

**UNITED NATIONS AND AFRICA UNION JOINT EFFORT IN THE
RESOLUTIONS OF CONFLICT IN DARFUR REGION, 2003-2011**

BY

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**BEING A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF
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DECLARATION

I, hereby declare that this dissertation titled: “United Nations and Africa Union Joint Efforts in the Resolutions of Conflict in Darfur Region, South Sudan” has been presented in any previous application of Master of Science (M.Sc) International Relation.

All quotations are indicated and sources of information specifically acknowledge by means of references.

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CERTIFICATION

This dissertation titled: “United Nations and Africa Union Joint Efforts in the Resolutions of Conflict in Darfur Region, South Sudan has been read and approved a meeting part of the requirement for the award of M.Sc Political Science (International Relations) in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Nasarawa State University Keffi.

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DEDICATION

This project work is dedicated to my creator, the Almighty God who give me the grace as well as provided all my requirements throughout the period of the study.

It is dedicated to my husband, Mr. Ishaku James Maimanga and two of our daughters, Bernice and Beatrice. I will also dedicate project to my parents and my amiable supervisor Prof. S.A Ibrahim and his wife, and Associate Prof. Usman Abu Tom, whose motivation propelled me to embark on the programme. Thanks for your support, patience and understanding. I really value your presence in life endeavor.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Cover page.....	i
Title page.....	ii
Declaration	iii
Certification.....	iv
Dedication	v
Acknowledgement	vi
Abstract	vii
Table of contents.....	viii

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

1.1	Background to the study	1
1.2	Statement of the problem.....	5
1.3	Research Questions.....	6
1.4	Objectives of the Study.....	6
1.5	Significance of the study	7
1.6	Research propositions.....	8
1.7	Scope of the study.....	8
1.8	Organization of the study.....	8

CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1	Conceptual Framework	9
2.2	Concept of conflict.....	9
2.3	Conflict Resolution	13
2.4	The causes of Darfur Civil War.....	18
2.5	The African Union Response on Darfur Conflict Resolution.....	25
2.6	African Union and the Challenges of peace-keeping operation	30
2.7	Humanitarian catastrophe and International Community	32
2.8	The concept of the united nations.....	37
2.9	Historical to the Emergence of the Africa Union	45

2.10	The UN Security Council and Peace-Keeping Mission in Africa.....	59
2.11	The Role of International Organization in South Sudan Conflict Resolution	64
2.12	The Role IGAD on the South Sudan Conflict Resolution.....	69
2.13	IGAD’s Peace Process in South Sudan.....	77
2.14	Theoretical Framework.....	82

CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODS

3.1	Research Design.....	89
3.3	Sample size and Sample Techniques	89
3.3	Method of Data Collection	92
3.5	Justification of Method	92
3.6	Procedures.....	93
3.7	Technique of data analysis.....	94

CHAPTER FOUR
DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

4.1	Data presentation	95
4.2	Data Presentation and Analysis	95
4.3	Discussion of Findings.....	108

CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1	Summary	110
5.2	Conclusion	111
5.3	Recommendations.....	113
5.4	Limitations of the study.....	114
	References	115
	Appendix ‘A’.....	119

ABSTRACT

This study is carried out with a view to examine the United Nations and African Union joint efforts in the resolution of conflict in Darfur region of Sudan. The basic contention in this research work is to point out the efforts made by the UN and AU mission in Darfur conflict. The research work captured the roles and the challenges confronting the AU on peacekeeping operation in Africa. The international organization and the UN Security Council played significant roles to resolve the Darfur conflict. It also examines the capability of the UN Security Council potentiality on the military resources, political and economic leverage at its disposal to deal with any insecurity challenges. The position of the United Nations concerning peacekeeping operation of the Darfur civil war weak and the reason for it are not farfetched. Firstly, the UN was at the forefront of the humanitarian efforts both in Southern Sudan and in Darfur. Secondly, the Arab/black African split, which was implicit in the Darfur crisis. Thirdly, it was the UN deeply involved in the Naivasha process where it had boosts the inter-governmental authority on developing (IGAD) capacity. Finally, the EU member states and America kept pushing the world body to act as if they were not partly responsible for it. The reluctance of the global communities towards Darfur conflict resolution meant that the AU assumed centre stage in the international response. The civil war in Darfur's presented the AU with a genuine opportunity to find an African solution by invoking article 4 (h) of its new charter. The UN provide a convenient façade behind which western powers could wash their hands off committing their own military to Darfur conflict. However, the study employed both primary and secondary method of data collection. For the primary data questionnaires were administered while for the secondary both qualitative and quantitative data were collected, while functionalism theory was adopted as a theoretical underpinning. The AU current situation does not indicate that any time would be soon of capable of finding no operation and the establishment of plan which gradually transfers the funding responsibility to the AU. This research therefore recommends that the AU should come out with fresh effective mechanism that can enable the union to deal with any insecurity challenges in Africa without depending the western powers.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The challenge before African states has been how to grapple with a variety of the complex political, economic, environmental and social conflicts that have arisen in an unprecedented manner in various parts of Africa. The challenges of neo-colonialism which has rippled and dovetailed with a series of devastating intra-state conflicts since the 1960 poses a lot of concern. Africa is one of the worst victims of violent conflicts in the world. Many states have been battered and collapsed as a result of the many fratricidal Wars, intractable political conflicts and economic insolence (Eghosa, 2000),

The people have become more pauperized, hopeless and helpless victims of Wars, repressive and corrupt governments, and economic adjustments that have had devastating and conflict-worsening consequences. African conflicts are not only more prevalent than earlier period; it is more virulent and destructive because its implications lie within both the state and the region. It is a Well-known fact that war is not only bloody but also satanic. It is not a ludo game where one could be killed as many times as possible and still live to play the game again. The African continent presents the image of a continent that has been ravaged by conflicts. There is hardly any part of Africa where violent conflict has not been witnessed. There is no gain saying the obvious that Africa, since the eve of the 21st century, has been challenged by a variety of complex political, economic, environmental and social upheavals in various degrees and intensity that is unprecedented in the continent. These challenges have launched the continent into a series of devastating intra state conflicts ever experienced in a single continent anywhere in the world in the last decade and a half.

Eight of the fifteen complex emergencies declared by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs were in Africa (Herbst 1998, Collers and Mills, 1999)

Corroborating the above position, Galadima (n.d) took a concise view of the continent and states that;

Conflicts erupted into ethnic warfare in central Africa Zaire, Burundi, and Rwanda. There was armed uprising in Northern Uganda civil war in Sudan and border conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Somalia has remained a collapsed state in spite of attempts to resuscitate it. In Southern Africa, Lesotho witnessed an armed uprising Angola was in turmoil In West Africa, Liberia was almost a collapsed state, even as rebels embattled Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. While Cote d'ivoire experiences armed rebellion, Sudan is encountering humanitarian catastrophe arising from a bitter intra-state conflict, almost of a genocidal proportion.

Okereke (2005) cited Thomos Hopes that Africa presents a continent where life is nasty, brutish and short due to the litany of armed conflicts that has destructive impact on both human and material resources. With these prevailing conflict situations in many parts of Africa, the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan is a very dangerous addition. For a continent that has suffered multiplicity of wars and conflicts, the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan constitutes another violent disruption to the peace security and development of the Africa continent (Oche, 2008).

The current crisis in Darfur began in February 2003, just after the government began peace negotiations to resolve the civil war with the south. The loosely aligned Sudan Liberation Movement Army (SLMA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebels attacked government targets in central Darfur and demanded autonomy. After a ceasefire mediated by Chadian President Idriss Deby between the government and rebel groups fell apart in December 2003, Khartoum used the Janjaweed militias to attack the villages populated by African Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa peoples. The

SLMA and JEM draw much of their support from these groups. African farmers and Arabic nomads long have competed for limited resources in western Sudan's Darfur region, particularly following a prolonged drought in 1983. Meanwhile, the Muslim government in the north was engaged in a civil war with rebels in the Christian south. The Sudanese government funded Darfur's Arab militias which came to be known as the "Janjaweed or armed horsemen "to keep the rebels at bay. This action by the Sudanese Government enflamed Arab-African tensions in Darfur and, as according to United Nations Security Council Special report says, the regime of President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir transformed a competition for scarce resources "into a large-scale violent confrontation tinged with serious racial and ethnic overtones."(UN, 2006).

Since the beginning of the conflict, almost 2 million Darfurians a third of the region's population—have been internally displaced as a result of the systematic destruction of villages; some 200,000 refugees have fled to neighboring Chad. An estimated 350,000 people in the region have died as a result of violence, disease, and starvation, according to a report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Sexual violence is rampant, and UN Undersecretary General Jan Egeland told the Security Council in 2005 that "rape is systematically used as a Weapon of warfare." The humanitarian situation remains catastrophic due to ongoing state-sponsored violence, layers of aid obstruction, the lack of an overall humanitarian strategic plan, and the weakened state of displaced Sudanese. Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), a disproportionate number of them women, are in terribly weakened states, subject to sexual abuse and without adequate shelter. The numbers of at-risk civilians continue to increase. And as need far outstrips the ability of agencies to deliver aid, and access is restricted due to instability, localized famine is feared.

The African Union (AU), sent monitors to oversee the 2003 peace negotiations. After those talks failed in 2004, the African Union sent around 3,000 troops to protect the observers there and provide security.

There are now about 7,000 AU soldiers in Darfur, which many experts say falls short of the actual security presence needed. The Well-meaning but ill-conceived peacekeeping mission by the African Union failed to stop the massacres and destruction of villages. This prompted the UN Security Council, in spite of reluctance on the part of China and Russia, to call for greater UN and NATO involvement in the crisis, against the wishes of the government in Khartoum. Noting the AMIS resource deficiencies, the deteriorating security conditions in Darfur, and the threats of some AMIS member states to Withdraw participation (Africa Action 2007), the international community began to unite more firmly around the idea of collective intervention in 2006. Prompted by threats to international peace and security, Argentina, Denmark, France, Ghana, *PM Greece, Slovakia, the UK, Tanzania and the US co- sponsored a resolution on a UN peacekeeping force that would send 17 300 militaries and 3 300 civilian police personnel to "Darfur as a Chapter VII mission. The aim of the resolution was to reinforce the AMIS effort and reduce the large-scale violence in Darfur (UN, 2006). Bashir's government voiced opposition to the presence of UN troops in Sudan, claiming that a UN presence would call into question the nation's sovereignty. Initially, China and Russia opposed the Security Council resolution due to their economic interests in Sudan, but they eventually abstained as a result of the international pressures that was brought to bear on them especially China that was threatened by the international Olympic Committee which threatened to take away the hosting right from her if she failed to persuade Sudan to allow the UN AU hybrid peacekeeping force access into Darfur.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

This research work is to examine one of the problems of effectiveness and ineffectiveness of United Nations and African Union Joint Mission in the resolution of conflict in Darfur region. The inability of UN/AU in protection incessant of occurrence and reoccurrence of conflict in Africa with specific reference to Darfur conflict, this has triggered serious problems in the continent. The interventions of African Union in Darfur conflict in 2002, The Africa body lack the resources and leadership capability to take effective actions in the Darfur conflict. The African Union (AU) contingents are not reliable to meet the critical mass requirements and while troops are not familiar to the surrounding environment they often lack the expertise to carry out effective mission to deal with conflict in Darfur region. However, the United Nation (UN) have the resources and military capability to deal with conflict in Darfur but yet the UN failed for quick response to take effective actions in order to stop the incessant killings and genocide which took place in the Darfur conflict. Absence of quick response from the UN caused damages and humanitarian catastrophe. The AU intervened with its African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) but adequately troop members and resources resulted in the force relinquishing leadership to the United Nations in 2007. In order to form a joint peace keeping force, the AU mission in Darfur region find itself in a terrible and horrible condition to deal with conflict in the region which the UN failures to quickly respond to the conflict scene also describe the Darfur conflict as the worst humanitarian crisis in Africa. In view of the above, the study is guided by the following research questions.

1.3 Research Questions

The research questions that the study seeks to answer are:

- i. What are the specific challenges that the UN and AU face in their efforts in resolving the South Sudan conflict resolution?
- ii. What are the roles played by the international communities in resolving the conflict in South Sudan?
- iii. What are the conflict resolution mechanisms adopted by the UN/AU in addressing the South Sudan conflict?
- iv. What steps and strategy measures can be taken by the international organizations in resolving the South Sudan conflict?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

This research is aimed at realizing the following general and specific objectives. The general objective is to assess the United Nations and African Union joint efforts in Darfur conflict resolution. The specific objectives of the study are as follows; :

- i. To investigate the specific challenges that the UN and UA face in their efforts in resolving the South Sudan conflict resolution,
- ii. To assess the roles played by the international communities in dealing with the South Sudan conflict resolution,
- iii. To find out the conflict resolution mechanism adopted by the UN/AU in addressing the South Sudan conflict,
- iv. To establish the steps and strategy measure taking by the international organization in resolving the South Sudan conflict.

1.5 Significance of the Study

The study is significant at the end of the research exercise in that it actually shows the significant efforts of the United Nations and African Union in the management, preventions and resolutions of conflicts especially in Darfur region, Sudan. The study will expose relationship between African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and United Nation Mission in Sudan UNAMID in the area of security and peacekeeping in Darfur conflict. The joint peacekeeping missions will provide platform information through recommendations on the practical aspect of improving the strategies, functions, and role the UN/AU, peacekeeping missions as regard the improvement of human condition, maintenance of the ceasefire agreement and the achievement of a permanent peace in Darfur. This study is important because despite the problems encountered by the UN/AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur region, the problems countered by the joint peacekeeping mission will demonstrate the important of late quick response to trouble areas in order to stop the incessant killings and genocide and ensure ceasefire, peace and security.

The study is also significant as it will add the theoretical and empirical knowledge to the subject matter as researcher who which to further the study on the topic laid hands to improve the research work. The study again is significant as recommendations that are made will enhance the mechanism use on conflict prevention management, transformation and resolution in the Darfur region, Sudan.

Finally, this research work will further input to increase volume of review available literatures in the area of conflict, peace and security in Africa and it will also serve as a reference point to the present and future researchers who are or might be eager to find solutions to the myriad of problems facing African continent.

1.6 Research Propositions

The following propositions will be drawn to guide this study:

- i. There are specific challenges confronting the UN/AU on conflict resolution in Darfur region, Sudan.
- ii. There is strategic measure taken by the international and regional organization to deal with conflict in Darfur region.

1.7 Scope of the Study

The scope of this study covers from the periods between (2003-2011) and the study focused on the United Nations and African Union joint efforts in the resolution of conflict in Darfur region, South Sudan. The scope also captured the role played by this regional organization for the purpose to curtail the challenges associated with Darfur conflict resolution.

1.8 Organization of the Study

The organization of the study is arranged into five chapters; chapter one covers the introduction which gives the background to the entire work including the organizational structure. Chapter two deals with the literature review and theoretical framework whereas chapter three handles the methodology of the study. Chapter four deals with the data presentation and analysis while chapter five covers the summary conclusion and recommendation and finally, there will be references at the end of the research work.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Conceptual Framework

2.2 The Concept of Conflict

Concept of conflict as a dynamic process that occurs between interdependent parties as they experience negative emotional reactions to perceived disagreements and interference with the attainment of their determination, self-esteem and goals with the cognitive view of interpersonal naive or negative perception toward the parties involved, Conflict as a means of dialogue integration settling disputes among parties or a general patent of groups dealing with desperate ideas (Smith 2005)

- i. **Disagreement:** - Generally, we are aware there is some level of difference in the positions of the two (or more) parties involved in the conflict. But the true disagreement versus the perceived disagreement may be quite different from one another. In fact, conflict tends to be accompanied by significant levels of misunderstanding that exaggerate the perceived disagreement considerably. If we can understand the true areas of disagreement, this will help us solve the right problems and manage the true needs of the parties.
- ii. **Parties involved:** - There are often disparities in our sense of who is involved in the conflict. Sometimes, people are surprised to learn they are a party to the conflict, while other times we are shocked to learn we are not included in the disagreement. On many occasions, people who are seen as part of the social system (e.g, work team, family, and company) are influenced to participate in the dispute, whether they would personally define the situation in that way or not. In the above example, people very readily "take sides" based upon current perceptions of the issues, past issues and relationships, roles within the organization, and other factors. The parties involved

can become an elusive concept to define.

- iii. **Perceived threat:** - People respond to the perceived threat, rather than the true threat, facing them, thus, while perception doesn't become reality per se, people's behaviors, feelings and ongoing responses become modified by that evolving sense of the threat they confront. If we can work to understand the true threat (issues) and develop strategies (solutions) that manage it (agreement), we are acting constructively to manage the conflict.
- iv. **Needs, interests or concerns** - There is a tendency to narrowly define "the problem" as one of substance, task, and near-term viability. However, workplace conflicts tend to be far more complex than that, for they involve ongoing relationships with complex, emotional components. Simply stated, there are always procedural needs and psychological needs to be addressed within the conflict, in addition to the substantive needs that are generally presented. And the durability of the interests concerns of the parties transcends the immediate presenting situation. Any efforts to resolve conflicts effectively must take these points into account.

Conflicts occur when people (or other parties) perceive that, as a consequence of a disagreement, there is a threat to their needs, interests or concerns. Although conflict is a normal part of organization life, providing numerous opportunities for growth through improved understanding and insight, there is a tendency to view conflict as a negative experience caused by abnormally difficult circumstances. Disputants tend to perceive limited options and finite resources available in seeking solutions, rather than multiple possibilities that may exist 'outside the box' in which we are problem-solving.

A few points are worth reiterating before proceeding which are as follows:

- a. A conflict is more than a mere disagreement - it is a situation in which people

perceive a threat (physical, emotional, power, status, etc.) to their well-being. As such, it is a meaningful experience in people's lives, not to be shrugged off by a mere, "it will pass."

- b. Participants in conflicts tend to respond on the basis of their perceptions of the situation, rather than an objective review of it. As such, people filter their perceptions (and reactions) through their values, culture, beliefs, information, experience, gender, and other variables. Conflict responses are both filled with ideas and feelings that can be very strong and powerful guides to our sense of possible solutions,
- c. As in any problem, conflicts contain substantive, procedural, and psychological dimensions to be negotiated. In order to best understand the threat perceived by those engaged in a conflict, we need to consider all of these dimensions.
- d. Conflicts are normal experiences within the work environment. They are also, to a large degree, predictable and expectable situations that naturally arise as we go about managing complex and stressful projects in which we are significantly invested. As such, if we develop procedures for identifying conflicts likely to arise, as well as systems through which we can constructively manage conflicts, we may be able to discover new opportunities to transform conflict into a productive learning experience.
- e. Creative problem-solving strategies are essential to positive approaches to conflict management. We need to transform the situation from one in which it is 'my way or the highway 'into one in which we entertain new possibilities that have been otherwise elusive.

The Role of Perception in Conflict as noted in the explanation of conflict, conflict as disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a threat to their needs, interests concerns. One key element of this definition is the idea that each party may

have a different perception of any given situation.

- a. **Culture, Race, and Ethnicity:** - Our varying cultural backgrounds influence us to have certain beliefs about the social structure of our world, as well as the role of conflict that experience. We may have learned to value substantive, procedural a psychological need differently as result, thus influencing our willingness to engage in various modes of negotiation and efforts to manage the conflict.
- b. **Gender and Sexuality:** - Men and women often perceive situations somewhere differently, based on both their experiences in the world (which relates to power a privilege, as do race and ethnicity) and socialization patterns that reinforce the importance of relationships vs. task, substance vs. process, immediacy vs. long-tel outcomes. As a result, men and women will often approach conflictive situations with differing mind sets about the desired outcomes from the situation, as well as the set possible solutions that may exist.
- c. **Knowledge General and Situational:** - Parties respond to given conflicts on the basis the knowledge they may have about the issue at hand. This includes situation-special knowledge (i.e., "Do I understand what is going on here?"), and general knowledge (i.e., "Have I experienced this type of situation before?" or "Have I studied about similar situations before?"). Such information can influence the person's willingness engage in efforts to manage the conflict, either reinforcing confidence to deal with the dilemma or undermining one's willingness to flexibly consider alternatives.
- d. **Impressions of the Messenger:** - If the person sharing the message - the messenger - perceived to be a threat (powerful, scary, unknown, etc.), this can influence responses to the overall situation being experienced. For example, if a big scan looking guy is approaching me rapidly, yelling "Get out of the way!" I may respond differently than

if a diminutive, calm person would express the same message to me as well, if I knew either one of them previously, I might respond differently based upon that prior sense of their credibility: I am more inclined to listen with respect someone I view as credible as if the message comes from someone who lack credibility and integrity in my mind.

- e. **Previous Experiences:** - Some of us have had profound, significant life experiences then continue to influence our perceptions of current situations. These experiences might have left us fearful, lacking trust, and reluctant to take risks. On the other hand previous experiences may have left us confident, willing to take chances and experience the unknown. Either way, we must acknowledge the role of previous experiences as elements of our perceptual filter in the current dilemma.

These factors (along with others) conspire to form the perceptual filters through which I experience conflict. As a result, our reactions to the threat and dilemma posed by conflict should be anticipated to include varying understandings of the situation. This also means that we can anticipate that in many conflicts there will be significant misunderstanding of each other's perceptions, needs and feelings. These challenges contribute to our emerging sense during conflict, that the situation is overwhelming and unsolvable. As such, they become critical sources of potential understanding, insight and possibility.

2.3 Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution has been conceptualized as the methods and processes involved in facilitating the peaceful ending of a conflict usually in the shapes of group members initiating a compromising dialogue or ideologies to the rest of the group. Augsburger, (1992). This is to say that conflict resolution is essentially aimed at intervention to change or facilitate the course of a conflict. Conflict resolution provides an

opportunity to interact with the parties concerned, with the hope of at least reducing the scope, intensity and effects of conflicts. During formal and informal meetings, conflict resolution exercises permit, a re-assessment of views and chains as a basis for finding options to crisis and to divergent point of view. Communication thus, is very pivotal in resolving any conflict and this is where the media comes in handy (Bannon, 2003).

However, one factor that has been found common in conflict situation is the absence of the right information or breach of communication between parties involved. Provision of the right information has been seen as the panacea for conflict resolution. According to Gisesa (2002). Conflict and peace have revealed that conflict are based on deficiency of information, stressing that cases of misinformation, wrong information or missing information chance, disparity in opinions and social difference which may lead to as well as heighten conflict. Thus, a wide range of methods and procedures for addressing conflicts exist, following the reason behind them. This includes but not limited to the following;

i. Negotiation

ii. Mediation

iii. Diplomacy

i. Negotiation: - This is a dialogue between two or more people or parties, intended to reach an understanding, resolve point of difference, or gain advantage in outcome of i dialogue, to produce an agreement upon courses of action, to bargain for individual or collective advantage to craft outcomes to satisfy various interests of two people or parties involved in negotiation process (Burton, 2001) Bronowscki (1983), further puts that negotiation is a process where each party involved in negotiating tries to gain

an advantage or minimize disadvantage for themselves by the end of the process. That is, it is intended to aim at a compromise and occur in business, nonprofit organizations, and government branches, legal proceedings, international dealings and in personal situations such as marriage divorce, parenting and in everyday life event that is prone to friction and conflict Michel, (1990). The employment of negotiation in conflict resolution stems from general assertion that when the parties involved in a conflict are optionally satisfied, conflict will definitely not ensue.

- ii. **Mediation:** - Broadly refer to any instance which a third party helps others to reach an agreement Johan, (2002). The term mediation on the other hand is used as a form of alternative disputes International Journal of Advanced Academic Research -Social Sciences and Education Vol.1 Issue I, Oct. 2015 | www.ijaar.org resolution a way of resolving disputes between two or more parties to negotiate a settlement. Adam Currie, (1992).

More often, mediation has a structure timetable and dynamics that ordinary negotiation lack. The process is usually private and confidential, possibly enforced by law. The mediator acts as a neutral third party and facilitates rather than directs the process. Mediators use various techniques to open, or improve dialogue between disputants, aiming to help the parties reach an agreement. Much depends on the skill of the mediator. As the practice of mediation gained popularity, training programmes, certification and licensing followed, producing trained, professional mediators committed to the discipline.

- iii. **Diplomacy:** - In conflict resolution diplomacy refers to any art and practice of conducting negotiations between representatives of groups or states. It usually refers to international diplomacy, the conduct of international relations through intercession of professional diplomats.

i. Dual Concern Model of Conflict Resolution

The dual concern model of conflict resolution is a conceptual perspective that assumes individual's preferred method of dealing with conflict is based on two underlying themes or dimension. According to the dual concern model, group members balance their concern for satisfying personal needs and interests with their concern for satisfying the needs and interest of others in different ways .The intersection point between these two dimensions ultimately lead individuals forward towards exhibiting different styles of conflict resolution (Goldfien and Robbennolt, 2007). In the light of this, the model identifies five conflict resolution styles or strategies that individuals may use depending on their dispositions towards pro-self or pro-social goals. They were;

- a. Avoidance Conflict Style:** - This is characterized by inaction and positivity. Avoidance conflict style is typically used when an individual has reduced concern for their own outcomes as well as the outcome of others .During conflict, these avoidance adopt a —wait and steel attitude, often allowing conflict to phase out on its own without any personal involvement (Bayazi and Mannix, 2005), Unfortunately, by neglecting to address high-conflict situations, avoider risk allowing problems to fester out of control. Avoidance also means a way of ignoring or suppressing conflict with the hope that they either disappear or remain at manageable levels without escalating. It should therefore be used in conflict situations in which issues are trivial or more important issues are pressing, when you will gain by avoiding conflict or preventing it.
- b. Yielding Conflict Style;** - In contrast, yielding or-accommodating conflict style is characterized by a high concern for others while having a low concern for one's own

self. This passive pro-social approach emerges when individuals derive personal satisfaction from meeting the needs of others and have a general concern for maintaining stable, positive social relationships. When faced with a conflict, individuals with a yielding" conflict style tend to give into others" demands out of respect for the social relationships,

- c. **Competitive Conflict Style:-** The individual seeks to satisfy himself only, not minding the import of his decision and activities on the other parties to the conflict he is competing. It could also maximize individual assertiveness (i.e. concern for self) and minimizes empathy (i.e., concern for others).

Groups consisting of competitive members generally enjoy seeking domination over others, and typically see conflict as a win or lose predicament. That is, fighters tend to force to accept their personal views by employing competitive power tactics (e.g., argue, insult, accusation, violence) that foster feelings of intimidation. In essence the best way to resolve this is the use of force or forceful achievement of one's objective especially when situation demands quick decision action in emergencies, and against people who take advantage of non-competitive behaviors (Bartol and Martin, 1997).

- d. **Cooperative Conflict Style:-** It means an active concern for both pro-social and prop-self behavior. Cooperation conflict style is typically used when an individual has elevated interest in their own outcomes as well as of others. This is used when objectives of the party is to find integrative or unifying solution on perspective. During conflict, cooperators collaborate with others in an effort to find an amicable solution that satisfies all parties involved in the conflict style tend to be highly assertive and highly empathetic at the same time. By seeing conflict as a creative

opportunity, collaborators willingly invest time and resources into finding a win-win solution. Strmberg and Dobson, (1987). Jarboe and Waterman, (1996). Opined that the cooperative conflict style is ideally recommended above all others.

2.4 The Causes of the Darfur Civil War

In November 1958, there was a strong sense of national. Economic setbacks, coupled with a sharp decline in foreign exchange reserves and a series of costly strikes in the nascent industries weakened the new government. Moreover, constant floor crossing by opportunistic parliamentarians in the weak coalition government, with the same government's inability to make any progress in controlling or extinguishing the continued rebelling in the southern region and subversion or possible invasion from Egypt added to its collapse (Daly, 1986), In November 1958, Brigadier-General Abboud took over power with the tacit approval of many in a kind of flight from political responsibility. He appointed prominent military figures to head all the ministries and put politicians from the two major parties under their authority, (Prunier, 2005).

In Darfur the felling was the regime made no difference; civilian or military, the men in power in Khartoum paid no attention to their distant colony, and the Nile Valley remained their only preoccupation. The Umma with 76 seats out of 173 won the first post-dictatorship elections, held in May 1965, In Dafur, the Mahdist party predictably won, with 16 seats out of 24. This is worth noting because almost forty years later, north eastern Darfur became the base from which the pro-fundamentalist Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) guerrilla movement organized itself among the Zaghawa, thereby reflecting a durable anchoring of the radical Muslim electorate in the sub-region.

The Darfur region's pastoralists are of Arab descent, and nomadic and semi-nomadic camel herding tribes inhabit the northern belt, the most arid zones. Since the conflict in Darfur intensified in 2003, the communities under attack, namely the Fur, Masaalit and Zaghawa has identified themselves as "African" in contrast to their former self-definitions as Sudanese or Darfurians. This disposition supports the international opinion that the "black Africans" in Darfur, nay the entire Sudan is labouring under oppression and marginalization; which is gravitating towards genocide. The black communities, even though, largely of Islamic faith increasingly see the attacks in their communities by the Sudanese government as racially and ethnically motivated ones (HRW Report, 2004).

The on-going attacks on the Muslim black communities in Darfur by the Sudanese government backed Arab militia; "the Janjaweed" is not new, Darfur has experienced occasional rounds of conflict for decades before the present round of conflicts, which escalated in 2003. Since 19SU when much of the Sahel region was hot by recurrent episodes of drought and increasing desertification, the southern migration of the Arab pastoralists provoked land disputes with agricultural communities. Such disputes generally started when the camels and cattle of Arab nomads trampled the fields of the non-Arab farmers living in the central and southern areas of Darfur. Sometime the disputes were resolved through negotiation between traditional leaders on both sides, compensation for lost crops, and agreements on the timing and routes for annual migration. Later, clashes became bloodier through the use of automatic weapons. By 1987, many of the incidents involved not only the Arab tribes, but also Zaghawa nomadi cattle herders who tried to claim land from Fur farmers, and some Fur leaders were killed. Moreover, the Arab tribes in Darfur felt that they were not adequately represented in the Fur-dominated local administration and in 1986, a number of Arab

tribes formed, what became known the "Arab Alliance" aimed at establishing their political dominance and control of the region. Meanwhile, Fur leaders distrusted the increasing tendency of the Federal government to favour the Arabs.

The fear of Arab domination was made real by the Sadiq El Mahdi government (1986-1989) policy of arming Arab Baggara militias from Darfur and Kordofan known as "Mujahedeen". Similar to the militias currently involved in the Darfur conflict, the Mujahedeen were a militia based in Darfur, employed by the El Mahdi government and its military successors for almost twenty years as a counter insurgency force against the southern-based rebels, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The Mujahedeen focused on raiding, looting, displacing, enslaving, and punishing the Dinka and Nuer civilians living in the South. They were largely drawn from the Rizeigat and Miserriya Baggara tribes of South Darfur and Kordofan, and also became involved in attacks against the Fur community in Darfur in the late 1980s, after taking power in a coup in 1989, the National Islamic Front (renamed the National Congress) ruling party incorporated many of the Mujahedeen militias into the Popular Defense Forces, paramilitaries whose atrocious human rights record has been documented by many organizations. One of the differences in the fighting was that the Sudanese government recruited volunteers to fight in the south on the basis of holy war, or a religiously sanctioned war against the largely non-Muslim southerners (HRW Report, 2004).

The occasional clashes in Darfur ballooned into full-scale conflict between the Fur and Arab communities. It also developed a more political character. In keeping with its rabid Arab nationalism since independence, the Khartoum government flamed tensions by arming the Arab tribes and neglecting the core issues underlying the conflict over resources: the need for rule of law and socioeconomic development in

the region (HRW Report, 2004: 9),

War erupted in Darfur in the beginning of 2003 when the allied rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), attacked government military installations. The rebels took up arms to protect their communities against a campaign by government backed militias recruited among groups of Arab extraction in Darfur and Chad. The militias called Jinjaweed, have over the past three years received increased government support to clear civilians from certain areas. Militia attacks and government offensive led to massive looting and mass rape in contravention to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention prohibiting attacks on civilians. Moreover, the civil war was a natural reaction to Khartoum's tyranny, absence of good governance, ethnicity and marginalization of the Darfur people. The focus group explained the above factors contributed to bringing the Darfur civil war within the structural conflict theory because there were defects in the socio-political arrangement in the governance of Sudan whether intentional or otherwise.

The civil war, which risks inflicting irreparable damage on a delicate ethnic balance of seven million people who are all Muslims, is multiple intertwined conflicts. One is between government-aligned forces and rebels; in a second case, government militia raid civilians; and a third involves a struggle among Darfur communities themselves. The civil war in Darfur began in February 2003, when the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) forces attacked government military installations in frustrations at the decades of political marginalization and economic neglect illustrated in the following analysis given by Fouad Ibrahim (2004: 6).

Sudan's counter-insurgency operations had spilled across the border into Chad, resulting in the deaths of approximately 200,000 people (mainly civilians) and forcing approximately 1.2 million to flee their homes. Around 400,000 of these were estimated to have crossed into Chad, while the majority remained internally displaced within camps in Darfur, between 240 and 440 people were dying daily because of the conflict. The situation, which the western world described, the "most serious humanitarian emergency in the world today" (Benn, 2004: 275) has deteriorated further, with the number of estimated deaths rising to over 200,00.

The current conflict in Darfur involves the government of Sudan and allied with militias; Janjaweed against an insurgency composed of two groups; the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Initially, the rebel groups were mainly composed of three ethnic groups, namely: Zaghawa, Fur and Masaalit. However, since the current conflict escalated in early 2003, members of some smaller tribes such as the Jebel and Dorok people have also joined the rebellion following Janjaweed militia attacks on the communities. Some Arab tribes and even some non-Arab tribes have also joined the government-backed militia.

The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) came into focus February 2003. It was formerly called the Darfur Liberation front (DLF) at the beginning. It was after it captured the town of Gulu that it changed its name to the SLA. Some of the political demands of SLA include the following socioeconomic development in the Darfur region, an end to tribal militias, and sharing of power with the central government. In early 2003, the SLA attacked the capital of North Darfur and damaged several government aircraft and helicopters and looted fuel and arms depots. In another major attack the SLA rebels again looted government stock of food and arms. In May 2003, the Al-Bashir

government dismissed the governors of North and West Darfur and other key officials and increased military strength in Darfur (Benn, 2004:9).

In February and April 2003, the SLA struck and captured the towns of Gula and El Fashir. The attitude of the government of al Bashir in Khartoum was to call the SLA "bandits" and refused to negotiate with the leadership. Following subsequent attacks on several towns in North and West Darfur, the government launched offensives against the killed tens of thousands, and let many more die of hunger and disease because they have been unable to sow their fields for fear of being murdered. A British report put the total death toll at 300,000, a figure the Sudanese government furiously disputes. The UN *s emergency relief coordinator has put the number of those who had died from hunger and disease over the past 19 months at 180,000, not including those in the violence". By the Sudanese government approach to the Darfur rebellion, the government has equally breached Article 17 of the Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1977, which addresses the protections the warring parties must provide for civilians in non-international armed conflicts, prohibits the forced displacement of civilians for reasons connected with the conflict.

The Chadian authorities and members of the Chadian armed forces have not been left out of the Darfur conflict. The reason is that Chad is a neighbor to Sudan, sharing similar ethnic formation, religion and other socio-cultural and economic factors. More so, of all the Sudan's neighbours, Chad bore more of the burden of the refugee problems that heralded not just the Darfur conflict but also the North-South conflict that lasted for over two decades. By March 2004, more than 1 10,000 displaced people in Darfur were reported to be taking refuge in Chad (The Economist, 2005). The people of Chad supported both sides of the Darfur conflict-the al-Bashir government forces and its proxies, armed Arab civilian groups (Janjaweed) and the

"rebel" black African groups of the SLA and JEM.

As a result of its resolve to annihilate the Darfur rebellion, and partly because of rabid Arab nationalism, the al-Bashir government with its Janjaweed proxies has launched attacks on civilian groups on increased scale, number, and the brutality and has been conducted on villages and towns in the absence of rebel presence or military targets.

Civilians sharing the ethnicity of the rebel movement, namely the Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa and a few small tribes have become the main targets of government military offensives aimed at destroying any real or perceived support base of the rebel forces. Government forces and Janjaweed militias have inflicted a campaign of forced displacement, murder, pillage, and rape on hundreds of thousands of civilians over the past fourteen months (The Economist, 2005: 13). This has continued, albeit at a low scale since the intervention of the forces of the African Union for peacekeeping in Darfur. In line with the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law, all parties involved in the Darfur conflict are obliged to distinguish at all times between civilian property and militia objectives. Acts or threats of violence intended to spread terror among the civilian population, in particular murder, physical or mental torture, rape, mutilation, pillage, and collective punishment, are prohibited. The destruction of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for food production, crops, drinking water installations and supplies, is also prohibited (HRW Report, 2004; 13).

Many villages have been destroyed, usually burned, with all property looted. Assets, such as water points and mills, have been destroyed in an apparent effort to render the villages uninhabitable. Many civilians have been killed and injured by aerial bombardment and militia raids. Militia and government forces reportedly raped

hundreds of women and allied militias to force rural civilians from their homes and render them destitute in government towns and camps (HRW Reports, 2004). Since the Sudanese government decided to attack civilians rather than concentrate on crushing the groups of SLA and JEM, the conflict in Darfur started to attract international sympathy to the extent that some sections of the international community has branded the war activities of the Sudanese government as "acts of genocide". At this stage, an issue of great importance to us is how the international community has responded to and managed the civil war.

2.5 The African Union Response on Darfur Conflict Resolution

The emergence of the African Union (AU) in 2002 was greeted with guarded optimism, and its activity in human rights and peacekeeping represents an improvement over the performance of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), its predecessor institution. The institution's failure to halt the human rights violations in Darfur has confirmed that its short- age of resources and political will are a real hindrance to its effectiveness in protecting human rights. It is true that the specific circumstances of the Darfur case -especially the government's active support for the violations being committed— magnify these shortcomings in ways that may not apply to peacekeeping situations. But it is difficult not to conclude that the AU's members are less than fully committed to making the most of limited tools at their disposal to change Khartoum's behavior.

The African Union is the direct successor to the Organization of African Unity, a continental institution founded in 1963 and rooted in the period of Africa's decolonization and independence. The OAU, disparaged abroad and in Africa as a "club of dictators," generally made no pretense of playing any role in protecting

human rights, focusing instead on securing the sovereignty of Africa's states as they emerged from colonial rule (Gottschalk and Schmidt 2004, 140). The African Union was established in 2002 in response to a number of competing initiatives by the heads of state of South Africa, Nigeria, and Libya to reform the QAU. African states ultimately decided to replace the OAU outright with a new institution whose charter incorporates several principles that set it apart from its predecessor's scrupulous deference to national sovereignty (Tieku 2004).

The AU's Constitutive Act articulates a strong commitment to human rights. The charter also gives the AU the authority to back up that commitment with action, explicitly providing for "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State, in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crime, genocide and crimes against humanity" (Article 4th). Given the records of their predecessors, African leaders seemed to have "slaughtered a holy cow" by taking even a declaratory step in this direction (Gottschalk and Schmidt 2004, 157). But the resulting high hopes - Amnesty International proclaimed the AU "a new opportunity for the promotion and protection of human rights in Africa" were laced with an understandable skepticism that these principles would translate well into practice (Amnesty International 2002).

The Darfur crisis has put these expectations to the test, and the results have been mixed. As the violence in Darfur continued into 2004, the African Union sent a small mission to Darfur with UN Security Council endorsement to monitor a cease-fire agreement between the rebels and Khartoum. This mission eventually evolved into the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which remains the only external peacekeeping force providing security in Darfur, though underfunded and understaffed, AMIS has received some praise for improving a grim security situation and received credit in UN Security Council Resolution 1706 for "reducing large-scale

organized violence"(GAG 2006, 45). But AMIS's efforts have fallen far short of ending the human rights violations in Darfur and its contributions have been generally recognized as inadequate. The force has been unable to play the protective function that the Darfur Peace Agreement assign it largely because it is too small, often operating below an authorized capacity that, even if fulfilled, would still be inadequate to secure enough to Darfur's vast territory (GAO 2006 and ICG 2005).

Beyond peacekeeping efforts, the AU's members have appeared highly reluctant to apply diplomatic pressure on Khartoum, even when President al Bashir has sought to assume leadership positions within the AU While the Darfur conflict raged. The AU's member states sent an unfortunate signal when they allowed Khartoum to host the group's annual summit in early 2006, even though the AU's rules of procedure explicitly require that the summit take place in a "conducive political atmosphere" (Udombana 2005). Al-Bashir subsequently sought to win the institution's rotating chairmanship as well. Fearful of the damage that would done to the AU's credibility if it were led by a government accused of genocide, the AU's member states came to a private agreement to deny Al-Bashir's bid and repeated their stand in 2007, supporting John Kufuor of Ghana after the situation in Darfur had worsened. But AU members specifically declined to frame their action as a statement on Khartoum's behavior; South Africa's representative insisted that the 2007 decision was made "to commemorate the historic independence of Ghana in 1957" and "had absolutely nothing to do with humiliating or rejecting Sudan" (Gruzd 2007, ENS 2007).

The fact that the AU and its member states have spent financial, diplomatic, and military resources engaging with the Darfur conflict suggests that the principles of the AU's charter have been at least partly translated into action. But chronic obstacles to more effective action remain. Most obviously, the African Union's financial and

military resources are severely limited: AMIS has lacked adequate soldiers from the beginning of its operation and has remained unable to fulfill even the authorized level of 7,000 (ICG 2005). A handful of Africa's wealthier states are left to bear the burden of paying for the AU's regular and peacekeeping budgets, complemented by often generous but ultimately inadequate foreign funding that makes planning difficult (Gottschalk and Schmidt 2004, 142; ICG 2006c, 11). The European Union's African Peace Facility, for example, provided 250 million euro of support for African peacekeeping efforts between 2004 and 2007, but the funds were already largely committed by mid 2005 (ICC 2005). The many crises on the African continent inevitably compete for a limited number of domestic troops and funds, as the slow response to recent calls for AU peacekeepers in Somalia has demonstrated. Domestic political factors pose a serious constraint on the AU's effectiveness as well. Even Africa's wealthy states can contribute to AU peacekeeping efforts only what their people will tolerate and what their other priorities will accommodate. South Africa's government has faced a public backlash over its high foreign peacekeeping expenditures during a major crime wave at home, while Rwanda's government recently warned that its growing peacekeeping budget was likely to make it miss spending targets it had arranged with the International Monetary Fund (Gottschalk and Schmidt 2004). For similar reasons, the AU seems unlikely to follow Desmond Tutu's plea to apply sanctions on Sudan, given the high political costs that any African government, especially a major Sudanese trading partner, would face in forcing domestic businesses to cut off trade with Sudan.

The AU's habits of operating by consensus and shunning confrontation are similarly constraining. Although the AU and its Peace and Security Council are empowered to

make decisions by a two-thirds majority, their charters also encourage them to make decisions by consensus (AU Constitutive Act, Article 7(1); AU PSC Protocol, Article 8(13)). The careful way in which the decision to deny Sudan the AU chairmanship was phrased speaks to a deep reluctance to criticize fellow member states also evident in the AU's silence on the government-led repression in Zimbabwe (Gottschalk and Schmidt 2004 and Manby 2004). Finally, protecting human rights is only one of many priorities within the African Union itself. To cite an example, the AU's members are instructed to consider a government "respect for constitutional governance as well as the rule of law and human rights" in voting for members of the Peace and Security Council. But no mechanism gives this principle any special place among the many other criteria identified which include a state contribution to the Union, its financial and military capacity, and an "equitable regional representation and rotation" (AU Constitutive act Article 5; AU PSC Protocol, Article 5(2)). The presence of Libya, Algeria, Cameroon, Togo, and Sudan itself all five rated "not free" by the think-tank Freedom House among the Council's first members in 2004 suggests that material and geopolitical factors are likely to trump the more humane criteria in determining PSC membership and other decisions (Freedom House 2006).

These constraints might be less severe in another situation where the host government did not actively oppose effective intervention. The active resistance of Khartoum magnifies the African Union's shortcomings, making its limited military resources less relevant and heightening its tendency to defer to the sovereignty of fellow states. But even if the African Union were a stronger institution and acted more forcefully, its performance in the Darfur case would still be sharply constrained, as the performance of institutions with far more extensive resources shows.

2.6 African Union and the Challenges of Peace Keeping Operations in Africa

Africa faces several challenges in its endeavours to implement her integration and development agenda (Mkwezalamba & Chinyama, 2007). After years of transiting from the OAU to the AU and, soon, to the proposed Union Government, it is impossible to ignore the relevance of problems encountered towards a meaningful continental Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, are biased against African countries on one hand and peace keeping operations effort on the other hand (Ngwane, 2000),

Another challenge that the AU has to contend with in its effort to promote peace keeping operations in Africa is the inadequate and inefficient infrastructure, especially transport and communications. In addition, the challenge the AU has to contend with hi its effort to integrate African economies is the prevalent of civil strife and conflicts. The lack of sustained political commitment to put in place agreed policies and plans has been one of Africa's major shortcoming and in the context of the AU, this is an issue that needs to be addressed (Ngwane, 2000).

It is pertinent to point out that in spite of the transformation of the OAU to AU; Africa is still the poorest continent in the world with almost half of its population still living in absolute poverty. This is despite the fact that Africa ranks as the most richly endowed continent in terms of natural resources. The AU is faced with some challenges that can jeopardize its objectives if not properly handled. The first and perhaps the most important challenge is how to promote inter and Ultra-African trade (Rodt, 2012). Africa countries produce only raw materials for which there is virtually no demand elsewhere in the continent. However, for many African countries, few commodities often make up the bulk of exports to the rest of the continent. Three,

African countries are still "grappling to undo a legacy dominated by trade with their former colonial rulers rather than with each other" (Mutume, 2002: 4).

The diversity in African countries' sizes, national resources, level of development and connections to global markets has been a major stumbling block to successful peace keeping operations. Obviously, many African states achieved only political independence and not economic independence as their economies are still tied to the apron string of the Western powers. They depend on foreign aid and loans to supplement their annual budget (Charles, 2010). Many African countries also face internal economic problems. Agriculture, which is the backbone of African economies, is on the decline, while African exports face constant fluctuations and occasional decline in international market. For instance, Benin Republic does not have the same economic interests as its giant oil-rich neighbor, Nigeria. Similarly, South Africa and Malawi do not experience the costs and benefits of regional trade arrangements in the same way (Harsch, 2002).

Unlike the other regional institutions such as the European Union (EU), the AU receives poor funding and non-payment of dues by the Africa states. Between 1993-2005, the AU Peace Fund was greatly financed by non-African actors by contributing 45 million US dollars out of the 60-70 million that AU was able to raise (David, 2005). In 2009, AU Peace fund had a negative balance because of the lack of fund by other African nations. Another challenge is the membership of Morocco, an important African country since 1984. It should be noted that Morocco has been outside the OAU because of the recognition and admission of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) by the organization (De-Waal, 2007). Furthermore, in spite of their exit, the crisis generated over the matter has persisted, rearing its head intermittently within the ranks of the organization. Morocco has not subscribed to the Constitutive

Act of the AU. She has recently joined the CEN-SAD and also continued to retain membership of the LEMA to institutions recognized as RECs and building blocks of the AU (Egiebade, 2004).

Another major obstacle is the known division among African as Franco and Anglo-Phone countries which has disunited African peoples. Many issues have been decided not on their merits but on this line of divide. For example, appointing a Secretary-General for the continental organization has been politicized on this line of divide (Brian-Vincent, & Dauda, 2011). The greatest challenge before the AU in the views of Olubomehin and Kawonishe (2004) is how to incorporate the generality of Africans into integration schemes in the continent. There is enough evidence to support the fact that, apart from all else, regional efforts have failed in Africa because such efforts sidetracked the people. In this wise, the AU itself seems to have fallen into the same pit, as did the OAU, which it replaced. Its Act seems more an instrument for "building a coalition of states" rather than "uniting of people" as obvious in the provisions for the Union's structure and decision-making process (Okeke, 2013).

2.7 Humanitarian Catastrophe and the International Community

Darfur is largely perceived as a "humanitarian crisis", the humanitarian crisis calls for charitable interventions. The Darfur situation is "a tragedy" and Sudan is "producing refugees as it is making peace" (The Guardian, 2004). Sudanese Humanitarian Affairs Commissioner responded that "The UN" should concentrate on its field work instead of issuing press statements". Tom Vraalsen, the UN Special Envoy declared:

The Government of Sudan (GOS) presentation of the situation as steadily improving contrasts sharply with first-hand reports (Delivery of humanitarian assistance is hampered by systematically denied access. Khartoum authorities claim there is unimpeded access but they greatly restrict access to the areas under their control while imposing blanket denial to all rebel-held areas. Because of growing insecurity and denied access, the humanitarian crisis has reached unprecedented proportions, with one million now war-affected (The Guardian, 2004).

There is an alarming growth of Global Acute Malnutrition Rates among the Internally Displaced People (IDP) population, which the LY now estimated at one million. The problem was typical of crisis management. The humanitarians were asked to venture into what was political decision-making without being given the vital assurance that help would be forthcoming if things went wrong (HRW Reports, 2004). Khartoum kept attacking the civilian population of Darfur, while pretending at the same time to cooperate with the international community in finding solutions to the southern Sudan's problems. The world was prepared to do little to stop the massacre in lieu of the ongoing Naivasha peace settlement (I-IRW Reports, 2004). The Conflicts in Sudan have attracted the attention of the international community. The prolonged conflict in the South of Sudan, which culminated in the signing of the Naivasha Peace Agreement in Kenya, is an obvious example. Also there was the conflict in the Nuba Mountain. In spite of the efforts by the international community, conflicts have remained part of the social life in Sudan.

The first Security Council resolution on Darfur was Resolution 1547 made on 11 June 2004. It sets out the Council's position in the Machakos/Naivasha peace process. Paragraph 6 of the resolution also called upon the parties involved 'to bring an immediate halt to the fighting in Darfur' and elsewhere, and to 'conclude a political agreement without delay'. On 30 July 2004, acting under Chapter VII of the UN

Charter, the Council Authorized Resolution 1556, which imposed an arms embargo on the region, supported the deployment of the AU Protection Force and gave the Sudanese government 30 days to disarm the Janjaweed or face sanctions (Observer, 2004).

Amnesty International suggested that although the resolution ensured the continued monitoring of the crisis, it failed to adopt measures that were urgent and essential to address the appalling human rights situation. As one of Amnesty's spokespersons stated, Resolution 1556 represented 'the abandonment of the people of Darfur and an abdication of the Security Council's role as a human right enforcing agent (Observer, 2004). Others asserted that the resolution went too far in threatening economic and diplomatic sanctions against Sudan. For example, China and Pakistan explained their abstentions in the Security Council vote by rejecting the need for 'mandatory measures' against Sudan. The Sudanese representative at the Council likewise rejected the resolution as 'an unfair and unjust policy of double standards' that was the result of a domineering, colonial mindset.

As a result of pressure from the international community, immediately after the resolution's passage, the Sudanese government relaxed visa controls for foreign aid workers but provided nothing more in terms of support for humanitarian agencies. A UN report on September 2004 noted that the Khartoum government had failed to meet 'some of the core commitments. Specifically, reports arose that, far from demobilizing militia, the Sudanese government was incorporating the militia into regular military and police forces. In addition, the Security Council was informed that there had been no systematic improvement of people's security and no progress on ending impunity. The EU's response to the crisis relied on diplomatic and humanitarian instruments. The European Commission had funded humanitarian programmes in Sudan for over

"ten Years. As a result of the drought; it provided an extra E14 million in assistance to western Sudan, in 2004, the Commission allocated a whopping amount of E92 million for humanitarian assistance to Darfur, in addition to its regular humanitarian programme in Sudan worth E30 million. Plans for reconstruction and development were made, conditional upon a comprehensive peace agreement and the resumption of bilateral cooperation between the government of Sudan and the European Development Fund. Despite offering some technical and financial support, the CU left the AU to take the lead in conflict resolution and efforts to achieve delivery of relief supplies. The EU threatened sanctions against the government of Sudan but showed no interest in deploying its own peacekeepers to Darfur.

The position of the United Nations concerning the management of the Darfur civil war was weak and the reasons for it are not far-fetched. Firstly, the UN was at the forefront of the humanitarian effort both in Southern Sudan and in Darfur. Secondly, the Arab/Black African split, which was implicit in the Darfur crisis, had many echoes inside the UN. Thirdly, it was deeply involved in the Naivasha process where it had to boost the Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) capacity. Finally, the European Union member states and America kept pushing the world body to act as if they were not partly responsible for it (Prunier, 2005:197).

As the conflict got aggravated, the UN seemed incapable of doing anything political about it. However, at the humanitarian level it carried over 60% of the financial burden. This situation demonstrated the UN's practical limitations in crisis over which the heavyweight member states do not want to act. The Report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on the Darfur Violence had evidence of violations of human rights by people who probably acted with genocide intentions. Although the situation was not genocide, it amounted to war crimes (Prunier, 2005). The United States refused to

support or favor the prosecution of those accused of war crimes in the Sudan in view of its ongoing war in Iraq. Therefore, the USA suggested that a special tribunal be set up in Arusha on the model of the Rwanda tribunal.

The reluctance of the global community to threaten military intervention in Darfur meant that the AU assumed centre stage in the international response. Despite clear evidence of government complicity in the attacks upon civilians, the AU refused to act without the consent of the Sudanese government. The civil war in Darfur's presented the AU with a genuine opportunity to find an African solution to this African problem by invoking Article 4(h) of its new Charter. As a result, the slogan of 'African solutions to African problems' provided a convenient facade behind which Western powers could wash their hands off committing their own soldiers to Darfur.

In the beginning, the Darfur crisis went almost unnoticed by the media. In Sudan, the media concentrated on the North-South peace negotiations in Naivasha, Kenya on which the foreign media reported. Even in Khartoum, a few nomads shooting themselves in distant Darfur did not draw much attention because the people had been fighting each other for a long time. The chaotic situation in Darfur became known to the wider world by 1999, through specialized publications such as African Confidential or the Indian Ocean's newsletter. In Sudan, the national press began to give some space to the activities of the "bandits" around the middle of 2003.

The anti-Khartoum activist Eric Reeves concentrated on his denunciations of the evils of the Government of Sudan (GOS) policy towards the South. He was the first foreign observer to notice what was by then ominously developing in Darfur. However, he did not draw much attention to the conflict that was perceived as a sideshow. Even, the usually well-informed advocacy NGO Justice Africa did not mention Darfur in its

October 2003 monthly brief. As a result of media briefs, the NGO's started noticing the unfolding conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan. It was largely through the Amnesty International and the International Crisis Group that the crisis came out of the shadows. The French media were among the first to give a separate picture of the Darfur situation. In addition, the first US article on the subject focused immediately on the Africans versus the Arabs side of the problem.

The Darfur problem attracted world attention with the interview given by the Human Right Coordinator for Sudan, Mukesh Kapila, to the UN 's owns Integrated Regional Information Network (IRfN) in March when he declared that Darfur was the world's greatest humanitarian crisis and that the only difference between Rwanda and Darfur is the numbers involved.

Previously, few people had ever heard of Darfur. Its history was a mystery nobody particularly wanted to probe. However, its story came up as the first genocide of the twenty first century. At the end of 2004, Darfur came to the fore as the worst humanitarian crisis and a horror story of the year. However, it is necessary to examine how far the Africa.

2.8 The Concept of the United Nations

In the century prior to the United Nations creation, several international treaty organizations and conferences had been formed to regulate conflicts between nations such as the Interactional Committee of the Red Cross and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, Following the catastrophic loss of life in the First World War, the Paris peace conference established the League of Nations to maintain harmony between countries. This organization resolved some territorial disputes and created international structures for area such as postal mail, aviation, and opium control, some of which would later be absorbed into the United Nations. However, the League

lacked representation for colonial peoples (then half the world is population) and significant participation from several major powers, including the United State, USSR, Germany, and Japan; it failed to act against the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the second Halo-Ethiopian War in 1935, the Japanese invasion of China in 1937, and German expansions under Adolf Hitler that culminated in the second World War.

i. Declaration of United Nations by the Allies of World War II

The earliest concrete plan for a new world organization began under the aegis of the US State Department in 1939. The text of the "Declaration by United Nations" was drafted by President Franklin Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Roosevelt aide Harry Hopkins, while meeting at the white House, 29 December 1941. It incorporated soviet suggestions, but left no role for France "Four policemen" was coined to refer four major Allied countries, United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and China, which was emerged in Declaration by United Nations. Roosevelt first coined the term United Nations to describe the Allied countries "On New Year's Day 1942, President Roosevelt. Prime Minister Churchill, Maxim Litvinov, of the USSR, and T.V. Soong, of China, signed a short document which later came to be known as the United Nations Declaration. One major change from the Atlantic Charter was the addition of a provision for religious freedom, which Stalin approved after Roosevelt insisted. By 1 March 1945, 21 additional states had signed.

A joint declarations by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of soviet socialist Republics, China, Australia, Belgi;um, Canada, Costarica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic,

El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa, Yugoslavia.

The Government signatory hereto, having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the 4, 1942, known as the Atlantic prime minister of Great Britain dated August 1 Charter, Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, Independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world.

Declare: Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the tripartite pact and its adherents with which such government is at war. Each Government pledge itself to cooperate with the Government signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies. The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other nations which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for Victory over Hitlerism. During the war, the United Nations became the official term for the Allies. To join countries had to sign the Declaration and declare war on the Axis.

ii. Founding the United Nations (1945)

The United Nations was formulated and negotiated among the delegations from the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United State and China at the Dumbarton Oaks conference in 1944. After months of planning, the United Nations conference on International Organization opened in San Francisco, 25th April, 1945, attended b 50

government and a number of non-governments organizations involved in drafting the United Nations Charter. "The Head of the delegations of the sponsoring countries took as chairman of the plenary meetings: Anthony Eden, of Britain, Edward Stettinius of United States, T.V Soong, of China, and Vyacheslav Molotov, of the Soviet Union. At the latter meetings,

Lords Halifax deputized for Mr. Eden, V. K Wellington Koo for T.V Soong, and Mr. Gromyko for Mr. Molotov, (19) the UN officially came into existence 24 October 1945, upon ratification of the Charter by the five permanent members of the Security Council -France, the Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States and by a majority of the other 46 signatories.

The first meeting of the General Assembly, with 51 nations represented, and the Security Council took place in London beginning 6 January 1946. The General Assembly selected New York City as the site for the headquarters of the United Nations, and the facility was completed in 1952. Its site like UN headquarters buildings in Geneva, Vienna, and Nairobi is designated as international territory. The Norwegian foreign minister, Trygve Lie, was elected as the first United Nations Secretary General.

iii. Structures

The United Nations' system is based on five principal organs; the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Secretariat, and the International Court of Justice. A sixth principal organ, The Trusteeship Council, was suspended in 1994, upon the independence of Palau, the last remaining United Nations trustee territory.

Four of the five principal organs are located at the main United Nations headquarters in New York City, The International Court of Justice is located in The Hague, while

other major agencies are based in the United Nations offices at Geneva, Vienna, and Nairobi. Other United Nations institutions are located throughout the world. The six official languages of the United Nations, used in intergovernmental meetings and documents, are Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish. On the basis of the convention on the Privileges and immunities of the United Nations, the United Nations and its agencies are immune from the laws of the countries where they operate, safeguarding the United Nations' impartiality with regard to the host and member countries.

iv. Principal Organs of the United Nations

(a) General Assembly

The General Assembly is the main deliberative assembly of the United Nations. Composed of all United Nations member states, the Assembly meets in regular yearly sessions, but emergency sessions can also be called. The assembly is led by a president, elected from among the member states on a rotating regional basis, and 21 vice presidents. The first session convened 10 January 1946 in the Methodist Central Hall Westminster in London and included representatives of 51 nations.

When the General Assembly votes on important questions, a two-thirds majority of those present and voting is required. Examples of important questions include recommendations on peace and security; election of members to organs; admission, suspension, and expulsion of members; and budgetary matters. All other questions are decided by a majority vote. Each member country has one vote. Apart from approval of budgetary matters, resolutions are not binding on the members. The Assembly may make recommendations on any matters within the scope of the United Nations, except matters of peace and security that are under consideration by the Security Council.

(b) Security Council

The Security Council is charged with maintaining peace and security among countries. While other organs of the United Nations can only make recommendations to member states the Security Council has the power to make binding decisions that member states have agreed to carry out, under the term of Charter Article 25. The decisions of the Council are known as United Nations Security Council resolutions.

The security council is made up of fifteen member states, consisting of five permanent member's china, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States - and ten non-permanent members - - Angola (term ends 2016), Chad (2015), Chile (2015), Jordan (2015), Lithuania (2015), Malaysia (2016), New Zealand (2016), Nigeria (2015), Spain (2016), and Venezuela (2016). The five permanent members hold veto power over United Nations resolution, allowing a permanent member to block adoption of a resolution, though not debate. The ten temporary seats are held for two years' terms, with member states voted in by the General Assembly on a regional basis. The presidency of the Security Council rotates alphabetically each month.

(c) Secretariat

The United Nations secretariat is headed by the Secretary-General, assisted by a staff of international civil servants worldwide. It provides studies, information, and facilities needed by United Nations bodies for their meetings. It also carries out tasks as directed by the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and social council, and other United Nations bodies. The Secretary-General acts as the de facto spokesperson and leader of the United Nations. The position is denned in the United Nations charter as the organization's "chief administrative officer". Article 99 of the

charter states that the Secretary-General can bring to the security council's attention " any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security", a phrase that Secretaries ~ General since Trygve Lie have interpreted as giving the position broad scope for action on the world state. The office has evolved into a dual role of an administrator of the United Nations organization and a diplomat and mediator addressing disputes between member states and finding consensus to global issues.

The Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly, after being recommended by the Security Council, where the permanent members have veto power. There are no specific criteria for the post, but over the years it has members have veto power. There are no specific criteria for the post, but over the years it has become accepted that the post shall be held for one or two terms of five years, that the post shall be appointed on the basis of geographical rotation, and the Secretary-General shall not originate from one of the live permanent Security Council member states. The current Secretary-General is Ban Ki-moon, who replaced Kofi Annan in 2007 and was elected for a second term to conclude at the end of 2016.

No.	Name	Country of Origin	Took Office	Left Office	Note
1.	Trygve Lie	Norway	2 Feb. 1946	10 Nov. 1952	Resigned
2.	Dag	Sweden	10 ^m April 1953	18 th Sept. 1961	Died in Office
3.	U Thant	Burma	30 ^m Nov. 1961	31 Dec. 1971	
4.	Kurth Waldheim	Austria	1 Jan. 1972	31 st Dec. 1981	

5.	Javier Perez de	Peru	1 st Jan. 1982	31 st Dec. 1991	
6.	Boutros	Egypt -	1 st Jan. 1992	31 st Dec. 1996	
7.	Kofi An an	Ghana	1 Jan. 1997	31 st Dec. 2006	

8.	Ban Ki-moon	South Korea	1 st Jan. 2007	31 st Dec. 2016	
9.	Antonio Guterres	Portugal	13 th Oct. 2016	Incumbent	

The International Court of Justice (ICJ), located in the Hague, in the Netherlands, is the primary judicial organ of the United Nations established in 1945 by the United Nations Charter, the Court began work in 1946 as the successor to the permanent court of International justice. The ICJ is composed of 15 judges who serve 9-year terms and are appointed by the General Assembly; every sitting judge must be from a different nation.

It is based in the peace palace in the Hague, sharing the building with the Hague Academy of International Law, a private centre for the study of international law. The ICJ's primary purpose is to adjudicate disputes among states. The court has heard cases related to war crimes, illegal state interference, ethnic cleansing, and other issues. The ICJ can also be called upon by other United Nations organs to provide advisory opinion.

(d) Economic and Social Council

The economic and social council (ECOSOC) assists the General Assembly in promoting international economic and social co-operation and development. ECOSOC has 54 members, which are elected by the General Assembly for a three-year term. The president is elected for a one-year term and chosen amongst the small or middle powers represented on ECOSOC. The council has one annual meeting in July, held in either New York or Geneva. Viewed as separate from the specialized bodies it co-ordinates, ECOSOC'S functions include information gathering, advising member nations, and making recommendations. Owing to its broad mandate of co-ordinating many agencies, ECOSOC has at times been criticized as unfocused or irrelevant. ECOSOC's subsidiary bodies include the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, which advises United Nations agencies on issue as relating to indigenous peoples; the United Nations Forum on forests, which co-ordinates and promotes sustainable forest management; the United Nations Statistical Commission, which co-ordinates information-gathering efforts between agencies; and the commission on sustainable development, which co-ordinates effort between United Nations agencies and NGOs working toward sustainable development. ECOSOC may also grant consultative status to non-governmental organizations; by 2004, more than 2,200 organizations had received this status.

(e) Specialized Agencies

The UN Charter stipulates that each primary organ of the United Nations can establish various specialized agencies to fulfill its duties. Some best-known agencies are the international Atomic Energy Agency, the Food and Agriculture Organization, UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), the World Bank, and the World Health

Organization (WHO), The United Nations performs most of its humanitarian work through these agencies. Examples include mass vaccination programme (through WHO), the avoidance of famine and malnutrition (through the work of the WP P), and the protection of vulnerable and displaced people.

No.	Acronym	Agency	Headquarters	Head	Established in
1.	FOA	Food and Organisation	Rome, Italy	Jose da Silva	1945
2.	IAEA	International Energy Agency	Vienna, Austria	Yukiya Amano	1957
3,	ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation	Montreal, Canada	Raymond Benjamin	1947
4.	IFAD	International fund for Agricultural Development	Rome, Italy	Kanayo F. Nwanze	1977
5.	ILO	International Labour Organisation	Geneva Switzerland	Guy Ryder	1946 (1919)
6.	IMO	International Maritime Organisation	London, United Kingdom	Koji Sekimizu	1948
7.	IMF	International Monetary Organisational	Washington D. C United States	Christine Lagarde	1945(1944).
8.	ITU	International Telecommunication Union	Geneva Switzerland	Hamodoun Toure	1947(1965).

9.	UNESCO	United Nations Educational and Cultural Organisation	Paris, France	Irina Bokova	1946
10.	UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation	Vienna, Austria .	Li Yong	1967
11.	UNWTO	World Tourism Organisation	Madrid, Spain	Taleb Riai	1974
12.	UPU	Universal Postal Union	Bern Switzerland	Bishar Abdirahman Hussein	1947(1974)
13.	WBG	World Bank Group	Washington, D. C United States	Jim Y, Kim	1947(1974)
14.	WFP	World Food Programme	Rome, Italy	Ertharin Counsin	1963
15.	WHO	World Health Organisation	Geneva Switzerland	Margaret Chan	1948
16.	WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organisation	Geneva Switzerland	Francis Gurry	1974
17.	WMO	World Meteorological Organisation	Geneva Switzerland	David Grimes, Michel Jarraud	1950(1873)

Source: Specialized agencies of the United Nations. Retrieved 6th August, 2013

(f) Membership

With the addition of South Sudan 14 July 2011, there are 193 United Nations member states, including all undisputed independent states apart from Vatican City. The United Nations Charter outlines the rules for membership:

a. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states that accept the obligations contained in the present charter and, in the judgment to the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. Chapter 11, article 4.

In addition, there are two non-member observer states of the United Nations General Assembly; the Holy See (Which holds sovereignty over Vatican City) and the state of Palestine. The Cook Islands and Niue, both states in free association with Zealand, are full members of several United Nations association with specialized agencies and have had their "full treaty-making capacity: recognized by the Secretariat.

(g) Group of 77

The group of 77 at the United Nations is a loose coalition of developing nations, designed to promote its members' collective economic interest and create an enhanced joint negotiating capacity in the United Nations. Seventy- seven nations founded the organization, but by November 2013 the organization had since expanded to 133 member countries. The group was founded 15 June 1964 by the "Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Countries" issued at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The group held its first major meeting in Algiers in 1967,

Where it adopted the Charter of Algiers and established the basis for permanent institutional structures.

(h) Objectives

i. Peacekeeping and Security

The United Nations, after approval by the Security Council, sends peacekeepers to regions where armed conflict has recently ceased or paused to enforce the terms of peace agreements and to discourage combatants from resuming hostilities. Since the United Nations does not maintain its own military peacekeeping forces are voluntarily provided by member states. These soldiers are sometimes nicknamed "Blue Helmets" for their distinctive gear the peacekeeping force as a Whole received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988.

In September 2013, the United Nations had peacekeeping soldiers deployed on 15 missions. The largest was the United Nations Organization stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), which included 20,688 uniformed personnel. The smallest, United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), included 42 uniformed personnel responsible for monitoring the ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir. United Nations peacekeepers with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) have been stationed in the Middle East since 1948, the longest-running active peacekeeping mission.

A study by the RAND Corporation in 2005 found the United Nations to be successful in two out of three peacekeeping efforts. It compared efforts at nation-building by the United Nations to those of the United States, and found that seven out of eight United Nations cases are at peace, as compared with four out of eight United Nations cases at peace. Also in 2005, the Human Security Report documented a decline in the number

of war, genocides, and human rights abuses since the end of Cold War and presented evidence, albeit circumstantial, that international activism mostly spearheaded by the United Nations has been the main cause of the decline in armed conflict in that period. Situations in which the United Nations has not only acted to keep the peace but also intervened include the Korean War (1950-53) and the authorization of intervention in Iraq after the Gulf War (1990-91).

The United Nations has also drawn criticism for perceived failures. In many cases, member states have shown reluctance to achieve or enforce Security Council resolutions. Disagreements in the Security Council about military action and intervention are seen as having failed to prevent the Bangladesh genocide in 1971, the Cambodian genocide in the 1970s, and the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Similarly, United Nations inaction is blamed for failing to either prevent the Srebrenica massacre in 1995 or complete the peacekeeping operations in 1992-93 during the Somali Civil War. United Nations peacekeepers have also been accused of child rape, solicitation prostitutes, and sexual abuse during various peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Sudan and what is now South Sudan, Burundi, and Ivory Coast. Scientists cited United Nations peacekeepers from Nepal as the likely source of the 2010-13 Haiti Cholera outbreaks, which killed more than 8,000 Haitians following the 2010 Haiti earthquake.

In addition to peacekeeping, the United Nations is also active in encouraging disarmament. Regulation of armaments was included in the writing of the United Nations Charter in 1945 and was envisioned as a way of limiting the use of human and economic resources for their creation. The advent of nuclear weapons came only weeks after the signing of the charter, resulting in the first resolution of the first General Assembly meeting calling for specific proposals for "the elimination from

national armaments of atomic Weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction". The United Nations has been involved with arms-limitation treaties, such as the Outer Space Treaty (1967), the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon (1968), the Seabed Arms Control Treaty(1971) the Biological Weapons Convention (1972), the Chemical Weapons rights action took on new impetus. The United Nations commission on Human Rights was formed in 1993 to oversee human rights issues for the United Nations, following the recommendation for that year's world conference on Human rights. Jacques Former and, a scholar of the United Nations, describes this organization's mandate as "Broad and vague", with only "meager" resources to carry it out. In 2006, it was replaced by a Human Rights council consisting of 47 nations. Also in 2006, the General Assembly passed a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous peoples, and in 2011 it passed its first resolution recognizing the rights of Lesbian Gay Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) People.

Other United Nations bodies responsible for women's right issues include United Nations Commission on the Status of women, a commission of ECOSOC founded in 1946; the United Nations Development Fund for women, created in 1976; and Advancement of women, founded in 1979. The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, one of three bodies with mandate to oversee issues related to indigenous people, held its first session in 2002.

iii. Economic Development and Humanitarian Assistance

Another primary purpose of the United Nations is to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character. Numerous bodies have been created to work towards this goal, primarily under the authority of the General Assembly and ECOSOC. In 2000,

the 192 United Nations member states agreed to achieve eight Millennium Development goals by 2015.

- a. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
- b. Achieve universal primary education
- c. Promote gender equality and empower women
- d. Reduce child mortality
- e. Improve maternal health
- f. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
- g. Ensure environmental sustainability
- h. Develop a global partnership for development

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), an organization for grant-based technical assistance founded in 1945, is one of the leading bodies in the field of international development. The organization also publishes the United Nations Human Development Index, a comparative measure ranking countries by poverty literacy, education, life expectancy, and other factors. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), also founded in 1945, promotes agricultural development and food security. UNICEF (The United Nations children's fund) was created in 1946 to aid European children after the Second World War and expanded its mission to provide aid around the world and to uphold the convention on the Rights of the child.

The World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund (IMF) are independent, specialized agencies and operate within the United Nations framework, according to a 1947 agreement. They were initially formed separately from the United Nations through the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944. The World Bank provides loans for

international development, while the from governments, corporations, and individuals, though the UNHCR'S administrative costs are paid for by the United Nations primarily budget.

iv. Other

Since the United Nations creation, over 80 colonies have attained independence. The General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial countries and peoples in 1960 with no votes against but abstentions from all major colonial powers. The United Nations works toward decolonization through groups including the United Nations committee on Decolonization, created in 1962. The committee lists seventeen remaining "Non-self Governing Territories", the largest and most populous of which is Western Sahara.

Beginning with the formation of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) in 1972, the United Nations has made environmental issues a prominent part of its agenda as a lack of success in the first two decades of United Nations work in this area led to the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, which sought to give new impetus to these efforts. In 1988, the UNEP and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), another United Nations organization, established the intergovernmental panel on Climate Change which assesses and reports on research on global warming. The United Nations-sponsored Kyoto Protocol, signed in 1997, set legally binding emissions reduction targets for ratifying states.

The United Nations also declares and coordinates international observances, periods of time to observe issues of international interest or concern. Examples include World Tuberculosis Day, Earth Day, and the International Year of Deserts and Desertification.

v. Funding

The United Nations is financed from assessed and voluntary contributions from member states. The General Assembly approves the regular budget and determines the assessment for each member. This is broadly based on the relative capacity of each country to pay as measured by its gross national income (GNI) with adjustments for external debt and low per capital income. The two-year budget for 2012-13 was \$5.512 billion in total.

The Assembly has established the principal that the United Nations should both be unduly dependent on any one member to finance its operations. Thus, there is a "ceiling" rate, setting the maximum amount that any member can be assessed for the regular budget. In December, 2000, the Assembly revised the scale of assessments in response to pressure from the United States. As part of that revision, the regular budget ceiling was reduced from 25% to 22%. For the least developed countries (LDCS), a ceiling rate of 0.01% is applied. In addition to the ceiling rates, the minimum amount assessed to any member nation (or "floor" rate) is set at 0.001% of the United Nations budget a large share of the United Nations expenditure addresses its core mission of peace and security, and this budget is assessed separately from the main organization budgets. The peacekeeping budget for the 2013-14 fiscal years was \$7.54 billion, supporting 82,318 troops deployed in 15 missions around the world. United Nations peace operations are funded by assessments, using a formula derived from the regular funding scale that includes a weighted surcharge for the five permanent Security Council members, who must approve all peacekeeping operations. This surcharge serves to offset discounted peacekeeping assessment rate for less developed countries. In 2013, the top 10 providers of assessed financial contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations were the United States (28.38%), Japan

(10.83%), France 7.22%), Germany (7.14%), the United Kingdom (6.68%), china (6.64%), Italy (4.45%), the Russian Federation 93.15%), Canada (2.98%), and Spain 92.97%). Special United Nations programme not included in the regular budgets, such as UNICEF and the World food programme, are financed by voluntary contributions from member governments, corporations, and private individual.

2.9 Historical Background to the Emergence of the African Union

The organization of African Unity was established on 25th May, 1963, at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and the Charter of the organization of African Unity was signed on that occasion by the Heads of State and Government of 32 African States. The organization was established to promote the Unity and solidarity of African countries, to defend the Sovereignty of members, to eradicate all forms of colonialism, to promote international cooperation with due regard for United Nations charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and to coordinate and harmonize member states economic, diplomatic, educational, health, welfare, scientific, and defense policies,

On 9th May September 1999, the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Union issued the sirte Declaration, calling for the establishment of an African Union, with a view, toward accelerating the process of unity among countries of the continent, enabling it to participate in global economy activity. Since 1999, three summits have been held to facilitate the implementation of the African Union.

The Lome Summit (2001) adopted the constitutive Act of the African Union, with specifies the objectives, principles and organization the African Union.

The Lusaka Summit (2001) drew the road map for the implementation of the African

Union. The Durban Summit (2002) launched the African Union and convened the first Assembly of Heads of State of the African Union,

Although, the organization of African Unity has helped to wipe out the prestige of colonialism and apartheid from Africa and preserved the existing sovereign borders between nations but, its achievement fell short of the desire of the founding fathers.

It failed to meet the economic and strategic challenges confronting the African continent. There is no doubt that the radical transformation of the erstwhile European Union equally influenced the metamorphosis of the African body from organization of African Unity. The 37th summit of the organization of African Unity (OAU) held on the 9th -13th July, 2001, was the last summit of the 38 years old organization and the birth of a new one, known as the African Union, which has adopted by 50 of the 53 member countries.

On Monday the 8th July, 2002, African leaders formally marked the end of the organization of African Unity and replaced it with the birth of African Union. 40 of the continent's 53 presidents and monarchs were in South Africa to witness the launch of the new Union.

i. The Organs of the African Union

In Structures, the organization of African Union began as one entity, whereas the African Union, integrating itself with the African Economic Community and building other structures consist of:

ii. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government

The Assembly composed of Heads of State and Government or their duly representatives. The Assembly of Heads of state and Government is the supreme

organ of the Union.

iii. The Executive Council

It composed of ministers or Authorities designated by the Governments of member states. The Executive Council is responsible to the Assembly.

iv. The Commission

It composed of the chairperson, the Deputy, eight commissioners and Staff member; each commissioner shall be responsible for a portfolio.

The Permanent Representatives Committee

It composed of permanent Representative of member states accredited to the union.

The Permanent Representatives committee is charged with the responsibility of preparing the work of the Executive Council.

v. The Peace and Security Council

The AHG/DEC 160 (xxxviii) of the Summit of Lusaka, July,2001 a decision was made for the creation within the African Union of the peace and security council.

vi. Pan-African Parliament

A Pan-African Parliament, and organ to ensure the full participation of African relating to the composition, powers, functions and organization of the Pan-African Parliament has been signed by member states.

vii. Economic, Social and Cultural Council

It composed of different social and professional groups of the member states of the Union, The States determining the functions, powers, composition and organization of

the Economic, social and cultural council have been prepared.

viii. The Court of Justice

A Court of Justice of the Union shall be established. The Statutes defining the composition of and functions of the Court of Justice have been prepared.

ix. The Specialized Technical Committees

The following specialized Technical committees are meant to address sectorial issues and are at ministerial level and assisting the Executive council in substantive matter.

- i. The committee of Rural Economy and Agricultural Matters
- ii. The committee on monetary and Financial Affairs.
- iii. The committee on Trade, customs and Immigration matters.
- iv. The committee on industry, science and Technology, Energy, Natural Resources and Environment;
- v. The committee on Transport, communications and Tourism;
- vi. The committee on Health, Labour and social Affairs, and
- vii. The committee on Education, culture and Human Resources.

viii. The Financial Institutions

- i. The African Central Bank
- ii. The African Monetary Fund
- iii. The African Investment Bank

ix. The Objectives of the African Union

- i. To achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African Countries and the

peoples of African,

- ii. To defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member states;
- iii. To accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;
- iv. To promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples.
- v. To encourage international corporation, taking due account of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- vi. To promote peace, security and stability on the continent,
- vii. To promote democratic and institutions, popular participation and good governance,
- viii. To promote and protect Human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African charter on Human and peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments;
- ix. To establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations,
- x. To promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies.

2.10 The UN Security Council and Peace Keeping Mission in Darfur Conflict.

Unlike the African Union, which lacks the capacity to shift Khartoum's calculations, the UN Security Council potentially has much more significant military resources and political and economic leverage at its disposal. It has taken serious steps toward using

these tools, but it too is restrained by a defiant Khartoum and a deeply reluctant China, potentially the council's most influential member in this situation but also its least willing to exert pressure. The United States has also been somewhat slow to exert maximum pressure on Khartoum, though it lacks the same capacity to change Khartoum's behavior.

The Security Council has taken several steps since July 2004 toward inserting an effective peacekeeping Force into Darfur and pressuring the parties to the conflict, especially Khartoum, to end the violence. Most significantly, it has given legally binding instructions to Khartoum to disarm the Janjaweed militias and apprehend their leaders, and it has imposed a travel ban and asset freeze on individuals identified by the Council's panel of experts as undermining peace in Darfur. The Council also took the unprecedented step of referring the Darfur situation to the prosecutor of the international Criminal Court (ICC), whose office is pursuing criminal cases against a senior Khartoum official and a Janjaweed leader. Most critically, the Council acknowledged in its Resolution 1706 that the African Union's peacekeeping Force "needs urgent reinforcing" and authorized the deployment to Darfur of a UN force of more than 20,000 military and civilian peacekeepers, operating under a broad mandate and allowed to use Force to protect civilians.

But the impact of many of these efforts has been diluted by the Council's own weak follow-through and Khartoum's intransigence. Only four individuals have been targeted under the Council's travel ban and asset freeze while the Council has repeatedly threatened to impose sanctions against Sudan's petroleum sector and top government officials, it has never done so in spite of Khartoum's evident failure to comply with the Council's resolutions (ICG 2006). Similarly, Khartoum's intransigence has proven a major obstacle. Khartoum refuses to allow entry to a UN

peacekeeping force, as the UN Security Council's Resolution 1706 "invited" it to do (ICG 2006). President Al-Bashir has blustered that no international peacekeeper would ever enter Darfur, calling the proposed UN Force colonialist" and linking U.S. support for the Force to "Jewish organizations (Washington Post 2006). In the absence of al-Bashir's consent, UN officials and other Security Council members have struggled to negotiate a plan that would gradually phase in UN peacekeepers in three steps over a period of months. But Khartoum continues to temporize and repeatedly seeks to renegotiate details of the plan that had been previously resolved (Reuters SA 2007).

Many commentators have called for the U.S. and its NATO allies to stage a humanitarian military intervention in Darfur, but no state or institution appears ready to contemplate using force (New Republic 2006). There is some precedent in NATO's intervention in Kosovo for taking military action when the Security Council is unable to act to stop massive human rights violations. But the remoteness of Darfur from airbases and the sea means that any Force would face a "daunting, if not impossible" task of supplying itself across a vast terrain, and "no government on the planet appears willing to attempt it in the Face of Khartoum's threats" (ICG 2006). Even if American forces were not largely tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. government is deeply reluctant to further worsen its standing in the Muslim world by invading or even bombing another predominantly Muslim country (ICC 2006).

More broadly, though, China's position of non-interference lies behind both constraints, enabling Khartoum's intransigence and hobbling the security Council's effectiveness. Beijing has expressed support for the upgraded UN Force, but it insists that "[a]ny solution would have to respect

Sudan's sovereignty, "which in practice appears to mean that Khartoum has the right

veto (AP 2007). Although Beijing has abstained from vetoing many Security Council resolutions on Sudan, it is reported to have used its veto threat to weaken the resolutions' content, most notably preventing the Security Council from identifying consequences if Khartoum Failed to consent to a stronger UN peacekeeping force (Reeves 2006).

Under increasing international pressure to lean on its ally in Khartoum, Chinese Premier Hu jintao met with Sudanese President Bashir during a February tour of Africa and is said to have encouraged him to resolve the Darfur crisis. But during the same visit, Hu forgave some \$70 million in Sudanese debt to China and offered an Interest-Free loan of \$12 million to construct a new presidential palace (Mc Doom 2007). These are not the actions of a government seriously seeking to steer Khartoum away its violent path.

No other power holds such potential influence over Khartoum as China. China is Sudan's biggest trading partner, it purchases 64 percent of Sudan's oil exports, and its companies have invested billions of dollars in Sudan's oil industry (Pan 2006 and Reeves 2006). But Beijing does not want to pressure Khartoum. The Chinese government may have leverage in the form of Sudan's economic dependence on Chinese investment and oil purchases, hut the dependence is reciprocal: China's growing economy needs energy and currently draws seven percent of its imported oil from Sudan (New York Times 2006). Much of the appeal that China has sought to cultivate among African heads of state comes from its willingness to provide aid with fewer of the governance-related strings that Western donors insist on attaching to their financial assistance (Kurlantzick 2006). Putting real pressure on Khartoum to shape up on human rights, then, would blur the lines between China's model of assistance and the traditional western model.

Across the Pacific, the United States government has made more substantial efforts to apply economic pressure on Khartoum, though it could do far more. Facing pressure from an unusually active movement on the domestic political scene, the U.S. Congress passed in late 2006 the Darfur peace and Accountability Act (Power 2006). Along with President Bush's companion executive order, the Act would freeze the property of Sudanese government officials and any other individual responsible for war crimes and bar any U.S. citizens or companies from conducting transactions with the Sudanese petroleum industry. The U.S. government has also hinted in early 2007 at its intention to take still tougher action ("Plan B") that includes "an aggressive crackdown on a much larger group of companies connected to Sudan," but it has not yet done so. The Bush administration is reported to be staying its hand "in hopes of still winning Khartoum's cooperation," though many critics have sharply accused the U.S. of dragging its feet without cause (Kessler 2007).

It remains unclear, though, whether a more assertive United States would ultimately have the leverage to move Khartoum. One Sudan scholar has concluded that the administration's "Plan B" package of punitive measures will prove only "a minor, short-term inconvenience." While Western sanctions on Sudan's petroleum sector could be made almost meaningless by the continuing patronage of China and a handful of Sudan's other customers (Kessler 2007; ICG 2006: 7). The U.S. also has conflicting priorities with respect to Khartoum, whose cooperation on intelligence and counterterrorism efforts since the September 11, 2001 attacks led the Central Intelligence Agency to see Sudan as on the path to being "a top-tier partner" in the war against Islamic terrorism (Janes Intelligence Digest 2005).

2.11 The Role of International Organizations in the South Sudan Conflict Resolution

In this section the study specifically examines the various peace processes adopted to end the Darfur conflict only with the intent to establish the role of external factors in their failure. First, the parties to the processes and their interests can be summarized as follows:

- a.** The Moslem dominated Sudan government (Pursues Arab domination in Darfur and prevention of perceived international efforts towards regime change under the guise of humanitarian intervention, and the neutralization of Chadian threat).
- b.** Darfur Aborigines (purses political emancipation from Khartoum military-Oppression and marginalization, secularism together with reclaiming their farm lands),
- c.** Darfur's Arabs (pursues Arabianization and acquisition of aborigines' farm lands for grazing).
- d.** Neighboring states like Chad, Libya etc., (Pursues oil, hegemony, regime stability and Arabianization).
- e.** Major Global powers like US, Britain, China, etc. (purses economic interest).
- f.** Global institutions and regional organizations like UN, EU and AU (pursue humanitarian assistance and relief). These interests structured the peace process.

The second attempt after that of the Sudanese government to resolve the conflict was initiated by Chad a neighboring country. Under the mediation of the Chadian government talks between the conflict parties started in the early part of 2003, leading to the first ceasefire agreement that was signed by the SLM/A and the Government of

Sudan (GoS) in September 2003 in Abeche. The agreement was not implemented because Darfur rebels had no confidence in the Chadian government because they perceive Idris Deby of Chad as a loyal ally to the GOS. Consequently, in spring 2004, the Chadian government, the AU and a range of other facilitators arranged another peace talk in N'Djamena leading to a Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on April 8, 2004 that established a Ceasefire Commission and the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). This set the stage for the intervention of regional organizations, global institutions and world powers in the conflict. The USA had of course made a variety of political interventions prior to mid-2004 in an effort to stop the violence. In April 2004, US efforts at the UN Human Right Commission to get a robust resolution expressing deep concern about the human rights situation in Darfur were rebuffed. The European Union, led by France, supported a resolution expressing concern about conditions in Darfur. On 26 July, 2004 the EU called for the Security Council to pass a resolution threatening sanctions if Khartoum failed to meet its commitments set out in its communique with the UN to disarm and neutralize the Janjaweed (ABC online, 2004). While in July, 2004 the .US circulated a draft resolution before the Security Council concerning international sanctions against Sudan. A critical study of the proposed sanctions reveals that it was solely against the Darfur militia and not the Sudanese government. On 13 May 2004, Kofi Annan wrote to the Sudanese President, urging him to disarm the Arab militias and improve humanitarian violations and access in the Darfur region (BBC Online, 2004).

On 24th June, 2004 Kofi Annan embarked on an official trip to Darfur and Khartoum to meet with its President Al-Bashir about the crisis. The government agreed to immediately start to disarm the Janjaweed and other armed outlaw groups' (UN, 2004). This agreement was neither implemented nor enforced and there was no

effective or even barely credible international response to the genocide in Darfur. As one activist put it; early warning is useless without early response. In Darfur, as in Bosnia and Rwanda, global institutions and regional organizations spoke loudly but carried no stick at all during the early stage of the conflict (Stanton, 2004). The main political responses came from the USA, EU and AU. At the very start of 2004, the EU played out the humanitarian crisis, that is, EU focused on humanitarian programmes alone. Within a few weeks, it had stiffened its resolve by announcing arms and military equipment embargo on Sudan and a public condemnation of the attacks by the Janjaweed militias. Finally, when the Addis Ababa ceasefire was signed in 28th May, 2004, the AU, with financial support from the EU's African Peace Facility, mobilized military observers to monitor the Ceasefire's provisions and verify any violations (EU, 2004). Unfortunately, these moves are unlikely to have any effect on the motivations of the perpetrators of the war. The number of observers (40 monitors and 300 troops) fell considerably short of the numbers required if the AU mission was to carry out its mandate effectively (BBC Online, 2004). The AU later sent 7,000 (though ill equipped) troops to Darfur. On 31st August, 2004, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 1706 which called for a new 20,600-troop UN peacekeeping force called United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to supplant or supplement a poorly funded and ill-equipped 7,000 troop African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) peacekeeping force. Sudan strongly objected to the resolution and said that it would see the UN forces in the region as foreign invaders. The next day, the Sudanese military launched a major offensive in the region. On 18 September, 2004, the UN Security Council, passed Resolution 1564, which called for a Commission of Inquiry on the Darfur conflict; and in March 2005, the Security Council formally referred the situation in Darfur to

the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, taking into account the report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1564 to 2004. Two permanent members of the Security Council, the United States and China, abstained from the vote on the referral resolution.

In April 2007, the judges of the ICC issued arrest warrants against the former Minister of State for the interior, Ahmed Haroun, and a Militia Janjaweed leader, AH Kushayb, for crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Sudan government says that the ICC had no jurisdiction to try Sudanese citizens and that it will not hand the two men over (BBC Online, 2007).

On 14th July, 2008, prosecutors at the ICC, indicated Al-Bashir, most Arab and African governments condemned the indictments as politically motivated while the African Union demanded the ICC suspend the indictment against the Sudanese President (People's Daily Online, 2008). China expressed "serious concern" over the indictment and urged the parties concerned to avoid complicating the situation in Sudan. With an increasing intensity in the Darfur crisis, inter-Sudanese Peace Talks were arranged in Abuja, Nigeria in 2005, under the auspices of an African Union (AU) mediation team led by Salim Ahmed and supported by the UN, UK, the US and other international partners. The UN, UK and AU mediators adopted the style and strategy used during the negotiations between North and South Sudan in Kenya that led to the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) in January 2005. The fundamental principle of this orthodoxy was for the mediator to act as formulators who guide the peace process and the drafting of peace agreements, but to leave the negotiating to the parties. Another strategy adopted was to get the parties to agree to a series of broad principles before tackling the nitty-gritty of a comprehensive peace agreement. Thus, in July 2005, guided by the mediators the parties to the conflict adopted, a

Declaration of Principles (DOP) with negative consequences as a faction of the SLM/A disagreed with the imposition leading SLM/A to split into two factions. The negative impact of this development led the UN, major European powers and the US together with AU and the financial backers of the Abuja negotiations to mount pressure and impose deadlines on the parties.

The mediation team divided the negotiations in three areas: power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and security and using experts attached to them, the mediators moved to draft a comprehensive peace agreement. The draft was presented to the parties on 25 April, while its Arabic translation only arrived on 28 April. The deadline expired only two days later, which meant that there was very little time for the parties to understand and discuss the 86-pags draft, let alone to consult their constituents, there were also no direct negotiations between the parties about the content of the agreement (Toga, 2007). At this point, the US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, British Minister for International Development Hilary Ben, and the then President of Nigeria Olusegun Obasanjo took over the mediation process, used manipulation, threats and inducements to secure the parties' signatures with little or no regard to the process, the content of the agreement, or its implementation (Nathan, 2006; de Waal, 2007). Therefore, the contents of the DPA did not emanate from the parties. On 5 May, 2006 the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed by the government and by Mini Minawi, the leader of one of the two SLM factions, but was rejected by JEM and Abdel Wahid al Nur, the leader of the other SLM faction.

The agreement did not achieve peace, and arguably heightened the conflict as violent protests against the DPA in Darfur followed. More ominously, the government and Minawi formed an offensive an offensive military alliance and attacked communities that support Abdel Wahid, while the Janjaweed's rampages continued unabated (Flint,

2006). There was widespread opposition to the deal within the Minawi group, with some commanders announcing a suspension of the DPA. Conversely, four senior officials from JEM and the Abdel Wahid faction signed a declaration of support for the Agreement and several leaders in Abdel Wahid's grouping broke away because of his stance. As the International Crisis Group (ICG) put it, the DPA "accelerated the breakup of the insurgency into smaller blocs along ethnic lines". The DPA did not resonate with the people of Darfur and met growing resistance from internally displaced persons (IDPs) in particular. They believed that the Agreement has been forced upon the land, rather than meeting the interests of all parties somewhere halfway, only strengthens the position of the government and (Minawi's) minority tribe, the Zaghawa, (Pronk, 2006). The DPA contains provisions on power-sharing and political representation; wealth-sharing, compensation for the victims of the conflict; ceasefire arrangements and long-term security issues; and a Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation designed to facilitate local dialogue and reconciliation. The content of the DPA has been criticized by a number of analysts (Flint, 2006) including the International Crises Group (ICG) whose commentary sparked a heated exchange of words with the AU (ICG, 2004: March, 25). These arguments and criticisms strengthened the position of the opposition groups and the conflict continued after the DPA.

2.12 The Role of IGAD on the South Sudan Conflict Resolution

The 1996 IGAD Agreement included among its principles, the peaceful settlement of conflicts, the maintenance of regional peace, stability and security, and the protection of human and people's rights. A new objective was "to promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and

intra-State conflicts through dialogue”. The IGAD Secretariat was restructured to fulfill the new mandate and in due course it established a division responsible for peace and security. However, IGAD’s institutional changes lagged behind real political processes within the region.

IGAD was very instrumental in the signing of the CPA on January 9, 2005. The CPA includes updates and amendments to previous protocols. The CPA itself is comprised of six protocols concluded between 2002 and 2005 (IGAD, 2005). The Machakos Protocol signed in Machakos, Kenya, on 20 July 2002, in which the parties agreed on a broad framework, setting forth the principles of governance, the transitional process and the structures of government as well as on the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan, and on state and religion. A six- year Interim Period, at the end of which, the people of southern Sudan were given the right to vote in a self-determination referendum to decide whether to remain united with Sudan or to secede. There is also the Protocol on security arrangements signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 25 September 2003 which provided a cessation of hostilities between the SPLA and the SAF, and the maintenance of SPLA forces in the south and SAF forces in the north (Government of South Sudan Development Plan, 2011-2013).

The Protocol on the resolution of conflict in southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile States was signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004. The Protocol on Power-sharing was signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004 and provides for power sharing arrangements between Sudan’s two

major political parties, the SPLM and NCP, as well as smaller parties, at the national and Southern Sudan levels of government. There is also the Protocol on wealth-sharing signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 7 January 2004 which provides that, among other things profits from oil extracted in southern Sudan were split 50-50 between the national and southern Sudan levels of government. The Protocol on the resolution of conflict in Abyei signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004 led to the establishment of a special administrative status for the disputed Abyei area, as well as a referendum for the “residents” of Abyei, to be carried out at the same time as the Southern Sudan referendum.

In accordance with the provisions of the CPA, the people of Southern Sudan voted in the Southern Sudan referendum on January 9, 2011. Six months later, on July 9, 2011, the Interim Period came to an end and South Sudan became the world’s newest nation. Despite this success, critical aspects of the CPA remain unimplemented. The Abyei area referendum never occurred, due to a disagreement between the two CPA parties over the definition of the term “resident” of the Abyei area. While some progress was made in carrying out popular consultations in Blue Nile, the process was never concluded. In South Kordofan, it never began. Today a new temporary agreement, concluded in June 2011, concerning the Abyei area remains unimplemented. In South Kordofan and Blue Nile, the GOSS had launched a sustained military offensive against the civilians of the two states.

The SPLM leadership sought to maintain unity over time with mixed results.

As the Republic of South Sudan emerged as an independent country, political rivalries may resurface and new groups may challenge the SPLM's leadership. In 1991, the SPLM faced its most serious internal crisis since its founding on 16th May, 1983 when a number of key commanders left the movement to form their own group. Following the split, several factions fought against the mainstream SPLM, often with the support of the Bashir government (Daniel, 2014). After years of reconciliation efforts, most of the key players in the different factions rejoined the SPLM. As SPLM began to confront the challenge of running a country without enough schools, hospitals or roads, the unity that had underpinned the referendum and declaration of independence dissolved

The most ferocious of the infighting began in mid-December 2013 when President Salva Kiir accused his sacked deputy Mr. Riek Machar of plotting a coup. Fighting between government troops and rebel factions erupted, and within weeks. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) split between forces loyal to the Government and forces loyal to former Vice-President Riek Machar. The consequences for the civilian population have been devastating (Daniel, 2014). A UN report released in May 2014 said that "widespread and systematic" atrocities had been carried out by both sides in homes, hospitals, mosques, churches and UN compounds.

According to the report there are reasonable grounds to believe that violations of international human rights and humanitarian law have been committed by both parties to the conflict. In light of the widespread and systematic nature of

many of the attacks, and information suggesting coordination and planning, there are also reasonable grounds to believe that the crimes against humanity of murder, rape and other acts of sexual violence, enforced disappearance, and imprisonment have occurred. Over one million South Sudanese have been displaced by the conflict. Despite the signing of a cessation of hostilities agreement on 23 January, fighting continues with little hope that civilians will see any respite from the relentless violence.

Since then the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) which was instrumental in the conclusion of the CPA process in 2005 has continued to offer good offices for dialogue and supporting peace consolidation within South Sudan (Kimani, 2012 as cited in Judith, 2016). South Sudan regards IGAD as the first point of call in regional peace initiatives. The current African Union led negotiations between north and South Sudan over the border conflict are being assisted by IGAD.

IGAD has been assisting South Sudan to integrate into the regional peace building architecture. The Conflict Early Warning and Early Response (CEWARN) mechanism of IGAD has been established in the South Sudan Peace building Commission (Kimani, 2012 as cited in Judith, 2016). There is a need for IGAD to play an active role in promoting peaceful co-existence between the two countries bearing in mind its credibility and mediation achievements. IGAD has coordinated the deployment of about civil servants from Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia to offer technical assistance in several ministries, commissions and local governments. IGAD is supplementing

assistance that is provided by the AU and other bilateral arrangements between Sudan and neighboring countries. IGAD is providing this support in collaboration with UNDP. The most common other possible solutions to the conflict in South Sudan was found to be engaging in home based negotiations like those that took place in Somalia, this was followed by creating an all-inclusive government, enhance the capacities of security measures, equal distribution of oil resources, bringing together of communities through ethnic intolerance driven by political incitements, bottom-up approach to resolution mechanisms, clan integration, having local dispute settlements like Gacaca courts in Rwanda, creation of compact governance, economic empowerment, sanctions carried out on rebels and individuals perpetuating conflict, return of people in diaspora, serious public sensitization and reconciliation campaigns at the grassroots, stable military that speaks with one voice and engaging IGAD, AU and UN security council (Sudan Tribune, 2012).

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has been the route map that the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and the Government of National Unity (GONU) and other development partners have followed to create an environment in which Khartoum and Juba could find enduring solution to the conflict. The CPA specifically provided a six-year interim period which Sudan will be governed. According to protocols on power-sharing and security, created statewide government and legislative chambers in both regions, stipulated that general election will take place at all government level which happened April 2010, recommended on the following that 1956 border be

delineated , that oil revenue be shared on 50% basis after a 2% share to oil producing states, a joint integrated military units be deployed on border and a disarmament demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process begin with IJN assistance and popular consultations be made in Blue Nile state and South Kordofan for final settlement of grievances with the North. Generally CPA sought to address the root cause of conflict by establishing a frame work for governance through which power and wealth shall be sheared and human right guaranteed.

IGAD played a leading role in diplomatic and peace negotiation such as post referendum arrangement between North and South as part of CPA implementation. Negotiation with dissident in Jonglei State (JS) Upper Nile State and state reconciliation efforts and peace conferences facilitated by development partners (DPs) and NGOs, creation of institution, such as former Peace Commission, South Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA), Committee of peace and state-level peace structures.

The common strategies IGAD has employed in the management of the conflict in South Sudan are: engaging high diplomatic mediation such as IGAD secretariat and peace ambassadors, building capacities of national security, making ultimatums for different leaders, use of Gacaca courts like the ones used in Rwanda and coming up with an early warning system for conflict eruption in South Sudan respectively.

Some of the measures IGAD has taken to mitigate the security threats in South Sudan are: IGAD has sent its mission in Sudan to help mitigate the

crisis/ Offered reinforcement, Employ early warning mechanisms to prevent conflict, approval of Protection & Deterrence Force (PDF) to come to South Sudan, special coordination with UNMISS peacekeepers battalion on conflicts zones, deployment of monitors through the Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms (MVM)

(Susan, 2013), built capacities of national security and built capacity of South Sudanese security organs.

The biggest challenge IGAD has faced in its South Sudan conflict management efforts has been political interference as well as external interference and interests from Uganda, Sudan, and other neighboring countries. Others were; lack credibility since one of IGAD members is directly involved in the conflict and also lack of partiality in mediation processes, IGAD member states and secretariat display their lack of a genuine grasp of South Sudanese socio-cultural dynamics, lack of public cooperation, lack of key security infrastructure in the country, lack of funds and resources and leaders not respecting peace agreements as well as bias from regional leaders. Few regional organizations or bodies have successfully intervened in the conflict between 2011-2013, however about 7,000 African Union troops have slowly been deployed in Darfur on a very limited mandate, The UN secretarial council has been consistent across the country and emphasizes protection of civilians, human rights reporting, EAC, SADDC, ECOWAS and Church based organizations also participate somehow in ending the ongoing conflict in South Sudan. Some of other possible solutions to the conflict in South Sudan

engaging in home based negotiations like those that took place in Somalia (Fight against Warlords).

Consequently, the above stated strategies and measures employed by IGAD in conflict resolution in South Sudan are the best strategy and measures IGAD has employed in the management of the conflict in South Sudan and conflict resolution. Also, the stated challenges have been the major challenge IGAD has faced in its South Sudan conflict resolution efforts. However, the challenges faced by IGAD in its South Sudan conflict resolution efforts will be reported and discussed in the chapter four of this thesis which is the data presentation and analysis, and would also discuss the achievements of IGAD, among others.

2.13 IGAD's Peace Process in South Sudan

The peace negotiation in South Sudan had taken almost two years. But the outcome is still negligible. In the mediation process, different parties have been participated. Among these, IGAD has been mentioned as the primary organ that struggles for ending the civil war in the country. The peace talks, mediated by IGAD, were led by special envoys that came from the big three regional powers of the authority. These are Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan. Though IGAD had put much effort to the greatest extent possible, the warring parties are reluctant to reach into agreement. Apart from the disputants, the member states of IGAD are also accused of their rivalries and deep-rooted regional division in the processes of mediation. To overcome these shortcomings, IGAD has widened its mediation process into the "IGAD-PLUS" initiative, which is composed of the IGAD itself, the AU, UN, China, U.S., UK, European Union

(EU), Norway and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF).

The “IGAD-PLUS” initiative is intended to provide an international facade behind IGAD in resolving the conflict that severely degrades the country within this short period of time. Meanwhile, it is not effective as it has been designed due to the fact that the parties in processes are disappointed by the IGAD as well as the country in question.

Notwithstanding with the challenges of IGAD, it has to be appreciated for its prior responses in addressing the conflict. Starting from the beginning of the conflict, IGAD has led much effort in mediating the worrying parties to come into negotiations and to stop the disputes. Since 2014, IGAD has led more than seven peace round talks between the conflicting parties. Sadly, enough, all rounds of peace talks were concluded by a very short - may be days or hours-long - agreements or complete disagreements that have resulted with substantial setbacks (The Sudan Tribune, 2014).

In 2014 alone more than six peace talks were held. To mention some,

The First Round Peace Talks: With a focus of reaching into a cessation of hostilities agreement, a release of the prisoners and a process of dialogue, the first round talks began on January 4, 2014, in Ethiopia. This round was full of delays and setbacks. However, in the end, the cessation of hostilities agreement was signed on January 23, 2014. But it was terrible to hear that the disputants had breached the agreement just after two days of their consensus.

The Second Round Peace Talks: It was conducted on March 2014. With respect to its designed objectives, the second peace talk was not as effective

as intended. The only thing that was successful during this round was the authorization of an IGAD Protection and Deterrent Force (PDF), which was designed to monitor and enforce the ceasefire. As part of this force, 90 Ethiopian peacekeepers were deployed in South Sudan.

The Third Round Peace Talks: Just after a month of the second round peace talk, the third was taken place in April 2014. As like that of the above two peace talks, this round was also ineffective and short-lived. It has been manifested by the fighting of the two opposing groups on May 22, 2014, that caused the displacement of 2000 peoples in the Upper Nile State.

The Fourth Round Peace Talks: Conducted on June 9, 2014, this round was focusing on the formation of a transitional unity government. Nevertheless, it was not an easy task provided the divergent views of the parties in conflict. What a form of government should be formed was the point of departure at this time.

The Fifth Round Peace Talks: This round was held on July 20, 2014, to compromise the complaint (Unfair inclusivity of IGAD in the selection of stakeholders' process) of the rebelling parties. However, it has failed because of the rejection of the opposition parties to attend the talks. It was really sad for both the mediators and the international community who want to see an effective peace agreement in between the disputants.

The Sixth Round Peace Talks: The last but not least peace talk in 2014 was carried out on November 10, 2014. This round was expected to be fruitful since there were a great zeal and devotion from both sides to be abided by the

cessation of hostilities agreement signed in the first round and other documents that include the likes of the implementation matrix. In this round, IGAD seemed to be serious in warning the warring parties to be abiding by the COH agreement and to work on the power-sharing accord. Meanwhile, the peace agreement was concluded by a heavy fighting between the opposition and government forces.

In 2015, the February's and March's peace talks were the bold peace negotiations that were resumed by the government of South Sudan and the rebels, which were facilitated by the Horn of Africa bloc, IGAD. On February 1st, 2015, President Kiir, and Dr. Machar have signed a new ceasefire yet had permissions to continue their discussions on some argumentative issues like power sharing and formation of the transitional government. After a month on March 5, 2015, which otherwise was called as the final peace deal between the government of the country and the SPLM (IO) ruined with no agreement. The collapse of the talk had exacerbated the conflict than it was before. The March 2015 IGAD report shows that after the violation of the peace deal, civilians were killed, women and children were abused and major infrastructural facilities in the Upper Nile and Unity states were destroyed. Following the ineffectiveness of the above IGAD-led peace talks, on 12th March 2015 IGAD publicized a new peace negotiation approach called as the IGAD-PLUS formula. Initially, the formula was expected to be implemented on April. However, due to the lack of commitment and political will from the conflicting parties, it has been fully implemented on 17th August 2015. Therefore, the

major decisions and challenges of the August 17 and 26 Peace deal will briefly discuss in the following sections.

On August 17, 2015; a historical IGAD-PLUS peace negotiation (deal) was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The proposal was comprehensive and inclusive. In the first place, it demands a permanent ceasefire between the warring parties not later than 72 hours after signing the accord. In the second place, the peace proposal has given 30 days for militants to assemble and canton. Moreover, it explicitly stated that the Kampala's troops to leave the country within 45 days and other overseas militia forces to be disarmed and back to their home. The peace deal is also promising to return Dr. Machar to his former position, the vice presidency.

On the due date, only Riek Machar, leader of SPLM/IO and Pagan Amum, on behalf of the Former Political Detainees signed the deal. However, President Salva Kiir regrets to sign the agreement and requests an additional 15 days for consultations. Finally, on 26th August 2015, he signed the deal with the rebelling parties except some serious reservations.

As it has been discussed earlier, even if seven and more ceasefires have already been agreed from both sides of the parties in conflict, all of the agreements were breached within few days, if not hours. So, this could lead us into raising questions like why those peace agreements proposed by IGAD as well as IGAD-PLUS were not effective. This can be seen from both sides i.e. from the IGAD's/IGAD-PLUS's ill-defined peace agreement proposals and the reluctance and refusal of the warring parties to be abided by such agreements.

To Brian Adeba (2015), the peace proposal suggested by IGAD is problematic. He argued on three key elements of the proposal which have been provided by IGAD. These include the why and the wherefore of the transitional government, the power-sharing formula and inclusivity issues.

Power sharing is one of the controversial issues that are expected to disrupt the peace deal. According to the July 2015 proposal of IGAD, at the national level, the power sharing proportion for the government, the SPLM-IO and the SPLM-FD and other political parties would be 53, 33 and 14 percent respectively. The arrangement is fully accepted by the SPLMIO. Nonetheless, there is a doubt from the Kiir's government side to accept the quota which could hold him down from prior demand (70 percent). Brian Adeba (2015) additionally argued that the origin and the role of the members of the SPLM-FD have been misread by IGAD. Giving a political party role for these peoples is deceitful. All opposition parties cannot deserve the role of political parties in South Sudan. But IGAD failed to recognize that.

The other contentious issue of the proposal is that the formation of a transitional government by returning Dr. Machar into his former vice-presidency position, which is suspected by the international community for aggravating the crisis. Nyagoah Tut (2015).

2.14 Theoretical Framework

This research work has been able to study the following theories; Marxist, Frustration and aggression, Functionalism, Neo-functionalism, Liberalism, Neo-liberalism etc. On the process of reviewing literatures and theories related to the topic of the study at the end, the researcher has adopted the theory of functionalism as the model to

explain the topic under view.

The theory that is employed in this research work is the functionalist theory as propounded by David Mitrany who was concerned in his work, *A Working Peace System* first published in 1943 with the need to finding solution to problems of war and peace in the international system. He further maintained the view that "there was need for a new kind of international system to replace the old one whose breakdown led to two world wars. He argued further that federal arrangements proposed by post-World War I pro-federalists would not be the best frame-work for such "a new international order, because it could not overcome the factors of nationalism and ideology. For even if a number of federal units could be constructed, it would still leave the world divided on competitive basis.

What influenced him (Mitrany) on functionalism was what he called 'ramification' an instance of collaboration among groups or entities. He observed that the development of collaboration in one technical field contribute to collaboration in other technical fields. He saw this as functional collaboration which results from the conviction or felt-need that the people must put their effort together in order to achieve a common objective. (Adeniran, 2007).

In his view, the felt-need in one particular sector generated a felt need for functional collaboration in another sector. He therefore felt and concluded that functional activity could change international activity and give it a new orientation in such a way that people think more and more of working together rather than getting engaged in activities that conflict and lead to confrontation. (Adeniran, 2007), it was also his view that such functional activities could build up the foundation of political agreement and that countries would act co-operatively and voluntarily in the common interest of one another.

According to Mitrany (1966) functionalism was the alternative choice. He posited that peaceful change would not come through a shift of national boundaries but by means of actions across them. To him, states would not surrender formal sovereignty but would transfer executive authority for specific ends. He is also of the view that world peace could be best promoted if international activities were to be organized around basic functional needs such as health care, transportation, cultural activities, welfare necessity, trade and development, scientific and even production etc. there could be as many international organization as needed and they would be arranged on a universal rather than a regional basis, with countries being under no compulsion to join. Functional union according to him would allow all states to work together without a general political authority.

Functionalism, however required a number of conditions according to Mitrany. These are:

- i.** The activities engaged in are selected specifically and they are organized separately, each according to its needs at the particular moment
- ii.** There are no fixed rules or organizational pattern, i.e, there is adequate flexibility. It is the function which determined the power it needed and the organization that is required to complete the task or accomplish the intended objective. Different functional agencies can be joined together to complete a particular task or accomplished laid down objectives or even co-ordinate a higher task; doing this, however, does not mean or require any overriding political authority. Wider platforms are seen or perceived and regarded as local problems within the local community that is engaged in functional activities.

The jurisdiction of a federal agency is only as wide as the widest limits of the functions being performed.

Functionalism had been taken up by other scholars where Mirany left it. The concept had been developed or expanded, taking into consideration related processes which Mitrany probably overlooked or paid little attention to. These scholars, for example had developed what is referred to as neo-federalism. This is a later version of functionalism. It still relies on organization by functions but it brought about a new function, consequences and relationships, such as the spillover effect (Adeniran, 2007).

As the member-states saw the economic benefits resulting from activities of the central organization, neo-functionalists believed they would be willing to give that organization broader authority. One technical task would spill over tasks until integrating force were virtually over-whelming. Spill over refers to demonstration effects and to aspects of sector integration. People go through a learning process and the experience in one endeavor led to task expansion and diversification or spill-over so as to bring about greater collaboration and peace. The spill over observed in the study of the European Coal and Steel (ECSC) had shown that once there is cooperation at one level, there could be cooperation in another area. Or once there is a booming enterprise, there would be subsidiaries or complementary activities. The spillover had been used especially by Ernst Haas, also a leading neo-functionalist, to show how functions can eventually lead to the demise of the nation-state. By this, he meant a situation whereby, through peaceful and non-coercive means, people are brought together from different nation states and they began to work and do things together (Adeniran, 2007). As a result of the above analysis, the new-functionalist organization would end up running everything, and at this stage the process of giving

it political power would be little more than a formality to which the former independent states would had no objection.

The factors that are conducive for regional integration such as economic development and a low level ideological politics, the existence of a pluralistic social structure, are generally not found in the developing region of Africa and the world, where industrialization remained limited and pressures and necessities of nation building call for emphasized on centralization, (Haas, 1967). In view of the absence of the enabling factors for integration, never the less, regional cooperation and integration is so compelling as to force nations into negative efforts regardless of the inappropriateness of certain background conditions. It would therefore be a definite restriction should one heed Haas' cautionary note and hesitate to apply the functionalist model to the study of African Union Integration.

Among the criticisms which had been made to show how functionalism is in explaining what actually goes on in the international system are that;

- i.** It is difficult and in fact, unrealistic to separate economic and social activities from political activities,
- ii.** Governments are usually unwilling and unprepared to relinquish their obligations or hand over the activities that they performed to any international or regional authority, such a move would be seen as likely to encroach upon their own sovereignty,
- iii.** Certain social and economic activities do not spill-over or subject themselves to any ramification or spil over into the political sector,
- iv.** The road to political integration which seemed to be the ultimate goals of functionalism, lies along the political path, certain acts coming as a result of the

people's collective political willingness rather than functional integration in economic and social sectors.

In essence of this, the functionalist theory is relevant to the present study and as a model of integration in African context.

2.14.1 Gaps in the Literature

- i.** However, the African Union had neither the means nor capability to engage in a peace support operation in a region the size of Darfur Conflict with the magnitude of the challenge involved. The AU mission required the support of the UN Security Council before it could undertake such a mission, and certainly with sufficient provision of logistics, funds and personnel are not adequate.
- ii.** The Khartoum government thus finds itself in a position to dictate terms of AU and UN engagement in the country without fear of major sanctions, as it could count on the support of the veto-wielding allies in the UN Security Council. These factors undermined AMIS and contributed to its inability to impose its presence in Darfur Conflict in order to ensure peace and security in the region,
- iii.** Several opinions have been expressed regarding the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) how it seemed to have 'failed.' From the perspective of its critics, AMIS had failed to accomplish its objectives, to halt the large-scale killings and displacements of the civilian population in Darfur Conflict. Resolutions except the UNAMID came with the increased resources, capability and required personnel, capable of halting attacks against civilians, internally displaced person (IDPs) and, ensure stability in Darfur in support of the AU Mission in Darfur Conflict.

2.14.1 Relevance of the Theory to the Study

From the above discussion, what is the relevance of the functionalist theory to the present study titled 'Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Challenges of Conflict Resolution in South Sudan. These can be

summed up as follow:

- i.** IGAD as an integrating body seeking for the economic and political unification of the sub-region, the functionalist theory on the other hand as a model could promote or contribute to peaceful co-existence within the sub-region.
- ii.** As a result of functional activities among the states, economic unification could build up the foundation of political agreement and countries would act cooperatively and voluntarily in the common interest of one another which is the common goals of the IGAD.
- iii.** The main objectives of IGAD is the political, economic and Social unification of the region which is the goal of functionalism, in terms of the functional activities that can performed together and in relation to trade and development in particular.
- iv.** The choice of the functionalist theory is to examined the IGAD integration experiment is justified by the fact that the objectives of the organization as contained in the Treaty included the promotion of peaceful cooperation and integration on economic, trade, development, monetary, social and cultural activities. These are expected to ultimately lead to the establishment of an economic and monetary Union through total integration of the National economies of the East African sub-region and Africa in general.

In essence, the functionalist theory is relevant to the present study and is a model of integration in Africa context.

2.14.2. Weakness of the Theory to the Study

- I.** It is difficult and, in fact, unrealistic to separate economic and social activities from political activities.
- ii.** Governments are usually unwilling and unprepared to relinquished their obligations or hand over the activities that they performed to any international or regional authority, such a move would be seen as likely to encroached upon their own sovereignty.
- iii.** Certain social and economic activities do not spill-over or subject themselves to any ramification or spill-over into the political sectors.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design

Research design entails collection of information from across section of the population on defined subject matter within a given period of time through the use of questionnaire to assess thought opinion and feelings about subject of discussion (Lawrence, 2006). The design also describes the approach used in the selection of sample and choice through which survey administers the instrument. Survey represents one of the most common types of qualitative social sciences research. It is often used.

3.2 Population, Sample Size and Sample Techniques

The target population refers to the total number of the aggregate of concern which by virtue of the common characteristics. It may lead to the gathering of the relevant information. The research population in this study is underlined by the number of government and private organizations that are fully involved in the study. therefore, the population of this study is inclusive Sudan Embassy 25, African Union Office 78, United Nations Office 57, Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution Office 166, National Defense College 2012, Army Barrack/Jaji 744 and Ministry of Defense 402. These are targeted population was chosen because they are major stake and mostly related to the study. Therefore, the total population of the study is (3484) three thousand four hundred and eighty four respectively.

The Population of the Study

S/N	Selected Organizations	Population of Staff in the Organizations
1	Sudan Embassy	25
2	African Union	78
3	United Nations	57
4	Institute of Peace & Conflict Resolution	166
4	National Defense College	2012
6	Army Barrack/Jaji	744
7	Ministry of Defense	402
8	Total	3484

Therefore, in selecting the sample size, the study adopted determination formula in social sciences propounded by Taro Yamane (1967) thus;

When N is the sample size, N is the population size and e is the level of precision (0.5)² thus the total population and sixty people based on the selected organization, applying the formula above the sample size is determined as thus:

$$\frac{N - n}{1 + (0.5)^2}$$

$$n = \frac{3484}{1 + 3485 (0.5)}$$

$$n = \frac{3484}{1 + 3485 (0.25)}$$

$$n = \frac{3484}{n = 3484 \ 1 + 3485 \times 0.25}$$

$$n = \frac{3484}{n = 3484 \ 872.27}$$

$$n = 399.42676985$$

Therefore, (400) is a sample size of the study.

Populations of Sample Size and Questionnaires Distributed

S/N	Selected Organizations	Population of Staff in the Organizations
1	Sudan Embassy	$\frac{25 \times 400}{3484} = 2.8$
2	African Union	$\frac{75 \times 400}{3484} = 8.6$
3	United Nations	$\frac{57 \times 400}{3484} = 6.5$
4	Institute of Peace & Conflict Resolution	$\frac{166 \times 400}{3484} = 19.0$
5	National Defense College	$\frac{2012 \times 400}{3484} = 230$
6	Army Barrack/Jaji	$\frac{744 \times 400}{3484} = 85$
7	Ministry of Defense	$\frac{402 \times 400}{3484} = 46$
8	Total	400

Source: Field Work October, 2018

The Sample Population for the Questionnaire Retrieved

S/N	Selected Organizations	Population of Staff in the Organizations
1	Sudan Embassy	2
2	African Union	8
3	United Nations	6
4	Institute of Peace & Conflict Resolution	19
4	National Defense College	150
6	Army Barrack/Jaji	50
7	Ministry of Defense	35
8	Total	270

Source: Field Work October, 2018

3.4 Method of Data Collection

Basically there are two main sources of data collection in this study primary and secondary sources of data were used.

- i. Primary Method of Data Collections:** - This involve the collection of data by the use of questionnaires, interview, field survey etc. for the purpose of this study questionnaires were distributed to the research respondents that were purposively sampled from general population of the study constituted from Sudan Embassy, African Union, United Nations, Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution, National Defense College, Army Barrack/Jaji and Ministry of Defense.
- ii. Secondary Method of Data Collection:** - Data were collected from document materials such as textbooks, journals, pamphlets, newspapers, magazines, publications, symposium, internet materials and other related documents.
 - a. Questionnaire:** - The study employed the use of structural questionnaires obtained from the population sampled in support of the study questionnaire were designed according to “Liker Pattern” Yes or No and Not sure or agree, Disagree, Strongly Agreed, Strongly Disagreed responses.
 - b. Interview:** - This is another vital technique for data generation while conducting a research of such magnitude and it is one of the ultimate tools in the hands of academia for an enhanced information gathering. For the purpose of this study the researcher conducted interview in target areas of study include Sudan Embassy, African Union, United Nations, Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution, National Defense College, Army Barrack/Jaji and Ministry of Defense.

3.5 Justification of Method

The instrumentation used in this research was based on both closed and opened ended

structured questionnaire. A questionnaire is an organized collection of questions intended to solicit data from respondents which could be on telephones, mails, face to face, etc.

Questionnaires are best suited for standardized questions, this is to ensure uniformity of questions, which should be interpreted in the same way we all responded. Adeoti (2010), the questions is made of (two) sections: A and B. section A captures the social demographic variables of the respondents and section B is the questions based on the variables of the study. Thereby, it is twenty seven (24) items contained in the questions.

3.6 Procedures

The procedures for conducting this research were through the use of structured questions. The question was also consisting of structured questionnaire were administered to (400) four hundred respondents purposively selected representing a wide spectrum of the organization appeared in the justification tables and distributed the questionnaire the sample techniques concerns on the respondents for the study and administered the questionnaire and retrieved after eight weeks.

However, the questionnaires were structured in two sections, section A contain questions seeking the demographic information/personal data while section B seek data from the relevant variables of the study. The second aspect is constructed in multiple choice form in order to enable the respondents have it easy to choose their form. The questions in this part are directly drawn and constructed from the research question objectives and prepositions of the study. They are meant to gather various qualitative and quantitative data for actual analysis that give answer to the research

questions and help in the discussion and analyzing the preposition of the study.

3.7 Technique of Data Analysis.

After the data have been collated, the researcher turns to the task of analyzing the data. The analysis of data requires a task of analyzing related operation such as establishment of categories to raw data through coding, tabulation and then drawing statistical inferences.

However, the topic under discussion descriptive and inferential statistic methods were used throughout in the data analysis of both primary and secondary data obtained. The qualitative data from the questionnaires were subjected to the analysis using the statistical package for social sciences. (SPSS version 20 and e-views) the same process was used by (Heoge and Maltery, 2001).

The descriptive statistics include the frequency and percentages table to describe the social demographic variable of the respondents for the study. The inferential statistics were used in the study include cross tabulation and simple percentages.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

As stated in the preceding chapter four while the data obtained from field survey would be descriptively presented through the use of the simple percentages and statistical method. The data analysis would also be anchored on the raw data through coding, tabulation and finally drawing statistical inferences.

Table 1: Age Distribution of Respondent

Age	Frequency	Percentage
18-25	20	7.4
26-39	180	66.6
40-59	60	22.2
60 and above	10	3.7
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table 1, shows the frequency and percentage of the respondent's age. Respondents between the age ranges of 18-25 have 20 representing (7,4%). Those within the ages of 26-29 have 180 frequency, representing (66.6%). And respondents within the ages of 40-59 have 60 frequency representing (22.2%) while those within the ages of 60 and above have 10 frequency, representing (3.7%).

Table 2: Marital Status Distribution of the Respondent

Marital Status	Frequency	Percentage
Married	100	37.0
Single	150	55.5
Divorced	0	0
Widowed	20	7.4
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table 2, indicates that 100 respondents representing (37.0%) are married. 150, representing (55.5%) are single while 0 respondents who represent (0%) are divorced and only 20 respondents who make up (7.4%) of the total respondents are widower.

Table 3: Sex Frequency Distribution of Respondents

Sex	Frequency	Percentage
Male	150	55.5
Female	120	44.4
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table 3, shows that 150 respondents representing (55.5%) of total respondents are male while 120 respondents representing (44.4%) are female members of the respondents with percentage of ((25,9%), while tertiary institutions to have 200 members with the percentage of (74.0%).

Table 4, Occupation Distribution of the Respondents

Occupation	Frequency	Percentage
Civil Servant	100	37.0
Military Personnel	50	18.5
Diplomat	100	37.0
Others	20	7.4
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table 4, Shows the occupation of the respondents from the various selected organizations for the study. This indicates that Civil Servants have 100 frequency representing (37.0) while Military personnel have 50 frequency representing 18.5%). Diplomats on the other hand have 100 frequency representing (37.0%) while others have 20 frequencies that represent (7.4%) of the total responses.

Table 5, Educational level of the respondents

Educational Level	Frequency	Percentage
Primary	0	0
Secondary	70	25.9
Tertiary	200	74.0
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table5, indicates the respondents educational background showing those respondents who attend primary have 0 number of respondents with (0%) and secondary to have 70 members of the respondents with percentage of 25.9%) while tertiary institutions to have 200 members with the percentage of (74.0%).

Table 6: The Nationality of the Respondents

Nationality	Frequency	Percentage
Nigerian	270	100
Non-Nigerian	0	0
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table 6, shows the nationality of the respondents, Nigeria have the highest respondents of 270 members representing (100%) while Non-Nigerians have 0 respondents representing (0%) of respondents.

Table 7: What are the causes of Darfur conflict in Sudan?

Respondent	Frequency	Percentage
Religion Differences	80	29.6
Absence of Development	100	37.0
Marginalization	90	33.3
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table 7, indicates details on information of the view of respondents on the causes of Darfur conflict in Sudan. A total of 80 respondents representing (29.6%) said religion differences was the major cause of Darfur conflict in Sudan and 100 respondents who represent (37,0%) responded otherwise; saying absence of development was the major cause of the conflict. While 90 respondents that represent (33.3%) of the respondents offered that marginalization was the cause of the conflict.

Table 8: What are the challenges confronting the AU on Sudan conflict resolution?

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Lack of Resources	150	55.5
Inability to Resolve the Conflict	50	18.5
Poor Coordination of Military Capability	70	25.9
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table 8, shows respondents responses on what the challenges confronting the AU on Sudan conflict resolutions are. 150 respondents representing (55.5%) said it is lack of resources while 50 respondents representing (18.5%) said inability to resolve the conflict. While 70 respondents representing (25.9%) said it is poor coordination of military capability.

Table 9: What are the roles played by the International Community's in resolving the Darfur conflict?

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Ensuring Peace and Security	50	18.5
Protection of Civilians Population	150	55.5
Settlement between the Warring Parties	20	7.4
Humanitarian Supports	50	18.5
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table 9, indicates that 50 (18.5%) of the respondents responded to ‘Ensuring peace and security’ 150 (55.5%) responded to ‘Protection of Civilian Population’ are the major roles played by the International Community's in resolving the Darfur conflict, 20 (7.4%) responded to ‘Settlement between the Warring parties’ and 50 (18.5%) responded to ‘Humanitarian Support, in the study.

Table 10: What are the measures taken by the UN in resolving the Darfur conflict?

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Mediation Measures	50	18.5
Stopped the Killings	80	29.6
Resolution of Conflict	50	18.5
Providing Peace and Security	100	37.7
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table 10, shows respondents responses on the measures taken by the UN to resolve the Darfur conflict. 50 respondents representing (18.5%) said Mediation measures. 80 other respondents representing (29.6%) said Stopped killings. On the other hand, 50 respondents representing (18.5%) said Resolution of conflict while 100 respondents who represent (37.0%) said Providing peace and security.

Table 11: What are the impact of economic developments in Darfur region?

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Disruption of Commercial Activities	100	37.0
Lack of Access to Farmland	50	18.5
Destruction of Development	70	25.9
None of the Above	50	18.5
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table 11, shows the responses of respondents on their view on the impact of economic development in Darfur region. 100 respondents representing the highest number of responses with (37.0%) opined the Disruption of commercial activities while 50 respondents representing (18.5%) pointed at Lack of access to farmland. Still yet, 70 respondents representing (25.9%) said Destruction of development while 50 respondents representing (18.5%) said None of the above.

Table 12: How prepared are the AU and UN to end the Sudan conflict?

Respondent	Frequency	Percentage
Well Prepared	50	18.5
Prepared	50	18.5
Fairly Prepared	120	44.4
Not Prepared	50	18.5
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table 12, indicates that 50 respondents representing (18.5%) believe that AU and UN

are Well prepared to end Sudan conflict. Equally speaking, another 50 respondents representing (18.5%) believed they are only Prepared. And 120 respondents representing (44.4%) believed they are Fairly prepared while 50 respondents representing (18.5%) believed they are Not prepared.

Table 13: How effective are the International Organizations on Darfur Conflict Resolution?

Respondent	Frequency	Percentage
Well Effective	150	55.5
Effective	100	37.0
Fairly Effective	20	7.4
Not Effective	0	0
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table 13, indicates how effective the international organizations are on Darfur conflict resolutions. 150 respondents representing (55.5%) opined that they are well effective. But 100 respondents (37.0%) said they are only effective. While 20 respondents representing (7.4%) said they are only fairly effective and 0 respondents (0%) said they are not effective at all.

Table 14: Who do you think are responsible involved in the Darfur conflict?

Respondent	Frequency	Percentage
Sudan Government	100	37.0
Darfur Militia	70	25.9
Foreign Troops	50	18.5
The Youth	50	18.5
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table 14, shows the thoughts of respondents on who are directly involved in the Darfur conflict. 100 respondents (37.0%) think the Sudan government, while 70 respondents representing (25.9%) think the Darfur militia and 50 respondents representing (18.5%) think the Foreign troops. And finally, 50 respondents representing (18.5%) respondents said the youth.

Table 15: Do you agree the AU and UN failed to break out peace in Darfur conflict?

Respondent	Frequency	Percentage
Agree	50	18.5
Disagree	100	37.0
Strongly Agree	50	18.5
Strongly Disagree	70	25.9
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table 15, indicates whether respondents agreed that AU and UN failed to break out peace in the Darfur region. 50 respondents representing (18.5%) agreed to that position while 100 respondents, representing (37.0%) disagree but 50 respondents

representing (18.5%) strongly agree and 70 respondents representing (25.9%) strongly disagreed,

Table 16: Do you believe the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur Region can deal with Darfur conflict?

Respondent	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	170	62.9
No	80	29.6
Not sure	20	7.4
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table 16, shows whether respondents believe the UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur region can deal with Darfur conflict. 170 respondents representing (62.9%) said Yes, while 80 respondents representing (29.6%) said No. but 20 respondents representing (7.4%) said they were not sure.

Table 17: What is your view on the roles of the International Communities in the Darfur conflict resolution?

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
To stop the Killings of Civilian Population	80	29.6
To Ensuring Peace and Security	120	44.4
To Ensure Effective Negotiation	70	25.9
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table 17, above shows respondents view on the roles of the international communities

in the Darfur conflict resolution. 80 respondents representing (29.6%) offered a stop in killing of civilian children. 120 respondents (44.4%) offered an ensuring of peace and security. Finally, 70 other respondents representing (25.9%) opined an ensuring of effective negotiations.

Table 18: What are the economic Condition facing the Darfur region?

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Hunger and Poverty	50	18.5
Insecurity and Killings	50	18.5
Enmity between Warring Parties	70	25.9
Raping and Starvation	100	37.0
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table 18, shows the economic hardship facing the Darfur region. 50 respondents (18.5%) indicate hunger and poverty while another 50 respondents representing (18.5%) said insecurity and killings. Yet, another 70 respondents (25,9%) said enmity between warring parties and 100 respondents representing (37.9%) said raping and starvation.

Table 19: Was there any Humanitarian Assistance made by the UN to the victims of Darfur conflict?

Respondent	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	170	62.9
No	100	37.0
Not sure	0	0
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table 19, shows whether there was any humanitarian assistance by the UN to the victims of the Darfur conflict. 170 respondents representing (62,9%) respondents said Yes; 100 respondents representing (37.0%) said No while 0 respondents representing (0%) said they were not sure.

Table 20: In your opinion, why did the conflict persist for so long despite the UN intervention?

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Special Interest by the International Communities	60	22.2
Political and economic interest	70	25.9
Inability to reached Compromise by both Parties	40	14.8
Injustice by the UN	100	37.0
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table 20, shows the opinion of respondents on why the conflict persist for so long despite the UN intervention. 60 respondents representing (22.2%) opined a special interest by international communities while 70 respondents representing (25.9%) opined a political and economic interest. But 40 respondents representing (14.8%) opined an inability to reach compromise by both parties and 100 respondents representing (37.0%) opined an injustice by the UN.

Table 21: What do you think should be done to prevent future occurrence of the Darfur conflict?

Respondent	Frequency	Percentage
Provision of social	100	37.0
Provision of human	70	25.9
Rehabilitation	50	18.5
Reconstruction	50	18.5
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table 21, requested for respondent's suggestions on what can be done to prevent future occurrence of the Darfur conflict. 100 respondents representing (37.0%) suggested a provision of social amenities. 70 respondents representing (25.9%) suggested a provision of human needs. While 50 respondents representing (18.5%) suggested a rehabilitation and 50 respondents representing (18.5%) finally suggested a reconstruction.

Table 22: Do you think the AU is not competent enough to halt the Darfur conflict without the intervention of the UN?

Respondent	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	100	37.0
No	150	55.5
Not sure	20	7.4
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table 22, seeks the thoughts of respondents on whether AU is not competent enough to halt the Darfur conflict without the intervention of the UN. 100 respondents

representing (37.0%) said Yes; 150 respondents representing (55.5%) respondents said No; while 20 respondents representing (7.4%) respondents said they were not sure.

Table 23: how would you access the roles the AU and UN in the Darfur conflict resolutions?

Respondent	Frequency	Percentage
Very good	100	37.0
Good	80	29.6
Excellent	50	18.5
Very poor	0	0
Poor	40	14.8
Total	270	100.0%

Source: Field Work October, 2018

Table 23 shows respondents assessment of the roles of the AU and UN in the Darfur conflict resolution. 100 respondents representing (37.0%) said Very good. 80 respondents representing (29.6%) said Good; 50 respondents representing (18.5%) said Excellent. 0 respondents representing (0%) said Very poor and finally 40 respondents representing (14.8%) said Poor.

4.2. Discussion of Findings:

The findings of this study shows that:

- i. The findings of this study show that there are specific challenges faced by the United nations and the African Union in their joint effort to resolve the conflict in Darfur region of Sudan. Some of those challenges include lack of resources, inability to

resolve the conflict and poor coordination of military capability among other challenges,

- ii. The study also assessed the roles played by the international communities in dealing with the Darfur conflict resolution. Part of these roles included the stopping of killings of civilian children, ensuring of peace and security, ensuring of effective negotiation among other roles,
- iii. The findings of this study further shows resolution mechanism adopted by both the United Nations and African Union in tackling the Darfur conflict. Part of these measures included a mediation measure embarked upon by the both bodies towards resolving the conflict in the region.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

Enduring shortages of capacity and weak political will have plagued the international response to Darfur strategy, and they have been made worse by the circumstances of the case. But this study concludes that most critical element in reversing the international community's failures is the approached and mechanism applied in dealing with Darfur conflict management. The African Union may not have acquired itself impressively in the Darfur conflict, but it is important to keep its role in the area of peace building, security and protection of civilian population. In this context, the fifty-four African states had demonstrated the kind of actions that Rwanda has shown in providing peacekeeping to Darfur region would not have become an open sore for the continent. This may be the case in current African crises, such as Somalia where the national government genuinely supports the presence of an effective peacekeeping force and the primary obstacle in the shortage of African states willing to support the troops.

But however, it is difficult to imagine that Sudan central government, given its concern and calculations, would ever have given access to an AU force that it expected to be well armed, manned, and funded. Indeed, the African Union's weak capacity and political will may have been integral to Khartoum's decision to allow the mission entry in the first place and to its willingness to task AMIS with the implementation of Darfur peace agreement in 2006. The AU role and intervention it was not only ineffective but actually solid counterproductive providing Khartoum government with a shield to block a more effective on UN force.

5.2 Conclusion

This research work examines the finding from the literature reviewed on the African Union and the Challenges of Conflict Resolutions in Africa. The AU had played a significant role in curtailing conflict in Africa. This research has revealed the problems on Darfur conflict in Sudan and the different motives why the conflict still escalated. It is however, be pointed out that the conflict in Darfur region has some elements of Western influence, notwithstanding the United Nations and African Union failed to take effective actions toward preventing the Darfur conflict which led to the present situation in Darfur region.

The UNs/AU must have detected the early signs of conflict escalations in the region, establishing military base to avert the reoccurrence of conflict from escalation in the region. It is important for the AU to enhance its efforts to mediate in the political, economic and the roots course of the Darfur conflicts. The international community must provide full support to AU, sponsor Darfur talks such as those schedules to begin. They should support the process and mediation terms and find to coordinate closely to the Darfur conflict resolution. The AU has so far demonstrated its commitment to take active role in the resolution of conflict in the continent and preparedness to prevent Western nations from conducting an imperialist agenda in Africa under the guise of conflict resolutions. While this bold disposition is encouraging a critical appraisal of the effort of the AU in resolutions of the Sudan conflict reveal inherent lapses or contradictions. Furthermore, the apparent politicization of the conflict in Sudan did not help matter. At one point, the rebels and Western African states reduce humanitarian crisis of grave magnitude to the level of political rhetoric. The humanitarian crisis accesses to Darfur region is extremely limited primarily because of insecurity and government restrictions on travel, the

Khartoum government has restricted relief activities to urban centres and IDPs camps in the area under its control. There have been numerous accounts of relief suppliers being looted after distributions in the IDPs camps and conflict-affected areas and some vulnerable population have asked not to be giving assistance because it may cause violence.

Funding operations is also a challenge. The current situation does not indicate that the African Union anytime soon will be capable of funding own operations. It is therefore necessary that external actors provide funding for current and near term operations and the establishment of a plan, which gradually transfers the funding responsibility to the African Union.

Another keystone issue is the built-up of a credible force capable of conducting full scale operations. The current two stages build-up scheduled until 2010 is not credible as it does neither build a force nor a command structure that can conduct full scale operations in a belligerent environment. The plan must at the end state build a structure comparable to a corps size land component with air support and strategic as well as tactical air and sea transportation capabilities in which a SHIRBRIG modeled force can only be sufficient in the near term soft missions, but which must be made more all round model like the NATO Response Force model. The force structure must be supplemented by adequate logistics which can sustain operations after the initial period with national logistics and a feasible command structure capable of sustaining and controlling; operations with strategic and operational headquarters. The gradual development of the: military capacity should especially, due to lack of funds be coordinated with external players like the UN, NATO, and European Union to establish cooperation make capabilities available to the African Union until it can provide all capabilities. Doing this can accelerate the gradual expansions of types of

missions for the African Union.

5.3 Recommendations

- i.** The process should also accord Darfur regional status to that accorded to South Sudan, to put Darfur in a better position to participate constructively in national politics and equitable distribution of national resources and services. This might entail the appointment of a vice president from the Darfur region within a unified national government.
- ii.** Regional unity and inter-ethnic corporation in Darfur should be fast-tracked by promoting comprehensive dialogue among the Darfur key stakeholders, including civil society groups, traditional leaders, youth and women's movements, on the state of human security and how that affect the region post-conflict in reconstruction. This dialogue will create the platform and framework for each stakeholder outlines its positive contribution towards peace building in the region.
- iii.** In a stage-by-stage approach, the agenda for the Darfur Peace Talks should also include a reconciliation process between the victims and perpetrators of crime, especially those localized cases that will not merit attention by the ICC. Adopting reconciliation best practice learned from other conflict will help to heal the psychological scars of the conflict.
- iv.** At the operational level, the process for the deployment of a AU Peace Mission should be expedited and the mission provided with a mandate that enables it to react forcefully to the incidence of human right abuses, crime against humanity and war crimes.
- v.** The African Union and United Nations should endeavour to establish a proper and active conflict resolution mechanism that could positively tackle incessant reoccurrence of conflict in the African continent. The AU should also quickly

participate actively in conflict prevention, resolution, management, transformation, peace keeping and peace enforcement in the continent.

- iv. The African Union should always take prompt action to conflict affected areas and ensure that the root courses of the conflict are identified and treated appropriately to prevent the future reoccurrence of conflict in Africa. The report panels which investigated the factual root of the conflict must be implemented without any delay.
- vi. The UN/AU should improve the democratization process and politics in the continent so that there are level playing ground for all citizenry to have opportunity for participating in political and decision making process, in this context, the African Union must guarantee human right violations, freedom of expressions, democracy and rule of law etc.
- vii. The African Union should not heavily depend on Western regional organization, International community and United Nations to come to their aids to enable them carry out their statutorily functions. The AU should come out with new political will and new mechanism that will make them effective to deal with economic, political and security challenges in Africa.

5.4 Limitations of the Study

The limitations of the study is among other things that the inaccessibility to all or most important materials and as well as the general problems with the secondary data that is subjective opinion often inform their conclusion. But however, the researcher overcomes the challenges through thoroughly examination and across examination of the facts by the writer's in the field and thereby drawn conclusion. Also time, cost and resources such as finance which culminated in the challenges experienced in the cause of carrying out the study.

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part of the purpose in the aftermath of the cold war. Appendix 1, p. 145 Show a chart of the African organisational architecture. Every state is member of at least one organisation and just three countries are just member of one (Morocco, Egypt and Western Sahara) organisation.

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APPENDIX 'A'

ADMINISTRATION OF QUESTIONNAIRES

Department of Political Science,
Faculty of Social Science,
Nasarawa State University, Keffi.
PMB, 1020.

5th October, 2018,

Dear Sir,

I am a postgraduate student of the above university undertaking a research on international relation, Titled: United Nations and African Union Joint Efforts in the Resolution of Conflict in Darfur Region, Sudan. The research is purely for academic purposes and your response will be treated with utmost secrecy and confidentiality. Please kindly respond to the following questions. I am grateful for your anticipation cooperation and understanding.

Yours Faithfully

EUNICE MBEKITA AKAWU
NSU/SS/M.SC/IRL/643/12/13

ADMINISTRATION OF QUESTIONNAIRES

SECTION A

Demographic Survey

Age: 18-25 () 26-39 () 40-59 () 60 and above ()

Marital Status: Married () Single () Divorced () Widower ()

Sex: Male () Female () Others (Specify) ()

Occupation: Civil servant () Military Personnel () Diplomat () Others ()

Education: Primary () Secondary () Tertiary ()

Nationality: _____

SECTION B

1. What are the causes of Darfur conflict in Sudan? (a) Marginalization (b) Absence of development (c) Religion differences (d) High rate of poverty
2. What are the challenges confronting the AU on Sudan conflict resolution? (a) Lack of resources (b) Inability to resolve the conflict (C) poor coordination (d) Lack of military capability.
3. What are the role played by the international communities resolving the Darfur conflict (a)Ensuring peace and security (b) Protection of civilians population (c) Settlement of the warring parties (d) Humanitarians supports.
4. What are the measures taking by the UN to resolve the Darfur conflict? (a) Mediation measures (b) Stopped the killings (c) Resolution of conflict (d) providing peace and security
5. What are the impact of economic development in Darfur region? (a) Disruption of commercial activities (b) lack of access to farmland (c) Destruction of development (d) None of the above.

6. How prepared the AU and UN to end the Sudan conflict? (a) Well prepared (b) Prepared (c) Fairly Prepared (d) Not Prepared.
7. How effective the International organizations on Darfur conflict resolution? (a) Well Effective (b) Effective (c) Fairly Effective (d) Not Effective
8. Who do you think are responsible involve in the Darfur conflict? (a) Sudan government (b) Darfur militia (c) Foreign troops (d) The youths
10. Do you agree the AU and UN failed to broke out peace in Darfur conflict? (a) Agree (b) Strongly Agree (c) Disagree (d) Strongly Disagree
11. Do you believe the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur region can deal with Darfur conflict? Yes () No () Not sure ()
12. What is your view on the roles of the International Communities in the Darfur conflict resolution? (a) To stop the killings of Civilian populations (b) To ensuring peace and security (c) To Ensure Effective Negotiation
13. What are the economic hardship facing the Darfur region? (a) Hunger and Poverty (b) Insecurity and killings (c) Enmity between the Warring Parties (d) Raping and Starvation
14. Was there any Humanitarian assistance by the UN to the victims of Darfur conflict? Yes () No () Not sure ()
15. In your own opinion why did the conflict persist for so long despite the UN intervention? (a) Special Interest by the International Communities (b) Political and Economic Interest (c) Inability to Reached Compromise by both Parties (d) Injustice by the UN.

16. What do you think should be done to prevent future occurrence of the Darfur conflict? (a) Provision of Social Amenities (b) Provision of Human Needs (c) Rehabilitation (d) Reconstruction
17. Do you think the AU is not competent enough to halt the Darfur conflict without the intervention of the UN? Yes () No () Not sure ()
18. How will you assess the roles of the AU and UN in the Darfur conflict resolution? (a) Very good (b) Good (c) Very poor (d) poor

INTERVIEW CONDUCTED

1. What do you think that the United Nations and Africa Union can do to stop the Darfur conflicts?
2. In your view, what do you think the South Sudan government will do to break out peace and security in the conflict environs?
3. What are the challenges facing the United Nations on conflict resolutions in Darfur Region?
4. Do you think the Africa Union can tackle Darfur conflict effectively without interventions of the United Nations?
5. Do you think the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has the strength to stop the South Sudan conflict?
6. How will you assess the role of the IGAD in the Darfur conflict resolution?
7. Is there any mediation approach taking by the international communities to break out peace and security in the Darfur conflict resolution?

8. Do you think the warring parties involved in the conflict are ready to accept conflict resolution mechanism adopted by the AU and UN?
9. Do you think International Organizations are fully prepared to stop reoccurrence of conflict in Africa?
10. What are the way forward to stop any conflict in South Sudan?