data required to fully understand how things are connected, and to establish sets of propositions or generalisations (Henning *et al.*, 2004).

A theory is thus an essential tool of research for stimulating the advancement of knowledge (Inglis & Maclean, 2005, Kawulich, 2009). Theory should, consequently, drive the research process and should provide a framework for action and for understanding.

Apart from a proper understanding of the concept of theory, the researcher also requires an understanding and knowledge of the related research philosophies that underpin the different principles of the research. In this study, the research conflict theory would be employed in explaining conflict between the farmers and the herders.

### **2.6.1 Realistic group conflict theory**

The first systematic attempt of going beyond the individual level approach to explain prejudice and discrimination came to us in the 1960s, by the hand of Muzafer Sherif (1966). In his theorizing of intergroup conflict, he claimed that social groups relate to each other in terms of functional relations and thus, are interdependent. The author also assumes that groups set up goals for themselves and strive to achieve them. When two or more groups are positively interdependent or their goals do not interfere with the other groups' goals, relations can be cooperative and positive. However, when different groups set the same goals for themselves, their interdependence becomes incompatible and competition rises. This competition over scarce resources (be them natural, territorial, wealth or power related) can create antagonist relations and thus impel divergence amongst the groups, which could lead to violence and conflict (Sherif, 1966).

This theory has received much empirical support and the famous Robbers Cave experiments are the primordial example of applicability of the theory. In these experiments (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961), they use a summer camp setting, in which they divided 22 boys into two groups and created a context in which the goals of both groups would be conflicting.

This lead, as expected, to hostility and conflict between both groups. Later on, however, they were given goals that, to be fulfilled, required the cooperation between the two groups. This superordinate goal was then able to unite both groups and create positive and cooperative intergroup relations.

Drawing from the previous points, we can conclude that groups with conflicting interests will become antagonistic in relation to each other when they cannot fulfill their goals and desires in interdependence. This theory thus claims that instrumental reasons lie at the heart of intergroup conflict and, once these negative instrumental factors disappear, intergroup relations will become peaceful. The group realistic conflict theory has the following assumption

1. When two or more groups are positively interdependent or their goals do not interfere with the other groups' goals, relations can be cooperative and positive.
2. When different groups set the same goals for themselves, their interdependence becomes incompatible and competition rises.
3. Competition over scarce resources (be them natural, territorial, wealth or power related) can create antagonist relations and thus impel divergence amongst the groups, which could lead to violence and conflict

From the assumptions of the theory we can say that the theory helps in explaining why the crises happen between the crop producers and herders in Barkinladi, looking at the second assumption of the theory 'competition over scarce resources (be them natural, territorial, wealth or power related) can create antagonist relations and thus impel divergence amongst the groups, which could lead to violence and conflict' cattle rustling causes scarcity of cattle to the farmers and destruction of farm produce also causes scarcity of crop, hence it these two factors cause crises between the two groups.

The third assumption of the theory ‘When different groups set the same goals for themselves, their interdependence becomes incompatible and competition rises’ also explain why crises ensues between the two groups because have the same goals of protecting their farmlands or their herds.

### **2.6.2 Criticism of the theory**

The event at Robbers Cave mimicked the kinds of conflict that plaque people all over the world. The simplest explanation for this conflict is competition. Assign strangers to groups, throw the groups into competition, stir the pot, and soon there is conflict.

There is a lot of evidence that when people compete for scarce resources (e.g. jobs, land) there is rise in hostility between groups. The study was a field experiment which means it has ecological validity.

However the Robbers Cave study is been criticized on number of issues. For example, the two groups of the boys for the study were artificial, as was the competition, and did not necessarily reflect real life.

Another shortfall of the theory is on the ethical issue, the participants were deceived, as they did not know the true aim of the study. Also, participants were not protected from physical and psychological harm. Nor the result should be generalized to real life because the research only used 12 year old white middle class boys and excluded, for example, girls and adults.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 Area of Study**

#### **3.2 BarkiLadi Local Government Area**

BarkinLadi (or BarkinLadi) is a Local Government Area in Plateau State, Nigeria. Its headquarters is in the town of BarkinLadi at 9°32'00"N 8°54'00"E. It has an area of 1,032 km<sup>2</sup> and a population of 175,267 at the 2006 census. Plateau state Polytechnic is Located in this town. The postal code of the area is 932. Languages spoken in BarkinLadi are Berom, Foron, Gashish Hausa and Fulfulde. The local government has five district which include Gashis, Ropp, Haypan, Pan and Foron, the local borders ManguBokkosRiyom Jos South and Jos East.

BarkinLadi Local Government Area of Plateau State is one of the oldest known local government areas in the state that has been engulfed with the challenges of conflicts. The conflicts in the area are diverse and mostly cut across the ethnic and religious divide (Cinjel&Akende, 2015). The Local Government Area which is predominated by the Berom who were mostly referred to as the indigenes are mostly Christians. Other settlers groups such as the Fulani and Hausa speaking groups are also living in the local government area.

The aforementioned groups are characteristically Muslims by religious profession (Sanni, 2016). There is also the presence of other neighboring ethnic groups such as the Mwaghavul, Ron, Mupun, Ngas and a lot of others.

#### **3.3 Subsistence Systems on the Plateau**

The farming systems of Plateau State are dominated by rain-fed cultivation, but vegetables are grown on the damp soils exposed in the dry season in the volcanic crater lakes of the Plateau.

The Plateau used to have a very distinctive agriculture based on the production of two cereals in particular, fonio (*acha*) and iburu, which are uncommon elsewhere in Africa (Portères, 1955). Davies (1946) conducted a comprehensive survey of the Gyel area, inhabited by the Berom people, which showed that some 60% of the total land surface was used for farming, with fonio the dominant crop. Fonio gives good yields on eroded soils and its Stover is recognised as an important feed for stock. Other crops grown include sorghum, millet, maize, iburu, yams, cocoyam, sweet potatoes, Irish potatoes and a variety of vegetables, both local and exotic. Livestock are dwarf cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, chickens, ducks and turkeys. A distinctive feature of farming on the Plateau is the use of *keraana*, (cactus) a spiny euphorbia, as live fencing, which makes an effective barrier to the entry of livestock into cropped fields.

However, the last thirty years has seen a significant change in the farming systems, with important implications for the economy of the Plateau, as well as for the interaction between pastoralists and farmers.

Dry-season, or *lambu*, farming was probably brought to the peri-urban regions of Jos in the mid-1960s by migrants from Hausa land. They initially cultivated vegetables, typically peppers and potherbs, using the *shaduf*lift. At this period, the mine-ponds and river valleys were virtually unused and there was no competition for the land. Shortly afterwards, the dry-season cultivation of sugar-cane and potatoes was introduced, perhaps through agricultural extension. At any rate, in many areas this was remembered as the first impetus towards dry-season gardens. However, the cultivation of vegetables soon became more profitable, as the expatriate population expanded in the 1970s and regional products began to be shipped long distances within Nigeria. Migrant Hausa appeared in greater numbers, but, perhaps surprisingly, many of the settled Fulbe began to buy or rent land and began gardening. Uptake by the indigenous farming populations was much

slower, but by the 1970s it had begun in villages close to Jos. Since then it has been gradually spreading throughout the Plateau, with remoter communities only adopting it in the late 1990s. A major change in the production system occurred in the early 1980s when small pumps for lifting water became available. These were distributed by the ADPs in Bauchi but seem to have been available on the open market in Jos. Even those who could not afford pumps hired them from entrepreneurs thereby expanding then potential size of plots and making possible large-scale commercial market-gardening. With the growth of Abuja in the 1990s the market for vegetables was stimulated still further, making almost all riverine plots extremely valuable.

Another quite different change was the spread of two New World crops, the Irish potato<sup>2</sup> and maize, in the rain fed areas. Maize was known on the Plateau prior to the 1970s but only grown in very small quantities as a garden crop. With the coming of the ADP system in the late 1970s, with hybrid seed and heavily subsidized fertilizer and tractor hire, it became a very attractive crop and many farmers desisted from the traditional fonio, sorghum and millet to plant maize. With the cessation of funding from the IBRD in the early 1990s, subsidies ceased and in many regions farmers reverted to their original cropping system. The spread of the potato is less obvious since it was not heavily promoted by any one agency. Nonetheless, it is perceived as a highly prestigious food, rather like wheat, and farmers able to grow it can often get high prices at the farm gate. From the 1980s onwards, the potato has been the major cash crop in the Bokkos area, SE of Jos. Its cultivation expands every year, but it seems the market is expanding still faster. The typical production system in the Bokkos area is now potato intercropped with maize, a system that depends entirely on fertilizer and is economic only because of the high price of potatoes.

Neither maize nor potatoes produce residues that are either palatable or nutritious for cattle, and as a consequence, the residues have very limited attraction to the herders. Where once the cattle stayed close to the homestead, now they must leave in search of areas where sorghum and millet are still grown, for example around Mangu. The overall pattern is that cattle have little or nothing to contribute in many areas and are regarded more as a nuisance than as potential contributors to soil fertility.

Off the Jos Plateau, the elaborate escarpment farms on the southern edges are a farming system with few parallels elsewhere in Nigeria. The use of terracing and intensive composting to keep hillside farms fertile has been described in some detail by Netting (1968) and Stone (1996). Many of these hill-farms have been abandoned in favour of rain fed plains cultivation of cereals. Findlay (1945) observed that when colonial policy compelled the Dimmuk people to move down to the plains they reverted to slash-and-burn cultivation. In the lowlands, the basis of subsistence is rain-fed cereal cropping, especially of sorghum and maize. Remarkably, dry-season *lambugardening* is very rare and most rivers remain accessible to pastoral herds.

The Fulbe have historically depended on riverine grazing for part of the year and indeed they regarded this as land over which they had some rights. But as more and more land has been turned to gardens, this not only has the effect of blocking access to water for their stock, but reduces the basis for interchange between farmer and herder. Vegetable residues are typically fed to goats and pigs and farmers are not willing to allow Fulbe to enter the plots; indeed they try very hard to exclude the cattle. Effectively, in many areas, Fulbe have accepted that all they can hope to retain are access tracks, and even these are in danger of being encroached. For this reason, herders now only leave the bulk of their herd on the Plateau for a relatively short time every year.

There has thus been a major shift in migratory patterns among pastoralists. They originally established bases on the Jos Plateau because its high-value grasses and presumed their large herds could pass the majority of each wet season there. They began to farm and indeed took on many of the values of their agricultural neighbours. However, as the density of farmed land increased it became necessary for the cattle to spend longer in the dry season grazing areas off the Plateau and only return during a specific window when the rain has fallen but the crops were not yet above ground. As it became more and more difficult to remain on the

Plateau as the wet season advanced, most pastoralists began sending their herds to Bauchi, more particularly the open and still sparsely populated areas off the eastern edge of the Plateau. This also required more labour since the herds had to be managed while in movement for most of the year and thus the pastoralists had to hire increasing numbers of herd boys from other tribes. The situation is now that most herds make a brief visit at the beginning and end of the wet season but essentially live elsewhere for most of the year.

This has had a further impact on other aspects of pastoral production; herd-splitting. Typically, herders split their stock into a milking herd, which stays by the homestead and provides income for women, and nutrition for the household. However, this also has labour costs and pastoralists are finding it increasingly difficult to keep their children at home, an unwanted consequence of improved educational access. As a consequence some herders are now dropping the milk-herd, buying powdered milk and keeping their entire herd in one place. Women have thus lost a significant source of income and are switching to other systems of income generation such as small ruminant keeping.

### **3.4 Sampling Procedure and Sample Size**

The target populations for this study are the cattle herders and crop farmers. The first stage involved the use of simple random sampling in selection of three districts. This selection was based on the frequency of occurrence of crop producers-herder conflict in the local government. These districts selected have recorded frequent clashes between herders and crop producers; these districts are Gashis, Pan and Haipan districts all in BarkinLadi local government of Northern senatorial constituency.

The second stage also involved the use of simple random sampling method in selection of 3 villages from each of the three districts Areas, also based on the frequency of occurrence, making a total of 9 villages. In the case of the herders, due to the nature of their settlement pattern and economic activities, their grazing places, markets and their extended family settlements (*Rugage*) were detected. A total of 21 farmers and 21 cattle herders from each of the 3 communities were selected using simple random sampling method, thus to given a total of 63 crop farmers and 63 cattle herders. The snowball method was used in identifying one respondent that helped the researcher identified the others, on and on. In all, 126 respondents were selected for enumeration by using structured interview.

### **3.5 Sources of Data Collection**

Data for the study is collected from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data was collected using 126 structured interview schedules with the aid of properly trained enumerators and translators and generated data for the study. Information collected includes those based on the socio-economic characteristics of the herdsmen and the farmers, causes of the conflicts, socio economic implication of the conflicts ways of forestalling future occurrence. Respondents for the

study included crop farmers and cattle herders. The selection of these herders was assisted by the list of cattle herders will be based on their location.

### **3.6 Methods of Data Analysis**

The data collected were analyzed using descriptive statistics, specifically, the mean, rating, frequency counts and percentages, which were used to present the data generated for the study which aim to depict the socio-economic effects of herders and crop producers conflict in BarkinLadiLGA in the period under study.

**CHAPTER FOUR**  
**SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CROP PRODUCERS**  
**AND PASTORALISTS CONFLICT IN BARKIN LADI:**  
**DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS**

**4.1 Data Presentation and Analysis**

This chapter presents a detailed analysis and interpretation of the data obtained through the questionnaires administered on the “Conflicts between Farmers and Herders and its effects on Socio-economic development of BarkinLadi Local Government Area of Plateau. The questionnaire was made up of four segments; Bio-data, Causes of the conflict, Socio-economic effects of the conflict and Solutions to the conflict. Each section was specifically designed to obtain unique information from the respondents.

A total of 126 questionnaires were distributed to the respondents. 63 (50.0%) of the questionnaires were administered to Farmers while the other 63 (50.0%) of the respondents were administered to Herders. The questionnaires were administered, the items were properly explained to the respondents and were collected at the spot, thus, yielding a 100.0% return rate. The retrieved questionnaires were analysed using IBM Statistical Package for the Social Sciences® (SPSS) version 21 and Microsoft® Excel 2013 version.

**4.2 Bio-data of the Respondents.**

The first section of the questionnaire is the bio-data section. This section was aimed at obtaining the bio-data of the respondents. This section provides basic information on the respondents and showcases the suitability of the respondents employed for the study. The section contains items such as the age, gender, religion, educational qualification, marital status etc. of the respondents. The responses to the items in this section are presented as frequencies and percentages.

The age range (in years) of the respondents are presented in Table 4.1. 9 (14.3%) of the crop producers were within the range 30 - 39 years, 43 (68.3%) of them were aged between 40 - 49 years, while 9 (14.3%) were aged between 50 - 59 years and 2 (3.2%) were either 60 years or older. On the other hand, 2 (3.2%) Herders were aged between 20 - 29 years, 17 (27.0%) were aged between 30 - 39 years. 34 Herders representing 54.0% of the Herders in this study were aged between 40 - 49 years while 7 (11.1%) and 3 (4.8%) were 50 - 59 years old and 60 years or older. Overall, a total of 77 respondents representing 61.1% of the total respondents in the study were aged 40 - 49 while 26 (20.6%) were aged 30 - 39 years. The lowest fraction of the respondents were aged 20 - 29; in which only 2 (1.6%) respondents fell within this category. This findings agreed with that of Kehinde (2011) and Adebayo and Olaniyi (2008), when they also found out in their research that the two occupation were dominated by youths hence the tendency of crises is high.

**Table 4.1: Age Distribution of the Respondents**

Age (in years)	Crop producers		Pastoralists		Total	
	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)
20-29	0	0.0	2	3.2	2	1.6
30-39	9	14.3	17	27.0	26	20.6
40-49	43	68.3	34	54.0	77	61.1
50-59	9	14.3	7	11.1	16	12.7
60 and Above	2	3.2	3	4.8	5	4.0
Total	63	100.0	63	100.0	126	100.0

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

The gender distribution of the respondents is shown in Table 4.2. Among the crop producers, 58 (92.1%) were males while 5 (7.9%) were females. On the other hand, among the Herders, 61 (96.8%) were males while 2 (3.2%) were females. Overall, 119 (94.4%) of the 126 respondents were males while 7 (5.6%) were females.

**Table 4.2 Distribution of the Respondents According to Gender**

Gender	Crop producers		Pastoralists		Total	
	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Male	58	92.1	61	96.8	119	94.4
Female	5	7.9	2	3.2	7	5.6
Total	63	100.0	63	100.0	126	100.0

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

The religion of the respondents are presented in Table 4.3. All crop producers were Christians while all Herders were of the Islamic faith. Thus, 50.0% of all respondents were Christians while the other 50.0% were Muslims.

**Table 4.3: Distribution of Respondents by Religion**

Religion	Crop producers		Pastoralists		Total	
	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Christianity	63	100.0	0	0.0	63	50.0
Islam	0	0.0	63	100.0	63	50.0
Traditional	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Total	63	100.0	63	100.0	126	100.0

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

The educational qualification of the respondents are presented in Table 4.4. None of the respondents underwent adult education. Of the crop producers, none had nomadic education while 45 (73.8%), 13 (21.3%) and 3 (4.9%) had primary, secondary and tertiary education respectively. On the other hand, 49 (77.8%) 10 (44.4%) and 3 (4.8%) and 1 (1.6%) Herders had nomadic, primary, secondary and tertiary education respectively. Overall, 49 (39.5%) of the total respondents had nomadic education, 55 (44.4%) respondents had primary education. 16 (12.9%) respondents meanwhile had secondary education and only 4 (3.2) respondents had some form of tertiary education, According to Ofuoku and Isife (2009) in their research on farmer-herder conflict in Delta State, educated people are more likely to bring better understanding to issues than Uneducated people. Educated person may likely be more open to dialogue during conflict.

**Table 4.4: Educational Qualification of Respondents**

Education	Crop producers		Pastoralists		Total	
	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Adult	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Nomadic	0	0.0	49	77.8	49	39.5
Primary	45	73.8	10	15.9	55	44.4
Secondary	13	21.3	3	4.8	16	12.9
Tertiary	3	4.9	1	1.6	4	3.2
None of the Above	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Total	61	100.0	63	100.0	124	100.0

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

The ethnicity of the respondents are presented in Table 4.5. Analyses revealed that all the crop producers were Berom by Tribe while all the Cattle Herder were Fulani by tribe. Therefore, the

respondents in the study were made up of 50.0% Berom natives and 50.0% Fulani herders. It is quite evident that the study was carried out in Berom land where most prominent tribes are Berom and Fulani.

Ethnicity may play a significant role in the conflict as noted by Tonah (2006) who stated that, farmer-herder differences are not only seen as resource conflict but are also sometimes represented as ethnic conflict involving the two groups. Since herder and farmer groups have very different values, customs, physical and cultural characteristics, disputes between them are frequently characterized as ethnic conflict.

**Table 4.5: Respondents' Ethnic Groups**

Ethnicity	Crop producers		Pastoralists		Total	
	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Berom	63	100.0	0	0.0	63	50.0
Fulani	0	0.0	63	100.0	63	50.0
Others	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Total	63	100.0	63	100.0	126	100.0

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

Table 4.6 reveals the nationality of the respondents. Analyses revealed that all respondents are Nigerians i.e. all the crop producers are Nigerians and all the Herders are Nigerians

**Table 4.6: Nationality of Respondents**

Nationality	Crop producers		Pastoralists		Total	
	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Nigeria	63	100.0	63	100.0	126	100.0
Others	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Total	63	100.0	63	100.0	126	100.0

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

The duration of stay (in years) of the respondents were investigated. Results revealed that all (100.0%) of the crop producers were born and brought up in the community. On the other hand, among the 63 Herders in this study, 39 (61.9%) have resided in the community for only about 1-5 years, 13 (20.6%) have been resident in the community for about 6-10 years, 5 (7.9%) have been resident in the community for about 11-15 years while 2 (3.2%) have been born and brought up in the community, this also goes with the findings by Kehinde (2011), in a research conducted on crop producers -herder conflict in Kabba/Bunu local government area of Kwara state, herders that lived in the community between 1-4 years were found to be in conflict with crop producers, while those that lived in the area above 8 years had the least frequency of conflict with crop farmers.

**Table 4.7: Respondents' Years of Residence in the Community**

Years	Crop producers		Pastoralists		Total	
	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1 – 5	0	0.0	39	61.9	39	31.0
6 – 10	0	0.0	13	20.6	13	10.3
11 – 15	0	0.0	5	7.9	5	4.0
16 and Above	0	0.0	4	6.3	4	3.2
Born and bred	63	100.0	2	3.2	65	51.6
Total	63	100.0	63	100.0	126	100.0

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

The marital status of the Respondents are presented in Table 4.8. Analysis revealed that 46 (73.0%) of the crop producers are married, 7 (11.1%) are unmarried, 1 (1.6%) is divorced while 9 (14.3%) are widowed. On the other hand, 38 (60.3%) Herders are married, 14 (22.2%) are unmarried, 9 (14.3%) are divorced while 2 (3.2%) are widowed. Overall, 84 (66.7%) of the respondents in this study are married while 21 (16.7%) are unmarried. Furthermore, 10 (7.9%) of the total respondents are divorced while 11 (8.7%) are widows. This means that, majority of the respondents from both groups have at least one dependent, making them economically liable, hence greater tendency to challenge all kind of occupational threats. The marital status corroborates the findings of Kehinde (2011) in his study on socioeconomic and environmental factors influencing farmer-herder conflict in Kabba/Bunu Local Government Area of Kwara State.

**Table 4.8: Marital Status of Respondents**

Marital Status	Crop producers		Pastoralists		Total	
	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Married	46	73.0	38	60.3	84	66.7
Unmarried	7	11.1	14	22.2	21	16.7
Divorced	1	1.6	9	14.3	10	7.9
Widow	9	14.3	2	3.2	11	8.7
Total	63	100.0	63	100.0	126	100.0

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

The total number of wives of the respondents are shown in Table 4.9. Of the 57 crop producers who are married, 56 (98.2%) are married to only one wife while 1 (1.8%) is married to two wives. However, of the 49 Herders who are married, 38 (77.6%) are married to only one wife, 7 (14.3%) are married to two wives, 3 (6.1%) are married to three wives while only 1 (2.0%) is married to four wives. Overall, 94 (88.7%) respondents are married to one wife, 8 (7.5%) are married to two wives while 3 (2.8%) and 1 (0.9%) are married to three and four wives respectively.

**Table 4.9: Number of Wives of Respondents**

No. of Wives	Crop producers		Pastoralists		Total	
	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)
One	56	98.2	38	77.6	94	88.7
Two	1	1.8	7	14.3	8	7.5
Three	0	0.0	3	6.1	3	2.8
Four	0	0.0	1	2.0	1	0.9
Others	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Total	57	100.0	49	100.0	106	100.0

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

The number of children of the respondents is presented in Table 4.10. Of the 57 crop producers who are married, 2 (3.5%) have no children, 46 (80.7%) had 1-5 children and 9 (15.8%) had 6-10 children. On the other hand, only 1 (2.0%) Herder had no child, 34 (69.4%) had 1-5 children, 13 (26.5%) had 6-10 children while only 1 (2.0%) had 11-15 children. Overall, 3 (2.8%) of the married respondents in this study do not have children, 80 (75.5%) had 1-5 children, 22 (20.8%) had 6-10 children while only 1 (0.9%) had 11-15 children. No respondent had 16 children or above.

**Table 4.10: Number of Children of Respondents**

No. of Children	Crop producers		Pastoralists		Total	
	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)
None	2	3.5	1	2.0	3	2.8
1 – 5	46	80.7	34	69.4	80	75.5
6 – 10	9	15.8	13	26.5	22	20.8
11 – 15	0	0.0	1	2.0	1	0.9
16 and Above	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Total	57	100.0	49	100.0	106	100.0

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

The occupation of the respondents are presented in Table 4.11. Results revealed that 63 (50.0%) of the respondents are crop producers while 63 (50.0%) are Herders. The respondents in this study do not have any other occupation other than the two above mentioned.

**Table 4.11: Occupation of Respondents**

Occupation	Crop producers		Pastoralists		Total	
	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Farming	63	100.0	0	0	63	50.0
Cattle rearing	0	0.0	63	100.0	63	50.0
Others	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Total	63	100.0	63	100.0	126	100.0

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

The number of cattle owned by the respondents are presented in Table 4.12. No crop producers owned a herd of cattle. 58 (92.1%) of the Herders owned 1-100 cattle while 5 (7.9%) had 101-200 cattle. In total therefore, 50.0% of the total respondents had no cattle while 58 (46.0%) had 1-100 cattle and 5 (4.0%) had 101-200 cattle. No respondent however had 201-300 cattle nor 301 and above number of cattle. The optimum herd size according to the Fulani in this sample lies between one to one hundred cattle (Iro, 2004). The smaller herd size is due to the activities of cattle rustlers which according to the herders, is posing serious threat to their existence.

**Table 4.12: Respondents' Number of Cattle**

No. of Cattle	Crop producers		Pastoralists		Total	
	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)
None	63	100.0	0	0.0	63	50.0
1-100	0	0.0	58	92.1	58	46.0
101-200	0	0.0	5	7.9	5	4.0
201-300	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
301 and above	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Total	63	100.0	63	100.0	126	100.0

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

The farm sizes of the respondents are presented in Table 4.13. 58 (92.1%) of the crop producers have farmlands of about 1-2 hectares, 4 (6.3%) had farmlands of about 3-4 hectares while 1 (1.6%) had a farmland that was less than a hectare in size. On the other hand, no Herder had a farmland; this corresponds to 50.0% of the total respondents in the study. This may be due to high pressure on land due to increase in population vis-à-vis the traditional land tenure of inheritance, whereby the land is usually divided into pieces and shared among several family

members. The implication is an increase in the tendency of the farmers to encroach more land reserves and cattle tracts, thereby creating room for conflict.

**Table 4.13: Respondent’s Farm Size**

Farm Size	Crop producers		Pastoralists		Total	
	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)
None	0	0.0	63	100.0	63	50.0
Less than 1ha	1	1.6	0	0.0	1	0.8
1-2ha	58	92.1	0	0.0	58	46.0
3-4ha	4	6.3	0	0.0	4	3.2
5-6ha	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
7ha and above	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Total	63	100.0	63	100.0	126	100.0

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

### **4.3 Causes of the Conflict**

The second section of the questionnaire is aimed at determining the causes of the conflicts between the Farmers and the Herders. The items in this section are Likert-scale items ranging from Strongly Disagree (SA) through Undecided to Strongly Agree (SA). The responses are presented as frequencies and percentages.

Responses to items in section B are presented in Table 4.14. A total of 45 (35.7%) respondents strongly agreed that ethnic differences is a cause of the conflicts between the Herders and crop producers. A further 76 (60.3%) respondents further agreed to this proposition while 4 (3.2%) respondents were undecided and 1 (0.8%) respondent disagreed to the proposition that ethnic

differences is a cause of the conflicts. No respondent however strongly disagreed. 54 (42.9%) respondents strongly agreed that religious differences is a cause of the conflicts between the two groups. A further 69 (54.8%) respondents agreed that religious differences while a further 3 (2.4%) were undecided. No respondent however disagreed nor strongly disagreed.

The issues of indigene/settler are a cause of conflicts as reported by a total of 97 (77.0%). A breakdown of this value revealed that 21 (16.7%) of the respondents strongly agreed that the issues of indigene/settler is a cause of conflicts while another 76 (60.3%) agreed to this. However, 16 (12.7%) respondents were undecided on whether issues of indigene/settler causes conflicts. Furthermore, 12 (9.5%) respondents disagreed while 1 (0.8%) respondent strongly disagreed to this.

Cattle rustling has been reported as a cause of conflicts between Farmers and Herder; in fact, a total 115 (91.3%) of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that cattle rustling is a cause of conflicts in the community and no respondent disagreed or strongly disagreed to this proposition. However 11 (8.7%) respondents were undecided. When asked if lack of access to water point is a cause of conflicts, 23 (18.3%) respondents strongly disagreed and a further 49 (38.9%) disagreed that water point is a cause of conflicts. 32 (25.4%) respondents were undecided. However, 19 (15.1%) respondents agreed that lack of access to water point was a cause of conflict and a further 3 (2.4%) of the respondents strongly agreed. 32 (25.4%) out of the 126 respondents strongly agreed that killing of stray animals is a cause of conflicts and a further 69 (54.8%) agreed to this as well. 19 (15.1%) were undecided while 5 (4.0%) respondents disagreed that killing of stray animals is a cause of the conflicts.

Inadequate grazing area is reported to be a cause of conflict by a total of 94 (74.6%) of the respondents. A breakdown of this values showed that 36 (28.6%) respondents strongly agreed

that inadequate grazing area is a cause of conflict while a further 58 (46.0%) agreed to this proposition. However, 23 (18.3%) respondents were undecided while a further 9 (7.1%) respondents disagreed that inadequate grazing areas is a cause of the conflicts. When asked if land encroachment is a cause of crisis between the Farmers and the Herders, 12 (9.5%) respondents strongly agreed that land encroachment is a cause of conflict between the Farmers and the Herders while a further 49 (38.9%) also agreed. On the other hand, 33 (26.2%) respondents were undecided while 27 (21.4%) and 5 (4.0%) respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively.

Indiscriminate bush burning was also reported as a cause of conflict by a combined total 91 (72.3%) respondents; a breakdown of this value showed that 38 (30.2%) of the respondents strongly agreed that indiscriminate bush burning is a cause of conflict and 53 (42.1%) other respondents also agreed. 29 (23.0%) respondents were however undecided on the relationship between indiscriminate bush burning and the observed conflicts. 5 (4.0%) respondents however disagreed that indiscriminate bush burning leads to conflicts between the Herders and the Farmers. Perceived hatred has also be reported as a cause of conflicts by 67 (53.1%) respondents, however, a total of 47 (37.3%) either disagreed or strongly disagreed to this proposition while 12 (9.5%) respondents were undecided on whether the observed conflict is caused by perceived hatred for between the Herders and the Farmers. When asked if crop damage is also a cause of the conflicts, 43 (34.1%) respondents strongly agreed that indeed crop damage by cattle is a cause of the observed conflicts while a further 74 (58.7%) respondents agreed. No respondent disagreed nor strongly disagreed to this item while only 9 (8.1%) were undecided on the relationship between crop by cattle and the observed conflicts between the crop producers and Herders in BarkinLadi Local Government Area of Plateau state.

Disregard for rules and regulation is attributed to be a cause of the reported conflicts by the Farmers and Herders by a total of 75 (59.5%) respondents; a breakdown of this value revealed that 10 (7.9%) respondents strongly agreed that disregard for rules and regulation is a cause of conflict between the Farmers and Herders, while a further 65 (51.6%) also agreed to this. On the other hand, 29 (23.0%) and 5 (4.0%) respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed to this respectively. A further 17 (13.5%) of the respondents were undecided on whether disregard to rules and regulations cause conflicts between the Herders and Farmers.

**Table 4.14: Causes of the conflicts**

<b>Causes</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>D</b>	<b>Un</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>SA</b>	<b>Total</b>
	<b>(%)</b>	<b>(%)</b>	<b>(%)</b>	<b>(%)</b>	<b>(%)</b>	<b>(%)</b>
Ethnic differences	0 (0.0)	1 (0.8)	4 (3.2)	76 (60.3)	45 (35.7)	126 (100.0)
Religious differences	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	3 (2.4)	69 (54.8)	54 (42.9)	126 (100.0)
Issues of indigene/settler	1 (0.8)	12 (9.5)	16 (12.7)	76 (60.3)	21 (16.7)	126 (100.0)
Cattle rustling	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	11 (8.7)	63 (50.0)	52 (41.3)	126 (100.0)
Lack of access to water point	23 (18.3)	49 (38.9)	32 (25.4)	19 (15.1)	3 (2.4)	126 (100.0)
Killing of stray animals	1 (0.8)	5 (4.0)	19 (15.1)	69 (54.8)	32 (25.4)	126 (100.0)
Inadequate grazing areas	0 (0.0)	9 (7.1)	23 (18.3)	58 (46.0)	36 (28.6)	126 (100.0)

Land encroachment	5 (4.0)	27 (21.4)	33 (26.2)	49 (38.9)	12 (9.5)	126 (100.0)
Indiscriminate bush burning	1 (0.8)	5 (4.0)	29 (23.0)	53 (42.1)	38 (30.2)	126 (100.0)
Perceived hatred	8 (6.3)	39 (31.0)	12 (9.5)	57 (45.2)	10 (7.9)	126 (100.0)
Crop damage by cattle	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	9 (7.1)	74 (58.7)	43 (34.1)	126 (100.0)
Disregard to rules and regulation	5 (4.0)	29 (23.0)	17 (13.5)	65 (51.6)	10 (7.9)	126 (100.0)
Lack of justice from government	2 (1.6)	17 (13.5)	20 (15.9)	48 (38.1)	39 (31.0)	126 (100.0)

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

**Key:** SD = Strongly Disagree, D = Disagree, Un = Undecided, A = Agree, SA = Strongly Agree

The size of the grazing areas available in the local government area is presented in Table 4.15. 2 (1.6%) respondents reported that the grazing areas are large enough for the Herders while 121 (96.0%) respondents reported that the grazing areas are too small for grazing while 3 (2.4%) respondents reported that they do not have an idea on the size of the grazing area relative to the number of cattle owned by the Herders.

**Table 4.15: Size of the Grazing Area**

<b>Size</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Large enough	2	1.6
Too small	121	96.0
No idea	3	2.4
Total	126	100.0

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

Table 4.16 presents the abundance or scarcity of grasses available in the grazing area. 35 (27.8%) of the respondents reported that there is abundant grass/fodder in the available grazing area while 84 (66.7%) respondents reported that there are grasses and fodders are scarce in the grazing area and 7 (5.6%) respondent do not have an idea of the abundance of fodder/grasses in the grazing areas.

**Table 4.16: Grasses/fodder in the grazing area**

<b>Size</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Abundant	35	27.8
Scarce	84	66.7
No idea	7	5.6
Total	126	100.0

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

The sufficiency of the public water points in the community is presented in Table 4.17. 56 (44.4%) respondents reported that the public water points present in the community is sufficient for use by Herders and crop producers while 67 (53.2%) respondents reported that the public

water points are insufficient while 3 (2.4%) respondents have no idea on the sufficiency of the public water points.

**Table 4.17: Public water points in the area**

<b>Public Water point</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Sufficient	56	44.4
Insufficient	67	53.2
No idea	3	2.4
Total	126	100.0

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

The factors that hinder free access to these resources (land and water) are presented in Table 4.18. 60 (47.6%) respondents (predominantly Herders) have reported that blocking of access to pasture and water by farmers are a major hindrance to free access to resources while 56 (44.4%) respondents have reported construction of public and private building on grazing areas as hindrance to the resources. 10 (7.9%) respondents however reported that other factors are responsible for hindrance to free access to resources. They reported that factors such as scarcity of water, land, fodder etc. is responsible for hindrance to these resources.

**Table 4.18: Things that hinder free access to these resources**

<b>Hindrance to free access to resources</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Blocking of access to pasture and water by farmers	60	47.6
Construction of public and private building on grazing areas	56	44.4
Others	10	7.9
Total	126	100.0

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

When asked if there are government development plans within the community, 37 (29.4%) respondent reported that there are government development plans within the community while 89 (70.6%) respondents reported that there are no government development plans within the community. This information is presented in Table 4.19.

**Table 4.19: Involvement in Government development plans in the community**

<b>Involvement</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Yes	37	29.4
No	89	70.6
Total	126	100.0

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

The frequency of conflicts between the Farmers and the Herders are presented in Table 4.20. 89 (70.6%) respondents reported that the conflicts occur quite frequently while 37 (29.4%) reported that that conflicts do not occur frequently.

**Table 4.20: Frequency of Conflicts**

<b>Frequency of conflicts</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Frequent	89	70.6
Not frequent	37	29.4
Total	126	100.0

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

When asked if there have been any other cause of conflict other than that which results from cattle herding, 83 (65.9%) respondents reported that there haven't been another cause of conflict between the Herders and the Farmers while 43 (34.1%) respondent said that there have been

other causes of conflict between the Farmers and the **Pastoralists**. This information is depicted in Table 4.21.

**Table 4.21: Apart from disputes resulting from animal rearing, have you ever had any problem with your host community before?**

	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
No	83	65.9
Yes	43	34.1
Total	126	100.0

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

From Table 4.21, 43 (34.1%) respondent reported that conflicts between the Farmer and Pastoralists for reasons other than animal rearing. These other reasons are presented in Table 4.22. 31 (72.1%) of them reported that conflicts do arise from religious crises, 9 (20.9%) reported that conflicts do arise from cultural disharmony while 3 (7.0%) reported that conflicts do arise from other causes such as theft, breakdown of law and order etc.

**Table 4.22: Other Causes of Conflict between Herders and Crop producers**

<b>Other causes of crisis</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Religious crisis	31	72.1
Cultural disharmony	9	20.9
Others	3	7.0
Total	43	100.0

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

#### 4.4 Socio-Economic Effects of the Conflict

The third section of the questionnaire was designed with the aim of understanding the socio-economic effects of the crisis between the Farmers and the **Pastoralists**. Each question in this section was intelligently designed to investigate a particular socio-economic aspect of the Farming and cattle herding. The items in this section are Likert-scale items and responses to these items are presented in Table 4.23.

Crisis always affects the social coexistence of the parties involved and indeed 78 (61.9%) respondents strongly agreed that the crisis has negatively affected their coexistence. A further 41 (32.5%) respondents also agreed that the crisis has affected their coexistence. 7 (5.6%) respondents were however undecided while no respondent disagreed nor strongly disagreed to this item. Crisis always leads to loss of lives and properties. When the Herders were asked, 42 (66.7%) of them strongly agreed that the crisis has affected the number of herds they had and a further 19 (30.2%) of them agreed that the crisis has negatively affected the number of herds they had. On the other hand, 46 (73.0%) Farmers strongly agreed that the crisis had affected the number of food they produced and a further 16 (25.4%) also agreed that the crisis had affected the quantity of food they produced while 1 (1.6%) farmer was undecided.

A total of 121 (96.0%) respondents have reported that the crisis had increased the rate of animosity between the Farmers and the Herders; a breakdown of this value reveals that 58 (46.0%) respondents strongly agreed that the crisis had increased the rate of animosity between the Farmers and the Herders while a further 63 (50.0%) had also agreed to this proposition. 5 (4.0%) respondents were however undecided while no respondent disagreed or strongly disagreed to this item. When responding to the item “social exclusion”, 27 (21.4%) of the respondents strongly agreed that social exclusion is one of the socio-economic effects of the

crisis between the Famers and the Herders, 66 (52.4%) others also agreed while 23 (18.3%) were undecided. Furthermore, 9 (7.1%) respondents disagreed that the conflicts leads to social exclusion while 1 (0.8%) respondents strongly disagreed. Crisis usually leads to breakdown of trust and 63 (50.0%) respondents strongly agreed that the crisis between the Farmers and Herders had led to a breakdown of trust between the Farmers and the Herders, a further 57 (45.2%) agreed to this item while 4 (3.2%) were undecided and 2 (1.6%) respondents disagreed to this item.

**Table 4.23: Socio-Economic Effects of the Conflict**

<b>Socio-economic effects of the conflict</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>D</b>	<b>Un</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>SA</b>	<b>Total</b>
	<b>(%)</b>	<b>(%)</b>	<b>(%)</b>	<b>(%)</b>	<b>(%)</b>	<b>(%)</b>
The crisis affected our social coexistence	0	0	7	41	78	126
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(5.6)	(32.5)	(61.9)	(100.0)
It affected the number of herds I had	0	0	2	19	42	63
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(3.2)	(30.2)	(66.7)	(100.0)
It affected the quantity of food I produced	0	0	1	16	46	63
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(1.6)	(25.4)	(73.0)	(100.0)
It increased the rate of animosity between us	0	0	5	63	58	126
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(4.0)	(50.0)	(46.0)	(100.0)
Social exclusion	1	9	23	66	27	126
	0.8	7.1	18.3	52.4	21.4	100.0
Breakdown of trust	0	2	4	57	63	126
	0.0	1.6	3.2	45.2	50.0	100.0

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

**Key:** SD = Strongly Disagree, D = Disagree, Un = Undecided, A = Agree, SA = Strongly Agree

#### **4.5 Solutions to the Crisis**

The fourth section of the questionnaire was designed to obtain possible solutions to the lingering conflicts between the Farmers and Herders. The section consists of four (4) Likert-scale items and four open ended items. The results of the analyses are presented below.

The responses to the Likert-scale items are presented in Table 4.24, 29 (23.0%) respondents strongly agreed that establishing a RUGA settlement would end the conflict between the Farmers and the Herders, a further 59 (46.8%) respondents agreed that a RUGA settlement would end the conflict. However, 19 (15.1%) respondents were undecided on the RUGA settlement as a means of ending the conflict conflicts. 13 (10.3%) respondents on the other hand disagreed that RUGA settlement would end the crisis between the Farmers and Herders while 6 (4.8%) respondents strongly disagreed. Tolerance has always been preached to warring factions, 32 (25.4%) respondents strongly agreed that tolerating one another would end the conflicts between the Farmers and the Herders and a further 74 (58.7%) respondents agreed that tolerance would end the conflicts. However, 13 (10.3%) respondents were undecided while 6 (4.8%) respondents disagreed and 1 (0.8%) respondent strongly disagreed to this item.

49 (38.9%) respondents strongly agreed that the intervention of security agents would end the conflicts between the Farmers and Herders, a further 66 (52.4%) respondents agreed to this item. 5 (4.0%) respondents were however undecided while 5 (4.0%) and 1 (0.8%) disagreed and strongly disagreed to this item. Fairness of justice was reported by 105 (83.3%) respondents as a possible way of ending the conflicts; a breakdown of this value showed that 26 (20.6%) respondents strongly agreed that the conflicts can be a way of ending the conflicts between the Farmers and Herders while a further 79 (62.7%) respondents agreed to this item. 17 (13.5%)

respondents were however undecided while 3 (2.4%) respondents disagreed and 1 (0.8%) strongly disagreed to this item.

**Table 4.24: Solutions to the Crisis**

<b>Ways of ending the conflicts</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>D</b>	<b>Un</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>SA</b>	<b>Total</b>
	<b>(%)</b>	<b>(%)</b>	<b>(%)</b>	<b>(%)</b>	<b>(%)</b>	<b>(%)</b>
Creation of the RUGA Settlement	6 (4.8)	13 (10.3)	19 (15.1)	59 (46.8)	29 (23.0)	126 (100.0)
Tolerating one another	1 (0.8)	6 (4.8)	13 (10.3)	74 (58.7)	32 (25.4)	126 (100.0)
Through the Intervention of security agents	1 (0.8)	5 (4.0)	5 (4.0)	66 (52.4)	49 (38.9)	126 (100.0)
Through fairness in justice	1 (0.8)	3 (2.4)	17 (13.5)	79 (62.7)	26 (20.6)	126 (100.0)

*Source: fieldwork 2019 May- July*

**Key:** SD = Strongly Disagree, D = Disagree, Un = Undecided, A = Agree, SA = Strongly Agree

Respondent also suggested ways that farmers can play a role in resolving the crisis. Some suggested that Farmers must respect and tolerate the Herders, their cattle and their religious views. Other suggested that Farmers must stop cattle rustling and vandalizing the properties of the Herders as this would reduce the frequency of the clashes.

Respondents have also suggested ways in which Herders can play a role in resolving the crisis between the Herders and Farmers. They have suggested that they should respect and tolerate the Farmers and their religious and ethnic predispositions. The Herders are also encouraged to keep

their cattle under check so as to prevent them from entering farmlands. They are also discouraged from entering farmlands and damaging crops.

#### **4.6 Major Findings**

The study revealed that majority of the farmers are males and only very few are female. In the case of the herders, all the respondents are males.

Majority of the crop farmers were within the age range of 40-49 years, while the largest percentage of the herders cut across 30-39years.

Majority of crop farmers and of cattle herders interviewed had no formal education at all.

More than three quarter of both farmers and herders are married. Most of the herders keep a herd size of less than 100 Cattle due to activities of cattle rustlers.12% within the range of 60-99, while only 12.7% maintain more than 100.

The study also found that the major causes of conflict between crop producers and herders in BarkinLadi LGA is the issue of Cattle rustling which has been reported as a major cause of conflicts between Farmers and Herder; in fact, a total 115 (91.3%) of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that cattle rustling is a cause of conflicts in the community and no respondent disagreed or strongly disagreed to this proposition, however A total of 45 (35.7%) respondents strongly agreed that ethnic differences is a cause of the conflicts between the Herders and crop producers.

#### **4.7 Contributions to Knowledge**

1. We found that from the research that cattle rustling is the major causative agents of farmers/Herders conflicts in the study area unlike on other part where the causes are different, therefore increases our knowledge in that regard.

2. The research also established that creation of RUGA settlement would end the conflict between the Farmers and the Herders, now, our knowledge has been increased in that aspect

## CHAPTER FIVE

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Summary

The study was conducted in BarkinLadi LGC, State. In all, 126 respondents (63 crop farmers and 63cattle herdsman) were selected for enumeration by use of interview Schedule using structured interview schedules in form of questionnaire. The data collected were analyzed using mean, frequency counts, percentages, ratings and Likert scale, while logistic regression model was used as inferential statistics.

Major findings of the studies revealed that majority of the farmers are males and only very few are female. In the case of the herders, all the respondents are males.

Majority of the crop farmers were within the age range of 40-49 years, while the largest percentage of the herders cut across 30-39years.

Majority of crop farmers and of cattle herders interviewed had no formal education at all.

More than three quarter of both farmers and herders are married. Most of the herders keep a herd size of less than 60 Cattle due to activities of cattle rustlers.12% within the range of 60-99, while only 12.7% maintain more than 100.

#### 5.2 Recommendation

1. Agents of the farmers and herdsman should be conveyed under a public forum and involved in the decision making and allowed to take part actively in the planning procedure of returning of peace to most of the affected communities
2. Participatory planning process that involves all stakeholders (herdsman and farmers) in the dispute resolution mechanism should be approved.

3. Ranching method of cattle rearing should be adopted at rearing location across the area while the herdsmen should be given needed training for effective and efficient management of the ranching.
4. There is need for proper re-orientation of the essence of social interaction irrespective of the religious and ethics background
5. Government should end the activities of the rustlers, else the crisis would continue.
6. Government should steadfast in implementing its policies of the creation of RUGA settlement as suggested by most of the respondents.

### **5.3 Conclusion**

The research explores the social and economic effects of the conflict between crop producers and Herdsmen in BarkinLadi LGA Plateau State. It can be concluded that the causes of the conflict are the issues of cattle rustling, ethno religious differences and sometimes destructions of farms produce by the herders. The social effect of the Farmers – Herdsmen conflict are, reduction in quality of social relationship, reduction of social support, while the economic effect of the Farmers – Herdsmen conflict are reduction in output and income of farmers/herders, loss of produce in storage, social exclusion, scarcity of agricultural products, reduction in the number of herds own by herders.

It was further concluded that crop producers and herders perception of the causes of conflict between Herdsmen and crop producers conflict in BarkinLadi LGA are not different while crop produce and Fulani perception of the social effects and economic effects of Herdsmen and crop producers clashes in the area are different.

## REFERENCES

- Abba, G.S. & Usman, A.T. (2008). Farmer-Pastoralist Conflict in West Africa: Exploring the causes and consequences. *Information, Society and Justice*.
- Abdulkadir, B. M. (2011). NEMA move to ends farmers-pastoralists clashes. In Daily Trust of 10<sup>th</sup> October available at <http://www.dailytrustnews> retrieved on 1stDecember, 2011.
- Adamu, A. (2011). Fulani pastoralists, farmers' clash return to Jigawa. In: Nigerian Tribune Newspaper Sunday, 27 November. Available at <http://www.sundaytribune.news> and retrieved on 1stDecember, 2011
- Adebayo, Akanmu G. (1997) Contemporary Dimensions of Migration among Historically.
- Adebayo, O. and Olaniyi, A. (2008). Factors Associated with Pastoral and Crop Farmers Conflict in Derived Savannah Zone of Oyo State Nigeria, in *Journal of Human Ecology*, 23
- Aliyu, C.(2015). Under development in developing Countries. London: Longman Group.
- Anderson, S. (2016). The impact of ethnic conflict in Nigeria. Ibadan: John Archers
- Antonio, R. & Silva, S, (2009). *Livestock and pastoralists*. Livestock Thematic Papers. International Fund for African Development (IFAD).
- Arditi, Claude (1997) Paysans Sara eteleveursArabesdans le sud du Tchad: du conflict a la cohabitation? L'hommeetl'animaldans le bassin du lac Tchad, Orleans, 1997.
- Awogbade, M. (1987).Grazing Reserves in Nigeria.Nomadic Peoples. No 23.
- Awogbade, M.O. (1983). Fulani Pastoralism: Jos Case Study. Zaria: ABU Press.
- Azarya, AnnekeBreedveld, Mirjam De Bruin, and Han Van Dijk, Eds. The Netherlands: Brill.
- Azarya, Victor (1996). Nomads and the state in Africa: the political roots of marginality. Aldershot: Avebury.
- B, Kawulich and C, Wagnee (2009), Research method in social sciences.Routledge publication
- Barrot, Pierre (1992) Farmers vs. Herders: Conflict Erupts. Club du Sahel Newsletter 12
- Bassett, Thomas J. (1986) Fulani Herd Movements. *Geographical Review* 26
- Beeler, Sabrina (2006) Conflicts between Farmers and Herders in North-western
- Benjaminsen, Tor A., and Boubacar Ba 2009 Farmer-Herder Conflicts, Pastoral Marginalization.

- Blench, R. & Dendo, M (2003). The transformation of Conflict between Pastoralist and Cultivators in Nigeria. *Journal Africa, ed. Moritz.*
- Blench, R. & Dendo, M (2003). The transformation of Conflict between Pastoralist and Cultivators in Nigeria. *Journal Africa, ed. Moritz.*
- Blench, R. & Dendo, M. (2003). *Access rights and conflict over common pool Resources on the Jos Plateau, Nigeria.* Report to World Bank/UNDP/DFID-JEWEL (Jigawa Enhancement of Wetlands Livelihoods Project).
- Blench, R. (2004). National resources conflict in North-Central Nigeria: A handbook and case studies. MallamDendo Ltd.
- Blench, R. and Dendo, M. (2003). "The transformation of conflict between pastoralists and cultivation in Nigeria". Paper in press for the Journal Africa.
- Blench, R.M. (1997). Neglected species, livelihoods and biodiversity in difficult areas: how should the public sector respond? Natural Resource Perspective Paper 23. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Blench, R.M. (1999). Traditional livestock breeds: geographical distribution and dynamics in relation to the ecology of West Africa. ODI Working Paper 122. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Bonkat, L. (2015). *Surviving in a conflict environment: Market women and changing socioeconomic relations in Jos Nigeria 2001-2010.* BIGSAS, Bayreuth University.
- Braukämper, Ulrich (2000). Management of Conflicts over Pastures and Fields among the Baggara Arabs of the Sudan Belt.
- Breusers, Mark, Suzanne Nederlof, and Teunis van Rheenen 1998 Conflict or Symbiosis? Disentangling Farmer-Herdsman Relations: The Mossi and the Fulbe of the Central Plateau, Burkina Faso. *Journal of Modern African Studies.*
- Burnham, Philip (1980). Opportunity and Constraint in a Savanna Society: The Gbaya of Meiganga, Cameroon. London: Academic Press.
- CHOŁAJ H., (1998). Transformacja systemowa w Polsce. Szkic teoretyczny. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu M. Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin.
- Cinjel, N. & Akende, J. (2015). Ethno-religious conflict in Barkin Ladi Local Government of Plateau state. *Nigeria Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 4.*
- Cooper, L. & Narangerel, G. (1993). Liberalisation in the Mongolian pastoral economy and its impact within the household: a case study of Arkhangai and Dornogobi provinces. PALD Research Report, 8. IDS, Sussex.

Corruption: A Case Study from the Inland Niger Delta of Mali. *Geographical Journal* 175  
Crisis Group Africa Report N°252, 19 September 2017

Dafinger, Andreas, and Michaela Pelican (2006) Sharing or Dividing the Land? Land Rights and Herder-Farmer Relations in Burkina Faso and Northwest Cameroon. *Canadian Journal of African studies* 40

Danladi, U. (2017). An exposition to the causes of under-development in developing countries. London: Prentice and Hall

De Haan, Leo, Antje van Driel, and AnneteeKruithof (1990) From Symbiosis to Polarization: Peasants and Pastoralists in Northern Benin. *The Indian Geographical Journal* 65

Diallo, Youssouf (1999). Dimensions socialesetpolitiques de l'expansionpastorale en zone semi-humideivorienne. In *Pastoralists Under Pressure: Fulbe Societies Confronting Change in West Africa*.

Diez, Thomas, Albert, Mathias and Stetter, Stephan (eds), *European Integration and Conflict Transformation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.

Diez, Thomas, Stetter, Stephan. & Albert, Mathias (2006) 'the European Union and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration.

E.E and Ebere, O. (Ed).*The management of national question in Nigeria*. Ibadan: John Archers

Fritz, J.M. (2004). Social and Economic Development.*Encyclopedia of Life of Live Support*

Fritz, J.M. (2004). Social and Economic Development.*Encyclopedia of Life of Live Support System (EOLSS UNESCO)*, Vol. 1.

Galaxy, J.G. and P. Bonte eds. 1991. *Herders, warriors and traders: Pastoralism in Africa*. Boulder: Westview Press

Gausset, Quentin (2005) *Agro-pastoral Conflicts in the Tika Plain (Adamawa, Cameroon)*. In *Beyond Territory and Scarcity: Exploring Conflicts over Natural Resource Management*. Quentin Gausset, Michael A. White, and Torben Birch-Thomsen, Eds.

Hagberg, Sten (1998) *Between Peace and Justice: Dispute Settlement between Karaboro Agriculturalists and Fulbe Agro-pastoralists in Burkina Faso*. Uppsala, Sweden: Department of Cultural Anthropology and Ethnology.

Harshbarger, Camilla 1995 *Farmer-Herder Conflict and State Legitimacy in Cameroon*. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida.

Hartmann, Betsy 2001 *Will the Circle Be Unbroken: A Critique of the Project on Herders against Farmers: Nigeria's expanding Deadly Conflict*

- Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. (1999). *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Hopen, C.E. (1958). *The pastoral Fulbe Family in Gwandu*. London: Oxford University Press for IAI.
- <http://www.oneworld.org/odi/publications/wp122>.
- Hussein, Karim, James Sumberg, and David Seddon 2000 Increasing Violent Conflict between Herders and Farmers in Africa: Claims and Evidence. *Development Policy Review* 17(4)
- Ibrahim, M., Abdurrahman, B.I. & Umar M.B. (2015).An assessment of farmer Pastoralist conflict in Nigeria using GIS.*International Journal of Engineering Science Invention*,
- Ibrahim, M., Adesiji, G. B., Tyabo, I. S., Umar I. S., Ndanitsa M.A, and Abdullazeez, A. (2014).Extent of Extension Service Delivery for Agro-Pastoralists in Niger State, Nigeria. *Research Journal on Humanities and Social Sciences*
- Information and Development Agency, the Governor's Office.Retrieved from [www.plateaustate.gov.ng/page/history](http://www.plateaustate.gov.ng/page/history).Accessed on 06.11.2016.
- Johnson, O.(2000). *Planning the city to mitigate urban violence*.Ibadan: IFRA
- Kabba-Bunu Local Government Area of Kogi State, Nigeria. An unpublished Phd. Dissertation submitted to Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.
- Kaufmann, R. von, S. Charter and R.M. Blench eds. 1986. *Livestock Systems Research in Nigeria's Sub humid Zone*. Proceedings of Sub-humid Zone Livestock Conference. ILCA, Addis Ababa.
- Kehinde, E. A. (2011). *Socio-economic and Environmental Factors Influencing Conflict between Crop Producers and Pastoralists*.
- Kuhn, T (1962): *The structure of scientific revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lipsey, R.G. and K.A. Chrystal, (1995).*An Introduction to Positive Economics: Choice and Opportunity Cost*. 8th Edn, ELBS with Oxford University Press, Oxford, ISBN: 0-19-442454-5, Mali. London: International Institute for Environment and Development.
- MacLean, J., &Inglis, S. (2005). *Sport and workplace health: The case of Canadian universities*. Paper presented at the European Association for Sport Management Congress, Newcastle Gates head, UK, Sept. Mali. London: International Institute for Environment and Development.

Migrant Nigerians: Fulani Pastoralists in Southwestern Nigeria. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*.

Module – 4, Contemporary Indian: Issues and Goals, 2001.

Moritz, Mark (2006a). Changing Contexts and Dynamics of Farmer-Herder Conflicts across West Africa. *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 40, 2006 the Politics of Permanent Conflict: Farmer-Herder Conflicts in Northern Cameroon. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*

NankinBagudu(2003) Identity, political religiosity and communal violence in Nigeria: implications: League for Human Rights

Nathan, L. (2001). The four horse men on apocalypse: the structural cause of violence in Africa, Track two, 10(2)

National Population Commission.2006 census figure.Retrieved from [www.population.gov.ng](http://www.population.gov.ng) Accessed on 06.11.2016.

Noorduyn, Ruth (2005) The Assertion of Rights to Agro-pastoral Land in North Cameroon: A Cascade to Violence?, vol. 76. Leiden, the Netherlands: African Studies Centre.

Obateru, O.(2000). *Planning the city to mitigate urban violence*. Ibadan: IFRA

Ofuoku, A. and Isife, B. (2009).Causes, effects and resolution of farmers-nomadic cattle herders conflict in Delta state, Nigeria.

Okoli, A.C. &Atellhe, G.A.(2014). Nomads against Natives: A political ecology of Plateau State herder/farmer conflict in Nassarawa state, Nigeria. *American International Journal of Contemporary Research*,

Oksen, Peter (2000) Cattle, Conflict, and Change: Animal Husbandry and Fulani-Farmer Interactions in Boulgou Province, Burkina Faso. Roskilde, Denmark: International Development Studies, Roskilde University.

Plang, J. P (2015).Domestic service and wage earning: A gender assessment of remuneration of domestic servants in Plateau State. An unpublished Ph.D. Thesis in Department of Sociology, University of Jos.

Randall Collins (1974), the basics of conflict theory: conflict sociology, New York academics press

Resource Inventory and Management Limited (RIM) to FDL&PCS, Abuja, Nigeria.

RIM, (1984). Livestock and land use in southern Gongola State. (3 vols). Report by Resource Inventory and Management Limited (RIM) to LPU, Kaduna.

- RIM, (1992). Nigerian National Livestock Resource Survey. (IV vols). Report by Robert McNetting (1968) Hill farmers of Nigeria: *cultural ecology of the Kofyar of the Jos Plateau*. University of Washington Press,
- Sanni, L. (2016). Globalization and democracy: Trends, types, causes and prospect. Abuja: Centre for Democratic Studies.
- St. Croix, (1944). The Fulani of Northern Nigeria. Government Printer, Lagos.
- Stenning, D. (1959). Savannah nomads. Oxford University Press for International Africa Institute, London.
- Stevenson, B. (2016). Conflict resolution and prevention. London: Macmillan.
- Tonah, S. (2006). *Managing Farmer-Herder Conflicts in Ghana and Volta Basin*. Ibadan Journal of Social Sciences 4
- Turaki, T. (201s). Sharia and the national question: managing the politics of difference, Osaghae.
- Umeh, G.N. & Chukwu, V.A. (2013). Socioeconomic perspective to arable crop farmer-herder conflict in Ebonyi North Zone, Ebonyi state, Nigeria. *International Journal of Science and Research*.
- Verma G, P Malick (1999), Researching education perspective and techniques. London palmer press
- Wosu, L. (1989). Rinderpest in Nigeria. Zaria: ABU press.
- Yonguan, C., H.M. Seip and H. Vennemo (2001). The environmental cost of water pollution in changing china. *Environ. Dev. Econ*.
- Zuppan, Mary E. 1994 Need Herders and Farmers Quarrel?: Rethinking Herder-Farmer Models in Africa. *The Rural Extension Bull*

## APPENDIX I: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

### Socio- Economic Effects of Herders/farmers Conflicts Questionnaire (SEEHFCQ)

I am a Postgraduate student of the Department of Political science and international studies, A.B.U., Zaria conducting a research on “conflicts between farmers and pastoralists and its effects on socio-economic development of Barkinladi local government plateau state. (2012-2015).” In partial fulfillment of the award of M.Sc. Political Science and international studies. Information provided shall be strictly confidential and will be used for academic purpose only.

Request: Please tick or respond where appropriate.

### SECTION A: SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

1. Name :( Optional): .....
2. Title (if any): (a) Official [ ] (b) Unofficial [ ]
3. Village/Town.....
4. Age (Years): (a) 20–29 [ ] (b) 30–39 [ ] (c) 40–49 [ ] (d) 50–59 [ ] (e) 60 and above [ ]
5. Sex (a) Male [ ] b. Female [ ]
6. Religion: (a) Christianity [ ] (b) Islam [ ] (c) Traditional [ ]
7. Highest Level of Education: (a) Adult [ ] (b) Nomadic [ ] (c) Primary [ ] (d) Secondary [ ] ((e) Tertiary [ ] (f) None of the above
8. Ethnic group: (a) Berom [ ] (b) Fulani [ ] (c) Others (specify).....
9. Country of origin: (a) Nigeria [ ] (b) Others (specify).....
10. Years of Residence in the community: (a) 1–5 [ ] (b) 6 –10 [ ] (c) 11 –15 [ ] (d) 16 and above [ ] (e) born and brought up

12. Marital status: (a) Married (b) not married (c) Divorced (d) Widow

13. Number of wives: (a) One [ ] (b) Two [ ] (c) Three [ ] (d) Four [ ] (e) others, (specify)...

14. Number of Children: (a) None (b) 1–5 [ ] (c) 6 -10 [ ] (d) 11–15 [ ] and above [ ]

15. Occupation: (a) Farming [ ] (b) Cattle rearing [ ] (c) Farming and cattle rearing [ ]

16. Number of Cattle: (a) None [ ] (b) 1-100 [ ] (c) 101-200

[ ] (d) 201-300 [ ] (e) 301 and above [ ]

17. Size of Farm: (a) Less than 1ha [ ] (b) 1-2ha [ ] (c) 3-4ha [ ] (d) 5-6ha [ ] (e) 7ha and above [ ]

18. Group/association : (a) Religious [ ] (b) Professional [ ] (c) Cooperative [ ] (d) Traditional/cultural [ ]

## SECTION B: CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT

Kindly choose either 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 from the followings which best indicate your opinion regarding the causes of the conflict. Please remember to tick only once for each of the listed items.

1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Undecided, 4 =

Agree, 5 = strongly Agree

The followings are the likely causes of the conflict in your area?

S/n	Causes	1	2	3	4	5
19	Ethnic differences					
20	Religious differences					
21	Issue of indigene/settler					
22	Cattle rustling					

23	Lack of access to water point					
24	Killing if stay animals					
25	Inadequate grazing areas					
26	Land encroachment					
27	Indiscriminate bush burning					
28	Perceived Hatred					
29	Crop damage by cattle					
30	Disregard to rules and regulation					
31	Lack of justice from the government					
32	Others (specify)					

33. Available land use resources in the area: (a) Forage  (b) water  (c) land  (d) Others (specify): -----

34 Size of the grazing area: (a) Large enough  b. Too Small  (c) No Idea

35. Grasses and or fodder in the grazing area: (a) Abundant  (b) Scarce  (c) No Idea

36 Public water points in the area: (a) Sufficient  (b) Insufficient  (c) No Idea

37 Things that hinder free access to these resources: (a) Blocking of access to pasture and water by crop farmers  (b) Construction of Public and Private Building on Grazing Areas  (c) Others (specify): -----

38. Involvement in Government development plans in the community: (a) yes  (b) No

39. If not, why? (State):-----

40. Frequency of involvement in the conflict: (a) frequent [ ] (b) Not Frequent [ ]

41. If frequent, what account for the frequency of the crisis? .....

41. Apart from disputes resulting from animals, have you ever had any problem with your host community before? a. Yes [ ] b. No [ ]

42. If yes, what was the cause of the dispute? a. Religious crisis [ ] b. Cultural disharmony [ ]

d. Others (specify): -----

### SECTION C: SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECT OF THE CONFLICT.

Kindly choose either 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 from the followings which best indicate how the crisis has affected you negatively socio-economically.

S/N	SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECT OF THE CONFLICT	1	2	3	4	5
43	The crisis affected our social coexistence					
44	It affected the number of herds I had					
45	It affect the quantity of food I produce					
46	It increased the rate of animosity between us					

### SECTION D: SOLUTIONS

Kindly choose either 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 from the followings which best indicate your opinion regarding the ways of which the conflict between farmers and herders can best be resolve. Please remember to tick only once for each of the listed items.

1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Undecided, 4 =

Agree, 5 = strongly Agree

The followings are the likely ways of which the conflict between farmers and herders can best be resolve in your area.

S/N	Ways of ending farmers/herders conflict	1	2	3	4	5
47	Creation of the Ruga settlement					
48	Tolerating one another					
49	Through the intervention of security agents					
50	Through fairness in justice					

51. Suggest possible way(s) in which farmers can help resolve the conflict in the community.....

.....

52. Suggest possible way(s) in which herders can help resolve the conflict in the community.....

.....

53. Suggest possible way(s) in which the above institutions can further be strengthened to perform better.....

.....

54. Suggest what you think Government should do to resolve the conflict

.....

.....