

**INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD) AND  
CHALLENGES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SOUTH SUDAN, 2013-2016**

**BY**

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**BEING A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE  
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## **DECLARATION**

I hereby declare that this dissertation titled; Inter-Governmental Authority Development (IGAD) and Challenges of Conflict Resolution in South Sudan, has been written by me and it is a report of my research work. It has not been presented in any previous application for Master of Sciences (M.Sc) degree political science (International Relations).

All quotations are indicated and sources of information specially acknowledged by means of references.

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## CERTIFICATION

This dissertation titled; “Inter-Governmental Authority Development (IGAD) and Challenges of Conflict Resolution in South Sudan” has been read and approved as a meeting part of the requirement for the award of (M.Sc) degree Political Science (International Relations) Faculty of Social Sciences, Nasarawa State University, Keffi.

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## **DEDICATION**

This dissertation is dedicated to my creator, The Almighty (Allah) who gives the grace as well as provided all my requirements throughout the period of the study.

It is also dedicated to my father

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## **ABSTRACT**

This study examines the inter-governmental authority and development IGAD and the challenges of conflict resolution. The main contention of this research work is to analysis out the institutional weakness and resource constraints the prevailing since the Colonial period, slow economic growth and ever-increasing level of poverty and the absence of democratization. These factors have culminated to triggered the recent conflict in South Sudan and Inter-Governmental Authority on Development IGAD as the Horn of Africa's sub-region body faced the daunting task of helping to resolve on rest in South Sudan. However, this study employed both primary and secondary sources of data collection. For the primary data questionnaires were administered while for the secondary sources quantitative data were collected. The study find out the role played by the Inter-Governmental Authority and Development in resolving the South Sudan Conflict, it also examine the conflict resolution mechanism adopted by IGAD in dealing with the South Sudan conflict resolution. The study reveals that the International Communities were indirectly detecting the IGAD on how to confront conflict in the region. The IGAD on the side relied on the International Community's support with necessary assistance to enable them carrying out their statutorily security function from peace keeping operations. The Study therefore, recommended that there is need for the IGAD to come out with new effective political will that can change the pattern of intervention relating with it member state to ensure effective conflict prevention, transformation, management and resolution.

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

ACHPR	:	African Charter on Human and People's Rights
AU	:	African Union
AEC	:	African Economic Community
AUHLIP	:	African Union High Level Implementation Panel
BCSSAC	:	Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control
CEWARM	:	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CPA	:	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
GRSS	:	Government Republic of South Sudan
ICG	:	International Crisis Group
IGAD	:	Inter Governmental Authority for Development
ISSP	:	IGAD Security Sector Programmes
USAID	:	United Nations Agency for International Development
MCP	:	Manifest Conflict Process
MVN	:	Monitoring and Verification Mechanism
PDF	:	Peace Defense Force
REC	:	Regional Economic Community

SAF	:	Sudan Armed Forces
SPLM	:	Sudan People Liberation Movement
SSPS	:	South Sudan Police Service
TFG	:	Transitional Federal Government
UN	:	United Nations
UNMSS	:	United Nations Mission for South Sudan
UNPA	:	United Nations Programme of Actions
USD	:	Upp Sala Conflict Database

# **CHAPTER ONE**

## **INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 Background to the Study**

Over the past two decades have witnessed the balkanization of the Horn of Africa, the failure of the state of Somalia, the coming about of an autonomous Punt land and a De-facto Somali land, a hostile Eritrea and last but not least, a South Sudan, the world's youngest state, that has been torn apart by a civil war, are just a few that have been mentioned.

The year 2011 was a year that held hope for peace and development for South Sudan. However, it was not long before such hopes were overshadowed by accusations of corruption, mismanagement of resources and authoritarian tendencies of the Government of South Sudan (GRSS) as well as the failure of the liberation movement, the Southern People Liberation Movement (SPLM) to transform itself into a popular movement (International Crisis Group, ICG, 2014). The culmination point of these factors was the outbreak of a civil war between President General Salva Kiir Mayardit and his Vice President Dr. Riek Machar, veteran fighters of the Southern People Liberation Movement (SPLM). This was triggered by the dissolution of the Parliament by the President in July 2013 followed by a failed coup attempt by his Vice President in December 2013. The divide between the two personalities was soon framed under ethnic fault lines of Nuer against Dinka plunging the world's youngest state into a bloody civil war.

Therefore, in light of its objective of promoting peace and stability in the region and create mechanisms within the region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter-State and intra-State conflicts through dialogue (Inter-Governmental Authority on

Development, IGAD, 1996), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was the first actor to intervene for the resolution of the South Sudan crisis as four (4) days after the crisis erupted on December 2013, the IGAD Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, H.E. Tedros Adhanom went on an emergency three day visit to Juba to convince conflicting parties to cease hostilities and consider a dialogue for peace (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, IGAD, 2013). This effort is inspired by the principle of subsidiary enshrined in Chapter VII of the United Nations' Charter, and the 1992 Agenda for Peace Report by Boutros Boutros Ghali which highlighted the importance of outsourcing the UN's peace role to regional and sub-regional organizations. It underlined the role that Regional Economic Mechanisms (RECs) can play on the achievement of peace and security in their respective areas of influence (United Nations, 1992), In light of this, the new African paradigm of African solutions to African Problems, it is believed that African RECs are best suited for the resolution of conflicts and the bringing about of sustainable solution in their particular neighbourhoods. This is further supported by the principle of subsidiary of the African Union (AU) that calls upon regional clusters to have the first say in what occurs in their neighbourhood (African Union, AU, 2008).

Thus, IGAD's selection as the platform for the resolution of the South Sudan conflict is inspired by this paradigm, as well as its acknowledgment of its peculiar knowledge of its volatile neighbourhood but most importantly its endorsement by the AU Peace and Security Council through the Communiqué of the 411 Peace and Security Council of Heads of States and Governments which stated the support and encouragement to be given by the AU to the IGAD Led South Sudan Peace Talks led by the Special Envoys

for South Sudan through the African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHLIP) (African Union, AU, 2013).

In fact, IGAD has a record of mediating conflicts in the volatile Horn region of which its member states are part of. These are in particular the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia, but also the settlement of the decade's long Sudan-South Sudan civil war and eventually the cessation of the Republic of South Sudan through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (Terlinden, 2004). Hence, IGAD was the right platform to tackle the outstanding issues between Kin and Machar. Therefore, the South Sudan Peace Talks/the IGAD led mediation for the resolution of the South Sudan Conflict were initiated on January 4th 2015 under the leadership of Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin from Ethiopia, (Ieneral Lazaro Sumbeiywo from Kenya and General Mohammed Ahmed Moustafa El Dabi from the Republic of the Sudan (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, IGAD, 2014). Thus, after 22 months of tedious consultations and negotiations, several breached cease fires and pressure from both IGAD member states and the international community, a Compromise Deal (CA) was finally reached on 17th August 2015 between President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Dr. Rick Machar (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, IGAD, 2015).

Amongst the reasons for the failure to reach an agreement sooner in the South Sudan Peace Talks is the unfolding of a complex regional war of interests between the member states of IGAD (International Crisis Group, ICG, 2015). This is not a new phenomenon as many regional frameworks in the continent are at their infant stages of development paving way for competition between their members' states interests. As De Waal (2015)

argues, this is indeed well illustrated within the IGAD region. With the independence of South Sudan, its neighbouring states not only felt a sense of entitlement to the resources of the country but also a concern to the unfolding of events in this new state vis-à-vis their interests at stake. As such, two years since the South Sudan Peace talks have started; IGAD not only negotiated a peace deal between President Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar but also the interests of its hegemony: Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda (Kefale, 2015). Hence, the South Sudan Peace Talks have been the platform of a bitter rivalry between Sudan and Uganda, and a competition for diplomatic influence between Kenya and Ethiopia.

However, the concern of this study is not the rivalry between the hegemony of South-Sudan. This study is an examination and investigation into the various challenges encountered by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the process of resolving the conflict in South-Sudan. In other words, this study intends to examine “Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and challenges of conflict resolution in South Sudan: 2013-2016”. it will provide insight into “Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and challenges of conflict resolution in South-Sudan: 2013-2016, with the preposition that the inherent dynamics and the hegemonic interplay as well as other factors at work in the crisis in South-Sudan constitutes a serious challenge to the conflict resolution effort by the intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in seeking a lasting solution to the crisis. Hence, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) made notable achievements in resolving the conflict, with regards to the signing of the Compromise Deal (CA) between President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Dr. Riek Machar on 17th August 2015

(Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, IGAD, 2015). However, most importantly the study intends to make necessary recommendations which the researcher hopes if adopted, would curtail the challenges and result in qualitative improvement in the role of both regional and sub-regional and even international organizations in their conflict resolution efforts.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

The study examines one of the problems which the African continent faced, the continent has been dragged into intra and interstate conflicts, surmounting to the extent of genocide and continuous human casualties. Colonial and super power legacies perpetuation have worsened the condition of security, human welfare and development. There are also institutional weakness and resource constraints prevailing since the days of the colonial period, slow economic growth and ever increasing level of poverty and the absence of democratization. These factors have culminated to trigger the recent conflict in south-Sudan and Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as the Horn of Africa's sub-regional body faces the daunting task of helping to resolve the unrest in South-Sudan. Hence, this thesis investigates the challenges encountered by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), particularly in the process of resolving the recent crisis in South-Sudan.

More so, the Horn of Africa is one of the multi-ethnic and unstable regions in the world. Boarder conflicts such as that of Somalia and Ethiopia, Eritrea and Ethiopia, civil wars between southern and northern Sudan, tribal wars in Somalia, clashes that occur between governments in power which want to keep the existing status quo and nationalists motivated groups that struggle to manipulate and address the interests of certain groups to



break away from the existing political entities and become sovereign, or join other states which they think ethically compatible have made the Horn of Africa quite unstable (Assefa, 2005). South-Sudan is one of the countries, in the Horn of Africa that has recently been affected by intra and inter-state conflicts (clannism) and endemic clash over resources, power and territory. The dynamics of the conflict in South- Sudan presents a major challenge to the regional organization, IGAD. Although, the IGAD has paid attention, the complexity of the problems in the region inhibits it from taking the needed measures. In view of the above the study tend to answers the following research questions

### **1.3 Research Questions**

The study is based on the following research questions:

- i. What is the role-played by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on South Sudan conflict resolution?
- ii. What are the specific challenges confronting the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in resolving conflict in South Sudan?
- iii. What are the conflict resolution mechanism adopted by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in resolving the South Sudan conflict?
- iv. How effective is the IGAD in dealing with the South Sudan conflict and its socio-economic and political development?

### **1.4 Objectives of the Study**

The broad objectives of the study are to examine the Inter-governmental Authority on development and challenges of conflict resolution in South Sudan. Specifically, the study is guided by the following specific objectives.

- i. To find out the role played by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on South Sudan conflict resolution
- ii. To investigate the specific challenges confronting the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in resolving conflict in South Sudan
- iii. To examines conflict resolution mechanism adopted by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in resolving the South Sudan conflict
- iv. To establish the effectiveness of the IGAD in dealing with the South Sudan conflict and its socio-economic and political development.

### **1.5 Significance of the Study**

Primarily this study have academic significance of contributing to body of knowledge and academics. The study further examines the significant of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Led South- Sudan conflict resolution efforts/peace talks have been and remains a subject of discussion in the global politics and academic circles to date. Hence, this study is timely as its provides insight into the conflict, the inherent cause of the crisis, the parties involved, measure taken to resolve the conflict, the role of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), challenges and achievements in the South-Sudan conflict resolution efforts. Drawing from this, it provides an opportunity for governments, policy makers, international, regional and sub-regional organizations and other players and stakeholders in the crisis and crisis mediation or resolution in South-Sudan and indeed Africa as a whole, to put in more efforts towards formulating and implementing measures to tackle the conflict, reach peaceful conclusions or agreements, resolve the crisis as well as prevent future occurrence of such and other crisis in Africa. This is undertaken under the premise that

there is no solution for South-Sudan without the participating regions, stakeholders, international and regional players (Rondos, 2016).

This study is expected to significantly contribute to the individual and society at large as it will create a comprehensive and holistic knowledge, in order to enlighten individuals and the general public on the recent crisis in South-Sudan and the role of regional and sub-regional organizations particularly the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in conflict resolution in South-Sudan and the “Horn of Africa” at large.

This study will also be useful to writers, scholars and even journalists, etcetera in order to add to their existing knowledge on what they already know about the recent crisis in South-Sudan and the role, challenges, and achievements of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the resolution of the recent conflict in South-Sudan.

Finally, it would also serve as a manual for academic and public discourse and also provide a basis for other useful for future researchers.

## **1.6 Research Propositions**

The research propositions are as follows:

- i. There is a significant relationship between the Inter-governmental Authority on Development IGAD and resolution of the conflict in South Sudan.
- ii. The challenges confronting IGAD explain the difficulties on her effort in resolving the South Sudan conflict and South Sudan socio-economic development.

- iii. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has made significant achievements in resolving the conflict in South Sudan and maintaining peace in the region.
- iv. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) used conflict resolution mechanism to end the South Sudan conflict.

## **1.7 Scope of the Study**

The scope of this study covers from the period between (2013-2016), the study examines “Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and challenges of conflict resolution in South-Sudan”. This study focus on the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), its role in conflict resolution in South Sudan and the challenges encountered in its conflict resolution efforts, coupled with its notable achievements in the South-Sudan conflict resolution. This research shall be limited to the study of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and challenges of conflict resolution in South-Sudan. This research focus on south-Sudan (2013-2016) because this period witnessed a lot of crisis, conflict and underdevelopment and the effort of IGAD to restore lasting peace in this region.

## **1.8. Organization of the Study**

The study is arranged into five chapters, chapter one cover the introduction which give the background to the work including the organizational structure. Chapter Two deals with the literature review and theoretical framework of the study whereas chapters Three deals with the methodology of the study. Chapter Fours cover data presentation, analysis, and discussion of findings, while Chapter Five is the Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.1 Conceptual Framework**

##### **2.2.1 Concept of Conflict**

Almost every academic has its theoretical approach to the understanding of conflicts in which economist focus on game- theory and decision- making, psychologist explore interpersonal conflicts, sociologists take status and class conflicts as the focal points, while political scientist centred on intra-national and international conflicts. Therefore, to review the conflict literature as a whole is an almost impossible task.

The term conflict has no positive intonation. Usually dysfunctional phenomenon's like discord, dispute of fighting are associated with it. Therefore, with the omnipresence of conflicts it is not surprising that the debate about this topic takes on significant also in the political science. Although the branch of peace and conflict research owes even a part of it's name to this subject, the disagreement over the exact notion of the conflict as a term dominates until today. This is however little amazing because it is about one of the most enigmatic and controversial terms, which itself triggers conflict very often (Burton 1968)

To singer and small (2005) defined conflict as violent disputes in which at least one of the combatant party is a state and are at least 100 battle deaths. This definition covers exclusively soldiers and other military staff. Civilian victims are however not considered. Both deaths threshold and the strict delimitation of state participating conflicts of the different conflict concepts. The definition of the stock holds international peace research

institute (SIPRI) shows Dalcon. V, (1997) a major armed conflicts is defined as the use of armed force between the military forces of two or more governments, or of one government and at least one organized armed group, resulting in the battle-related deaths of at least 1000 people in any single calendar year and in which the incompatibility concerns control of government and/ or territory.

Also the Uppsala conflict database (USDP) follows this very narrowly composed conflict notion (Williams, 1996): An armed conflict is defined as a contested incompatibility that concerns government of territory of both, where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle,-related deaths of these parties, at least one has to be the government of a state.

In turn, other conflict definitions have broader scope for example the Heidelberg Institute for International conflict Research defined conflicts as the clashing of interest (positional differences) on national value of some duration and magnitude between at least parties (organization group, states, groups of state organization) that are determined to pursue their interests and win their cases (HIIK, 2005)

This definition testifies the fact that numbers of conflicts take place in weak or already collapsed states which are not capable to intervene in the conflict with their own troops. Also conflicts in which the state power is not one of the conflicted parties are covered by this definition.

Conflict may be defined as a struggle or contest between people with opposition needs, ideas, beliefs, values, or goals. Conflict in turn is inevitable. However, the results of conflicts are not predetermined. Conflict might escalate and lead to non-productive

results or conflicts can be beneficially resolved and lead to quality final products. Therefore, learning to manage conflict is integral to a high performance team.

Conflict management is the principle that all conflicts cannot necessarily be resolved, but learning how to manage conflicts can decrease the odds of non-productive escalation. Conflict management involves acquiring skills related to conflicts resolution, self-awareness about conflict modes, conflict communication skills, and establishing a structure for management of conflicts may be environment conflict may be classified into violent and non-violent conflicts as such absence of violence does not automatically mean an absence of conflict. Conflicting interest can be pursued without violence or coercion when the conflict already exist this means only an absence of violent methods employed by parties in their struggle to resolve their incompatible difference over issues that are of national relevance for them. Parties do not use force against each other. Yet, the existence of non-violent conflict must be noticed and recognized by the outside world, as well as one of the involved parties. In addition, it should be stressed that violent escalation of every conflict evolves from a non-violent phase of the conflict. Non-violent conflict has been termed by Sandole (1998) as “manifest conflict process (MPC)” and is defined as a situation in which two parties Or their representative try to pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatibility goals by undermining direct or indirect each other goal seeking capability. In the same vein, this approach defines a latent conflict as pre-MPCs phase. According to above mentioned COSIMO conflict, and manifested conflicts. A conflict cannot be detected without existence of some visible signs that show certain position difference or interest opposition between two states over certain commodity. Sometimes conditions for conflict exist, but the parties are not pursuing an

overt strategy to achieve their goals. However, one party has to have positional differences articulated in some form of demands and the other party shall be aware of such demands following this logic latent conflict is defined as a stage in the development of a conflict where one or more groups, parties or states question existing values, issues or objectives that are nationally relevant. Latent conflict must carry some identifiable and observable conflict categories or signs in order to be recognized and noticed as such.

The positional difference and the clashing interest in a latent conflict must be articulated as demands or claims. The manifest conflict is a stage when tensions are present but are expressed by means below the threshold of violence. Tense relations between the parties may reach a turning point from where the use of force may become more likely. Economic sanctions for example, are a means by which a latent conflict at all stages carried out by nonviolent means and without use of armed force. The distinction between objective latent and manifest conflicts is to be recognized in a sense the “communicative interaction” (Alber, 2004) between the parties is required to turn latent into manifest conflict.

Conflicts enter a violent phase when parties go beyond seeking to attain their goals peacefully, and try to dominate, damage or destroy the opposing parties’ ability to pursue their own interest. The existence of frustration of substantive (physical, social affection, self-esteem, and self-actualization) or instrumental needs (security, knowledge, and power) is the essential condition for responses is produced when certain innate needs or demands are deeply frustrated. In political conflict analysis, the use of force, physical damages and human casualties’ thresholds are commonly used to define violent conflict particularly in respect of war. An “aggressive manifest conflict, which is the term that



Sandole used to describe violent conflict, which according to his definition represents: A situation in which at least two parties, or their representatives, attempt to pursue their perception of mutually incompatible goals by physical damaging or destroying the property and high-value symbols of one another (e.g religious shrines, national monuments); and/or psychologically or physically injuring, destroying, or otherwise forcible eliminating one another (Sandole, 1998).

### **2.1.2 Concept of Conflict Resolution**

Conflicts, according to some scholars like Jurgen, (2006) are not inherently bad or unproductive because they lead to progress and development thus, the literature on conflict resolution centres on three themes namely; principles of negotiation, consensus building and mediation (Fisher and Ury, 1981:Jurgen, 2006). Central to the philosophy of these themes is; the need for a searching dialogue to identify the essential needs and interests of the parties that lie behind their public and demands; they also elaborate a process of pragmatic problem-solving, in which stakeholder representative seek solution that address the core interests of the parties and are acceptable to the stakeholders as possible. Respondents invited to the processes are chosen based on their stake of the decision, and often on their ability to block any agreement as well (Jurgen, 2006).

However, Remain (2005), gave three approaches to dealing with conflicts as; conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation. Conflict settlements aims at a definite end to all forms of the direct violence without necessarily coping with the basic causes of the conflict (Zertman, 1989). According to Fisher (1918), this form considers conflict a zero-sum game, a deficit and anti-development phenomenon. Thus, most strategies used incorporate a range of peaceful measures like negotiation, mediation or

facilitation, as well as coercive measures like military, political or economic sanctions and threat.

The conflict resolution approach and its own part considers on-going conflicts as a result of unsatisfied human needs (Kelman and Fisher, 2003). This approach differentiates interests that are changeable or negotiable, from needs, which are quasi natural phenomenon. Here, security, justice and recognition are to be mentioned among the others' needs and values. The approach intends not to end the conflict as such, but to transform it into a non-violent conflict (Burton, 1990). Burton outlined a wide spectrum of methods (like mediation, negotiations, or arbitration) in order to convert the respective conflict into a situation acceptable for both sides. This approach aims at improving communication between the conflicting parties and the development of mutual understanding for the interest of each side.

The ability for mutual respect and reciprocal understanding in the respect of the interest in conflict is required to lead both parties toward sustainable and acceptable solution. This mutual respect and reciprocal understanding bothers on the socio-economic and cultural life of the group concerned. Unfortunately, research on conflict management framework in Africa has shown that regional actors lack objectivity, neutrality and impartiality (Olonisakin, 2000). Given that they may have vested interests in the resolution or cause of the conflict in their neighbourhood. This is almost always true of individual or group actors, whether they are acting alone or under the umbrella of an organization. As a result, their credibility may be in question when they respond to conflict or crisis in their backyard.

Fassati (1998) excellently summarized all the twelve conflict resolution alternatives as enumerated by Galtung (1987) in the following manner:

- i. Transcendence: - Both actors simultaneously reach their objectives.
- ii. Persuasion: - Only one actor reaches its objective and the other renounces its own, whether coercion or not.
- iii. Compromise: - Neither actor reaches its own objective; both agree on an alternative and complementary solution.
- iv. Exchange: - Each actors has two goals and only is achieved.
- v. Separation: - The actors cases to interact or divide the territory, object of their incompatibility.
- vi. Integration: - There is a fusion in which the actors unify their territory.
- vii. Diversion: - The actors overcome the conflict and start a new relationship; negative (second conflict) or positive (cooperation).
- viii. Militarization: - The actors forget their conflict and start to interact with a new actor: together (old two versus new one) or not (old one versus a new one and one old together).
- ix. Segmentation: - One actor divides the other one into two actors and has a positive interaction with only one of them.
- x. Subversion: - One actor promotes a change of elite in the other one and has a positive interaction with the new elites.
- xi. Incapacitation: One actor eliminate or physically neutralizes the other one, for example through ``ethnic cleansing``.
- xii. Domination`` - One actor impose its objectives and the loser does not agree.

However, the fundamental defect associated with the entire conflict resolution strategies discussed previously is that they are all western typologies, which cannot be applied to non-western cultures and values successfully. Mohammed (2009) and Irani (1999) correctly argued that western models of conflict resolution that succeeded in resolving conflicts and practices. In the west argues Iran. "Conflict is commonly perceived to occur between two or more individuals, acting as free agents pursuing their own interest" while in the non-western setting, "individuals often belong to communities and abide by rules and rituals collectively defined in those communities". Thus, in the case of Darfur in Sudan, the Arab-Islamic culture and that of the Darfur aborigines together with the western culture must be explored while pursuing peace. While the conflicts, Arabs and African resort to socio-cultural formations and values.

It is important to understand the sociological factors that are involved in the Darfur conflict resolution, which are Islamic versus African civilizations and western versus African civilizations cannot be resolved through the application of western and African typologies of conflict resolution. This is because of the difference in cultures, traditions, languages, race, norms and values. Their reconcilability of these factors and the unmitigated effort by each to subdue the other, that eventually led to the emergence of hatred and phobias on the part of local actors; scepticisms, suspicion and lack of trust on the part of external forces that intervened in the conflict resolution.

### **2.1.3 Concept of Development**

The meaning of development has been under intense intellectual rigor of investigation for a long period now. This is because the concept generates much controversy on the

actuality of its meaning. However, according to Seers (1969), “the challenges of any period depend on the tasks that face those living in it. Social problems and political upheavals have emerged in countries at all stages of development”. These problems range from poverty. Unemployment. Widespread of malnourishment, poor health prospects, etc. and they hamper, at every stage, what many see as economic growth or development. Seers believe that development has, however, been treated chiefly as a normative concept and inevitably understood as almost synonymous with improvement. This is tied to the fact that the actual meaning of the concept generates much controversy.

Thus notwithstanding, development may be considered as a process that involves the progress of people in society, since people live within some form of social framework consisting of socio- economic and political structures, and not in isolation (Burkey, 1996; Ayatse, Onaga and Ogoh, (2013). It then means that development is multidimensional and comprehensively a transformation of the society.

Unlike democracy and good governance, the concept of development has a loose meaning and rather subjective in meaning that is why scholars express different opinions and explanations. Onyekpe (2004) sees development as a generic term which encompasses the transformation of the economy, state and society through the achievement of greater capacity to deal with the challenges of:

- i. Production and its expansion
- ii. Political administration and governance and
- iii. Organizing the civil society as a community of people.

This conceptualization see development as almost progress of society and it directs its focus on the path of improving society and its structures with regards to growth. It

however, means that, development can be seen as economic growth (production and expansion) and improvement of political and social structures of every society.

Todaro and Smith (2003) are of the opinion that, “development is a multidimensional process involving the reorganization and reorientation of the entire economic and social systems. In addition to improvement in income and output, it typically involves radical changes in institutional, social and administrative structures as well as in popular attitudes, customs and beliefs”. This conceptualization holistically covers virtually every aspect of human endeavour and it portrays a common feature that borders on growth and improvement.

Development has been a complicating factor because it is multidimensional as well as value loaded. However, it has been viewed from political, economic and social dimensions and these various aspects are well reflected in the extant literature on the concept (Lane and Ersson, 1997 cited in Omotola, 2007). Development is therefore a concept with ambiguity. It is not one-sided but it must contribute to the growth and improvement of society and its inhabitants both politically, economically or otherwise. In this same way, Adedeji cited in (Agbayoko, 2010) argue that development is all about improvement of man and his environment. Such improvement is multifarious and imminent to the growth of man, economically, socially and even politically.

In regards to Adedeji’s conceptualization, Ibi-Ajayi (2003) identifies some goals of development, particularly in Africa as follows:

- i. To increase the availability and widen the distribution of basic life sustaining goods such as food, shelter, health and security.

- ii. To raise the levels or standards of living in addition to higher incomes, the provision of more jobs, better education and greater attention to cultural and human values all of which will serve not only to enhance material well-being but also to generate greater individual and national esteem.
- iii. To expand the economic and social choices available to individuals and nations by freeing them from servitude and dependence not only in relation to other people but also the forces of ignorance and human security (cited in Ayatse, Onaga and Ogoh, 2013).

The foregoing shows that development attempts to solve the problems of poverty, unemployment, malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, indecent shelter, and insecurity, either of life or of the society.

Thus, Ayatse, Onaga and Ogoh, (2013) holds that the hallmark of development is to as much as possible, reduce those obstacles that inhibits attaining higher standard of living so as to maximize the potentials of the people to enable them live high quality life. Summarily, the views expressed so far on the concept of development tend to focus more on socio-economic development and this is seen basically in the aspect of improving standard of living, poverty and malnutrition reduction, creation of employment opportunities, etc. However, the all-encompassing conceptualization of the concept of development is that given by Dudley Seers.

Seers (1969) posit that:

The questions to ask about a country's development are therefore: What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three of these have declined from high levels, then beyond doubt that has been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result 'development', even if per capita income doubled. This applies of course to the future too. A 'plan' which conveys no targets for reducing poverty, unemployment and inequality can hardly be considered a 'development plan' (Seers, 1969).

This conceptualization recognizes three main aspects (poverty, unemployment and inequality) that need improvement in human life and society and it states less, the importance of per capita income if these aspects are not improved or in the process of improvement. However, these areas of human life culminate the aspect of socio-economic development which is central to this study. They include the areas of industrialization, unemployment and poverty in which democracy and good governance are expected to facilitate or not being able to facilitate.

The literature on socio-economic development over the years has been dominated by two strands of thought:

- i. The 'stages of economic growth' in which the process of 1960s;
- ii. The 'structural-internationalist' models of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

This presupposition, as shown by Todaro (1977), explains the thinking of the 1950s and early 1960s to show the emphasis on the concept of stages of economic growth in which the process of development was viewed with the perception as a series of successive stages through which all countries must pass. It was an economic theory of development in which the right quantity and mixture of saving, investment and foreign aid were all that necessarily mattered to the economic growth of the Third World nations which was



tailored along the path of economic historicity of the developed countries. Consequently, according to Todaro, “development thus became synonymous with economic growth” (Todaro. 1977). Development must therefore be seen as the process of boosting the progress of the economy and society in enabling and facilitating the growth and better condition of the people. Viewed from the aspect also, Paul P. Streeten, Chairman of Editorial Advisory Board, World Development states:

Development must be redefined as an attack on the chief evils of the world today; malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, slums, unemployment and inequality. Measured in terms of aggregate growth rates, development has been a great success. However, measured in terms of jobs, justice and the elimination of poverty, it has been a failure or only a partial success (cited in Todaro, 1977).

The view above sees development chiefly as reflecting on the basic indices need to comprehend economic development, it all borders on the improvement from the aspect of job creation, poverty reduction and justice enhancement to balance inequality in the society.

However, economic development is a relative concept, in that scholars have tried to establish what actually defines the concept. According to Macun (1997), economic development is the mobilizing efforts to cope and adapt to political and economic changes in the environment. This includes some formal and informal arrangements of bolstering and guiding the formal capacity to act. The end goal of this conception is the improvement of human life, building capacity to enhance standard of living of the large number of the people and creation of employment to reduce poverty.

Murray (2008) sees socio-economic development as the struggle to strengthen economic base and increase in job opportunities for the teeming population. To this end, there is effort (struggle) to create capacity, enabling environment and adequate opportunities to reduce unemployment and improve the living standard of the large number of people living in a geographical entity. The basic ingredient here is the capacity to absorb the unemployed and the creation of viable structural capacity to enhance the living condition of the masses. This in turn will reduce inequality in the society and enhance justice.

Todaro (1977) sees socio-economic development from the living conditions of people. In his view, more than two-thirds of the world population “are much less fortunate”; “their health is poor”, many cannot read or write, “they are unemployed, and their prospects for a better life are bleak or uncertain at best”. This view sees economic development as that aspect of development that basically deals with the improvement of the living condition of the people in order to foster creation of job opportunities, reduce poverty and reduce inequality for the larger number of the world population. To buttress this conception, the Santiago Declaration of Third World Economists (1973) states that, “the Third World, with 70 percent of the world population, subsist on only 20 percent of the world income- and even this meager income is so maldistributed internally as to leave the bulk of its population in abject poverty”. Economic development seen as the improvement of the living condition of people therefore takes a very vital position in the multidimensional concept of development. If the questions raised by Seers on poverty, unemployment and inequality are sacrosanct to development, then economic development must be

established as the foremost and most important aspect of development, in that, the larger population of the people fall short in this aspect of societal needs.

However, according to Bruce and Southworth (1968),

Economic development presents a number of dilemmas; many of these show most sharply in relation to agriculture.... The most obvious dilemma arises from the urgency of development. The object is industrialization; it would be convenient if a developing nation could focus its efforts solely on this aim. But as we have seen, this is not possible.... In fact, the process of structural transformation can be frustrated either because nonfarm employment opportunities are not expanding rapidly enough in relation to the growth of total population and labor force or because agricultural productivity is not rising sufficiently to provide food for a growing nonfarm population (Bruce and Southworth, 1968).

This view establishes the fact that, given the nature of African society as agrarian, the more need for development should be concerted on agriculture and industrialization. However, the authors do not dispute the fact that more attention given industrialization does not invariably correlate the obvious fact that, industrialization does not represent the other aspects of the economy and society that equally need improvement. Hence, even though industrialization will boost creation of job opportunities and reduce poverty in return, there is need to accomplish development as multidimensional as the concept suffice.

Therefore, it shows a corresponding and correlating conception of the term ‘development’ to border more (but not entirely) on economic development in Africa, Nigeria inclusive and particularly, South Sudan. Consequently, we can establish that, the earlier operational definition of the concept “as the areas of inequality, unemployment and poverty” that need to be improved is sacrosanct. In other words, this research views development in specific areas of industrialization, inequality, unemployment and poverty.

## **2.2 Empirical review/Review of previous studies**

### **2.2.1 Historical Background to the Formation of Inter-government Authority and Development (IGAD)**

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGAD) was established in 1986, with the objective of addressing environmental crises that led to food insecurity and famine in the Horn of Africa. Because of the prevailing inter and intra-state conflicts, the impetus for the establishment of IGADD came from UN agencies, which saw the urgent need for a regional coordination agency to address problems of famine and drought. The founding members were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda. In 1993, Eritrea joined the Organization after its independence. The headquarters is located in Djibouti. It is one of the African Union's (AU) recognized Regional Economic Communities (RECs), with over 200 million people and an area of 5,222,520 square kilometres (IGAD, 2016).

Despite the organization's narrow initial scope, IGADD summits provided a venue for meetings between member states to solve other issues of mutual concern including peace and security. IGADD facilitated peace between Ethiopia and Somalia. By 1994, the members of IGADD had come to realize that the developmental problems of the region extended beyond the impact of environmental degradation. Accordingly, on March 21, 1996, IGADD member states decided to transform the organization into the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The new IGAD was launched in Djibouti November 25 —26, 1996 (IGAD, 2001).

With the inauguration of IGAD, great emphasis was given to the peaceful settlement of regional conflicts as a means for achieving sustainable development. IGAD member

states agreed: a) to take effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional cooperation, peace, and stability; b) to establish effective mechanisms of consultation and cooperation for the peaceful settlement of differences and disputes; and c) to agree to deal with disputes between member states within this sub-regional mechanism before they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD, 1996). With this aim, three priority areas were identified:

Conflict prevention, management and humanitarian affairs; infrastructure development and food security; and the environment.

The need for engaging IGAD in the Somali and Sudanese peace processes was one of the major reasons that brought about the transformation of IGAD. Great emphasis was also given to regional economic integration.

The revitalization of IGAD was conceived due to the existing good relations between member states. The end of the Cold War led to the end of dictatorial regimes in Ethiopia and Somalia and “the ideological differences and military confrontations associated with it” (Kinfu, 2006) as cited in (IGAD, 2016). The newly “emerging leaders” promoted policies of peaceful relations and a new era of cooperation and co-existence. Hence there was political will and new energy to address the security issues in the region through revitalized regional organization (IGAD, 2016).

#### **i. Vision, Mission, Principles and Major Activities of IGAD**

The founding leaders of IGAD were motivated by a vision where the people of the region would develop a regional identity, live in peace and enjoy a safe environment alleviating poverty through appropriate and effective sustainable development programmes. The

IGAD Secretariat as the executive body of the Authority was given the mandate to achieve this goal. As enunciated by IGAD (2016), the mission and vision of IGAD is:

**a. Vision:-** IGAD to be the premier Regional Economic Community (REC) for achieving peace and sustainable development in the region.

**b. Mission:-** Promote regional cooperation and integration to add value to Member States' efforts in achieving peace, security and prosperity.

Therefore, IGAD has the vision of “becoming the premier regional organization for achieving peace, prosperity, and regional integration in the Horn of Africa.” The mission of IGAD is to assist and complement the efforts of the member states to achieve, through increased cooperation:

- a.** Food security and environmental protection
- b.** Promotion and maintenance of peace and security
- c.** Economic cooperation and integration (IGAD 2001).

The principles and values of IGAD include:

- i. Promotion of good governance and protection of human rights through institutionalization of democracy and transparency.
- ii. Promotion of a sense of community that aspires to maintaining peace in the region and the peaceful resolution of disputes between and within member states (IGAD 2003).
- iii. The core activities of IGAD, according to the IGAD Strategy include:
- iv. Promoting compatible policies in the IGAD priority areas
- v. Developing strategies and concepts of regional relevance
- vi. Capacity building (IGAD, 2016)

It is important to note that IGAD's approach is to be proactive towards the relevant emerging issues both regional and international in nature.

## **ii. Aims and Objectives of IGAD**

As stipulated in Article 7 of the Agreement Establishing IGAD (IGAD, 1996), the aims of IGAD include:

- a. Promote joint development strategies and gradually harmonize macro-economic policies and programmes in the social, technological and scientific fields;
- b. Harmonize policies with regard to trade, customs, transport, communications, agriculture, and natural resources and environment, and promote free movement of goods, services, and people within the region;
- c. Create an enabling environment for foreign, cross-border and domestic trade and investment;
- d. Initiate and promote programmes and projects to achieve regional food security and sustainable development of natural resources and environmental protection, and encourage and assist efforts of Member States to collectively combat drought and other natural and man-made disasters and their consequences;
- e. Develop and improve a coordinated and complementary infrastructure, in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy in the region;
- f. Promote peace and stability in the region and create mechanisms within the region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter-State and intra-State conflicts through dialogue;

- g.** Mobilize resources for the implementation of emergency, short-term, medium-term and long-term programmes within the framework of regional cooperation;
- h.** Facilitate, promote and strengthen cooperation in research development and application in science and technology.
- i.** Provide capacity building and training at regional and national levels; and
- j.** Generate and disseminate development information in the region.

### **iii. IGAD Structure**

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development is comprised of four hierarchical policy organs (IGAD, 2016). They include:

- a.** The Assembly of Heads of State and Government: It is the supreme policy making and regulatory organ of the IGAD. It determines the objectives, guidelines and programmes for IGAD and meets once a year. A Chairman is elected from the Member States in rotation.
- b.** The Council of Ministers: It is composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and one other Focal Minister designated by each member state. The Council formulates policy, approves the work programmes and annual budget of the Secretariat during its biannual sessions.
- c.** The Committee of Ambassadors: It is comprised of IGAD Member States Ambassadors or Plenipotentiaries accredited to the country of IGAD Headquarters. It convenes as often as the need arises to advise and guide the Executive Secretary.
- d.** The Secretariat: It is headed by an Executive Secretary appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government for a term of four years,



renewable once, The Secretariat assists Member States in formulating regional projects in the priority areas, facilitates the coordination and harmonization of development policies, mobilizes resources to implement regional projects and programmes approved by the Council and reinforces national infrastructures necessary for implementing regional projects and policies.

The Executive Secretary is assisted by four Directors responsible for:

- a. Agriculture and Environment;
- b. Economic Cooperation and Social Development;
- c. Peace and Security; and
- iv. Administration and Finance.**

Besides the four Divisions and sections at the Headquarters in Djibouti, IGAD has a number of specialized institutions and Programmes hosted by other Member States. These include the IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), the IGAD Security Sector Programmes (ISSP), the IGAD Centre for Pastoral Area and Livestock Development (ICPALD) and IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC), and the IGAD Regional Aids Programmes (IRAPP) (IGAD, 2016).

The Conflict Early Warning Network (CE WARN) is the unit of IGAD that was established with the objective of preventing conflicts, mainly in pastoral areas, in the region by facilitating the exchange of pertinent information among the member states. ICPAT is IGAD's security sector program striving to build member states' national capacity against terrorism, and promote regional security cooperation by tightening border control and enhancing judicial measures against terrorism.

IGAD also has liaison offices located in member states. The office in Kenya is responsible for environmental issues and the office in Uganda coordinates on HIV/AIDS. The liaison office in Mogadishu is responsible for updating IGAD on day-to-day developments in Somalia. IGAD has set up a Facilitation Office for Somalia in Ethiopia to be able to follow the development in Somalia. It has also a liaison office accredited to the African Union (IGAD, 2016).

It is important to note that the number of employees at the IGAD Secretariat was thirty professionals, as at December 2008 (IGAD, 2008).

#### **v. The IGAD Region**

The IGAD region stretches over an area of 5.2 million km<sup>2</sup> that comprises the countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. The region has about 6960 Km of coastline with the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Toudjoura and the Red Sea. Also, the IGAD region has a total of 6910 Km of international borders with Egypt, Libya, Chad, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Tanzania (IGAD, 2016).

Some 70 percent of the IGAD region is made up of Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs), which receive less than 600 mm of rainfall annually. The rest of the region has a great variety of climates and landscapes including cool highlands, swamp areas, tropical rain forests and other features typical of an equatorial region. Furthermore, the region possesses diverse ecosystems and agro-ecological zones at different altitudes ranging from 150 meters below sea level (Dalul) to about 4600 meters above the sea level (Mount Kenya) (IGAD, 2016).

Socio-economically, most of the IGAD Member States belong to the world's Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and share similar economic growth rates and social ethnic groups across their borders, which could be a good opportunity for regional integration, if appropriately utilized. Farmlands account for 7 percent, forests 19 percent and permanent pastures 28 percent of the total land area. The remaining 46 percent is relatively unproductive or marginal land. Additionally, this region also contains extensive mineral resources that have not yet been fully explored and exploited. One of the main challenges in maximizing the agricultural potential of this region is the high degree of variability in rainfall patterns in terms of both space and time (IGAD, 2016).

Furthermore, the IGAD region is prone to recurrent droughts and dry spells, making it one of the most vulnerable regions on the African continent for climatic variations, which accentuates the need for policies and programmes that enhance the technical and research capacities of the region. Land and environmental degradation are the most serious threats to the region as both affect its agricultural production and economic growth. Such degradation does not only contribute to food insecurity, famine and poverty, but may equally fuel social, economic and political tensions that can cause conflicts, wider poverty and misery. Sustainable management of natural resources is therefore essential if the IGAD Member States are to achieve sustainable development, eradication of poverty, peace and security. This is particularly true for trans-boundary natural resources, like surface and ground water resources (IGAD, 2016).

#### **vi. Demography of the Region**

The IGAD region has a population of over 230 million people characterized by high natural population growth rates. The average population density is about 30 persons per

km<sup>2</sup>. Variations in the population density between the IGAD countries are substantial ranging from 14.5 persons per km<sup>2</sup> in Somalia to above 95 persons per km<sup>2</sup> in Uganda. These variations are even more pronounced between the different ecological zones. For example, within the IGAD region there are deserts with scarcely anybody living in them, and conversely there are rural areas with high populations of more than 600 persons living on one km<sup>2</sup>. Similarly, urban densities are quite high, for instance in Nairobi where there are 4,509 persons/km<sup>2</sup> and higher still in Addis Ababa at 5,165 persons/km<sup>2</sup>. However, the demographic age structure shows that some 50 percent of the population are youth, which provides a good opportunity for continued economic growth, if the youth is provided with, appropriate education and training (IGAD, 2016).

Moreover, there is a major trend for urbanization in the IGAD region with large numbers of people from the rural areas migrating into the big urban centres in search of employment and better incomes. The average rate of urbanization in the region is estimated at 4,1 percent. The capital cities of Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Khartoum have populations of well over three million each. Socio-economic and environmental problems in the ever-growing urban centres are on-going challenge, and present a very real threat to peace and stability in some countries of the IGAD region (IGAD, 2016).

#### **vii. Economy of the Region**

The IGAD region is located in a strategic place in the Horn of Africa and blessed with a good climate, rich hinterland, a long coastline with deep natural ports and situated on major air traffic routes for tourism and commodity markets in Africa, the Far East, Middle East, and Europe. It is endowed with substantial natural resources such as oil and gas reserves, wildlife, high tourism potentials, diverse ecosystems, alternative energy

resources (hydroelectric, solar and geothermal), marine, water and livestock resources. A population of over 230 million and vast expanses of territory coverage provide a sizeable market, which has the potential to attract both domestic and foreign investors (IGAD, 2016).

The economic mainstay of the region is agriculture, both livestock and crop production, which provides the basis for food supplies and export earnings, as well as employment for over 80 percent of the population. The contribution of industries to the respective national economies of the IGAD Member States is about 15-20 percent, on average. Since they produce similar commodities and there is a low level of infrastructure development in the region, the level of intra-state trade remains low and markets are neither inter-dependent nor inter-linked. Among the impediments to development within the region is the poor transportation infrastructure, more so, for landlocked countries such as Ethiopia, South Sudan and Uganda. IGAD's over-arching objective of regional integration is to create an open, unified, regional economic space for private operators; a single market open to competitive entry and well integrated into the global economy. This requires both regional infrastructure as well as the gradual harmonization of policies for removal of physical and non-physical barriers to inter-state transport and communications. Competitiveness of the region through trade expansion is hampered by the poor and inefficient road and railway network systems that in turn raise transport costs and lead to burdensome trade logistics.

The road and railway missing links entail that the existing networks are not optimally utilized, and that opportunities are being lost due to the lack of economies of scale necessary to attract and sustain private investments in these networks. The other modes of

transport also have specific challenges within the region. Key challenges for the railway sector include aging tracks and lack of maintenance, different gauges of tracks which prevents seamless regional connectivity, shortage of serviceable rolling stock that limits operational performance, and limited ranges of investment versus profitability choices for railway companies to invest in upgrading existing or developing new rail networks. Seaports within the region have capacity constraints that result in congestion and berthing delays. Lastly, growth in the region's air traffic is not being matched with enhanced connectivity within the region. The air traffic control systems and the airport infrastructure are also inadequate (IGAD, 2016).

Most of the IGAD Member States belong to the world's Least Developed Countries (LDC). They face both human and material challenges in their pursuit for development. Nevertheless, the region has a wide range of agro-ecological zones (AEZ) with rich biodiversity and diverse agricultural potential, which if effectively cultivated and managed could turn the Region into a bread basket for Africa and neighbouring Asian countries. It is against this backdrop that IGAD Member States have chosen to enhance their regional co-operation in an effort to maximize the potential of the vast resources and propel the region to new economic growth levels. Mobilizing the necessary resources for the implementation of development programmes at the national and regional levels is a huge challenge for both IGAD and its Member States. The capacity of IGAD and the Member States to cope with development problems of the region on their own and without substantial external support is a consideration, which highlights the importance of regional cooperation and the IGAD as a regional organization (IGAD, 2016).

#### **viii. IGAD Areas of Cooperation**

The Agreement Establishing IGAD identifies some twenty areas of cooperation among the Member States. In addressing these diverse areas of cooperation in a manageable manner, the overarching IGAD Regional Strategy (2011-15) regrouped them under four Pillars (IGAD, 2016) as follows:

Pillar 1: Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment;

Pillar 2: Economic Cooperation, Integration and Social Development;

Pillar 3: Peace and Security; and Humanitarian Affairs;

Pillar 4: Corporate Development Services Hence, all IGAD programmes are clustered under these Pillars. The details of the programmes are provided in the specific sectorial and or departmental strategies.

IGAD recognizes the need for close and cooperative partnerships with all stakeholders in translating the ideals of the Strategy into concrete results. To that effect, IGAD has entered into partnerships with relevant actors at the local, national, regional and global levels who have similar mandates for achieving sustainable development in the region. Key IGAD partners include among others: the African Development Bank, the World Bank, the European Union (EU), Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Ireland, USAID, and Switzerland. Furthermore, IGAD enjoys close cooperation with the African Union (AU), RECs, UN-system agencies, and range of international, regional civil society organizations(IGAD, 2016).

#### **xi. IGAD Governance Issues**

The region is increasingly moving towards democratic governance and has made good progress towards establishing a competitive economy. Good governance with appropriate

and conducive structures and institutions is a significant prerequisite for the positive outcomes of sustainable development at all levels. The IGAD member states have been progressively taking tangible steps towards improving governance systems both at the national and regional levels by strengthening structures and institutions in all development sectors and their respective inter-linkages by ensuring coherence, integrating policies, minimizing duplication of efforts and wastage of resources, and strengthening institutional capacities. The region has realized commendable economic performance through improvements in transparency and accountability, decentralization and empowerment, social inclusiveness and democratization. Nevertheless, some macroeconomic challenges remain which require continued and deepening institutional reforms and creation of an enabling environment for private-sector development as well as capacity development. Civil Society and non-state actors are not playing their role and should have much bigger role to play in the IGAD's development initiatives such as project preparation and implementation (IGAD, 2016).

The IGAD civil society and non-governmental organizations Forum which was established pursuant to the decision of the IGAD Council of Ministers should serve as the mechanism to involve civil society appropriately in the policy formulation and strategic planning discussions, and the planning, designing and implementation of IGAD programmes and processes. Governance, peace and security and humanitarian affairs will have to increasingly play a pivotal role in responding to the various adversities that the region faces (IGAD, 2016).



#### **x. Comparative Advantage**

IGAD is a Regional Economic Community (REC), one of the eight building blocks of the African Economic Community (AEC). The strategic location of the region, its size, ecological diversity, vast resources and people who are naturally integrated by culture and trans-boundary resources are among the main advantages that IGAD possesses.

Furthermore, the IGAD region is host to a number of UN agencies and the AUC (in Addis Ababa and Nairobi), which allows for leveraged communications and facilitating meetings with the various Heads of State on high level policy issues and topics of common interest within the region.

The IGAD also enjoys the support of the individual Member States, as well as having formidable political clout through the high-level policy organs that are able to work collectively on tackling complex regional issues. Despite prevailing bilateral differences between some Member States, there is a positive commitment towards IGAD as the regional development institution. This is exemplified by the regular use of IGAD as a vehicle for addressing regional problems and concerns such as the Sudan and Somalia Peace Processes, regular participation of all countries in the meetings of the IGAD policy organs, financial contributions paid for the up-keep of the Secretariat and the establishment of political instruments such as IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CE WARM) the IGAD Security Sector Programmes (ISSP), the IGAD Centre for Pastoral Area and Livestock Development (ICPALD) and IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC). This political will for regional cooperation is one of the strongest assets of IGAD, and has led to the IGAD Secretariat playing an increasingly important role in regional coordination and working towards

developing a common position for the Member States in various regional and international for a meetings, and conferences (IGAD, 2016).

The programmatic approach adopted by the IGAD, another comparative advantage of the organization, creates the opportunity to connect individual programs and projects to a longer term vision and outcomes. The approach works on the premise that when diverse actors join their forces, the net effect will be bigger than the sum of the individual activities. Furthermore, a programmatic approach recognizes the importance of local ownership as a crucial and decisive element in creating a common vision and a strategy, setting the agenda and priorities, and establishing a plan of action. As a result, the IGAD has been able to create platforms and for engaging technical experts from the Member States to discuss issues concerning the environment, transport, gender affairs, health (HI V/AIDS), drought reliance initiative (IDDRSI) and many regional technical committees; thus advancing the collective knowledge of the IGAD region. It has also created platforms where IOAD and its Development Partners discuss on regional priority interventions, mainstreaming of development partners' programmes and projects into regional development frameworks, resources mobilization and monitoring of the implementation of programmes and projects supported by Development Partners. The IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) at political and technical levels demonstrates additional strength of IGAD.

Capacity building initiatives such as the Institutional Strengthening Action Programmes (ISAP) are another major strength of IGAD. These include identifying training needs, developing training concepts to address the needs, mobilizing funds to organize, conduct

and facilitate the whole range of IGAD activities including cross-cutting themes like information management, gender and mediation processes.

#### **vii. IGAD Role in the Horn of Africa**

In politics, regions are measured as sub-divisions of the globe. Africa seems as region of the world polity that is made up of different and sometimes overlapping sub-regions. Sub regions may have corresponding organization. IGAD is also one of the sub regions that represented the Horn of Africa. (Mwaura, Baechler and Kiplagat, 2002: 116) IGAD and its member states are in place to develop forums for civil society, community based organization, and important NGOs to participate in promoting peace efforts in the horn of Africa as seen in Somalia and Sudan. To this end, IGAD has created permanent secretaries to both Sudan and Somalia to spread it peace-making efforts (Mwaura, Baechler and Kiplagat. 2002).

It has also enlisted the aid of the international community to these effort as well as other economic and social development efforts. And the IGAD and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) consisting of twenty countries, the UN, the World Bank, and EU have been to assist and support peace processes; that is, in Somali and South Sudan as well as development of the region.

Since, the main focus of IGAD is on capacity building and awareness creation, and on the Early Warning of conflicts; in September 2002, the prominent mission in this regard established a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) around the intra- state conflicts in the Horn of Africa, to carter for the various forms of intra—state conflicts. Such forms are clan (tribe) conflicts, ethnic conflicts, terrorism and others. For instance, In Somalia, there has been series of conflicts, of which the IGAD Heads of

Governmental approved a resolution on regional cooperation to combat such conflicts; likewise, in the recent crisis in South Sudan, in which the IGAD played significant role in conflict mediation and resolution.

The issue of peace and security has been the priority in the Horn of Africa region to harmonies and coordinate peacemaking and building activities. And, IGAD works in one of its priority area, that is, conflict prevention, management and resolution in the Horn of Africa. This is because, now days, economic growth and poverty reduction programs are associated with the peace and security agenda. So to secure sustainable development, common security is the major prerequisite. Thus, the issue of peace and security in the Horn of Africa is prioritized after revitalization of IGAD and it moves ahead a broader development mandate.

The importance of regional peace and security strategy is indisputable to contain and manage conflicts in the region and harmonize and coordinate peacemaking and building activities. IGAD endorsed its first peace and security strategy during the 2003 summit. Elements of IGAD peace and security architecture are already in place, starting with the obligations of all member states imposed by the UN Charter and the Constitutive Act of the AU to participate in advancing the international collective security (IGAD, 2016). There are also IGAD-specific agreements and mechanisms that indicate the collective aspirations of member states for mutual security including the Agreement Establishing IGAD (1996), Program on Conflict Prevention.

Management and Resolution, the Protocol on the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), IGAD Capacity Building Against Terrorism (ICPAT), and the policy framework for the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). The Strategy

owned by the IGAD Secretariat was prepared by consultants over the past years. It is based on the above mentioned elements and covers 2010 -2014. The peace and security strategy accords the primary responsibility to governments to ensure peace and security to their citizens. The strategic objectives include strengthening conflict prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts consolidating preventive diplomacy; promoting cooperation to address common peace and security threats; and enhancing cooperation in other areas accidental to peace and security such as environment and trans-boundary resources. Respect for principles of international law, mutual respect, and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, rejection of use of force, respect for territorial integrity and equitable utilization of trans-boundary resources, and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty are the chief principles of the strategy (IGAD 2001). The aim of the strategy is “to enable IGAD member states and the IGAD Secretariat and citizens of the region to actively contribute to developing and maintaining peace and security”. IGAD, 2005).

### **2.2.2 The South Sudan Conflict**

The current conflict in Sudan in general and South Sudan in particular traced its genesis back to the colonial past. The seeds of the civil wars that have been fought for decades in Sudan were sowed by the Turko-Egyptian and Anglo-Egyptian colonial rulers that administrated North and South Sudan separately (Mawut, 1995). In 1821, Turko-Egyptian forces invaded the northern regions of the Sudan aimed at controlling the lucrative slave trade channel of the South that involved European, Egyptian and northern Sudanese merchants (Johnson, 2003). And the beginning of north-south divide was linked with this commercial exploitation of the Sudan. Major factors that contributed to

the divide were inability of some areas to carry on the burden of new forms of taxation and land ownership and the resultant expansion of slave-raiding and slave-owning that mainly contributed to the exploitation and subjugation of the South (Johnson, 2003). Though this galvanized Sudanese resistance against the Turko-Egyptian rule under a Muslim leader, Al-Mahdi, who managed to oust the joint rule in 1885, his regime continued slave-raiding in the South has become a divisive element and shaped the north-south dichotomy of slave-master relationship that shaped deeply the political development of the later years (Ding, 1995).

The Anglo-Egyptian condominium rule that ousted the Mahadist and established in 1898 was dominated by the British which administered the North and South Sudan as separate and different states under a Governor General. This policy reinforced Arabism and Islam in the North while South Sudan was ruled as an African colonial territory, which encourages African identity (Khalid, 2003). Besides, the British introduced the policy of “Closed Districts” that alienated southern areas from the north and thus prevented Sudanese from interacting to each other (Khalid, 2003). Yet, in 1947, the British suddenly reversed such policy and decided that the South and North would become an independent country, but without allowing people of the south “Closed Districts” to exercise their right to self-determination, which became the main reason that resulted in the first civil war called Anya-Nya I (1955-1972) in Sudan (Woodward, 2003). The successive regimes of Sudan after independence subsequently failed to accommodate Southerners’ demands for a federal arrangement that was outlawed by the central government (Ding, 1995). The Southerners quest for regional autonomy thus stood

contrary to the integrationist policies that were pursued by successive regimes at Khartoum (Lesch, 1998).

The Addis Ababa Accord of 1972 ended the first phase of the civil war by recognizing the ethnic plurality of the Sudan. The Accord that offered the South regional autonomy, proportional representation in the national assembly, and recognized English as its principal language, however, was revoked by President Numeiri in 1983 who established the Islamic Sharia as the supreme law of the Land that triggered Sudan People's Liberation Movement Army SPLMA to be established against it in the same year (Bahru, 2006; Woodward, 2003). The similar policy Bashir pursued since 1989 coupled with his conflict over oil and water resources with the SPLM/A led to the second episode of the civil war known as Anya-Nya II (1983-2005) and to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 (Bahru, 2006; Jok, 2012).

During the civil war, more than two million people died, four million were uprooted and some 600,000 people sought shelter across Sudan's borders (IJNMIS, 2014). The Transition Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan came out due to the 2011 referendum that formalized the divorce of the South from the North, promised a decentralized democratic system and aspired to reconstruct South Sudan and transform the economic and social fabric of the society that had long been affected by decades of civil wars. Despite such constitutional commitments, what has been observed since independence, however, is rivalry for political power between elites of different ethnic backgrounds mainly of Dinka and Nuer that traced its origin back to the 1990s has reached peak in the recent alleged coup attempt and left the country in chaotic situation.

The fact is that, on January 9 2011, South Sudan participated in a referendum exercise with the closest inquiry by the Pan-African community, together with relevant regional and international actors, that determined South Sudanese independence and the country was thus declared a new republic separate from North Sudan. Globally welcomed as the world's newest state, the hopes and aspirations of the international community for South Sudan were far from what was witnessed. In fact many South Sudanese welcomed the newest nation in the world with so much roaring cheer and enthusiasm. A sea of people waved flags in a blur of colour as the South's flag was hoisted high into the air. Many embraced each other and cried as the new national anthem was sung for the very first time ever. Nevertheless, this incident was short lived, as it was not long before many people across the world got shocked as gloomy report of near a genocide, massacres and destruction of villages and towns in South Sudan dominate the international media (Awolowich, 2015 and Lunn, 2016). Thus sadly, on December 15, 2013 South Sudan once again slides back to conflict and fight between the South Sudan Presidential guards triggered what later become labelled a Civil war (International Crisis Group, 2014).

Members of the presidential Tiger Battalion fought for reasons that are yet to be fully disclosed, sparking off shooting and violence in various residential neighborhoods in Juba. The main protagonists of this armed conflict were President Salva Kiir and his former Vice President Riek Machar. In fact, the South Sudanese President Salva Kiir Mayardit appeared on national television in full military uniform, something he had not won since the end of the war and accused his former vice-president Riek Machar and several others of plotting a military coup (Awolowich, 2015 and Lunn, 2016). Machar however, denied having anything to do with the initial fighting. Despite the fact that, he



quickly declared himself the commander of the SPLM/i\ in Opposition, an armed opposition group. In the week that followed, eleven members of the SPLM!A elite, including its secretary general Pagan Amum, former ministers, and the former SPLA chief of staff were detained under charges of the attempted coup. Several SPLA commanders defected from the army to join a rebellion that had been born (De Waal, 2014).

The fighting which followed forced tens of thousands of people to be killed and hundreds of thousands to flee their homes and take refuge in neighboring countries or remain as Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) inside South Sudan (Mehari and Abel, 2013). Human rights violations were an everyday reality and committed on a daily basis. A catastrophic humanitarian situation has made more than five million South Sudanese food insecure and immoderate spending on conflict has left the nation virtually bankrupt (Human Rights Watch, 2016 and Tewodros, 2015).

It is argued that the immediate cause of the conflict in South Sudan lies on internal power struggle between the political elite but there are other number of factors that has contributed as a root cause to the conflict in South Sudan; and they discusses below.

### **2.2.3 Causes of Conflict in South Sudan**

South Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011 following a referendum that was held on 9 January 2011 (Lacher, 2012). It consists of more than 60 ethno-linguistic groups, of which Dinka and Nuer respectively are the dominant ethnic groups, and divided into 10 states in three provinces: Bahi el Ghazal, Equatorial and Greater Upper Nile (Transitional Constitution, 2011, Jok, 2011). Three years after its independence,

South Sudan has reverted to internal conflict. The question that must be raised is that, what causes the conflict? Both the structural and proximate causes contributed to the conflict.

Competition for power between elites of different ethnic milieus and their subsequent inability to provide basic services to the public lies at the heart of the recent conflict in South Sudan (Blanchard, 2014; Mehari, 2013). The current political crisis that also assumes ethnic dimension traces its origin back to the 1990s, where leaders of the SPLM/A competed for political power mobilizing support along ethnic lines that resulted in spilt within SPLM/A of those who allied with Dr. John Garang and Salva Kiir and those with Dr. Rick Machar, Dr. Lam Akol and Gordon Kong. The rivalry for power that has caused ethnic atrocities by all sides brought to calmness by reconciling the major factions in the early 2000s (Weber and Ajak, 2014; Jok, 2014). The fissure that has been created within SPLM/A in 2012 resulted in what the public considered as autocratic and in some aspects unconstitutional move of Kiir's dismissal of the entire cabinet and some state governors elected by the people (Awolich, 2014). Political instability has been backed by rampant corruption that suggests the weakness of the legislative, regulatory and enforcement mechanisms of the state (Mehari, 2013). In this line, President Salva Kiir convinced that corrupt officials had stolen \$4 billion in oil revenue from government coffers in 2012 (Raghavan, 2013).

Unfair distribution of political power and resources is also structural factor that precipitated the conflict (Jok, 2011, 2013). Key political positions (that are dominated mainly by elites from Dinka ethnic groups) (Lacher, 2012; Jok, 2013) have often been used to channel public resources to private coffers as exemplified in the corruption case above. Besides, resources that are much needed to develop the bureaucratic apparatus

intended to deliver public services were instead drained away into patronage structures (Lacher, 2012). Consequently, the central government was unable to provide protection for citizens from ethnic and communal based conflicts that have frequently affected citizens lives and resources besides paucity of public services in education and health and of infrastructure (Jok, 2013). In this line, Jok (2011) wrote that “Corruption, nepotism, exclusion, and domination of government and business by some ethnic groups all seemed to erode the public’s enthusiasm for the upcoming transition.”

Moreover, the failure of the state building project that has been set in motion since the transitional five years period after the CPA signed in 2005 (beside the above reasons) mainly due to the inability of the government to: (a) create institutions and transform the SPLM/A from guerrilla movement to a ruling party and a professional army (Weber and Ajak, 2014) (b) incorporate the demands for reforms within the party/SPLM (Jok, 2014) (c) disarm and integrate the multiplicity of militias of various regions into the community (Crisis Group, 2014) (d) attempt to set the pace for the Permanent Constitution to replace the Transitional Constitution by 2015 (De Villiers, 2013) (e) hold accountable those who committed crimes on ethnic based killings in the past and recompense the affected citizens; (f) create Dinka-Nuer healthy relations that has long been characterized by rivalry and enmities; and (g) benefit the youth from the fruits of independence (Awolich, 2014; Jok, 2014). Due to such fragility, the state has not been able to provide services for its citizens nor has it managed to exert political authority over and to control its territory (Weber and Ajak, 2014).

Booth (2014) summarizes the underlying causes of the South Sudan conflict as follows:

The roots of this crisis run deep. The government attempted to contain inter-communal violence without fully committing to the hard work of addressing its causes which include trauma from decades of war, economic disparity, historical grievances between communities, human rights abuses, and political grievances due to real or perceived underrepresentation. On top of this, the government had also progressively reduced the space for political competition, within and outside the ruling party, and for independent media and civil society voices to be heard.

Rivalry among political elites in the top echelon on ethnic line, their undemocratic nature of dealing with political problems, and paucity of development partly due to rampant corruption and (ethnic and tribal clientelism (Lacher, 2012) laid the foundation to conflict to ferment and awaiting triggering incidence of the clash between presidential guards on 5h December 2013 that fall persisted long before in the liberation period in the history of SPLAJM and the alleged coup attempt engineered by Dr. Riek Machar to become violent. The political dispute that later assumed ethnic dimension sparked ethnic killings and counter-killings in South Sudan (Blanchard, 2014; Crisis Group, 2014). As a result of the conflict, over 10, 000 people were killed, 1,000,000 civilians have been displaced including 70,000 who have sought refuge inside JNMISS bases, 200,000 people have fled to neighbouring states, and more than half of South Sudan's population will need assistance in the coming months (Crisis Group, 2014). In response to the conflict, state, regional and international actors have exerted efforts to soothe the conflict though they could not be able to bring peace solving the conflict that is causing human suffering.

Other major causes of the conflict in South Sudan are outlined and discussed as follows:

### **i. Power Struggle**

This has been described as the cause and trigger of the recent conflict in South Sudan. The SPLM had been the signatory party to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the 22 years long war in 2005. John Garang, who had led the movement since its establishment in 1983, died in a helicopter crash three weeks after his inauguration as the president of the GOSS. His long-time deputy Salva Kiir took over the position of the president and led the south towards independence in 2011. However prior to the outbreak of violence on December 15, 2013, there were indications as early as 2008 that all was not well, and that differences within the party portended violence (De Waal, 2014). At the time, differences between the President and Pagan Amum, the then Secretary General of the SPLM had threatened to derail progress towards elections. The differences were eventually resolved, with many urging for unity of purpose as the elections and the eventual referendum approached (International Crisis Group, 2014). In addition to this the relationship between the President and his Vice President was at edge. In fact the two leaders were already strained, and that these differences were overlooked for the sake of unity within the party during the Interim Period (2005-2011). The SPLM split in 1991 and the reordering of the SPLM leadership to accommodate Riek Machar on his return were partly to blame for the frosty relationship that carried on into government after independence. In 2010, the two leaders are said to have supported rival candidates in a number of key electoral positions, particularly the governorships of several states. The tensions within the political class exploded when Vice President Dr. Riek Machar, SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amun, and Madam Rebecca Garang, the widow of the late Dr. John Garang, publicly announced their intention to run for the post of Chair of the

SPLM, and thus President of the country. Taking this as a crucial concern, President Kiir removed executive powers from Dr. Riek in April. In July, he dissolved the government, removing Riek and others from any government office (International Crisis Group, 2014).

ii. **Corruption, Patronage and Impunity**

Since South Sudan's independence, the government has largely squandered its economic potential and political goodwill, becoming a kleptocracy where political power is leveraged to secure wealth. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 between Sudan and SPLA was followed by large increase in government fund. Plus South Sudan has been dominated by rotating set of elites who move seamlessly between positions in government and the frontlines of the rebellion, as political situations change (De Waal, 2014). In July 2013, President Kiir reshuffled his entire cabinet, removing prominent elites, such as former Vice President Rick Machar and firing a group of ethnically diverse cabinet Ministers and high-level officials accusing them of corruption (De Waal, 2014 and Lunn, 2016). Most of these individuals had played leading roles in the country's economic and political decisions in the post-independence government, and after being pushed out of the government, many joined apolitical opposition bloc that soon developed into an armed opposition. Meanwhile, the conflicting parties have sought to consolidate power around their loyalists, particularly those from their particular ethnic group. Besides this South Sudan has been crushed down by corruption patronage and impunity in fact a case in point in this regard is what happened in the year 2012 whereby President Salva Kiir accused 75 ministers and officials of having stolen \$4 billion in state funds and demand the money to be returned, but according to news reports, only 1.5% of

this sum was actually recovered (Aljazeera, 2014). Only a fraction of the recovered wealth was actually reinvested into the country and revenues from the oil sector are rarely reinvested in critical sectors of the economy. Meanwhile, elites on both sides have killed tens of thousands of people, displaced over millions, and has left another millions, or around 40 percent of the population, food insecure but no instrument has not yet been established to hold them accountable till today (International Crisis Group,20 14).

### **iii. Militarization and Arm Proliferation**

The linkage between conflicts and militarization is an established process in South Sudan current conflict. Since the eruption of conflict in South Sudan there has been a steady rise in military expenditure and thus easily outstripping social spending. This has created resentments and grievances by the local community because the government is using it large amount of revenue to strengthen itself and fight back the opposition which is at the expense of livelihood improvement of South Sudanese. There is also support to increasing and persistence of guerrilla movements related to the very few employment opportunity available to young men. In fact the guerrilla organization presents opportunities for survival, rewards, recognition and advancementnot available to most civilians in South Sudan. In addition to this, in fulfilling its functions of theguardian of authority and legitimacy, the South Sudan government attempts to accumulate and imports a hulk of modem weapons systems (Briedlid and Arensen, 2014). What is more the existence of plentiful weapons as a consequence of post war should not be omitted from the analysis of potential causes of conflict. The second civil war in Sudan lasted more than two decades and resulted in high militarization and arm proliferation among civilians (Small Arm Survey, 2014).

#### **vi. Weak Institutional Capacity**

The crisis in South Sudan is also associated with the inability of relevant institution to manage and mediate conflict which splits out into the army, and subsequently the general population (Lunn, 2016). Additionally South Sudan beyond the political conflict, the country encounters a challenge of weakness or absence of institutions and lack of institutional capacity within the state appears to be a case in point On the top of the establishment of institutions was based on ethnic aggregation and personality cults (De Waal, 2014).

#### **v. Instrumentalization of Ethnic Identities**

The concept of ethnicity in Africa in general and South Sudan in particular is a commonality at the present time. It can be invoked to defend political, social and cultural positions because it carries authority, beyond rationality, preference or choice. In fact ethnicity can be an instrument of socio-political mobilization and can also inspire organized violence and political instability. Disorder of political structures relating to ethnic ground has been a significant contributor to the power struggle among the South Sudanese communities. While much of the conflict is political, there are also ethnic drivers to the escalating violence and the two are often difficult to distinguish Dinka and Nuer ethnic identities were deliberately politicized during the second civilwar, and militarized structures within communities, such as the Geiweng, Titweng and White Army Bunam (International Crisis Group, 2014). The polarization and arming of communities along ethnic lines in this conflict, and the manipulation by the powerful elites are a key factor that risks a rapidly deep and wide war with serious of regional humanitarian and political consequences (South Sudan Protection Cluster, 2014).



**vi. Lack of Inclusiveness and Participatory State Apparatus**

Inclusive governance is significant to the realization of democracy and peace dividends in states emerging from conflict. However in South Sudan, the exercise of inclusivity has been marred with contradictions between constitutional provision and existence practices (Radon and Logan. 2014). Political parties in South Sudan are found to be the foci for rewarding the warlord's dubbed as freedom fighters at the expense of participatory civilian structures, the nerves of ethnic factionalism over nationalism, exercise of centralized nomination system, all of which breed disaffection and tensions among the citizenry. Moreover the observed militarization of public service, perception of ethnic favouritism in public employment and appointments, marginalization of regions outside urban centres and unequal share of national resources comprise practices that violate the foundations of inclusive governance and push the country to the margin of conflict (De Waal, 2014).

**vii. Lack of Commitment towards Nation Building**

The SPLM/A independence struggle ended through a negotiated Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, which aimed to achieve democratic transformation as well as self-determination for the people of South Sudan (Debay, 2012). However the post-independence period was more concerned with state formation-establishing power structure and authority, as opposed to nation building which would require addressing the underlying drivers of conflict so as to establish a united South Sudan with a common idea of national identity (Sorbo, 2014). This has also contributed to the current conflict in South Sudan.

#### **viii. Oil as Causes of Conflict**

Long before atrocious conflict erupted in December 2013, South Sudan was already demonstrating all the indicators of the resource curse. Ninety-eight percent of the government annual operating budget and 80 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is derived from oil, making South Sudan the most oil reliant country in the world (Nyathon et al, 2016). But rather than use of this revenue to invest in public service and infrastructure to improve livelihoods, the government financed a military and security apparatus. On the top of this SPLA government officials had embezzled much of the revenues from this sector and deposited the money in foreign countries (Tiitmamer and Awolich, 2015). Plus Juba was benefiting a lot from oil money at the expense of other states in South Sudan.

#### **ix. Past Rift**

Even though the Dinka and the Nuer fought side by side against the government in Khartoum for decades, their affiliation has been ambivalent. In fact in 1991 internal leadership struggles between late SPLM leader John Garang (Dinka) on the one side and his deputy, Riek Macbar (Nuer) on the other led to a crack within the SPLM. Machar created the SPLM-Nasir faction (Khadiagala, 2014). The most important blowback for the SPLM (Dinka) was not only that large faction of its troops broke away in a critical phase of the war, the SPLM-Nasir faction switched sides to ally with the central government in Khartoum (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2011) After becoming Khartoum's new proxy in the civil war, the SPLM-Nasir, consisting mainly of Nuerfighters, killed at least 2,000 Dinka civilians in the town of Bor, in what was known as the Bor massacre, on 15 November 1991 (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012; and Carlos and Gutschke, 2014).

Even though this happened almost a quarter of a century ago, the event remains present in the collective memory of the Dinka and the Nuer and has the potential to fuel resentment in the current struggle.

#### **2.2.4 Consequence of the South Sudan Conflict Resolution**

The South Sudan conflict is one of the most severe humanitarian crises, which has immensely caused myriad misery and devastation on innocent citizens. As successive report of the I-ugh Commissioner for Human Rights, UNMISS, the AU and international organizations have documented, there have been numerous, repeated incident and patterns of serious and systematic violence against civilians, in many cases in circumstances in which people were targeted due to their ethnic origin (Human Rights Watch, 2016 and Tewodros, 2015). Many civilians have been attacked and killed by both sides of armed group in their homes, as well as in places of shelter, including churches, mosques, hospitals, and in government facilities. Tens of thousands have been displaced from their homes, more than 1.5 million of them within the country. Serious violations of international humanitarian law, gross violations of international human rights law and human rights abuses have been perpetuated by all parties to the conflict including attacks against civilians, rape and other crimes of sexual violence, arbitrary arrest and detention, abduction, deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance (Tewodros, 2015).

Besides these human costs, the food security situation deteriorated drastically taking thousands of lives. Although it is difficult to quantify the decline in South Sudan's output that has resulted from conflict, sever economic effects have become increasingly apparent, and the country'sfiscal position has deteriorated as government revenues have

decreased. This has resulted in budgetary constraints and the abandonment of government plans to increase investment (WFP, 2015 and King, 2015).

In addition to this, economic consequences, the violent conflict caused enormous destruction of infrastructure related to health, education, transportation and communications along with the loss of private assets and flight of financial capital abroad. These economic impacts may be even greater when indirect costs are added, including lost investment, productivity declines, diminished employment opportunities and increased crimes. Besides human costs and economic impact of violent conflict in South Sudan, the people of South Sudan experienced, decay in social capital, loss of trust among and between member of households communities and ethnic group and intensification of inter and intra-community conflicts (King, 2015).

What's more in addition to its consequence on South Sudanese citizen's the current conflict of South Sudan has a far reaching external consequence to the peoples and states of the region. This is compounded by the fact that the region constitutes interlinked regional security complexes. Plus due to the approximately near location to South Sudan each neighbouring state like Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and others would eventually be forced either implicitly or explicitly to shoulder the political and socio-economic consequences of the South Sudanese current conflict (Mehari and Abel, 2013). Therefore the following sub sections has given paramount importance to the analysis of a number of actual and potential political, economic and social consequences of the current conflict of South Sudan upon the mere existence of the Horn of African countries.

Uganda is highly affected by the contiguity of instability in South Sudan and its territory. In particular, Uganda has been challenged by its concern that unstable South Sudan

would become a safe haven to the Lord of Resistance Army (LRA), which has operated in Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of Congo (International Crisis Group, 2014). Economic interests of Uganda, however, have been crushed due to conflict in South Sudan. In fact Uganda is the largest trading partner of South Sudan, exporting coffee, shoes, vehicles, steels and other agricultural products, amounting to millions of dollars annually (Awolich, 2014). In addition, South Sudan employs thousands of Ugandan citizens, especially in the service sector, generating a significant amount of revenue yet this has been challenged by the conflict in South Sudan (Lunn, 2016).

Likewise Sudan significant potential of importing uninterrupted flow of oil from South Sudanese fields was considerably challenged. Although it has lost 75% of the oil reserve together with the secession of South Sudan, South Sudan oil is still an important source of revenue to Sudan (IRIN, 2014), Yet Sudan was irritated by Uganda's intervention into the conflict since both were supporting rebels of each other (Mehari and Abel, 2013). Plus the influx of refugees from South Sudan into the neighbouring states of Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda is a major consequence which countries of the horn of Africa have to grapple with. Unfortunately, if the current civil war in South Sudan continues the probability of refugee influx creating pressure in host countries of Horn of Africa is expected to worsen (United Nation Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2015).

In fact Ethiopia has suffered notably due to Nuer refugee flow influx around Gambela region. The increase in number the Nuer's has been a significant problem since Ethiopia is currently suffering from the politics of number. Number matters the most in politics of Ethiopia's federal system, since power is allocated in direct proportion to the population

of the country's ethno-cultural communities. In this regard Gambella is suffering from one of the most contentious issues which is the politics of numbers that has locked two of the region's major ethnic groups, the Anuak and the Nuer, into conflict (Dereje, 2014). Until the mid-1980s the Anuak constituted the majority of Gambella's population. However, the massive influx of refugees since the outbreak of the second Sudanese civil war in 1983 and the current South Sudanese war has dramatically changed the region's demography. Ethiopian economic interest in South Sudan is also at stake due to the conflict. Like Kenya and Uganda, Ethiopia has a large contingent of citizens working in South Sudan. Plus the Ethiopian Airline and the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia used to have strong hold. However, since the outbreak of the conflict, a number of Ethiopians and Ethiopian institutions have left the country putting a strain on the country's potential of earning foreign currency and employment for its citizens (Mehari and Abel, 2013).

Kenya on the other hand has been affected considerably given that South Sudan has been a destination to Kenyan citizens and banks for employment, investment and business. A crisis in South Sudan has risked all these economic benefits that Kenya enjoys from South Sudan. In addition violence in South Sudan also disrupted Kenya's plan to provide an alternative trade route to South Sudan to transport its oil, via the port of Lamu. Added to all this, Kenya is also presently suffering from instability in Somalia and does not want to see another failed state that can serve as a safe haven to terrorists (International Crisis Group, 2014).

### **2.2.5 The Role of IGAD in the South Sudan Conflict Resolution**

The 1996 IGAD Agreement included among its principles, the peaceful settlement of conflicts, the maintenance of regional peace, stability and security, and the protection of human and people's rights. A new objective was "to promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-State conflicts through dialogue". The IGAD Secretariat was restructured to fulfil the new mandate and in due course it established a division responsible for peace and security. However, IGAD's institutional changes lagged behind real political processes within the region.

IGAD was very instrumental in the signing of the CPA on January 9, 2005. The CPA Includes updates and amendments to previous protocols. The CPA itself is comprised of six protocols concluded between 2002 and 2005 (IGAD, 2005). The Machakos Protocol signed in Machakos, Kenya, on 20 July 2002, in which the parties agreed on a broad framework, setting forth the principles of governance, the transitional process and the structures of government as well as on the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan, and on state and religion. A six- year Interim Period, at the end of which, the people of southern Sudan were given the right to vote in a self-determination referendum to decide whether to remain united with Sudan or to secede. There is also the Protocol on security arrangements signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 25 September 2003 which provided a cessation of hostilities between the SPLA and the SAF, and the maintenance of SPLA forces in the south and SAF forces in the north (Government of South Sudan Development Plan, 2011-2013).

The Protocol on the resolution of conflict in southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile States was signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004. The Protocol on Power-sharing was signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004 and provides for power sharing arrangements between Sudan's two major political parties, the SPLM and NCP, as well as smaller parties, at the national and Southern Sudan levels of government. There is also the Protocol on wealth-sharing signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 7 January 2004 which provides that, among other things profits from oil extracted in southern Sudan were split 50-50 between the national and southern Sudan levels of government. The Protocol on the resolution of conflict in Abyei signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004 led to the establishment of a special administrative status for the disputed Abyei area, as well as a referendum for the "residents" of Abyei, to be carried out at the same time as the Southern Sudan referendum.

In accordance with the provisions of the CPA, the people of Southern Sudan voted in the Southern Sudan referendum on January 9, 2011. Six months later, on July 9, 2011, the Interim Period came to an end and South Sudan became the world's newest nation. Despite this success, critical aspects of the CPA remain unimplemented. The Abyei area referendum never occurred, due to a disagreement between the two CPA parties over the definition of the term "resident" of the Abyei area. While some progress was made in carrying out popular consultations in Blue Nile, the process was never concluded. In South Kordofan, it never began. Today a new temporary agreement, concluded in June 2011, concerning the Abyei area remains unimplemented. In South Kordofan and Blue Nile, the GOSS had launched a sustained military offensive against the civilians of the two states.



The SPLM leadership sought to maintain unity over time with mixed results. As the Republic of South Sudan emerged as an independent country, political rivalries may resurface and new groups may challenge the SPLM's leadership. In 1991, the SPLM faced its most serious internal crisis since its founding on 16th May, 1983 when a number of key commanders left the movement to form their own group. Following the split, several factions fought against the mainstream SPLM, often with the support of the Bashir government (Daniel, 2014). After years of reconciliation efforts, most of the key players in the different factions rejoined the SPLM. As SPLM began to confront the challenge of running a country without enough schools, hospitals or roads, the unity that had underpinned the referendum and declaration of independence dissolved.

The most ferocious of the infighting began in mid-December 2013 when President Salva Kiir accused his sacked deputy Mr. Riek Machar of plotting a coup. Fighting between government troops and rebel factions erupted, and within weeks. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) split between forces loyal to the Government and forces loyal to former Vice-President Riek Machar. The consequences for the civilian population have been devastating (Daniel, 2014). A UN report released in May 2014 said that "widespread and systematic" atrocities had been carried out by both sides in homes, hospitals, mosques, churches and UN compounds.

According to the report there are reasonable grounds to believe that violations of international human rights and humanitarian law have been committed by both parties to the conflict. In light of the widespread and systematic nature of many of the attacks, and information suggesting coordination and planning, there are also reasonable grounds to believe that the crimes against humanity of murder, rape and other acts of sexual

violence, enforced disappearance, and imprisonment have occurred. Over one million South Sudanese have been displaced by the conflict. Despite the signing of a cessation of hostilities agreement on 23 January, fighting continues with little hope that civilians will see any respite from the relentless violence.

Since then the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) which was instrumental in the conclusion of the CPA process in 2005 has continued to offer good offices for dialogue and supporting peace consolidation within South Sudan (Kimani, 2012 as cited in Judith, 2016). South Sudan regards IGAD as the first point of call in regional peace initiatives. The current African Union led negotiations between north and South Sudan over the border conflict are being assisted by IGAD.

IGAD has been assisting South Sudan to integrate into the regional peace building architecture. The Conflict Early Warning and Early Response (CEWARN) mechanism of IGAD has been established in the South Sudan Peace building Commission (Kimani, 2012 as cited in Judith, 2014). There is a need for IGAD to play an active role in promoting peaceful co-existence between the two countries bearing in mind its credibility and mediation achievements. IGAD has coordinated the deployment of about civil servants from Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia to offer technical assistance in several ministries, commissions and local governments. IGAD is supplementing assistance that is provided by the AU and other bilateral arrangements between Sudan and neighbouring countries. IGAD is providing this support in collaboration with UNDP. The most common other possible solutions to the conflict in South Sudan was found to be engaging in home based negotiations like those that took place in Somalia, this was followed by creating an all-inclusive government, enhance the capacities of security measures, equal

distribution of oil resources, bringing together of communities through ethnic intolerance driven by political incitements, bottom-up approach to resolution mechanisms, clan integration, having local dispute settlements like Gacaca courts in Rwanda, creation of compact governance, economic empowerment, sanctions carried out on rebels and individuals perpetuating conflict, return of people in diaspora, serious public sensitization and reconciliation campaigns at the grassroots, stable military that speaks with one voice and engaging IGAD, AU and UN security council (Sudan Tribune, 2012).

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has been the route map that the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and the Government of National Unity (GONU) and other development partners have followed to create an environment in which Khartoum and Juba could find enduring solution to the conflict. The CPA specifically provided a six-year interim period which Sudan will be governed. According to protocols on power-sharing and security, created state wide government and legislative chambers in both regions, stipulated that general election will take place at all government level which happened April 2010, recommended on the following that 1956 border be delineated , that oil revenue be shared on 50% basis after a 2% share to oil producing states, a joint integrated military units be deployed on border and a disarmament demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process begin with IJN assistance and popular consultations be made in Blue Nile state and South Kordofan for final settlement of grievances with the North. Generally CPA sought to address the root cause of conflict by establishing a framework for governance through which power and wealth shall be sheared and human right guaranteed.

IGAD played a leading role in diplomatic and peace negotiation such as post referendum arrangement between North and South as part of CPA implementation. Negotiation with dissident in Jonglei State (JS) Upper Nile State and state reconciliation efforts and peace conferences facilitated by development partners (DPs) and NGOs, creation of institution, such as former Peace Commission, South Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA), Committee of peace and state-level peace structures.

The common strategies IGAD has employed in the management of the conflict in South Sudan are: engaging high diplomatic mediation such as IGAD secretariat and peace ambassadors, building capacities of national security, making ultimatums for different leaders, use of Gacaca courts like the ones used in Rwanda and coming up with an early warning system for conflict eruption in South Sudan respectively.

Some of the measures IGAD has taken to mitigate the security threats in South Sudan are: IGAD has sent its mission in Sudan to help mitigate the crisis/Offered reinforcement, Employ early warning mechanisms to prevent conflict, approval of Protection & Deterrence Force (PDF) to come to South Sudan, special coordination with UNMISS peacekeepers battalion on conflicts zones, deployment of monitors through the Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms (MVM)(Susan, 2013), built capacities of national security and built capacity of South Sudanese security organs.

The biggest challenge IGAD has faced in its South Sudan conflict management efforts has been political interference as well as external interference and interests from Uganda, Sudan, and other neighbouring countries. Others were; lack credibility since one of IGAD members is directly involve in the conflict and also lack of partiality in mediation processes, IGAD member states and secretariat display their lack of a genuine grasp of

South Sudanese socio-cultural dynamics, lack of public cooperation, lack of key security infrastructure in the country, lack of funds and resources and leaders not respecting peace agreements as well as bias from regional leaders. Few regional organizations or bodies have successfully intervened in the conflict between 2011-2013, however about 7,000 African Union troops have slowly been deployed in Darfur on a very limited mandate. The UN secretarial council has been consistent across the country and emphasizes protection of civilians, human rights reporting, EAC, SADDCC, ECOWAS and Church based organizations also participate somehow in ending the ongoing conflict in South Sudan. Some of other possible solutions to the conflict in South Sudan engaging in home based negotiations like those that took place in Somalia (Fight against Warlords).

Consequently, the above stated strategies and measures employed by IGAD in conflict resolution in South Sudan are the best strategy and measures IGAD has employed in the management of the conflict in South Sudan and conflict resolution. Also, the stated challenges have been the major challenge IGAD has faced in its South Sudan conflict resolution efforts. However, the challenges faced by IGAD in its South Sudan conflict resolution efforts will be reported and discussed in the chapter four of this thesis which is the data presentation and analysis, and would also discuss the achievements of IGAD, among others.

#### **2.2.6 IGAD's Peace Process in South Sudan**

The peace negotiation in South Sudan had taken almost two years. But the outcome is still negligible. In the mediation process, different parties have been participated. Among these, IGAD has been mentioned as the primary organ that struggles for ending the civil war in the country. The peace talks, mediated by IGAD, were led by special envoys that

came from the big three regional powers of the authority. These are Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan. Though IGAD had put much effort to the greatest extent possible, the warring parties are reluctant to reach into agreement. Apart from the disputants, the member states of IGAD are also accused of their rivalries and deep-rooted regional division in the processes of mediation. To overcome these shortcomings, IGAD has widened its mediation process into the “IGAD-PLUS” initiative, which is composed of the IGAD itself, the AU, UN, China, U.S., UK, European Union (EU), Norway and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF).

The “IGAD-PLUS” initiative is intended to provide an international facade behind IGAD in resolving the conflict that severely degrades the country within this short period of time. Meanwhile, it is not effective as it has been designed due to the fact that the parties in processes are disappointed by the IGAD as well as the country in question. Notwithstanding with the challenges of IGAD, it has to be appreciated for its prior responses in addressing the conflict. Starting from the beginning of the conflict, IGAD has led much effort in mediating the worrying parties to come into negotiations and to stop the disputes. Since 2014, IGAD has led more than seven peace round talks between the conflicting parties. Sadly enough, all rounds of peace talks were concluded by a very short - may be days or hours-long - agreements or complete disagreements that have resulted with substantial setbacks (The Sudan Tribune, 2014).

**In 2014 alone more than six peace talks were held. To mention some are:**

The First Round Peace Talks: With a focus of reaching into a cessation of hostilities agreement, a release of the prisoners and a process of dialogue, the first round talks began

on January 4, 2014, in Ethiopia. This round was full of delays and setbacks. However, in the end, the cessation of hostilities agreement was signed on January 23, 2014. But it was terrible to hear that the disputants had breached the agreement just after two days of their consensus.

The Second Round Peace Talks: It was conducted on March 2014. With respect to its designed objectives, the second peace talk was not as effective as intended. The only thing that was successful during this round was the authorization of an IGAD Protection and Deterrent Force (PDF), which was designed to monitor and enforce the ceasefire. As part of this force, 90 Ethiopian peacekeepers were deployed in South Sudan.

The Third Round Peace Talks: Just after a month of the second round peace talk, the third was taken place in April 2014. As like that of the above two peace talks, this round was also ineffective and short-lived. It has been manifested by the fighting of the two opposing groups on May 22, 2014, that caused the displacement of 2000 peoples in the Upper Nile State.

The Fourth Round Peace Talks: Conducted on June 9, 2014, this round was focusing on the formation of a transitional unity government. Nevertheless, it was not an easy task provided the divergent views of the parties in conflict. What a form of government should be formed was the point of departure at this time.

The Fifth Round Peace Talks: This round was held on July 20, 2014, to compromise the complaint (Unfair inclusivity of IGAD in the selection of stakeholders' process) of the rebelling parties. However, it has failed because of the rejection of the opposition parties

to attend the talks. It was really sad for both the mediators and the international community who want to see an effective peace agreement in between the disputants.

**The Sixth Round Peace Talks:** The last but not least peace talk in 2014 was carried out on November 10, 2014. This round was expected to be fruitful since there were a great zeal and devotion from both sides to be abided by the cessation of hostilities agreement signed in the first round and other documents that include the likes of the implementation matrix. In this round, IGAD seemed to be serious in warning the warring parties to be abiding by the COH agreement and to work on the power-sharing accord. Meanwhile, the peace agreement was concluded by a heavy fighting between the opposition and government forces.

In 2015, the February's and March's peace talks were the bold peace negotiations that were resumed by the government of South Sudan and the rebels, which were facilitated by the Horn of Africa bloc, IGAD. On February 1<sup>st</sup>, 2015, President Kiir, and Dr. Machar have signed a new ceasefire yet had permissions to continue their discussions on some argumentative issues like power sharing and formation of the transitional government. After a month on March 5, 2015, which otherwise was called as the final peace deal between the government of the country and the SPLM (IO) ruined with no agreement. The collapse of the talk had exacerbated the conflict than it was before. The March 2015 IGAD report shows that after the violation of the peace deal, civilians were killed, women and children were abused and major infrastructural facilities in the Upper Nile and Unity states were destroyed. Following the ineffectiveness of the above IGAD-led peace talks, on 12<sup>th</sup> March 2015 IGAD publicized a new peace negotiation approach called as the IGAD-PLUS formula. Initially, the formula was expected to be implemented



on April. However, due to the lack of commitment and political will from the conflicting parties, it has been fully implemented on 17th August 2015. Therefore, the major decisions and challenges of the August 17 and 26 Peace deal will briefly discussed in the following sections.

On August 17, 2015; a historical IGAD-PLUS peace negotiation (deal) was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The proposal was comprehensive and inclusive. In the first place, it demands a permanent ceasefire between the warring parties not later than 72 hours after signing the accord. In the second place, the peace proposal has given 30 days for militants to assemble and canton. Moreover, it explicitly stated that the Kampala's troops to leave the country within 45 days and other overseas militia forces to be disarmed and back to their home. The peace deal is also promising to return Dr. Machar to his former position, the vice presidency.

On the due date, only Riek Machar, leader of SPLM/IO and Pagan Amum, on behalf of the Former Political Detainees signed the deal. However, President Salva Kiir regrets to sign the agreement and requests an additional 15 days for consultations. Finally, on 26th August 2015, he signed the deal with the rebelling parties except some serious reservations.

As it has been discussed earlier, even if seven and more ceasefires have already been agreed from both sides of the parties in conflict, all of the agreements were breached within few days, if not hours. So, this could lead us into raising questions like why those peace agreements proposed by IGAD as well as IGAD-PLUS were not effective. This can be seen from both sides i.e. from the IGAD's/IGAD-PLUS's ill-defined peace

agreement proposals and the reluctance and refusal of the warring parties to be abided by such agreements. To Brian Adeba (2015), the peace proposal suggested by IGAD is problematic. He argued on three key elements of the proposal which have been provided by IGAD. These include the why and the wherefore of the transitional government, the power-sharing formula and inclusivity issues.

Power sharing is one of the controversial issues that are expected to disrupt the peace deal. According to the July 2015 proposal of IGAD, at the national level, the power sharing proportion for the government, the SPLM-IO and the SPLM-FD and other political parties would be 53, 33 and 14 percent respectively. The arrangement is fully accepted by the SPLMIO. Nonetheless, there is a doubt from the Kiir's government side to accept the quota which could hold him down from prior demand (70 percent). Brian Adeba (2015) additionally argued that the origin and the role of the members of the SPLM-FD have been misread by IGAD. Giving a political party role for these peoples is deceitful. All opposition parties cannot deserve the role of political parties in South Sudan. But IGAD failed to recognize that.

The other contentious issue of the proposal is that the formation of a transitional government by returning Dr. Machar into his former vice-presidency position, which is suspected by the international community for aggravating the crisis. Nyagoah Tut (2015).

### **2.2.7 Role of the AU, EU and UN on South Sudan Conflict Resolution**

The proximity gave IGAD the advantage of taking lead on South Sudan mediation, yet the AU maintained a role in the overall ownership of an African problem within the African continental framework. The unspoken arrangement was that IGAD takes the lead

in facilitating a political solution through mediation while the AU takes on the issues of providing protective space in international arena while it tackles accountability related matters in nature such as Justice and investigating the alleged atrocities and human rights violations. The responsibility on matters of international peace and security lies on the UNSC, however at the AU continued as part of its complementary with the UN to play a vital role through its Security Council providing guidance and management of conflict on African conflicts. AU's overall responsibility on matters of peace and security in Africa demanded that IGAD reports the progress, hinderers and challenges to the AU Peace and Security Council which it continue to do in implementation to the principle of subsidiarity where RECs play vital roles as building blocks of the AU. The AU in the case of current conflict in South Sudan took lead to investigate the alleged atrocities and violations of human rights. However, its role is complementary as the report was held by the AUSC and not released as leverage on the parties to achieve a mediated settlement as well to avoid polarization of the parties and hardening their positions more in case no agreement is reached.

AU encourages the complementarity between RECs and its structures as well attempting solutions to African problems through its mechanism. South Sudan case is unique in a sense that the parties accepted IGADs' mediation while maintaining the AU as the next level of reporting and seeking remedies while in cases of conflict in Sudan's Darfur, Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile in addition to political dialogue, the AU took the lead with support from IGAD with symbolic presence in the presence.

Nonetheless, with the mounting discomfort of the deteriorating situation on the ground the IGAD role was strengthen with what became known as the IGAD plus where the (5)

regions of Africa are represented by the decision of the AUSC namely Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda and South Africa in addition to other partners; Troika and China.

The role to be played by the IGAD plus is still subject of on-going consultations between the Special Envoys and the parties to the conflict in addition to IGAD member states and the intended countries to be represented.

The European Union (EU) continue to support the process financially as it did in the first peace mediation led by IGAD from 1993 – 2005. EU as well has established with IGAD the IGAD Partners Forum that is chaired by Italy and represents the group of friends to mediation and source for IGAD mediators to seek leverage from.

The EU's interests in the region and IGAD's process is related to the fact that EU is represented by "same colonial powers who had once competed over North-East Africa at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century" and such peace and stability in the region falls under their scope in their bigger efforts brining aid and development.

Though the EU did not want to be treated as outsider when it came to the peace process due to the fact that it funded the process, other reason was its projection of this relationship as it "It met frequently to discuss ways to boost the "friendship" – or put another way, strengthen the "partnership" (ibid).

In the current crisis of South Sudan, EU's role continued as a financier to the mediation process led by IGAD yet, it developed its own positions towards addressing the conflict while channelling them via the mediation as it categorises its role "the EU's efforts, including those of its Special Representative for the Horn of Africa Alexander Rondos,

are coordinated with, and complementary to this united international effort” (EU Fact Sheet No. 140710/01).

The new EU stand is much illustrated by the statement of the 28 members on the crisis of South Sudan “The European Union is determined to do everything possible to avert further suffering of the people of South Sudan” (EU Declaration on South Sudan, Press 394, Brussels, 10 July 2014).

The EU challenges the parties to address this conflict seriously and engage towards achieving an end to the violence "It is now time for the South Sudanese leaders to rise to the challenge and start negotiating in good faith towards a peaceful, equitable and sustainable solution" (Ibid).

European seriousness about contributing positively to ending the violence took to another level when it started imposing sanctions “two persons responsible for violating the ceasefire agreement will be targeted with a travel ban and a freeze of their assets in the European Union”. The two sanctioned individuals were reported to be Maj. Gen. Santino Deng, Commander of Third Division of the SPLA and Peter Gadet who was described as the leader of the anti-government Nuer militia (Sudan Tribune July 10, 2014).

The EU engagement goes parallel levels in case of pushing for a negotiated settlement while in the other hand imposing sanctions “targeted measures against individuals responsible for obstructing the peace process, breaching the cease- fire agreement and having committed egregious human rights violations”. The sanctions extend to the

country as well to “same time, an existing arms embargo against South Sudan will remain in place” (EU Fact Sheets).

The EU role in the IGAD led mediation can be summarise as it offers support using leverage both sanctions and benefits attaining peace in addition to financing the process “Supporting IGAD in its efforts to mediate between the warring parties and broker a peaceful solution to the conflict. €1.1 million have been mobilized from the EU's African Peace Facility to allow IGAD to set up a platform for peace talks and provide initial funding to a monitoring and verification mechanism” while promised to mobilize addition €45 million fund for European Development Fund (EDF) “to strengthen the EU response to the humanitarian crisis” (ibid).

The UN has no direct role in the mediation process as an external actor, yet it has huge presence on the ground in South Sudan through its mission in country (UNMISS), which superseded the conflict.

The relations between the GOSS and the UN deteriorated at early stages of the conflict when (13) UNMISS trucks transporting weapons manifestoes as building materials were uncovered. “The weapons were packed in crates whose labels said they contained food rations. Under the terms of its agreement with South Sudan, the U.N. is only allowed to ship its peacekeepers weapons by air, not by land” (Foreign Policy March 18, 2014).

The UN admitted its responsibility and the mistake of non-adherent to the Standard of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and “the weapons seized were claimed to belong to Ghanaian peacekeepers but the cargo wrongly labelled” (African Globe March 19, 2014)

“containers were wrongly labelled and inadvertently contained weapons and ammunition” (UNMISS statement on the seizure of weapons March 6, 2014).

The GOSS and the general public in South Sudan accused UNMISS of housing in protection camps elements of pro-Machar rebels and in some occasions white army militia members within its protection sites (AC 2 May 2014, Vol 55 - N 9: p. 2).

UNMISS' role in South Sudan continues to expand with its vital civilian protection mandate where it houses hundreds of thousands of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who are forced to take shelter either because of fighting or fearing retribution of other communities in relation to the current conflict. It accepted responsibility over the violation of the Standard of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and apologised but still denied covering elements of rebellion within its protection, then conducted search for weapons among IDPs who sought protection in the camps and managed to uncover huge numbers of rifles and pistols though refused to surrender them to the security organs of the GOSS. It destroyed these weapons transparently in the presence of its representative. Though, the UN HQs expressed an apology and was able to dispatch a high level team to investigate the circumstances of the incident it issued a press statement ahead the arrival of the team and expressed “the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is looking forward to being able to conduct this investigation in full transparency and collaboration with the authorities of South Sudan, and allow the Mission to clarify the circumstances of this unfortunate incident, ensure that it will not happen again, and defuse any misunderstanding between the United Nations and the Government of South Sudan” (Sudan Tribune March 12, 2014). The implications of this serious incident created difficult relations where mounting distrusts by the parties to the conflict of assigning a

role to the UN on Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) established by the Secession of Hostilities Agreement signed on 23 Jan 2015. The UN mission in South Sudan continues to provide logistic to the MVM in their deliverance of mandate “to protect civilians and provide humanitarian relief wherever possible” (EU Fact Sheet on South Sudan). The UNSC tries to play its leverage role through threatening targeted sanctions against people it may name as spoilers or obstructing peace. Despite the mixed reactions on which the sanctions were received and the regional and national rejection of even a wider arms embargo, it remained an attempt to skilfully engage in ending the crisis through backing African Unions efforts as well IGAD led process.

#### **2.2.8 Gaps in the Literature**

Having x-rayed what the above mentioned scholars such as Burton ( 1968) Small,(2005), Jurgen, (2009), Seer (1969) Todaro and Smith(2003) Bruce and South(1968) IGAD (2001) and King look at the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in resolving conflict in South Sudan and several others have written, we noted that these scholars have not satisfactorily and systematically addressed in the extant literature on the challenges and role played by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on South Sudan conflict resolution, conflict resolution mechanism adopted by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in resolving the South Sudan conflict and establish the effectiveness of the IGAD in dealing with the South Sudan conflict and its socio-economic and political development. These are the gaps that this study intends to fill.



### 2.3 Theoretical Framework

The theory that is employed in this research work is the functionalist theory as propounded by David Mitrany (1966) who was concerned in this his work; *A working peace system* first published in 1943 with the need to finding solution to the problems of war and peace in the international system. He further maintained the view that “there was need for a new kind of international system to replace the old one whose breakdown led to two world wars. He argued further the federal arrangements proposed by post-world war I pro-federalist would not be the frame-work for such “a international order, because it could not overcome the factors of nationalism and ideology. For even if a number of federal units could be constructed, it would still leave the world divided on competitive basis.

What influenced him (Mitrany) on functionalism was what he called ‘ramification’, an instance of collaboration among groups or entities. He observed that the development of collaboration in one technical field contribute to collaboration in other technical fields. He saw this as functional collaboration which results from the conviction or felt-need that the people must put effort together in order to achieved a common objective. (Adeniran, 2007).

In his view, the felt-need in one particular sector generated a felt need for functional collaboration in another sector. He therefore felt and concluded that functional activity change international activity and give it a orientation in such a way that people think more and more of working together rather than getting engaged in activities that conflict and lead to confrontation (Adeniran, 2007). It was his view that such functional activities could build up the foundation of political agreement and that countries would act co-operatively and voluntarily in the common interest of another.

According to Mitrany (1966) functionalism was the alternative choice. He posited that peaceful change would not come through a shift of national boundaries but the means of actions taken across them. To him, states would not surrender formal sovereignty but would transfer executive authority for specific ends. He is also of the view that world peace could best be promoted if international activities were to be organized around basis functional needs such as health care, transportation, cultural activities, welfare necessity, trade and development, scientific and even production etc, there could be as many international organization as needed and they would be arranged on a universal rather than a regional basis, with countries being under no compulsion to join. Functional union according to him would allowed all states to work together without a general political authority.

Functionalism, however, required a number of conditions. According to Mitrany, these are:

- i. The activities engaged in are selected specifically and they are organized separately, each according to its needs at the particular moment.
- ii. There are no fixed rules or organizational pattern, i.e. there is adequate flexibility.
- iii. It is the function which determined the power it needed and the organization that required to complete the task or accomplished the intended objective.
- iv. Difference functional agencies can be joined together to complete a particular task or accomplished laid down objective or even to co-ordinate a higher task; doing this, however, does not mean required any over-riding political authority.
- v. Wider problems are seen or perceived and regarded as local problems within the local government that is engaged in functional activities.

- vi. The jurisdiction of agency is only as wide as the widest limits of the functions being performed.

Functionalism had been taken up by other scholars where Mitrany left it. The concept had been developed or expanded, taking into consideration related processes which Mitrany probably over looked or paid little attention to. These scholars, for example, had developed what is referred to as neo-functionalism. This is a later version of functionalism. It still relies on organization by function by functions but it brought about function, consequences and relationships, such as the spill-over effect (Adeniran, 2007).

As the member-states saw the economic benefits resulting from activities of the central organization, neo-functionalists believed, they would be willing to give that organization broader authority. One technical task would spill-over tasks until the integrating force were virtually over-whelming. Spill-over refers to demonstration effects and aspects of sector integration. People go through a learning process and the experience in one endeavour led to task expansion and diversification or spill-over so as to bring about greater collaboration and peace. The spill-over observed in the study of the European Coal and steel Community (ECSC) had shown that once there is cooperation at one level, there could be cooperation in another area. Or once there is booming enterprise, there would be subsidiaries or complementary activities. The spill-over had been used especially by Ernst Haas, also a leading neo-state. By this, he meant a situation whereby, through peaceful and neo-coercive means, people are brought together from different nation states and they began to work and do things together (Adeniran, 2007). As a result of the above analysis, the new-functionalist organization would end up running

everything, and at stage the process of giving it political power would be little more than a formality to which the former independent states would have had no objection.

The factors that are conducive for regional integration such as economic development and a low level of ideological politics, the existence of a pluralistic social structure, are generally not found in the developing region of Africa and the world, where industrialization remained limited and pressure and necessities of nation building call for emphasis on centralization. Haas, 1967). In view of the absence of the enabling factors for integration, nevertheless, regional cooperation and integration efforts still occurred, these are due to the fact that the necessity for integration is so compelling as to force nations into integrative efforts regardless of the inappropriateness of certain background conditions. It would, therefore, be a definite restriction should one heed Haas' cautionary note and hesitate to apply the functionalists model to the study of ECOWAS integration.

Functionalism is a theory of international relations that arose during the inter-War period principally from the strong concern about the obsolescence of the state as a form of social organization. Rather than the self-interest of nation-states that realists see as a motivating factor, functionalists focus on common interests and needs shared by states (but also by non-state actors) in a process of global integration triggered by the erosion of state sovereignty and the increasing weight of knowledge and hence of scientists and experts in the process of policymaking (Rosamond, 2000).

The roots of functionalism can be traced back to the liberal/idealist tradition that started with Kant and goes as far as Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" speech (Rosamond, 2000). Functionalism is a pioneer in globalization theory and strategy. States have built

authority structures upon a principle of territorialism and state-theories were built upon assumptions that identified the scope of authority with territory (Held, 1996, Scholte: 1993, 2000, 2001), aided by methodological territorialism (Scholte 1993). However, unlike the state-theories, functionalism proposed to build a form of authority based in functions and needs, which linked authority with needs, scientific knowledge, expertise and technology; that is, it provided a supra-territorial concept of authority.

The functionalist approach excludes and refutes the idea of state power and political influence (realist approach) in interpreting the cause for such proliferation of international organizations during the inter-war (which was characterized by nation-state conflict) and the subsequent years (Wolf, 1973). According to functionalism, international integration, that is, the ‘collective governance’ and ‘material interdependence’ (Mitrany, 1933) between states, develops its own internal dynamic as states integrate in limited functional, technical, and/or economic areas. It posits that international agencies would meet human needs, aided by knowledge and expertise. The benefits rendered by the functional agencies would attract the loyalty of the populations and stimulate their participation and expand the area of integration.

The following are strong assumptions underpinning functionalism:

- i. That the process of integration takes place within a framework of human freedom;
- ii. That knowledge and expertise are currently available to meet the needs for which the functional agencies are built;
- iii. That states will not sabotage the process.

Therefore, the objective of functionalism towards global peace is achieved through functional cooperation by the work of international organizations (including intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations). The activities of functional international organizations involve taking actions on practical and technical problems rather than those of military and political nature. They are also non-controversial politically and involve a common interest to solve international problems that could best be tackled in a transnational manner (Wolf, 1973). According to David Mitrany, dealing with functional matters provides the actors in the international community the opportunity to successfully cooperate in a non-political context, which might otherwise be harder to achieve in a political context. Further development would lead to a process called “autonomous development” towards multiplication, expansion, and deepening of functional international organizations (McCormick, 1999 and Wolf, 1973). Ideally, this would ultimately result in an international government (Mitrany, 1966 and Wolf, 1973). Functionalists in this manner assume that cooperation in a non-political context would bring international peace. Eradication of existent non-political, non-military global problems, which functionalists consider to be the very origin of conflict within the global community, is what they aim to pursue (Wolf, 1973).

However, critics point out some limitations of functionalist assumption:

- i. In practice, dealing with functional matters does not necessarily and always facilitate cooperation.
- ii. Its simplified assumption overlooks different causes of state conflict (Wolf, 1973).

Hence, the proliferation of functional international organizations has occurred without adequate reorganization and coordination efforts due to a lack of central global governance to ensure accountability of such organizations (Mitrany, 1966). As a result, a pattern of decentralization could be observed among functional international organizations to the present day (Wolf, 1973). For example, the League of Nations' effort to coordinate functional international organizations in the field of social and economic cooperation through establishment of UN Economic and Social Council has been futile (Ziring, Riggs and Piano, 2005). As a result, the idea of decentralization prevails to the present day except in cases of special cooperative relationships between Economic and Social Council and some functional organizations (Ziring, Riggs and Piano, 2005). Subsequently, summits such as the World Summit for Social Development in 1995, The Millennium Summit in 2000 and World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 were held to address and coordinate functional cooperation, especially regarding the social and economic aspects (Ziring, Riggs and Piano, 2005). Thus, substantive functions of functional international organizations include human rights, international communication, health, the law of the sea, the environment, education and information, international relief programs, refugee support, and economic development (Ziring, Riggs and Piano, 2005).

In summary, the main objective of functionalism towards global peace is achieved through functional cooperation by the work of international organizations including intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (Mitrany, 1948). It emphasizes cooperation and social organization idea. Functionalists focus on common interests and needs shared by states but also by non-state actors in a process of global integration

triggered by the erosion of state sovereignty and the increasing weight of knowledge and hence of scientists and experts in the process of policy-making (Rosamond, 2000). The Functionalism theory is relevant in this study simply because of its emphasis on international integration, the collective governance and material interdependence between states (Mitrany, 1948).

### **Weakness of the Functionalism Theory to the Study**

Governments are usually unwilling and unprepared to relinquish their obligations or hand over the activities that they performed to any international or regional authority, such a move would be seen as likely to encroach upon their own sovereignty.

### **Relevance of the Functionalism Theory to the Study**

From the above discussion, what is the relevance of the functionalist theory to the present study titled ‘Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Challenges of Conflict Resolution in South Sudan. These can be summed up as follow:

- i. IGAD as an integrating body seeking for the economic and political unification of the sub-region, the functionalist theory on the other hand as a model could promote or contribute to peaceful co-existence within the sub-region.
- ii. As a result of functional activities among the states, economic unification could build up the foundation of political agreement and countries would act cooperatively and voluntarily in the common interest of one another which is the common goals of the IGAD.
- iii. The main objectives of IGAD is the political, economic and Social unification of the region which is the goal of functionalism, in terms of the functional activities that can performed together and in relation to trade and development in particular.



- iv. The choice of the functionalist theory is to examine the IGAD integration experiment is justified by the fact that the objectives of the organization as contained in the Treaty included the promotion of peaceful cooperation and integration on economic, trade, development, monetary, social and cultural activities. These are expected to ultimately lead to the establishment of an economic and monetary Union through total integration of the National economies of the East African sub-region and Africa in general.

In essence, the functionalist theory is relevant to the present study and is a model of integration in Africa context.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 Research Design**

The design describes the approach used in the selection of sample and through which survey administers the instrument. Survey represents one of the most common types of qualitative social science research, it is often used. However, a research design is simply the procedure a researcher adopted in order to carry. The study employed a survey design.

#### **3.2 Population, Sample Size and Sample Techniques**

The term population refers to the total number or the aggregate of concern, which by virtue of the common characteristics, may lead to the gathering of relevant information. The research population therefore, inclusive South Sudan Embassy 36, IGAD Permanent Representative Office at AU, Abuja, 50, Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution 166, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1789, and Ministry of Defence 403. This targeted population was chosen because they are central to the study. However, the population staff of this organizations are (2443) two thousand four hundred and forty-three respectively.

### The Population of the Study

Selected Organizations	Population of Staff in the organizations
South Sudan Embassy	36
IGAD Permanent Representative Office at AU, Abuja	50
Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution	166
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	1789
Ministry of Defence	402
Total	<b>2443</b>

*Sources: Field Work September, 2018*

A sample size is a group of items taken from the population, so that the needed information can be obtained for the purpose of analysis. As can be expected the question of how large a sample must be, to be considered adequate is not a simple one. However, Osuala (1999) states that three factors determine size of an adequate sample (i) nature of population (ii) type of sample design and (iii) degree of precision desired. Having regards to the characteristics of the research population and considering the size of the population of the entire state where respondents are to be drawn.

However, in selecting the sample size the study adopted determination formula in social sciences propounded by Yamane (1967) thus:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

When n is the sample size, N is the population size and e is the level of precision  $(0.05)^2$  thus the total population for the three organizations are (1024) thousand people based on the selected organizations, applying the formula above the sample size is determined as thus:

$$\underline{n = N}$$

$$1 + N (e)^2$$

$$\underline{n = 2443}$$

$$1 + 2443 (e)^2$$

$$\underline{n = 2443}$$

$$1 + 2443 (0.5)^2$$

$$\underline{n = 2443}$$

$$1 + 2443 (0.25)$$

$$\underline{n = 2443}$$

$$1 + 2443 \times 0.25$$

$$\underline{n = 2443}$$

$$611.75$$

$n=399.34613813$

Therefore, (400) is a sample size of the study.

### **Selected Organizations and Questionnaires Distributed**

<b>1.</b>	South Sudan Embassy	<u>36 x 400</u> 2443= 5
<b>2.</b>	IGAD Permanent Representative Office at AU, Abuja	<u>50x 400</u> 2443= 8.1
<b>3.</b>	Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution	<u>166 x 400</u> 2443= 27.1
<b>4</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affair	<u>1789 x 400</u> 2443 = 292
<b>5</b>	Ministry of Defence	<u>402 x 400</u> 2443 = 65
	<b>Total</b>	<b>400</b>

**Sources: Field Work September, 2018**

### **The Sample Population of the Questionnaire Distributed**

<b>1.</b>	South Sudan Embassy	5
<b>2.</b>	IGAD Permanent Representative Office at AU, Abuja	8
<b>3.</b>	Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution	25
<b>4</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affair	257
<b>5</b>	Ministry of Defence	60
	<b>Total</b>	<b>355</b>

*Sources: Field Work September, 2018*

The table above indicated that total number of the sample size is four hundred (400) were chosen as the sample of the study. The justification of the sample size is that the organizations was reflected or chosen, hence, purposely selected by the respondents. It is believed that in so doing, the sample selection exercise must include all the vital segment of the organizations targeted.

Sample technique refers to the sub-set or sub-grouping of the population which is to represent the whole population. Having determined the target population, the researcher must decide the way of selecting a sample or what is popularly known as sample techniques. In determining the sample technique for this study, the researcher task in the considerations of the fact that the technique nature of the investigation requires the responses of the subject with good and related knowledge of the matter. To achieve this, the study areas were various organizations selected in the sample techniques employed in the selections.

However, for the purpose of this research, the sample size is four hundred (400) respondents, the technique used for sample of the respondents was a purposive sampling technique. Four hundred (400) questionnaires were administered to the staff of the selected organizations, only three hundred and fifty five (355) questionnaires were returned thereby used for the analysis.

### **3.3 Methods of Data Collection:**

Basically, there are two main methods of data collections in this study. They are primary and secondary method.

**i. Primary Method of Data Collection:-** This involve the collection of data by the used of questionnaires, interview, field survey etc. for the purpose of this study questionnaires were used and distributed to the research respondents that were purposively sampled from general population of the study, these inclusive South Sudan Embassy, IGAD Permanent representative Office at AU, Abuja, Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Defence.

**Questionnaire:-** This study employed the use of structural questionnaire obtain from the population sampled in support of the study. The questionnaire was designed according to (Likert Pattern) of Agree, Strongly Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree or Undecided responses. Respondents were required to choose from any of the questions raised by the researcher.

**ii. Secondary Method of Data Collection:-** Data were collected from document materials like textbooks, journals, pamphlets, newspapers, magazines, symposium, internet materials, publications and other related documents on the

operation of IGAD with focus on the conflict resolution mechanism put in place to end the South Sudan conflict.

### **3.4 Techniques for Data Analysis**

Data collected for this research work were analyzed using simple statistical tools such as simple percentage, tables or frequencies distributions tables. The presentation and analysis of the data helped to explain the relationship between Intergovernmental Authority on development and challenges of conflict resolution in South Sudan.

### **3.5 Justification of Methods**

The research used two basic sources of data in the process of conducting the research. And these are primary and secondary data. One of the reasons for combining both sources is because of the nature of the research which requires that people are interviewed and that secondary materials are used to complement the primary source. There is done to need to ensure the reliability and validity of the data



## CHAPTER FOUR

### DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

#### 4.1 Presentation of data and Analysis

As stated in the preceding chapter four, while the data obtained from field survey would be descriptively presented through the use of the simple percentages and statistical method. The data analysis would also be anchored on the raw data through cross tabulation, cording and finally drawing statistical inferences

**Table 1: Age Distribution of Respondent**

Age	Frequency	Percentage
18-25	50	14.9
26-39	80	24.7
40-59	105	31.3
60 and above	100	29.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

*Field Work September, 2018*

Table 1, Shows the frequency and percentage of the respondents aged. Respondents between the Age ranges of 18-25 had 50 (14.9%) of respondents, 26-39 had 83 (24.7%), 40-59 had 105 (31.3%) which is the highest number of respondents, and 60 and above had 100 (29.8%) in the study.

**Table 2: Marital Status Distribution of Respondents**

<b>Marital Status</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Marriage	130	38.8
Single	109	32.5
Divorced	50	14.9
Widowed	46	13.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100%</b>

*Field Work September, 2018*

Table 2, Indicates the respondents of marital status, this shows that, the respondents who are Married had frequency distribution and percentage of 130 (38.8%), Single had 109 (32.5%), Divorced had 50 (14.9%) and Widowed had 46 (13.7%) of respondents responded in the study.

**Table 3: Sex Distribution of Respondents**

<b>Sex</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Male	185	55.2
Female	150	44.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100%</b>

*Field Work September, 2018*

Table 3, Reveals the sex frequency and percentage distribution of the respondents, its indicates that Male in the study participated higher based on the frequency and percentage of 185 (55.2%) and Female had frequency of 150 (44.7%) of respondents.

**Table 4: Occupation Distribution of Respondents**

<b>Occupational Level</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Civil servant	203	60.5
Diplomat	32	9.5
Military	100	29.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100%</b>

*Field Work September, 2018*

Table 4, indicates the occupations of respondents from the various selected organizations for the study. This indicates that the Civil Servants had the highest number of respondents in the study with frequency and percentage of 203 (60.5%), Diplomat had 32 (9.5%) of respondents, and Military had 100 (29.8%) of respondents.

**Table 5: Educational Distribution of the Study Respondent**

<b>Educational Level</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Secondary	23	6.8
Tertiary	312	93.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100%</b>

*Field Work September, 2018*

Table 5, Indicates the respondents' educational background, showing those respondents who attended Secondary had 23 (6.8%) and Tertiary also had 312 (93.1%) which constituted the highest number in the study.

**Table 6: Nationality of the Study Respondents**

<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Nigerians	301	89.8
South Sudanese	34	10.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100%</b>

*Field Work September, 2018*

Table 6, Shows the nationality of the respondents, Nigeria had frequency of 301 and percentage of (89.8%), while Non-Nigeria had frequency of 34 and percentage of (10.1%) in the study.

**Table 7: How effective is the IGAD in dealing with the South-Sudan conflict resolution?**

<b>Responses</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Well Effective	52	15.5
Effective	56	14.9
Fairly Effective	165	49.2
Not Effective	78	32.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100%</b>

*Field Work September, 2018*

Table 7, Reveals that 52 (15.5%) of respondents responded to 'Well Effective' that IGAD can effectively deal with the South-Sudan conflict resolution. 56 (14.9%) responded to 'Effective' 165 (49.2%) responded to 'Fairly Effective', and 78 (32.2%) responded to 'Not Effective' that IGAD is not effective to deal with the South Sudan conflict resolutions.

**Table 8: Do you agree that the South-Sudan conflict has direct linkage with the socio-economic and political development?**

<b>Responses</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Agree	65	19.4
Strongly Agree	185	55.2
Disagree	32	9.5
Strongly Disagree	39	11.6
Undecided	14	4.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100%</b>

*Field Work September, 2018*

Table 8, Shows that 65 (19.4%) of respondents responded to ‘Agreed’ 185 (55.2%) responded to ‘Strongly Agreed’ that South-Sudan conflict has direct linkage with the socio-economic and political development. 32 (9.5%) responded to ‘Disagreed’ 39 (11.6%) responded to ‘Strongly Disagreed’, that the South Sudan conflict has no any direct linkage with the social economic development. And 14 (4.1%) responded to ‘Undecided’ in the study.

**Table 9: Do you satisfied with the contribution made by the IGAD on South-Sudan conflict resolution?**

<b>Responses</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Well Satisfied	78	23.2
Satisfied	180	53.7
Fairly Satisfied	63	18.8
Not Satisfied	14	4.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100%</b>

*Field Work September, 2018*

Table 9, Indicates that 78 (23.2%) of respondents responded to ‘Well Satisfied’ 180 (53.7%) responded to ‘Satisfied’ with the contribution made by the IGAD on South-Sudan conflict resolution. 63 (18.8%) responded to ‘Fairly Satisfied’ and 14 (4.1%) responded to ‘Not Satisfied’ with the contribution made by the IGAD on South-Sudan conflict resolution in the study.

**Table 10: Do you agree that the government (in Juba) is ready to support the IGAD on how to tackle the South-Sudan conflict?**

<b>Responses</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Agree	195	58.2
Strongly Agree	63	18.8
Disagree	30	8.9
Strongly Disagree	37	11.0
Undecided	10	2.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100%</b>

*Field Work September, 2018*

Table 10, Shows that 195 (58.2%) of respondents responded to ‘Agreed’ that the government (in Juba) is ready to support the IGAD on how to tackle the South-Sudan conflict. 63 (18.8%) responded to ‘Strongly Agreed’, 30 (8.9%) responded to ‘Disagreed’, 37 (11.0%) responded to ‘Strongly Disagreed; to that, that the government (in Juba) is not ready to support the IGAD on how to tackle the South-Sudan conflict. And 10 (1.9%) maintains ‘Undecided’ in the study.

**Table 11: How will you assess the efforts of the IGAD so far in curtailing the South-Sudan conflict?**

<b>Responses</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Very Good	60	12.9
Very Excellent	210	62.6
Very High	50	14.9
Very Low	63	18.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100%</b>

*Field Work September, 2018*

Table 11, Indicates that 60 (12.9%) of respondents responded to ‘Very Good’, 210 (62.6%) responded to ‘Very Excellent’ to the efforts of the IGAD so far in curtailing the South Sudan conflict. 50 (14.9%) responded to ‘Very High, and 63 (18.8%) responded to ‘Very Low’ on the effort of the IGAD in curtailing the South Sudan conflict.

**Table 12: Is there any efforts made by the IGAD as sub-region body to tackle the humanitarian crises in South-Sudan conflict?**

<b>Responses</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Yes	250	74.6
No	45	13.4
Don’t Know	32	9.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100%</b>

*Field Work September, 2018*

Table 12, Indicates that 250 (74.6%) of respondents responded to ‘Yes’ that there is tremendous efforts made by the IGAD as sub-region body to tackle the humanitarian



crises in South-Sudan conflict. 45 (13.4%) responded to ‘No’ that there no any efforts made by the IGAD as sub-region body. And 32 (9.5%) responded to ‘Don’t Know’ in the study.

**Table 13: In your view, do you agree that the IGAD is competent to tackle the South-Sudan conflict without intervention of foreign body?**

<b>Responses</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Agree	30	8.9
Strongly Agree	50	14.9
Disagree	63	18.8
Strongly Disagree	80	53.7
Undecided	12	3.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100%</b>

*Field Work September, 2018*

Table 13, Reveals that 30 (8.9%) of respondents responded to ‘Agreed’, 50 (14.9%) responded to ‘Strongly Agreed’ that the IGAD is competent to tackle the South-Sudan conflict without intervention of foreign body. 63 (18.8%) responded to ‘Disagreed’ 80 (53.7%) responded to ‘Strongly Disagreed’ that the IGAD is not competent to tackle the South-Sudan conflict without intervention of foreign body. And 12 (3.5%) responded to ‘Undecided’ in the study.

**Table 14: In three sentences, is there any need for the IGAD to play any active role in South-Sudan conflict?**

<b>Responses</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Yes, to ensure peace and security in South Sudan	115	34.3
To protection of civilians population against genocide	130	38.8
To mediate between the warring parties involves in the conflict	100	29.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100%</b>

*Field Work September, 2018*

Table 14, Shows the need for the IGAD to play active role in South Sudan conflict. 115 (34.3%) of respondents responded to ‘Yes, to ensure peace and security in South Sudan’. 130 (38.8%) responded to ‘To protection of civilians population against genocide’, and 100 (29.8%) responded to ‘To mediate between the warring parties involves in the conflict’.

**Table 15: What are the common strategies employed by the IGAD on the management of South-Sudan conflict?**

<b>Responses</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
High Diplomatic Mediation	230	68.6
Negotiation	43	12.8
Reconciliation	48	43.3
None of the Above	14	41.1

<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100%</b>
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*Field Work September, 2018*

Table 15, Reveals the common strategies employed by the IGAD on the management of South-Sudan conflict. 230 (68.6%) of respondents responded to ‘High Diplomatic Mediation’ such as IGAD secretariat and peace ambassadors, building capacity of national security. 43 (12.8%) responded to ‘Negotiation’, 48 (43.3%) responded to ‘Reconciliation’, and 14 (41.1%) maintains ‘None of the Above’ in the study.

**Table 16: How prepared is the IGAD on the South Sudan conflict resolution?**

<b>Responses</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Well Prepared	55	16.4
Prepared	95	28.3
Fairly Prepared	165	44.2
Not Prepared	20	5.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100%</b>

*Field Work September, 2018*

Table 16, Shows that 55 (16.4%) of respondents responded to ‘Well Prepared’ 95 (28.3%) responded to ‘Prepared’ that IGAD is prepared on the South Sudan conflict resolution, while 165 (44.2%) responded to ‘Fairly Prepared’ by the IGAD on the South Sudan conflict. And 20 (5.9%) responded to ‘Not Prepared’ that IGAD is not Prepared on the South Sudan conflict resolution.

**Table 17: Do you agree that the AU/UN assisted the IGAD on South-Sudan conflict resolution?**

<b>Responses</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Agree	64	19.1
Strongly Agree	185	55.2
Disagree	45	13.4
Strongly Disagree	31	9.2
Undecided	10	2.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100%</b>

*Field Work September, 2018*

Table 17, Reveals that 64 (19.1%) of respondents responded to ‘Agreed’, 185 (55.2%) responded to ‘Strongly Agreed’ that the AU/UN assisted the IGAD on South-Sudan conflict resolution. 45 (13.4%) responded to ‘Disagreed’, that the AU/UN are not assisted the IGAD on South-Sudan conflict resolution, 31 (9.2%) responded to ‘Strongly Disagreed’, and 10 (2.9%) responded to ‘Undecided’ in the study.

**Table 18: Do you agree the South-Sudan government contributed to genocide against civilian population in the conflict?**

<b>Responses</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Agree	100	29.8
Strongly Agree	123	51.6
Disagree	31	9.2
Strongly Disagree	24	7.1
Undecided	7	2.0

<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100%</b>
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*Field Work September, 2018*

Table 18, Shows that 100 (29.8%) of respondents responded to ‘Agreed’, 123 (51.6%) responded to ‘Strongly Agreed’ that the South-Sudan government contributed to genocide against civilian population in the conflict. 31 (9.2%) responded to ‘Disagreed’ with this opinion, 24 (7.1%) responded to ‘Strongly Disagreed’, and 7 (0.2%) remains ‘Undecided’ in the study.

**Table 19: What are the role played by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on South-Sudan conflict Resolution?**

<b>Responses</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Protection of civilian against genocide and catastrophic	75	22.3
Conflict perversion and management	65	19.4
Calling the attention of International Communities on humanitarianand emergencies response in the conflict	107	30.4
Available resources needed to cope with the situation coordinating emergencies situation and serving about daily warning system in the region	93	27.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100%</b>

*Field Work September, 2018*

Table 19, Indicates the roles played by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on South-Sudan conflict Resolution, 75 (22.3%) of respondents responded to

‘Protection of civilian against genocide and catastrophic’, 65 (19.4%) responded to ‘Conflict perversion and management’, 107 (30.4%) responded to ‘Calling the attention of International Communities on humanitarian and emergencies response in the conflict’, and 93 (27.7%) responded to ‘Available resources needed to cope with the situation coordinating emergencies situation and serving about daily warning system in the region’

**Table 20: What are the specific challenges confronting the IGAD in resulting the South-Sudan conflict?**

<b>Responses</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Resource such as lack of disbursement of funds pledged by IGAD members state is one of the major challenges confronting the IGAD on south Sudan conflict resolution	110	32.8
The inability of the parties involves in the conflict to arrive at the compromised which believed the major challenge	125	37.3
The south Sudan government frequency boycott the IGAD on peace accord on the conflict management	100	29.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100%</b>

*Field Work September, 2018*

Table 20, Shows the specific challenges confronting the IGAD in resulting the South-Sudan conflict. 110 (32.8%) of respondents responded to ‘Resource is one of the major

challenges confronting the IGAD on south Sudan conflict resolution’. Resources such as lack of disbursement of funds pledged by IGAD members states which results in absence of military capacity, poor coordination among others which makes lack of fund and resources a major challenge. 125 (37.3%) responded to ‘The inability of the parties involves in the conflict to arrive at the compromised which believed the major challenge. 100 (29.8%) responded to ‘The south Sudan government frequently boycott the IGAD on peace accord on the conflict management’ making lack of partiality in mediation processes a challenge. This is as a result of political interference as well as external interference and interests from Uganda, and other neighbouring countries. Leaders not respecting peace agreements as well as bias from regional leaders.

**Table 21: What are the conflict resolution mechanisms adopted by the IGAD in resolving the South-Sudan conflict?**

<b>Responses</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Mediation Mechanism	82	24.4
Conflict prevention, management and resolution through dialogue	121	36.1
Involvement of international Donor and organization to assist in managing the conflict and ensure peace and security.	132	39.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100%</b>

*Field Work September, 2018*

Table 21, Indicates the conflict resolution mechanisms adopted by the IGAD in resolving the South-Sudan conflict. 82 (24.4%) of respondents responded to ‘Mediation

Mechanism’, 121 (36.1%) responded to ‘Conflict prevention, management and resolution through dialogue’ 132 (39.4%) responded to ‘Involvement of international Donor and organization to assist in managing the conflict and ensure peace and security’.

#### **4.2. Discussion of Findings**

- i. The finding of this study shows that there are specific challenges confronting the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in her efforts to resolved conflict in South Sudan. Some of these challenges include the lack of resources, absence of military capability, poor coordination among others.
- ii. The findings of this study reveals that the IGAD cannot effectively tackle the South Sudan conflict without the intervention of foreign body. The out-comes of the findings further explain that effective measures are mechanism must be adopted by the IGAD to enable them deal with conflict effectively in the region.
- iii. The findings shows that the South Sudan government is not fully accepting the IGAD on conflict resolution mechanism on how to resolve the conflict in South Sudan. The IGAD has played a very significant role towards ensuring peace and stability on the South Sudan conflict resolution. The IGAD and AU went into diplomatic negotiation together with South Sudan government to ensure the warring parties come into agreement so that peace and stability can be restored in the region.
- iv. The findings also reveals that the international communities were indirectly dictating the IGAD on how to confronting conflict in the region. The IGAD on the other side relied on the international community’s to support them with



necessary assistance to enable them carrying out their statutorily security functions. Hence believe that the IGAD lack resources and military strength to tackle any security challenges confronting her domain especially on war and terrorism. This is evident in the interpretation of table 20 which states in its last paragraph that political interference as well as external interference constituted a challenge to IGAD in the South Sudan conflict.

- v. Finally, the research finding indicates that South Sudan conflict has a truly direct connection with the socio-economic and political development. Poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, inequality and absence of development were among the exogenous factors that triggered conflict in South Sudan

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.1. Summary**

The study examines the conflict-ridden over the years of experience in conflict involving countries like Somalia, South Sudan, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra-Leone, Liberia, etc. The spill-over effects of these conflict into neighbouring states necessitates the involvement of other countries, global institutions and regional organization like the Africa Union (AU), The United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), among others, in what may be conventionally called domestic affairs of such conflict ridden countries.

Conflicts enters a violent phase when parties go beyond seeking to attain their goals peacefully, and try to dominate, damage or destroy the opposing parties' ability to pursue their own interest. The existence of frustration of substantive (physical, social affection, self-esteem, and self-actualization) or implemental needs (security, knowledge, and power) is the essential condition for responses is produced when certain innate needs or demands are deeply frustrated". In political conflict analysis the use of force, physical damages and human casualties' thresholds are commonly used to define violent conflict, particularly in respect of war. An "aggressive manifest conflict, which the term that Sandole use to describe violent conflict, which according to his definition represents: A situation in which at least two parties, or their representatives, attempt to pursue their perception of mutually incompatible goals by physical damaging or destroying the property and high-value symbols of one another (e.g. religious shrines, national

monuments); and/or psychologically or physically injuring, destroying, or otherwise forcible eliminating one another.

The conflict resolution approach and its own part consider on-going conflicts as a result of unsatisfied human needs (kelman and fisher, 2003). This approach differentiates interests that are changeable or negotiable, from needs, which are quasi natural phenomenon. Here, security, justice and recognition are to be mentioned among the others' needs and values. The approach intends not to end the conflict as such, but to transform it into a non-violent conflict Burton, (1990). Burton outlined a wide spectrum of methods (like mediation, negotiations, or arbitration) in order to convert the respective conflict into a situation acceptable for both sides. This approach aims at improving communication between the conflicting parties and the development of mutual understanding for the interest of each side.

The ability for mutual respect and reciprocal understanding in the respect of the interest in conflict is required to lead both parties toward sustainable and acceptable solution. This mutual respect and reciprocal understanding bothers on the socio-economic and cultural life of the group concerned. Unfortunately, research on conflict management framework in Africa has shown that regional actors lack objectivity, neutrality and impartiality Olonisakin, (2000). Given that they may have vested interests in the resolution or course of the conflict in their neighbourhood. This is almost always true of individual or group actors, whether they are acting alone or under the umbrella of an organization. As a result, their credibility may be in question when they respond to conflict or crisis in their backyard.

The issue of peace and security has been the priority in the Horn of Africa region to harmonies and coordinate peacemaking and building activities. And, IGAD works in one of its priority area, that is, conflict prevention, management and resolution in the Horn of Africa. This is because, now days, economic growth and poverty reduction programs are associated with the peace and security agenda. So to secure sustainable development, common security is the major prerequisite. Thus, the issue of peace and security in the Horn of Africa is prioritized after revitalization of IGAD and it moves ahead a broader development mandate.

The importance of regional peace and security strategy is indisputable to contain and manage conflicts in the region and harmonize and coordinate peacemaking and building activities. IGAD endorsed its first peace and security strategy during the 2003 summit. Elements of IGAD peace and security architecture are already in place, starting with the obligations of all member states imposed by the UN Charter and the Constitutive Act of the AU to participate in advancing the international collective security (IGAD, 2016). There are also IGAD-specific agreements and mechanisms that indicate the collective aspirations of member states for mutual security including the Agreement Establishing IGAD (1996), Program on Conflict Prevention.

The common strategies IGAD has employed in the management of the conflict in South Sudan are: engaging high diplomatic mediation such as IGAD secretariat and peace ambassadors, building capacities of national security, making ultimatums for different leaders, use of Gacaca courts like the ones used in Rwanda and coming up with an early warning system for conflict eruption in South Sudan respectively.

Some of the measures IGAD has taken to mitigate the security threats in South Sudan are: IGAD has sent its mission in Sudan to help mitigate the crisis/Offered reinforcement, Employ early warning mechanisms to prevent conflict, approval of Protection & Deterrence Force (PDF) to come to South Sudan, special coordination with UNMISS peacekeepers battalion on conflicts zones, deployment of monitors through the Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms (MVM) (Susan, 2013), built capacities of national security and built capacity of South Sudanese security organs.

The biggest challenge IGAD has faced in its South Sudan conflict management efforts has been political interference as well as external interference and interests from Uganda, Sudan, and other neighbouring countries. Others were; lack credibility since one of IGAD members is directly involve in the conflict and also lack of partiality in mediation processes, IGAD member states and secretariat display their lack of a genuine grasp of South Sudanese socio-cultural dynamics, lack of public cooperation, lack of key security infrastructure in the country, lack of funds and resources and leaders not respecting peace agreements as well as bias from regional leaders. Few regional organizations or bodies have successfully intervened in the conflict between 201 1-2013, however about 7,000 African Union troops have slowly been deployed in Darfur on a very limited mandate, The UN secretarial council has been consistent across the country and emphasizes protection of civilians, human rights reporting, EAC, SADDCC, ECOWAS and Church based organizations also participate somehow in ending the on-going conflict in South Sudan. Some of other possible solutions to the conflict in South Sudan engaging in home based negotiations like those that took place in Somalia (Fight against Warlords.

## **5.2 Conclusions**

The study concluded that IGAD and its member states have contributed much time and political capital to containing and resolving the civil war in South Sudan. So far they have failed due to internal divisions and power struggles; centralisation of decision-making and lack of institutionalisation; and too much focus on political elites. It will take further political effort from IGAD to resolve its differences and an investment in IGAD-PLUS by its members for it to succeed in ending South Sudan's war. Regional heads of state will need to compromise with one another on a unified political strategy with the support of the AU's high representative. IGAD-PLUS members should clearly outline the pressures and incentives they can bring to the table to support this strategy. A dedicated UN envoy for South Sudan and Sudan can represent the UN and encourage the wider international community to adopt a more unified approach, so as to use the necessary and contextually appropriate tools to prod the recalcitrant South Sudanese parties to agreement. However imperfect the process is, IGAD-PLUS is the last, best chance for peace in the near-term and its success is critical to avoiding further deterioration in South Sudan and the region.

The approach of conflict mediating, negotiating and resolution of any conflicts situation. This could be the only situation to peaceful conflict transformation. The international bodies must provide interventions to prevent negative prognoses while the local actors must maintain and be clear to the needs, and rights of the people in bringing satisfaction peaceful culture and structure.

The past must be cleared for the better future as a matter of reconciliation, creating self-sustaining virtuous cycles of peace as an ideal option to peaceful relation. In power

sharing a board of compromise must be drawn between the conflicting parties hence lasting solutions.

There is need to respect peace pact and respect on the agreement on power sharing for proper governance and power balance.

The approach of mediation, dialogue, conflict mapping, legitimizing and bridging the contracting goals must be reconciled amicably to sustain peaceful relations. There is need to realize that the warring communities can always solve their problems without influence of external factors as the case of Sudan.

There is need to beef up the African Union force with extra resources and equipment as the first step in a three-phased proposal by the UN to ease the crisis deployment of several hundred soldiers and police officers to help the AU troops.

African troops should get UN logistical support and there should be substantial UN involvement in the command and control of the peacekeepers and special representative to lead the joint force appointed by the UN and the AU.

There is need for disarmament of civilians and border security control to avoid illegal import and export of small arms and light weapons

### **5.3 Recommendations**

It is therefore very important that this research work provides solution for reaching recommendations extracted from the key findings of the study. The following recommendations were made:

- i.** There should be more international pressure to discourage the government of South Sudan from involvement in undermining the security of its citizens. Instead, the of South Sudan should be barred from holding leading roles in some multilateral structures, as the (AU) did when it refused the Khartoum regime its championship. Such status could only be regained when progress has been made towards the restoration of peace, human dignity and good governance in the South Sudan.
- ii.** Regional unity and Inter-ethnic Corporation in South Sudan should be fast-tracked by promoting comprehensive dialogue among the South Sudan key stakeholders, including civil society groups, traditional leaders, youth and women's movements, on the state of human security and how that affects the region post-conflict in reconstruction. This dialogue would create the platform and framework for each stakeholder outlines its positive contribution towards peace building in the region.
- iii.** The IGAD should put more pressure and inducements to bring the warring parties to an agreement, which could include the use of force, UN sanctions and criminal accountability, as well as development and security assistance, an economic bail-out and political guarantees.
- iv.** In a stage by stage approach, the agenda for the South Sudan peace talks should also include a reconciliation process between the victims and perpetrators of crime, especially those localized cases that didn't merit attention by the ICC, adopting reconciliation best practice learned from other conflict which could help to heal the psychological scars of the conflict.



- v.** The IGAD and AU should endeavour to establish a proper and active conflict resolution mechanism that could positively tackle the incessant reoccurrence of conflict in Africa continent. The AU should also quickly participate actively in conflict prevention, resolution, management, transformation, peacekeeping and peace enforcement in the continent.
- vi.** The peace process should also accord the regional status to that accorded to South Sudan to put the country in a better positions for the citizenry to participate constructively in national politics and equitable distribution of national resources and services. This might entail the appointment of others ethnics groups for the purpose to achieved the national government.
- vii.** The IGAD should not heavily depends on Western regional organizations, International Communities and United Nations to come to their aids to enable carryout their statutorily functions. The IGAD should come out with new political will and new mechanism that would make them effective to deal with economic, political and security challenges in the region.
- viii.** The IGAD should improve democratization process and politics in the region so that there are level playing ground for all citizenry to have opportunity for participating in political and decision making process. In this context, the IGAD must guarantee human right violations, freedom of expression, democracy and rule of law etc.
- ix.** The IGAD should always take prompt actions to conflict affected areas and ensure that the root courses of the conflict are identified and treated appropriately

to prevent the future reoccurrence of conflict in region. The report panels which investigated the factual root of the conflict must implemented without any delay.

- x. The provision of security should not be best on power centred or state-centric perspectives. It should rather take into consideration complex emerging factors that are critical to the creations of stable peaceful living conditions in the country.

#### **5.4. Limitations of the Study**

The limitations of the study is among other that the inaccessibility to all or most important materials and as well as the general problems with secondary data that is subjective opinion often inform their conclusion. But however, the researcher overcomes the challenges through thoroughly examination and across examination of the facts by the writer's in the field and thereby drawn conclusion. Also time, cost resources such as finance which culminated in the challenges experienced in the cause of carrying out the study.

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## **Appendix ‘A’**

### **QUESTIONNAIRE**

Department of Political Science,

Faculty of Social Sciences,

Nasarawa State University, Keffi.

PMB 1022.

3<sup>rd</sup> September, 2018

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am a post Graduate Student of the above named University, undertaking a research on the “Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Challenges of Conflict Resolution in South Sudan: 2013-2016. This research is purely for academic purpose and your responses will be treated with utmost secrecy and confidentiality. Please kindly respond to the following questions. I am grateful for your anticipated cooperation.

Yours Faithfully

Ibrahim Mohammed Surajo

**NSU/SS/MSC/IRL/0089/16/17**

## SECTION ‘A’

### Demography Survey

Age: 18-25 ( ) 26-39 ( ) 40-59 ( ) 60 and above ( )

Marital Status: Married ( ) Single ( ) Divorce ( ) Widower ( )

Sex: Male ( ) Female ( )

Occupation: Civic Servant ( ) Diplomat ( ) Military ( )

Educational level: Secondary ( ) Tertiary ( )

Nationality .....

## SECTION B

1. How effective is the IGAD in dealing with the South-Sudan conflict and its socio-economic and political development?
  - a. Well Effective (b) Effective (c) Fairly Effective (d) Not Effective
2. Do you agree that the South-Sudan conflict has direct linkage with the socio-economic and political development?
  - a. Agreed (b) Strongly Agree (c) Disagree (c) Strongly Disagree (d) Undecided
3. Do you satisfied with the contribution made by the IGAD on South-Sudan conflict resolution?
  - (a) Well Satisfied (b) Satisfied (c) Fairly Satisfied (d) Not Satisfied

4. Do you agree that the government (in Juba) is ready to support the IGAD on how to tackle the South-Sudan conflict?  
(a) Agree (b) Strongly Agree (c) Disagree (d) Strongly Disagree (e) Undecided
5. How will you assess the efforts of the IGAD so far in curtailing the South-Sudan conflict?  
(a) Very Good (b) Excellent (c) Credible (d) None of the above
6. Is there any efforts made by the IGAD as sub-region body to tackle the humanitarian crises in South-Sudan conflict?  
Yes ( ) No ( ) Don't Know ( )
7. In your view, do you agree that the IGAD is competent to tackle the South-Sudan conflict without intervention of foreign body?  
(a) Agree (b) Strongly Agree (c) Disagree (d) Strongly Disagree (e) Undecided
8. What are the common strategies employed by the IGAD on the management of South-Sudan conflict?  
(a) High Diplomatic Mediation (b) Negotiation (c) Reconciliation (d) None of the above
9. How prepared is the IGAD on the South Sudan conflict resolution? (a) Well Prepared (b) Prepared (c) Fairly Prepared (d) Not Prepared
10. Do you agree AU/UN assisted the IGAD on South-Sudan conflict resolution? (a) Agree (b) Strongly Agree (c) Disagree (d) Strongly Disagree (e) Undecided
11. Do you agree the South-Sudan government contributed to genocide against civilian population in the conflict? (a) Agree (b) Strongly Agree (c) Disagree (d) Strongly Disagree (e) undecided

12. In three sentences, is there any need for IGAD to play an active role in South- Sudan conflict

1.....

2.....

3.....

13. What are the role played by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on South-Sudan conflict Resolution?.....

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14. What are the specific challenges confronting the IGAD in resulting the South-Sudan conflict.....

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15. What are the conflict resolution mechanisms adopted by the IGAD in resolving the South-Sudan conflict? .....

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