

**THE CHALLENGE OF MANAGING INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS  
(IDPs) ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY OF  
MAIDUGURI METROPOLITAN AND BAMA LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
COUNCILS, BORNO STATE**

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ZARIA, NIGERIA**

**FEBRUARY, 2020**

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**BEING A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE  
STUDIES, AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF  
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MPhil IN POLICY AND  
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES**

**DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES  
FACULTY OF ADMINISTRATION  
AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY,  
ZARIA, NIGERIA**

**FEBRUARY, 2020**

## **DECLARATION**

I declare that the work in this Project titled “The Challenge of Managing Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) On Local Government Administration: A Study of Maiduguri Metropolitan and Bama Local Government Councils, Borno State” has been carried out by me in the Department of Local Government and Development Studies. The information derived from the literature has been dully acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided. No part of this dissertation was previously presented for another degree or diploma at this or any institution.

**TAHIRU Shettima**  
**P15ADLG9005**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Signature**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Date**

## CERTIFICATION

This thesis titled “THE CHALLENGE OF MANAGING INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS) ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY OF MAIDUGURI METROPOLITAN AND BAMA LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS, BORNO STATE” by TAHIRU, Shettima meets the regulations governing the award of MPhil Policy and Development Studies in the Department of Local Government and Development Studies, Faculty of Administration, Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) Zaria and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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Chairman, Supervisory Committee

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Date

## **DEDICATION**

This research work is dedicated to the entire Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Borno State.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

All praises are due to Allah, the lord of the universe and its content. Much thanks to Him whose adoration is bestowed upon and who gave me the knowledge, wisdom, patience and opportunity to display and contribute my little quota to the development of intellectualism. My profound gratitude goes to my supervisors Prof. Bashir Jumare and Dr. Adamu Sanusi Gambo for their support and guidance throughout the period of the research. Also, my regard goes to the entire lecturers of the Department of Local Government and Development Studies, for their academic and moral/emotional supports within the period of this program.

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## ABSTRACT

Management of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) has been an issue of concern to all levels of government and agencies in Nigeria in recent years as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency and other conflicts. So much human and financial resources have been committed to effectively manage the IDPs, but in spite of the efforts to ensure the effective management of these people, there are still manifestation of problems that include poor shelter, poor food supply, poor health facilities, security breaches and host of others. This study therefore assessed the challenges of managing Internally Displaced Persons on Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (MMC) and Bama Local Government. Based on this, data were collected through both primary and secondary sources. The primary source included questionnaire, interview and observation that provided the research with firsthand information, while the secondary sources included existing government documents on food and other items supplied to IDPs, financial and material support given to IDPs by the international organizations and donors and official gazettes from World Bank, which provided the research with second hand information. Data were presented using percentages and tables and further analyzed using chi-square non-parametric inferential tool. Based on the data collected and analyzed, the four hypotheses were all rejected as the P. values were less than the level of significance of 0.05. In line with this, the study revealed among others that shortage and non-qualification of human resources significantly affects the management of IDPs, the financial capacity of the two local governments significantly affected the management of the two IDP camps in the two local governments. Based on the findings, the study recommended among others that the two local governments should employ and train competent staff/human resources to effectively manage IDPs. That the budgetary allocation

of the two Local Government Areas should be increased by 30% to accommodate the bulk of needs and problems of the IDPs of Maiduguri Metropolitan Council and Bama camps.



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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

DTM	-	Displacement Tracking Matrix
FGN	-	Federal Government of Nigeria
FRN	-	Federal Republic of Nigeria
HI	-	Alternate Hypothesis
HO	-	Null Hypothesis
IDPs	-	Internally Displaced Persons
IOM	-	International Organization for Migration's
LGAs	-	Local Government Areas
MMC	-	Maiduguri Metropolitan Council
NCFR	-	National Commission for Refugees
NEMA	-	National Emergency Management Agency
NGOs	-	Non-governmental Organizations
SEMA	-	State Emergency Management Agency
SJLGA	-	State Joint Local Government Account
UNICEF	-	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Background to the Study**

The world is characterized by disasters and chaos which have led to the loss of lives and properties, thereby leading many people displaced from their homes. In Nigeria like other countries of the world, which include, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan, have all experienced internal displacement as a result of conflicts. In Nigeria the Numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have been on increase as a result of Boko-Haram insurgency in North- East. According to International Organization for Migration's (IOM) (2016) of the total figure of IDPs, 13.33 percent were displaced due to communal clashes, 0.99 percent by natural disasters and 85.65 percent as a result of insurgency attacks by Islamists group.

The increase in the number of people displaced is alarming in Borno State as many have left their ancestral home. In the word of IOM (2016) there are 2,241,484 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Nigeria as of February, 2016. According to the report, this figure is particularly based on an assessment conducted from November to December 2015 by the International Organization for Migrations (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) team in 207 Local Government Areas covering 13 states of Northern Nigeria. The North-Eastern states of Nigeria continue to suffer massive population movement on a large scale arising from Boko- Haram insurgency. The three states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe recorded Millions of IDPs. This excludes those that have qualified as refugees across Nigeria's International Borders like Chad, Niger, and Cameroon among others. Scores of settlements have even been attacked several times such that their populations have been decimated (Clean Foundation, 2015).



It is amazing that the IDPs are scattered across different parts of the country. Despite scattered IDPs across different parts of Nigeria, only few of them are legally established and managed by the Government. Ibrahim (2016) notes that out of over fifty (50) IDPs camps in Maiduguri, only 19 are established and managed by the government. However, the problem of terrorism and management of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Maiduguri Metropolitan Council and Bama Local Government have affected the mandate of the two councils in terms of provision of infrastructural facilities and rural community development as millions of Naira have been spent on the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

Overtime a lot of IDPs face a lot of problems in Borno, Bama and Nigeria as a whole. These problems are enormous, and it's really a personal matter for every refugee. Nevertheless, it's possible to determine the Top 5 Problems of IDP;

**Lack of Government Help:** The Government especially the federal government of Nigeria leaves Internally Displaced Citizens to fend for themselves. They do not have enough financial support from the Government. Most of the support for IDP comes from volunteers and international organizations. The Federal Government has not organized any adequate policy towards IDP. Moreover, it seems that the IDP of Nigeria is mostly recognizable by international organizations, but not the country.

**Lack of Financial Support:** Thousands of people in Nigeria have been internally displaced from their homes. Neither government nor volunteers can provide them with sufficient financial support. Therefore, these people have difficulties not only with finding a place to live but also no money to feed their children.

**Intolerance:** One of the political leaders of Nigeria has said that Nigeria is not a country or nation. It's a name of a land where four hundred tribes converge. Nigeria has problems

with inner tolerance towards her people. Two different tribes may be sworn enemies, and they may have problems when it comes to overcoming their differences even during turbulent times.

**Lack of Medical Supplies:** One of the main contributors towards medical supplies for internally displaced persons is international organizations. The United Nation continues to provide humanitarian aid to the conflict zones in Nigeria. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also provided medical help and eases the problems of Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria.

**Violence:** The United Nations representatives continue to bring awareness to the issue of violence towards Internally Displaced People in Nigeria. One of the reasons for that is the misunderstanding of the meaning of IDP. Some Nigerians see IDP as a threat to their jobs. Moreover, there are also reports of violence on the basis of religion. The UN has expressed their concerns towards these acts of violence.

Based on the practical issues discussed, studying the challenge of managing Internally Displaced Persons on local government administration becomes imperative.

## **1.2 Statement of the Research Problem**

The Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) comprise of male and female, old and young who left their homes to seek refuge in the camps. The IDPs are supposed to be managed properly considering the trauma they have gone through in the process of leaving their homes, but instead, the situation of the IDPs in the camps is nothing to write home about as many are malnourished, starved and raped, couple with high rate of poverty. According to the UNICEF (2015) the most recently opened camp in Maiduguri, Dalori camp have an estimated 15,000 IDPs and by far has the greatest health needs with thousands of men, women and children arriving malnourished, dehydrated and

exhausted. Between 20<sup>th</sup> March and 19<sup>th</sup> May 2015, 73 deaths were recorded in Dalori camp with a crude mortality rate of 0.92/ 10,000 per day.

The elderly (60 years and above) were the most affected comprising 51 percent of the deaths recorded followed by children fewer than 5 comprising 33 percent of the deaths recorded. This to Ibrahim (2016) was as a result of the poor administration of IDPs camps by different stakeholders, which has affected the well being of the displaced persons thereby denying them access to quality health services and better educational opportunities. In some camps access to food is a problem. This is as a result of the poor management of the IDPs camps. In this regard, in some camps NEMA/SEMA introduced food rationing arrangement for the IDPs based on the ability of respective local governments' contribution to the wellbeing of their IDPs in a camp (NEMA, 2015).

Putting it differently, Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (MMC) and Bama Local Government have spent a lot of money and resources to cater for their people who are in the IDPs camps, so that the trauma of insurgency is dealt with but all the resources and money spent by these two local government councils have affected their statutory responsibilities of providing infrastructures such as schools, health, water and agriculture among others. Some writers attributed the problem to insufficient trained IDP camp staff to manage the affairs of the Internally Displaced Persons, while other writers are of the view that insufficient financial resources is the main obstacle towards effective and efficient management of the IDPs as well as the effects of managing IDPs on local government administration. Others observed that, the problems are attributed to poorly defined areas of jurisdiction between and among the tiers of government on their roles in managing the affairs of the IDPs.

It is against this background that this research seeks to examine the challenge of managing Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) on local government administration of Maiduguri Metropolitan Council and Bama Local Government Areas of Borno State.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

The research intends to answer some vital questions, about challenges of managing Internally Displaced Persons on local government administration in Maiduguri Metropolitan and Bama Local Government of Borno State.

- i. How has the management of IDPs affected the administration of MMC and Bama local government areas?
- ii. What is the jurisdiction of the two local governments in managing IDPs?
- iii. To what extent are the human resources adequate in the effective management of the IDP camps of Maiduguri Metropolitan Council and Bama local government areas?
- ii. How has the financial capacity of the two local government areas affected the management of IDP camps?

### **1.4 The Objectives of the Study**

The objectives that this study is set to achieve are:

- i. To examine the extent to which management of IDPs affected the administration of MMC & BAMA Local Government Area.
- ii. To find out the jurisdiction of the 2 Local Government Areas in Managing IDPs
- iii. To determine the adequacy of human resources for the effective management of IDPs in the two Local Government.

- iv. To ascertain the financial capacity of the two local government areas in the management of IDPs

## **1.5 Hypotheses**

Ho<sub>1</sub>: There is no significant relationship between sufficient human resources and effective management of IDPs in Maiduguri Metropolitan Council and Bama local government.

Ho<sub>2</sub>: There is no significant relationship between financial capacity of the two local governments and effective management of IDPs.

Ho<sub>3</sub>: Jurisdictional Authority of the two local government areas has no relationship with the management of IDPs.

Ho<sub>4</sub>: There is no significant relationship between the management of IDPs and Administration of MMC & BAMA local government Areas.

## **1.6 Justification and Significant of the Study**

It is a known fact that for every research carried out, there must be justification. In a research carried out by Priscilla Kaumrugi (2013) on the Municipalities and IDPs outside of camps. A case of Kenya's Integrated Displaced Persons, the study argued that internally displacement in Kenya has occurred periodically throughout the country's history, resulting from a diverse range of causes which include politically- instigated violence; Land and boundary disputes, natural disasters such as drought and other impacts of climate change; floods and landslides; development projects such as the construction of dams, roads and hydro-electric power plants, cattle rustling; conflicts over access water and pasture, environmental conservation projects, activities of local – level armed groups/gangs. According to the researcher, since the early 1990s transition

to democracy, displacement occurred primarily in ethnically- mixed regions. However, the problem has spread and is now felt in nearly all parts of the country including international border areas and lands inhabited by pastoralists. The paper found out that the main and most devastating cause of internal displacement in Kenya is politically – motivated ethnic violence which tends to recur during general elections held every five years.

Similarly, Mohammed and Ahmed (2015) carried out a research on the effect of insurgency on Borno State economy (2008-October 2014). The objective of the study is to analyse the effect of insurgency on the trade relationship between Borno State and her immediate neighbours. The study revealed that prior to the insurgency, annual grain flow trade partners was 294000 tonnes however, the flow of grain decreased to 94,500 tons by second quarter of 2014. The study also revealed that the major cause of the insurgency aside of corruption and arrogant display of affluence by the elitist class was unrealized political will. The study therefore recommended that genuine development and appropriate integrative program should form the basis for governance.

Obikaeze and Onuoha (N.D) carried out a research on the Nigerian state and Management of internally displaced persons from 2012-2016. The aim of the paper was to investigate inter alia, how Nigerian government has effectively managed IDPs. The paper observed that there are still problems in resettlement and protection of IDPs in the country. The paper therefore recommended that there should be an urgent need to embark on a holistic and well coordinated approach with the help of foreign nations to effectively engage in technical and military actions in order to completely displace Boko Haram Insurgents from those deadly enclaves in Nigeria and beyond.

Priscilla Kaumrugi. The study failed to state clearly the method placed on ground to curtail ethnic violence and also the extent of the crisis over the years. The methodology used in the study is not clearly stated.

Mohammed and Ahmed (2015) observed that since the study is on impact, the methodology did not take in to consideration both the primary and secondary sources of data, the instrument of analysis that was supposed to be used is regression which is inferential but the study used descriptive analysis. The study also failed to indicate how it got its sample size and the formula used to get the sample size.

Obikaeze and Onuoha (2013) in their study failed to use the appropriate methodology. He supposed to use both questionnaire and interview to reach conclusion. Also, the instrument of analysis used was not stated in the work. The study is limited as government officials were not met to sample their opinions. The time frame of the work is not included in the study.

This study attempted to bridge the gaps identified in the study conducted by other researchers mentioned. Therefore this research work employed chi-square statistical analysis so as to get the effect of managing internally displaced persons (IDPs) on local government administration, since regression analysis measure the effect of independent variable on dependent variable.

This research tends to bridge the gap by examining the challenges of managing internally displaced persons and its impact on local government administration in Maiduguri Metropolitan and Bama local government councils. The findings of this research work will no doubt benefit the government both at the national and state level. It will equally benefit scholars, researchers, foreign bodies, non-governmental organizations, the medial and the general public.

The findings of this research shall be of benefit to the governments and policy planners of Borno state and Nigeria, in the sense that the study will provides them with more insight in coming up with improved managerial techniques for handling the internally displaced as well as for tackling the causes and reducing the impacts of internal displacement on the local government administration. The study shall benefit governmental and humanitarian agencies, national and international, that are concerned with the welfare of the internally displaced persons. Besides, the findings of the research shall help citizens of both local government councils become well aware of the issues of IDP(s) and their rights. The internally displaced themselves shall gain from the findings of the research: they shall become aware of the rights and privileges accruing to people of their status. Again, the findings of the research shall contribute to knowledge especially future researchers who might endeavour to undertake research on IDPs. Adopt

### **1.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study**

This research work undertook an assessment of the efforts of these two local governments in managing the IDPs and the impact of IDPs on their administration. The research looked into the efforts made by the local governments in managing the IDPS. This research work covers the period between 2009-2016 reason being that it was the period of pick of insurgency and manifestations of managing the internally displaced persons in the two Local Government Areas. Another justification for the choice of time frame is the financial resources committed toward managing the IDPs in the camps of the two Local Government Areas. The problem of insurgency which led to internal displacement in Borno State started right in 2009. The choice of MMC and Bama Local Government Areas is on the fact that the two Local Government Areas were highly vulneprable L.G.As and strong IDP camps were established to manage the affairs of



IDPS. Another justification is the fact that MMC is an Urban Local Government While Bama is a rural Local Government Area which makes it good for analysis.

The study faced some difficulties in the area of sourcing for data especially on the security issues. In which information are always treated as confidential matters. The study was also limited to the area of a coverage as the two (2) Local Government are far from each other which makes it difficult for the researcher to shuttle between the two (2) local government areas. Safety of the researcher was also another challenge as some angles of the two local government areas are vulnerable for attaches at any point in time. Nevertheless, the researcher was pro-active to overcome these challenges through commitment, sacrifice and hard work to make the research a valid one.

## **1.8 Operational Definition of Terms**

**Jurisdictional Authority of Local Government:** In this context of research, jurisdictional authority of Local government refers to the areas of authority or functions of Local Governments as contained in the fourth schedules of 1999 constitution as amended.

**Human Resources Requirement:** in this study, Human Resources Requirement refers to the specific skills, capabilities or attributes available in the Local Government for the effective management of the IDP camps.

**Financial Capacity Requirement in the IDP Management:** In this study, financial capacity refers to the financial limit or the amount of money required for the provision of basic necessities for the internally displaced persons in the camps by the two local government.

**Effective IDP Management:** In this study, Effective IDP management refers to the extent which the two Local Government achieve their target in managing the affairs IDPs successfully and efficiently.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter focuses on the review of concepts related to the work which include Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Local Government Administration, Constitutional provisions of Local Government in Nigeria, Management of IDPs in Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (MMC) and Bama Local Government Areas, key Aspects and Challenges of Managing IDPs. Lastly, the theoretical framework of the study was discussed. Confession resition

#### **2.2 Overview of Internally Displaced Persons**

According to International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2016), there are 2,241,484 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Nigeria as of February, 2016. According to the report, this figure is based on an assessment conducted from November to December 2015 by the international organization for Migration's (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) team in 207 Local Government Areas (LGA) covering 13 states of Northern Nigeria. UNICEF (2014) reported that since 2011, the population of the North-East of Nigeria States has been affection by the insurgence between Boko-Haram and governmental forces. According to their report large majority of the IDPs are women and children and over 90 percent are accommodated in host families within communities who are themselves poor and consequently putting pressure on already scarce resources.

According to Obikaeze and Omioha (not available) Nigeria has experienced incessant cases of internal displacement of people. The cause of this alarming situation is not far-fetched in the Nigeria context. Historically, the country has experienced incidences or crises leading to the displacement of people from their original inhabitations. For instance, the civil war that took place in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970 resulted in the

displacement of people especially those from the Eastern region of the country. Intra-ethnic conflicts, flooding, erosion, desert encroachment among others have remained great challenges facing the country, sometimes the causes of displacement are complex and often overlapping.

Furthermore, Ladan (2011) observes that in Nigeria, most of the incidences of internal displacement occur because of violent conflicts with ethnic, religious and/or political undertones. He went further to say that thousands are annually internally displaced as a result of natural disasters including flooding in the North and West, erosion in the East, oil spillage and development projects in the Niger Delta (South-south) IOM(2016) reports that vast majority of IDPs identified in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe have been displaced because of the insurgency (85.68%), a smaller number was forced to leave their place of origin because of communal clashes (3.33%) or natural disaster (0.99%). Most of the IDPs are living with families in host communities. Communities who are themselves poor, thus severely straining already scarce resources as well as aggravating poverty levels (including food and nutrition insecurity) of the affected / host communities (OCHA, 2015).

USAID (2015) reported that despite successive efforts by the Nigerian military forces in the region, it is a common fact that Boko Haram violence in the North Eastern Nigeria and neighbouring countries continues. International media reports indicated that Boko Haram attacks had displaced nearly 1.4 million people and more than 1 million of these numbers displaced in Borno state, north-eastern Nigeria. According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (2016) this represents a slight decrease from nearly 1.5 million IDPs in late April to approximately 1.4 million by late June, following the return of 120,000 people to areas of origin in Adamawa (USAID, 2016). Despite the efforts

made by the Nigerian government, it has been observed that IDPs have continued to face harsh conditions especially in the IDP camps. Today, it has been reported that armed groups unleash violent attacks on the IDPs, resulting to loss of innocent lives (Obikaeze and Onuoha, N.D). According to FRN (2012) IDPs in Nigeria face insecurity and all forms of exploitation and abuse including rape, camping in congested shelters, isolated as well as insecure or inhospitable areas.

OCHA (2014) insecurity mainly due to loss of income and livelihood caused by the insurgency and displacement within the web of contesting vulnerability today, internally displaced person's plight is more worrisome and precarious.

FRN (2012) observes that while some efforts are made by humanitarian and faith –based organizations and government agencies to address some of the basic needs of IDPs, their vulnerability tend to be increased by barriers to accessing health care services, education, employment, economic activities and information for participation in decision making affecting their lives. Furthermore, IDPs in Nigeria also face lack of access to justice, whether in relation to cases of human rights violations such as discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities, sexual violence and deprivation of means of livelihood (FRN, 2012).

### **2.3 Concept of Internally Displaced Persons**

According to the African Union Convention for protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Person (2009) defined as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border. Internally Displaced Persons

(IDPs) are citizens of a country who are displaced within the territory of a country as a result of natural disasters such as erosion, desertification, and flooding; people can also be displaced as a result of human caused disaster such as civil war, internal armed conflict, terrorism and so forth. In this situation, people are left with the option of fleeing their homes for safety.

Displaced persons under international law are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obligated to flee or to have cause to leave their homes or place of habitual residence in particular, due to or in order to stave off the effect of armed conflict, violations of human rights, situations of generalized violence, natural or manmade disasters, to another place considered relatively safe either within their own national borders (as internally displaced persons) or travel across an internationally recognized state border (as refugees) (Ladan, 2006). Internally Displaced persons are mostly victims of the brutality of man against man, various kind of injustices or violent confrontations, perpetrated either by their own government against them or by others, such as terrorism, communal clashes, religious conflicts, riots, natural disasters and so on. Ocha (2003) described IDPs as persons or groups of persons who because of armed conflict, systematic violations of human rights, internal strife, or natural or man-made disasters have been forced to flee their homes or places of habitual residence suddenly or unexpectedly, to another location but have not crossed an internationally recognized state border. It is expedient to clearly distinguish between refugees and IDPs.

The displaced persons, who have crossed an international border and falls under one of the relevant international legal instruments, are considered as refugees. Although internally displaced persons are often defined as those uprooted by conflict, human rights violations and natural or human-made disasters, Robinson (2003) expanded the scope to

also include those displaced by development projects. Most times, the focus of sympathetic attention and international aid centre is around those displaced by disaster than for victims of development. The available estimates only include people who have sought shelter at temporary IDP camps; whereas, most IDPs had reportedly preferred to seek shelter with relatives, rather than living in camps. The head of National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced - Hajiya Hadiza Kangiwa estimated at the sensitization rally to commemorate 2013 World Refugees' Day that Nigeria currently has 4.4 million internally displaced people (NAN, 2013). The cause of IDPs in Nigeria can be traced to many events and situations all across the nation. While some of the conflicts appear to be caused by religious or ethnic differences, gains from politics, social and economic nature are generally behind the violence in the country with increasing level of poverty, low levels of education and a host of youth population with feeling of alienation (Oduwole and Fadeyi, 2013). Nigeria has had cause to contend with the issues of internally displaced persons who were affected by disasters in different parts of the country. Although, Nigerian government is yet to compile reliable figures of the displaced, not less 63,000 people were documented as newly displaced by violence. Terrorism, whether domestic or transnational has a devastating effects. For instance, Oriakhi and Osemwengie, (2012) observed that attacks from Islamic sect Boko Haram menace in Nigeria has led to loss of many lives, destruction of properties worth billions of Naira, severe damaged to infrastructure, loss of investment and income to mention but a few.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) at present, there is no internationally agreed definition of who is an internally displaced person but the United Nations (UN) working definition of IDPs is.

Displaced persons under international law are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obligated to flee or to have cause to leave their homes or place of habitual residence in particular, as a result of or in order to avoid the effect of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and they must have either remain within their own national borders (as internally displaced persons) or they must have crossed an internationally recognized state border (as refugees), (Ladan, 2006). Hence displaced persons are of two categories: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

According to Oduwole and Adebayo (2013) the convention relating to the status of refugees (CRSR) of 1951 defines the term “refugee” as applying to any person who;

“...as a result of events occurring before 1st January 1951 and owing to well – founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion is outside the country of his (or her) nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is willing to avail himself (or herself) of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being made outside the country of his (or her) former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it...” (pp. 252 – 3).

In comparison to the CRSR of 1951, according to Ladan (2004) the OAU convention (1969) governing the specific aspects of refugee problem in Africa gives a broader definition of the term “refugee”, taking account of most of the root causes of the refugee problem. The second paragraph of article 1 of the OAU convention state that:

“the term „refugee“ shall also apply to every person, who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part of the whole of his (or her) country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his (or

her) place of habitual residence in order to seek refugee in another place outside his (or her) country of origin or nationality”.

Under the Cartagena Declaration, the term “refugee” is defined as including “Persons who have fled their countries because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order” (UNHCR, 1995).

On the other hand, internally displaced persons (IDPs), as a result of situations of armed conflicts (or the threat thereof) and mass violations of human rights, as well as floods, earthquakes and other natural disasters, the number of people fleeing their homes has increased dramatically over recent years. There are also deep – seated factors underlying this phenomenon of mass displacement. For example, Under-development, poverty, unequal distribution of wealth, unemployment, ethnic tensions, political and economic subjugation of minorities, intolerance, absence of democratic procedures, and many other factors have been cited as causes. Where such people, in fear of persecution, seek refuge in other countries, their interests are protected by the refugee convention of 1951 and the 1967; protocol relating to the statute of refugees. If those persons are victims of armed conflict situations, they are entitled to protection under the Geneva Convention of 1949 and their additional protocols of 1977. In general, human rights law offers protection to all persons without any adverse distinction. However, where such people and displaced within their own country, specific problems as the rights and protection arise (Deng, 1994).



Under the following working definition of “Internally Displaced persons” (IDPs), which was developed by the special Rapporteur on IDPs as there is at present no specific international legislation devoted to that issue, displaced persons are deemed as:

“Persons or groups of persons who have been forced to flee their homes or places of habitual residence suddenly or unexpectedly as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters, who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border” (OCHA, 2003; UN, 2004).

In this thesis, IDPs is defined as persons who have been displaced by natural disaster or conflicts from their homes and traditional support structure and have not crossed the border of their countries. They are victims of various kinds of injustices, violent confrontations perpetrated by their own government or others against them.

Internally Displaced persons also known as IDP's are mostly victims of the inhumanity of man against man. They are victims of various kind of injustices or violence confrontations, perpetrated by either their own government against them or by others, such as, communal clashes, terrorism, riots, religious conflicts, natural disasters and so on.

It is on record that, the expectation of the global population, resulting from the abrupt liquidation of the cold war consequent on the collapse of the soviet union towards the tail end of 1980's were dashed. Many people across the world that thought that the new world order would bring a desired peace to the entire world, enabling acculturation of development attitude to the world through the magical framework of integration and mutual aspiration of world state-actors soon realized that, the new world order is not circled around the pursuit of peace and development, but the continuation of hostility in another dimension (Hamzat, 2016).

Contrary to the expectation of the world population, the new world order has been characterized by more unstable and turbulent conflict situation, unhealthy power politics, destructive ethnic insurgencies, national rivalries, religious bigotry, government hypocrisy and endemic poverty, manufactured by globalization. Terrorism on the other hand has assumed a new dimension with its characteristic innovative contradictions, which has posed a greater threat to the world peace and security. What a new world disorder.

The IDPs are physically, psychologically and socially displaced as they have to relocate to refugees' camp. Statistics on IDPs in Nigeria revealed that an overwhelming majority of women and children constitute the IDPs. The population is composed of 53% women and 47% men (DTM 2016). Women and children remain the most vulnerable to sexual and gender based violence. There have been reported cases of rape, sexual harassment, forced marriage, infant marriage, sexual diseases and uncontrolled birth occasioning high infant and maternal mortality. Furthermore, because some of the IDPs integrate with other family members in various locations data about them is not easy to get. All these factors make it nearly impossible to obtain an accurate number of displaced persons in Nigeria.

IDPs are caused by several factors, according to a strategic conflict assessment carried out by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution in 2002, the return to democracy and the competition for the new political opportunities had led to increased violence. Local competition for resources has often been aggravated by "Inter-elite" rivalries over privileges such as political and public service appointments, oversight of projects and admission into schools (IPCR 2002). In addition, the interplay between the tripodal ethnic structure and communal patterns of inequalities, closely linked to this is the issue

of natural disasters such as flooding or soil erosion. Other causative factors identified in literature include: religious violence and displacement due to communal conflicts over land and borders and militancy in North East and in the Southern Nigeria.

### **2...3.1 Challenges facing the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Nigeria**

The challenges of internally displaced persons either overtly or covertly has a tremendous negative effect on Nigerians and inimical to development. The following are some of the challenges faced by IDPs in Nigeria (Azam, 2009)

- i. **Insecurity:** Women and girls are been raped on daily basis as a result of insecurity in the camps. Youths indulge in hard drugs, smoking and other criminal activities.
- ii. **Trauma and Bitterness:** The IDPs are traumatized and frustrated because of the situation they find themselves. Most of these IDPs live in bitterness due to painful separation from their spouses, families and loved ones.
- iii. **Hunger and Starvation:** It is said that a hungry man is an angry man and because of the level of hunger and starvation faced by the IDPs you see them protesting and demonstrating with their children at the camps.
- iv. **Acute Malnutrition:** When one is not feeding well, it has an effect on one's health such as changing the colour of one's hair, eyes and teeth which may result to death. It is discovered that people give them only one type of food item i.e. carbohydrate which affects them not to have a balanced diet.
- v. **Sexually Transmitted Diseases:** This is also another challenge that the IDPs are facing, they have unprotected sex which result to all kinds of STDs like

HIV/Aids, gonorrhoea, syphilis etc. They also suffer from hypertension, diabetes and other diseases due to lack of medical health facilities.

- vi. **Education:** The IDPs are facing the challenge of educating their children or family members because they are always in transit or floating. More to that there are no provisions by government in this regard.
- vii. **Rights of IDPs:** There is insufficient understanding of the rights of IDPs as set out in the UN guiding principles on Internal Displacement and the Kampala Convention. These rights include the right to life, freedom of movement, association, dignity of human person, personal liberty, right to private and family life etc.
- viii. **Shelter/Accommodation:** The most common shelter used by IDPs in Nigeria are schools, tents, bunkhouses, churches, mosques, town halls, abandoned and uncompleted buildings. How can human beings live in these places comfortably?
- ix. **Waste Management and Electricity:** There is often no proper waste management and electricity for the IDPs. This explains the regularity of hygiene based epidemic in camps and total darkness in camps.
- x. **Lack of Good Water:** Because of the overcrowded nature of camps, it becomes difficult for the IDPs to access good water for cooking and sanitation facilities.

### **2.3.2 Challenges Constraining Effective Management of IDPs in Nigeria**

There are many problems militating against the proper management of IDPs in Nigeria and these problems are complex. Funding is one of the problems militating against management of IDPs. According to the Osagioduwa and Oluwakorede (2016) in their survey research carried out, respondents disclosed that although IDPs management

agencies in Nigeria get funds mainly through revenue, international aids and donations, the funds they get are more often than not insufficient to meet the increasing needs of IDPs in the country.

Corruption is another problem, according to Obikaeze and Onuoha (N.D) corrupt office holders in government and in IDPs management agencies alike, have been accused on several occasions of diverting funds and relief materials meant for IDPs for their personal use and for their relative or friends. A situation that reduces the efficiency of the agencies concerned in managing IDP(s).

### **2.3.3 Overlapping IDPs Management Institutions**

Improperly defined, unclear and overlapping policies and institutions have been identified as a challenge confronting IDPs management agencies. The overlapping responsibility hinders agencies in the discharge of their duties. In terms of overlapping institutions, it was noticed from the testimony of key informants from government agencies that the government has established several IDPs management institutions or agencies with similar mandates and structures (Osagioduwa and Oluwakorede, 2016). According to them, a clear example cited by key informants is that of the National Commission for Refugees (NCFR).

### **2.3.4 Attitude of Host Communities**

Sometimes, as internally displaced person over- burden existing community services, resources and job or economic livelihood opportunities, tension arises between the two populations, making effective local integration difficult (Kangiwa, 2012). Cost food, housing, health care and education. In spite of this ugly situation, it has been observed that a good number of host communities are usually friendly with IDPs. However, this friendly attitude usually gets frosted whenever food and non- food items supplied to the

IDPs either from the government agencies or humanitarian groups. As a result of poverty and hunger, members of the host communities of the IDP camp always struggle to have a share from the supplied items (Obikaeze and Onuoha (not available)). This therefore, reducing or shorting the ration meant for the IDPs. Durosare and Ajiboye (2011) observed that influx of non- displaced young people who took advantage of porous IDP camps to enjoy humanitarian services and later leave for their stable homes or businesses, thus making it difficult to ordinarily identify the real target individuals. This observation is in tandem with the findings of Ladan (2013) that fractions between IDPs and host communities resulting from concentration of assistance to IDPs and scarcity of resources for distribution are major hindrance to IDPs management (Obikaeze and Onuoha, (not available)).

### **2.3.5 Concept of Insecurity**

The concept of insecurity connotes different meanings such as: absence of safety; danger; hazard; uncertainty; lack of protection, and lack of safety. According to Beland (2005) insecurity is a state of fear or anxiety due to absence or lack of protection. Achumba et.al (2013) defined insecurity from two perspectives. Firstly, insecurity is the state of being open or subject to danger or threat of danger, where danger is the condition of being susceptible to harm or injury. Secondly insecurity is the state of being exposed to risk or anxiety, where anxiety is a vague unpleasant emotion that is experienced in anticipation of some misfortune. These definitions of insecurity underscore a major point that those affected by insecurity are not only uncertain or unaware of what would happen but they are also vulnerable to the threats and dangers when they occur.

In the context of this study insecurity is defined as a breach of peace and security, whether historical, religious, ethno- regional, civil, social, economic, and political that contributes to recurring conflicts, and leads to destruction of lives and property.

### ***Maitatsine Religious Crises and Effects of Heresy***

*Maitatsine* is the name of a religious fanatics group which erupted in Northern parts of Nigeria. It is one of the names by which the leader of the group was known. His real name was Muhammadu Marwa. His aliases include: Muhammadu Arab, Muhammadu *Mai Tabsiri*, Muhammadu Marwa *Darka* and Muhammadu Allah *Tatsine*. Abdul Fattah Olayiwola(2007) asserted that the name *Maitatsine* evolved from the Hausa word *Tatsine* which Marwa was frequently repeating during his preaching session. Muhammadu Marwa would talk about things that his group believes in and to those who do not believe in the same, he would say “*Allahtatsine*” meaning: ‘May Allah’s curse be upon them (Report of Tribunal, item 67:12) For this reason, he and his group were identified as *Maitatsine* i.e ‘the one who curses’ and less commonly, as *Allah Tatsine* i.e one who uses Allah to curse. It is not on record that the group at any point rejected the appellations.

Muhammadu Marwa, the controversial Islamic preacher in Nigeria was said to have originally come from Marwa in northern Cameroon.(Lubeck, 1985:369). After his education, he moved to Kano, Nigeria in about 1945 (Report of Tribunal, item 67:29).He became known for his controversial preaching on the Qur’ān. *Maitatsine* claimed to be a prophet and saw himself as a *mujaddid* or reformer in the image of Sheikh Usman DanFodio. (Niels,1989: 84).Although a Qur’ānic scholar, he seemingly rejected the hadith and the sunnah while here graded the reading of any other book other than the Qur’ānas paganism. *Maitatsine* spoke against the use of radios, watches, bicycles, cars

and the possession of more money than immediately needed. In 1979, he even rejected the prophet hood of Muhammad and portrayed himself as *annabi* (prophet) and was so believed by his followers. (Niels, 1989: 86). His followers dared not talk anything negative about him anywhere; not even in the privacy of their homes. They believed that anything said about him anywhere in the globe is heard by him (Olayiwola: 2007:128).

In addition to the heresy uttered by Maitatsine as described above, he was also allegedly involved non-Islamic practices like the use of human organs for the manufacture of charms and drinking human blood (Adesoji, 2011:101). This is underscored by the group's mysterious power in defending selves and attacking their praise. The followers confiscated people's houses at will to establish their base. Their hold on the enclave became so strong that they began to harass non-member neighbours many of whom fled the area for dear life. The group's ability to withstand and survive police sporadic attacks on them conceited them into believing in their invulnerability and immunity against human attack of any sort. (Olayiwola: 2007:128). This lend more credence to the allegation of their being fetish as obtainable in paganism.

The Devastation experienced in the *Maitatsine* uprising cannot be overestimated. Its first major religious violence in Kano took place between December 18 and 29, 1980. It was triggered off by members of the *Maitatsine* sect. In that attack, *Maitatsine* unleashed a three-day riot in which 4,200 people were killed, mostly Muslims (Boer, 2003:39). The purpose as claimed by the group was to reform Muslim worship and to cleanse Islam from its many non-Muslim accretions. (Tell, 28/10/91:3)



Another riot took place in October 1982, when the sect killed some 400 people in Maiduguri and destroyed much property. (Boer, 2003:39). In the same month, uprising also took place in Rigassa, Kaduna state and, again, in Kano where many lives were also lost. (Newswatch, 6/5/91:16). In February 1984, *Maitatsine* struck in Jimeta, Yola, where 763 people were killed and almost 6000 were displaced. (Boer, 2003:39). In 1985, the same sect killed over 100 people in ten hours of fighting in Gombe (Newswatch,6/5/91:16). However, there are many reports on *Maitatsine*. While some are similar to the above others have little differences. For instance, a summary of Abimbola O. Adesoji's Report (in Africa Today, 2001:98) says: In 1980, the first in the chain of *Maitatsine* riots broke out in Kano. Others occurred in 1982 in Kaduna and Bulumkutu, 1984 in Yola, and 1985 in Bauchi (see also Ibrahim 1997:511) It is germane here to note that partial out breaks were also reported in Plateau, Bauchi, and parts of Kaduna State. Again, the Police had to resort to the use of deadly ammunition before those rioters were subdued. Each of the outbreaks of violence caused by *Maitatsine* led to loss of hundreds or thousands of lives. Properties worth millions of naira were also vandalized. Alas, it had all happened as a result of heresy in the utterances of *Maitatsine*.

#### **Aftermath of *Maitatsine* in Kano: Menace of Provocative utterances**

The precedent of *Maitatsine* and the level at which the crisis had abused people's minds suggested the existence of crisis, friendly atmosphere and a similitude of gun powder waiting for a little spark, to encourage recurrence. This happened in many parts of northern Nigeria, predominantly Kano state. This explains why recurrence of crisis in Kano is examined in this section to represent other violent uprisings between the exit of *Maitatsine* and emergence of *Boko Haram* in a bid to underscore the fact that genesis of every crisis always involves certain unpleasant utterances.

## **Kano Riot 1982**

This riot sprang up when the Anglican Archbishop Canterbury visited Fagge, Kano city to lay the foundation of a church very close to the area's mosque (Boer,2003:39).The riot which evolved between some Muslim youth and the church was so tense that about forty-four people were killed (Kuka, 1993:154).

It is relevant to recall that Sokoto Jihad which started in1804 was extended to Kano in1807. (Olawale, 1997:112) This fact presupposes the existence of *Masājid* or mosques in every part of Kano City from time immemorial. Not only the disapproval of the motive behind the construction of the church many years after the *Masjid* has been existing, the extreme proximity of the Church to the Mosque did not go down well with many Muslims. Some Muslim youth around the area felt the need to make a protest to avoid anything that may lead to religious crisis as a result of the Church's plan. However, these Muslim youths were made more seriously infuriated by the statement uttered by some Christians who were stakeholders in the Church. The Church referred to the protest as irrational and that the Church in question, St. George's Anglican Church, predated the existence of any mosque in the area and that what was only about to happen was expansion of the Church. Another report of the provocative utterances of the Church members is expressed by Jan H. Boer, "To fully appreciate their rationality of this protest, you must know that Church had been there..."(2003:40) Naming the peaceful exercise of the Muslim youth an irrational act was understood to be tantamount to "do your worse" and in deeper view, blasphemy. Hence, it led to loss of lives as reported above.

### **Kano Riot, 1991**

The front headline of Tell magazine of October 29, 1991 screams “*Bloodbath in Kano: Religious Fanatics Strike again.*” The major cause of this uprising was the blasphemy attributed to the visit of the Christian Evangelist Reinhard Bonke from Germany. (Boer, 2003:41) It was around 10a.m., that Muslim youths marched to the Emir’s palace, protesting the presence of the invited evangelist. According to the protesters, Bonke was already known for blasphemous utterances against Islam and personality of Prophet Muhammad. (SAW). Why the protest continued, the state government who had not responded to the application received from CAN asking for the use of the Race Course for the use of Bonke’s one-week crusade cautioned the CAN by asking her to hold the crusade in one of the Churches. (Tell, 29/10/91)

By Sunday, October 13, when Bonke arrived in Kano, the activities of the organizers remained unchanging and the tension had grown higher. The riot lasted two days, leaving more than 200 people dead and hundreds injured. With the series of attacks and counter-attacks, the crisis was escalated; the destruction had been massive and far-reaching. Corpses littered the areas. Building materials worth millions of naira were destroyed. At Airport Road, a big Mobil filling station was burnt and 16 vehicles were burnt and about three nearby filling stations were burnt. About 20 churches and mosques were also burnt including Mosque at Emir Road. (Boer, 2003:42)

While accounting for the causes and magnitude of the destruction, it should be registered that the peaceful protest against an anticipated blasphemy grew big and became uncontrollable as the organizers bombarded the Kano City with radio and television adverts as well as bill boards. It was glaring that CAN in Kano gave the Bonke crusade widely suspected publicity, much more than for previous events and several thousands of posters were pasted around Kano city. Some of the posters,

according to Mukhtar (1992:17), carried the captions 'Jesus for all by the year 2000', "the anointed man of God is coming to deliver sinners and unbelievers to Jesus Christ" (Tell, 29/10/91). In a typical Muslim dominated City like Kano, these statements were not only Blasphemous but also abusive, provocative and confrontational; otherwise, one must be ready to answer the questions; who were the sinners and who were the unbelievers?

### **Kano Riot, 1994/1995**

The year 1995 started while the atmosphere in Kano had been tense. According to various sources, a clash took place in December 1994, when Gedeon Akaluka, a Christian of the Ibo ethnic group, devastatingly desecrated and mutilated copy of the Qur'ān and displayed some pages he had used as toilet papers. (Africa No 1 Radio 13 Feb. 1995) It was also reported that he did not deny the fact that he allegedly ordered his wife to use some pages as paper pad for her baby. (Boer, 2003:46) In Islamic faith, to publicly boast of having done this is blasphemy of a higher order. It is not enough to say that the Muslims accused Gedeon Akaluka of insulting Islam and in fact it is mischievous for any reporter to pretend not knowing the status of the Qur'ān to the Muslims. In the crisis that followed this Akaluka who was neither remorseful of his blasphemous utterances and action nor vindicated or called to order by the CAN, was killed in the mid of the tension created by himself. (The Guardian 3 June 1995)

Provocative statements were also at the center of the press reports surrounding the clashes that broke out in May 1995 between Muslims and Christians in the northern city of Kano (Country Reports 1995 1996:208). Sources reported that the clashes started following an utterance during a minor dispute between a Muslim Hausa and a Christian Ibo over a tip for car parking (Reuters 3 June 1995). Another report has it that

it had all started with an item stolen from the car of a Hausa woman and a nasty comment made by an Igbo woman. By and large, it could not have led to any serious riot if caution had been taken in people's utterances. According to Kano CAN Chairman as reported by Jan H. Boer (2003:47) "Like most of the others, it took only as park to set it off, an irrelevant park that really had nothing to do with any Christian-Muslim issues". He said while describing genesis of this crisis.

Country Reports (1995) states that the clashes resulted in scores of deaths and the partial destruction of the city's central market (1996:208), while other sources reported that over 25 persons were killed.(Reuters 31 May 1995)According to Boer(Ibid),the state government put the number of casualties at three. Military sources gave a figure of "over twenty-three"; CAN "over sixty"; Murtala Hospital reported "about 200". To conclude this segment, it is instructive to give another example of provocative and inciting statement of one Samuel Uche who is reported by Boer (2003:49) to have said:

I must tell youth at SabonGari is not an easy field to swallow. As small as we are, there is nothing we don't have. This SabonGarican face the whole of Kano State...But any day they (the Muslim indigenes) attempt to come into this area, nobody in Kano will be safe. The Emir, the Governor, the police, nobody will be safe. I don't want to tell you how but it will happen, we're prepared.

### ***Boko-Haram* and Beyond: The Danger of Hate Speech**

*Boko-Haram* is a combination of two words '*Boko*' and '*Haram*'. *Boko* is a Hausa word derived from English noun 'Book'. *Boko* is a term in the Hausa language that is generally used to describe any book, knowledge, activity or culture that is related to the West. When a Hausa man is particular about Western education, he says *silmin-boko*. On the other hand, *Haram* is a word that has its origin from the Arabic language and it

simply means unlawful or prohibited in both Arabic and Hausa languages. Apparently, the compound name *Boko-Haram* means ‘western way of life is unlawful’, probably in the life of a Muslim. (Mustapha, 2014:14) In this paper, *Boko- Haram* refers to *Jama’ahAhl as-SunnahLi ad-Da’WahWa al-Jihad*, a group founded by Muhammad Yusuf around 2002 in Northern Nigeria.

Ustaz Muhammad Yusuf as he was popularly called was born on January 29, 1970 in Girgir Village, Jakusko Local Government Area of Yobe State. He had four wives and twelve children. Not much is known about his educational pursuit. Details about this confusion are explained in the work of Mustapha (2014:41). In 2002, Muhammad Yusuf founded the group that would eventually become known as *Boko Haram* with its official name *Jama’atuAhlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad* which in English means “people committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad” and was its spiritual leader until he was killed in 2009.(Mustapha, 2014:42). Yusuf made his heresy and inciting utterances by preaching against Western education and consistently argued that the current system in Nigeria symbolized by government, needed to be overthrown and replaced with an extreme version of Islamic law. Just like *Maitatsine* as discussed earlier, Yusuf was also hostile to other Muslims who disagreed with his methods and beliefs. He was soon regarded as an oddity by the rest of Muslims and media profile of its group became popularly known as *Boko Haram*, meaning “Western education is unlawful” in English language. The group operated from its Maiduguri base under various sobriquets. It consistently showed a version to ‘Boko’ or Western education. (Leadership, 31/7/2009: 4)

One must say that *Boko Haram* stand point on Western Education is not new in Northern Nigeria. There was the perception in Muslim-north that since Western education (*Boko*) came to the area through Christian missionaries, Muslim children

going to the schools shall be converted to Christianity. Many northerners, especially Muslim scholars in the olden days would deny their children access to Western schools. They would make the children to standby their homes and chant the derogatory songs composed to discourage very school-going child not to go to school by singing what is narrated in Daily Trust (3/8/2009: 2) as:

*'Yan Makaranta Bokoko Bakaratuba Sallah Ba'abiyarhanyar Allah Sai awanzagin Malam.* The interpretation of the song is: Children of Western schools, You neither study nor pray, You don't follow God's path, You only abuse your teacher. However, *Boko Haram* sacrilege was beyond condemnation of Western education; the inciting nature of its utterances was unprecedented. The movement is equally opposed to working in the public sector. They organized themselves into a structured command with Muhammad Yusuf as the commander-in-chief otherwise known as the *AmirulAam*. There are two deputies to him addressed as *Na'ibAmirul- Aamland*

The State Commands have their *Amir* or commander, just as each Local Government Area has its own *Amir*. At all different levels the followers constitute the subjects. They are equally structured to perform the multiple roles of the soldiers, police and so on. (Mustapha, 2014: 49)

Another set of Hate speech of the *Boko Haram* was on Sunday 14<sup>th</sup> June, 2009 when Muhammad Yusuf, the *BokoHaram* sect leader threatened, while addressing his followers over an arrest made against some members (see Mustapha, 2014 for details) that his group will carry out reprisal attack. He was quoted as saying “what I said previously that we are going to be attacked by the authorities has manifested itself therefore, we will not agree with this kind of humiliation, we are ready to die together with our brothers and we would never concede to non-belief in Allah.” (Mustapha, 2014:71)

The embattled Muslim group called *BokoHaram* was thought to have been vanquished in 2009, when the Nigeria military crushed its Maiduguri headquarter and mosque into concrete shards and its leader was arrested and killed in police custody. But about a year later, Maiduguri and surrounding villages again began living in fear of the group. The fear at the moment in all the Northern states of Nigeria including the Federal Capital Territory is of the sect's attacks. Every one fears the group whose members have murdered a handful of police, local, Muslim clerics and politicians among others. The group has engineered massive prison breaks and has claimed responsibility for bombing lots of important public places. The most disastrous bombing orchestrated by the group is that of the United Nation's Building, situated in Nigeria's Federal Capital Territory on 26<sup>th</sup> August 2011 which made the international bodies to declare *Boko Haram* terrorist organization.(Mustapha, 2014: 79)

### **Theorising Insecurity Question in Nigeria**

The piece by an erstwhile Head of the State, Abdulsalami Abubakar, on *the challenges of security in Nigeria* (2004) which came from an address given at NIPSS in 2004 clearly shows that the greatest threat to the current civilian dispensation is insecurity. As he rightly observes, in addressing the challenge to the survival of democracy in Nigeria, it is pertinent to consider security issues and problems that have affected the attitude, confidence and cooperation of all groups and segments that make up the Nigerian federation. Akin Oyebode (2011) seems to echo this position of Abubakar in his piece on *the imperative of insecurity*.

He declares: "it is self-evident that without security, hardly is anything possible." He never the less counsels that "security should go beyond law and order by encompassing meaningful existence for the generality of the populace"(Akinbode,2011:27).Putting it



more succinctly, S.L. Ezeoha (2011:38) in *Causes and effects of insecurity in Nigeria* declares that “Security means stability and continually of livelihood, predictability of relationships, feeling safe and belonging to a social group. In the same token, John Oshodi(2011) argues that one sure way of tackling the insecurity situation in Nigeria is to accord the field of psychology a pride of place in policy formulation and implementation to promote national cohesion and integration.

Many other contributors take critical look at the possibilities and difficulties of achieving sustainable peace in our embattled nation. S.B. Jegede’s *back to state of nature? (2011)* and Rose Ada his *what hope for the common man? (2011)* put the Nigerian ruling class to task on its competence to get us out of the woods. To Jegede, the insecurity situation in the country has led many to wonder if Nigeria has not returned to the state of nature where, according to Thomas Hobbes, life was solitary, nasty, brutish and short. Adahi compliments Jegede’s position with her observation the public functions are now held amidst tight security and that the Nigerian government has failed to secure itself not to talk of securing the “common man” as enshrined in section 14 (2c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

*In the study of security* by Biodun Ogunyemi (2011) attempted to refocus issues of insecurity from the prehistoric times. He draws from Frantz Fanon’s dimensions of violence to argue that explaining the emergent security problems in Nigeria must recognize the physical, structural and psychological violence unleashed on the people over the years by a tiny class of oppressive and manipulative rulers of the Nigerian state. While agreeing with Oyebode and others that security goes beyond maintaining law and order, Ogunyemi argues that the strength, wealth and security of our nation reside in “expanding people’s choices in every relevant way” (Ogunyemi2011:34).

The *This Day* Newspaper's editorial (2011), titled *Soldiers as security men* observed that the current state of insecurity in Nigeria has left the Federal Government to deploy troops in such a manner that all our roads are littered with soldiers in combat ready fashion. The impression one gets is that security can be created by merely posting soldiers on the roads. But given the temperament of soldiers, many have questioned the wisdom of such a large scale deployment. As noted by *This Day*, the menace of terrorism no doubt calls for a new approach that will be founded on credible intelligence gathering". Nevertheless, the deployment of policemen to guard political office holders, private homes and individuals who have the financial muscle and influence in government circles has led to a situation such that there are very few left to fight crimes in the street.

*Insecurity: Consequences for investment and employment*, Ike Okorie Laments that Nigeria would not be able to tap in to about \$1.4tr investment capital which circulates around the world for as long as the insecurity situation persists, his main concern is the need to examine what the rising insecurity portends for the country particularly in the areas of foreign investment and employment generation. Insecurity is a risk factor which investors the world over dread and makes them to move elsewhere. Okorie argues that the severe security threat to life and property all over the country sends wrong signals to the international community; stating that "Economic globalization is not just an historical evolution but also a process(Okorie,2011:26).

*Will there be peace in our time?* This is the question pointedly raised and addressed by Rotimi Fasan (2011), in his piece culled from the *Vanguard* newspaper. His thesis is that, going by the magnitude of the social and political upheavals around the world, one will not be far from the truth to assert that there is never period in human history more turbulent than today. He posits that peace couldn't have been farther from our door step.

Apart from the economic and social problems, we are bedevilled constantly today with fears of one attack or the other by one extremists group or another. Hostage taking, bomb throwing and violent crimes are now part of our daily life that we only shake our heads to acknowledge the events and move on as if nothing has happened. He concludes: with all the set routines of daily living, finding food to eat and paying bills in the midst of direct attacks by those propagating one extremist view or another, there is no word for it but that we are in troubled times” (Fasan,2011:36).

There are three major contending perspectives to the understanding of insecurity question. There is the armed robbery theory, wobble economy and opposition–ruling party theses. The Armed robbery theory posits that the high wave of armed robbery in Nigeria is primarily responsible for high level of insecurity in Nigeria. It also argues that in Nigeria, politics is extremely competitive and elections are perceived as zero-sum contests. The fall out is the increasing militarized nature of politics, the use of violence as an electoral tool, and the inculcation of a culture of violence in society. Again, this thesis recognizes the existence of armed groups of varying character and intent operating in Nigeria. However, today’s armed groups are better armed and trained, and increasingly sophisticated in their actions compared to those of the past.

Studies on armed robbery concluded by arguing that as a result of zero-sameness politics combined with the prevalence of armed groups provided an easy marriage between politics and violence. Armed groups have taken advantage of the opportunities presented by being hired hands, and have now developed their own bases of economic support (armed robbery) thereby freeing themselves from their political patrons.

They used this theory to explain the mindless murder of Bola Ige, Alfred Rewane, Dikibo The major proponents of this thesis include former President Obasanjo and other

government apologists, and Marshall Harry and other party chieftains sent to their early graves between 1999 and 2008. Keen observers and analysts of the polity have inflamed this thesis. They countered by positing that in all these high profile killings, the assailants' drove away without taking a pin further weakens this conjuncture.

The proponents of this thesis stopped short of propounding the armed banditry thesis after the attack on former governors Akume, Ibori, Nnamani, Udenwa, Tinubu and Orji among others. Closely related to the armed banditry thesis is the wobble economy thesis and the fall out it generates on the nation. This theory posits that as a result of the growing array of qualified and unqualified youths competing in the existing saturated labour market there is a tendency for them to be recruited and exploited as hired killers. It further argues that as a result of high level of poverty among Nigerians, the youths are adversely attracted to violent crime. These youths are lured and armed by "second-term politicians" who wanted to retain power no matter the cost arms them with guns. After these elections, none of these guns were recovered from these new merchants of death.

Ibrahim and Igbuzor (2002:12) add that while the poor people in Nigeria rate insecurity as a key cause of poverty, they do not necessarily see poverty as a cause of armed conflict. While we are not necessarily disputing the linkage between poverty and violent conflict, the nature of that linkage remains to be clarified. In the first place, if poverty exists and has apparently existed as a pervasive and structural feature of the Nigerian state, why has it not produced the sort of conflict that we have witnessed in recent years.

It would appear that the thesis for the above link might well lie in relative deprivation rather than absolute poverty. So set against the inability of the government to provide basic infrastructure and basic services for its populace, new conflicts have emerged through politicized agents who have used the conditions of the poor to address the

responses or non-responses of the state to the lawful yearning of the citizens. This has led some groups to engage in and try to influence the political process themselves. These conflicts in Nigeria are purposeful in intent and directed at key targets, whether economic or political. Armed violence is about more than oil, ethnicity, or politics. In essence, such actions is about access to resources, whether through committing crimes, playing communal tension, stealing oil or winning elections.

The third thesis is the ruling-opposition party thesis. According to this perspective, the ruling PDP accuses to opposition parties and other branded anti-democratic forces of engaging in violent crimes to truncate democracy in Nigeria. According to the ruling party, the only way to get even with the government is to create crisis for it. This has supposed that it is farfetched but it is not possible. The ruling party cite the bomb blast in Osun, Ekiti and Ondo clashes, Jos and Bauchi ethno-religious conflicts to support their argument. Those who are opposed to this view accuse the ruling party of masterminding the “state-sponsored terrorism”. A case index is probably the allegation of the Action Congress and, Conference of Nigerian political parties and former Governor Orji Uzor Kalu that certain forces within the PDP are behind the bloodletting in the country. The former chairman of the Board of Trustee of the PDP is at the centre of the accusation.

In view of this, one can posit that Nigeria in recent times has witnessed an unprecedented level of insecurity. Inter and intra-communal and ethnic clashes, ethno-religious violence, armed robbery, assassination, murder, gender-based violence, and bomb explosion have been on the increase leading to enormous loss of life and property and a general atmosphere of siege and social tension for the populace (Ibrahim and Igbuzor, 2002:2). While communities and ethno- regional and religious groups fight

each other, state agents and party officials have been involved in the perpetration of violence and destruction as reflected in the Odi, Benue, Jos and Rivers crises.

The state exists fundamentally for the protection of lives and property and ensuring the well-being of the citizens. As such, state-based institutions and agencies have responsibility for the security of the citizens. However, certain institutions and agencies are specifically charged with the responsibility for the security of life and property. They include the police, state security agencies, the military, immigration, and prison services.

For the purpose of this paper, insecurity refers to the breach of peace and security, whether historical, religious, ethno-regional, civil, social, economic and political that have contributed to recurring conflicts, which Nigeria has witnessed over the years resulting in wanton destruction and loss of lives and property.

### **Manifestations of Insecurity in Nigeria**

The under listed are the various manifestations of conflict and insecurity in Nigeria.

#### **Ethno-religious Conflict**

Communal and societal conflicts according to Ibrahim and Igbuzor (2002) have emerged as a result of new and particularistic forms of political consciousness and identity often structured around ethno-religious identities. In all parts of Nigeria, ethno-religious conflicts have assumed alarming rates. It has occurred in places like Shagamu (Ogun State), Lagos, Abia, Kano, Bauchi, Nassarawa, Jos, Taraba, Ebonyi and Enugu State respectively. Groups and communities who had over the years lived together in peace and harmony now take up arms against each other in gruesome “war”. The claim over scarce resources, power, land, chieftaincy, local government councils, control of markets, “Osu caste system” and sharia among other trivial issues have resulted in large

scale killings and violence amongst groups in Nigeria. In these conflicts, new logics of social separation and dichotomy have evolved in many communities in Nigeria. There is the classification of the “settler” and “indigene”, “Christian” and “Moslem”, and “osu” (slave) and “Nwadiala” (freeborn). These ethno-religious identities have become integrative and destructive social elements threatening the peace, stability and security in Nigeria.

### **Politically Based Violence**

Politics in the current civil dispensation like the previous Republics have displayed politics of anxiety which has played down on dialogue, negotiation and consensus. The anxiety is as a result of perceived or real loss of power by an elite stratum. Put different the quest for political power is among those elites that won it before, those that lost it and those who want it back.

Currently, politicians are already strategizing about the control and retention of power come 2011 elections. To this end, inter and intra-political party conflicts have become rife in which politicians are deploying large resources to out-do each other, changing the rules and legislations of the political game, distorting laws and employing violence and political assassination to settle political scores. Party meeting, campaigns and conventions have become war threats where small and light weapons like guns, and cutlasses are freely displayed and used to rig elections, harass and intimidate electors. Also, a spate of politically motivated killing is rife. The most shocking of this killing is rife. The most shocking of this killings was the murder of Chief Bola Ige, Funsho Williams, Dikibo, Ogbonna Uche, and Marshall, among others Onyemaizu (2006:10) adds:

A resort to violence, including armed militancy, assassination, kidnap, etcetera, have somewhat suddenly become attractive to certain individuals in seeking to resolve issues that could have ordinarily been settled through due process. The end-products of such misadventures have often been catastrophic. They include the decimation of innocent lives, disruption of economic activities, destruction of properties among others.

The predilection of most of the politicians is not for election but selection. This lack of party internal democracy is already being revealed in the party primaries, and “selection” of national executive officers of the parties. Even politicians themselves are afraid of what the forth coming general elections between 2010 and 2011 portend. An atmosphere of political insecurity is fast engulfing Nigeria’s nascent Fourth Republic.

### **Economic-Based Violence**

In a popular parlance, this thesis is also known as “political economy of violence”. Recent writings in the mass media across the globe and across political divide have laid much emphasis on the role of resources ingenerating conflict which is a major cornerstone of economic-based violence. Cries of resource control and revenue sharing regularly rent the air between proponents and opponents.

Although by no means limited to oil in the Niger Delta, the most prevalent campaign about the link between resources and conflict focuses on oil and the Delta region. Put differently, there is evidence to suggest that oil has given rise to vertical and horizontal conflicts between National, State and society or between dominant and subordinate geo-political zones, classes and groups across Nigeria, given the pivotal role that oil plays in the restructuring power relations in Nigeria.

It is how ever true that other types of resource driven conflicts have received less attention in the debate. Assets such as grazing and farming and water resource, have



tended to give rise to horizontal conflicts that involve communities across the geo-political zones.

The other thesis is that conflict in Nigeria is poverty induced. This explanation is closely related to relative deprivation, rather than absolute poverty. As a result of the above, the inability of the state to provide basic services for the populace, generate new conflict or renew old ones manifested through politicized agents who have used the conditions of the poor to address, the responses or non- responses of the state to the legitimate yearnings of the people.

### **Organized Violent Groups**

Organized violent groups take varying dimension and forms. These include: ethnic militia, vigilantes, secret cults in tertiary institutions and political thugs. Various reasons and circumstances account for their emergence. The causes of the manifestations include the culture of militarism that has its antecedents in military rule, the failure of the state and its institutions, economic disempowerment, the structure of the state and Nigeria's federalism, non-separation of state and religion, politics of exclusion, culture of patriarchy and gerontocracy and ignorance and poor political consciousness (Ibrahim and Igbuzor, 2002:7).

### **Boko Haram: History, Modes of Operation and Litany of Attacks**

The Nigerian militant group Boko Haram conducted a series of bombing attacks and armed assaults on January 20 in the northern city of Kano, the capital of Kano State and second-largest city in Nigeria. The attacks, which reportedly included the employment of at least two suicide Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs), targeted a series of police facilities in Kano. These included the regional police headquarters, which directs police operations in Kano, Kastinaand Jigawa States, as well as the State

Security Service Office and the Nigerian Immigration Service Office. At least 250 people died in the Kano attacks, according to media reports. The group carried out a second wave of attacks in Bauchi State on January 22, bombing two unoccupied churches in the Bauchi metropolitan area and attacking a police station in the Tafawa Balewa local government area. Militants reportedly also tried to rob bank in Tafawa Balewa at the same day. Though security forces thwarted the robbery attempt, 10 people reportedly died in the clash, including two soldiers and a deputy police superintendent. In a third attack, Boko Haram militants attacked a police sub-station in Kano on January 24 with small arms and improvised hand grenades. A tally of casualties in the assault, which reportedly lasted some 25 minutes, was not available. This armed assault stands out tactically from the January 20 suicide attacks against police stations in Kano. The operation could have been an attempt to liberate some of the BokoHaram militants the government arrested following the January 20 and January22 attacks. Stratford has followed BokoHaram carefully to assess its intent and ability to become more transnational (Stewart 2012). As Stewart noted after the U.S State Department issued warning nearly November 2011 about BokoHaram's alleged plans to strike Western-owned hotels in Abuja, Nigeria's capital, the group made significant leaps in its operational capability during 2011.

During that time, it transitioned from very simple attacks to successfully employing suicide VBIEDS. An examination of the recent attacks in Kano and Bauchi States, however, does not reveal further advances in the group's operational trade craft and does not display any new ability or intent to project power beyond its traditional areas of operation.

The group's official name is Jama'atuAhlis Sunna Lidda'awatiWalJihad, meaning 'People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad.' It earned

its nick name from the teachings of its founder MohammedYussufintheearly2000s, in the restive north eastern city of Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state.

Yusuf argued that Western education, or ‘boko,’ had brought nothing but poverty and suffering to the region and was therefore forbidden, or ‘haram,’ in Islam. He began peacefully mostly preaching and quickly gained a following among disaffected young men in the northeast. But his anti-establishment rhetoric and hints that Boko Haram was building an arsenal of weapons also caught the attention of the authorities.

In 2009, the police clamped down on sect members who were ignoring a law requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets. That sparked a furious backlash. Police stations and government offices in Borno were burned to the ground, and hundreds of the group and hundreds of criminals released in a prison break, as the violence spread across northern Nigeria. The government and army reacted with force: Yusuf was captured and short dead in police custody. Five days of fighting left some 800 people dead.

Book Haram leaders still cite Yusuf’s death as one of the main factors driving the insurgency. The group remains fiercely anti-government and anti authority and resentful of the decades of corrupt, poor governance that have impoverished its home region.

At first, Boko Haram was involved mostly in fermenting sectarian violence. Its adherents participated in simple attacks on Christians using clubs, machetes and small arms. Boko Haram came to international attention following serious out breaks of inter-communal violence in 2008 and 2009 that resulted in thousands of deaths. By late 2010, BokoHaram had added Molotov cocktails and simple Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to its tactical repertoire. This tactical advancement was reflected in the series of small IEDs deployed against Christian targets in Jos, Plateau State, on Christmas Eve

2010. Boko Haram conducted number of other armed assaults and small IED attacks in early 2011.

The IEDs involved in these attacks were either improvised grenades constructed by filling soft drink cans with explosive- which were frequently explosive-which were frequently thrown from motorcycles or slightly larger devices left at the target. This attack paradigm was shattered June 16, 2011 when Bokhara launched a suicide VBIED attack against the headquarters of the Nigerian National Police in Abuja. Though not overly spectacular (security measures kept the device away from the headquarters building and it exploded in a parking lot), the successful deployment of a large VBIED and a suicide operative represented a dramatic leap in Boko Haram's capability. An organization does not normally develop such a capability internally without some signs of progressive advancement in its bomb making capability. For example, a group could be expected to employ medium sized IEDs before it employed large VBIEDs. That is skipped a step prompted (Stewart2012) to believe reports of Boko Haram members receiving training formal Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in northern Africa or from Al-Shabaab in Somalia (or some other outside group).Boko Haram conducted its second suicide VBIED attacks in Abuja in August 26, 201, this time targeting a U. N Compound in the city's diplomatic district. This attack proved far more deadly because the driver was able to enter the compound and reach a parking garage before detonating his device near the building's entrance. The attack against the U.N compound also marked a break from Boko Haram's traditional target set of government and Christian facilities. If the intelligence that triggered the warnings of hotel attacks in November 2011 is accurate, it appears the group may also have considered transnational targets at least to the extent of seeking to eliminate involvement by the international community in Nigerian in order to

undercut Abuja. This shift in targeting raised concerns that the group's contacts with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and /or Al Shabaab had influenced it.

According to the *Guardian of London* (2012:12), for militant groups, claims of al-Qaida membership bring the temporary boost of credibility and kudos, and therefore of funds and recruits. But we should be wary of taking the supposed links to al-Qaida too seriously. Claims that Boko Haram leaders met al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia during the pilgrimage to Mecca should not be dismissed outright. But it is unclear whether it was same encounter with Saudi Arabian militant—of whom there are very few these days—or with figures from “al-Qaida Central”, who would have taken an enormous risk by travelling. Both scenarios are theoretically possible.

The conventional wisdom in intelligence circles is that Boko Haram has received cash, possibly large sums of euros paid to criminal “jihadi” factions in the Sahel, from the al-Qaida affiliate al-Qaida in the Maghreb. The latter group is fragmented but tenacious, and is also believed to have provided Boko Haram with training in contemporary urban terrorism, particularly suicide attacks. However, the Nigerian group remains a local phenomenon that does not pose an international threat, British and other officials say.

The fact that it appears to be boasting of links with al-Qaida—which has suffered significant losses in recent years—does, however, indicate that the brand created by the late Osama bin Laden may remain or attractive and durable than some analysts have thought.

It also raised fears that due to its rapidly involving attacked capability, Boko Haram now was on a trajectory to become then next jihads franchise group to become a transnational terror is threat following in the steps of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemen-

based al-Qaeda franchise group. The January attacks provide us an opportunity to evaluate the theory.

For instance, according to the new Boko Haram leader in Nigeria, (Abu Qaqa) said in a recent interview that the group's members were spiritual followers of al-Qaida, and met senior figures in the network during visits to Saudi Arabia. He goes on to posit that the group recruits from neighbouring Chad, Cameroon and Niger Republic (Adeyemi, 2012a:1, 4)

From the indices above, (Stewart, 2012) captured this al-Qaida linkage analysis in the following those thematic forms: First, the group appears to have no shortage of explosive material. In addition to the devices the group employed in the attacks, the police reportedly seized some 300 improvised grenades and 10 VBIEDs (Adeyemi, 2012b:1). It also appears BokoHaram has access to large quantities of commercial explosive, rather than being forced to rely on less reliable and less stable improvised explosive mixtures. A good deal of mining occurs in central Nigeria, and it appears that the group is either stealing commercial explosive from mining companies, extorting mainlining companies for explosives or has somehow been able to purchase commercial explosive using a front company or companies.

The Nigerian government has sought to tighten control on commercial explosives in response, but its efforts so far do not seem to have affected the group's ability to procure large quantities of explosives. BokoHaram also appears to have competent bomb makers. While the improvised hand grenades the group is issuing are quite rudimentary, being made by inserting a non-electric detonator with a short piece of time fuse in a soda can filled with high explosive their devices are function in gas designed. The same can be said for their suicide vests and VBIEDs: They are simply yet functional. This stands

out, since IEDs commonly malfunction. Bomb making is an art that normally follows significant learning curve absent outside instruction from a more experienced bomb maker. BokoHaram's proficiency suggests the group's bomb maker(s) indeed received training from experienced militants elsewhere. The group also appears to have had no problems recruiting militants, including suicide bombers. The January 20 attacks alone involved dozens of militants. Two people served as suicide bombers for the VBIEDs while perhaps two other suicide bombers worked on foot; others threw IEDs from motorcycles and conducted armed assaults (Adeyemi, 2012c:4).

That said, the group's operational planners do not appear to be as advanced as their bomb makers and recruiters. Though they have proved fairly successful in attacking soft targets, they have not had much success in their attacks against harder targets. For example, the attacker in the January 20 strike on the State Security Service Office in Kano was shot and killed before he could approach the building. Likewise, security forces were able to repel the attackers in the January 22 attempted bank robbery in TafawaBelewa (Lister, 2012:14). All three January attacks also occurred in Boko Haram's traditional central regions of Nigeria. These are as are both familiar and accessible to the group and it has strong support there. (It also has significant support in the area around Abuja). Joe Bavier, a writer who is a frequent visitor to the region, told CNN that the Federal government has completely lost control of the north-east, despite deploying thousands of troops and establishing a Joint Task Force. Now, he says, it looks like this insurgency has broken out of the north-east". And what's worrying, he says, is that there's "not a whole lot of visible effort from the federal government to calm things down (Lister, 2012:14).

Philippe Pontet, Africa analyst at the Eurasia Group, says that BokoHaram's main aim appears to be humiliating Jonathan's government, tapping into an existing sense of

grievance among Muslims in the north. He and other analysts say the government's heavy-handed response has played into Boko Haram's hands (Thomas and Kujenya, 2012:12).

"The impulse is to hit back hard and there are political pressures for a crackdown," de Ponte argues, "but Jonathan is so weak in the north that he needs to be careful not to alienate people there further" (Lister, 2012:14).

Among the poorer part of Nigeria, the north lacks infrastructure such as reliable power. Since the end of military rule, much of the region has felt excluded from the system of patronage that fuels Nigerian politics. When he ascended to the presidency in April last year, Jonathan broke the unofficial rotation of Christian and Muslim as head of state. Bavier, who is with the Pulitzer enter on Crisis Reporting, says poverty has fed Boko Haram's ranks. It is no longer a sect of Islamic fanatics but has the support of disgruntled politicians and their paid thugs (Lister, 2012:14).

## **2.4 Review of Empirical Studies**

Vida, Atehortua and Sakedo (2012) carried out a study on local government responses to internal displacement in urban areas in Bogota and Cali, Colombia. They found out that in Bogota, the government has developed a new strategy for victims of the armed conflict through the establishment of regional centers of Assistance to victims called 'centers of Dignity' (Centros Dignificar). These are for the implementation of national policies by the full institutional structure for victims in terms of the national government departments, districts and municipalities-building on the experience over the past decade of Assistance and orientation Units for IDPs (Unidades de Atencion y orientation (UAO) Para poblacion desprazada). This was the system in place until 2011 when the policy shifted to assistance to 'victims' as discussed above. The objective is to have centers of



Dignity in areas hosting the largest numbers of victims. This is a good work but the work failed to state the methodology used.

Obikaeze and Onuoha (not available) carried out a research on the Nigerian state and management of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from 2012-2016. The study adopted ex-post facto descriptive method, hence relied heavily on secondary sources of data collection and human security approach's employed as a theoretical framework. The paper revealed that, there are still lacunas in resettlement and protection of IDPs in the country. The work therefore recommended that there is urgent need to embark on a holistic and well coordinated approach with the help of foreign nations to effectively engage in technical and military actions in order to completely displace Boko- Haram insurgent from their deadly enclaves in Nigeria and beyond.

Also, Nigerian government should be more proactive in the construction of destroyed houses of IDPs in their various communities so that they would have confidence to return home, and also develop strong mechanism to guarantee the protection and safety of IDPs, especially those in IDPs camps. This is a good study but the work failed to state clearly the jurisdiction it covers because not all the states in Nigeria experienced IDPs problem.

Kamungi (2013) carried out a study on the municipalities and IDPs outside of camps. The case of Kenya's integrated displaced persons. The study found out that municipal authorities in Kenya play an important role in assisting IDPs through their routine social programme as well as adhoc response to unexpected situation of displacement. While these efforts enrich the work of mandated national authorities, IDPs continue to exist within municipalities even after the end of formal interventions. IDPs indiscriminate settings can therefore be negative correlated with a backlog in social services delivery, social ills such as crime, economic underdevelopment and conflict with host

communities. The work therefore recommended that, there should be collection and maintenance of data on IDPs. Also there should be enhancement of inter-ministerial coordination. The work failed to state the theory and methodology used.

Wopp, Githinji and Karuoya (2010) conducted a study on Internal Displacement and Local Peace building in Kenya. They found out that peace building after 2007-2008 postelection violence in Kenya is inextricably linked to the challenges of dealing with hundreds of thousands of people that the violence internally displaced- a problem recognized in the national accord drawn up after the violence occurred.

## **2.5 Theoretical Framework**

The structural violence theory was propounded by Johan Galtung in 1969 in an article titled violence, peace and peace research. It refers to a form of violence wherein some social structure or social institution may harm people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs.

### **2.5.1 Structural Violence Theory**

The theory of structural violence states that some violence are avoidable but becomes inevitable due to deprivation of some basic human needs in the areas of political, socioeconomic and cultural structures, because those suffering from this deprivations are linked with the variables mentioned above by structural violence theorists. Structural violence may occur as a result of lack of human agencies which may make an action of a person to result to unequal distribution of resources. Structural violence exists when some groups, classes, genders, and nationalities are assumed to have, and in fact do have, more access to goods, resources, and opportunities than other groups, classes, genders and nationalities, these unequal advantage is built into the very social, political and economic systems that govern societies, states and the world Galtung (1969). The theory

emphasizes on the functional relationships of different structures and institutions to look into the causes, consequences, management of the consequences as well as the modalities of preventing future occurrence of similar violence.

For a long time however, there tends to believe the government's inability to meet up with its responsibilities also leads to violence in societies such as that of the Boko Haram (Burton, 1997). The structural violence theory has its largest proponents from the intelligentsia, prominent amongst them are Johan Galtung (1969); and (Burton, 1997). One of the schools of thought which blame socioeconomic conditions for the violence act such as those of Boko Haram activities in Nigeria is premised on the human needs/ structural violence theory. It argues that human beings have some basic needs to achieve and when the failure to do this is caused by somebody, it then leads to violence activities (Rosati et al, 1990 cited in Faleti: 51). This theory is likened to that of frustration-aggression theory of violence, states "frustration is a product of aggression" (Dougherty and Pfaltzgrate Jnr, 1990: 266).

The theory sees relative deprivation as the main difference between what one expects but unable to get which is seen as a gap between aspirations and achievement which brings about psychological state of frustration and aggressive attitudes coming out of such situation (Midlarsky, 1975:29). It is further argued that Nigeria's socio-economic index seems to confirm the views of human needs/ structural violence theory. Nigeria ranked 16 out of 176 in 2013 on the index table where the socio-economic factors stands high as the reason for violence activities such as that of Boko Haram in Nigeria and particularly in the Northern part where unemployment among the youths; corruption; poverty; injustice; and a worsening standard of living is the order of the day.

## 2.5.2 Management Theory

Lyndall Urwick and Luther Gulick did an edition of a publication titled, *Papers on the Science of Administration* in 1937, which consisted of articles on management theory and public administration. Gulick isolated the responsibilities of the chief executive and enumerated them in accordance with the acronym POSDCORB, which stands for planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting. One of his main points was that well-managed or self-contained organizations are nearly always headed by a single top manager such as a CEO (Gulick, 1936). Urwick on the other hand argues that the activities required for realizing the goals of an organization should be grouped and allotted to persons in an impersonal way. In addition, Urwick also put in writing; the problems associated with the management of a huge numbers of employees and employed a formula to help him find out the least and highest number of subordinates a manager can manage effectively (Urwick, 1933). This paper focuses on the Gulick and Urwick organizational theories, how they are applicable in the hospital setting as well as in the decision making process.

In the *Notes on the Theory of Organization*, Gulick describes the POSDCORB principles by arguing that if the work load of an executive becomes too much and overpowering, some of the POSDCORB elements can be organized as the executive's subdivision based on the size and the difficulty of the work (Gulick, 1936). In relation to organizing Gulick emphasized on division of labor and specialization to help increase efficiency. However, he says that there are disadvantages associated with division of labor. For instance, when division of labor results in a tasks requiring lesser time than the full time an employee is supposed to work such that a worker may have to be assigned to other tasks to occupy his remaining time. Another limitation arises in a case where some tasks

can only be handled by some workers because of lack of technological knowledge and experience at the time.

According to Urwick (1933), there are four ways of organizing specialized workers i.e. based on the purpose the employees are serving, the processes used by the workers, the materials or clients they are dealing with as well as their place of work. It is important to recognize the fact that the above modes of organizing workers can often cross one another, forming a complicated and interconnected organizational structure where organizations such as schools will include workers and professionals even outside the education field such as doctors, secretaries, janitors etc.

There are two methods that are useful in achieving coordination of divided labor for instance by placing employees to work under managers who coordinate their work as well as by developing a clear idea of what needs to be done in every worker, after which each worker suits his or her work to the needs of the whole organization.

According to Gulick (1936), the number of employees that that a single manager can effectively handle depend on factors such as space, specialization of employees, organizational stability and whether the manager is from a similar area of specialty. Though Gulick does not give a definite number of employees that can be effectively controlled by a manager, the numbers three to six have been suggested by people such as Ian Hamilton and Urwick. The emphasis on the theory of unity of command is also essential to enable every employee to have one direct boss in order to avoid inefficiency and confusion (Urwick, 1956). Gulick and Urwick emphasize the need to differentiate between the operational components (the doers) within an organization and the coordinating components (the thinkers and planners).

In a hospital setting, the Gulick and Urwick Organizational theory can be applied by allocating works according to the area of specialization of employees for example; doctors should treat patients, while nurses should be charged with taking care of patients. That way cases whereby nurses prescribe wrong drugs to patients can be avoided. The consequences of such actions are detrimental; for instance severe effect on patient's health or even death. In conclusion, Gulick and Urwick's Organizational theory can be applied in decision making process of an organization by recruiting only the number of employees that a manager can effectively control hence saving costs as well as reducing cases where some workers do not work as required because of lack of supervision.

### **2.5.3 Application of the Theory to the Study**

In the interpretation of the Boko-Haram's evolution and violence activities, the proponents of Human needs/structural violence theory admits that there is endemic poverty and hopelessness in Nigeria generally but more severe in the northern part of Nigeria. It was debated that "the root cause of violence and anger in both the north and southern part of Nigeria is endemic poverty and hopelessness; hence the Nigerian government was advised to address the socio-economic deprivation in the country which is most severe in the north (Herskovits, 2012). Some scholars also reaffirm that the very high incidence of poverty in Nigeria is generally seen as a northern problem. The three northern regions have an average poverty incidence of 70.1% compared to 34.9% of the South's three. While the Southern part of Nigeria record the lowest poverty incidence, the Northern part has the highest with 70% of the people living below \$1 per day, which is equivalent to N129 per day" (Lukman n.d.).

Frustration as a result of economic deprivation may lead to violence in some developing countries (Dougherty and Pfaltzgrate, Jnr. 1990: 266). This is the present situation as

currently taken place in Nigeria of today. It is pertinent to argue that the North's socio-economic crisis lies in its system of patrimonial economic system, which disallow women from participation in economic activities, and the bad governance in Nigeria that places distribution above production (Aregbesola, 2012). Aregbesola further argued that the non-participation of women in economic activities does not lead to violence and terrorism, yet, it is only the adult males that sustain that society; because, for the male to sustain their family has become difficult, especially with the north no longer with political power at the center makes the Northern elites unable to meet up their demands which in turn makes it difficult for crumbs to go to the less privileged and hence, violence in the Northern part of Nigeria (Aregbesola, 2012).

Economically, there is competition for scarce resources which also play some role in the political violence in some developing countries (Oberschal 1969 and Nelson 1969). There is complaint from the Northern part of Nigeria claiming to be at disadvantage in the federal allocation structure, despite the prevailing illiteracy; poverty; and ignorance in that part of the country, this situation makes it difficult for the North to develop industrially and hence their engagement in violence activities (Daily trust, online, 2012). Some argued that poverty and unemployment are not excuses for terrorist activities by Boko-Haram because, other parts of Nigeria do experience adverse socio-economic conditions. The North West and North central also have beggars on their streets yet they did not use the poverty excuse to go into violence activities (People Daily, online, June 26, 2012). From the above perspective therefore, it can be stated that, other factors such as religion contributed to the evolution of Boko-Haram in Nigeria as explained in other theories, but not addressed in the Daltung structural violence theory, because not every socio-economically deprived individual will be motivated to lend support to acts of violence perpetrated by the Boko-Haram insurgent group in Nigeria which has some

devastating impact on the business environment in Nigeria and particularly the North-Eastern Zone.

The Internally Displaced Persons are supposed to be taken good care of by providing them with basic human needs such as food, shelter, security, potable water supply, clothing, and schools. These are to be provided by different structures and institutions to include different levels of government, NGOs, as well as the private sector organizations. The IDPs are provided with some services that will comfort them effectively and efficiently. To achieve that, IDP camps are to be made effective and efficient by well-trained human resources, financial resources, and activities of local government, state government as well as the federal government. Not only that, the NGOs and the private sector organizations formed significant parts of managing the affairs of the IDPs in both MMC and Bama local government areas.

This theory is much applicable to this study as it focuses on the managing the aftermaths of Boko-Haram insurgency in Borno State and specifically management of IDPs in MMC and Bama local government areas. The study also focuses on the effects of managing the IDPs on local government administration. The challenges of IDPs in Borno State and Nigeria includes Insecurity, Trauma and Bitterness, Hunger and Starvation, Acute Malnutrition, Sexually Transmitted Diseases, Education, Rights of IDPs, Shelter/Accommodation, Waste Management and Electricity Lack of Good Water, etc. This has resulted in low management of the plight of the IDPs in Bama and Maiduguri Metropolitan councils. The management of IDPs by camp officials as said by Gulick involve specialization of employees, organizational stability and whether the manager is from a similar area of specialty.



## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

Research methodology is the technique used in data collection and analysis. It is one of the most critical aspects of a research work because it determines the success of the study and provides the basis for drawing up inferences and conclusions. Therefore, this section outlines and explains the methodology that has been adopted in this study under the following captions: research design, population and sample size and sampling technique. Others are sources of data, administration of instruments and method of data analysis. Finally, the researcher explains the reasons for adopting the tools in testing the validity or otherwise of the earlier hypotheses formulated in chapter one of the work.

#### **3.2 Research Design**

For the purpose of this study, the survey research method is adopted. The use of survey research was justified on the ground that it enables the researcher to generalize the sample of this study to its population so that inferences and conclusion can be made. This method focuses on population of the study in which data collected were used for intensive study and analysis. A sample from a subject of population is carefully selected to represent the characteristic of the population. This provides the opportunity to generalize the findings of the study for the whole population of the study.

The study covers Maiduguri metropolitan council and Bama local government. The Local Government Areas were chosen because of the fact that Maiduguri metropolitan and Bama Local Government Areas are parts of flash point for the operation of the insurgency and Internally Displaced Persons.

### 3.3 Population of the Study

The population of the study comprised of all the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) of Maiduguri metropolitan council and Bama Local Government Areas which are projected at 92278 people including camp officials of the two Local Government Councils. The population of the Bama Local Government IDPs including the camp officials was 36,450 while that of MMC was 55828.

### 3.4 Sample Size

Sample size is the process of drawing sample from the total population. The sample size was arrived at using Yamane's formula which is computed below as thus:

$$N = 92278$$

$$n = \frac{N}{1+N(e)^2}$$

Where: n = Sample size

N = Total population

e = Level of significance (5% or 0.05)

$$n = \frac{92278}{1+92278(0.05)^2}$$

$$n = \frac{92278}{1+92278 \times 0.0025}$$

$$n = \frac{92278}{1+230.695}$$

$$n = \frac{92278}{1+231.695}$$

$$n = 399.74$$

$$\approx 400$$

In view of this, the value on the total population of the two Local Government Areas is 92278. This means the sample size for this study stands at 400 respondents. Out of this number 158 respondents was drawn from Bama Local Government, while 242 drawn from MMC using proportionate sampling procedure.

### **3.5 Sampling Technique**

The study adopted purposive sample through random sampling technique as the population is known. The figure of the sample size comprises of the IDPs and camp officials of the two Local Governments. The choice of this technique is basically to avoid bias or absence of systematic variance. In the sampling every subject in the population is given equal and independent chance of being included in the sample.

### **3.6 Sources of Data**

The study used both primary and secondary data. This can be justified on the basis of its validity and reliability as the data obtained from the secondary sources will compliment the one generated from the field.

#### **3.6.1 Primary Sources of Data**

This is the first hand data that has been generated through field work by the researcher. Two major instruments were used in generating data namely, questionnaire and interview. Through these, both qualitative and quantitative data were garnered namely; questionnaire and interview. The use of questionnaire can be justified on the basis of its reliability, convenience, preserving identity and lower rate of reactivity.

The questionnaires were structured in a close ended manner and using Likert scale format for easy analysis.

The questionnaire was drawn to reflect all the sample size of the respective camp officials and the internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps in Maidugari metropolitan council and Bama Local Government Council of Borno, State.

The questionnaire was divided into two sections (A and B). Section A consists of questions relating to the respondents personal data such as” Gender, Age, Educational Qualification. Section B of the questionnaire consists of questions relating to the variables of the study.

Also in order to obtain more information, the researcher conducted structured interview by focusing on key individuals who have direct involvement and knowledge of the activities of insurgents, management of IDPs camps and its impact on local government administration. The use of interview was to compliment the questionnaire and enable the researcher to investigate further and make follow- up. It also enabled the researcher to seek clarification on some of the responses given in the questionnaire. To verify some of the answers given in the questionnaire which appeared doubtful on the basis of data that was collected and on- the – spot assessment that was carried out.

### **3.6.2 Secondary Sources of Data**

This is the second hand data already generated and stored in texts, files etc. Secondary data were collected from the education and community development department and internally. Displace persons (IDPs) camps in Maiduguri metropolitan council and Bama local government council of Borno State.

The data that were obtained from the secondary sources were used as evidence to support data from the primary sources.

### 3.7 Instrument of Data Collection and its Administration

A total of 400 questionnaires were administered to camps officials of the two Local Government and the IDPs. One hundred and fifty eight (158) questionnaires were administered to the Internally Displaced Persons' (IDPs) Officials. Two hundred and forty two (242) questionnaires were administered to the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Also a total of ten (10) people were interviewed in the two Local Government Areas while 10 people were interviewed in the IDPs camps. The selection was done randomly.

Table 3.1: **The distribution of respondents in MMC and Bama**

Officials	No of Respondents	Percentage %
NEMA	30	7.5
SEMA	50	12.5
LG Officials	15	3.75
Traditional leaders	46	11.5
Security	17	4.25
IDPs	242	60.5
Total	400	100

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

The researcher selected 20 respondents from the total sample size and interviewed them in other to probe further on the issue under study. The interviewees were distributed across the study areas.

Table 3.2: **Number of persons interviewed**

MMC	5	25%
BAMA	5	25%
IDPs	10	50%
Total	20	100%

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

### 3.8 Method of Data Analysis

Both descriptive and inferential statistical tools of analysis were employed for the analysis of data obtained from questionnaire through the use of SPSS version 20. The descriptive statistical tools used in this study include frequency tables, simple percentages and average mean score, for analyzing and interpreting the data that were collected. The study also adopted the chi-square  $X^2$  test instrument as an inferential statistical tool to statistically test the hypotheses postulated.

The choice of this tool can be justified on the ground that it measures the relationship between variables of interest chi- square is a non parametric tool and it is used to measure the level of relationship between the observed and expected frequencies, the formula for calculating the chi- square goes thus:

Where:  $\chi^2$  is the chi-square

O is the observed frequency

E is the expected frequency

$\Sigma$  is the summation

Source: (Anyadike, 2009:40-48)

The expected frequency is usually calculated by multiplying the total by the row total and then divide the result of by the grand total each cell. Thus:

$E = \frac{CT \times RT}{GT}$

GT

Pearson's correlation and column test was used to further substantiate the extent of relationship among the variable compared (management of internally displaced persons, local government administration). The assumption under the test procedure is that when

p-value is  $\leq 0.05$ ; the null proposition is invalidated else the study fails to reject the null proposition is p-value is  $\geq 0.05$ .

The level of significance measures the degrees of significance that will assign to committing type one or two error. Thus where 0.05 (5%) level of significance is used, it means there is 95% assurance of not committing any of the error. Hence the level of significance used for this research is 0.05 risking just 5% of the test result which will also give a high chance of validity.

In order to also pick appropriate value in the test procedure, a minimum allowance given in a number of data and this is what degree of freedom stand for. Therefore degree of freedom is a number of allowances given within the sample and it is calculated as  $(R-1)$   $(C-1)$ . (Anyadike, 2009: 40-48).

### **Decision Rule**

The decision rule states that: if level of significance is greater than p-value, the null hypothesis should be rejected but if otherwise it should be accepted.

**CHAPTER FOUR**  
**HISTORY AND OPERATIONAL PATTERN OF MMC AND BAMA LOCAL**  
**GOVERNMENT**

**4.1 Introduction**

This chapter examines the historical profile of MMC and Bama Local Government Area, the goals and objectives of the local government as a third tier of government. The researcher also examined the local government structure, organizational chart, the mode of their operations, the various departments of the local government and their roles.

**4.2 Local Government Administration in Nigeria**

It is acknowledged that local government constitutes the most critical level of governance where the momentum to sustain national development can be created (Olayiwola, 2013). According to him local governance is a system of devolution of powers to the local authority to provide services of local nation.

Golding (1975) say local government is the management of their own affairs by the people of a locality. Also Olayiwola (1984, 1986, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2011,2012,2013) local government is a public organization authorized to decide and administer a limited range of public policies within a relatively small territory which is a sub- division of a regional or national government. It is a political sub-division of a nation (or in a federal system, state) which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs including the power to impose taxes or to exert labour for prescribed purposes, local government is a territorial non- sovereign community possessing the legal right and the necessary organization to regulate its own affairs; and in Nigeria, local government is defined as: ‘ government at local level exercises through representative councils established by law to exercise specific powers within defined areas. These powers should give the council substantial control over local affairs as well



as staff and institutional and financial powers to initiate and direct the provision of services and to determine and implement projects so as to complement the activities of the state and federal government in their areas and to ensure, through devolution of functions to these councils and through the active participation of the people and their traditional situations that local initiative and conditions are maximized.

According to Golding (1975) local government administration is aimed at bringing government nearer to the people, catering for local needs encouraging local participation in politics and ensuring the preservation of local traditions history and culture of the people as well as relieving the central or federal government of the burden of over centralization, local government administration is also designed to provide essential social and economic services for the locality, mobilize the people for community development, make for simple administration of justice at the local level and serve as a link between the people and the state/ central government among a host of other functions.

### **The Role of Stakeholders in Tackling the Challenges of IDPs in Nigeria**

The key stakeholders here are the individuals, civil society organisations, educational institutions, government and international organisations (NGO); the stakeholders have roles to play in the challenges facing the IDPs by responding to the situation (Alobo & Abaji, 2016). These roles are as follows:

- a. **The Role of Individuals:** The Individuals have roles to play. These include:
  - i. The role to love the IDPs and care for them because they are human beings and fellow citizens, we need to embrace them, go close to them, pray, cry and play with them. Make them feel loved and give them the sense of belonging.

- ii. Individuals can provide the IDPs with gift items like clothes, shoes, food items, toys for the children, cream, perfumes and so on. We have to sacrifice our money and buy them good gifts.
- iii. The individuals can extend their hands of care through provision of food, clothing, shelter that will heal the emotional effects of what they have been through. We need to restore their dignity, and through love and care.
- iv. Individuals may also provide shelter/accommodation to the IDPs.

**Role of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs):** In addition to the individual roles, the CSO can assist the IDPs. The scope of activities for civil society groups for displaced persons may include the following;

- i. Civil society organizations (CSOs) can play the role of monitoring situations of forcible displacement in the state, in order to ensure that it does not amount to arbitrary displacement by states.
- ii. The civil organizations can assist the victims to obtain a legal remedy, including compensation.
- iii. CSOs can advocate for legal or policy frameworks to address gaps related to durable solutions.
- iv. They can assist displaced persons with skills and the creation of livelihood opportunities, to enable them to start rebuilding their lives.
- v. They can also contribute to peace-building activities aimed at ensuring good relations between the displaced persons and the local communities where they intend to settle permanently (Falabi, 2014).

#### **Role of Educational Institutions**

- i. Educational institutions have a role of providing quality education as a key factor in countering the risk of radicalisation among youths. This is premised on the

grounds that youths who have received even a little education are more inclined to view unreasonable violence negatively and are less susceptible to ideological brainwashing by extremist groups (Martin-Rayo, 2013)

- ii. Efforts to provide adequate protection and assistance to internally displaced persons must be based on accurate information about their number (reflecting the number of children, women and men in different age groups) in all locations such as camps, cities, rural settings. Educational institutions could embark on research to provide data on numbers and state of affairs of IDPs in the country to give adequate guidance for intervention.

**The Role of Government:** Addressing the problems of IDPs is primarily the responsibility of the government. This requires the taking of concrete steps to prevent arbitrary displacement, protect and assist the IDPs and find durable solution to their problems. The role of government according to Bookings (2005) includes:

- i. Government has the responsibility to prevent overt conditions on their territory that might compel population to flee.
- ii. Raising national awareness for recognized problems and addressing same.
- iii. Adequate medical care should be given to IDPs especially to their pregnant, nursing mothers and children. Their children should be immunized to avoid being affected by vulnerable diseases.
- iv. The IDPs also need to be empowered; government should provide them with vocational training and skill acquisition so that they don't stay idle while in camp.
- v. Government should provide IDPs with adequate security; make sure that their lives are being secured before sending them back to their homes. Also the camp they live should be guarded by the security armed forces to make sure that further attacks both internally and externally are prevented.

- vi. The IDPs should not only be provided with carbohydrate food. Well balanced diet should be given to them so that they will not be malnourished.
- vii. While the IDPs are still in camp, they need to be educated on pre-marital sex and the dangers of unprotected sex to avoid sexually transmitted diseases.
- viii. Good shelters should be provided for them to avoid effects of cold. Also good source of water should be made available for them to prevent water born diseases.
- ix. The government should provide a national legal framework to develop laws to uphold the rights of IDPs.
- x. The role of government is also to collect data so as to obtain credible information needed on the numbers, location and conditions of IDPs in order to design effective policies and programmes.
- xi. Government should provide for the education of the children while the period of displacement lasts and even after for children who become orphans with no one to care for them.
- xii. To provide training programmes for government officials including camp administrators, military and police exposing them to the rights and needs of the displaced and their own official duties to protect and assist them.
- xiii. Participation of IDPs in Decision Making: Engaging displaced persons in consultation and building upon their skills. The participation of women can reduce their vulnerability to sexual harassment and violence.
- xiv. Government owe it as a duty to establish conditions to allow IDPs to return voluntarily, in safety and dignity, to their places of habitual residence.
- xv. Allocation of adequate resources to the extent they can, to address situations of internal displacement.

- xvi. Cooperation with international, regional and local organizations in providing assistance to IDPs.

**The Role of Non-Governmental International Organisations (NGOs):** The international actors here are the international free donors and humanitarian agencies that help in preventing displacement and providing protection and assistance to those displaced. Their roles in helping IDPs are thus:

- i. In line with the United Nation's guiding principles on Internal Displacement of 1998 and the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa, they should help in preventing displacement and providing protection and assistance to those displaced.
- ii. They should actively play role of providing funding from the Commonwealth of Nations and gifts to countries that are in dear need of such assistance.
- iii. International actors have the role to engage indigenous researchers and NGOs dedicated to advancement of women and children to collate and analyse data to generate comprehensive result for proper intervention.
- iv. As part of their role, they should provide a comprehensive humanitarian support and training programme to equip IDPs with skills for better livelihoods.
- v. The provision of health facilities and services to the IDPs. The World Health Organization (WHO) has the role to intervene in cases like this so as to remedy and help the situation.

### **4.3 Historical Background of MMC and Bama Local Government Area**

**4.3.1 Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (MMC)** was created in 1976 with Maiduguri doubling as Borno State Capital and also the headquarters of MMC. It's the largest city in Borno State. MMC has fifteen (15) electoral wards. Each ward is represented by either elected or appointed councillor. The city sits along the seasonal Ngadda River. It's has a population of 543,016 according to 2006 population census.

**4.3.2 Bama Local Government Area** was created in 1976 with its headquarters in Bama. It has an area of 4,997km<sup>2</sup> and a population of 269,986 as per 2006 population census. It is located 66km from Maiduguri the state capital. It's the second largest city in Borno State. The Local Government is constituted of fourteen (14) electoral wards. Each ward is represented by a councillor either elected or appointed. The major tribes in the Bama include Kanuri, Shuwa, Gamurgo, Mafa (Wula) and Mandara

### **4.4 Objectives of MMC and Bama Local Government Area**

The two local government as third tier of government derives its objectives from the 1999 constitution as amended and other extent laws as provided by the Borno State House of Assembly.

The objectives of the two local governments are as follows:

- i. To provide a two- way channel of communication between local community people and the government that is, federal, state and local government.
- ii. To involve the community members in the management and policy affairs considered to be local.
- iii. To provide an enabling framework within which local resources can be effectively utilized.

- iv. To achieve the basic needs of the people within a defined geographical setting and with little resources available to the people and their government.

#### **4.5 Functions of MMC and Bama Local Government**

MMC and Bama local government like any other local government in the country performs various duties. These duties or functions can be traced in the fourth Schedule of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended. The said functions are also contained in the 1976 local government reforms. Some of the functions or duties performed by MMC and Bama local government area may include the following:

- i. Provision and maintenance of public conveniences and refuse disposal
- ii. Registration of birth, death and marriages
- iii. Establishment, maintenance and regulation of market, motor parks and abattoirs.
- iv. Licensing of bicycles, wheelbarrows and carts
- v. Establishment and maintenance of burial grounds
- vi. Making recommendations to the state commission on economic planning or any similar body, concerning policy implementation
- vii. Collection of rates, viewing centres, private schools.
- viii. Construction and maintenance of streets, roads, drains and other public highways, parks or such facilities as may be prescribed from time to time by House of Assembly of the State.
- ix. Assessment of privately owned tenant house for the purpose of levying such rates as may be prescribed by the House of Assembly of the state
- x. Naming of roads, streets and numbering of houses.

Apart from the above functions, MMC and Bama Local Government Area perform other functions such as:

- i. The provision of infrastructure and social amenities
- ii. Provision and maintenance of health services
- iii. The provision and maintenance of primary education
- iv. Providing conducive environment for agriculture and natural resources
- v. Maintenance of law and order

#### **4.6 The Structure of MMC and Bama Local Government**


Local governments throughout the nation are having almost similar structure to conform to their functions. The local government council could be generally subdivided into two; the first is the political functions and the second is the administrative functions.

The local government's political setup includes the chairman, vice chairman, elected councillors and including the four elected supervisory councillors. While the administrative setup includes the secretary of the local government, head of departments and various unit heads.

The councillors are the legislative leaders of the council who from time to time deliberate on matters affecting the local government and passed to the executive arm of the council for execution. Political actors of the local government perform executive and legislative roles in the local government.



**Fig: 4.6 Organizational Charts of MMC and Bama Local Government**



Source: Information unit, MMC and Bama Local Government (2018)

- i. **Administrative arm of the local government:** The administrative body of MMC and Bama local government council is made up of the Secretary. Director of Personnel Management (DPM). Head of various departments and entire civil servant of the local government.
- ii. **Function of the Chairman:** The vice chairman is also a political appointee along with the chairman. He exercises duties of administration through the description of the chairman. At times he represents the chairman in the local government council in his absent.

- iii. **Functions of the Councillors:** The councillors are also elected by the electorates from different electoral wards of the Local Government. The councillors are very important personnel in the local government. They are involved in policy making, enactment of bye-laws and making rules and regulations governing the running the affairs of the local government. The councillors attend the local government meetings at least once in a month, debate, approved and amend local government annual budget. They also serve as members of the various sub- committees such as health care, committee on education among others.
- iv. **Functions of the secretary:** The 1976 local government reforms provide that each local government council should have a secretary. The secretaries are career Local Government staff appointed by Local Government service commission with the approval of the executive Governor. The following powers were vested on him.

He serves as the secretary of the meeting during the executive meetings, the secretary is the head of the local government council bureaucracy, he coordinates the work of the various departments, he is the link between the council and the Local Government staff.

MMC and Bama local government council is made up of twelve (12) departments as we can see in the above diagram, they are as follows:

- i. Personnel/administration department
- ii. Health department
- iii. Works department
- iv. Agriculture and natural resources department
- v. Education and social development department

vi. Treasury department

**i. The Department of Personnel Administration**

This department is otherwise known as general administration. Its primary function includes procurement, development, compensation, integration, maintenance and separation of workers, the department is headed by Director of Personnel Management (DPM).

**ii. The Health Department**

This department is responsible for the execution of all programmes and projects on primary health care, the department is also in charge of prevention services such as tuberculosis and leprosy control, expanded programme on immunization control of communicable disease control of diarrhoea diseases (EPI/CD/CDD)

**iii. The Works Department**

The department is responsible in coordination of all projects executed by the local government council such as construction of feeder roads, culvert schools, boreholes, water supply and electricity supply. It is also in charge of rehabilitation and repairs. A chief engineer heads the department.

**iv. The Agriculture and Natural Resources Department**

This department is headed by head of agriculture and natural resources. Its main responsibilities include providing fertilizers, seedling, spraying machines, agriculture, the department has four units that is forestry, veterinary, extension and agriculture.

**v. The Education and Social Development Department**

The department consists of four units that are community development information, social welfare and adult education.

The community development coordinates the activities of different communities by encouraging them to embark on self-help project.

The information unit also serves as the media of the local government broadcasting and enlightening the staff of the local government internally and externally. The social unit also embarks on rehabilitation, an emergency relief services, organizing seminar and conferences for youth organization as well as general public on social work.

The adult education unit dealt with organizing adult education classes for illiterate people, participating in the conduct of induction courses of adult education instructor, compiling statistical and other returns on adult education classes.

#### **vi. The finance or treasury department**

The finance department is responsible for all financial management revenue generation and the disbursement of fund for carrying out local government services. It advises both the executive and department on proper financial planning and the operational stages. It has four sections, that as revenue, account, store and budgeting sections.

#### **4.7 Sources of Revenue in MMC and Bama Local Government**

Finance is said to be the bedrock of every organization and the survival of every organization depends on its financial capability, therefore, MMC and Bama local government like any other local governments in Nigeria derives its revenue from two sources, first statutory allocation from federal government account and state (external sources) and the internally generated revenue (that is internal sources).

- i. Twenty percent (20%) from the federation account
- ii. Ten percent (10%) from the internal generate revenue of the state account.

Internal sources of local government revenue are

- i. The local government derives revenue from commercial ventures example like local government transport scheme
- ii. Rates collected from motor parks, market, roads, health services, etc
- iii. Taxes and rates from stores
- iv. Licenses and fees from registration of indigene certificate birth certificates etc.

#### **4.7.1 Nigerian 1999 Constitution (As Amended) and Local Government Administration**

According to Olayiwola (2013) the main provision of the 1999 constitution on local government vests states with authority to ensure their existence as democratic institutions by legislations that provides for their establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions. It further provides that local governments shall receive a share of the federation account on terms decided by the National Assembly.

The constitution guarantees fiscal transfers from the federation account to local government as well as their functions. However, the 1999 constitution does not give local governments clear mandates on key local functions such as local development planning, primary education, health services and the development planning, primary education, health services and the development of agriculture and natural resources. Their role in economic development planning, primary education, health services, the development of agriculture and natural resources. Their role in economic development planning is to make recommendations to a state's agency for economic planning, while in respect of

primary education, health and agricultural development, their role is stated as ‘ participation in the government of a state as respects’ these functions. With such unclear mandates, local governments have had a herculean task resisting state interference in local governance. One of the problematic areas in local government administration since 1999 has been how to secure adequate funds for local governments. Following the return to democratic rule in 1999, local officials expected that arbitrary deductions from local funds and procurements on their behalf would cease which would result in more revenue accruing to them.

One aspect of the constitutional problem is that it provides for the establishment of a state joint local government account (SJLGA) into which shall be paid the allocations to local governments from a state’s internal revenue, while of the same time empowering the National Assembly to determine on what terms and manner the allocations from the federation account shall be distributed to local governments. State assemblies are empowered to decide the formula for allocation of revenue to local governments within their states. These provisions are meant to ensure that the federal account allocations which are by far the largest sources of funding of local governments are protected as best as the National Assembly can decide while at the same time, allowing states to decide distributive equity within its jurisdiction. The problem is that the SJLGA has historically facilitated state encroachment on local revenues, therefore, necessitate its abolition under the military reforms of the mid 1980s (Gboyega, 2003).

Functions of a local government council under the fourth schedule of the 1999 constitution are as follows:

- 1) The consideration and the making of recommendations a state commission on economic planning or any similar body on

- (i) The economic development of the state, particularly in so far as the areas of authority of the council and of the state are affected and
- (ii) Proposals made by the said commission or body
- (ii) Collection of rates, radio and television licenses,
- (iii) Establishment , maintenance of commentaries, burial grounds and homes for the destitute or infirm:
- (iv) Licensing of bicycles, trucks (other than mechanically propelled trucks), canoes, wheel barrows and carts.
- (v) Establishment, maintenance and regulation of slaughter houses, slaughter slabs, markets, motor parks and public conveniences
- (vi) Construction and maintenance of roads, streets, street lightings, drains and other public highways, parks, graders open spaces, or such public facilities as may be prescribed from time to time by the House of Assembly of a state
- (vii) Naming of roads and streets and numbering of houses
- (viii) Provision and maintenance of public conveniences, sewage and refuse disposal
- (ix) Registration of all births, deaths and marriages
- (x) Assessment of privately owned houses or tenements for the purpose of levying such rates as may be prescribed by the House of Assembly of a state and
- (xi) Control and regulation of :
  - (a) Out-door advertising and hoarding
  - (b) Movement and keeping of pets of all descriptions
  - (c) Shops and kiosks
  - (d) Restaurants bakeries and other places for sale of food to the public

(e) Laundries and

(f) Licensing, regulation and control of the sale of liquor

#### **4.7.2 Administration and Management of IDP's in Maiduguri Municipal Council and Bama Local Government Area**

##### ***Location of IDP camps***

There are 15 IDP camps officially recognized by the Borno State Government. The camps are located in Maiduguri Municipal Council and Jere LGAs.

**Table 4.1: Camp Location and GPS Coordinates/Axis in MMC**

<b>S/N</b>	<b>Camp Name</b>	<b>GPS Coordinates</b>
1.	Government Girls College camp	Northern (N) 11.8329, Eastern (E)013.14091
2.	Girls secondary School camp (Former WTC)	N11.83225, E013.14010
3.	EYN/CAN Centre camp	N11.84394, E013.13693
4.	Farm Centre camp	N11.86142, E013.21474
5.	Government College camp	N11.83515, E013.12718
6.	Yerwa camp	N11.83415, E013.11955
7.	Teachers Village camp	N11.84307, E013.09869
8.	Bakassi camp	N11.79308, E013.11784
9.	National Youth Service Corp camp	N11.82590, E013.11947
10.	Arabic Teachers College camp	NA (Not available )
11.	MOGCOLIS camp	N11.84564, E013.14880
12.	Sanda Kyarimi camp	N11.84984, E013.18254
13.	Dalori camp	N1177930, E013.22357
14.	Fori SUBEB school camp	N11.79914, E013.17713
15.	Gubio Road Housing Estate camp	Camp newly set up.

***Source: SEMA 2018***

##### **Population of IDP in the Camps**



The population of internally displaced persons in camps across Borno State is fluid, depending on the frequency of violence in other parts of the state. The total number of IDPs residing in the 15 camps as at May 2015 was 92,278, including camp officials of MMC and Bama Local Government Area.

**Table 4.2: Number of IDPs, LGAs served and the SIDHAS supported health facilities affected.**

<b>Name of Camp</b>	<b>Estimated Number of IDPs</b>
Government Girls College camp	2,921
Girls secondary School camp	7,726
EYN/CAN Centre camp	1,952
Farm Centre camp	4,500
Government College camp	9,479
Yerwa camp	6,200
Teachers Village camp	7,938
Bakassi camp	10,083
N.Y.S.C camp	4,425
Arabic Teachers College camp	12,337
MOGCOLIS camp	2,907
Sanda Kyarimi camp	5,711
Dalori camp	15,529
SUBEB school camp	72
MMC camp Officials	285
Bama Camp Officials	213
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>92,278</b>

*Source: SEMA 2018*

### **Organizations working in IDP Camps**

The assessment identified eight development and humanitarian organizations providing varied services in at least one or more of the camps. The table below shows the scope of services provided by these organizations in the IDP camps.

Table 4.3: **Partner activity in the IDP camps**

<b>S/N</b>	<b>Name of Organization</b>	<b>Services Provided</b>	<b>Camps Covered by the Services</b>
1.	Red Cross (ICRC)	First Aid services	All the camps visited
2.	MSF	Basic Medical services & Basic Obstetric care	3
3.	WHO	Immunization and Disease surveillance	All the camps visited
4.	Action Against Hunger	WASH	3
5.	Save the Children	Education, Trauma Services, WASH, food security	4
6.	UNICEF	ANC, PHC services, Under - 5 nutrition	All the camps visited
7.	National CDC	Technical Support	2
8.	UNFPA	Condom distribution	1

*Source: Field survey 2018*

### **Distribution of Health Care Workers in the Camps**

There were 208 health workers providing health services across the 14 IDP camps visited. In the camps, the health care workers are State or Local Government employees while humanitarian development organizations also engaged health workers, most of whom are retired state or local government employees to support the intervention in the camps. These health workers include doctors, nurses/midwives, community health extension workers, laboratory scientists, environmental health officers and pharmacists.

### **Health Conditions Reported in IDP Camps**

All IDP camps have reported cases of trauma, skin infection, anemia, measles, chicken pox, vomiting, fever, diarrhea and malnutrition. About 64% of the camps have reported HIV cases. Most of the HIV cases were identified through confidential acknowledgment with health care workers. Tuberculosis (TB) cases were mostly from TB suspects identified by Local Government TB and Leprosy (LGTBL) supervisors working in the camps. The TB cases were confirmed through referrals to DOTS centres in the state capital.

### **HIV/AIDS Prevention, Treatment and Support Services in the Camps**

About 60% of the camps have reported PLHIV resident in the camps. However, only 30% of the camps have some form of HIV testing services, which is not standardized. None of the camps have services for anti-retroviral refill or comprehensive HIV/AIDS treatment and care services. About 30% of the camps have staff trained in HIV testing and counselling. Only 44% of the camps have safe and adequate storage facilities for ARVs. About 79% of the camps have available space for HIV Counselling and Testing.

### **Reproductive Health Services**

In the last 6 months, 530 women gave birth in the camps. However, only 33% of the camps have ANC services. None of the camps is providing prevention and treatment services for GBV. About 20% of the camps have reported HIV+ pregnant women. Only 38% of the camps are offering free condoms.

### **Shelter**

All the camps provide a mixture of tents and houses for the IDPs. However, in all the camps, tents are crowded. The IDPs are using materials such as clothes and sacks to shield themselves from the sun, rain and for privacy.

### **Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)**

#### **Water Supply**

All the camps have water supply. The sources of water in these camps include boreholes, truck supply and wells. The figure below shows the nature of water supply in the camps. Due to the number of IDPs received in the camps on a daily basis, the current available source is not sufficient.

## **Toilet Facility**

The two main types of toilets used in the camps include pit latrine with cement slab and traditional pit latrine. Most of the camps have latrines with cement slabs. Open defecation was observed to be occurring in some of the camps.

## **Solid & Sewage Disposal in the Camp**

Collective bins, village collection and dumping are the main types of solid waste disposal being used in the camps. The camps do not have adequate sewage waste disposal.

### **4.7.3 Key Aspects of Challenges to IDP Assistance**

The number of IDPs and the strength of the economy in the territorial units are the variables that affect the role of local authorities. Maiduguri Municipal Council (MMC), as the capital of the state and a larger city than Bama, has a certain capacity for economic and administrative manoeuvring, and, therefore, a greater ability to respond. In contrast, despite being an important city, Bama is hugely impacted by the ongoing flux of forcibly displaced persons, who exert pressure on less robust public finances, which have also suffered from many management and corruption problems in recent years. Facing these conditions, the response of the authorities is much more precarious and depends on assistance from national and state authorities.

While the management of MMC is known as one of the most efficient in the state, over the past eight years, the administration has focused on the provision of emergency assistance to the growing population of IDPs in the city, on guiding national policies and on the lack of local policies supporting socioeconomic rehabilitation. In contrast, relevant government officials in Bama deem that internal displacement is associated with the armed conflict that occurs within and outside of the local government and that, as such, it

is not they but, rather, the local authorities in the local governments of origin who bear the economic and administrative responsibility for the IDPs.

With the above points in mind, this research highlighted some of the key aspects of challenges to local government response to IDPs in Maiduguri Municipal Council (MMC) and Bama local government:

- i. Health services are in principle universal in Borno state, but in fact remain a lacuna in government response, with serious deficiencies in quality and coverage for the entire population. In Maiduguri Municipal Council (MMC), while IDPs themselves have a special system for accessing health services, managed by the council, the assistance they receive is inadequate.
- ii. In Bama, there have been significant advances in IDP assistance in terms of health, education, civil registration, and in the provision of some public services such as electricity and sewage, with the exception of new, substandard or informal settlements where there are conflicts with the surrounding communities for access to public services.
- iii. While Maiduguri Municipal Council (MMC) and Bama have tried to form links with local governments of origin in order to facilitate the return of IDPs, these programs have not been possible due to the ongoing armed conflict which makes returns unsustainable. In fact, IDPs do not tend to return to their place of origin, but, rather tend to resettle in urban areas, resulting in an urbanization of internal displacement.
- iv. In MMC, the municipal administration offers IDPs, in conjunction with the state government, housing and livelihoods programs, and, to a lesser extent, with the assistance of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) through the

International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the National emergency management agency (NEMA).

- v. However, these programs are insufficient as they neither provide the minimum coverage needed nor enable the self-sufficiency of IDPs.
- vi. Host communities comprised of IDPs themselves, in the outskirts of Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (MMC), have been strained by the arrival of more newly displaced IDPs. In the context of marginalization and lack of subsistence measures, the relationships between these hosts and IDPs have become tense and exacerbate the local government's existing social and racial discrimination.
- vii. To overcome this situation, Maiduguri Municipal Council (MMC), has endeavoured to ensure that programs targeting IDPs also benefit host communities. Notwithstanding, some host communities have protested to prevent the implementation of these policies.
- viii. Plans, programs and projects targeting IDPs include consultations with leaders of organizations assisting IDPs. However, it is recognized that this participation focuses on the provision of information, as IDP leaders do not have a significant influence on public policies that are shaped by the law and depend on the political will of officials in terms of assigning resources and setting priorities. IDP leaders and host community organizations are not consulted in these policies. Rather, consultation is effected at the level of project implementation.
- ix. Officials recognize that IDP organizations and their leaders are well informed about their rights, while the main challenge lies in the high levels of fragmentation within the IDP community and the fact that their organizations may not be representative of the vast numbers of existing IDPs.

#### **4.7.4 The Current Status and Challenge of IDPs in Nigeria**

According to Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), as at 2013, 3.3 million people were displaced in Nigeria essentially as a result of insurgency. It also recorded 1,538,982 IDPs in Nigeria as of April 2015. As at December 2015, the total number of IDPs identified in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe amounted to 2,152,000 people.

- i. The vast majority of IDPs identified in the above mentioned states have been displaced because of the insurgency (91.98%); a smaller number was forced to leave their place of origin because of community clashes (7.96%) or natural disaster (0.06%).
- ii. In Borno, 24.2% of the population was displaced in 2015 following the increase in violence in this state since the beginning of the year. A large number of IDPs in north east Nigeria live with relatives and friends. 87% of IDPs live with host communities and 13% live in camps or camp-like settings. The situation in other states are quite different, while there are no identified camps in Yobe, Bauchi and Gombe, 12% of the IDP population in Adamawa and 18% of IDPs in Borno live in camps or camp-like setting.
- iii. A total of 43 displacement sites have been identified in Adamawa, Borno and Taraba States. The number of individuals residing in these sites consists of 154,008 individuals within 19,348 households.
- iv. The bulk of these victims are women and children who are also the most vulnerable. Research shows that 62% of the IDP population in sites are female while 38% are male. Half of the total numbers of individuals residing in sites are children under 17 years old. The vulnerability identified that within the IDP population, 3.33% are single headed-households, 2.26% are breastfeeding mothers while 1.22% are

pregnant women. In addition, 1.61% of the IDPs have been identified as unaccompanied and separated children.

- v. The challenges faced by IDPs in Nigeria is not entirely different from the general problems associated with IDPs as observed above but it is necessary to identify specifically those difficulties IDPs encounter in Nigeria. First, there is insufficient understanding of the rights of IDPs as set out in the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the Kampala Convention. These rights include the right to life, freedom of movement, association, dignity of human person, personal liberty, right to private and family life etc. IDPs usually suffer the worst violation of their fundamental human right. Their lives are threatened as a result of the violence by the Boko Haram insurgency. They are forced to flee from their homes and seek shelter in schools, churches, mosques and informal settlements and in the process the situation gravely affects their security and health. We have indeed recorded several instances where IDPs are killed in their make-shift camps by Boko haram.

Similarly, IDPs along with the majority of the affected population, have witnessed atrocities in addition to losing family members and succumbing to the insurgents campaign of terror. Many IDPs therefore fear that they will be pursued by the insurgents, will be perceived by the authorities as supporters of the insurgents or will be accused by the insurgents or other elements as informants for the authorities. Remaining silent and hidden for IDPs becomes the unpalatable option. Besides, Women and children remain the most vulnerable to sexual and gender based violence. There have been reported instances of rape, sexual harassment, forced marriage, infant marriage, sexual diseases and uncontrolled birth occasioning high infant and maternal mortality in make-shift IDP camps in Nigeria. The needs of children are highly disregarded in armed conflict situations and this is the case in Nigeria.



- i. Children are being exposed to enhanced risk of abuse, forceful conscription by insurgents as child soldiers, suicide bombers, sex slaves and abrupt discontinuation with their education. Their lives change towards a different direction of malnutrition, inadequate amenities needed for their survival. According to NEMA, there are over 750 unaccompanied and separated children.
- ii. Most of the school age children in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe have had their opportunities for schooling severely constrained. The destruction of schools and indiscriminate killing of students and teachers by Boko Haram insurgents has left many schools deserted and deprived children of their right to education.
- iii. The adopted and yet to be released Chibok girls which has generated international condemnation remains indelible in our memories. Most of the displaced persons are camped in schools thereby interrupting learning and other school activities. The education of displaced victims is virtually non-existent in some camps. There is lack of access to quality learning opportunities. 338 schools have been damaged or destroyed by attacks. At least 196 teachers and 314 school children killed.
- iv. The most common types of accommodation used by IDPs in Nigeria are schools and government buildings. Others include tents and bunk houses. Shelter for IDPs in Nigeria is insufficient and most times do not stand the test of time and weather. Many existing shelters have been damaged or destroyed. Report shows that IDPs live in churches, mosques, town halls, abandoned and uncompleted buildings and where available, other forms of makeshift camps which are grossly inadequate and unsuitable for accommodating the surge in displaced populations. These shelters are not as a result of government effort but as a result of the individual's effort to survive.

- v. The shelters are often overcrowded and unsuitable in terms of water and sanitation facilities, cooking and privacy, especially for women. There is often no proper waste management and electricity. This explains the regularity of hygiene based epidemics in camps. Things are made worse by the fact that access to health care in Nigeria generally and the North East in particular is severely constrained for both the IDPs and host communities as a result of the destruction of health care facilities and health care workers. Outbreak of disease has increased in areas affected by dislocation. There is also the case of lack of access to vaccinations. The number of cholera cases among IDPs is seriously on the increase. More ailments are undiagnosed as there is no health checks carried out in these camps.
- vi. Some IDPs have access to food distribution every day while others receive irregular food distribution. On the other hand, some IDPs never receive food distribution. Malnutrition in the conflict areas continue to rise as there is limited access to food in this situation.
- vii. This is mainly because no actual statistics of IDPs exist in Nigeria as not all displaced persons are accounted for. For those persons who have the resources, at the occurrence of violence, although they become displaced by virtue of the attaining circumstance, however they migrate to other places where there is peace and stability with their available resources. Others flee to the homes of their extended families or friends in other parts of the country. All this factors makes it nearly impossible to obtain an accurate number of displaced persons in Nigeria.

**The Management of Displacement:** The majority of persons displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency stay in host communities. They do not have to go through a complicated documentation process. Internal migration in Nigeria is very easy: when you

move to a new place, you do not have to register to the city council or to make yourself known to the authorities. The process is more difficult for displaced people who do not stay in host communities and need to be absorbed into camps. They first have to find a camp, and then there is some kind of documentation to go through: this is the only time they need to register themselves. Only 10-11% of IDPs from the Boko Haram insurgency actually stay in camps. As the country does not have a single building that has all the necessities and requirements of a displacement camp, IDPs are sheltered in other buildings and institutions like schools, palaces of traditional rulers, churches and mosques, Youth Orientation Camps, tertiary institutions, government buildings and so on. The government agency NEMA (National Emergency Management Agency) is responsible for the management of displacement in Nigeria. They are supported by international organizations

**Living Conditions in the Camps:** - This part is built on the results of an ethnographic study Ms. Abdulazeez carried out in IDPs camps in Nigeria in 2014. She focused especially on the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) camp in the heart of Maiduguri. She chose this camp because she had military contacts that could ensure her safety there. As the security situation was much tensed at that time, she did not really have another choice.

**i. Shelters:** - The NYSC camp is made of permanent buildings originally built for youth orientation camps once a year. There are also tents provided by NEMA, the UNHCR, UNICEF or other international organizations.

Those who cannot stay in buildings or in tents build their own makeshift tents individually. The camps are overcrowded and the access to living spaces is very scarce.

**ii. Food and Nutrition:** - The government is supposed to provide the basics. Some camps are lucky enough to have government-employed cooks, but it was not the case in

the NYSC camp: displaced women were organized into cooks. Government officials say they feed displaced people three times a day with assorted nutritional meals. But in reality people are usually fed only once in a day and they eat the same things every day.

**iii. Health and Hygiene:** - There was a camp clinic at the NYSC camp. What were constantly available were immunization kits for children. But aside that, there were hardly any drugs for specific ailments, not even for the most common ones like fever, malaria, diarrhea. Very serious health cases were transferred to the government hospital, but as drugs are not free, people would have to sell their supplies to be able to get access to healthcare. The next picture shows a water source next to a bin and close to living quarters, which is very unhygienic for a place already overcrowded. Health issues in the camps are not taken care of seriously.

**iv. Security before you enter the Camp:** - there are armed guards who interrogate you. They are especially weary of researchers and journalists, because there are things going on in the camps that they do not want people outside to know. If you are a researcher or an analyst, they do not allow you to be free to do research in the camps.

Security soldiers outside also search people going in. But this organized security situation did not prevent bomb blasts to happen in camps, for instance in Malkohi camp in September 2015 and in Dikwa camp in February 2016, which means that people are not kept safe. 4.3.5. Education As many former schools are used as camps, education has stalled in many places. UNICEF has introduced the shared school initiative and it is going on in most of the camps. They provide books and educational material for IDPs. But the conditions are difficult: pupils are crunched into places and age grades are mixed.

**v. The Limits and Opportunities in the Camps:** -There are different problems with the way displacement is managed in Nigeria. IDPs lack access to relief materials. Funds for the camps are embezzled by state and camp officials, who swell the number of IDPs to

get even more funding. Human trafficking is taking place in the camps: many women, young girls and children are trafficked outside the country. However, many IDPs have found unexpected ways to cope with their predicament. For instance, selling their relief material for some time allowed some of them to have a start up and develop some kind of economic activities in order to sustain themselves. People develop coping mechanisms. There are stalls in camps where people, especially women, sell tiny things to be able to survive.

**vi. Boko Haram's Impact on Daily Life:** -Boko Haram made terrorism and violent extremism to become the first identity that Muslims are known for in Nigeria. It takes other kinds of identities away from them. As a Muslim in Nigeria, you now have to assert yourself. It is a hard task to convince other person that being a Muslim does not mean that you support Boko Haram. People in Nigeria have battled with religious crises and religious differences for long, but Boko Haram brought this religion issue much more into the consciousness of social relations. Social relations and everyday life in Nigeria have changed totally. You would very rarely see a military uniform on the streets before Boko Haram in Maiduguri, Kano, Kaduna, Abuja, Jos and other northern cities. Now there is a military checkpoint every 20 meters. If you are a woman wearing hijab or even a man wearing a turban, people think you are a Boko Haram member and you are hiding a bomb somewhere. Nigeria has become this tensed militarized society where you see military people everywhere. There is a continuous feeling of uncertainty and of not being safe in your own community.

But at the same time, life just goes on and people find coping mechanisms. One day in Kaduna, Ms. Abdulazeez passed through a place where they had been a bomb two hours earlier. She could not have guessed that there had been a bomb, because life had gone back to normal again. The police had come and cleared everything. People have put it in

their consciousness that life must go on. They had to incorporate this security situation into their daily lives and now they are somehow coping with it.

**vii. Doing Research in the Camps.** When Ms. Abdulazeez decided to do ethnographic research in IDPs camps, she did not realize how difficult it would be to gather data. Access to camps was difficult and access to people much more. The fear of being ejected from camps by officials prevented displaced persons from sharing freely their experiences, especially when camp officials were present. A lot of suffering in silence was going on in the camp and the people's helplessness was palpable. Camp officials and government officials were also not amenable to share distinct details of their operations and activities especially against the back-drop of corruption, embezzlement and diversion of relief and non-relief materials going on in most camps. Ms. Abdulazeez learned to listen to what was not being said. She learned the act of 'actor's observation' and seized opportune moments to get unguarded conversations with actors involved.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

#### 5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, analysis of data collected from the administration of questionnaires are presented in tables to show frequencies, percentages, mean and standard deviation of the respondents. The chapter is divided into two parts; the first part is the presentation of responses from the camp officials and the second part constituted the responses from the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). A total of 400 Questionnaire were distributed to the respondents, out of which 310 copies were correctly filled and returned. The analysis of this study was therefore based on the 310 copies (77.5%) of the returned questionnaire which is considered adequate for statistical analysis.

#### 5.2 Data Presentation and Analysis

Table 5.1: **Response Rate of the Copies of Questionnaire Distributed**

Category	Questionnaire Administered	No of Returned	Percentage
Camp Officials	158	104	39.5
IDPs	242	206	60.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>400</b>	<b>310</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

#### Analysis of Bio-data of the respondents

Table 5.2: **Age bracket of the respondents**

Category	Frequency	Percentage (%)
16-20 years	66	21.3
21-29 years	44	14.2
30-39 years	122	39.4
40-49 years	62	20.0
50 and above	16	5.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>310</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

From table 5.2 above, it shows that those between the ages of 16-20 years were 66 in number representing 21.3% while those between the ages of 21-29 years were 44 representing 14.2%. Furthermore, those between the ages of 30-39 years were 122 representing 39.4%, while those between the ages of 40-49 years were 62 representing 20.0% and lastly those above 50 years and above were 16 representing 5.2%. From the above table, it shows clearly that those between the ages of 30-39 years were higher in number, mostly women.

**Table 5.3: Gender of the respondents**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Male	106	34.2
Female	204	65.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>310</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Field Survey, 2018**

From table 5.3 above, 106 of the respondents representing 34.2% were male, while 204 respondents representing 65.8% were female. This shows that majority of the IDPs were female. This might be attributed to the fact that most of the men were killed or missing as a result of Boko Haram insurgency.

**Table 5.4: Level of Education of the respondents**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Primary	155	50.0
Secondary	140	45.2
Post-secondary	15	4.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>310</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Field Survey, 2018**

From table 5.4 above, 155 representing 50.0% of the respondents are having only primary school certificate as their highest educational qualification, while 140



representing 45.2% of the respondents are having only secondary school certificate as their highest qualification. Only 15 representing 4.8% are having post-secondary school certificate. This indicated that majority of the respondents are having low educational qualification largely because of the effect of the insurgency.

Table 5.5: **Marital status of the respondents**

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Single	63	20.3
Married	155	50.0
Widows	92	29.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>310</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Field Survey, 2018**

From table 5.5 above, 63 representing 20.3% of the respondents are single, while 155 representing 50.0% of the respondents are married and 92 representing 29.7% of the respondents are widows. This indicated that majority of the respondents are married. Furthermore, the percentage of widows (29.7%) is relatively high largely because of the effect of the insurgency that led to the death of their husbands. This means that most IDPs who might have lost their love ones end up getting married as a means of survival in the camp.

Table 5.6: **Respondents views on the adequacy of staff managing the affairs of IDPs camps are adequate in number.**

Category	Frequency	Percent
strongly disagreed	17	16.3
Disagreed	55	52.9
Undecided	7	6.7
Agreed	11	10.6
Strongly Agreed	14	13.5
Total	104	100.0

**Source: Field Survey, 2018**

Table 5.6 above revealed that more than average of the respondents disagreed that the staff managing the affairs of IDPs camps are adequate in number with 52.9%, 16.3% strongly disagreed that the staff managing the affairs of IDPs camps are adequate in number, 13.5% strongly agreed that the staff managing the affairs of IDPs camps are adequate in number, 10.6% agreed that the staff managing the affairs of IDPs camps are adequate in number and the least proportion of the respondents are 6.7% did not decide whether the staff managing the affairs of IDPs camps are adequate in number or not. The implication of this result is that the staffs managing the affairs of IDPs camps are not adequate suggesting that the two Local governments need to put in more efforts to provide additional staffs for effective and efficient management of the affairs of the IDPs.

**Table 5.7: Respondents views on appointment of camp officials is done fairly in MMC and Bama local government IDP camp.**

Category	Frequency	Percent
strongly disagreed	13	12.5
Disagreed	60	57.7
Agreed	13	12.5
Strongly Agreed	18	17.3
Total	104	100.0

**Source: Field Survey, 2018**

Table 5.7 above depicts that majority of the respondents disagreed that the appointment of camp officials is done fairly in MMC and BAMA local government IDP camp with 57.7%, 17.3% strongly agreed that the appointment of camp officials is done fairly in MMC and BAMA local government IDP camp, 12.5% strongly disagreed and agreed that the appointment of camp officials is done fairly in MMC and BAMA local government IDP camp respectively. The implication of this result is that the staffs

managing the affairs of IDPs camps are not fairly selected. This might affect the effective and efficient management of the affairs of the IDPs.

**Table 5.8: Respondents opinion of the staff appointed to serve as IDP camp officials are well trained to manage the affairs of the camps in MMC and BAMA Local government.**

Category	Frequency	Percent
strongly disagreed	23	22.1
Disagreed	43	41.3
Agreed	38	36.5
Total	104	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.8 above revealed that more than average of the respondents disagreed that the staff appointed to serve as IDP camp officials are well trained to manage the affairs of the camps in MMC and BAMA Local government with 41.3%, 36.5% of agreed that the staff appointed to serve as IDP camp officials are well trained to manage the affairs of the camps in MMC and BAMA Local government, 22.1% strongly disagreed that the staff appointed to serve as IDP camp officials are well trained to manage the affairs of the camps in MMC and BAMA Local government. This implies that the staffs managing the affairs of IDPs camps are not trained specifically for the purpose they are serving suggesting that the two Local governments need to employ specialists to train the staffs for effective and efficient management of the affairs of the IDPs.

**Table 5.9: Respondents opinions on whether corruption do exist among the IDP camp officials in the management of camps of MMC and Bama Local government.**

Category	Frequency	Percent
strongly disagreed	15	14.4
Agreed	57	54.8
Strongly Agreed	32	30.8
Total	104	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.9 above revealed that more than average of the respondents agreed that corruption do exist among the IDP camp officials in the management of camps of MMC and BAMA Local government with 54.8%, 30.8% strongly agreed that corruption do exist among the IDP camp officials in the management of camps of MMC and BAMA Local government, 14.4% strongly disagreed that corruption do exist among the IDP camp officials in the management of camps of MMC and BAMA Local government. This implies that the staffs managing the affairs of IDPs camps engaged in corrupt and unethical behaviour in discharging their responsibilities. This suggested that the two Local governments need to reorient the staffs as to why they are appointed to serve at the camp and that disciplinary action should be taken by the Local government authority to ensure effective and efficient management of the affairs of the IDPs.

**Table 5.10: Respondents views that if corruptions do exist in the management of IDP camps, that can be checkmated through the activities of Anti-graft Agencies.**

Category	Frequency	Percent
strongly disagreed	6	5.8
Undecided	14	13.5
Agreed	51	49.0
Strongly Agreed	33	31.7
Total	104	100.0

**Source: Field Survey, 2018**

Table 5.10 above shows that more than average of the respondents agreed that if corruption do exist in the management of IDP camps that can be checkmated through the activities of Anti-graft Agencies with 49%, 31.7% strongly agreed that if corruption do exist in the management of IDP camps, that can be checkmated through the activities of Anti-graft Agencies, 13.5% did not decide whether if corruption do exist in the management of IDP camps, that can be checkmated through the activities of Anti-graft Agencies, 5.8% strongly disagree that if corruption do exist in the management of IDP

camps, that can be checkmated through the activities of Anti-graft Agencies. This result further complement the suggestion offered in the preceding discussion of corrupt practices implying that disciplinary action should be taken by the Local government authority to ensure effective and efficient management of the affairs of the IDPs.

**Table 5.11: Respondents opinions whether the officials of Local Government (chairman and councillors) are assumed to be loyal to those appointed them rather than the people.**

Category	Frequency	Percent
strongly disagreed	15	14.4
Disagreed	19	18.3
Agreed	38	36.5
Strongly Agreed	32	30.8
Total	104	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.11 above revealed that majority of the respondents agreed that the officials of local government (chairman and councillors) are assumed to be loyal to those appointed them rather than the people with 36.5%, 30.8% of the respondents strongly agreed that the officials of local government (chairman and councillors) are assumed to be loyal to those appointed them rather than the people, 18.3% disagreed that the officials of local government (chairman and councillors) are assumed to be loyal to those appointed them rather than the people, 14.4% of the respondents strongly disagreed that the officials of local government (chairman and councillors) are assumed to be loyal to those appointed them rather than the people. The implication of this result is that on average, camp officials are loyal to the authorities of the two local governments. This also contributes to the effective and efficient management of the IDPs.

**Table 5.12: Respondents opinions whether this loyal to the state affects the management of IDP camps in MMC and Bama Local Government.**

Category	Frequency	Percent
strongly disagreed	1	1.0
Disagreed	26	25.0
Undecided	5	4.8
Agreed	51	49.0
Strongly Agreed	21	20.2
Total	104	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.12 above revealed that majority of the respondent agreed that there loyalty to the state affects the management of IDP camps in MMC and BAMA Local government with 49%, 25% of the respondents disagreed that their loyalty to the state affects the management of IDP camps in MMC and BAMA Local government, 20.2% strongly agreed that their loyalty to the state affects the management of IDP camps in MMC and BAMA Local government, 4.8% did not decide whether their loyalty to the state affects the management of IDP camps in MMC and BAMA Local government, and 1% strongly disagreed that their loyalty to the state affects the management of IDP camps in MMC and BAMA Local government. This result implied that the loyalty of the IDPs and camp officials to the state significantly improve the management of IDP camps in MMC and BAMA Local government. This further makes government (Local government) to sacrifice their resources to the welfare of the IDPs in these camps.

**Table 5.13: Respondents responses to the question of whether Local government election can enhance the effective management of IDP camps in MMC and BAMA Local government**

Category	Frequency	Percent
strongly disagreed	12	11.5
Disagreed	15	14.4
Undecided	23	22.1
Agreed	40	38.5
Strongly Agreed	14	13.5
Total	104	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.13 above shows that more than average of the respondents agreed that Local government election can enhance the effective management of IDP camps in MMC and BAMA Local government with 38.5%, 22.1% did not decide whether Local government election can enhance the effective management of IDP camps in MMC and BAMA Local government, 14.4% disagreed that Local government election can enhance the effective management of IDP camps in MMC and BAMA Local government, 13.5% strongly agreed that Local government election can enhance the effective management of IDP camps in MMC and BAMA Local government, 11.5% strongly agreed that Local government election can enhance the effective management of IDP camps in MMC and BAMA Local government. The result of Table 5.13 suggested that Local government election if successfully conducted can play a significant role in the effective management of IDP camps in MMC and BAMA Local government. Thus, there is the need for election of the right candidate that can take the interest of the IDPs as priority and first agenda in the budget.

### Item Statistics

Item	Mean	Std. Deviation	Remark
the staff managing the affairs of IDPs camps are adequate in number	2.5192	1.26936	Not-adequate
the appointment of camp officials is done fairly in MMC and BAMA local government IDP camp	2.6442	1.33597	Not-Significant
the staff appointed to serve as IDP camp officials are well trained to manage the affairs of the camps in MMC and BAMA Local government	2.5096	1.19867	Not-Significant
corruption do exist among the IDP camp officials in the management of camps of MMC and BAMA Local government	3.8750	1.26712	Significant
if corruption do exist in the management of IDP camps, that can be checkmated through the activities of Anti-graft Agencies	4.0096	.99020	Significant
the officials of local government (chairman and councillors) are assumed to be loyal to those appointed them rather than the people	3.5096	1.45479	Significant
this loyal to the state affects the management of IDP camps in MMC and BAMA Local government	3.6250	1.09887	Significant
Local government election can enhance the effective management of IDP camps in MMC and BAMA Local government	3.2788	1.21045	Significant

**Source: Field Survey, 2018**

The result of the descriptive statistics in the table above buttressed the result of individual items presented so far. From the table, it can be seen that the mean of individual item exceed 2.5 which is above the average value of the likert scale of 5. This further implied that the results presented so far represent the actual happening in the camps of the two



Local governments. This further suggested that the Local government authorities take the welfare of the IDPs as their first priority.

### 5.3 Test of Hypothesis

#### Hypothesis one

H<sub>0</sub>: There is no significant relationship between adequate human resources and effective management of IDPs in the two local governments.

H<sub>1</sub>: There is significant relationship between adequate human resources and effective management of IDPs in the two local governments

#### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	79.351 <sup>a</sup>	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	87.046	8	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	34.333	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	104		

a. 8 cells (53.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.55.

**Source: Field Survey, 2018**

The finding from table 4.6 above revealed that there is a relationship between adequate human resources and effective management of IDPs in the two local government, since the  $\chi^2(79.351)$  and p-value (0.000) is less than 0.05 level of significance at 95% confidence limit. Thus, the study rejected the null hypothesis that states that is no significant relationship between adequate human resources and effective management of IDPs in the two local governments. This means that the alternate hypothesis was accepted.

**Table 5.14: Respondents opinions on whether how adequate are the funds provided for the management of IDPs.**

Category	Frequency	Percent
Not adequate	55	52.9
Undecided	8	7.7
Fairly adequate	9	8.7
Adequate	21	20.2
Very adequate	11	10.6
Total	104	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.14 above revealed that majority of the respondents agreed that the funds provided for the management of IDPs is not-adequate with 52.9%, 20.2% agreed that the funds provided for the management of IDPs is adequate, 10.6% agreed that the funds provided for the management of IDPs is very adequate, 8.7% agreed that the funds provided for the management of IDPs is fairly adequate the least proportion did not decide whether the funds provided for the management of IDPs is adequate or not with 7.7%. The result of Table 5.14 implied that the two Local governments need to outsource for more funds to adequately cater for the needs and wants of the IDPs. This can be made possible via seeking for assistant from the state government, federal government, individual donor and NGOs.

**Table 5.15: Responses on the effectiveness of the management of funds for IDPs**

Category	Frequency	Percent
Disagreed	8	7.7
Undecided	20	19.2
Agreed	64	61.5
Strongly Agreed	12	11.5
Total	104	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.15 above shows that majority of the respondents agreed that the management of funds for IDPs is effective with 61.5%, 19.2% did not decide whether the management of funds for IDPs is effective or not, 11.5% strongly agreed that the management of funds for IDPs is effective, 7.7% disagreed that the management of funds for IDPs is effective. This result suggested that the camp officials of the two Local governments are actually making judicious use of the funds meet the basic needs of the IDPs. Thus, the camp officials have the best interest of the IDPs at heart like the two Local government authorities.

**Table 5.16: Respondents views on the efficacy of Accountability and Transparency principles in the management of IDP funds.**

Category	Frequency	Percent
strongly disagreed	47	45.2
Disagreed	8	7.7
Undecided	8	7.7
Agreed	13	12.5
Strongly Agreed	28	26.9
Total	104	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.16 above revealed that more than average of the respondents strongly disagreed that Accountability and Transparency principles are applicable in the management of IDP funds with 45.2%, 26.9% strongly agreed that Accountability and Transparency principles are applicable in the management of IDP funds, 12.5% agreed that Accountability and Transparency principles are applicable in the management of IDP funds, 7.7% disagreed and did not decide whether Accountability and Transparency principles are applicable in the management of IDP funds respectively. This suggested that the camp officials are not transparent and thus cannot account for how the funds for the management of IDP are expended.

**Table 5.17: Summary of respondents views on leakages in the management of IDP funds.**

Category	Frequency	Percent
Yes	84	80.8
No	20	19.2
Total	104	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.17 above shows that more than average say yes there are leakages in the management of IDP funds with 80.8%, while 19.2% says no. This implied that the two Local government authorities have to do something fast to take care of the leakages in the management of IDP funds.

**Table 5.18: Respondents opinions on how these leakages can be addressed through effective accountability and transparency process.**

Category	Frequency	Percent
Yes	77	74.0
No	7	6.7
Missing	20	19.2
Total	104	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.18 above shows that majority of the respondents agreed that it can be addressed through effective accountability and transparency process with 74%, while 6.7% agreed that it cannot be addressed through effective accountability and transparency process. Thus, the two local government authority should employ effective accountability and transparency procedure to overcome the leakages in the management of IDPs funds.

### Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
How adequate are the funds provided for the management of IDPs	2.6500	1.41315	84
the management of funds for IDPs is effective	3.9524	.72652	84
Accountability and Transparency principles are applicable in the management of IDP funds	2.5238	1.77313	84
Are there leakages in the management of IDP funds	3.0000	1.00000	84
do you think this can be addressed through effective accountability and transparency process	2.7833	.27805	84

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

The result of the descriptive statistics in the table above buttressed the result of individual items presented so far. From the table, it can be seen that the mean of individual item exceed 2.5 which is above the average value of the likert scale of 5. This further implied that accountability and transparency is the best instrument Local government authorities can used to overcome the leakages and other negative practices engaged in by camp officials.

### Hypothesis Two

H<sub>0</sub>: There is no significant relationship between financial capacity of the two local governments and effective management of IDPs.

H<sub>1</sub>: There is significant relationship between financial capacity of the two local governments and effective management of IDPs.

### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	96.954 <sup>a</sup>	12	.016
Likelihood Ratio	87.878	12	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	10.304	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	104		

a. 14 cells (70.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .62.

### *Source: Field Survey, 2018*

The finding from table 5.1 above revealed that there is a relationship between financial capacity of the two local governments and effective management of IDPs, since the  $\chi^2(96.954)$  and p-value (0.016) is less than 0.05 level of significance at 95% confidence limit. Based on the result, the study rejected the null hypothesis that state that there is no significant relationship between financial capacity of the two local governments and effective management of IDPs. Thus, the alternate hypothesis was accepted.

**Table 5.19: Summary of respondents views on the roles played by the local government authorities in the management of IDP camps.**

Category	Frequency	Percent
strongly disagreed	26	25.0
Disagreed	2	1.9
Undecided	16	15.4
Agreed	53	51.0
Strongly Agreed	7	6.7
Total	104	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.19 above shows that majority of the respondents agreed that the Local government authorities have roles to play in the management of IDP camps with 51%, 25% strongly disagreed, 15.4% did not decide whether or not, 6.7% strongly agreed, 1.9% disagreed. The implication of this study is that the two Local government authorities play a vital role in the management of the IDPs and as a matter of fact, they are doing their best.

**Table 5.20: Summary of Respondents opinion on whether local government have responsibility of ensuring peace and harmony within their respective jurisdictions**

Category	Frequency	Percent
Yes	89	85.6
No	15	14.4
Total	104	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.20 above revealed that more than average of the respondents says yes local government have responsibility of ensuring peace and harmony within their respective jurisdiction with 85.6%, while 14.4% says no local government cannot have responsibility of ensuring peace and harmony within their respective jurisdiction. This suggested that the two local government authorities are doing their best to ensure peace and harmony within the IDPs themselves as well as the camp officials and the IDPs.

**Table 5.21: Summary of Respondents views on whether local government council discharge their responsibilities accordingly in the management of IDPs.**

Category	Frequency	Percent
strongly disagreed	9	8.7
Disagreed	70	67.3
Undecided	25	24.0
Total	104	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.21 above depicts that majority of the respondents disagreed that MMC and BAMA Local government council discharge their responsibilities accordingly with 67.3%, 24% did not decide whether MMC and BAMA Local government council discharge their responsibilities accordingly or not, 8.7% strongly disagreed that MMC and BAMA Local government council discharge their responsibilities accordingly. Although, this result contradict the previous results as it suggests that MMC and BAMA Local government council are not discharging their responsibilities as expected.

**Table 5.22: Summary of respondents' opinion on whether the management of IDP camps is within jurisdiction of local government authorities**

Category	Frequency	Percent
strongly disagreed	4	3.8
Disagreed	43	41.3
Agreed	50	48.1
Strongly Agreed	7	6.7
Total	104	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.22 above revealed that more than average of the respondents agreed that the management of IDP camps within jurisdiction of local government authorities with 48.1%, 41.3% disagreed that the management of IDP camps within jurisdiction of local government authorities, 6.7% strongly agreed that the management of IDP camps within jurisdiction of local government authorities, 3.8% strongly disagreed that the management of IDP camps within jurisdiction of local government authorities. This means that the management of IDP camps is within the jurisdiction of local government authorities. Perhaps that is because they deal with the affairs of citizens at the grass root.



**Table 5.23: Respondents opinions on the role of state government in the management of IDP camps**

Category	Frequency	Percent
strongly disagreed	8	7.7
Disagreed	15	14.4
Agreed	7	6.7
Strongly Agreed	74	71.2
Total	104	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.23 above shows that more than average of the respondents strongly agreed that State government has role to play in the management of IDP camps with 71.2%, 14.4% disagreed that State government has role to play in the management of IDP camps, 7.7% strongly disagreed that State government has role to play in the management of IDP camps, 6.7% agreed that State government has role to play in the management of IDP camps. This implied that it is also part of the responsibility of the State government to take good care of the IDPs. Thus, the result further suggested that the role is not for Local government authorities alone.

**Table 5.24: Respondents views on whether federal government also has roles to play in management of IDP camps**

Category	Frequency	Percent
strongly disagreed	8	7.7
Disagreed	44	42.3
Undecided	10	9.6
Strongly Agreed	42	40.4
Total	104	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.24 above connotes that majority of the respondents disagreed that Federal government also has roles to play in management of IDP camps with 42.3%, 40.4% strongly agreed that Federal government also has roles to play in management of IDP

camps, 9.6% did not decide whether Federal government also has roles to play in management of IDP camps or not, 7.7% strongly disagreed that Federal government also has roles to play in management of IDP camps. This showed that it is part of the responsibility of the federal government to play a significant role in the effective and efficient management of the IDPs. Thus, the result further suggested that the role is not for the State and Local government authorities alone.

**Table 5.25: Respondents views on whether the state and federal government discharge the responsibilities of managing the affairs of IDP Camps.**

Category	Frequency	Percent
strongly disagreed	63	60.6
Disagreed	25	24.0
Agreed	13	12.5
Strongly Agreed	3	2.9
Total	104	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.25 above shows that more than average of the respondents strongly disagreed that the state and federal government discharge the responsibilities of managing the affairs of IDP Camps with 60.6%, 24% disagreed that the state and federal government discharge the responsibilities of managing the affairs of IDP Camps, 12.5% agreed that the state and federal government discharge the responsibilities of managing the affairs of IDP Camps, 2.9% strongly agreed that the state and federal government discharge the responsibilities of managing the affairs of IDP Camps. The implication of this result is that the state and federal government do not place emphases in assisting the two Local government authorities in managing the affairs of IDPs.

### Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	Remark
1. Local government authorities have roles to play in the management of IDP camps	3.1250	1.34155	Significant
2. Do local government have responsibility of ensuring peace and harmony within their respective jurisdictions	2.5442	.35302	Not-Significant
3. does MMC and BAMA Local government council discharge these responsibilities accordingly	2.6538	.55335	Not-Significant
4. the management of IDP camps within jurisdiction of local government authorities	3.1250	1.14644	Significant
5. State government has role to play in the management of IDP camps	4.1923	1.40095	Significant
6. Federal government also has roles to play in management of IDP camps	3.2308	1.52157	Significant
7. the state and federal government discharge the responsibilities of managing the affairs of IDP Camps	2.7308	1.14256	Not-Significant

**Source: Field Survey, 2018**

The result of the descriptive statistics in the table above buttressed the result of individual items presented so far. From the table, it can be seen that the mean of individual item exceed 2.5 which is above the average value of the likert scale of 5. This implied that the two local governments are doing their best in ensuring effective and efficient management of the IDPs. However, the results further suggested that the state and federal governments have a vital role to play improving the standard of living of the IDPs. Thus, the management of IDPs should be a collective responsibility of federal, state and the Local government.

### Hypothesis Three

H<sub>0</sub>: There is no significant relationship between Jurisdiction authority of the two local government areas and the management of IDPs.

H<sub>1</sub>: There is significant relationship between Jurisdiction authority of the two local government areas and the management of IDPs.

#### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	203.970 <sup>a</sup>	12	.020
Likelihood Ratio	174.102	12	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	64.516	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	104		

a. 14 cells (70.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .08.

**Source: Field Survey, 2018**

The finding from table 5.1 above revealed that there is a relationship between Jurisdiction authority of the two local government areas and the management of IDPs, since the  $\chi^2(203.970)$  and p-value (0.020) is less than 0.05 level of significance at 95% confidence limit. Therefore, the study rejected the null hypothesis that state that there is no significant relationship between Jurisdiction authority of the two local government areas and the management of IDPs. Hence, the alternate hypothesis was accepted.

**Table 5.26: Respondents were asked whether resources meant for the provision of public utilities in the two local governments are diverted for IDP management.**

Category	Frequency	Percent
Strongly disagreed	44	14.2
Disagreed	86	27.7
Agreed	140	45.2
Strongly Agreed	40	12.9
Total	310	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table above revealed that majority of the respondents agreed that resources meant for the provision of public utilities in the two local governments are diverted for IDP management with 45.2%, 27.7% of the respondents disagreed that the resources meant for the provision of public utilities in the two local governments are diverted for IDP management, 14.2% of the respondents strongly disagreed that resources meant for the provision of public utilities in the two local governments are diverted for IDP management, the least proportion of the respondents strongly agreed that resources meant for the provision of public utilities in the two local governments are diverted for IDP management with 12.9%. This implied that there is no any externally sourced fund to manage the affairs or welfare of the IDPs because the resources the two Local government councils depend on in managing the affairs of the IDPs are meant for the provision of public utilities in the two local governments.

**Table 5.27: Respondents opinions on whether staff of the two local government areas is usually sent to IDP camps to discharge their local government administrative responsibilities**

Category	Frequency	Percent
Strongly disagreed	212	68.4
Disagreed	75	24.2
Agreed	12	3.9
Strongly Agreed	11	3.5
Total	310	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.27 above revealed that more than average of the respondents strongly disagreed that The staff of the two local government area are usually sent to IDP camps who are suppose to take their local government administrative responsibilities with 68.4%, 24.2% of the respondents disagreed that The staff of the two local government area are usually sent to IDP camps who are suppose to take their local government administrative responsibilities, 3.9% of the respondents agreed that The staff of the two local government area are usually sent to IDP camps who are suppose to take their local government administrative responsibilities, the least proportion of the respondents strongly agreed that the staff of the two local government area are usually sent to IDP camps who are suppose to take their local government administrative responsibilities with 3.5%. This connotes that the staff of the two local governments that are saddle with the day to day management of the IDPs are not performing their duties as expected.

**Table 5.28: Responses on whether drugs meant to be distributed to the clinics in the two local government area are shifted to IDP camps.**

Category	Frequency	Percent
Strongly disagreed	5	1.6
Disagreed	75	24.2
Agreed	33	10.6
Strongly Agreed	197	63.5
Total	310	100.0

**Source: Field Survey, 2018**

The table above revealed that majority of the respondents strongly agreed that Drugs mean to be distributed to the clinics in the two local government areas are shifted to IDP camps with 63.5%, 24.2% of the respondents disagreed that Drugs mean to be distributed to the clinics in the two local government area are shifted to IDP camps, 10.6% of the respondents agreed that Drugs mean to be distributed to the clinics in the two local government area are shifted to IDP camps, the least proportion of the respondents strongly disagreed that Drugs mean to be distributed to the clinics in the two local government area are shifted to IDP camps with 1.6%. This result suggested that Drugs mean to be distributed to the clinics in the two local government areas are shifted to IDP camps. Thus, the attention of the world health organization, NHIS and other health organizations are greatly needed to assist with the needed drugs to the IDPs. This will sustain the drugs meant for clinics within the two local governments.

**Table 5.29: Summary of respondents’ opinion on whether instructional materials distributed to primary schools of the two local governments were shifted to IDP Camps schools.**

Category	Frequency	Percent
Strongly disagreed	148	47.7
Disagreed	55	17.7
Agreed	5	1.6
Strongly Agreed	102	32.9
Total	310	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.29 above shows that majority of the respondents strongly disagreed that the Instructional materials meant to be distributed to primary schools of the two local government are shifted to IDP Camps schools with 47.7%, 32.9% of the respondents strongly agreed that the Instructional materials meant to be distributed to primary schools of the two local government are shifted to IDP Camps schools, 17.7% of the respondents disagreed that the Instructional materials meant to be distributed to primary schools of the two local government are shifted to IDP Camps schools, the least proportion of the respondents agreed that the Instructional materials meant to be distributed to primary schools of the two local government are shifted to IDP Camps schools with 1.6%. This result connotes that the instructional materials that are being utilized at the camp are provided by the two local government authorities. It further suggested that they are not shifted from primary schools to camp.



**Table 5.30: Respondents opinions on whether the welfare of local government staff have not adequately granted as a result of the burden of IDPs management**

Category	Frequency	Percent
Strongly disagreed	54	17.4
Undecided	38	12.3
Agreed	16	5.2
Strongly Agreed	202	65.2
Total	310	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.30 above revealed that more than average of the respondents strongly agreed that the welfare of local government staff are not adequately granted as a result of the burden of IDPs management with 65.2%, 17.4% of the respondents strongly disagreed that the welfare of local government staff are not adequately granted as a result of the burden of IDPs management, 12.3% of the respondents did not decide whether the welfare of local government staff are not adequately granted as a result of the burden of IDPs management or not, 5.2% of the respondents agreed that the welfare of local government staff are not adequately granted as a result of the burden of IDPs management. This result suggested that the welfare of the citizens of the two local governments are not adequately met as substantial part of the funds are diverted to cater for the IDPs.

**Table 5.31: Respondents view on whether IDPs are served 3 meals per day in their respective camps within MMC/ BAMA Local government.**

Category	Frequency	Percent
Strongly disagreed	192	61.9
Disagreed	107	34.5
Agreed	6	1.9
Strongly Agreed	5	1.6
Total	310	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.31 above revealed that more than average of the respondents strongly disagreed that IDPs are served 3 meals per day in their respective camps within MMC/ BAMA Local government with 61.9%, 34.5% of the respondents disagreed that IDPs are served 3 meals per day in their respective camps within MMC/ BAMA Local government, 1.9% agreed that IDPs are served 3 meals per day in their respective camps within MMC/ BAMA Local government, the least proportion strongly agreed that IDPs are served 3 meals per day in their respective camps within MMC/ BAMA Local government with 1.6%. This means that coupled with the hardship situation of the IDPs, they lived in hunger as the camp officials and the two local government authorities cannot adequately feed them with three squared meal.

**Table 5.32: Summary of respondents views on how adequate are the meal provided to IDPs in MMC/BAMA Local government Camps.**

Category	Frequency	Percent
not adequate	39	12.6
Undecided	48	15.5
fairly adequate	213	68.7
Adequate	10	3.2
Total	310	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.32 above revealed that more than average of the respondents agreed that the meals provided to IDPs in MMC/BAMA Local government are fairly adequate with 68.7%, 15.5% did not decide whether the meal is adequate or not, 12.6% agreed that the meal provided to IDPs MMC/BAMA Local government are not adequate, where 3.2% agreed that the meal is adequate. This result indicated that despite the inability of the camp officials and the two local government authorities to provide the IDPs with adequate feeding, they try their best to see that the quality of the meal provided is fairly good.

**Table 5.33: Respondents opinion whether the meals provided to IDPs in MMC/BAMA Local government IDPs Camp is a balanced diet.**

Category	Frequency	Percent
Strongly disagreed	156	50.3
Disagreed	107	34.5
Agreed	26	8.4
Strongly Agreed	21	6.8
Total	310	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.33 above revealed that majority of the respondents strongly agreed that The meals provided to IDPs in MMC / BAMA Local government IDPs Camp is a balanced diet with 50.3%, 34.5% disagreed that The meals provided to IDPs in MMC / BAMA Local government IDPs Camp is a balanced diet, 8.4% agreed that The meals provided to IDPs in MMC / BAMA Local government IDPs Camp is a balanced diet, 6.8% strongly agreed that The meals provided to IDPs in MMC / BAMA Local government IDPs Camp is a balanced diet. Even though the qualities of the food provided to the IDPs in the two camps are fairly good enough, the result of Table 5.33 disclosed that the foods are mostly not balanced diet that can nourish their body and well being.

**Table 5.34: Respondents views of whether shelter is adequately provided to IDPs in their respective camps in MMC / BAMA Local government to accommodate IDPs**

Category	Frequency	Percent
Strongly disagreed	122	39.4
Disagreed	119	38.4
Agreed	23	7.4
Strongly Agreed	46	14.8
Total	310	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.34 above shows that majority of the respondents strongly disagreed that the Shelter provided to IDPs in their respective camps in MMC / BAMA Local government is adequate to accommodate IDPs with 39.4%, 38.4% disagreed that the Shelter provided to IDPs in their respective camps in MMC/BAMA Local government is adequate to

accommodate IDPs, 14.8% strongly agreed that the Shelter provided to IDPs in their respective camps in MMC / BAMA Local government is adequate to accommodate IDPs, 7.4% agreed that the Shelter provided to IDPs in their respective camps in MMC / BAMA Local government is adequate to accommodate IDPs. The implication of the result of Table 5.34 is that the shelters the two local governments councils provide to the IDPs do not go round to settle each IDP. This further revealed that there is under supply of shelter to cater for the needs of the IDPs.

**Table 5.35: Summary of respondent’s responses to whether conveniences are provided in the IDP Camps of MMC / BAMA Local government.**

Category	Frequency	Percent
Strongly disagreed	44	14.2
Disagreed	41	13.2
Undecided	44	14.2
Agreed	124	40.0
Strongly Agreed	57	18.4
Total	310	100.0

**Source: Field Survey, 2018**

Table 5.35 above shows that more than average of the respondents agreed that Convenience are provided in the IDP Camps of MMC/BAMA Local government with 40%, 18.4% strongly agreed that Convenience are provided in the IDP Camps of MMC/BAMA Local government, 14.2% strongly disagreed and did not decide whether or not Convenience are provided in the IDP Camps of MMC/BAMA Local government respectively, the least proportion disagreed with 13.2%. This suggested that the IDPs in the camps of the two local governments are living in good condition despite the shortcomings one of the camp officials and local government authorities in guaranteeing their comfort to the maximum.

**Table 5.36: Summary of respondents' opinion on whether water supply is adequate in the IDP Camps of MMC / BAMA Local government**

Category	Frequency	Percent
Strongly disagreed	187	60.3
Disagreed	97	31.3
Agreed	21	6.8
Strongly Agreed	5	1.6
Total	310	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.36 above shows that more than average of the respondents strongly disagreed that water supply is adequate in the IDP Camps of MMC / BAMA Local government with 60.3%, 31.3% disagreed, 6.8% agreed that Water supply is adequate in the IDP Camps of MMC / BAMA Local government, 1.6% strongly agreed that Water supply is adequate in the IDP Camps of MMC / BAMA Local government. This result has clearly showed that the IDPs in the two camps are seriously facing challenge of water which is one of the basic necessities of life. The camp officials need to take this into consideration and make sure that he problem is solved.

**Table 5.37: Respondents views of the cleanliness of the IDP Camps of MMC/Bama Local Government**

Category	Frequency	Percent
not clean	3	1.0
fairly clean	243	78.4
Clean	13	4.2
very clean	51	16.5
Total	310	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.37 above depicts that more than average of the respondents agreed that the IDPs Camp in MMC/BAMA Local government fairly clean with 78.4%, 16.5% agreed that the IDPs Camp in MMC/BAMA Local government are very clean, 4.2% agreed that the IDPs Camp in MMC/BAMA Local government are clean, 1% of the respondents agreed that the IDPs Camp in MMC/BAMA Local government are not clean. Although, the

result of this study have suggested that the camps in which the IDPs lived are fairly clean, but it is important to note that cleanliness is next to Godliness. The camp officials need to improve on the hygiene of the IDPs by making sure that the environment is very clean and habitable.

**Table 5.38: Respondents responses on whether there are outbreaks of pandemic diseases in the IDP Camps of MMC / BAMA Local government**

Category	Frequency	Percent
Yes	256	82.6
No	54	17.4
Total	310	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.33 above shows that more than average of the respondents say yes there is outbreak of pandemic disease in the IDP Camps of MMC/BAMA Local government with 82.6% while others says no with 17.4%. The implication of this result is that the health and safety of lives of the IDPs are not guaranteed because there is outbreak of pandemic disease in the IDP Camps of MMC/BAMA Local government.

**Table 5.39: Summary of respondents view asked in table 4.38 the measures taken to control the outbreak of disease in IDP Camps of MMC / BAMA Local government.**

Category	Frequency	Percent
Yes	240	77.4
No	16	5.2
Missing value	54	17.4
Total	310	100.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2018*

Table 5.39 above revealed that more than average of the respondents there are measures taken to control the outbreak of the disease in the IDP Camps of MMC/BAMA Local government with 77.4% while the least proportion says that measures are not taken to control the outbreak of the disease in the IDP Camps of MMC/BAMA Local government with 5.2%. This implied that the camp officials are doing their best to control the outbreak of the disease in the IDP Camps of MMC/BAMA Local government.

**Item Statistics**

Item	Mean	Std. Deviation	Remark
1. Resources meant for the provision of public utilities in the two local governments are diverted for IDP management	3.8477	1.40176	Significant
2. The staff of the two local government area are usually sent to IDP camps who are suppose to take their local government administrative responsibilities	1.3555	.77877	Not-significant
3. Drugs meant to be distributed to the clinics in the two local government area are shifted to IDP camps	4.2109	1.23766	Significant
4. Instructional materials meant to be distributed to primary schools of the two local government are shifted to IDP Camps schools	2.1641	1.61501	Not-significant
5. the welfare of local government staff are not adequately granted as a result of the burden of IDPs management	3.9727	1.52985	Significant
6. IDPs are served 3 meals per day in their respective camps within MMC/ BAMA Local government	1.3555	.77877	Not-significant
7. How adequate are the meal provided to IDPs in MMC / BAMA Local government Camps	2.6797	.72419	Not-significant
8. The meals provided to IDPs in MMC / BAMA Local government IDPs Camp is a balanced diet	1.8398	1.31721	Not-significant
9. Shelter provided to IDPs in their respective camps in MMC / BAMA Local government is adequate to accommodate IDPs	2.2266	1.54267	Not-significant
10. Convenience are provided in the IDP Camps of MMC / BAMA Local government	3.5859	1.31374	Significant
11. Water supply is adequate in the IDP Camps of MMC / BAMA Local government	1.4922	.99012	Not-significant
12. How clean are this IDP Camps of MMC / BAMA Local government	2.2305	.81023	Not-significant
13. Are there outbreak of pandemic diseases in the IDP Camps of MMC / BAMA Local government	1.0000	.00000	Not-significant
14. If the answer to question 3 is yes, are there measures taken to control the outbreak of disease in IDP Camps of MMC / BAMA Local government	1.0625	.24254	Not-significant

**Source: Field Survey, 2018**

The result of the descriptive statistics in the table above display the result of individual items presented. From the table, it can be seen that the most of the mean of individual item are below 2.5. That is below the average value of the likert scale of 5. This implied that the money the two Local governments are spending for the IDPs are not actually meant for that purpose suggesting that the citizens are living below standard as the money meant to take care of them are being diverted to cater for the IDPs. This result further suggested that the two Local governments need to outsource money from the state, federal government and other non- governmental agencies to properly take care of the welfare of the IDPs.

#### **Hypothesis Four**

H<sub>0</sub>: There is no significant relationship between the management of IDPs and administration of MMC and BAMA Local Government Area.

H<sub>1</sub>: There is significant relationship between the management of IDPs and administration of MMC and BAMA Local Government Area

#### **Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	269.708 <sup>a</sup>	9	.007
Likelihood Ratio	288.198	9	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	108.562	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	310		

a. 2 cells (12.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.97.

#### **Researcher's survey 2018**



The finding from table 5.1 above revealed that there is a relationship between the management of IDPs and administration of MMC and BAMA Local Government Area, since the  $\chi^2(269.708)$  and p-value (0.007) is less than 0.05 level of significance at 95% confidence limit. Thus, the study rejected the null hypothesis that states that there is no significant relationship between the management of IDPs and administration of MMC and BAMA Local Government Area.

#### **5.4 Discussion of Interview Result**

Synthesis of interview report on the challenges of managing internally displaced persons (IDPs) on local government administration in Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (MMC) and BAMA local government councils, Borno State. The interviewees consist of two (2) categories of people i.e, the camp officials and the IDPs. A focused group discussion was conducted to support the questionnaire result.

#### **How do you Rate Food Supply in the IDP Camps of MMC and BAMA Local Government Areas?**

In order to find out the adequacy of food supply in the IDP Camps of MMC and BAMA Local government areas, the researcher asked the respondent to pose their view on the issue. Majority of the respondents of IDPs of MMC and BAMA Local Government Areas stressed that there is no adequate food supply in IDP camps. While few of them viewed that there is adequate food supply in the both camps of the two Local Government.

**Are Drugs Adequately Supplied in the IDP Camps of MMC and BAMA Local Government Areas?**

The researcher investigated the adequacy of drugs supplied in the IDP camps of MMC and BAMA Local Government Areas. Majority of the interviewees from both IDP camps in the two local government responded that there is no adequate drug supply in the camps while only few of the respondents says that there is adequate drug supply in the IDP camps.

**Do you think the Environment of IDP Camps of MMC and Bama Local Government are Cleaned?**

The researcher investigated the hygienic of the environment of IDP camps of MMC and Bama Local Government Area. The respondents unanimously agreed that the IDP camps in the two Local governments are not properly cleaned.

***Is there Adequacy of Water Supply in the IDP Camps of MMC and BAMA Local Government Areas?***

The researcher asked the interviewees to pose their view on the adequacy of water supply in the IDP Camps of MMC and BAMA Local government. Most of the interviewees responded that there is no adequate water supply in the IDP camps of the two Local Government Areas. While only few of the interviewees said that there is adequacy of water supply in the IDP camps.

**Do you Get Three Square Meals Per Day in the IDP Camps?**

The researcher investigated whether the people of the IDP camps in BAMA and MMC Local Government Area get three square meals supplied per day. Some of the interviewees in the IDP Camps of MMC and BAMA Local government replied they enjoyed three square meal per day. While others replied that they don't have access to three square meal per day in the both camps.

***Is the Food Ration Adequate to satisfy you and your Family?***

An interview was carried out pertaining the Satisfactory of food ration adequacy in the IDP Camps of MMC and BAMA Local Government Areas. Majority of the respondents viewed that the food rationing is not adequate enough to satisfy them. While others mentioned that the food rationing is satisfactory in the IDP Camps of the two Local Government Areas.

***In case of Illness, do you have Access to Medical Care in the Camp?***

An interview was conducted regarding the availability of medical health facility in the IDP camps in the two Local Government Areas. Majority of the respondents viewed that there is no medical health dispensary in the IDP camps of the two Local Government Areas. While only few of them respondent that there is.

***Did you face any security breach in your camp?***

The research investigated the possibility of security breach in the Camps of the two local Government Areas. Some of the respondents viewed that they faces security breach in their camps while others said that didn't face any security breach in the IDP Camps of the two Local Government Areas.

## 5.5 Analysis of Observation

Below are the pictorial evidence of camp management for IDPs in the two selected LGAs of Borno State.

Figure 1: Some IDPs carrying the food supplied distributed among them the camp officials.



Figure 2: These are grain Supplied for distribution to IDPs. The camp management ensures that these food supplied get to every IDPs living in the camp.



Figure 3: Distribution of Food ration ticket to IDPs.



Figure 4: Cross section of IDPs waiting to collect food ration tickets. The most affected are the women and children which constituted largest part of IDPs living in the camp.



Figure 5: Cross Section of a Camp Settlement in Bama local government in Borno State.



## 5.6 Major Findings of the Study

Based on the data gathered, discussed and analysed, the study found out that:

- i. Human resources (camps officials) significantly affect the effective management of IDP camps in both MMC and Bama Local Government Areas. The findings of this study is consistent with result of Obikaeze and Onuoha (2013), Mohammed and Ahmed (2015), Obikaeze and Onuoha (N.D), Priscilla Kaumrugi (2013). However, it contradicted the findings of Vida, Atehortua and Sakedo (2012), Kamungi (2013), Wopp, Githinji and Karuoya (2010). Evidences were seen

where the staff that should be engaged in manning the affairs of local government administration were now redeployed to serve IDP camps officials. At the local government secretariat, the staffs are not adequate thereby negatively affecting the effective managing of IDP camps in the two local government areas. These local government staff that serve as camp officials lacked the requisite skills to effectively manage IDPs in the local government areas.

- ii. Financial capacity of the two local governments significantly affects the management of IDPS as it serves as a determinant factor for the purchase and maintenance of facilities in the IDP camps. Financial capacity of the two is relatively low compared to the myriad of problems in effective management of IDP camps in both the local government areas. The financial resources which ordinarily shall be committed to the development of the two local government areas are now diverted to the management of the two IDP camps, thereby making financial resources not sufficient for the local government administration and not sufficient for the effective management of the IDPs. The findings of this study is consistent with result of Obikaeze and Onuoha (2013) and Priscilla Kaumrugi (2013). However, it contradicted the findings of Kamungi (2013) and Wopp, Githinji and Karuoya (2010).
- iii. Jurisdiction authority of the tiers of government significantly affects the effective management of IDPs in the two local government areas. The federal government, state government and local government authorities all have lands in the management of IDPs but there is no clear cut of demarcation between the areas to be covered by each and every tier of government. This, to a larger extent significantly affects the effective management of IDPs in the two local government areas. The agencies and the tiers of government always shift blames

on the poor management of the IDPs in the two local government areas. The findings of this study is consistent with result of Mohammed and Ahmed (2015), Obikaeze and Onuoha (N.D) and Priscilla Kaumrugi (2013). However, it contradicted the findings of Wopp, Githinji and Karuoya (2010).

- iv. Management of IDPs significantly affect the administration of both MMC and Bama local government areas. The financial resources and human resources that ordinarily shall be committed to the administration of the local government areas are now shifted to the management of IDPs camps. This hampers the effective performance of local government administration. The findings of this study is consistent with result of Obikaeze and Onuoha (N.D), Priscilla Kaumrugi (2013). However, it contradicted the findings of Vida, Atehortua and Sakedo (2012), Kamungi (2013).

## **5.7 Implications of the Findings**

Based on the above major findings, the state lacks a sound and coherent policy on ground that guides and regulates the activities of the IDPs in Borno State. In line with this, the above captured or mentioned major findings can only be made effective with a sound policy measure that would serve as a framework for analysis and onward suggestions.



## CHAPTER SIX

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 6.1 Summary

The world is generally characterized by conflicts arising from natural and manmade phenomenon which has often led to massive movements/displacement of huge people from their original place of abode. These movements lead to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and also rendering others as refugees.

The activities of the insurgents in the North-East especially in Borno state have resulted to the displacement of a lot of people from their original place to settle in various towns and villages within the local government areas. These challenges compelled the state together with the local governments to establish camps in order to settle the people who are forced to leave their homes as a result of the conflict. The establishment of IDPs camps especially within the state capital sometime in 2013/2014 to cater for the needs of the displaced persons brought about enormous challenges to the government especially MMC and Bama local governments. Much as MMC was not directly affected but the entire IDPs came to Maiduguri to settle thereby increasing the burden on the council in the areas of managing these people. While Bama local government council witnessed the displacement of its entire population thereby rendering the council with enormous challenges of managing its people especially the IDPs in various camps in Maiduguri and elsewhere.

This research focused on the challenges of managing Internally Displaced Persons on local government administration; a study of MMC and Bama local government. The concept of IDPs came into existence as a result of the activities of the members of Boko Haram in 2009. This sect was led into this heinous crime by their leader Moh'd Yusuf.

This research focused on the newly emerged phenomenon of IDPs especially the two local governments that is the focus of the study as it affects its resources and its functions. The operations of the local government system in the state hitherto concentrates on its traditional functions which include provisions of water, health facilities, education, agricultural inputs and host of other local needs of the local people in the local government. It is never in the history of local government administration in the state that a huge challenge of managing Internally Displaced Persons is added to the responsibilities of local government management. This development has rendered the local governments totally incapable of provision of the essential services to the people at the grassroots as all its resources is channel towards management of IDPs.

## **6.2 Conclusion**

In conclusion, the challenges of Internal Displacement remain a pressing issue in Nigeria. while some significant displacement crises have subsided due to the cessation of hostilities and tens of thousands of IDPs have been able to return to their original place of residence, over a million more in the country remain in a precarious situations and new situations of internal displacement continues to occur. A great deal therefore remain to be done to address IDPs Protection and Assistance needs, to find durable solutions to their plight and to prevent further displacement from taking place. Based on the reviews made, it is observed that embracing and assisting the IDPs by giving them shelter and basic needs such as food, cloth, water and so on will help them. Apart from these basic needs supplies, the IDPs need to be counselled, and equipped with skills to overcome the emotional trauma that is usually associated with such dehumanising experiences. This requires intervention of different agencies, government and non-governmental bodies.

After an in-depth investigation and analysis of the data collected, the study identified that local governments of MMC and Bama are indeed overwhelmed by the challenges of managing internally displaced. These local governments don't have the skilled manpower to be able to handle the various camps occupied by their people while on the other hand; they also lack the required funds to manage the camps effectively and efficiently.

It's also imperative to note that the study also came to the conclusion that there exists a serious administrative conflict between all the agencies of government especially those share with the responsibility of managing the affairs of displaced persons. This inter agency conflicts have affected the quality of service delivery to the displaced persons.

### **6.3 Recommendations**

Based on the summary of the major findings, the study made the following recommendations:

- i. Government should ensure that where relief materials are sent to IDPs those materials should not be diverted for other use.
- ii. Adequate security mechanism should be put in place at the camp sites to relax the apprehensive minds of the IDPs while there.
- iii. It is imperative to speedily recover and rehabilitate men, women and children in these camps to facilitate proper integration of IDPs back into the various social structures, thereby eliminating tendencies of social vices.
- iv. The two local government areas (MMC and Bama) should employ more technical and professional human resources with managerial skills to effectively manage the IDP camps while the affected staffs of the two local government areas should return to carry out their official responsibilities in their respective local

governments. The newly employed staff to manage the affairs of the IDP camps should be given adequate and requisite training to discharge their duties of managing Internally Displaced Persons in the two local government areas.

- v. The budgetary allocation of both MMC and Bama local government areas should be increased to accommodate the bulk of needs in the IDP camps. Separate grant for the effective management of IDPs should be made available thereby making it possible for the two local governments to increase their financial spending in socio-economic development. The Federal and State governments should create a means of financing the Internally Displaced Persons separate from the local government allocation to enable the local government authority's discharge their other constitutional duties.
- vi. There should be clear cut demarcation of the areas that shall be handled by each tier of government and their respective agencies that manage the affairs of IDPs in the two local government areas to avoid shifting of blames by different tiers and agencies of government. The security of services in the camp is provided by the Federal Government in addition to the bulk supply of food by National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), while State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) provides condiments to the food supplied by the Federal Government. The Local Governments should provide water and medical services to their respective IDPs in the camps.
- vii. There should be separate mechanisms that should be instituted by the local governments to handle both the human and financial resources to effectively manage the affairs of Internally Displaced Persons in the two local government areas. The bulk of the activities of managing the IDPs should not be left to the

local government authorities but rather should be a collaborative effort between the Federal, State and Local Government. This will make it possible for local governments in question to have enough funds and human resources to discharge their constitutional responsibilities.

viii. The Borno State Government should as a matter of urgency formulate a sound and coherent policy guiding the management of IDPs in the state. This will serve as a framework for guiding the conduct of IDPs in the state.

ix. Finally, the result of the survey revealed that the IDPs are seriously facing challenge of water. This study therefore suggests that the Local government authorities should make sure that water is adequately provided to the IDPs as it is one of the basic necessities of life.

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## APPENDIX I

### QUESTIONNAIRE

Department of Local Government and  
Development Studies  
Faculty of Administration  
Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria

Dear Sir/Ma,

I am a postgraduate student of Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, Department of Local Government and Development Studies, I am conducting an academic research on **“The Challenges of Managing Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Its Impact on Local Government Administration; A Study of Maiduguri Metropolitan and Bama Local Government Councils, Borno State.** You are hereby kindly requested to fill this questionnaire and return same to help facilitate the completion of my thesis. All information supplied will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

Thank you.

**TAHIRU, Shettima**

**Researcher**

## APPENDIX II

### SECTION A: BIODATA OF RESPONDENTS

(Kindly tick or write the appropriate response where required.)

1. Age.

- a. 16-20 yrs. ( ), b. 21-29 yrs.( ), c. 30-39 yrs. ( ), d. 40-49 yrs. e. 50-above ( )

2. Gender

- a. Male ( ), b. Female ( )

3. Level of Education of respondents

- a. Primary ( ), b. Secondary ( ) c. Post-secondary ( )

4. Marital Status

- a. Single ( ) b. Married ( ) c. Widow ( )

### QUESTIONS RELATING TO HYPOTHESES ONE (RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMAN RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT OF IDPS)

1. The staff Managing the Affairs of IDPs Camps are adequate in Number

- (a) Strongly Agree [ ] (b) Agree [ ] (c) Undecided[ ]

- (d) Disagree [ ] (e) Strongly Disagree [ ]

2. The appointment of camp officials is done fairly in MMC & BAMA local government IDP Camps.

- (a) Strongly Agree [ ] (b) Agree [ ] (c) Undecided[ ]

- (d) Disagree [ ] (e) Strongly Disagree [ ]

3. The staff appointed to serve as IDP camp officials are well trained to manage the affairs of the camps in MMC & BAMA Local Government

- (a) Strongly Agree [ ] (b) Agree [ ] (c) Undecided[ ]

- (d) Disagree [ ] (e) Strongly Disagree [ ]

4. Corruption do exist among the IDP camp officials in the management of Camps of MMC & BAMA Local Government

- (a) Strongly Agree [ ] (b) Agree [ ] (c) Undecided[ ]

- (d) Disagree [ ] (e) Strongly Disagree [ ]

5. If corruptions do exist in the management of IDP Camps, that can be checkmated through the activities of Anti-graft Agencies.

- (a) Strongly Agree [ ] (b) Agree [ ] (c) Undecided[ ]

- (d) Disagree [        ]        (e) Strongly Disagree [        ]
6. In your opinion, how best do you think the IDP camp officials can be made more effective & efficient?-----
7. The Officials of Local Government (Chairmen & Councillors) are assumed to be more loyal to those who appointed them rather than the people.  
 (a) Strongly Agree [        ] (b) Agree [        ] (c) Undecided[        ]
- (d) Disagree [        ]        (e) Strongly Disagree [        ]
8. This Loyalty to the state affects the management of IDP Camps in MMC & BAMA Local Government.  
 (a) Strongly Agree [        ] (b) Agree [        ] (c) Undecided[        ]
- (d) Disagree [        ]        (e) Strongly Disagree [        ]
9. Local Government Elections can enhance the effective management of IDP camps in MMC & BAMA Local Government  
 (a) Strongly Agree [        ] (b) Agree [        ] (c) Undecided[        ]
- (d) Disagree [        ]        (e) Strongly Disagree [        ]

**QUESTIONS RELATING TO HYPOTHESES TWO (RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCIAL CAPACITY AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF IDPS)**

10. How adequate are the funds provided for the management of IDPs  
 (a) Very adequate [        ] (b) Adequate [        ] (c) Fairly Adequate [        ]  
 (e) Undecided [        ] (f) Not adequate [        ]
11. The management of funds for IDPs is effective  
 (a) Strongly Agree [        ] (b) Agree [        ] (c) Undecided[        ]  
 (d) Disagree [        ]        (e) Strongly Disagree [        ]
12. Accountability & Transparency principles are applicable in the management of IDP funds.  
 (a) Strongly Agree [        ] (b) Agree [        ] (c) Undecided[        ]  
 (d) Disagree [        ]        (e) Strongly Disagree [        ]
13. Are there leakages in the management of IDP funds  
 (a) Yes [        ]        (b) No [        ]

14. If yes to Question above, do you think this can be addressed through effective accountability and transparency process.

(a) Yes [ ] (b) No [ ]

15. Based on your opinion how do you think IDP funds can be managed in MMC & BAMA Local Government ?-----  
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**16. QUESTIONS RELATING TO HYPOTHESES THREE (RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY AND MANAGEMENT OF IDPs)**

17. Local Government Authorities have roles to play in the management of IDP Camps

(a) Strongly Agree [ ] (b) Agree [ ] (c) Undecided[ ]

(d) Disagree [ ] (e) Strongly Disagree [ ]

18. Do Local Government have responsibility of ensuring peace & harmony within their respective jurisdictions

(a) Yes [ ] (b) No [ ]

19. If yes to Question above, does MMC & BAMA Local Government councils discharge these responsibilities accordingly

(a) Strongly Agree [ ] (b) Agree [ ] (c) Undecided[ ]

(d) Disagree [ ] (e) Strongly Disagree [ ]

20. The management of IDP Camps is within the jurisdiction of Local Government Authorities

(a) Strongly Agree [ ] (b) Agree [ ] (c) Undecided[ ]

(d) Disagree [ ] (e) Strongly Disagree [ ]

21. State government has role to play in the management of IDP camps

(a) Strongly Agree [ ] (b) Agree [ ] (c) Undecided[ ]

(d) Disagree [ ] (e) Strongly Disagree [ ]

22. Federal Government also has roles to play in the management of IDP Camps.

(a) Strongly Agree [ ] (b) Agree [ ] (c) Undecided[ ]

(d) Disagree [ ] (e) Strongly Disagree [ ]  
23. The state & Federal Government discharge their responsibilities of managing the affairs of IDP Camps

(a) Strongly Agree [ ] (b) Agree [ ] (c) Undecided[ ]

(d) Disagree [ ] (e) Strongly Disagree [ ]

24. In your opinion, how do you think the tiers of government should collaborate to ensure effective management of IDP camps in MMC & BAMA Local Government -----  
-----  
-----  
-----  
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**QUESTIONS RELATING TO HYPOTHESES FOUR (RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MANAGEMENT OF IDPS AND ADMINISTRATION OF MMC & BAMA LOCAL GOVERNMENT**

25. Resources meant for the provision of public utilities in the 2 local Governments are diverted for IDP management.

(a) Strongly Agree [ ] (b) Agree [ ] (c) Undecided[ ]

(d) Disagree [ ] (e) Strongly Disagree [ ]

26. The staff of the 2 Local Government Area are usually sent to IDP camps who are suppose to take their local Government Administrative responsibilities

(a) Strongly Agree [ ] (b) Agree [ ] (c) Undecided[ ]

(d) Disagree [ ] (e) Strongly Disagree [ ]

27. Drugs meant to be distributed to the clinics in the 2 Local Government Areas are shifted to IDP Camps

(a) Strongly Agree [ ] (b) Agree [ ] (c) Undecided[ ]

(d) Disagree [ ] (e) Strongly Disagree [ ]

28. Instructional Materials meant to be distributed to the primary schools of the 2 Local Governments are shifted to IDPs camps schools.

(a) Strongly Agree [ ] (b) Agree [ ] (c) Undecided[ ]

(d) Disagree [ ] (e) Strongly Disagree [ ]

29. The welfare of local government staff are not adequately granted as a result of the burden of IDPs Management.

(a) Strongly Agree [ ] (b) Agree [ ] (c) Undecided[ ]

(d) Disagree [ ] (e) Strongly Disagree [ ]

30. IDPs are served 3 meals per day in their respective camps within MMC & BAMA Local Government

(a) Strongly Agree [ ] (b) Agree [ ] (c) Undecided[ ]

(d) Disagree [ ] (e) Strongly Disagree [ ]

31. How adequate is the meal provided to IDPs in MMC & BAMA Local Government Camps

(a) Very adequate [ ] (b) Adequate [ ] (c) Fairly Adequate [ ]

(e) Not Adequate [ ]

32. The meal provided to IDPs in MMC & BAMA Local Government IDP Camps is a balanced diet.

(a) Strongly Agree [ ] (b) Agree [ ] (c) Undecided[ ]

(d) Disagree [ ] (e) Strongly Disagree [ ]

33. Shelter provided to IDPs in their respective camps in MMC&BAMA Local Government is adequate to accommodate IDPs.

(a) Strongly Agree [ ] (b) Agree [ ] (c) Undecided[ ]

(d) Disagree [ ] (e) Strongly Disagree [ ]

34. Convenience are provided in the IDP Camps of MMC & BAMA Local Government

(a) Strongly Agree [ ] (b) Agree [ ] (c) Undecided[ ]

(d) Disagree [ ] (e) Strongly Disagree [ ]

35. Water supply is adequate in the IDP Camps of MMC & BAMA Local Government

(a) Strongly Agree [ ] (b) Agree [ ] (c) Undecided[ ]

(d) Disagree [ ] (e) Strongly Disagree [ ]

36. How clean are these IDP Camps of MMC & BAMA Local Government

(a) Very clean [ ] (b) Clean [ ] (c) fairly Clean [ ] (e) Not Clean

37. Are there outbreak of Pandemic Diseases in the IDP camps of MMC & BAMA Local Government

(a) Yes [ ] (b) No [ ]

38. If the answer to Question 34 is Yes, Are there measures taken to control the outbreak of diseases in IDPs Camps of MMC & BAMA Local Government.

(a) Yes [ ] (b) No [ ]



## **APPENDIX III**

### **CHECKLIST OF ISSUES**

The items which were observed in the study involved the following:

1. The shelter provided to accommodate the Internally Displaced Persons in form of tents in camps.
2. Environmental sanitation of the camps of the two local government areas.
3. Population and population distribution of the two local government IDP camps (over crowding).
4. Security personnel provided to safeguard the IDP camps of MMC and Bama local government areas.
5. Water supply for the Internally Displaced Persons within the two local government areas.
6. Primary schools setting of the IDP camps of the two local government areas.
7. The composition of camp officials managing the affairs of the IDPs in the two local government areas.
8. Food distribution to Internally Displaced Persons in the camps.

## **APPENDIX IV**

### **INTERVIEW FORMAT**

1. How do you rate food supply in the IDP Camps of MMC and BAMA Local government areas?
2. Are the drugs adequately supplied in the IDP Camps of MMC and BAMA Local government areas?
3. Do you think the environment of IDPB Camps of MMC and BAMA local government are cleaned?
4. Is there adequate water supply in the IDP Camps of MMC and BAMA Local government Areas?
5. Do you get three square meals per day in the IDP camp?
6. Is the food ration adequate to satisfy you and your family?
7. In case of illness, do you have access to medical care in the camp?
8. Did you face any security breach in your Camp?

## FIGURES I - XI

Figure 1: Some IDPs carrying the food supplied



Figure 2: Food Supplied for distribution to IDPs



Figure 3: Arrangement of Food to be distributed to IDPs



Figure 4: Children in IDP Camp



Figure 5: Distribution of Food ration ticket to IDPs



Figure 6: Cross section of IDPs waiting to collect food ration tickets



Figure 7: IDPs Shelter in Camp



Figure 8: Cross Section of a Camp Settlement





Figure 9: Large Family Shelter in Camp



Figure 10: Small Family Shelter in Camp





**Figure 11: Organization Chart of Internally Displaced Persons Camp.**

