



**KWARA STATE UNIVERSITY, MALETE, NIGERIA**

**SCHOOL OF POST GRADUATE STUDIES (SPGS)**

**ECOWAS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN WEST AFRICA: A STUDY OF THE  
GAMBIAN TRANSITION OF POWER BETWEEN PRESIDENTS YAHYA JAMMEH  
AND ADAMA BARROW**

**By**

**Mubarak Sulaiman JAMIU**

**MATRIC NO: 18/27/MIR004**

**APRIL, 2021.**



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GAMBIAN TRANSITION OF POWER BETWEEN PRESIDENTS YAHYA JAMMEH  
AND ADAMA BARROW**

**A M.Sc Thesis SUBMITTED**

**BY**

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**18/27/MIR004**

**In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirement for the award of Being a Master of Arts (M.A.) in**

**International Relations and Strategic Studies.**

**Department of Politics and Governance, Faculty of Humanities, Management and Social**

**Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of, Kwara State**

**University, Malete. Nigeria**

**APRIL, 2021**

## **DECLARATION PAGE**

I hereby declare that this thesis titled (Ecowas and Conflict Management in West Africa: A Study of the Gambian Transition of Power Between Presidents Yahya Jammeh and Adama Barrow) is a record of my research. It has neither been presented nor accepted in any previous application for higher degree.

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**MUBARAK SULAIMAN JAMIU**

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**Signature & Date**


**APPROVAL PAGE**

This is to certified that this thesis by (MUBARAK SULAIMAN JAMIU) has been read and approved as meeting the requirements of the Department of Politics and Governance for the award of degree of masters of Arts (M.A) in international relation and Strategies studies.

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this research work firstly to the Supreme God who made everything possible for keeping me healthy and giving me the required wisdom to articulate. Second, to the unforgettable memory of my late uncle, Yakubu Idris (AFLALU); Rest in Peace, uncle.

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## ABSTRACT

*Managing political power transitions have been a daunting task for incumbents in less developed countries of the world. A not too impressive performance on this score by the political class have been a major cause of conflict in these countries. It is apparent that the West African sub-region is not immune from this malaise. President Yahya Jammeh's 22 years reign in the Gambia was phenomenal. He mutated from being a leader of a military Junta in 1994 to civilian President – having won three different rounds of elections. His unwillingness to hand over power to Adama Barrow who defeated him in the 2016 round of election called for ECOWAS intervention which is also the subject of this study. Faced with apparent constitutional crisis, in the Gambia, the international community led by the ECOWAS was forced to invoke its relevant protocols aimed at protecting the sanctity of Democracy. This study examined the factors responsible for the attendant political impasse in the Gambia, it analyses the extent to which ECOWAS protocols were used as mechanism for managing the crisis as well assess the effectiveness of the strategies adopted by ECOWAS member nations to avert similar reoccurrence in the sub-region. The study revealed a significant commitment to Democracy and its values as shown in the unanimous condemnation of Yahya Jammeh's sight-tight tendency. The massive mobilization of human, material, diplomatic and military resources by West African nations under the aegis of ECOWAS portends good omen for Democracy in Africa and West Africa in particular. The study employed Qualitative method with the aid of descriptive analysis. The study recommends that the Government of the Gambia of Adama Barrow should, in conjunction with ECOWAS, the Gambian military and other international development partners embark on massive political reorientation of the political elites and the entire citizens on the values of Democracy in modern international system.*

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.2 Background to the Study**

Conflict is common in every human society and regardless of its nature and form has a dysfunctional and disrupting effect, especially when it assumes a crisis dimension. The attendant breakdown of law and order, abuses of human rights, destruction of lives and property, as well as refugees all these are normally caused by conflicts and it goes beyond national boundaries and this call for peace, security, and development at national, regional, and global levels.

Thus, in response to the above, the countries within the African sub-region came together to form a community known as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to fine-tune the need for security, self-preservation and good governance at the region (Thomas, 2010). The current global trend is for groups of contiguous nations to pull their resources together under a regional cooperation for the wellbeing of their citizens. This is what is generally referred to as integration which covers the full range of public sector activity, including the coordination of economic policies, regional security, human rights, education, health, research and technology, and natural resource management.

Africa is said to have accounted for more conflicts in the post-cold war era than any other continent (Department for International Development, 2001). Having lost the strategic significance, it enjoyed during the cold war, Africa was abandoned by the West and left to deal by itself with the myriad of local conflicts (Dala, 2007). The disputes and civil wars that have plagued the continent particularly in Somalia, Liberia, the Congo, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Ivory Coast, and Sudan have made it imperative for the African continent to develop capacities for dealing with conflict. The

emergence of sub-regional bodies such as ECOWAS is a reflection of the determination of African countries to avoid conflict in the region.

Established in 1975 as a sub-regional organization to basically promote the economic integration of the fifteen Member States in West Africa, ECOWAS has been gradually transformed, into an organization also responsible for finding solutions to armed conflicts and other political crisis which were undermining peace and security within the community space. This is because; socio-economic development in West Africa is inseparable from warfare. Also, mass violence in different forms has afflicted nearly every West African nation since independence. These conflicts are epic events in each nation's history, destroying life, skills, wealth, and infrastructure and potentially damaging a society's social bonds and institutions. In other words, progress whether through human rights or development based approaches, has been threatened and impeded by high incidences of violence and social upheaval (Hansen, 1987).

The spate of armed conflicts and insecurity in the 1990s transformed ECOWAS's institutional foundations and policy agenda, by putting peace and security issues at the epicenter of regional integration projects (Cilliers 1999), and the organization since the end of the Cold War have subsequently developed key policies that continue to shape the region's peace and security dynamic. This includes the 1999 adoption of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (ECOWAS 1999); the 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (ECOWAS 2001); the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF); and the ongoing development of a regional security sector reform (SSR) policy. Given the scale, impact and ubiquity of these conflicts, confronting them became a matter of defending humanity.

In mid 1990s, the global wave of democratization inspired a momentum for competitive party politics in Africa and this offered a viable alternative to the seemingly troubled autocratic regimes, (Nwamakula, 2016).

Thus, Africa's agenda transformed to include promotion of democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance, (AU, 2000). One of the ways of promoting democratic principles is by peaceful transition of power from one regime to the other through the constitutional instrumentality of limiting the period within which a leadership is in power before the enthronement of another leadership. The conduct of periodic election at the expiration of each regime remains a major mark of representative democracy. In view of this, every democratic dispensation is characterized by periodic succession of government and the tenure of any government is often entrenched in the provisions of the constitution usually a period of four (4) years.

Following the disputed December 2016 presidential elections in The Gambia, ECOWAS managed to "restore democracy" in the country by using the threat of force, but without any use of direct physical violence. Both the African Union and the United Nations Security Council backed ECOWAS, which also gave ECOWAS legitimacy, for what were essentially ECOWAS's policy, and indeed an African solution to African problems. Gambia, just like other African countries experienced power tussle in her Democratic transition of Government, even though it has been argued by most political analysts that such scenario is normal in African countries. Just when the scenario of military invasion became credible did the Gambian regime accept its defeat. It is without doubt that Gambia Electoral commission declared the 2016 presidential election to be free and fair and for that reason, the incumbent president Yahaya Jammeh congratulated the president elect Adama Barrow but other reason(s) best known to Yahaya Jammeh, He found it difficult to relinquish power to the president elect in the long run.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

After the attainment of political independence, most countries in Africa had witnessed turbulent succession or change in government as many African presidents had tried and some had succeeded to perpetuate themselves in office at the expiration of their tenures. It is like a political culture of most African States that as soon as a president assumes office, he starts plotting and strategizing from the first day on how to perpetuate himself or sit-tight in office through unconstitutional means after his tenure of office had elapsed (John and Adriana, 2015).

To meet up with this unconstitutional desire, African Political leaders employ undemocratic strategies such as rigging of elections, intimidation of oppositions and suppression of the press, manipulation of the constitution to suit personal ambitions etc. This has continued to generate a lot of problems in the continent. Many African presidents both current and past, such as Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe; Eduardo Dos Santo of Angola, Paul Biya of Cameroon, the list can go on and on are sit-tight presidents. According to Kunuji (2016) sit-tightism in Africa has a long and troubling history which has in a very large extent faltered the concept of democracy in Africa as a continent. However, the fight against this unconstitutional and undemocratic act has been a battle individual personalities, pressure groups, both local and international organizations, as well as sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS in an attempt to preserve the ideals, ideas and ideologies of Democracy.

Political and economic insecurity has been the age-long plague bedeviling Africa in general and West Africa in particular. In the past, security in West Africa focused almost exclusively on military concerns. A disproportionately high percentage of national resources went into the procurement of military hardware and maintenance of large military forces in the hope of promoting physical security

It is against this backdrop that this study seeks to take a critical look at power transition conflicts

in Gambia and the role of ECOWAS in fighting for the enthronement of sustainable democratic culture in Gambia. It tries to establish the fact that ECOWAS as a sub-regional body is out to enthrone democracy and guarantee peace and stability in the entire sub region through conducting a qualitative study. This it did by condemning and removing Yahya Jammeh's led government when he tried to elongate his tenure of office in Gambia in 2016.

### **1.5 Research Questions**

Sequel to the above objectives, the study also addressed the followings questions:

- i. What are the causes of power tussle in the Gambia post presidential election?
- ii. What is the role of ECOWAS in managing Gambia power transition conflict?
- iii. What are the strategies adopted by ECOWAS in managing Gambia electoral conflict?
- iv. To what extent do the strategies adopted by ECOWAS restore harmony to Gambia's stability?

### **1.6 Objectives of the Study**

The main objective of the study examines the role of EWOWAS in conflict management while the specific objectives are as follows:

- i. To examine the predisposing factors for transitional crises in Gambia.
- ii. To analyze the adequacy of ECOWAS protocols in managing Gambia's democratic transition.
- iii. To determine the strategies adopted by ECOWAS in managing Gambia's electoral conflict
- iv. To assess the effectiveness of the strategies adopted by ECOWAS in restoring stability to Gambia.

### **1.5 Justification and Significance of the Study**

The reason for dwelling in this area of research is as result of the researcher's interest to add to knowledge in the area of Peace and Security as such the significance of the study are as follows:

The findings of this research may help draw attention to key areas of focus in Sub Regional Peace Support Operations in West Africa and Africa in general. The study will also contribute in the enrichment of literature on the role of ECOWAS in Sub- Regional Peace Support Operations in west Africa, the Gambia in particular and Africa in general. However, the study would also to help increase understanding of the root causes of conflict in Sub-Regional Peace Support Operations, and in so doing, inter-state conflict prevention activities with development and humanitarian crisis prevention mechanism. The study would enable the governments in the sub-region to formulate and implement policies that will encourage peace and harmony in African States generally.

### **1.6 Scope of the Study**

This study is basically within the context of ECOWAS intervention in conflict management in the West African sub-regions. The study seeks to give an overview of strategies of managing conflicts by ECOWAS. Specifically, the focus of this study is limited to the ECOWAS resolution of power transition conflicts in Gambia between the incumbent president Yahaya Jammeh and the president elect Adama Barrow after the 2016 presidential election, within the year 2016-2017

### **1.7 Definition of Terms**

- i. **Conflict:** A conflict is a serious difference between two or more beliefs, ideas, or interests refers to some form of friction, or discord arising within a group when the beliefs or actions of one or more members of the group are either resisted by or unacceptable to one or more members of another group.
- ii. **Conflict management:** The practice of recognizing and dealing with disputes in a rational, balanced and effective way. Conflict management implemented within an environment usually involves effective communication, problem resolving abilities and good negotiating skills to restore the focus to the company's overall goals.

- iii. **Electoral violence:** The term “Electoral violence” therefore means any act of violence perpetrated in the course of political activities, including pre, during and post-election periods, and may include any of the following acts: thuggery, use of force to disrupt political meetings or voting at polling stations, or the use of dangerous weapons to intimidate voters and other electoral processes, or to cause bodily harm or injury to any person connected with electoral processes.
- iv. **Election:** Election is the process of actualizing representative democracy, which exposes people to the experiences of competition for powers through balloting. These cardinal features of elections have eluded the Gambian polity as elections have been shrouded in repeated outbreaks of violence, which occurs as a result of electoral frauds that mar the legitimacy of elections and erode the stability of the political system.
- v. **Conflict Prevention:** For the purposes of this work, the term conflict prevention refers to non-violent (or creative) conflict transformation and encompasses activities designed to defuse tensions and prevent the outbreak, escalation, spread or recurrence of violence.
- vi. **Sit-Tightism:** The act of staying in power at all cost and not wanting to relinquish power, it can be further viewed as the act of staying where one is rather than changing position or accepting defeat.
- vii. **Power Transition:** The process or style power changes from one person to another. This is also the stages power passes through from one person to another. Also this could also account for the shifts of power and the causes of conflicts among people and or nations.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

#### 2.0 Introduction

Literature review is a well-integrated discussion and critical evaluation of different scholarly viewpoints on a given research problem as found in the previous relevant studies highlighting their strengths, weaknesses and indicating how it was used in given studies, so as to make some contribution(s) to the existing body of knowledge, especially on the research problem and on other related areas of investigation. A coherent literature review is characterized by a logical flow of ideas, current and relevant references with consistent, appropriate referencing style; proper use of terminology or terms and an unbiased and comprehensive view of the previous study or on the research topic.

#### 2.1 ECOWAS and Conflict Management in the Gambia: The Genesis of the Problem

The Gambia had been a member of ECOWAS ever since the organization was created in 1975. Initially formed to promote economic cooperation and integration in West Africa, beginning in the 1990s ECOWAS assumed a more political role following the wave of political reforms and the growing number of protracted domestic violent conflicts in the region. The revised ECOWAS treaty (1993) and especially the Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention (1999) and the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001) formally enshrined the commitment of the organisation to promote democracy and good governance and to adopt what was later to be called the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Electoral observation had been part of the ECOWAS mandate since the revised 1993 treaty, but responsibilities were further clarified with the 2001 protocol. The ECOWAS Commission created the Electoral Assistance Unit in 2005, and this is roughly the moment when ECOWAS began to systematically observe all national elections in member

countries (Hartmann 2013). Electoral observation requires an invitation from national authorities, and in a quite unusual step, President Jammeh refused to allow the ECOWAS Observation Team to monitor the December 2016 presidential elections (ECOWAS 2016).

Following Jammeh's original concession of defeat, ECOWAS, together with the AU and the UN Official Representative for West Africa, congratulated the Gambian people and its leaders for the smooth and peaceful election and transition (ECOWAS 2016). When Jammeh later changed his position, ECOWAS was quick to react, calling on the Gambian government to "abide by its constitutional responsibilities and international obligations," going on to state, It is fundamental that the verdict of the ballots should be respected, and that the security of the president-elect, Adama Barrow, and that of all Gambian citizens be fully ensured. (ECOWAS 2016).

According to ECOWAS, the reversal of position by President Jammeh was unacceptable and threatened peace not only in the Gambia but the entire West African sub-region. ECOWAS leaders thus decided to send a mediation commission to Banjul. As acting ECOWAS chairperson, Liberian president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf headed the delegation that travelled to Banjul on 13 December 2016, together with the presidents of Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone; Muhammadu Buhari, John Dramani Mahama, and Ernest Bai Koroma respectively), and the UN Special Representative for West Africa (as well as a former ECOWAS Commission president), Ghana's Mohammed Ibn Chambas. Despite the high-ranking composition (comprising all Anglophone heads of state within ECOWAS), however, the commission did not manage to convince Jammeh to modify his position.

Following the failure of this first mediation, ECOWAS heads of state were apparently convinced that they needed to adopt more credible sanctions. When asked whether the UN would consider military action to force Jammeh's departure, Chambas did not rule out this possibility (Farge and McAllister 2016). At their regular summit on 17 December 2016 in Abuja, they decided upon the

following course of action: ECOWAS would continue mediation efforts through President Buhari and President Mahama, and request that the AU and UN endorse their decisions. The heads of state would attend the inauguration of President-elect Barrow, to be sworn in on 19 January 2017 in conformity with the Gambian Constitution.

ECOWAS would be obligated to take all necessary means to strictly enforce the results of the elections (ECOWAS 2016). To that end, ECOWAS placed standby forces on alert and formally authorized them to intervene militarily if Jammeh did not step down. Further negotiations between Buhari and Jammeh in Banjul ended on 13 January without any breakthrough, and as the deadline of 18 January approached, the option of military intervention became more realistic. On 14 January, Barrow travelled together with the ECOWAS mediators to Bamako to meet most of the other ECOWAS heads of state, who were attending the France–Africa Summit there. UN Special Representative Chambas declared that ECOWAS would ask the UN Security Council to approve the deployment of troops to The Gambia if Jammeh refused to cede power (*Vanguard* 2017).

ECOWAS chiefs of staff gathered on 14 January in Abuja to discuss the preparations for the establishment of the ECOWAS Military Intervention in The Gambia (ECOMG). On 18 January, troops (most from Senegal, with contingents from Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, and Togo) started to move towards the border with The Gambia (which is surrounded by Senegalese territory), and together with Nigerian forces also implemented a naval blockade. In the afternoon of 19 January, under the sponsorship of ECOWAS and in the presence of many international diplomats, Adama Barrow was sworn in as president in the Gambian embassy in Dakar, Senegal.

The same day, the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 2337, expressing its full support for ECOWAS's quest "to ensure, by political means first," that "the will of the people of The Gambia as expressed in the results of 1st December elections" be honored, though the

Security Council did not endorse military action according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UN 2017).<sup>1</sup> On 19 January, some troops nevertheless invaded Gambian territory, but the invasion was quickly halted by a last-minute negotiation by Mauritania's president Abdel Aziz, Guinea's Alpha Condé, and Ibn Chambas. Under the imminent threat of military invasion, with thousands of Gambians fleeing to Senegal, and with Jammeh's own army chief pledging his allegiance to President Barrow, Jammeh eventually agreed to step down and go into exile. The ECOWAS contingents then secured the territory, and it was decided that ECOMIG would stay for a further three months in The Gambia, as requested by President Barrow.

## **2.2 Transitional Crises in Gambia**

Since turning into a republic and obtaining a constitution in 1970, the Gambia has been heading off to the polls on a five-year tenure to pick its President and individuals for parliament. At first, the ministry of local government was responsible for elections, however this changed in 1996, when, out of the blue, the new constitution made arrangement for elections to be led by a free electoral body that stretched out the voting rights to every single Gambian national of eighteen and more, both within and outside the country. Meanwhile, when Jammeh came into power, Gambians dwelling outside the country did not have the privilege to vote. To his knowledge that most of the diaspora were against him, Jammeh figured that this arrangement would anchor him a simple triumph at the elections (Sanyang & Camara, 2017).

The Peoples Progressive Party (PPP), under Jawara, came back to office five sequential occasions in national elections; the last in 1992. These elections, however not without constituent imperfections, were, regardless, viewed free and just by international monitors and commonwealth. However, mostly in view of Jawara's 30-year presidency, he and the PPP were criticized for First President of the Gambia, Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara financial misappropriation,

which brought about the unpopular disintegration of trust in both him and his administration (Saine, 2015).

According to Saine (2015), Yahya Jammeh, a previously armed force officer who took power in the 1994 coup, guaranteed to organize accountability, truthfulness, and integrity in government to stem uncontrolled degradation and political rot. He welcomed Gambians and the media, specifically, to fill in as guard dogs over his revolution. Nonetheless, Jammeh and his framed military movement before long changed to serious severe measures to contain difficulties to his run. Facing local and international pressure to reestablish democratic standards and end military control, Jammeh relented.

In 1995, the AFPRC consented to a two-year tenure to change back to regular civilian government. A hurriedly drafted constitution was embraced in August 1996 to substitute the 1970 constitution. Meanwhile, the new constitution, however, displayed a few key defects. These incorporated the omission of presidential term-limits, in spite of mainstream support for term confinements, and inability to expand the presidential age prerequisite from 30 to 40 years. The new constitution held declarations from the time of military rule, and in addition laws that restricted press freedom and reclamation of capital punishment. Jammeh additionally forced new criteria on potential presidential aspirants, including a deposit of \$1,000 and signature of 5,000 people to be qualified to run for the presidency. These were unaffordable to most political party leaders which gave him the sole opportunity for a soft run (Saine 2015). Yahya AJJ Jammeh, Leader of the APRC and Second President of The Gambia. In his arguments, Saine (2015) further claims that although electoral laws exist on paper to ensure widespread suffrage free and just races regulated by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) of the Gambia and checked by local and international observers but they are only for formalities. Indeed, following the 2001 presidential race in which Jammeh won a second five-year term, he altered the constitution to a simple majority framework

in place of the required 51 percent of victory required to get into office. In spite of that fact that, Jammeh continued to utilize the new law as far as possible to limit possibilities for political change, or review of mainstream and resistance from political party complaints.

The non-existence of fund for campaign laws likewise dissatisfies Gambians, denying them of their voice and right particularly those in the diaspora to pick their leaders were used as tools by him to remain in power. The then leading party with its leader, Yahya Jammeh utilized state and individual monetary resources to wage solid political activities. Besides, Jammeh's campaign accounts are supported by foreign governments, residential business commitments and cash from drugs deals and seizures, for example, the cocaine store found in Bonto outside the capital, Banjul (Burden, 2017). There were numerous visible crackdowns on oppositions before and after elections and the Electoral Management Body called Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) was also a tool President Jammeh used to manipulate the election results. Burden (2017) indicates that the election results were not satisfactory to all political parties. This uncovers there are still some displeased individuals from the electorates in the nation. In spite of the fact that the autonomy of the Independent Electoral Commission is ensured by the Constitution, The Commonwealth Expert Team to the 2011 presidential races of the Gambia revealed that somewhere in the range of 1996 and 2011, three chairpersons from the Commission were sacked without due processes. This defenselessness is likewise in view of the dependence of the commission for the greater part of its financing from the legislature. Beyond this, the group likewise saw that the president broke the Electoral Act in 2011 by utilizing the state resources for his political campaign.

In 2016, both the African Union and ECOWAS eagerly denounced the pre-election crackdown on the opposition after a Gambian High Court had charged individuals from the opposition with an unlawful parade and unlawful gathering in the development to the elections. Beyond this, the ECOWAS pre-decision facts discovering mission distinguished the dissent of equivalent access to

state media, the absence of press freedom, terrorizing, unlawful capture and confinement of opposition individuals and rejection of campaign licenses as contests that could deter the 2016 electoral procedure (Sanyang & Camara, 2017). Human Rights observe additionally detailed that the legislature of Alh. Yahya Jammeh was credited with the capture and executing of Solo Sandeng, a UDP activist, by the state intelligence agency for leading an open protest calling for electoral reform. Saine (2015) claims that an expansion in the registration charges of a candidate for the presidential, legislative and local government elections were focused on individuals from the opposition. From 1994 to 2001, the Jammeh administration was not perceived as credible by the US government, because of its poor democratic records. The United States and Gambia's primary opposition parties, and in addition the international observers did not accredit the 1996 races as free and fair.

In 2001, nonetheless, the greatest opposition party (UDP) surrendered and conceded defeat to Jammeh in a phone call from the leader of the party, making room for the US to perceive the races credible as mirroring the will of the general population (Burden, 2017). Burden (2017) argues that despite the fact that requests for electoral reforms have been overlooked by Jammeh all through the electoral cycles since 2001, the opposition parties have kept on challenging every single one of them, including 2011 and 2016. Clashed by the procedure paving the way to the 2011 elections, which as indicated by an ECOWAS official statement was regarded not to have been helpful for free, just and transparent elections, the international community decided not to observe the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections. In this regard, the ECOWAS Commission informed President Jammeh about their decision not to deploy an ECOWAS monitoring team to the presidential race that occurred in the nation on November 24, 2011. Jammeh and the APRC weakened the Gambian political issues through terrorizing, suppression and politicized security forces that were persecuting the opposition party militants. Despite the fact that in mid-2015,

Jammeh freed in excess of 300 prisoners (security, political, and common criminals), some key political rivals remained imprisoned, including the UDP's national treasurer and two other UDP individuals. The three were sentenced for rebellion in 2013 and have supposedly been tormented in care. In June 2016, political activists, human rights groups, and civil society groups from Senegal and The Gambia met with political leaders in Dakar to talk about President Jammeh's administrative issues, and also his refusal to execute electoral changes and the constant clampdown on opposition demonstrations. The result was a further call for electoral reforms and the suspension of restrictions (Burden, 2017).

### **2.3 Political History of Gambia**

The origins of modern Gambia can be traced to April 1816 when an expeditionary force from Goree under Captain Alexander Grant took possession of Banjul Island, renamed it St. Mary's and established a settlement which was named Bathurst after the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Earl Bathurst, though, this was not the first settlement on the river Gambia. The British Colony, presumed to be the smallest country in West Africa and fondly referred to as the Smiling Coast of Africa, with an estimated population of 1.8 million at the last census in 2013 and a total area of approximately 11,000 square kilometers which is about 4,361 square miles is located on both banks of the Gambia river, extending 470 kilometers into the interior of Africa.

It is surrounded on its three sides by its larger neighbor, Senegal and on the fourth "western" side by the Atlantic Ocean. The Gambia which has increased in population dramatically since after independence in 1965 is an ethnically diverse nation with over 10 ethnic groupings, having the Mandinka as the largest group with over 36% of the total population, followed by the Fula, 22%, the Wolof, 14%, the Jola, 11%, and the Serahuli, 8%. The Gambia is a Muslim dominated country totaling 95% in 1993 census release and about 4% of the population being Christians most of whom are Roman Catholics while the rest belong to other faiths. Notwithstanding, the Gambia is

known and highly admired as a secular state free from religious intolerance and all kinds of bigotry. It is a country where people live harmoniously amidst religious differences, albeit Muslim dominating other faithful. It has as its main exports tourism products and groundnuts where large portion of its foreign exchange earnings come from. Its political system is Unitary Presidential System with mixed economy ideology and the sitting president as at the time of this compilation is President Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh who took the mantle of leadership in 1994.

Until 1960, Politics in the Gambia was dominated by the Akus (who were Yoruba ex- slaves dumped at Bathurst and Freetown from Europe after the slave trade ended, and the Wollofs. Meanwhile, the first quasi- political organization in the Gambia was formed and led by Edward Francis Small, a referred father and doyen of the Gambian modern politics. Small, was a radical nationalist whose political movements gave impetus to electoral and party politics in the Gambia. He later in 1917, joined with other militants to found the Gambia Native Defensive Union (GNDU) that collaborated with other West Africa to establish the National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA) at a conference held in Accra in March 1920.

Small heralded an era of political activism in the tiny but beautiful Gambia, using his journalist professionalism and political astuteness to achieve this noble goal. In the development of trade unionism, Edward Francis Small was at the forefront. He founded the first Gambian Trade Union, the Bathurst Trade Union (BTU), although, the activities of the Union did not extend beyond the colony area, it was strong enough to organize the first labor strike in Gambian history in 1929, making one of the most successful strikes in Africa before the second world war. Indeed Edward Francis Small participated fully and led in the many political organizations and activist movements that shot The Gambia to the forefront of political leadership and advancement, not only within the British West Africa until the Independence time but in the whole of the sub- Saharan. Some of these movements included; The Rate Payers' Association and the Bathurst Urban District Council

(BUDC) established in 1930 and later renamed the Bathurst Advisory Town Councils (BATC) in 1935. These two movements later dominated Bathurst politics, with Small emerging as the first appointee of BATC to the legislative council in January 1942. Edward Small went on to represent the municipal council in the legislative council between 1942 and 1947 and when the elective principle was first introduced by the British colonial government in the Gambia for the legislative council in 1947, he became the first Gambian to win a popular vote. Sponsored by his labor Union, Small defeated Sheik Omar Faye and I. M. Garba Jahumpa to become the elected representative for Banjul and the Kombo area in the Legislative Council. Edward Francis continued to play active and important role in Gambia's electoral and political process as an activist, trade unionist and journalist until his death in January 1958, the role that paved the ways for the peaceful conducts of elections in the Gambia both in the pre-independence and post-independence times and the achievements that have contributed to The Gambia's successes and enviable political climate.

### **Gambia's Political Relationship with her Neighbors.**

While the government of Senegal welcomed an eventual merger of both countries, it was the political leaders of the small Gambia who feared that they would be submerged in all ramifications, saying, they might later be deprived of equality in citizenship upholding in a French speaking country. The PPP government and their supporters were united in the view that the interest of the Gambia in self-rule and economic development, not the British anxiety to rid itself of a liability, should determine the future of the country. They opted for independence. A constitutional conference was later held in July 1964 in London on the Gambia's political future where it was agreed that Gambia should become an independent sovereign state on February 18th, 1965, though, could continue to cooperate with Senegal. The Gambia became independent under the leadership of Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara who himself became its first President after a successful referendum was held in April 24th, 1970 for a republican status. Nonetheless, after a rule of thirty

years or more, Jawara was overthrown in a bloodless military coup by a group of young soldiers from the Gambia National Army as earlier remarked, which created the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) with Lt. Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh as the head of state. The AFPRC, who initially announced a four-year transition period to return the country to civilian rule, finally, after consultation with the people nationwide accepted two-year transition period. The AFPRC was later transformed into a political party called the Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation and Construction (APRC) for the purpose of contesting the September 26th, 1996 presidential and general elections in a multi-party democracy with now retired Colonel Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh contesting as president. He won landslide and became the first president of the Second Republic of the Gambia. Germane in this road to independence in this text was the process of elections and the party politics in the Gambia and how these had helped to lay the very good foundation upon which the independence and the post-independence electoral process commenced and consolidated for a sovereign national state of the Gambia.

The foundation was multi-party electoral and political process and it was very harmonious and free from unnecessary crises that could jeopardize a viable geopolitical process of a young new nation. Multi-partism in a political process, whether for a young or a large independent nation, is believed to be more democratic, accommodating divergent political views and opinions and allowing for healthy political competitions and choices within the polity. As observed by Taagepera, (2007: 5 - 7) .....“Electoral system is the set of rules that govern ballot structure and seat allocation” and since this is so, it is inextricably intertwined with party system. In other words, what Taagepera is pointing at is that an ideal electoral system can leverage on an ideal party system and a more liberal or democratic party system can make an adopted electoral process work smoothly for the operations of a good political ideology and practice in a state. The adopted first-past-the-post type of electoral system in the Gambia and the unique voting system with “drum and

marbles” that was introduced in the early 1960s basically to address the high levels of illiteracy in the country, have reduced considerably the unwarranted tensions that election crises would have generated on the country’s political structure and partisanship and this is exactly what we aim to look at in this study under the two republics so as to assess the extent to which the process has leveraged on the country’s attainable peaceful and viable political process.

### **The Electoral Process and Practice in the Gambia’s First Republic (1965 - 1994)**

Mechanism, Dynamics, Strategies and Drawbacks. The election process in the Gambia’s first republic, presumed to have commenced from 1965, when the country fully attained independence, but dated back to September, 1959 when a new constitution was promulgated by Governor Windley after accepting the Bathurst Conference Constitutional proposals including the adoption of a universal suffrage for the protectorate took place under Sir. Dawda Kairaba Jawara leadership. This development gave the direction that the electoral process in the Gambia followed. The constitutional process paved ways for the first ever most popular general election into the House of Representatives which took place between May 20 and 30, 1960. The election was contested by Jawara PPP’s Party, P. S. Njie’s United Party and a coalition of “Democratic Congress Alliance (DCA) formed through the merger of GDP led by Rev. J. C. Faye and the GMC headed by I. M. Garba Jahumpa. The fourth urban political party, the Gambia National Party (GNP), did not formally contest the election. Although, it was learnt that, GNP’s general secretary, M. B. Jones did not stand as an independent in the election. The GNP could not assert itself articulately or present a credible candidate like others because of its loose coalition of individuals and the internal divisions within the party, believed to have been widened by the 1960 Windley Constitution. These internal divisions or disagreements later led to the unpopularity of the party and subsequent disintegration. There was also a separate indirect election for protectorate chiefs, which was held at the Chiefs’ Conference at Georgetown in May, 1960, and as noted by Hughes, (2006: 138), one

complicating factor for the 1960 election unlike in later Gambian elections, was that, the candidates were not required to declare their party allegiance before polling day and which was of course preferred by many of them. However, a great number of the nominally independent candidates were endorsed by one party or another, even though; they did not contest on those parties' platforms.

The central legislative election most seats, were won by the Jawara party. PPP gained more popularity as a party among the rural populace, especially in the predominantly Mandinka illiterate society where the adopted voting methodology had been instrumental and far-reaching. At the same time, the leadership of the party was careful derailing from the national objectives of being a national party that represent all the diverse people in a democratic political arrangement and government. This was orchestrated by the Jawara leadership as Prime Minister by ensuring that nationalistic political spectrum in campaigns, speeches, promises and developments were advanced. Prior to this election of 1960, a unique "drum and marble" method of voting was specially devised by two colonial officials. Under this system, Hughes noted, a voter used a marble rather than a ballot paper to cast vote. The marble was dropped through a narrow tube into an empty, sealed steel drum that contained a bicycle bell; as it fell to the bottom of the drum, it struck the bell which made a sound audible to the presiding officer and the party agents outside the ballot box. As also observed by a facilitator Staino S. (2006).. "This system is based on the use of tokens (clear – glass marbles) to be cast in separate iron-made drums (which serve as a ballot box) for each individual party/ candidate. Each party/ candidate competing in an election has a drum painted with its own identifying colors and their party symbol/ photograph. On Election Day, at the polling station, drums are placed behind the polling booth. Voters, after being issued a marble, proceed to the polling booth to vote. When a marble is introduced in the drum of the selected party/

candidate, by falling, it hits a bell whose sound clearly indicates to the audience in the polling station that a vote was cast.

To prevent hearing other sounds, when sealing the drum, polling officers place sand or saw-dust into its bottom, and also, since the sound is like a bell of a bicycle as already inferred, on the Election Day, bicycles are banned from the immediate proximity of polling stations. When voting process has ended, votes are counted by placing the marbles into special trays (with either 200 or 500 holes), a simple system that allows counting officials to quickly ascertain the number of votes cast in each drum. One could ask how uniquely advantageous the voting system is to ensuring non-rigging, non-manipulating and fraudulent electoral practice. Hughes noted, “It used to make impossible multiple voting that could encourage double – counting and made easier for the illiterate who could neither read nor write to participate without difficulties in voting, thereby preventing voting rigging and other electoral feasible fraud up to the counting stage after the voting has ended”. In her own submission, Staino S. says .....”the unique voting system is simple, affordable and locally-owned”. Gambian voters are well acquainted with, and it is reputedly difficult to rig, she observes. The marble system requires appropriate arrangements to ensure that the secrecy of the vote is maintained at all times. The drums are installed within wellfitted booths. The more candidates compete in the elections, the larger the polling booths are made to be for accommodation. Should the bell not produce a ring when a voter is inside the polling booth, polling officers are required to check whether the marble was mishandled by the voter (for example, the marble could be laying down on the ground or perhaps it may have been simply left on the table where the drums are placed).

From the analysis above, it is clearly observed and confirmed that voting system in the Gambia’s electoral practice is not only unique but quite relevant to its situation and electoral needs, and since the very essence of any election in an electoral process is to prevent rigging, make the process free

and fair and guarantee the safety of voters, electoral officials, security agents, politicians, election observers and the general citizenry, then, it suffices to say that, the uniqueness of the voting method has achieved its primary objective in the first place and in the latter place has confirmed the hypothesis drawn for this study that the electoral system or process in the Gambia from independence is a factor to the makings of peace enjoyed in the Gambia's polity. "As a predominantly illiterate society, with diverse people and culture as small in size as it is, though, interrelated in modes, identity and certain values, but, with multiculturalism, multi-partism and multi-linguistics, it is commendable for the government of the day under Sir. Dawda Jawara to maintain and guarantee the designed 'drums and marbles' voting system even after independence. In spite of the defects in colonial rule, certain legacies were bequeathed by them to their former colonial governments' heirs, but, which some of them either abandoned or corrupted to bastardize the workings of their countries' governmental systems. This development in countries like Nigeria and Kenya occurred where early election crises contributed to arsons and subsequent military incursions that gave setbacks to developmental processes in political economy affairs and the social settings. The Gambia's political process is exempted from this process, because a more traditional voting system which suites situational needs and which guarantees free, fair and credible elections, that would be devoid of crises and violence and could indeed help an attainable political stability is in place. The peace Gambia enjoys today is no doubt a resultant effect of the viable electoral process in place from the independence time.

Staino S. (2006) posits further "Token – ballot system remains a very convenient voting system in a country with a large illiterate voting population and with limited financial resources". Voter education initiatives can easily be limited to provide the electorate with basic explanations on how to introduce the token in a party-colored drum. It is more economical as financial and logistical burden of printing and dispatching ballot papers for every election is removed and importantly as

the system enjoys a lot of cooperation and convenience among the electorate and the politicians. It is therefore very sustaining and over-arching for the country's political engineering and maneuvering. However, the unique voting system is not without some flaws, but what is important to this study is not the defects of the system, but its benefits to the harmonious desirable political climate in the Gambia, after all, everything good, could still have its defects. The benefits of the system have far out-weighed its shortcomings; therefore we relax on what the defect might be saying. For example, Staino S. argues, that the system does not allow voters to express a blank vote in secrecy due to absence of ringing to an audience in the polling booth when a voter casts his/her vote, indicating a vote was not counted after voting. She suggested the adoption of an additional drum for use by the voters who are or might be willing to cast a blank vote. To her, voters who fall victim of non-casting of votes might be free from undue intimidation or influence and the breaches of secrecy code in votes might be taken care of. Sara also observes that.....”unlike more ‘traditional’ voting systems with ballot papers and ballot boxes, in the Gambian system the drums are placed behind the polling booth and thus, they are not visible to polling officers and electoral observers”. She argues, it could be relatively easy for a voter with fraudulent intentions to invalidate or at least delegitimize the voting process in a given polling station by simply tampering with the security seals of any of the drums. Furthermore, in case of election – related disputes, the absence of ballot papers (and consequently, of a paper-trail with clearly marked ballots) makes an eventual post-election vote recount an exercise that may prove more quite difficult to dispel or rebuff any allegations of electoral fraud.

What could be identified as strategies and methods for consolidation in this context by President Jawara were, firstly, the effective use of the locally devised voting methodology with the use of drums and marbles and how it was strengthened as the voting behavior in the polity, given the high illiteracy level in the society that made people to believe in their votes for their candidates.

Secondly, as a Mandinka man and who could also speak with the electorate in virtually all the major languages spoken across the country, he did enjoy the support and cooperation of his Mandinka majority and that of all especially during the campaigns and rallies which are held prior to elections. Thirdly, Religion and belief also played a potent role as the people believed that Jawara was their God-sent ruler and by divine right, they must vote for him. Fourthly, President Jawara extended free food gifts, both raw and cooked to his subjects especially sugar and rice which he gave out constantly and did not make them to feel hungry. This gesture had an adverse effect on the people because it kept them lazy and non-development-oriented. As a result, Jawara experienced little or no pressures on development programmes such as creation of jobs and other opportunities. Schools were not built, industries were not constructed, existing infrastructures were not maintained, rather, they were decaying e.g. roads, hospitals, pastimes and other institutional structures were being deserted. Higher education and sustainable development strides were not inspired by the Jawara led administration.

The people were not creative and innovative-thinking and proven. The Army and the Police were not effectively serviced and maintained. The youths were left unrepresented, unkempt, unengaged and underpowered for them to contribute meaningfully to economy and because illiteracy was high, very little could realize the dangers of all these deprivation and neglect for future growth of the nation. People felt they were living rightly until 1994 when the regime was accused of corruption and mismanagement, lack of vision and concern for citizenry by a group of young soldiers led by Lt. Yahya Jammeh of the Gambian National Army after their bloodless coup of July 22, 1994. Lt. Jammeh later headed the transition government, established a provisional ruling council and put in place a visionary administration that is development – oriented and awareness – driven. Before 1994, some coup attempts were made against the Jawara regime and some pockets of resentment were coming from certain sections of the populace against a regime that they

perceived was not working, however, all were summonted and survived. Hughes (2006: 198), for instance, remarked when he said, the Jawara regime began to lose popularity after its fifteen years of hegemonic dominance in politics and rule began to be insecure following increasing internal division i.e. intra-party conflicts and the emergence of the National Convention Party (NCP) in the mid – 1970s coupled with the regime’s compromising stances with the corruption levels that were rampant among his government officials and key allies especially the ministers. In Hughes’s words ..... “President Jawara also came to be seen as tolerating a persistent and growing incidence of cronyism and downright corruption on the part of his ministers and senior civil servants identified with the PPP administration”. Even when it became necessary to remove such transgressors, the almost ritualistic process, which usually avoided any legal investigation or penalty, came to be his political Achilles heel and that contributed to the undermining of his legitimacy in radical political circles. Indeed, as inferred, Jawara’s own personal finances also came under suspicion. In addition, his ‘one nation’ approach, involving the creation of patron – client networks to link the political centre with its periphery, came with a price.

Although, it had clearly helped the Gambia avoid the inter-communal strife that wracked so many other African states after independence, the system was denounced by his radical critics. Consequent upon this, these first waves of postindependence dissidents emerged but were won over with scholarships and accelerated promotions. A second one came in the form of overthrowing by violent means in 1981 but the dissidents were crushed by soldiers from the Senegalese Army with hundreds of them being killed[. Notwithstanding, if anything is to go by, the Gambia is still presumed to be most peaceful and violent free in view of the happenings and given enormity of dimensional crises resulting from elections and military coups that its co-ECOWAS nations were experiencing, especially countries like Guinea, Burkina-Faso, Mali, Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia, Togo and Sierra Leone. Furthermore, the Jawara administration failed to

establish and strengthen the electoral institutions for electoral growth such as creating an independent electoral body like the 'IEC', the civil society groups, the Media among others. For example, The Gambia could not boast of a state- owned television station, albeit, institutions where media practitioners could be trained. Not until the second republic before initiatives for these strides came to surface. In the university of the Gambia established fifteen years ago by the second republic's leader, Journalism as a profession and programme of study has just begun at degree level where Gambians can train as professionals to boost the country's media industry and contribute not only to national development and growth processes but to the international media technology. Aside, the establishment of Gambia's Institute for Journalism and Media Practition is on the way for operation and training. In the first republic, elections were still organized by a committee of people from the Interior Ministry and this proved undemocratic and primitive for a new nation yearning for development in all phases of life.

All these encouraged poor political orientation and social awareness which are needed to advance the existing electoral system, social cohesion and political emancipation. These must have instigated series of coups staged against the Jawara regime until that of the 1994 became manifest and successful. In 1956 Gold Coast pre-independence elections and Nigeria's 1959 pre-independence elections, violence were reported and wide political corruption were reminiscent of the political systems in spite of the credibility of the party candidates like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Nnamdi Azikwe, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and S. L. Akintola, both of Nigeria. The leadership in the Gambia in the independence election and up to 1994 was able to maintain electoral harmony amidst tensions. The electoral harmony plus the relative peace enjoyed in the country have been assets for political stability and viable environment. While such environment was good for business investment and economic advancement of the society, in the first republic, the Sir. Jawara government did merely little to harness the opportunity in advancing development

and growth for its people. These development strides which have been pursued and stupendously invigorated and sustained by the second republic's leader Yahya Jammeh have become instrumental for sustainable growth and nation-building processes and peace for the country.

### **The Electoral Process and Practice in the Gambia's Second Republic (1994 - Date)**

Mechanism, Dynamics, Strategies and Drawbacks. The change of power in the Gambia's political process in 1994 came in the form of a bloodless coup which occurred on Friday, July 22, 1994 when a group of young officers of the Gambia National Army (GNA) led by Lieutenant Yahya A. J. J. Jammeh struck to take over the government of president Jawara of the people's Progressive Party (PPP). Thereafter, the military government established an Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) which put in place a two-year transitional process for the purpose of conducting elections that would return the country back to a civilian rule. The overthrow of the Jawara led – government was justified by the corruption claims levelled against the regime by the new leaders and the promises made to the Gambian people to correct things, eradicate corruption in all spheres of governance, and bring succour to the Gambian people through an all-round development. Other leaders of the coup were Lieutenants Sana Sabally, Sadibou Hydar, Edward Singhateh and Yankuba Touray, all of whom were from the GNA, Hughes, (2006: 280), Perfect (2008: 431). After the evening of the coup and announcements of the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council together with other justifications for an established military political order, the leaders settled down for work, dissolved all political parties, banned all political movements and activities including campaigns, meetings and gatherings, abolished the constitution and made some significant arrests of suspected corrupt government officials for their trials and subsequent recoveries of government assets and properties. A purge of the civil service was also carried out and a few months later, the electoral process was put back into force to commence journeys to civil rule through elections. Indicating the popularity of the 'take over', particularly among the youths who embraced the coup

and the welcoming accorded it by the main opposition parties as well as the acceptance of ministerial appointments by the two former PPP ministers, coupled with the non-resistance the officers enjoyed from co-colleagues in the army as well as those from the Senegalese Army after the Senegalese government dissolved the Senegambia Confederation for non-cooperative attitude of the Jawara administration in 1989, albeit, the non-preparedness of the United States to instruct the crew of its visiting warship to put down the insurrection, the new military rule enjoyed nation-wide cooperation up to the rural areas across the constituent tribal groupings on the hope of a new change and development. After surviving an attempted coup by two of the AFPRC leaders, Sana sabally and Sadibou Hy dara in November 1994, Colonel Jammeh set up a National Consultative Committee (NCC) to look into how to return the country into civilian rule and modalities to follow. The Commission put up recommendations for a new political order such as the drafting of a new constitution through a referendum to be conducted and the setting up of a constituent assembly and the reduction of the four-year military rule to two years.

These recommendations were overwhelmingly accepted by the new military leader and in August 1996, the referendum was actually held, and a presidential election was fixed for September of the same year after the referendum endorsed a new constitution called the “1996 Gambia’s Constitution”. Political activism resumed partially prior to August 1996 during which the established AFPRC was changed to a political party known as the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and construction (APRC) and the head of state himself declared his interest to contest the September 1996 election as president. He resigned from the GNA and registered with the established independent Electoral Commission (IEC) situated in Banjul. The People’s Democratic Organization for independence and socialism (PDOIS), being the only party on which the partial ban was not reinforced and allowed to partake in the September presidential election, presented Sidia Jatta, while the two newly established parties, the United Democratic Party (UDP)

and the National Reconciliation Party (NRP) presented A.N. M. Ousainou Darboe (a lawyer by profession) and Alhaji Hamat N. K. Bah respectively. Given the popularity Yahya Jammeh's military administration had enjoyed, the goodwill of his person among the citizenry as the one looked up to, to deliver the best dividends of governance, ensure unity and harmony among the diverse population and bring development to the doorsteps of every Gambian and coupled with the divisions among the opposition ranks together with the effective campaigning strategies of the new APRC, the latter was able to secure victory with 56% of the vote to the 36% of Darboe with Bah and Jatta trailing behind. There was a similar result in the National Assembly election in January 1997, with the APRC winning 33 out of the 45 seats while UDP won seven to become the main opposition party in the parliament. If we flash back to the unique nature of the Gambia's voting system that is not easily frauded or compromised and which was also used in the 1996 elections coupled with the popular 'Will' that the APRC as a newly launched party enjoys and the strategies of its campaigns, which this author would elaborate on after, one would say and confirm that the APRC genuinely won the 1996 presidential election and the 1997 parliamentary polls respectively.

It could be said that the election was free from any form of intimidation, harassments, bribery and cynicism. The elections were free and fair with credible results. As this type of development situation is rare in other Sub-Saharan Africa when the military takeover government and are returning their countries to civil rule, there are usually electoral contestations and fraud either perpetrated by the regime in power that wants to transform itself into civilian rule at all cost through falsified election results or perpetrated by the influential political party or parties that have collaborated with the military to be seated in power. This is usually possible when or where the election system or the voting system is easily vulnerable. The Gambia's case is different and it is so with the aid of a viable traditionally adopted voting system of the use of token. Furthermore,

with this voting methodology, people could accept results in good faith including the opposition and the international observers seeing them as credible and just. The love the people themselves have for the new regime was another instrumental factor which was used as a strategy to intensify development-oriented campaigns as well as indoctrinations of an “ideology salvaging” that rested on ‘rescue mission’ of my people from poverty, illiteracy and total subjugation. Today, after about eighteen years of rule, it is not an illusion or is it over-statement to conclude that the APRC government has caused a revolution in the entire Gambian nation and its people with spectrum of avalanche developmental projects covering virtually all aspects of human endeavors. In infrastructures such as road networks, good portable and drinking water, twenty-four hours uninterrupted electricity, good housing schemes, good working environment, enabling and harmonious investment climate, establishments of educational institutions and the improvements of the teaching and learning conditions at all strata of education including the establishment of the first ever owned government university, the University of the Gambia.

The health sector is not left behind as different classical and ultra-modern and state of the art hospitals and clinics are springing up daily including the rehabilitations of the existing (RVTH) now called Edward Francis Small Teaching Hospital built by the colonial master but had gone decayed because of lack of government attention or the neglect and nondevelopment attitudinal behavior of the previous regime. In Agriculture, the country can now boast of increased revenues as GDP from its main crop (groundnut) and several other crops like cashew etc. Animal husbandry and veterinary services have been enlarged and improved upon, cattle being the main product of the people. The president himself had launched “Operation Back to the Land” and “Let us Grow What We Eat and Eat What We Grow” which necessitated the establishments of the Kanilai farms where the produces of the farms are used to leverage poverty and hunger as well as generate employment for the wandering youths that had been left unkempt by the Jawara administration.

The tourism industry, oil and gas, fisheries, Banking, Finance and Insurance, Beverages and Security Services have been stupendously invigorated with the availability of favorable and peaceful investment climate. These have attracted overwhelming investments from Europe, Asia and friendly African nations like Nigeria where the latter has dominated more than fifty percent of the businesses in the Gambia.

### **Gambia's Foreign Relationship in the Second Republic**

The government of President Jammeh has also improved on foreign relations with increased establishments of embassies and commissions abroad, that which cut across continents of the world including America and the Russian Federation. More opportunities have come for many Gambians through the goodwill of the regime and its policy – thrust both at home and abroad. The civil service and the private sector, including the transportation and communication sectors have been Gambia-nized. Employment opportunities have been generated for Gambians across the sector of the economy up to the aviation and engineering sectors. Medical Doctors who are Gambians have been produced from the University of the Gambia, Engineers, Architects, Information Technology Experts, Nurses and Midwives, Agricultural Experts, Lecturers in various disciplines who are Gambia origins as well as technocrats, through the transformation agenda of the President of the Gambia, Sheikh Prof. Alagie Dr. Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh. Through the efforts of the APRC government and in fulfillments of its promises to the people during the takeover of government and subsequent transition from military to civilian leadership under Yahya Jammeh, Gambians, home and abroad, have been given international appointments and awards. For example, Mrs. Fatou Bensouda was appointed in 2012 as the new chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC) and her appointment has brought glory and more recognition for the state of the Gambia in international arena under this government. The second republic regime has also helped many Gambians at home and abroad through promotion of education and

technical expertise to gain opportunities in various fields of endeavor. Many Gambians have equally been sent abroad for higher degrees up to PhD in Taiwan, Cuba, Nigeria and Ghana, Europe and America, Malaysia, Hongkong, Japan the list goes on, in order to strengthen the country's manpower and resource development.

Members of the Armed Forces up to Fire Service staff and Prison Officials have been encouraged to go back to schools for acquisition of more knowledge, skills and experience not only as officers but as individuals so that when they retire from service they can still not be tired by be useful for themselves and the nation. Intelligence training supports have been sought from advanced friendly nations like America, Britain, France and here in Africa, Nigeria for the personnel of the Gambia Armed Forces for the purpose of strengthening and widening the scope and size of the army. This is evidenced in the astronomical number of officers that are being sent abroad especially the USA for more training and knowledge to build capacity. As a result, the Gambia has been able to increase her troop and material contributions to peace-keeping efforts within the ECOWAS sub-region, the AU and the UN. Port services have been greatly invigorated and enlarged to contain and serve the increasing and advanced economic activities and enterprising which have received boosts from the foreign investments that the peace and stability in the Gambia is attracting back home to improve the quality of life of an average Gambian and non-Gambian alike that visit and live in the Gambia. More government institutions have been established to render services to the people in every sector of the economy including employment generation in the private sector like in the banking and finance institutions, hotelling, building and construction. The government has also been very accommodating and tolerant with foreigners who have come to stay in the Gambia as a result of good climate and conducive living environment by allowing them to engage freely in various trade and businesses without disturbance. Many have been engaged in public service such as in the education, judiciary, aviation, farming and tourism to name a few and all these have

added to the GDP and GNP for Gambia's foreign earnings. If peace is not promoted and efforts to achieve this are not re-doubled in the current dispensation, most possibly the country might still be far behind in advancement. It is therefore imperative to acknowledge the development strides of the Yahya Jammeh administration in this republic without prejudices, just as it is important to commend the transformation agenda of the regime in the deliveries of good governance and dividends of democracy to the people of the Gambia.

Crystal to say that the peace in the Gambia has a corresponding effect on the peace attainable within the immediate borders of the state including the troubled Cassamance. If these giant strides are intensified in fewer years to come, it is probable, if not realistic that Gambia might rise to become an economic super power just as is referred the peace super power in the world. If countries like Singapore, Indonesia and Hong Kong in Far East Asia through their ASEAN TIGER cooperation could rise to the economic powers they are today, the tiny Gambia could make it, in view of quality of leadership and cohesion as well as the good will the country enjoys from far and near within the international system and global economic and political relations under Yahya Jammeh regime. This writer is of the opinion that within political realms and economic affairs in the comity of nations, the current regime should be commended for giant strides in development. In the area of human rights and press freedom, the second republic efforts to guarantee these have been encouraging contrary to opinions in some quarters. What the government tries to ensure is the damage abuses of these privileges and rights in the bid of enjoying them can do to the guaranteed peace in the forms of importations of foreign ideals, sectarian practices and undesirable civil disobedience. As these occurrences which are strange in the Gambia pose serious threats to the international community and world peace as they occur in other nations, the government in regime is more cautious and careful in allowing excesses as well as undue favor. The government in the Gambia under the second republic has also been very critical in tackling crimes. War has

been declared against crimes such as illicit drugs and drug trafficking, human trafficking, child and sex abuses, character assassination, laziness, hooliganism and politics of brutalities in the bid for desperate wealth. Rumor mongering and sheer gossiping that lead to carrying of wrong information have also been legislated against to curtail their surge in a society where problem of literacy is in question and under attention of government.

This writer views with concern how these malaise and crimes heighten so rapidly occurrences of violence in societies. Having discovered the problems that these nuisances in societies constitute to peace and a stable political process, the government of Yahya Jammeh leaves no stone unturned to condone any of these in governance. As a result, condemnations come from those who are major beneficiaries of crimes and social decays, albeit political machinations as they are being deprived of their proceeds in favor of stability and peace sustenance in the Gambia. For example, the Gambia is among the four countries that dropped newly to lowest ranking in US human trafficking report according to releases carried by the media (both locally and internationally). This implies, the nation will be more accessible to international support and aids that are needed for development and growth especially from the international institutions like the IMF, the World Bank and highly advanced nations like the US, Canada and Europe. This is already evident in the ways many more countries around the world, from Asia, Latin America, North America, Europe, the Middle East have opened up diplomatic and business relations with the country as well as how many groups, institutions and individuals have made Gambia a place of call. The rest of the three countries that dropped in ranking are Thailand, Malaysia and Venezuela. This development is healthy for stability and electoral cohesion that will continue to sustain and consolidate on the peace enjoyed in the Gambia. Foreign investment will be promoted and economic climate will be made conducive and harmonious to do business. All forms of religious intolerance and unauthorized associations and movements that can cripple the efforts of government in governance on the altar of human

rights and press freedom in delivering the dividends of democracy are disallowed in the national interests. What makes Gambia to be free from violence and other occurrence of crises is not an easy task for the government and so may not be well with some people in some quarters within and without who aim to destabilize the peace of the country and turn volatile the political situation basically because they are deprived and denied.

These groups would seek for recognition from global powers in the name of human rights abuses and elongated rule to take Gambia back to yester years and make her to join the club of terrorist nations where peace is a strange commodity and safety is an illusion. Consequently, the government of the second republic strives to seek understanding of its good intentions to prevent crisis rather than be curing them within the global realm. Today, we all see what is happening in other parts of the sub-region like Nigeria, Mali, Niger and the Cote d'ivoire where terrorists like the face-less Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Maghreb in Northern Mali are causing mayhems on daily basis, the one that attracts not only members of the ECOWAS sub-region nor the rest of Africa but also the entire global community where the issue of peace and international security has been an uncompromising critical issue against all forms of international terrorism and other crimes that are capable of leading the world into another disintegration that was experienced during the first and second world wars before the establishment of the United Nations and its Security Council. Other strategies evolved by the government of the second republic under President Yahya Jammeh in the effort to guarantee peace and a viable electoral process that will enhance good governance are the involvements of women and youths in politics and the central place that has been accorded them in various political offices. These groups who appear to be closer to the grass root and the interior of the Gambia society and which of course dominate the larger portion of the Gambia population are empowered and their horizons broadened for full engagements in the governance process. They are used for campaigns during politics, their rights protected and liberty

preserved, more recognition are given to their hard work particularly the women as the latter strive to be pro-active in supporting development strides and the transformation agenda of the Yahya Jammeh regime.

This becomes a boost for the government to gain more recognition and formidable stand in politics, thereby winning every election when it is held which is presumed to be misinterpreted. With women engagement and that of the youths in politics, gender barriers which is one of the areas of focus by governance experts and practitioners today has been broken and youth restiveness has been suppressed drastically. These two key issue-areas have been issues not ignored and so crises not ensued. The government also strives to cater for the aged by setting aside provisions for their cares and upkeep. Monthly allowance is given them to sustain their living and those retired are paid their pensions promptly. Often times, their hospital bills are cleared and free medical care is given to them and their relatives. This has been an impetus for President Yahya Jammeh's re-elections up till date. The government also from time to time engages in consultations with the people up to the interior villages. The President and his entourage often embark on "Bantaba" gatherings that bring the people together as a family with their leader to discuss affairs that concern them and find solutions to areas that need them. Government has also endeavored to promote wolof as a national language even though it is still not the officially legalized national language within the provisions of the constitution, but it has helped in the integration of the society as one house irrespective of differences in beliefs, ideology and interests. On January 25, 2008, an independent writer authored (DO) was writing on peaceful elections in the Gambia in the Daily observer with regards to 'Giant Strides in Elections in the Gambia' and it goes..... "Many a time, Africans are bothered with talk about the model of democracy that exists in the West. Nowhere is this more pronounced than in the American media, where journalists preoccupy themselves with the painting of their model as the only viable path to peace and progress".

The opinion argued that any true and sincere person who has watched the manner in which political events have been unfolding in the country's democratic governance system in the past few years will give a big thumbs-up to the giant strides made by the Gambia. According to the writer, during this period, developments hitherto unknown in the country's political evolution have taken place. The space in our political system has been opened to accommodate multi-party democracy, where political parties and media institutions have been allowed to participate, thereby giving Gambians the opportunity to access objectives and diverse information at necessary and relevant times. The most laudable development among them is the establishment of an independent democratic institution, such as the 'IEC', which is constitutionally mandated to oversee issues pertaining to national elections. Unlike what obtained in the past, the establishment of this national institution has ushered in and consolidated into the country's electoral system confidence and trust. No wonder, this model of the country's electoral system has continued to generate both local and international recognition. The reporter further asserted.... "All these developments have created the necessary conduits for the population to make political choices in a mature manner devoid of intimidation or interference. The reporter stressed the peaceful and orderly manner in which the local government elections of 24th January, 2008 was conducted, the orderly and most responsible ways both the security personnel, election officials and party faithfuls as well as the voters conducted and comported themselves, arguing this is typical of the international reputation the Gambia has enjoyed and continues to enjoy as a super power of peace in the world.

Despite the political divides, Gambians go to polls to vote and refuse to be dampened at a time when some countries in the African continent like Kenya and Cote d'ivoire are gripped by an orgy of fatal political violence. These developments have confirmed Gambia's position as the best promoter of peace that transcends political divides, economic disparities and social inequalities as well as cultural differences and varied mind sets. The developments have helped to keep the people

together as one people, promote a common cause which is peace development and peacebuilding, and promote national consciousness towards nationbuilding, where differences have become national strengths. In a report published by Musa Ndow, a reporter with the Daily Observer, on March 14th – 16th, 2014 and captioned “Jammeh’s Expertise Sought Ahead of Bissau Poll”, Guinea Bissau’s Chief diplomat to the Gambia, His Excellency, Idrisa Diallo was quoted in an exclusive interview with journalists as saying; “The intervention of President Jammeh in engaging the stakeholders in dialogue will be crucial to the process, given his past successful initiatives in the Bissau electoral and governance process”. The special envoy affirms further... “I personally want His Excellency, Sheik Prof. Alagie Dr. A. J. J. Jammeh to help us. I know he has been helping and he is very much concerned about our welfare; but we will still need his support. We will appreciate if he can send a delegation to engage all the stakeholders in the political front to talk to them so that we can conduct our elections peacefully”. The diplomat describes President Jammeh as a good negotiator and one who knows how to get what he wants and use what he gets to improve on what is on the ground, stressing the leader’s giant strides and preponderance of development projects he has achieved or accomplished in the Gambia.

The leader’s giant strides in electoral process and governance were also commended by the Nigerian leader, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan when in November, 2013, he visited President Jammeh in the Gambia en-route Guinea Bissau and Conakry, when the former remarked on the administrative skill and political experience the latter possesses to lead not only the Gambia people as a nation but the whole of Africa, especially in the conducts of elections and handling of sensitive issues of national question. His experience in the boiling and thematic issue of the Cassamance to resolve between them and the Senegalese government is another maestro legacy, albeit, his leadership of the African Union Security Council to resolve crises-proven issues like those of the South-Sudan and the Central African Republic. All these are particularly to put credence to

President Yahya Jammeh's skills and diplomacy of handling crises in the one part and restore peace where such are crucially needed and in the other part to prevent such from happening where they are imminent.

Electoral crises, as we all know is one of crucial areas of political affairs that quickly spur and spark violence of ignominy that easily truncate a viable political process. Electoral crises fuel political divides, cultural differences and politics of 'do or die' affair, culminating into political assassination, socio-economic mayhems, youth restiveness and political gangsterism. It results into a term of unpredictability, uncertainty and confusion, a time of arsons and massive destructions of life and property. Should a government of any nation be able to curtail this surge or totally prevent their occurrences at all, then, we can say such a government is violent free and an advocate of non-violence and peace development. This is evident in the catalogues of awards internationally and nationally which spectrum of institutions like religious bodies, countries and regime bodies have showered on President Jammeh to honor, encourage him and sharpen his psychological morale and postures. In spite of these giant strides and many others, there are areas within the governance to be improved upon in the advancement of peace and development. For example, there is still need for the government to engage the people the more, especially the local people, among which illiteracy is still high in the activities of government and its transformation agenda of turning the Gambia into what the president fondly refers to as 'the economic super power' and the food basket of the Sub-Saharan Africa. It is also crucial for the government to increase level of political participation as well as make more prudent, equal opportunities for all where no Gambian irrespective of differences will be left behind or be kept from the benefits of resource distribution and equity. Going by this preponderance of development and giant strides, it is evident that efforts under the second republic to preserve peace in the Gambia and make possible a viable voting system that promotes political stability and economic prospect have been more

pragmatic and over-arching. The second republic leader appears more courageous, determined and unwavering to taking the Gambia to a greater height where it can be a voice for Africa in world affairs. Efforts are being re-doubled towards self-reliance and self-sufficiency but without compromises with those things that tend to jettison peace and cohesion. On the international scene, Jammeh has increased considerably and tremendously Gambia's relations abroad and establishments of diplomatic missions, that which was not invigorated in the first republic. The electoral process therefore has constituted a source of peace to achieve greatly by successive governments in the Gambia through adoption of unique voting system and the use of strategies to accomplish missions.

#### **2.4 Democratic Transition**

Democratic transition is the movement from one government to another. Such transition and movement is created by tenure expiration in some cases. Change of government using various methods is also a transitional development. A popularly accepted notion is the view that democratic transition implies the movement from one democratic government to another. Democratic transition is a switch from one government to another.

Omoruyi (2003) posits that it is not a single day switch. It is a switch that takes time. In Elaigwu's (1986) narrations, democratic transition is a designed programme of movement from totalitarian regime to a democratic order. Under apartheid South Africa, Mandela (1994) conceived democratic transition as a gradual movement from minority to majority rule.

Omoruyi (2003) further submits that democratic transition is a broad threshold that commences with the empowerment of individual citizens and group that eventually leads to the installation a winner of an election and his survival in office of whole rule. This implies that democratic transition is a systematic approach to the establishment of a democratic regime in the context of

totalitarian regime states. It is an act of trying to achieve and make democracy work. Making democracy work as NDI (2014) submits require informed and active citizens who understand how to voice their interests, act collectively and hold public officials accountable. Democratic transition is a process of movement leading towards the establishment of civil rule therefore, Przeworski et al (2000) considers it as democratization. and democratization as Inglehart and Welzel (1993) identified, is a movement to a more democratic political regime. Putman et al (1993) asserts that it may be the transition from an authoritative regime to a full democracy. Democratization as Colomer (2000) believes is a transition from an authoritative political system to a semi-democracy. But Epstein et al (2004) submits that it is a transition from a semi-authoritarian regime to a democratic political system.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) subscribed to the view that democratization is a transition from less to a more democratic political system. They also posit that economic development, history and civil society are some of the factors that influence democratization. Nigeria's economic development experience and political history as well as the nature of its civil society shape its democratization process at different times that the country adopted such attempts to lead the nation into democratic rule. Democratic transition has been considered as democratization since it entails a gradual process and switch from one government to another. Democracy is thus an essential issue in democratic transition and democracy as Coleman and Lawson-Reiner (2013) observed is struggling.

Epstein et al (2004) contends that the study of democratization is one of the most vulnerable literatures in comparative politics. It is one of the most vigorous, as controversies over theory and method interact with empirical research in debating the origins and determinants of democratic forms of government. In Nigeria, the democratic form of government became necessary on

realization of the political and economic backwardness that was setting into the system and polity as a result of the age-long military regime that refused to transfer political power to a democratic government aspired by the Nigerian people. The period between political independence and final transition to civil rule in the country in 1999 witnessed an unprecedented military rule accompanied by constitutional suspension and disrespect for the fundamental human rights of citizens and the rule of law. But still under civil rule, periodic occasional insecurity situations arising at different locations in the country left most of the ordinary citizens aspiring for a military regime which they just came out from few years ago. Both mass and elite political culture affects democratic transition in the country. And the level of influence which attitudes have on the development of democracy in the country thus, affect also the economic and political development of the nation.

## **2.5 Conflict**

Etymologically the word conflict comes from the Latin word “confligere” which means to strike together. Conflict is a situation that involves at least two actors. These actors should somehow interact directly or indirectly in order to be engaged in a conflict. Therefore, conflict is a relation among actors (Eynikel and Ziaka 2011). In more general terms, conflict is a type of disagreement among two or more actors related to a particular situation. It is a hostile positioning of the actors that could evolve into some kind of aggressive behaviour.

The Foundation Coalition (2012) defined conflict “as a struggle or contest between people with opposing needs, ideas, beliefs, values or goals”. Conflict within teams is inevitable; however, the results of conflict are not predetermined. Conflict might escalate and lead to non-productive results, or conflict can be beneficially resolved and lead to quality final products. Kalu Kelechi, says that “conflict is a process of interaction between two or more parties that seek to thwart, injure

or destroy their opponent because they perceive they have incompatible goals or interests” (Kalu 2003). Furthermore, “conflict is a struggle, between individuals or collectives, or even values or claims to status, power and scarce resources in which the aims of the conflicting parties are to assert their values over those of others” (Goodhand and Hulme 1999).

The dynamism of conflict constitutes an intricate interplay of characteristics which likely require a third party as the conflict develops. This characteristic of conflict, led to studies in understanding of the importance of conflict resolution. This is because, according to the theorists, that conflict can be categorized into two classes, which are; destructive or constructive. Constructive conflict has been argued to be an important necessity to the society, as it remains key in understanding the normative orientation of conflict resolution as well as a valuable aspect in human creativity.

Johan Galtung(2003) as among initial scholars of peace and conflict studies, theorized conflict in successive subdivisions, which are; Symmetric and asymmetric this symptomatically can either be classified as structural, cultural or direct violence, in which case, if not adequately responded to, structures into Negative or positive peace.

Symmetric conflict could be viewed with contradiction. In which case, contradiction signifies an underlying conflict situation that can either be actual or perceived, based on the parties in conflict. This is because, contradiction in a symmetric conflict is defined by the parties. It can be influenced by the parties’ interest and the clash of interest between them. Asymmetric conflict which is also viewed through a contradiction lens, expounds its contradiction to parties’ relationships and their conflict of interests integral in the relationship.

The contradiction and characteristics of both the symmetric and asymmetric conflict were built up to the two aspects to explain the phenomenon, this are; attitudes and behaviours. Attitudes

encompasses perceptions and misperceptions amongst parties, which can either be of a positive or negative end result, in which case attitudes are influenced by emotions of hatred, fear and bitterness. It has three elements which are either of feelings (emotive), beliefs (cognitive), and desire or will (conative). behaviour is characterized by coercion or cooperation. Signs in this particular phenomenon are either of conciliation or hostility. Hostility on behavior is coupled by threats, coercion and damaging attacks.

Galtung (2003) argued that conflict without attitudes or behavior that exist in cases, is known as structural conflict. This is because; structural conflict can only be successfully avoided through elimination of structural contradictions and injustices. Cultural violence in retrospect can only be eliminated through changing attitudes while direct violence through changing conflict behavior.

This is because, direct violence is characterized by the immediate cause of action by conflict, and structural violence and indirect cause of action by conflict, while cultural violence, seeks to justify why direct and structural violence occurred in the first place. Understanding of these stages of conflict, have a massive impact on peacekeeping, peace building and peacemaking missions. In which case, in order to critically analyze direct, structural and cultural violence, it requires the understanding of the concepts of positive and negative peace. This is because, conceptually, in order for one to eliminate direct violence, negative peace has to be in existence, and in order for one to eliminate structural and cultural violence, positive peace has to be in existence.

Negative peace has been argued to ensure absence of direct violence, in which case, presence of structural and cultural violence still exist in this type of society. Negative peace has been implored in cases of discrimination, persecution, genocide, the terrible destruction of war and the threat of nuclear holocaust. Negative peace is coupled by repression, deprivation, exploitation and injustice. The term 'negative' is used in this sense in relation to peace because, it offers a society the sense

of peace which exists theoretically but not in actualization, as it offers a sense of perceptive peace. This is because, a sense of people killing each other in the society is not evident, but grievances are still being experienced in the society. Hence the concept of ‘happyslaves’ and or ‘suffering and smiling’; this is the situation many African societies are currently into, e.g. Nigeria, Kenya, Burundi, Uganda, among many others.

In contrast, positive peace is theorized by an eventual elimination of cultural and structural violence, in which case, direct violence cannot exist. This is a concept of an ‘ideal’ society, one which only experiences total peace, not in perception or theory, but in actual existence and practice. It illuminates a society which is legitimate and just in all aspects. It addresses issues of unjust economic relations, differences of race gender, class, and unjust political relations between majority and minority groups within a country, to unjust personal relations between individuals. However, in understanding all this, Galtung (2003) further conceptualizes that contradictions, attitudes and behaviour have to be present in a society in order to realize a full blown conflict. This is because, the dynamism of conflict illustrates that attitudes, structure and behavior are constantly changing and influencing one another.

This influence eventually leads to an oppressive relationship between parties or their interests changing. This then leads to parties utilizing this atmosphere to develop hostile attitudes and conflictual behaviour. This eventually manifests into a full blown conflict with other parties being drawn in, hostility deepening and spreading ultimately generating secondary conflicts. This usually leads to a complicated situation in an attempt to address original core conflict.

In which case, resolving conflict has to be dynamic and creative as conflict also is. It has to encompass a set of creative techniques which will promote de-escalation of conflicting behavior,

a change in attitudes, and a transformation of the relationships or clashing interests that are at the core of the conflict structure.

Onumajuru, (2005) writes that conflict is a very fluid and ambiguous concept. According to the International Alert, an NGO “Conflict is a multi-dimensional social process which is a common and essential feature of human existence. When expressed and handled constructively, conflict can act as a catalyst for personal, social and political change and transformation. When it is expressed destructively, conflict fosters violence and damage that is familiar in wars and violent conflicts. According to Tom Woodhouse (2000), conflict is the pursuit of incompatible goals by individuals or groups. The use of such a broad definition allows for the consideration of any conflict, whether it is interpersonal or international, whether it is pursued by peaceful means or by the use of force. Contemporary conflict, refers to the prevailing pattern of political and violent conflict in the post-cold war world, while contemporary armed conflicts refers to those that involve the use of force (Zartama 1996). Conflict is an inevitable aspect of human life, which Zartman sees as something that is desirable (Zartama 1996). Stedman is of the view that; “Conflict stems from the basic fact of human interdependence. Seeking to satisfy their needs, wants and desires, people make demands upon themselves, upon the physical environment, upon other people, and upon whatever organization and institutions that appear to be in a position to help them” (Stedman 1996). This definition offered by Stedman is clearly not narrowed to the African situation.

Stagner defines conflict as “a situation in which two or more human beings desire goods which they perceive as being obtainable by one or the other, but not that each party is mobilizing energy to obtain a goal, a desired object or situation, and each party perceives the other as a barrier or threat to that goal” (Stagner, 1967). The British Defence Doctrine however defines conflict “as a human struggle manifested as a clash of wills between two opposing leaders or leadership groups.

It may also become a contest of wills between opposing populations who are suffering as a result of hostilities” (. British Defence Doctrine, London, 1996). The similarity of these definitions shows that conflict can be said to be a familiar and basic phenomenon of human interaction. Deng, Kimaru and Zartman defined conflict as “perceived divergence of interest” or “action seeking inconsistent goals” (Deng, Kirmaru, Lyons, Rothchild and Zartaman, 1996).

Based on the above premises therefore, it is safe to put that conflict is a situation where by two parties agree to disagree or disagree to agree with or without the use of force. However, conflict is inevitable.

## **2.6 Classifications of Conflicts**

As has been indicated above, scholars and students of conflict resolution have provided definitions for the concept of 'conflict,' looking at it from different angles and within different contexts as explained in the previous section. Indeed, the general consensus among political scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, social psychologists, and/or legal experts in the field have settled on defining any form of conflict, as a struggle over values, clash of interests, claims to status, power, and scarce resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals.

There are also conflicts that, although they do not involve clear-cut objectives over which parties are rivaling, also have the same effects as the ones described above. These include terrorism, hijacking, drug trafficking, gangster related crimes, organized crimes, religious violence, urban warfare, and kidnapping. These types of conflicts have great impact(s) on the socio-political and economic relationships in many societies. However, public media tend not to expose the origins or causes of these conflicts. It is also important to note that the intensity of some of these conflicts may be far more destructive and violent compared to other conventional types of conflicts such as regional and international wars or civil strife<sup>7</sup> (Sandole 1993; Burton 1990).

In general, terms, the nature of conflict issues may fall into the following five categories:

- Sovereignty issues (structural factors) involving adversaries with incompatible claims to a specific piece of territory
- Ideology issues (political and cultural factors) focusing on the nature of a political system, basic values, or beliefs
- Security issues (including economic factors) concerning frontiers, borders and territories
- Issues of self-determination and national selfhood in independence conflicts (Kleiboer 1996).

On the other hand, conflicts whether they are caused by humans or not, require mechanisms to resolve them. The use of these methods is determined by the knowledge and the understanding of the nature of the conflicts by the mediators or facilitators who are tasked to resolve the conflict. It is noticeable that in those conflicts that are difficult to resolve, the difficulty is not necessarily attributed to their complexities, rather it is because sometimes the mediators have very little knowledge of the origins and the nature of these conflicts.

The post-structuralism theories prefer to classify conflicts into five levels, namely, biological, physiological, societal, international and global conflicts. Indeed, understanding the causes of each set of conflicts may make it easy for the mediators, facilitators or regional and international organizations' conflict resolution practitioners to deal with conflicts, each within its category and context.

### **2.6.1 Biological conflicts**

This category of conflicts is concerned with human nature. According to this level of conflict, the assumption is that violent human behaviour is a function of a biologically determined human nature. Understood as such, it lends itself easily to a non-voluntary and spontaneous view of conflict and conflict resolution. The assumption is that conflicts are produced by biologically motivated actions or behaviour of human beings (Sandole 1993).

St. Augustine (1948) on the other hand, argues that negative human behaviour is a function of 'original sin'. The assumption is that man was peaceful and sinless before Adam and Eve disobeyed God's commands. In this sense, a conflict may be considered to be the result of humankind's actions.

Sigmund Freud (1930) in turn, viewed human destructiveness as the result of a "dialectical struggle" between two opposing forces from within an individual, namely, one associated with life (Eros) and the other with death (Thanatos). The human reaction to events in Freudian argument is determined by the result of this dialectical struggle within oneself (Meadow and Spohnitz 1995). Furthermore, Hans Morgenthau (1973), the father of the Cold War's 'balance of power politics,' postulates that humans are being driven by their need for power and security in pursuit of interest defined as power, which is survival. Morgenthau (1973) believes that power is the determinant factor in human relations, and thus the main drive behind any conflict.

The implication in the above discussion is that an understanding of human motivations through his/her actions can only be achieved if the character of the person in question is related to his/her motives. That is, answering the question why he or she behaves or reacts that way, is related to his/her human nature. It is difficult however, to determine how and why a person behaves the way he/she does, and therefore in such a conflict situation, finding the appropriate conflict resolution mechanism becomes a laborious task.

### **2.6.2 Physiological conflicts**

This category argues that the form of physiological expression of a conflict is determined by the interaction between a physiological mechanism, stimulation of the mechanism and learning (Sandole 1993). Conflict at this level is acquired through interaction with nature and other fellow human beings. Indeed, Scott (1958) contends that humans have "an internal physiological mechanism which has only to be stimulated to produce fighting."

In other words, the motivation for aggression is often intensified and reinforced through success, and that the longer the success continues, the stronger the motivation becomes. This argument seems to suggest that the successful party in the conflict will have little interest in resolving the conflict as long as it feels that it is on the winning side, and the opposite tends to be true.

For example, in some conflicts in Africa, such as in Angola in the 1980s and the early 1990s, where one party regarded itself as victorious, solutions took longer to be reached. On the other hand, individuals who feel that they may suffer a symbolical or material loss in a conflict, tend to be accommodating regarding solutions that may help them retain some respect, while potential victors tend to be stubborn to seek peaceful solutions.

### **2.6.3 Societal conflicts**

Conflicts at the societal level tend to have peculiarities that differ from one society to another. The main question that often arises is: why are some communities more prone to conflict or certain forms of it than others? John Burton argues that explanation of social change and of the consequences of resistance to change is centred on the individual's role in society (Ross 1993; Burton 1984). This means that those groups that prefer the status quo, as long as it serves their interests, resist changes in society. The losing party would do anything to see that change takes place, and sometimes they act merely for the sake of attaining change.

On the other hand, Robert North and others believed that if the perceptions of anxiety, fear, threat, or injury are great enough, even the perception of one's own inferior capability will fail to deter a person or a nation from going to war (Zines, North and Koch 1961). When a given group feels threatened or marginalized, its first option tends to be violence. Thus, violence according to the societal level theoreticians is the result of the passions override reason or when a person or a group becomes desperate to achieve his/her goals.

In terms of economic relations, whether in urban or rural societies or in both, John Burton argues that: “the major sources of potential conflict between capitalism and socialism are the shortcomings within each system that render each insecure, even without external threat” (Burton 1984: 3, 6-7).

These shortcomings may result in ethnic conflicts, racial conflicts, high levels of street violence, high levels of unemployment and growing inequality of income and opportunity. When solutions to these shortcomings are not found, violence becomes an alternative to the status quo.

In Africa, as in many societies elsewhere, conflicts over potential threats or fear of the unknown, results in community violence. When some members of a given society feel that others are involved in unjust practices regarding them, they tend not to look into their real power balance; rather they choose to take extreme measures that may sometimes lead to further humiliation.

#### **2.6.4 International conflicts**

The significant role of a conflict in the international environment at this level can vary, depending on whether the international political systems are unipolar, bipolar or multipolar. For example, the collapse of the bipolar system in 1989-1990 was accompanied by a resurrection in ethnic conflicts and nationalist sentiments in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union republics. While the bipolar international system might have served its political, ideological and economic purposes well during the Cold War era, there is no doubt that it did have its own inherent and devastating weaknesses. On the other hand, the trend towards the multipolar or multilateral system has also been criticized by some politicians and academics, and they described it as a move in the direction of a “unit veto state,” where many, most, or all states have the capacity to destroy everyone else. The underlying assumption is that some of the powerful states prefer the unipolar system (as practiced by the United States of America in Afghanistan and Iraq in 1991 and 2003), which allows them to dictate the trend of world politics (Sandole 1993).

The EU for instance, has been trying since the early 1990s to become a partner of the US in deciding the policies that shape world order. Apparently, the US has not been forthcoming or accommodative in this venture. This has created some tensions in the relationships between the two powers. The launch of the Euro monetary system in January 2002, 'international terrorism' and the tensions in the Middle East are some of the conflicts that are likely to dominate Euro-American relations in the 2000s.

What do these categories of conflicts have to do with conflicts in Africa? At the international level, with the super and medium Western powers pre-occupied with the war against what they call international terrorism, Africa will be affected in two ways: blackout from the active world attention to its internal conflicts, and the impact of the ongoing conflict between the West and the terrorist organizations on Africa. The effects of terrorism on Africa had already been felt in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and 2003, when terrorists bombed US and Israeli properties in these countries. There is no doubt that the African continent dominated the international focus briefly on its developmental agenda, especially after the formation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU) in 2002 and 2001.

## **2.7 Conflict Management**

For creating peace and conflict prevention, peace workers apply conflict resolution strategies, which can help to some extent. As a result, intercultural conflict management emerged and made it possible to analyze conflicts and find ways to reduce international tension. According to Ting-Toomey and Oetzel (2001), intercultural conflict management is a process of using a set of culture-sensitive skills that help transition the process of conflict effectively and meet important objects amicably, for warring parties. Intercultural conflict management consists of different methods and types. As Bercovitch et al. (2004) argue, there are three peaceful conflict-management types:

diplomatic, legal, and political. The first type is diplomatic, or in other words, bilateral negotiation. Negotiation is a problem-solving process that relies on cooperation and mutual respect in order to satisfy mutual interests (Isenhardt, 2000).

This is the kind of conflict management parties' use when they want to control a conflict by themselves and do not want to defeat an external power. The second type of conflict management is legal and means states are trying to create a new international law or submit a conflict to the international courts or tribunals. That is, states decline all responsibility for the conflict and do not keep it under control. The third type of conflict management is political and results in the establishment of international organization. These organizations have the express purpose of achieving peace; they are the UN or regional groups, such as the African Union or European Union. The organizations take measures to resolve the conflict or provide warring parties with humanitarian aid. The decisions of those organizations are taken by the government of the countries, but not judges, which is the difference between the legal types of conflicts management (Bercovitch, 2004). In these situations, states pass on responsibilities to the external agencies and do not control the conflict anymore. Therefore, when international organizations are involved in such conflicts, they have to offer the conflicting parties more than they can do by themselves during the bilateral negotiation. In other words, the international organizations take negotiations into their own hands, undertake the intercultural conflict management, use the culture-sensitive skills and treat everyone with respect.

Stern (2016) states that traditional methods of managing international conflicts are: diplomatic, military, and economic facilities of control. Stern (2016) also describes four basic conflict resolution strategies: power politics, conflict transformation, structural prevention, and normative change. Conflict transformation strategy focuses on reconciliation between the states and

satisfaction of mutual interests. Structural prevention focuses on establishing independent organizations to identify nonviolent ways to prevent the conflict. The main point of normative change strategy is the creation of principles, norms and responsibilities for the conflicting states, in order to prevent a violent conflict (Stern, 2016).

Tracks of diplomacy is another concept of conflict management described by Ramsbotham (2005). Track I refers to official communication of high-level leaders or governmental representatives. Track I is a type of official diplomacy which includes such diplomatic activities as mediation, negotiation, or different kinds of sanctions: diplomatic or economic (Nan, 2003). Nan (2003) also notes that war or peacekeeping are not a part of official diplomacy, or in other words, Track I diplomacy. This diplomacy may influence escalation or de-escalation of the conflict (Nan, 2003).

## **2.8 The Nature of Conflict in West Africa**

There is a rich body of literature on the causes of conflict in Africa. It is true that Africa's wars in general are the result of a mixture of structural economic, political, cultural and historical factors (Bakut, 2009; Edlyne, 2009; Osaghea, 2005; Albert, 2003; Bozeman, 1976). The root causes of conflicts in Africa are usually traceable to the colonial era when Europeans scrambled for territories with scant regard for ethnic boundaries (Richard, 2006). There is hardly any zone within the continent that cannot trace its conflict and instability to its colonial history.

European colonialism along with its attendant historical legacies played a key role in causing, sustaining and aggravating all types of conflicts through the creation of artificial colonial boundaries, which led to state formations, but with little or no regard for ethnic and cultural identities that existed prior to their incursion into African territory. Other causes of conflict in Africa include military incursion into governance, ethnic deprivation, poor governance and ecological and environmental problems. The West African sub-region is not a homogenous zone.

The region is made up of a variety of states in terms of territorial size, colonial history, economic strength, internal cohesion and external linkages. It comprises eight francophone countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo); five Anglophone countries (Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone); and two Lusophone states (Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau).

The defining features of this region are corruption, poverty, underdevelopment, political instability, electoral violence, arms proliferation, and military incursion in governance; drug trafficking, territorial disputes; problem of leadership, resurgence of religion and ethno-religious conflict, secessionist tendencies, and inability of the states to provide and/or guarantee security for the people. The most problematic area in the sub region has been the Mano River Region, comprising Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea, renowned for prolonged internecine wars (Odobu, 2011). Besides, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire reputed as citadels of political stability, have also had their fair share of internal political divisions; while Guinea, Nigeria and Mali have also experienced one form of instability or the other (Oloyede and Albert, 2010). Hence, while it can be argued that states in the West African sub-region are not homogeneous in terms of size and endowment, they do have in common, cross-cutting features of insecurity associated with poverty, underdevelopment, conflict and crime both at the national and transnational levels with far-reaching implications.

The point of emphasis is that the inability of many West African states to effectively secure the nation and manage domestic pressures has resulted to violent conflicts beginning with Liberia in 1989, Sierra Leone in 1991 and so on (Udofia, 2010). The neighborhood effect of the conflict and the reluctance of the international community especially the "big powers", compelled some regional leaders within ECOWAS to push for intervention in Liberia, and ECOWAS through its intervention force intervened to deal with the crises. This was a watershed in terms of sub-regional

intervention in internal conflict despite the fact that ECOWAS was not originally established to perform conflict management role.

## **2.9 International Organizations**

International organizations are important actors in the critical episodes of international politics, with power in mediation, dispute resolution, peace keeping, applying sanctions and others. They also help in managing various key areas of international concern, from global health policy to the monetary policies around the world (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). An international organization can be defined as ‘an institutional agreement between members of an international system in order to achieve objectives according to systemic conditions, reflecting attributes, aspirations and concerns of its members’ (Hanrieder, 1966). And what gives the basic rule of them is the sovereignty of the nation-state (Barkin and Cronin, 2009). In terms of the concept of global governance promoted by the international organizations, this was originally based on raw power, but has evolved to legitimacy and customs (Keohane and Nye, 2001).

International organizations can be a complement to national prevailing paradigm, being an expression of denationalization policies (Zürn, 2004). And this is an evident fact by supranational and transnational characteristics of undermining national decisions, using the principle of international cooperation. But the politicization of these decisions brings again into question their need for legitimacy. Two very important features make the difference between international organizations and other type of organizations: centralizations of power and decision-making autonomy. Both have political effects beyond the simple effectiveness of the already taken decisions, because they resemble so much with governments or private companies. International organizations carry out actions that enjoy a sort of legitimacy and affect the legitimacy of the state

activity. Even centralization may alter the perceptions of the states in the context of complex interactions between them (Ostrom, 1990).

International organizations seek to establish solid connections between their activities and social values system to which they belong, this links representing their legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975, Buchanan and Keohane, 2006). Others say that legitimacy lies in the means by which to achieve the specific goal (Lawrence, 2008). What is clear is the fact that most researchers have concluded upon the legitimacy problems that international organizations face as threatening the global economic balance, along with other crucial elements (Clark, 2003). When concerns about legitimacy decrease, the system itself is flawed and solutions must be found really quickly. International organizations participate as independent and neutral actors on the global stage and can transform the relationships between states, increasing the efficiency and legitimacy of their individual or collective decisions.

This feature requires the short or long term balanced actions depending on the interest of both sides: powerful states will not join any organization they cannot influence and small countries will not join any organization whose decisions undermine their sovereignty (Bradford and Linn, 2007). Authoritarian states are reluctant to allow international organizations in taking decisions for them, decisions that interfere with their national policies. And with the ones which are undemocratic and unstable and tend to limit the presence of organizations within their territory, states can even be against their participation in global economic governance. Global governance is strengthened only if it fits the internal profile of dominant countries (Cowhey, 1993).

The main attributes of international organizations continue to be in the first line for facilitating negotiations and implementing agreements, dispute resolution, offering technical assistance and developing rules. But the most important thing remains their neutrality, impartiality and

independence (Griffin, 2003). Neutrality enables organizations to act as mediators between states and to implement their decisions. Impartiality resides on the fact that neither part is favored whatever the subject is. And independence resides on the fact that international organizations can take decisions for themselves. It is undeniable that international organizations can take decisions that bind on member states through predictable mechanism and pursuing their interests (Wouters and de Man, 2009). Decision-making processes vary between consensus, vote and unanimous vote. The most common form of decision-making is consensus, involving further discussions to reach general agreement rather than forcing the decision by voting process. While the member states have certain reservations about the discussions or negotiations.

International organizations refer to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the decisions (Ziegler and Bonzon, 2007). The problem of legitimacy is directly related to the influence of the international organizations and often to state sovereignty. The principle of consensual decision-making is the main subject of critics, being argued that they shall be made only at formal level and must reflect the power relations between states, taking the form of a weighted voting under major interests. Informal practices that lead to decision involve the emergence of some specific groups with some sort of composition, who deliberately exclude other countries (Kim, 2009). The principle of consensus practiced within the international organization has always meant that all parties have to agree upon a specific issue, but in practice tis voting system can be hidden; reality proves that the voting share of wealthier countries is more important than of poorer countries (Low, 2011).

Many countries feel excluded or left behind by the decisions of the international organizations and for the most of the poor countries, participation in the international system remains a distant dream. For example, the international trade system is perceived as a fortress, all the discussions being held behind closed doors and favoring the powerful producers and exporters. The international

organizations are seen as closed systems and those who are within those are bounded to their commitments taken in “packages”, with no way out or a way to comment upon them, because of the economic reality or simply because of an implementation mechanism more and more strict. And this results in the lack of legitimacy, poor support and a lack of loyalty to the values that underline the system itself (Sutherland and all, 2004). Most of the critics relate easily to the existing democratic deficit within the international organizations (Elsig, 2007).

Unlike the early period of their existence, the lack of legitimacy of these organizations is no longer offset by progress towards globalization. Cooperation in an anarchic era seemed easier than nowadays, in an environment governed by rules and procedures. Increased political participation and the insistence of the members to veto decisions becomes suffocating in further liberalization and increased welfare, but also in preventing the adoption of the reforms needed to balance the system and being in favour of developing countries. The international organizations have changed the nature, purpose and structure of the multilateralism and globalization. They have become the main target of the lobby groups and civil society, a fact which led to excessive politicization (Mercurio, 2007). Critics say that the big number of ECOWAS members do not easily allow the organization to reach a consensus or to effectively address the burning issues of the 21st century, this leading to blockages and disagreements during negotiations (Sun, 2011).

Africa is a host to a number of international cum regional organizations that have taken upon themselves the responsibility to ensure peace and stability in their region, in addition to other political and economic objectives. Africa’s sub-regional bodies have emerged as institutions of mediation in armed conflicts on the continent. Increasingly, regional organizations have emerged as alternatives to the AU and United Nations in conflict resolution and management the use of regional and global organizations to resolve interstate conflict has a long history.

he Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), was established on May 28, 1975 through the treaty of Lagos. It is a 15-member regional group with a mandate of promoting economic integration in all fields of activity of the constituting countries namely, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d' Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Togo. ECOWAS was set up to foster the ideal of collective self-sufficiency for its member states in areas such as industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial issues, social as well as cultural matters. The founding fathers of ECOWAS envisioned the creation of a borderless region where the citizens of the 15 member States have the opportunity to enjoy the benefit of comparative advantage in the abundant resources available to the different States and are able to exploit same through the creation of opportunities under a sustainable environment. However, in spite of its initial objective of purely economic integration, the realities on ground convinced leaders of the member states that ECOWAS cannot but meddle into political integration as well. Seeing the need for the sub region to be governed in accordance with the principles of democracy, rule of law and good governance, strategies for achieving same were put in place.

Corroborating this fact, Hartmann, (2017), notes that ECOWAS which was initially formed to promote economic cooperation and integration in West Africa, started from the 1990s to assume a more political role following the wave of political reforms and the growing number of protracted domestic violent conflicts in the region. Hartman (2017) equally notes that the revised ECOWAS treaty (1993) and especially the Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention (1999) and the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001) formally enshrined the commitment of the organization to promote democracy and good governance and to adopt what was later to be called

the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). To achieve this, ECOWAS created certain mechanisms and operates through protocols. Two of such protocols which are essential to the realization of this objective include the protocol relating to the mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, peacekeeping and security as well as the Supplementary Protocol which refers to protocol A/SP1//12/01 on democracy and good governance. The Supplementary Protocol was signed in 2001 in Dakar by the Heads of State and Government of 14 of the 15 ECOWAS member States. The essence of the Supplementary Protocol is the development of a constitutional State based on rule of law, strengthening of democracy and adopting common principles of good governance within ECOWAS' 15member States.

According to Massaër Diallo (2005), the Supplementary Protocol was developed in 2001 as an expression of a new, collective political resolve of ECOWAS' member States to take the process of preventing and resolving crises and violent conflicts forward, and to achieve peace and security through the development of democracy and good governance. The Protocol marks an important stage in the sub-region's political development which was characterized for long periods by the armed forces' deep involvement in political decision-making. As of 2001, it provides an emphatic statement of the incompatibility of democracy and good governance with military-run government and the military's involvement in politics. The Protocol marks a turning point in ECOWAS' political construction. This regional Institution saw itself mainly in economic terms when it was founded in 1975. It complements a chapter specifically devoted to governance the 1999 protocol which created an ECOWAS level mechanism along with bodies responsible for dealing with issues of conflict prevention, maintaining and building peace and developing a regional security system. The Supplementary Protocol represents both a defining point and an important dimension in the

regional process of building a democratic political governance framework for supporting economic and social development in West Africa, Diallo (2005).

Burton and Fisher (2000) posits that, regional organizations help reduce conflict by isolating and dividing local conflicts before they become intractable global issues. There are many generalizations that have been made that make it possible for sub regional bodies to be effective in conflict resolution. Firstly, these sub regional organizations are made up of countries involved in a conflict and those that are not. As a result, Karuru (2011) notes that they have the proximity, and at the same time the sense of balance that allows them to politically define the nature of the conflict. In addition, political and geographical proximity allows these organizations to realize the effects and repercussions of a given conflict, and, if necessary, to seek support from extra-regional sources to end the dispute.

Franke (2009), posits that regional and sub-regional organizations' geographical proximity can facilitate more rapid and less expensive responses to violent conflict than is possible through a global body such as the UN and their cultural proximity provides them with a better understanding of a conflict's dynamics, key players and context-specific management and resolution options. Moore reinforces this fact and observes that regional organizations may be more effective at mediating conflict because their member states share common interests that make their actions more timely and effective. Wehr and Lederach (2012) Share the opinion that, mediators who are “closer” to the disputants are more likely to promote trust-based mediation, which may be effective at creating more binding agreements.

Garnet, and Schnabel (2000) observes that there is often the possibility that warring parties are more willing to or feel more comfortable at managing disputes at a regional level as opposed to the international level through the UN. This is because both states and private actors in a conflict

may favor the participation of less intrusive third-parties. Similarly, some countries might resist assistance from outside states and international organizations out of concern for protecting state sovereignty and to shield themselves against outside actors seeking to gain political influence over internal affairs. Bergenas (2015), posits that the President of Sudan's refusal to allow UN troops to replace the African Union (AU) force in that war-torn country is one illustration of this issue, Regional organizations, compared to the UN, have the possibility of being more flexible in their treatment of evolving or ongoing wars as they have a limited agenda and are not subject to the use of veto powers from the part of regional hegemonies as is 'the case in the UN Security Council. There is also reason to believe as Bergenas, notes peer pressure applied from other states within regional and sub-regional organizations will be more effective than efforts from outside.

Francis (2006), observes that a combination of proximity and flexibility should, in principle, imply the ability to act faster and, if needed, rapidly deploy peace keeping forces, and regional and sub-regional organizations would spur national governments to action and set a positive example for nations in other regions Oloo (1993) argues that critical to the success of any regional or sub-regional organization in conflict management is the political interests and commitment by the leadership of each member state.

This would essentially entail giving up a certain degree of national sovereignty by each member state for a common good, a matter which is not easy to achieve as most states are highly guarded about their sovereign identity and interests. Moreover, the regional approach to resolving complex problems should also have inter-sectorial linkages, because the totality of human existence consists of interrelated facets of social, cultural, political and economic experience which do not appear in isolated compartments. The combined resources of regional states he observes are also likely to be

cost- effective and much more productive to regional development than individual efforts of states which are often replete with duplication of efforts and wastage of scarce resources.

In 2006 Francis, examined building regional peace and security Systems in Africa. And concluded that sub regional organizations arrangements usually lack the operational expertise to handle complex conflict situations and they do not have the capability to prevent violence from breaking out and have not been able to develop a comprehensive peacekeeping capacity.

In 2003 Clement, compared conflict Management in West Africa and the Great lakes region and concluded that the proximity factor could play a negative role as it might generate tensions and undermine impartiality as member states could be involved in the conflict. In 2002 Ghebremeskel, observed that regional actors tend to see conflicts in their region through "the colored glasses of narrow national self- interest" and are thus likely to be confronted with an incompatibility of interests leading them to put their own political and military gain before a lasting resolution of the conflict. Jackson notes that usually the greatest obstacle in regional peace efforts is the fact that these organizations lack the resources and the political consensus to carry on effective operations.

Escalating violence require military backing and political support, they also require long-term post-conflict commitments. It is no longer sufficient to stop the violence. These maintains that the continent's regional and sub-regional organizations suffer from enormous resource and capacity constraints in the areas of training, interoperability, sustained readiness, transportation and logistics as well as funding which will continue to thwart effective action for the foreseeable future. Given that these resource and capacity constraints are directly related to the meagre military capabilities of the organizations' member states and their dire economic situations, the regiosceptics also doubt the potential for substantial improvements in the short-term.

Apart from the literature of sub-regional organizations involvement in conflict management, there is a lot of literature on their involvement in such processes Attivor (2009, Adams & Mengistu, B. (2008). Such studies have primarily dwelt on mediation processes. Mohamoud examined peace efforts towards the Somalia conflict and concluded that twelve national reconciliation conferences were convened with the goal of restoring a central authority in Somalia yet no success was achieved. He attributes this to the fact that faction leaders and warlords who signed the peace deals, and agreed to form a central government, often failed to honor their pledges and/or promises. This was because they have never trusted each other and feared losing their economic and political power in a national government framework.

Attivor (2009) assessed the AU conflict management mechanism through the study of the Chadian and Liberian crises. He observed that in both countries and indeed most of African countries, the main sources of conflicts have been economic vulnerability and political instability, while AU organs for conflict management have been ad hoc in nature until the establishment, in 1993 of the mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution. He concluded that the establishment of the mechanism is an indication that the AU realized the importance of preventive diplomacy and early warning concept as tools for conflict prevention and management.

Considering the fact that conflicts cannot be generalized as one, conflicts happen for different reasons and most importantly because of meeting a specific goal(s). One can safely put that conflicts are of different categories as opined by scholars.

## **2.10 Theoretical Framework**

### **Regional Security Complex Theory**

Theory is a set of interrelated concepts that are used to explain, describe, interpret and predict the relationship between phenomena or variables. Theory helps to provide us with a way of looking at

the real world. Here, Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) as advanced by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003) was used as guide in this study. RSCT provides a theoretical and conceptual framework for understanding the emergent structure and dynamics of regional security. It also theorizes the historical dynamics and continuities that characterized the pre-Cold War (before 1945), Cold War (1945–1989/90) and post-Cold War (from 1990) global transformations, with implications for regionalism and regionalization. The theory has constructivist roots emphasizing that the evolution of regional security complexes are influenced by patterns of amity and enmity amongst units in the international system (Buzan and Wæver 2003). The realities of conflict and co-operation are dependent on the actions and perceptions of actors as well as power equations. RSCT was developed to advance the frontiers of knowledge on the interplay of middle level security relations between two extremes national and global securities. Buzan and Wæver defined Regional Security complex as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot be realistically be considered apart from one another.

The main assumptions and arguments of this theory are as follows:

- i. The theory argues that international security is best examined from a regional perspective especially considering the fact that state and non-state actors relationship is interwoven.
- ii. The theory argues that actors' security challenges are usually generated in their immediate neighborhood. This translates that the security of each actor interacts with one another because most security concerns do not travel well over distances.
- iii. The theory also argues that security features at the regional level are durable and would in-turn build a stronger and dynamic security.

## **Relevance of the Theory to the Study**

First, the theory views national securities as interconnected, rather than isolated, phenomena. They are inter-connected, yet emphasize the nation as the subject and object of security. This is captured in Buzan's pioneering definition of a security complex as 'a group of states whose security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot reasonably be considered apart from one another' (Buzan 1991).

Second, the theory views global security as normative, aspirational and often illusive. This is because global security is hinged on the architecture of international law and order, which, unlike municipal or regional order, is difficult to enforce and adjudicate. The third realm is regional security which is seen as realistic in the sense that it provides a space where security units (states) come together – where the two 'extremes of national and global interplay' (Buzan and Wæver 2003). A Regional Security Complex is thus defined as: 'a set of units whose major process of securitization or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another' (Buzan and Wæver 2003).

Applying Buzan's theory provides deeper insights into how different types of conflict suddenly erupt and quickly spread in space and time and also into the interplay between these different types. Security complexes are exposed to four major types of threats and their interaction: balance of power contests between great powers; lingering conflicts which emerge between states; intra-states conflicts, such as election violence, struggles for power etc. which are usually spillovers of internal politics; and, conflicts which arise from trans-national threats caused, for instance, by the rise of radical Islam and informal networks, state fragility, demographic explosion, environmental degradation or resource scarcity.

Thus Regional security complexes theory offers a useful framework for explicating the dynamics of interstate threats by governments' coordinated responses to external danger, conflict management. Regional security complexes theory also provides insight into the formation and resurgence of regional organizations such as ECOWAS & IGAD, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.

### **Limitations of the Theory**

- One of the major weaknesses of this theory is its inability to account for the impact of other actors and structures on securitization, while giving too much attention to how international anarchy is constructed politically.
- Another shortcoming of this theory is its inability to recognize security challenges in nation states differently. It rather emphasizes on tackling security challenges wholesomely.

#### **2.10.1 Conflict Theory**

Conflict theory, first proposed by Karl Marx (1818-1883), is a theory that society is in a state of perpetual conflict because of competition for limited resources. Conflict theory holds that social order is maintained by domination and power, rather than by consensus and conformity. According to conflict theory, those with wealth and power try to hold on to it by any means possible, chiefly by suppressing the poor and powerless. A basic premise of conflict theory is that individuals and groups within society will work to try to maximize their own wealth and power.

Conflict theory has been used to explain a wide range of social phenomena, including wars, revolutions, poverty, discrimination, and domestic violence. It ascribes most of the fundamental developments in human history, such as democracy and civil rights, to capitalistic attempts to control the masses (as opposed to a desire for social order). Central tenets of conflict theory are

the concepts of social inequality, the division of resources, and the conflicts that exist between different socioeconomic classes.

Many types of societal conflicts throughout history can be explained using the central tenets of conflict theory. Some theorists, including Marx, believe that societal conflict is the force that ultimately drives change and development in society.

Marx's version of conflict theory focused on the conflict between two primary classes. Each class consists of a group of people bound by mutual interests and a certain degree of property ownership. Marx theorized about the bourgeoisie, a group of people that represented members of society who hold the majority of the wealth and means. The proletariat is the other group: it includes those considered working class or poor.

With the rise of capitalism, Marx theorized that the bourgeoisie, a minority within the population, would use their influence to oppress the proletariat, the majority class. This way of thinking is tied to a common image associated with conflict theory-based models of society; adherents to this philosophy tend to believe in a pyramid arrangement in terms of how goods and services are distributed in society; at the top of the pyramid is a small group of elites that dictate the terms and conditions to the larger portion of society because they have an out-sized amount of control over resources and power.

Uneven distribution within society was predicted to be maintained through ideological coercion; the bourgeoisie would force acceptance of the current conditions by the proletariat. Conflict theory assumes that the elite will set up systems of laws, traditions, and other societal structures in order to further support their own dominance while preventing others from joining their ranks. Marx theorized that, as the working class and poor were subjected to worsening conditions, a collective consciousness would raise more awareness about inequality, and this would potentially result in revolt. If, after the revolt, conditions were adjusted to favor the concerns of the proletariat, the

conflict circle would eventually repeat but in the opposite direction. The bourgeoisie would eventually become the aggressor and revolter, grasping for the return of the structures that formerly maintained their dominance.

In current conflict theory, there are four primary assumptions which are helpful to understand: competition, revolution, structural inequality, and war.

### **Competition**

Conflict theorists believe that competition is a constant and, at times, an overwhelming factor in nearly every human relationship and interaction. Competition exists as a result of the scarcity of resources, including material resources—money, property, commodities, and more. Beyond material resources, individuals and groups within a society also compete for intangible resources as well. These can include leisure time, dominance, social status, sexual partners, etc. Conflict theorists assume that competition is the default (rather than cooperation).

### **Revolution**

Given conflict theorists' assumption that conflict occurs between social classes, one outcome of this conflict is a revolutionary event. The idea is that change in a power dynamic between groups does not happen as the result of a gradual adaptation. Rather, it comes about as the symptom of conflict between these groups. In this way, changes to a power dynamic are often abrupt and large in scale, rather than gradual and evolutionary.

### **Structural Inequality**

An important assumption of conflict theory is that human relationships and social structures all experience inequalities of power. In this way, some individuals and groups inherently develop more power and reward than others. Following this, those individuals and groups that benefit from

a particular structure of society tend to work to maintain those structures as a way of retaining and enhancing their power.

## **War**

Conflict theorists tend to see war as either a unifier or as a "cleanser" of societies. In conflict theory, war is the result of a cumulative and growing conflict between individuals and groups, and between entire societies. In the context of war, a society may become unified in some ways, but conflict still remains between multiple societies. On the other hand, war may also result in the wholesale end of a society.

## **Relevance of the theory to the Study**

This theory is relevant to this study as it stressed on the causes of conflict in governments and society at large as well as how the conflict can be contained. This theory also tries to examine the relationships between people and governments as well as translate the behaviours in power transitions in governments.

## **Limitations of the Theory**

The primary limitation of the conflict theory is the fact that it overlooks the stability of the society. While societies are in a constant state of change majority of the change is very small and it sometimes goes almost unnoticed. The theory also notes that many of the border elements of societies remain remarkably stable over time. Conflict theory focuses on the change and the conflict, also keeping in mind of the fact that neither (conflict and change) is better than the other. Conflict theory fails in the strength of these predictions which can be seen in the historical failure of Marxism. It makes many assumptions about the level of subordination of the proletariat and

lower classes that do not hold up in history. Conflict theory also misses by ignoring the micro level interactions and the individual.

### **Empirical Studies**

Akintunde (2013) investigated on “Ecowas and the Challenges of Conflict Management in West Africa” adopting qualitative research design. The findings show that ECOWAS’s quest for peace and stability in the West African sub-region led to the formation of ECOMOG in 1990 in order to deal with the insecurity that followed the collapse of state in Liberia. Conscious of the fact that sustainable development cannot be achieved in an atmosphere devoid of peace, ECOWAS authority committed itself to promoting a lasting peace in the sub-region through a mechanism for collective security and peace which led to the adoption of the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and security. The study recommended that to end violent conflicts and civil strife in the sub-region there is the need for the collaborative and collective efforts of the civil society, regional government as well as the international community in identifying and understanding the causal causes of conflicts and also, developing concrete policy and programmes to prevent, manage and resolve these conflicts. There is also the need for ECOWAS to act more responsibly in future operations by avoiding potential conflict with the UN, if it is to be taken seriously in the international community.

Severus (2017) studied “Ecowas and the fight against Sit-Tightism in West Africa: A Case Study of the Gambia 2016-2017”. The study adopted secondary data method. The findings show that ECOWAS has shown the world and also sent signal to over ambitious presidents in the sub region that it is prepared to fight sit-tight leaders in the sub region. The study recommends among other things democratic consciousness and political vigilantism among the people and an entrenched interest by non-state actors like the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) to fight sit-

tight leaders in all African countries as a way of salvaging African democracy from over ambitious African presidents.

Sheriff et (2017) researched into “ECOWAS treatise and protocols: Impact on regional cooperation and integration in West Africa” the study delves into the treatise and protocols of ECOWAS, it also analyses the significance of such protocols to the survival of the organization and betterment of the peoples of the region. Using historical descriptive research from library instrument, findings show that, the organization is doing well in terms of integration, but there still remain some challenges. The paper concludes that, the creation of ECOWAS by the member-states on 28th May, 1975, was to promote cooperation and integration among members especially as it relates to the economic affairs of the sub-region. The community has through its various treaties and protocols ensured that this objective is attained as a result the sub-region is more integrated than it was before the creation of the Community though not without challenges. The paper recommends that, the number of road blocks on the sub-region’s highways should be reduced to give citizens access to travel within the Community with ease, among others.

Gilles Olakounle Yabi, “The Role of ECOWAS in Managing Political Crisis and Conflicts: The cases of Guinea and Guinea Bissau” talks about ECOWAS’ continuous transformation from principally a peacekeeping security organization in the late 1990s to an increasingly normative sub-regional organization which confidently started to manage issues of governance, human rights abuse and security predicaments in Guinea (2007-2010) and Guinea Bissau (2005-2010) using its 1999 Protocol on the “Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security” and the “2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance”. The ECOWAS Commission by deploying its electoral observer missions, fact

finding, condemning human rights violations, appointing mediators and special representatives and its institution of international contact groups was able to manage both crises in the sub- region. Shola Omotola's work on "Unconstitutional Change of Government in Africa: What Implication for Democratic Consolidation? (2011)" analyses the different types of "unconstitutional change of government" across the African continent. Omotola's work supports the argument that "unconstitutional change of government" poses a principal threat to Africa's democratic solidification and stability. She points out the fact that, military coups will continue to be the main source of democratic regression on the African continent since much effort has not been made to curb its predisposing factor which mainly is bad governance among others. She mentions three main kinds of "unconstitutional change of government" in Africa, namely, military coups d'états, change of the constitution with the aim of prolonging one's tenure and the refusal on the part of incumbents to assume office after losing an election and their adoption of strategies such as power sharing as it was made evident in the cases of Zimbabwe and Kenya. Omotola posits that at the regional level, the Article 30 of the AU's constitutive Act which posits that "Governments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union" is used to address the challenge of "unconstitutional change of government". The AU also suspends member states that assume power through unconstitutional means. She also identifies the ECOWAS "2001 protocol on Democracy and Good Governance" and its 1999 mechanism as instruments used in addressing these challenges at the sub-regional level. She concludes that, the failure of the sub-regional and regional governance structures to steadily respond in accordance to their principles and norms in situations of unconstitutional change of government is accounted for by some domestic forces at play in the various African countries and the involvement of some hegemonic powers. She points out "insatiable ambition, ethnocentrism and the entrenchment of some institutions such as the military"

as the domestic forces responsible for unconstitutional change of government. However, she attributes the external factors to the quest of colonial masters to promote long term economic welfares, and the quest of emerging powers to protect their valued relations etc.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.0 Introduction**

This chapter discusses the procedure through which the study was conducted. The chapter starts from the background, research design, population sample and sampling techniques, instrument of data collection, reliability of research instrument and method of data presentation and analysis.

#### **3.1 Research Design**

This research adopts the qualitative study. Qualitative analysis records people's attitudes, feelings and behaviors in greater depths. This study uses qualitative analysis because, this form of analysis creates openness, avoids pre-judgements, provides depth and looks deeper into the issue and stimulates people's individual views and or perceptions. The research will use content analysis. Data for this research was sourced from both primary and secondary. The purposive sampling method was used in sampling specific individuals and organizations interviewed for the study. This shall serve as the primary source. Also, professionals in the field of International Politics and Peace Studies were interviewed. In addition, semi-structured interview guidelines and snow-balling sampling were used. The secondary sources on the other hand comprise of data collected from journal articles, reports, books, unpublished works, and articles from the internet, magazines, and newspapers, reports recommendations from symposia, workshops and seminars relevant to the research.

### **3.2 Sampling Technique**

This study adopts purposive sampling technique considering the fact that the study is international and or foreign in nature, only few interviewees have in-depth knowledge of the study and were able to provide unbiased judgements. Purposive sampling, also known as judgmental, selective, or subjective sampling, is a form of non-probability sampling in which the researcher relies on his own judgment when choosing members of the population to participate in the study.

This sampling method requires the study to have prior knowledge about the purpose of the study under investigation so that the study can properly choose and approach eligible participants. The study used purposive sampling when it wants to access a particular subset of people, as all participants of a study are selected because they fit a particular profile.

Purposive sampling also means when the study thoroughly scans through how it established a sample population, even if it is not statistically representative of the greater population at hand. As the name suggests, the researcher also collected all relevant needed data on purpose because these individuals fit the profile of the people that is need to reach.

While the findings from purposive sampling do not always have to be statistically representative of the greater population of interest, they are qualitatively generalizable. The more prior information that the study has about a particular population of interest, the better the sample that the researcher selected.

### **3.4 Sampling Size**

Qualitative analyses typically require a smaller sample size than quantitative analyses. Qualitative sample sizes should be large enough to obtain enough data to sufficiently describe the phenomenon

of interest and address the research questions. The goal of qualitative researchers should be the attainment of saturation. Saturation occurs when adding more participants to the study does not result in additional perspectives or information. Glaser and Strauss (1967) recommend the concept of saturation for achieving an appropriate sample size in qualitative studies. Creswell (1998) recommends 5 – 25 and Morse (1994) suggests at least six. These recommendations can help a researcher estimate how many participants they will need, but ultimately, the required number of participants should depend on when saturation is reached.

In choosing samples for this study, interviewees were categorized into two Governmental Institutions and Professionals in the field of International Politics and Peace and Strategic Studies and they are as Follows:

- (i) Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA)
- (ii) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Abuja.
- (iii) Specialists in the Field of International Politics and Peace and Strategic Studies.

The sample size is Ten (10): Two (2) interviewees from Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Three (3) interviewees from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Three (3) interviewees from Specialists in International Politics and Two (2) interviewees from Specialists in Peace and Strategic Studies respectively.

The choice of the population is further strengthened; Teddlie (2007), the technique is used in selecting units (e.g. individual, groups of individuals, institutions). That it is a type of sampling in which “particular settings, persons, or events are deliberately selected for the important information they can provide that cannot be gotten as well from other choices”.

### **3.4 Reliability of the Research Instruments**

Primary and secondary type of data was employed and the instrument used is semi- structured interview questions and related books, journals, articles in the field of study. All of these are meant to ascertain the validity or otherwise of the research questions and clarify the assumptions by the study on ECOWAS and Conflict Management in West Africa: A Study of Gambian Power Transition between Yahya Jemmeh and Adama Barrow.

Considering the above fact that data collection instruments is a standard instrument of gathering data, it is assumed that it will give accurate and unbiased data for effective and efficient analysis. Therefore, any generalization that the study arrived at is regarded as accurate.

### **3.5 Method of Data Presentation and Analysis**

Data presentation and analysis in this study employed the qualitative descriptive method owed to the fact that quantitative data were not involved in the study and required no statistical analysis. Data generated were described, narrated in accordance with the responses of the interviewees depicting positive or negative as regards the research assumptions. The narrative technique provided helped to expose the logical account of the events and issues which helped in describing and explaining the extent of agreement or disagreement or even departure of a set of opinions and feelings on an issue or phenomena. The data generated were basically described, interpreted and in conjunction with the secondary data to prove the study's assumptions right or wrong. In other words, the use of qualitative descriptive analysis helped the study to simply or literally explain and interpret the result of the findings corroborating the information generated in primary and secondary sources which helped the researcher to draw conclusions on the findings.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

#### 4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents findings generated from the field. Notable points and valid opinions of interviewees as well as related propositions and theories to the study were appropriately cited and justified with some other secondary sources. This is done, analyzing the questions based on how they fit into, with the objectives of the study. The chapter therefore is divided into sub-sections for proper analysis and understanding of the objectives of the study. For confidentiality, the study used numbers to represent the respondents

#### 4.1 Transitional Politics in The Gambia

The fact must not be over emphasized that the refusal of Yahaya Jammeh to relinquish power after the election results was declared not in his favor is the major factor that caused the post presidential power tussle in Gambia. The other reason is fear of prosecution. This finding is in accordance with the findings of Onuoha & Ngwu (2017) that Jammeh must have been alarmed by the plans of the opposition. The feeling of insecurity that goes with such threats extends to Jammeh's military cohorts. For instance, when Jammeh initially conceded defeat, the head of the army, General Ousman Badjie, also congratulated Barrow and pledged his allegiance. Later on Jammeh backtracked, so did Badjie. On January 4 2017, Badjie again assured Jammeh of "the unflinching loyalty and support of the Gambia Armed Forces". Conceivably, then prospect of being prosecuted may have contributed to Jammeh's retraction of his concession. Again, this finding can be anchored on the postulations of the theory of political realism which emphasize the constraints imposed on politics by the nature of human beings, whom they consider egoistic, and by the

absence of an international government to control all members of the international community. Together, the egoistic nature of man and the absence of a world government contribute to a conflict-based paradigm of international relations, in which the key actors are states, in which power and security become the main issues, and in which there is little place for morality.

**Respondents 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8** are of the opinion that the soul cause of Gambia's post presidential power tussle is nothing but as a result of the sit- tight syndrome that exist in African leaders and by extension their leadership styles; this by proxy is the factor that made Yahaya Jammeh refuse to adhere to the dictate of Democracy with exchange of the peace of Gambia at large. While **Respondents 1, 9, 3** are of the opinion that the cause of the 2016 post presidential power tussle is as a result of the Military, Dictatorial and Authoritarian nature of the incumbent president Yahaya Jammeh of Gambia. However, the above are not in support with the opinion of **Respondent 10** where he believes that Mis-Governance, poverty and the erratic behavior of the incumbent president Yahaya Jammeh was the cause of Gambia's post presidential power tussle among others. (Fieldwork 2020).

Furthermore, **Respondents 1, 4, 6, 8 and 9** described the conflict of Gambia's power tussle as being Political in nature considering the fact that it was about constitutional crisis, fight for power acquisition, political revolution, and selfish interest among others. While **Respondent 7 and 2** described the conflict of Gambia as a fight between Democracy and Autocracy building on the fact that the Incumbent president wanted ignoring election results at the expense of the image of democracy and the interest of Gambians at large. However, **Respondent 3** opined that *"It was a crisis that is surrounding the future of the country, A country that nearly lost Democracy and its image at the international community. This is because Gambia at that time was at the verge of being Sanctioned, Alienated and Isolated by*

*the International community” Respondent 4.* While **Respondent 10** described the whole conflict as an unfortunate but avoidable crisis that would have not come into history if not for the Incumbent president that refused to concur with the election results at first. (Fieldwork 2020).

Building from the above premises therefore, it is factual that the conflict of Gambia is purely a political fight for political interest of the incumbent president Yahaya Jammeh against all odds. However, this finding is in line with what Adem OZER (2019) discovered about the cause of Gambia’s post presidential election crises that Jammeh, who was defeated in the elections on 1 December 2016, initially rejected the election results on the grounds that “*there were serious and unacceptable abnormalities in the elections*” and demanded that the elections be held again under the supervision of the independent electoral commission.

#### **4.2 ECOWAS PROTOCOLS AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION**

It is imperative to place on record that ECOWAS roles using its relevant protocols was very precise and effective enough to quench the crisis of Gambia and was also able to save her image internationally, from sanctions and critics especially within the confine of its legal mandate. This finding is in relationship with the findings of Muhammad (2018) which states that The ECOWAS military intervened in the Gambia crisis with code-named Operation Restore Democracy which is in line with the decision of several West African countries to resolve the breakdown of internal order in the government of the Gambia due to a constitutional crisis in a dispute over the country's presidency. Also, the findings of Akinkunmi (2019) corresponds with this finding where he held that ECOWAS managed to “restore democracy” in The Gambia by using the threat of force without using any actual physical violence. On 19 January, there was apparently some sporadic

fighting on Gambian territory which involved Senegalese troops and rebel units from Casamance, but the negotiated departure of Jammeh avoided any military confrontation between the Gambian army or affiliated mercenaries and the ECOWAS troops. Ever since Jammeh had reneged on his commitment to respect the electoral results, ECOWAS heads of state and the ECOWAS Commission had been quite clear in their position and remained steadfast

**Respondents 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6** described the roles played by ECOWAS in managing Gambia's power transition conflict as an attempt to preserve and or the quest to restore Democracy in Gambia and as well promote the Doctrines of Democracy because ECOWAS used all the machinery it has at hand to save Gambia from the power transition crisis. While **Respondents 9 and 10** described the roles played by ECOWAS as an attempt to avoid bloodbath even with the face of military invasion. However, **Respondents 7 and 8** described the roles played by ECOWAS as being very effective and vital considering the fact that ECOWAS was able to manage the political rivalry and resolved the crisis efficiently without both parties loosing. Furthermore, **Respondent 1** opined that *“The role of ECOWAS in managing the conflict cannot be overemphasized as it really exploited all necessary diplomatic measures in ensuring that the transition conflict was amicably resolved between the two parties and the succeeded at the end. Although it was not only ECOWAS that played the role of settling the conflict, other actors within the International scene like the African Union and some individuals the President of Mauritania and other key players outside the country tried to manage the Gambian power transition conflict”* (**Respondent 2**). (Fieldwork 2020).

Furthermore, **Respondents 1, 6, and 10** stated the ECOWAS has the clear legal mandate to respect and protect the Democracy of its member states, so ECOWAS was in the best

position to intervene in the crisis of Gambia. While **Respondents 3, 5, 7 and 8** opined that ECOWAS was of course in the best position to intervene in the Gambia's crisis especially in the context of sub-regional entities which Gambia falls under. However, **Respondents 2, 4 and 9** were of the opinion that since Gambia is part of the countries that signed the treaties of ECOWAS in an attempt to ensure there is peace all over the West African region, the fact must therefore not be overemphasised that ECOWAS was in the best position to intervene in the crisis of Gambia. (Fieldwork 2020).

Consequent upon the respective views of the respondents, one can build on the fact that ECOWAS was in the best position to intervene in the Gambia's crisis, not only because it has the legal mandate to do so but most importantly because it had the legal barkings of other international communities and or organizations like the African union, European Union, and United Nations. This submission is in line with the findings of (Hartmann, 2017) which justifies the behavior of ECOWAS and its success: i) ECOWAS had a clear legal mandate to threaten the use of force in order to protect democracy in one of its member states; ii) there was consensus that ECOWAS forces could have coped with the relatively small Gambian army; iii) the Gambian president could not rely on friends among his regional peers or some powerful ally from outside Africa; iv) regional leaders such as Nigeria and Senegal made a credible commitment to the regional intervention. It is reasonable for ECOWAS to assume a role and mission to promote democracy in the Gambia. ECOWAS's request to use force and threat to use force as well as its preparation for the use of force challenge certain aspects of the law regarding the use of force. This challenge raises the legitimacy of the intervention.

The Effectiveness of ECOWAS Roles in Solving Gambia's Transition Tussle is also an issue to contend with. However, **Respondents 1, 8, 9 and 10** are of the opinion that the ECOWAS roles in solving Gambia's transition tussle were very effective considering the fact that she was able to balance up power within the conflicting parties, it was also able to employ the use of army without bloodshed and most importantly avoided the escalation of the of the conflict to other neighboring countries. While **Respondents 6 and 7** opined that the roles of ECOWAS were effective because of the diplomatic approaches she used. However, **Respondents 3 and 4** are of the believe that the ECOWAS roles were effective because of the support she was able to gather from UN, AU, and EU respectively. Furtherance on the above, **Respondents 2 and 5** are of the opinion that ECOWAS roles were effective considering the fact that she achieved its strategic objectives of seeing to the fact that Yahaya Jammeh relinquished power and let the will of the people prevail. (Fieldwork 2020).

Against this backdrop, one would be able to deduce the fact that ECOWAS roles in resolving Gambia's transition tussle is very effective considering the fact that it was able to stand to the end when it achieved its desired goal.

#### **4.3 ECOWAS and The Management Gambia's Electoral Conflict**

The strategies used by ECOWAS to manage Gambia's crisis were Mediation and Military invasion following the failure of the mediation strategy, and the strategies were strategically achieved without and bloodshed. This finding is supported by the discovery of Akinkunmi (2019) "The practice of coercive diplomacy is widely employed by states in the international system as it proves

to be a viable means to achieve political objectives without resorting to war, which is costly also for the winner. On December 9, after initially accepting the results, however, Jammeh changed his mind and said he would contest the election result, citing “serious and unacceptable abnormalities.” In response, on December 12 the AU Peace and Security Council stated it would take “all necessary measures” to ensure compliance with the election results. On December 17, the ECOWAS Authority took a similar position, stating it “shall take all necessary measures to strictly enforce the results of the 1 December 2016 elections.” On December 21, the UN Security Council issued a presidential statement on The Gambia commending ECOWAS’s position. There followed series of diplomatic initiatives, including by the presidents of Liberia, Ghana, and Nigeria, and then later Guinea and Mauritania, to convince Jammeh to commit to leave office and transfer power to Barrow according to the official schedule, on January 19, 2017”.

**Respondent 9** is of the opinion that the strategies adopted by ECOWAS in managing Gambia’s conflict can be categorized into 2: the first is the consultation strategy and the other was the use of Democratic peace theory in resolving the crisis. **Respondent 7** is of the opinion that the strategies used to resolve Gambia’s power transition tussle are the Mediation and Alternative Dispute Resolution (**ADR**) strategies. However, **Respondent 3** is of the opinion that the strategy used to conquer the political crisis in Gambia is the Bargain of compromise. Also **Respondent 5** is abit divergent in his view where he opined that the strategies used to manage the conflict of Gambia are Diplomacy and Military invasion. Nevertheless, **Respondents 1, 2, 4, 6 and 8** were partially in support of others where they opined that the strategies used to manage Gambia’s crisis is the Mediation and Military support (ECOMOG) but were totally divergent in their view where they opined that part of the strategies used by ECOWAS to be able to legally quench the crisis of Gambia is the support of the international community she was able to rally support for. They include U.N, AU, and EU. (Fieldwork 2020).

#### 4.4 ECOWAS and Its Strategies Effectiveness

it is pertinent to note the fact that the strategies employed by ECOWAS to manage the crisis of Gambia was very effective as the end justifies the means. This finding is in consonance with the tenets of Democratic Peace Theory which states that democracies are hesitant to engage in armed conflict with other identified democracies. Among proponents of the democratic peace theory, several factors are held as motivating peace between democratic states:

- Democratic leaders are forced to accept culpability for war losses to a voting public;
- Publicly accountable states people are inclined to establish diplomatic institutions for resolving international tensions;
- Democracies are not inclined to view countries with adjacent policy and governing doctrine as hostile;
- Democracies tend to possess greater public wealth than other states, and therefore eschew war to preserve infrastructure and resources

Subsequently, **Respondents 6, 7, 8 and 10** are of the opinion that the strategies adopted by ECOWAS in resolving Gambia's electoral crisis were very effective though they are of the opinion that ECOWAS is expected to be more relevant in economic dealings than being political, as such, A.U would have been in a better position to intervene with more effective and everlasting strategies. However, **Respondents 1, 5, and 9** are of the opinion the strategies were effective considering the fact that it was able to resolve the crisis between the two conflicting parties amicably. **Respondents 3 and 4** were also of the opinion that the strategies employed by ECOWAS were very effective and sufficient building on the fact that ECOWAS was able to avoid bloodbath and most importantly, the strategies led to a peaceful transition of power. **Respondent**

**2** however opined that the strategies used by ECOWAS were very effective knowing fully that *“The parties to the conflict especially the government in power which was earlier prevailed upon to give Democracy a chance within the framework of Games theory now weighed the option of insisting and desisting in the face of threat of the use of force by ECOWAS and then the government acted to the latter which it desisted. Finally, that led to the restoration of democracy and power transition from the incumbent president to the opposition and the process was midwifed by ECOWAS with a new regime sworn into office”*. **Respondent 3**. (Fieldwork 2020).

The challenges faced by ECOWAS in restoring stability to Gambia cannot be overemphasized as **Respondents 4, 8 and 9** were of the opinion that the challenges faced in the adoption of strategies by ECOWAS are insubordination from other neighboring countries, the conflicting local laws of individual neighboring countries and the attempt to bypass the sovereignty of member states. **Respondents 2 and 7** opined that constitutional crisis of Gambia and the erratic behavior of the incumbent president were the major challenges faced by ECOWAS in managing the crisis. Although **Respondents 3, 5, and 10** were a bit divergent in their view were they opined that the major challenges faced are the harsh condition of bargain and how to provide exit options for president Yahaya Jammeh. While **Respondents 1 and 6** were of the opinion that the major challenges faced in the strategies adoption were lack of specific mandate for the protection of civilians and inadequate financial resources. (Fieldwork 2020).

Sequel to the views of the respondents above, it is safe to put that the chief among the challenges faced in their strategy adoption was how to save Yahaya Jammeh from the face of international sanctions and also the problem of logistics within neighboring nation states

#### 4.5 Discussion of Findings

**Objective 1: To examine the causes of power tussle in the Gambia post presidential elections.**

Following the analysis of findings on the causes of power tussle in Gambia, one must not over emphasize the fact that there are ample number of reasons that caused the post presidential power tussle in Gambia. Part of the reasons as gotten from field work is the refusal of Jammeh to cede power to the democratically elected president after the declaration of election results in 2016. No wonder Onuoha and Ngwu, opined that Jammeh, four days after losing December 1, 2016 elections, contested the results. Jammeh suggested that the election must be repeated on the grounds that irregularities were made during the election and declared a 90-day state of emergency. International, continental and regional organizations (UN, AU, The Organization of Islamic Cooperation and ECOWAS), as well as Western powers (US and France) reacted on Jammeh's decision and demanded that the results be accepted by Jammeh and the transition of power be carried out peacefully. Also Harley backed the opinion by stating that in response to Jammeh's position, Senegal urged the Security Council to convene an emergency meeting, while the US State Department spokesman Mark Toner called Jammeh to accept the December 1 election results and allow regular transition of power to the new president Barrow in accordance with the Constitution of the Gambia. Also Cocks and Farge, 2017 was divergent in his view by stating the fact that The Gambia's problem changed its dimension from internal to international one. The ECOWAS countries decided to take military action against the Gambia and this decision was supported by the UN Security Council and the AU Although the political crisis that emerged in the Gambia was disposed of in a peaceful manner, this situation brought up the question of the legality of this intervention.

**Objective 2: To examine the roles of ECOWAS in managing Gambia's power transition conflict.**

ECOWAS roles in managing the crisis of Gambia is evidently effective considering the fact that it was able to resolve the crisis without bloodbath. Apart from that, ECOWAS has the legal mandate to intervene in the Gambia's crisis. In order to implement the 1 December 2016 election results, ECOWAS has succeeded in "*operation restore democracy*" without the direct use of a physical force, using only the threat of using force. According to Tomas Serna and Virginia Comolli, the purpose of the operation was; to re-establish the constitutional order in Gambia, to enable the newly elected leader Barrow to take office, to re-influence the will of the Gambia in the country's administration, and to establish appropriate conditions for the normalization of the political and humanitarian situation in the Gambia. The ECOWAS army, which consisted of a 7,000 military personnel with air and naval support (Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana, Mali and Togo), entered the Gambia on 19 January, but did not encounter any resistance. In addition to the resignation of many ministers, the declaration that the Gambia Army will not be a party to the conflict is one of the factors that broke down the power of Jammeh. According to Christof Hartman, four main factors explain the behavior of ECOWAS and its success: i) ECOWAS had a clear legal mandate to threaten the use of force in order to protect democracy in one of its member states; ii) there was consensus that ECOWAS forces could have coped with the relatively small Gambian army; iii) the Gambian president could not rely on friends among his regional peers or some powerful ally from outside Africa; iv) regional leaders such as Nigeria and Senegal made a credible commitment to the regional intervention (Hartmann, 2017; 91). It is reasonable for ECOWAS to assume a role and mission to promote democracy in the Gambia. However, ECOWAS's request to use force and threat to use force as well as its preparation for the use of

force challenge certain aspects of the law regarding the use of force. This challenge raises the legitimacy of the intervention.

**Objective 3: To determine the strategies adopted by ECOWAS in managing Gambia's electoral conflict.**

The treaty of ECOWAS has frequently been updated since it was written in 1993 and in 200 the article “democracy and good governance” was included in the treaty. Which laid the foundation for the implementation of the UN's “Responsibility to protect” (R2P) Concept. In 2005, the organization commenced The Electoral Assistance Unit intending to observe the political situations and elections in the member states.

ECOWAS (mainly Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mauritania and Senegal) has attempted to solve the constitutional crisis that took place in the Gambia at the beginning by political means, and sometimes conducted individual or sometimes mediated activities by the leadership of UN Secretary General West Africa Representative Mohamed Ibn Chambas. However, the fact that the mediation mission failed, has caused the harsh statements of ECOWAS. ECOWAS has notified the new president Barrow that it will “*take all necessary measures*” to implement the final results of the December 1, 2016 elections if power is not transitioned. The gathering of Senegalese and Nigerian troops at the Gambia border meant a confirmation of physical stability.

Building from the above facts therefore, it is safe to affirm that following the failure of various mediation processes by ECOWAS, there was also the bargain of compromise, and then the employment of ECOMOG in the long run. However, it is pertinent to put forward that the strategies yielded positive results considering the fact that the end justifies the means.

**Objective 4: To assess the effectiveness of the strategies adopted by ECOWAS in restoring harmony to Gambia's Politics.**

The failure of the sub -regional and regional governance structures to steadily respond in accordance to their principles and norms in situations of unconstitutional change of government is accounted for by some domestic forces at play in the various African countries and the involvement of some hegemonic powers. Insatiable ambition, ethnocentrism and the entrenchment of some institutions such as the military” as the domestic forces are responsible for unconstitutional change of government. However, the external factors can be attributed to the quest of colonial masters to promote long term economic welfares, and the quest of emerging powers to protect their valued relations. Notwithstanding the efforts of ECOWAS, the crises in the sub-region, have followed in a quick sequence and further producing a glaring disconnection between the community's stated objectives and practices especially in the area of peaceful coexistence among the society as a whole. The Gambia is a signatory of the ECOWAS's treaties and protocols; and ECOWAS had the legal directive to intervene in the internal politics of its members when it deems it necessary. ECOWAS as a communitarian security organization does not only ensure the promotion of democratic development in the sub - region, but also demands that its members to adhere to the fundamental principles of democracy and good governance. Building on the above premises therefore, it is safe to put forward that the strategies of ECOWAS in resolving Gambia's crisis was very effective as such it is worthy of praise.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the summary of findings on **ECOWAS and Conflict Management in West Africa: A Study of Gambia Power Transition Between Yahya Jammeh and Adama Barrow.**

Conclusions was drawn according to the findings on each of the study objective, and gives recommendations as per research objectives.

#### 5.1 Summary of Findings

This research examines the role of ECOWAS and Conflict Management in West Africa: a study of Gambian Power transition between Yahaya Jammeh and Adama Barrow. In terms of general assessment of the performance of ECOWAS, significant achievement has been made by ECOWAS in conflict management. The fact that the ECOWAS sub-region has been transformed from a zone of crippling wars (especially in the Mano River Region) in the 1990s into an area where no active war is raging today is a mark of progress that has been made. At the same time, it can be argued that democratic culture is gradually taking root in many of ECOWAS member states. Both Liberia and Sierra Leone, two of the most disturbing and unstable states in West Africa have successfully conducted consecutive general elections. So ‘too have some other ECOWAS member countries including Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal.

Considering the implications of Jammeh’s refusal to cede power, the United Nation Security Council, the African Union and ECOWAS took the unanimous decision to consider all their options, including military intervention, to enforce the will of the Gambian people. ECOMOG

coalition forces comprised of military personnel from Senegal, Mali, Togo, and Nigeria, entered Gambian territory.

Last minute mediation efforts by the presidents of Mauritania and Guinea Conakry, and the head of the UN West Africa office, Muhammad Ibn Chambas, finally achieved a positive result as Jammeh has seen that the ECOMOG has engulfed his country and there is no way a military Gambian men of about 40,000 will defeat the coalition of military forces from Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Togo; In other words Jammeh made the wise choice and went on Exile to the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, The agreement provided Jammeh and his supporters with a “package deal” with a wide range of personal guarantees ensuring his dignity, security, personal safety, and other rights. President Barrow and his team, however, refused to broker any form of immunity deal with Jammeh. These events must be regarded as a historical milestone for both governance and security in Africa, since this was the first time in ECOWAS and AU history that the option of military power was used with the firm backing of the international community to enforce the political will expressed in elections largely seen as free and fair in an African country.

## **5.2 Conclusion**

ECOWAS has played a significant role in the enthronement of democracy and democratic governance in West Africa through the institutionalization of democratic norms, principles and practices. Looking at the personal backgrounds of those of Jammeh’s West African peers who tried to convince him to step down, it is clear that few of them felt any solidarity with the Gambian leader. Most of them were elected as opposition candidates against incumbents, and owed their position as heads of state to a functioning electoral process and strong regional democratic norms. Pevehouse and others have argued that democratic density the relative number of democratic

regimes within a regional organization – would affect how strongly the organization can push for democracy.

There is certainly a strong variation among African sub regions when it comes to the number of democratic regimes. This would explain why ECOWAS finds it easier than other regional arrangements in Africa to push for Democratization, and why it is less likely that we will see a repetition of ECOWAS's restoration of democracy policy in other parts of the African continent. In other sub regions (and regional arrangements) of the continent, with the exception of Southern Africa, we still find a majority of leaders who reached power by means other than the ballot box. The determined intervention on the part of ECOWAS should thus be praised but also assessed realistically.

The ECOWAS intervention in The Gambia sends a powerful message. Nothing would be more wrong than to suggest that ECOWAS leaders defended the principles of liberal democracy in The Gambia to please the Western donor community. West African leaders and bureaucrats had clear ownership over the process, and actually found an African solution to an African problem, the determined intervention on the part of ECOWAS should thus be praised but also assessed realistically.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

The successful management of The Gambian 2016 post-election impasse by ECOWAS, the AU and the UN has shown that applying the principles of subsidiary, complementarity and comparative advantages, as well as the coherent coordination of joint preventive diplomacy and mediation initiatives, can yield positive and timely results. Going forward, it is therefore necessary

for the Gambia's new president and other regional and international stakeholders to ensure the following:

1. Barrow should be mindful of the fact that those who voted for change want to see a new Gambia where basic freedoms are guaranteed, fundamental human rights are respected and transparency in managing state affairs is given top priority.

2. Barrow needs to continue to talk the language of unity and reconciliation with the strong backers of former president Jammeh. Measures to immediately pursue either Jammeh or his cronies might be counterproductive and could destabilize the fragile peace the country is currently enjoying.

3. Regionally, while celebrating its successes, ECOWAS needs to reflect on the challenges encountered, with a view to drawing lessons from the experience.

4. ECOWAS also needs to support the new government by undertaking the security sector reform of The Gambian military, which is presently polarized between supporters of Jammeh and supporters of Barrow.

5. ECOWAS also needs to support and ensure that Barrow runs an inclusive government, where the focus is on respect for human rights and civilian protection.

6. The ECOWAS member states will need to respond more proactively to electoral conflicts and risks alongside intrastate conflicts. This also raises the issue of the role of the international community in supporting ECOWAS military and peace operations in the region.

7. The international community in general should draw inspiration from the multi-actor coordination showcased by ECOWAS' handling of this impasse, and give due consideration to working with regional actors.

8. The international community must accept its responsibilities in supporting peacekeeping efforts in West Africa and that in the face of the current global financial crisis “peacekeeping cannot be only an ECOWAS affair.” ECOWAS success in 2016 Gambia’s presidential election proved its commitment to the security of the people and this organization can also serve as a model to other regional bodies in the region.

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## **Appendix 1**

### **INTERVIEW GUIDE**

Dept. of Politics and Governance,  
Kwara State University,  
P.M.B 1515Malete,  
Kwara State, Nigeria.

**Dear Respondent,**

I want to thank you for taking your time to grant us this interview today. I am a post graduate students of the above named institution and currently researching on “**ECOWAS and Conflict Management in West Africa: A study of Gambia power transition Between Yahya Jammeh and Adama Barrow**””. I would like to know your views, observations and opinion on the above topic. The interview will not take too much of your valuable time. This interview will be tape recorded with your kind permission just for accuracy purpose. I would seek your full support in this exercise. All responses will be kept confidential.

Thank you for your time.

Mubarak Sulaiman Jamiu

## SECTION A: RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

This section asks general information about yourself.

Please tick ( ) or fill in the blanks the answers that correspond to your options:

1. Age:

Which age group do you belong?

( ) 20-30 years old ( ) 30-40 years old ( ) 40-50 years old ( ) 50 years and Above

2. Gender:

What is your gender?

( ) Male ( ) Female

3. Marital Status:

What is your marital status?

( ) Single ( ) Married ( ) others please specify \_\_\_\_\_

4. Experience:

What is your year of experience?

( ) 1-5 year ( ) 6-10 years ( ) 11-15 years ( ) 16 years and above

6. Educational Level:

What is your educational level?

( ) OND/NCE ( ) HND/ B.Sc. ( ) MSc ( ) PhD ( ) others please specify

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## **Section B: Semi – Structured Interview**

1. What are the causes of Gambia's post presidential power tussle?
2. How would you describe the conflict of Gambia power tussle?
3. How would you describe the roles played by ECOWAS in managing Gambia's power transition conflict using its relevant protocols?
4. Did you think ECOWAS was in the best position to intervene in the Gambia's post presidential Election crisis?
5. How effective is the ECOWAS roles in solving Gambia's transition tussle?
6. What were the strategies adopted by ECOWAS to resolve Gambia power transition tussle?
7. How effective are the strategies adopted by ECOWAS in resolving Gambia's electoral crises?
8. What are the challenges faced in the adoption of strategies by ECOWAS in managing the Gambia's power tussle?
9. Is there any other thing you will like to add?

**Appendix 2**

**LIST OF RESPONDENTS**

<b>SN</b>	<b>Name of Respondents</b>	<b>Date of Interview</b>	<b>Status</b>
1	<b>Prof. Simon Achin</b>	<b>20<sup>th</sup> June, 2020</b>	<b>NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIR (RESEARCH DEPARTMENT)</b>
2	<b>Dr. Najibullahi Nuhu</b>	<b>9<sup>th</sup> June, 2020</b>	<b>MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ECOWAS HEADQUATER)</b>
3	<b>Prof. Sani Ali</b>	<b>22<sup>nd</sup> July, 2020</b>	<b>NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIR (RESEARCH DEPARTMENT)</b>
4	<b>Prof. Riyaudeen Zubairu</b>	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> July, 2020</b>	<b>MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ECOWAS HEADQUATER)</b>
5	<b>Dr. Moruf Olarewaju</b>	<b>8th July, 2020</b>	<b>PEACE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES SPECIALIST</b>

6	<b>Dr. A. Abdullahi</b>	<b>21<sup>st</sup> July, 2020</b>	<b>INTERNATIONAL POLITICS SPECIALIST</b>
7	<b>Dr. Adedoyin</b>	<b>17<sup>th</sup> July, 2020</b>	<b>INTERNATIONAL POLITICS SPECIALIST</b>
8	<b>Dr. Akinkunmi Lawal</b>	<b>22<sup>nd</sup> June, 2020</b>	<b>INTERNATIONAL POLITICS SPECIALIST</b>
9	<b>Dr. Hassan</b>	<b>20<sup>th</sup> July, 2020</b>	<b>PEACE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES SPECIALIST</b>
10	<b>Dr. Basiru Musa</b>	<b>30<sup>th</sup> July, 2020</b>	<b>MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ECOWAS HEADQUATER)</b>

### Appendix 3

#### RESPONDENT 2`

1. What are the causes of Gambia's post presidential power tussle?

The Eco system of the Gambian political trend is not different from what is obtainable in the experiences of other African countries. This is because Democracy means everything and anything and it has lost the meaning more in Africa than anywhere in the world due to the trappings of sit-tight syndrome as well as the lack of integrity by political office holders to concede defeat during a lost election contest and also undergo a transition without fighting back. All of these factors were a play in the Gambia's post presidential election tussle in the Gambia.

2. How would you describe the conflict of Gambia power tussle?

I will describe it as not just a fight between Yahaya Jammeh and Adama Barrow but also as a fight between Democracy and Autocracy, A fight between right and wrong, it was a fight between the general populace and the incumbent president and it was an opportunity for emancipation at the end. It was also a situation where the constitution prevailed and the people triumph. This is the beauty side of a conflict; it is also a driver for positive change. The tussle has led to a new milestone in the Gambian Democratic Struggle.

3. How would you describe the roles played by ECOWAS in managing Gambia's power transition conflict?

ECOWAS did fantastically very well and acted within its jurisprudence of operational protocol especially with regards to its crusade and promotion of Democracy within the region and beyond. In the end its purpose was achieved against all odds and the Gambia now have Democracy that is

presiding over its National sovereignty. It is a graphic illustration of how much ECOWAS as a multinational organization can achieved with the needed unbroken focus, support, commitment and determination. This is quit commendable.

4. Did you think ECOWAS was in the best position to intervene in the Gambia's post presidential Election crisis?

Yes, because Gambia is a country in West Africa and apart from that Gambia is a founding body and also a signatory to the chapter that established ECOWAS in 1975. ECOWAS in in the vanguard of ensuring that there is peace everywhere within its sphere and jurisdiction of influence which Gambia is included. ECOWS could not sit and watch things to get out of control and hence the need to intervene. Infact, the intervention can be morally justifiable and same can be done if such circumstances become reality of another ECOWS member state.

5. How effective is the ECOWAS roles in solving Gambia's transition tussle?

The roles ECOWAS in stemming down the tussle was glaringly clear for all to see, the organization was very professional, effective in the use of all its mechanism at its disposal to manage the crises there by averting a possible on slot on Democracy in Gambia. The achievement of this success speaks to the fact that the mediating role played by ECOWAS in Gambia was very effective and successful.

6. What were the strategies adopted by ECOWAS to resolve Gambia power transition tussle?

Stemming the types of tussles born out of clashing interests of political gladiators like ECOWAS did in the post-election tussle in Gambia goes with much expense of resolution mechanisms. Some of the strategies may prove abortive, some may be less effective and some won't even yield any immediate result but all go a long way in determining which line of action that need to be taken.

In the case of the Gambia specifically, the strategy that worked the magic one in restoring Democracy was the use of threat of force of inversion but this was to be done without any use of direct physical violence which was also supported by both the AU and the United Nations Security Council. It has a legal justification because the strategy would have worked since Gambia is a member bound by the decisions of the organization. The success achieved by the legal intervention speaks to the efficacy of African solutions to African problems.

7. How effective are the strategies adopted by ECOWAS in resolving Gambia's electoral crises?

I can say the strategies adopted by ECOWAS in putting to check the attack on Democracy in the Gambia's post presidential election tussle was very effective. The parties to the conflict especially the government in power which was earlier prevailed upon to give Democracy a chance within the framework of Games theory now weighed the option of insisting and desisting in the face of threat of the use of force by ECOWAS and then the government acted to the latter which it desisted. Finally, that led to the restoration of democracy and power transition from the incumbent president to the opposition and the process was midwived by ECOWAS with a new regime sworn into office.

8. What are the challenges faced in the adoption of strategies by ECOWAS in managing the Gambia's power tussle?

A number of challenges could certainly be encountered in the quest by ECOWAS to restore Democracy in Gambia. The number one challenge was the erratic behaviour and the inability of the authoritarian incumbent president who had been repressive to political oppositions. In fact he never saw himself leaving office and on one of those interviews on BBC he was alleged to have said that he would rule Gambia for 1 billion years if it is the will of Allah. There was also the

challenge of constitutional crises with followed Yahaya Jammeh's concession of defeat after he was deterred by the threat of inversion by ECOWAS as it was also backed by other multinational organizations like the AU and the UN security council. There were also the challenge of funding and availability of logistics, holding of meetings and most of the envoys and the leaders and representatives of other governments like President Buhari. A lot of other challenges is also obtainable in trying to push such a resolution. It was never a tea party or a simple task but inspite of all the challenges, January 2017, President Jammeh yielded to the voice of reason coupled with the fact that he was afraid of threat of inversion and all the consequences and implication that will come with it and then he gave Democracy a chance.

9. Is there any other thing you will like to add?

No, I think you have covered all the needful.

## **RESPONDENT 6**

1. What are the causes of Gambia's post presidential power tussle?

The power tussle arises as a result of December 2016 presidential elections in the Gambia, when the Electoral Commission of the Gambia declared opposition candidate Adama Barrow as the winner of the election. However, the long-standing president, Yahya Jammeh refused to step down and handed over the mantle of leadership to the winner, Adama Barrow.

2. How would you describe the conflict of Gambia power tussle?

The Gambian crisis could be described as political crisis (or Constitutional Crisis) that occurred when Yahya Jammeh declined the result of December 2016 presidential election and refused to

step down for Adama Barrow. At that stage, the ECOWAS stepped in to assist the country in resolving the political crisis which could have claimed the lives of many Gambian citizens.

3. How would you describe the roles played by ECOWAS in managing Gambia's power transition conflict?

It played peace and conflict resolution role to restore democracy in Gambia. ECOWAS' forces was intervened to bring peace in Gambia's political crisis. The ECOWAS Standby Force comprising its armed forces from Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana and Sierra Leon has forced President Yahya Jammeh to step down as President of the Gambia. More so, the ECOWAS managed to restore democracy in the country by using the threat of force, but without any use of direct physical violence. Both the African Union and the United Nations Security Council backed ECOWAS, which also gave ECOWAS legitimacy, for what was essentially ECOWAS's policy, and indeed an African solution to African problems.

4. Did you think ECOWAS was in the best position to intervene in the Gambia's post presidential Election crisis?

Essentially, the ECOWAS has a clear legal mandate to use force in order to protect democracy in one of its member states. Furthermore, there were consensus among the member states that ECOWAS forces to join with the small Gambian army and oust Jammeh out of power. Likewise, the Gambian president could not defend on his allied friends within and outside Africa. Regional leaders such as Nigeria and Senegal made a credible commitment to the regional intervention. Certainly, the ECOWAS intervention was a victory for pro-democratic activist regionalism.

5. How effective is the ECOWAS roles in solving Gambia's transition tussle?

The ECOWAS' role in resolving Gambian transition tussle is very effective, considering the approaches used by the commission in solving the problem. Initially, ECOWAS leaders sent mediation commission to Banjul in order to persuade Jammeh to hand over the power to Barrow. In line with this, the commission delegation was headed by ECOWAS acting chairperson, Liberian president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, others include presidents of Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone. Despite the high-ranking personalities, however, the commission could not manage to convince Jammeh to change his position. As a result of that, the Commission left with no other alternative than to intervene militarily. It was only when ECOWAS members prepared for a military invasion of the country, following the inauguration of Barrow as new president in the Gambian embassy in Dakar on 19 January, when some Senegalese troops effectively surrounded the country and started to march towards Banjul to make this threat credible – that Jammeh could be convinced in a final round of negotiations to accept exile. He eventually left The Gambia on 21 January, with Barrow assuming office in the capital city on 26 January 2017.

6. What were the strategies adopted by ECOWAS to resolve Gambia power transition tussle?

ECOWAS used the threat of force, following the failure of its first mediation. Although, the military intervention was without any use of direct physical violence. The option of military intervention became more realistic as Jammeh eventually agreed to step down and go into exile. Succinctly, ECOWAS managed to “restore democracy” in The Gambia by using the threat of force without using any actual physical violence.

7. How effective are the strategies adopted by ECOWAS in resolving Gambia's electoral crises?

We can say that it was effective as the aim were achieved without any direct military confrontation between the Gambian army or affiliated mercenaries and the ECOWAS troops. It was only when

the scenario of military invasion became credible, Jammeh accept the defeat. The ECOWAS had also won legitimacy through being backed by both the African Union and the United Nations Security Council (the latter with some reservations) for what was essentially its strategy and policy.

8. What are the challenges faced in the adoption of strategies by ECOWAS in managing the Gambia's power tussle?

The major challenge faced by the ECOWAS was lack of appropriate mandate. ECOWAS has been suffering from lack of specific mandate for the protection of the civilians. Protection of the civilians must be a policy included in all types of intervention, whether peacekeeping or peace enforcement.

Secondly, there is lack of intervention strategies. There is no comprehensive protection strategy. Under this strategy, peacekeepers must police themselves to avoid impunity and inject confidence in the mission. Thirdly, inadequate resources. Maintaining regional peace and security involve costly expenses. The importance of the availability of adequate resources to undertake intervention has become more relevant today than ever. Finally, two thirds of ECOWAS member states are considered undemocratic regimes, and bad governance, compounded by high levels of corruption.

9. Is there any other thing you will like to add?

### **RESPONDENT 3**

1. What are the causes of Gambia's post presidential power tussle?

Let me start by saying Gambia has been under democratic rule for a very long period of time under Yahaya Jammeh. He was seen by the world as a despotic, undemocratic and a dictatorial president and that close to the time of the 2016 presidential election, comity of nation, Global community

formed a semi collation of pressure against the government of Yahaya Jammeh. International Civil society organization mounted pressure on the Government of Gambia to organize a free, fair and credible election in Gambia that is accepted by each and every stakeholder in that election and that such kind of pressure that was mounted on the Government was one of the key reasons that made Jammeh to have suspected foreign influence in Gambia's affairs. Although Gambia was under many international sanction and in particular Jammeh himself was been sanctioned by many foreign powers. These factors of tension with the international communities made Yahaya Jammeh to lose international reputation and also made him suspect that there was a plot of removing him from power which will ultimately result to trails in International Criminal Court and or International Court of Justice.

2. How would you describe the conflict of Gambia power tussle?

It was a crisis that is surrounding the future of the country, A country that nearly lost Democracy and its image at the international community. This is because Gambia at that time was at the verge of being Sanctioned, Alienated and Isolated by the International community. Yahaya Jammeh was also the cause of that conflict because of the pain he has inflicted on his people. The economy of Gambia was also in a bad shape as a result of international sanctions on his country. Another factor was when Yahaya Jammeh refused to cede power when the then election management body gave a verdict of result of losing the 2016 presidential election. This led the country to a hazy with uncertainty and made the country full of political hullabaloo.

3. How would you describe the roles played by ECOWAS in managing Gambia's power transition conflict?

Gambia being a member of ECOWAS and a part and parcel of West African Geo political zone gave ECOWAS the legitimacy to play a significant role in resolving the conflict in Gambia. The bone of contention is that the role played by ECOWAS was not a role that is independent of the role played by international community and infact, ECOWAS has been viewed by many as a puppet of America and Europe in general. ECOWAS was also believed that it was studying the body language of European Union and other World Super Powers before it took it stand to intervene in the ECOWAS crises because the World Powers wanted to place sanctions on Gambia and also force Yahaya Jammeh out of power. However, ECOWAS played a significant role in forcing Yahaya Jammeh to cede power but it was not an independent position as a body. In this regard, when US position is different, ECOWAS decision too would be different inspite the reality of situation on ground. Had it been US decided to support Yahaya Jammeh that ECOWAS would also support him against the people of Gambia. In essence, the roles played by ECOWAS was significant.

4. Did you think ECOWAS was in the best position to intervene in the Gambia's post presidential Election crisis?

Of course, ECOWAS was the best regional and political body to act in fact they should be the body to act and should be the only body to resolve the Gambia post electoral crises before the intervention of any foreign body. This is like an internal affair of ECOWAS and not of the Western World. ECOWAS should be sovereign and independent in acting on matters that concerns its member nations that formed the union. Eventhough its efforts looks like it was the only one that resolved the crises but behind the scene, we know that Western bodies were silently involved.

5. How effective is the ECOWAS roles in solving Gambia's transition tussle?

Well, the Effort of ECOWAS wouldn't have been very effective without the support of the International community in particular, United Nation and European Union otherwise, it wouldn't have succeeded. The effectiveness of ECOWAS efforts is that they mediated in the conflict and that they got all the support needed to resolve the crises amicably.

6. What were the strategies adopted by ECOWAS to resolve Gambia power transition tussle?

The strategies can be seen as Bargain of compromise, that is a win-win situation. A win-win in the sense that Yahaya Jammeh would cede power but he would not be investigated. He would also leave the country without prosecution, Also he would not face international trial and or prosecution particularly in the International Criminal Court. And in return, Adama Barrow would be sworn in as the new president and would not investigate his predecessor's administration. Again is that Yahaya Jammeh was given a lifeline of exile and could return after 4 years and still participate in the Politics of Gambia. In otherwards, it was a win-win case. All these were played under the principle of consensus and compromise.

7. How effective are the strategies adopted by ECOWAS in resolving Gambia's electoral crises?

The strategies used brought about peace to reign in the country without bloodshed. It also led to peaceful transition of power, The strategies were effective to have allowed Yahaya Jammeh to come back to his country and to even participate in the political activities after a period of time. The above reason in my own opinion is the reason why Yahaya Jammeh decided to cede power. If otherwise was the option, He would have opted for a war. In otherwards, the strategies were effective and sufficient.

8. What are the challenges faced in the adoption of strategies by ECOWAS in managing the Gambia's power tussle?

The key challenge faced was the conditions given to be accepted by Yahaya Jammeh despite the involvement of individual actors within the international community because I could remember the Private jet owned by Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu was used to flew Yahaya Jammeh and his family out of Gambia and he was assured no prosecution was going to follow his exit out of the country. Another challenge faced was the ability to save Yahaya Jammeh from the international community against trial.

9. Is there any other thing you will like to add?

No.

## **RESPONDENT 1**

- 1 What are the causes of Gambia's post presidential power tussle?

In my own view, there are many causes of the presidential power tussle and can be broadly categorized in to two: Remote and Immediate factor. Some of these Remote factors include the the circumstance in which Yahaya Jammeh emerged as the president of Gambia in 1994. You may remember that Yahaya Jammeh came into power through a military coup in 1994 and after taking over the power, he showed his commitment in initiating a transition from Military to civilian government, however he insisted that he wants to participate in the election that will oversee the transition from military to civilian government which he did in 1997 and having the advantages of being in the corridor of power, he succeeded in winning that election. Therefore, he metamorphosed from a military dictator to a democratically elected civilian president in 1997; and after that, he also won the three subsequent elections that followed from 2001, 2006 and 2011. He

however ruled for 22 years. Another remote factor that led to the crises is the denial of equal access to the state media by Yahaya Jammeh i.e no press freedom and there was also the scene of unlawful detention of the opposition party by the state security agents. While the immediate factor that led to the crises is the refusal to agree with the earlier declared election results by electoral management body.

2. How would you describe the conflict of Gambia power tussle?

The conflict was obviously political which is a result of the popular syndrome among African leaders of wanting to remain in power at all cost and as long as possible. I may also describe the conflict as an attempt of a sit-tight president to remain in power with at the other side of the coin, It is a group of political revolutionary or vanguard that is strongly firm in removing the incumbent president and do away with the statusquo.

3.How would you describe the roles played by ECOWAS in managing Gambia's power transition conflict?

ECOWAS has played a central or key role in managing the Gambia's power transition conflict. The role of ECOWAS in managing the conflict cannot be overemphasized as it really exploited all necessary diplomatic measures in ensuring that the transition conflict was amicably resolved between the two parties and the succeeded at the end. Although it was not only ECOWAS that played the role of settling the conflict, other actors within the International scene like the African Union and some individuals the President of Mauritania and other key players outside the country tried to manage the Gambian power transition conflict.

4. Did you think ECOWAS was in the best position to intervene in the Gambia's post presidential Election crisis?

Of course it was because if you are talking about the legality of constitutionality over the intervention of Gambia's power transitional conflict. It has all the legal barking to do that because the country in question is one of the members of ECOWAS and it is a signatory to the ECOWAS treaty, protocols and agreements, considering that, it has compromised its sovereignty to ECOWAS. Haven said all these, ECOWAS was in the best position to intervene especially its attempt to use diplomacy and avoiding blood shed even though AU was also part of the international bodies that took part in the reconciliation.

5. How effective is the ECOWAS roles in solving Gambia's transition tussle?

The roles of ECOWAS in resolving the Gambia's power transition tussle was so effective. I do not see it as effective because it was able so resolve it at the end but because of the way and manner in which it made it happen. It wouldn't have been easier for ECOWAS to achieve its aim if it employed the use of army in a chaotic way and manner.

6. What were the strategies adopted by ECOWAS to resolve Gambia power transition tussle?

ECOWAS largely relied in the use of mediation in resolving the power conflict. It could be recalled that ECOWAS sent a four-man committee even before the election to monitor the situation and the report given by this four-man committee showed that there was going to be a post presidential electoral crises that later surfaced because the political climate was so tensed before the election. In addition to the mediation role, ECOWAS has started mobilizing ECOMOG should in case if there was need to use threat as another strategy. In otherwards, it was prepared to use the Military as the last resort if the mediation had failed. These efforts made by ECOWAS created a synergy between her and other peace loving bodies who were ready to support the struggle in bringing the power transition tussle to an end.

7. How effective are the strategies adopted by ECOWAS in resolving Gambia's electoral crises?

The strategies were so effective because in this kind of scenario, the best strategy to adopt by any actor interested in resolving the conflict should be mediation and this is exactly what ECOWAS did. ECOWAS served as a third party by bringing to table both incumbent president and president elect and was able to uphold the first presidential election results. The incumbent president had to succumb to the pressure put on him to cede power.

8. What are the challenges faced in the adoption of strategies by ECOWAS in managing the Gambia's power tussle?

Had it been ECOWAS failed in the use of its first strategy which was the use of mediation, it would have faced serious challenge such as the issues of logistics and even human right violation issues would arise in addition to the problem of oversight of military activities in curbing the power tussle considering the issue of insurgency faced by the West African region at that moment. The only major issue which was faced by ECOWAS was the lack of cooperation with the mediation body by the incumbent president and was normal.

9. Is there any other thing you will like to add?

No, considering the fact that you have already captured all the necessary variables needed in accessing your thesis.

Thank you.

## **RESPONDENT 5**

1. What are the causes of Gambia's post presidential power tussle?

Really, one may point out the fact that there are remote and immediate case of Gambia's power tussle. The immediate cause principally has to do with the failure of Yahaya Jammeh to hand over to the democratically elected leader Adama Barrow. Although he had earlier accepted defeat and acknowledged the fact that Adama Barror won the election but later reversed his decision which had actually resulted to the generation of tension which had the potential of not only destabilizing Gambia but also the whole of West Africa. Haven said that, some of the remote causes may has to do with the fact that he had been in power for too long of which he has been in charge of the past elections and he was always declared the winner whether the elections were free and fair or not. Another factor is that when one person has been ruling for a long period of time, it may likely slide or result into Autocracy or Dictatorship that will in turn lead to abuse of power that will turn the leader against the people.

2. How would you describe the conflict of Gambia power tussle?

It has to do with the people wanting a new leadership and a rebirth of Gambia under a new leadership and it principally had to do with the failure of the Incumbent president to acknowledge election results earlier declared.

3. How would you describe the roles played by ECOWAS in managing Gambia's power transition conflict?

The role played by ECOWAS was excellent in the fact that it played the needed timely intervention which had resulted in Yahaya Jammeh relinquishing power and which had seen Adama barrow been sworn in as the Democratically elected leader of Gambia.

4. Did you think ECOWAS was in the best position to intervene in the Gambia's post presidential Election crisis?

Yes, ECOWAS was of course in the best position to intervene in the context of the sub-region so that the gains being made by it since its establishment in 1975 in terms of uniting the region, in terms of seeing to the economic development of the sub-region would not be destroyed by the crises in Gambia.

5. How effective is the ECOWAS roles in solving Gambia's transition tussle?

It was effective in the sense that the organization achieved its strategic objective of seeing Yahaya Jammeh giving in to the will of the Gambians by relinquishing power and by paving way for Adama Barrow been the Democratically elected leader to assume office.

6. What were the strategies adopted by ECOWAS to resolve Gambia power transition tussle?

One, it used the carrot and stick approach and or Diplomacy, force or military might and Diplomacy. The first strategy used was diplomacy which President Buhari alongside the president Johnson of Liberia and other African leaders whom paid visit to Yahaya Jammeh to diplomatically get him convinced or to persuade him to see reason to relinquish power haven shun the willingness to pave way for the president elect to assume the mantle of leadership. The use of ECOMOG was later introduced following his refusal to cede power.

7. How effective are the strategies adopted by ECOWAS in resolving Gambia's electoral crises?

They were effective. A combination of force and diplomacy worked well as the mission to let Yahaya Jammeh cede power was achieved.

8. What are the challenges faced in the adoption of strategies by ECOWAS in managing the Gambia's power tussle?

One may say considering the fact that ECOWAS is a sub-regional organization, they would need the support of AU and UN before they could intervene militarily in the crises of Gambia they might have been challenges faced.

9. Is there any other thing you will like to add?

ECOWAS should continue to strengthen its capacity given the wonderful role it had played in the political impulse in Gambia which took many by surprise in terms of how they were able to stabilize the situation.

#### **RESPONDENT 9**

1. What are the causes of Gambia's post presidential power tussle?

First and foremost let me say that one thing that is constant is the individual interest, when the individual interest is above the national interest, definitely there will be a conflict between the person that is retaining the power and the person that is willing to take over power, I think that Yahaya Jermaine have tasted what power is all about and he came into the system not through democracy system and he became the president of Gambia through military coup-detat which he later turn himself to civilian government without the legitimate means, now that he believes that he is still popular then he was able to conduct what they called election. When he conducted the election, the eyes opener happens where the people eyes open about the governance and politics and that is why they voted him out and then pick up the new person. But Yahaya Jermaine now see it as "I am a leader before and I was a leader, I still want to be a leader forever, so now I am not popular anymore so I must be there by all means" and that is

why there is tussle between two of them, so Adama Barrow in his own wisdom left the state for him in order not to cause chaos, but to Yahaya Jammeh he believes he has control over security and resources of the state. So as a result of that, the major causes of this Gambian Presidential power tussle is nothing but: Personal interest, the syndrome of sit-tight, he doesn't want to become a follower anymore because he perceives himself a leader.

2. How would you describe the conflict of Gambia power tussle?

I describe the power tussle in Gambia between the two of them as political rivalry between the two of them, as a group of people that do not really want power to serve the personal interest which can cause underdevelopment for the state. Infact, ever since the involvement of ECOWAS to restore power back to Adama Barrow, what has been the development there? No. so that will tell us that in any situation whereby somebody climb the throne or the altar, that person is not to serve the interest but the personal interest so just like when you are fighting for power by all means, it means that you have personal interest that you want achieve

3. How would you describe the roles played by ECOWAS in managing Gambia's power transition conflict?

Infact, ever since the establishment of ECOWAS and ever since our effort to study what ECOWAS is all about, I believe this is one of the greater achievement or the great achievement that is ever achieved by the ECOWAS to managed the conflict without bloodshed, that is why I gave them that kudos, they tried, they managed the power between Yahaya Jammeh and Adama Barrow, Infact, to extent that when Yahaya Jammeh left the state, that is Gambia, no ever bloodshed, killing of the people , destroying the properties has never happened, this is

mediation and diplomatic relations that is engaged by the ECOWAS, so they were able to managed the conflict.

4. Did you think ECOWAS was in the best position to intervene in the Gambia's post presidential Election crisis?

Yes of course, when you look at the entire world, no nation is an island, there is need for them to interact with one another, if Nigeria or the ECOWAS country state decided not to participate in this particular conflict, when there is internal conflict over there, there is bound for refugee, the people from that state will move to another place to seek for political asylum, so by the time they do so, they are going to affect the budget of their neighboring state , they may even transform the political character of the neighboring community, so in order to contain that one, the ECOWAS need to look into it and intervene and that is the first perspective, then the second perspective is that they are member, they signed agreement , there is an agreement sign by them under the protocol that to maintain good governance within the Africa or ECOWAS sub-region so in view of that they need to participate in the system, they are intervening in the managing of the crisis not because of what they are going to gain but because of the treaties signed by all the ECOWAS member state.

5. How effective is the ECOWAS roles in solving Gambia's transition tussle?

I think if you look at what really happen at the end of the crisis, it is very absolutely effective because no effort is being made again to re-engineer the conflict that already has been stopped by the ECOWAS, it is means that they were able to play what they called balance of power between the people that belong to Jermaine and the people that belong to Adama Barrow they were able to balance the situation and that is why there is no imminent crisis of political rivalry

between the two of them so when you look at the way they managed it, no side of this system that affected, they balance the situation.

6. What were the strategies adopted by ECOWAS to resolve Gambia power transition tussle?

I think when you look at it, when you are following the terrain, you will see that it is something that we can view from the perspective of the consultation and then they use democratic peace theory and they used what we called consultation and then the security dilemma, what I mean by the three of them is that , when Yahaya Jermaine started with security threat, they came with security dilemma to him that they would end up with what we called Game Theory because the two of them did not kill both the ECOWAS military and then the military that supported the Yahaya Jermaine, the two of them signed an agreement that there would be no war, so that is what they called the security dilemma, they also used what we call consultation, this means that Yahaya Jammeh had agreement with ECOWAS that after leaving office, he would not be probed. The last strategy is the democratic peace.

7. How effective are the strategies adopted by ECOWAS in resolving Gambia's electoral crises?

The strategies were very effective because ECOWAS was able to solve the crisis amicably.

8. What are the challenges faced in the adoption of strategies by ECOWAS in managing the Gambia's power tussle?

No system is perfect, when we are talking about collective responsibility, the problems that will be faced is mostly the with the center. ECOWAS was challenged with the problem of the internal political crisis of member states. The local laws made by these individual

member states are what is sabotaging the efforts of ECOWAS. Another challenges are financial strength, if not for individuals like President Muhammadu Buhari that supported ECOWAS both militarily and economically, ECOWAS would have failed in their mediation process.

9. Is there any other thing you will like to add?

This research should also focus on recognition of whether there was a peaceful transition of power in Gambia or it was forcefully.

#### **RESPONDENT 4**

1. What are the causes of Gambia's post presidential power tussle?

The 2016 presidential election in Gambia was affirmed by the then incumbent president Yahaya Jammeh to be free and fair in the favor of Adama Barrow whom was declared the winner of the election. Unfortunately, president Yahaya Jameh reversed his decision of the election after a day of victory. This led to the breaking of law and order in Gambia. That is the major issue that led to the crisis of Gambia's electoral crisis in 2016.

2. How would you describe the conflict of Gambia power tussle?

The conflict was political in nature, it was a tussle between the then incumbent president and the president elect, following the dispute of the electoral crises ECOWAS was able to send delegation to Banjul in 2016 in order to mediate the foreseen crises, and they were unable to meet a balanced ground with the two parties, which led ECOWAS to use force to restore Democracy back to Gambia.

3. How would you describe the roles played by ECOWAS in managing Gambia's power transition conflict?

ECOWAS played a very fantastic role, It played a mediating role in terms of conflict management and resolution. Gambia has been a member of ECOWAS since its inception in 1975. ECOWAS was able to gather the support of AU and UN to restore Democracy back to Gambia. ECOWAS was able to mobilize army from member states particularly Nigeria and Senegal to combat the Gambian army and they made sure Yahaya Jammeh agreed to the peace treaty. In order for peace to be restored back to Gambia.

4. Did you think ECOWAS was in the best position to intervene in the Gambia's post presidential Election crisis?

ECOWAS was in the best position to intervene. ECOWAS was created in 1975 to promote trade, political and Economic dependence of which ECOWAS is one if the 16 member states. Yahaya Jammeh has been the president of ECOWAS for the past 22 years so he conceded defeat to Yahaya Jammeh in 2016. ECOWAS has been a front line fighter in the fight for peace to reign in all of its jurisprudence through its combined army, Nigeria has contributed immensely and in terms of financial and medical aid in making sure tht ECOWAS was able to perform its best and in reference to Gambia's election, Nigeria head of state and Senegalese head of state contributed greatly in making sure peace was restored to Gambia.

5. How effective is the ECOWAS roles in solving Gambia's transition tussle?

ECOWAS role was very effective because if not because of ECOWAS, Democracy would have been thrown into the waste bin of history in Gambia because the presedent was not ready to cede power. Following the failure of the first mediation, ECOWAS was apparently convinced that they needed to adopt more credible sanction. ECOWAS continued the mediation effort largely through President Muhammadu Buhari and President Mahamma and requested the endorsement of AU and

EU. ECOWAS also enforced all necessary means to adopt the presidential result earlier pronounced.

6. What were the strategies adopted by ECOWAS to resolve Gambia power transition tussle?

ECOWAS adopted mediation as a strategy, apart from the mediation process, they also used force although physical force was not used. They were able to gather support through United Nation and African Union and was able to rally support from the international community against the Incumbent president of Gambia.

7. How effective are the strategies adopted by ECOWAS in resolving Gambia's electoral crises?

The strategies were very effective aside from the mediation peace process in which ECOWAS adopted as first prove abortive because the incumbent president refused to cede power. He only ceded power following the series of threat on him and the agreement with the mediation team at the long run.

8. What are the challenges faced in the adoption of strategies by ECOWAS in managing the Gambia's power tussle?

One of the challenges faced is the lack of support from other African countries, the issue of financial support is also inclusive and likewise the support of military aids and other medical assistance from other West African sub-countries but particularly Nigeria and Ghana were able to gather support for them. Other challenges was that ECOWAS was unable to quickly muster support in order to curb the crises from the initial stage. Another challenge was that ECOWAS was not given full support by the AU initially not until when the UN gave them full support to use military sanction too. Another issue was the sit-tight syndrome which exist among African leaders.

ECOEAS Diplomatic strategies and Mediation initiative was poor in the beginning. They were unable to draw a clear framework right from the beginning.

9. Is there any other thing you will like to add?

Full support should be given to other regional organizations like SADC and even ECOWAS itself. Another this that the successful mediation of ECOWAS shows that applying principle of complementarity, joint preventive diplomacy and comparative avenger mediation initiatives can actually be a good measure of solving conflict management in most African countries.

## **RESPONDENT 8**

1. What are the causes of Gambia's post presidential power tussle?

It is not farfetched from the fact that African politics is sit-tight in nature. Considering this fact therefore, Yahaya Jammeh after spending a long period of time in office did not want to cede power.

2. How would you describe the conflict of Gambia power tussle?

The conflict of Gambia is political in nature and therefore the conflict can be described as a fight for power acquisition and or refusal to relinquish power to the Democratically elected elect.

3. How would you describe the roles played by ECOWAS in managing Gambia's power transition conflict?

ECOWAS been a regional organization did its best in resolving the Gambian power tussle and the political rivalry. ECOWAS played an effective role in managing the power tussle in Gambia political terrain.

4. Did you think ECOWAS was in the best position to intervene in the Gambia's post presidential Election crisis?

Yes, it is best we Africans solve our own issue ourselves. It is an embarrassment for us to wait for foreign nations to help us solve our issues. In other words, if ECOWAS was able to solve the issue effectively without bloodshed, I think it's quite commendable.

5. How effective is the ECOWAS roles in solving Gambia's transition tussle?

It's quite understandable that if ECOWAS had not come in, then the crises would have escalated to other neighboring member states. So, the strategies were quite effective.

6. What were the strategies adopted by ECOWAS to resolve Gambia power transition tussle?

To the best of my knowledge, ECOWAS adopted so many strategies. Part of the strategies used was mediation, dialogue and when both failed that was when they employed the use of military.

7. How effective are the strategies adopted by ECOWAS in resolving Gambia's electoral crises?

The strategies were very effective, because in a situation where by the political climate is hazy, if the strategies employed by ECOWAS was not effective, their efforts wouldn't have yielded.

8. What are the challenges faced in the adoption of strategies by ECOWAS in managing the Gambia's power tussle?

Despite the fact that ECOWAS comprises of different Member states, we need to identify the fact that every state is sovereign. So ECOWAS was faced with the challenge of intervening into the affair of a sovereign nation and at the same time trying to quench the crises that is capable of escalating and making the whole region unstable.

9. Is there any other thing you will like to add?

Yes, this topic is very important and relevant at this particular point in time especially considering the fact that the kind of politics we play in Africa is a bit similar. Also out of your recommendation should be that an orientation should be held for all our political elites in other to shy away sight-tight politics.

## **RESPONDENT 7**

1. What are the causes of Gambia's post presidential power tussle?

Basically, considering the 2016 Gambian election, one of the major factors we can note as the cause of the power tussle is the selfish interest of Yahaya Jammeh over his long term rule and his refusal to cede power after he lost the election.

2. How would you describe the conflict of Gambia power tussle?

Honestly speaking, I wouldn't say the conflict is confrontational or destructive but a partial and unreasonable conflict. Reason being that, a country like Gambia that promotes the doctrine of Democracy can be ruled for a long period of time under the same person and still refusing to cede power after defeat and inturn making himself like a dictatorial and or Autocrat.

3. How would you describe the roles played by ECOWAS in managing Gambia's power transition conflict?

As a matter of fact, in dispute resolution under peace studies, I got to realize ECOWAS played a vital role because they mediated between Adama Barrow and Yahaya Jammeh. They made Yahaya Jammeh realize that Election results cannot be favourable all the time. If not for ECOWAS

intervention, the conflict could have escalated to other neighboring African countries as such that could be destructive rather than being constructive.

4. Did you think ECOWAS was in the best position to intervene in the Gambia's post presidential Election crisis?

As a matter of fact, you know we have regional and sub-regional organizations so also we have continental organizations, as such they also call them conglomerate organizations such as the UN. ECOWAS is a regional organization which made it to be in the best position to intervene before the conglomerate organizations. Example is that of the conflict in Rwanda where ECOWAS had earlier sent its mediation team ahead of the UN, even though I would have expected AU to come in earlier before ECOWAS.

5. How effective is the ECOWAS roles in solving Gambia's transition tussle?

I will rate their effectiveness on the percentage of 55, that is above average. For the fact that ECOWAS was able to achieve the desired goal, then it is a job well done. As such, their roles were reasonably effective.

6. What were the strategies adopted by ECOWAS to resolve Gambia power transition tussle?

They used both Mediation and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) which is a mechanism used to make Yahaya Jammeh understand the fact that he might not be a leader at that time but he could be a powerful states man and also a winner at the end.

7. How effective are the strategies adopted by ECOWAS in resolving Gambia's electoral crises?

The ECOWAS strategies were very effective on a rating of 60% though I believe AU would have done better than ECOWAS because they were more of being Economical than Political.

8. What are the challenges faced in the adoption of strategies by ECOWAS in managing the Gambia's power tussle?

The challenges are numerous but I would like to note out part of them. In any society where there is power tussle, then mediation wouldn't work as easy as expected. One of the greatest challenges faced by ECOWAS was the refusal of Yahaya Jammeh to relinquish power. Another challenge is that Yahaya Jammeh was seeing ECOWAS as not being in the best position to come in as such that made it hard for him to comply. Another challenge again is the financial cost involved in the mediation process.

9. Is there any other thing you will like to add?

No. That would be all for that.

## **RESPONDENT 10**

1. What are the causes of Gambia's post presidential power tussle?

The post presidential power tussle in Gambia could be attributed to a number of causes among which include Mis-governance, Poverty, and the Erratic behavior of the incumbent President Yahaya Jammeh. Also the refusal of Yahaya Jammeh to allow ECOWAS election monitoring team into the country during the 2016 presidential election could also be one of the cases.

2. How would you describe the conflict of Gambia power tussle?

The conflict of Gambia power tussle was very unfortunate but avoidable if not for the sit-tight attitude of the incumbent president Yahaya Jammeh.

3. How would you describe the roles played by ECOWAS in managing Gambia's power transition conflict?

The role of ECOWAS in the post presidential electoral crisis was decisive as it was able to prevent unnecessarily bloodbath that would have accompanied the power tussle if ECOWAS had not intervened. In other words, the role was very decisive.

4. Did you think ECOWAS was in the best position to intervene in the Gambia's post presidential Election crisis?

ECOWAS was in the core position to intervene in the Gambian crisis a sub-regional body to which Gambia is a member and of course, ECOWAS has the legal mandate to intervene in the domestic politics of member nations.

5. How effective is the ECOWAS roles in solving Gambia's transition tussle?

ECOWAS roles were effective as the incumbent president was forced to hand over power to the duly elected president without violence that could had been the case if ECOWAS did not intervene in the crisis.

6. What were the strategies adopted by ECOWAS to resolve Gambia power transition tussle?

In the management of the crisis, ECOWAS adopted a lot of strategies but the most effective was the Military Inversion of Gambia after other strategies such as dialogue, sanction and mediation had failed.

7. How effective are the strategies adopted by ECOWAS in resolving Gambia's electoral crises?

The strategies were very effective.

8. What are the challenges faced in the adoption of strategies by ECOWAS in managing the Gambia's power tussle?

ECOWAS face a lot of challenges while trying to adopt the strategies to manage the crisis in Gambia. Chief among the challenges was the challenge on how to provide exit options for Yahaya Jammeh. This is to say that ECOWAS would not have achieved a peaceful transition without compromises such as allowing Yahaya Jammeh to flee the country without facing trial. Also, allowing Yahaya Jammeh to make way with the money he looted while at the helm of affairs of the country.

9. Is there any other thing you will like to add?

Nothing for now.

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