

**ANALYSIS OF FARMERS-HERDSMEN CONFLICTS AND
NATIONAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA**

BY

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**BEING A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF
POSTGRADUATE STUDIES, NASARAWA STATE UNIVERSITY,
KEFFI, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(PH.D.) IN SECURITY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES OF THE
NASARAWA STATE UNIVERSITY, KEFFI**

JANUARY, 2021

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has been written by me and it is a report of my research work. It has not been presented in any previous application for Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in security and Strategic Studies. All quotations are indicated and sources of information specifically acknowledge by means of references.

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CERTIFICATION

The thesis Analysis of Farmers-Herdsmen Conflicts and National Security in Nigeria meets the regulations governing the award of Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in Security and Strategic Studies, of the School of Postgraduate Studies, Nasarawa State University, Keffi, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge.

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DEDICATION

I humbly dedicated this thesis to Almighty God.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

From the outset, I give Almighty God the glory for the grace he granted me to undertake this additional postgraduate study.

This thesis on Analysis of Farmers-Herdsmen Conflicts and National Security in Nigeria addresses a conflict that is likely to threaten the very existence of Nigeria as a nation. Understandably, the immeasurable support I received from my beloved wife, Mrs. Dorcas Doo Tyoor and our lovely children, Fredrick McFadden Terhemba Tyoor-Jnr, Ter-nenge Tyoor, Iwuese-ter Tyoor and Terfa Tyoor, provided me the enabling mental environment that crystallized into the production of this work. From the rising to the setting of the sun, I shall remain eternally grateful for their unflinching support.

I am also indebted to my supervisor, Professor Haruna Kuje Ayuba whose immeasurable inputs and wealth of experience impacted positively on the substance and quality of this work. During the course of supervision, he was careful, thorough, patient, humane and highly methodical in making quality inputs that have eventually characterised the substance of this thesis. I am most grateful to him, particularly knowing his busy schedules as the Director of Academic Planning of the University. I am equally indebted to my mentor, Professor Olayemi Akinwumi, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Academic) who left no stone unturned at encouraging me at every important point during this study. I must also acknowledge the invaluable contributions of Professor Francis Onu who served as my Internal Examiner. I am equally appreciative to Professor Andrew Zamani, the Director of the Institute of Governance and Development Studies, who also made immense contributions to the quality of this work. I remember with deep pain, the late Professor Filaba Mailafia who though, supportive, enthusiastic and expectant of the final products of this study, was snatched by the icy hands of death before my final defence. May God in his infinite mercies grant Professor Mailafia's soul eternal rest.

Lastly, I appreciate all the other agencies and individuals who were consulted during this work, but whom have not been specifically mentioned in this portion of the work.

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ABSTRACT

The study has examined the impact of farmers-herdsmen conflict on national security in Nigeria in order to suggest strategies to curb its recurrence, for the enhancement of national security in Benue State, North Central Nigeria. The study adopted the descriptive survey research method with the aim of gathering data from the respondents. The study was guided by six objectives and six hypotheses. Questionnaire was the major source of data collection which was administered to the respondents. The purposive sampling techniques was used to select the sample size for the study. The questionnaire was based on five-point Likert scale ranging from 1-strongly disagree, 2-disagree, 3-neutral, 4-agree and 5-strongly agree. The Cronbach Alpha reliability scale was used to determine the reliability of the measuring instruments. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix were used to test the correlation among the variables while the multiple regression model was employed in the analysis of the data which was obtained by the use of questionnaire administered on the selected respondents and the decision was based on 5% level of significance. The study found that farmers-herdsmen conflict has a significant impact on national security. In addition, the conflict between herdsmen and farmers has led to wanton destruction of human lives, properties, cattle and farming activities leading to national security challenges and economy of the affected communities. The study concluded that the main cause of conflict between farmers and herdsmen is land which is used by farmers for cultivation and grazing for herdsmen. This concern was not solved neither by leaders nor elders. In addition, farmers and herdsmen conflict management actors have rejected the concept of separating farming from grazing area the idea which could have reduced direct collision between farmers and herdsmen and recommended among others that the strategies of Anti-Open Grazing law should be sustained to curtail the menace of unaccounted wandering of herdsmen and cattle encroaching on farm land leading to conflict. This should avoid competition for the available few resources of land and water because it will enhance farmers and herdsmen to make impactive use of their respective areas.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The primary concern of every nation is to guarantee the security and wellbeing of its citizens. To achieve this, nations institute measures to ensure the preservation of collective national interests and goals. This is aimed at providing a conducive environment for the direction of national resources towards development. National security is generally concerned with the defence of national interest, core values and the totality of measures put in place to protect the corporate existence of a state. A secured nation is one that is reasonably free from danger, fear, uncertainty or anxiety. However, nations are often confronted with occasional threats to national security. These threats are usually manifestations of prevalent social, political, economic or cultural factors that may create conflicts which threaten national security.

In many cases, these conflicts arise from a struggle for limited environmental resources among different groups in the society. A clear demonstration of such conflict is the struggle for the use of land resources for crop farming and animal husbandry. In a bid to increase production, farmers seek arable land to cultivate crops, while herdsmen also desire extensive grassland and water sources to graze their animals. As a result, the competition between farmers and herdsmen for land resources often lead to violent farmers-herdsmen conflict, which negatively affect national security.

According to Abbas (2012), farmers-herdsmen conflict is a direct threat to food security, which attracts negative consequences for national security. Furthermore, these conflicts often result in significant loss of human lives and property, as well as create dislocations in societal

activities. Incidents of farmers-herdsmen conflict have the potential to significantly undermine societal cohesion, thus constituting threat to national security.

In Mongolia, conflicts over land ownership rights between native Mongolian pastoralists and settler Han Chinese farmers have been raging in the inner Mongolian provinces since 1997. The disputed area involves over 1000 hectares of arable land which the natives claim was acquired illegally by the farmers (Sartor, 2014). The conflict had disrupted farming and grazing activities, with considerable loss of lives and property. Over 50 lives have been lost in the conflicts; the most recent being clashes in May 2013 which led to 3 deaths. Significantly also, the conflict has affected relations between China and Mongolia over the Chinese support to the agrarian Han Chinese involved in the conflicts. The strained relations have hindered Sino-Mongolian collaboration in the exploitation of water resources in the Gobi Desert which would have been economically beneficial to both countries. The conflict between Mongolian herdsmen and Han Chinese farmers thus constitutes a hindrance to economic development of Mongolia and China, with negative implications to the national security of both countries.

In Sudan, the Darfur conflict began as a communal conflict between indigenous farmers and nomadic Arab herdsmen in the Jabba Merra Region in 1993 (Copnail, 2017). The nomadic herdsmen had been forced to move southwards with their livestock in search of water and grazing areas due to drought conditions in northern Sudan. However, their movement into the more arable Jabba Merra Region occupied by farming Sudanese tribes led to a struggle for land resources and killings between the herdsmen and farmers. The researcher further asserts that the failure of the Sudanese government to provide effective measures to resolve the conflict intensified the situation to a full-blown insurgency in 2003. This resulted to the loss of over 400,000 lives during the conflict, while over 2 million people were displaced from

their homes. Furthermore, economic activities in the region fell by over 75 per cent, while literacy rates dropped by about 35 per cent, between 1993 and 2002. The conflict attracted international attention, leading to the deployment of African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions. Thus, farmers-herdsmen conflict constituted a threat to Sudan's national security.

In Nigeria, conflicts between the farmers and herdsmen have been witnessed in many parts of the country, leading to destruction of lives and property, with grave implications for national security. States such as Benue, Plateau, Nassarawa, Taraba, Kaduna, Kebbi and Zamfara, amongst others in the Northern Region have experienced intense conflicts between farmers and herdsmen. The situation is however, not confined to the Northern Region. States in the south such as Oyo, Enugu and Imo have also witnessed farmers-herdsmen conflict. According to Olayoku (2014), over 120 cases of farmers-herdsmen conflict were reported around the country between June 2008 and May 2014, leading to over 3,700 deaths and over 61,000 people injured. During this period, crops and livestock worth billions of Naira were destroyed, while thousands of people were displaced.

In view of this situation, government reacted to these conflicts by deploying the Nigeria Police and military units to enforce security, as well as to apply various measures and strategies to resolve the conflicts. Some of these measures include the establishment of grazing reserves and the institution of mediatory panels, as well as payment of compensation to aggrieved persons. Despite these measures, farmers-herdsmen conflict still rages in several states across the Country. Existing conflict resolution mechanisms have been deficient in bringing a comprehensive end to the crises, which has continued unabated in some states. As increasing arid conditions in the North force herdsmen to move further

southwards, more states could experience these conflicts which are capable of resulting to loss of lives and properties, thereby undermining national security.

The purpose of this study, therefore, is to examine the impact of farmers-herdsmen conflict on Nigeria's national security, in order to seek options for the prevention of such conflicts. The experiences in other parts of the world suggest that unresolved farmers-herdsmen conflict could escalate to wider conflicts that seriously undermine national security. Thus, the motivation for this research is borne out of the desire to proffer strategies towards addressing the root causes of farmers-herdsmen conflicts in Nigeria.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Over the years, government at all levels in Nigeria has applied various instruments to address emerging conflicts between farmers and herdsmen in various parts of the country. The Grazing Reserves Law of 1965 was designed to regulate and control the activities of herdsmen, as well as protect them from intimidation and exploitation. This law if effectively implemented would have minimized contacts between farmers and herdsmen and thus prevented conflicts between these two groups. In the event of conflicts, security agencies and military units have been deployed restore law and order. Government has also applied conflict resolution measures such as mediation by local elders and traditional rulers, government mediation committees and payment of compensations amongst others to bring immediate and permanent resolution to the conflict. However, the various efforts have failed to achieve the desired objectives

Farmers-herdsmen conflicts have raged intensely for decades in Nigeria, leading to loss of lives and threatening national security. In 2014, over 1,000 deaths were confirmed in 21 recorded incidents in Plateau, Benue, Taraba and Kaduna States, among others (Olayoku, 2014). Significantly also, the increasing sophistication in the use of weapons by the warring

parties also presents great concerns. In recent years, security forces have confiscated large quantity of sophisticated weapons such as AK 47 and General-Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG) from militants on both sides. This is indicative of the propensity that these conflicts could deepen into a full-blown warfare if ongoing resolution mechanisms are not intensified. It therefore, becomes necessary to examine the problem of farmers-herdsmen conflicts in Nigeria, with a view to identifying possible conflict resolution options. It is against this backdrop that this study seeks to find answers to the following research questions.

1.3 Research Questions

- i. What is the relationship between farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State and implication for National Security in Nigeria?
- ii. What are the issues involved in farmers-herdsmen conflicts in Benue State and implication for national security in Nigeria?
- iii. What are the impact of farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State and implication for national security in Nigeria?
- iv. What are the challenges militating against efforts to curb farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State to enhanced national security in Nigeria?
- v. What are the prospects for curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State for the enhancement of national security in Nigeria?
- vi. What strategies could be adopted to address farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State to enhancement of national security in Nigeria?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study is to analyse farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State Nigeria in order to suggest strategies to curb its recurrence, for the enhancement of national security in Nigeria. Specific objectives are as follows:

- i. Examine the relationship between farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State and implication for National Security in Nigeria
- ii. Ascertain the issues involved in farmers-herdsmen conflicts in Benue State and implication for national security in Nigeria
- iii. Determine the impact of farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State and implication for national security in Nigeria
- iv. Ascertain the challenges militating against efforts to curb farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State to enhanced national security in Nigeria
- v. Highlight the prospects for curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State for the enhancement of national security in Nigeria
- vi. Provide adopted strategies to address farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State to enhancement of national security in Nigeria

1.5 Statement of Hypotheses

H₀₁: There is no significant relationship between farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State and implication for National Security in Nigeria

H₀₂: There is no significant relationship in issues involved in farmers-herdsmen conflicts in Benue State and implication for national security in Nigeria

H₀₃: Impact of farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State has no significant implication for national security in Nigeria

H₀₄: Challenges militating against efforts to curb farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State has no significant implication for enhanced national security in Nigeria

H₀₅: Prospects for curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State has no significant implication for the enhancement of national security in Nigeria

H₀₆: There is no significant relationship between adopted strategies to address farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State and enhancement of national security in Nigeria

1.6 Significance of the Study

The outcome and recommendations of this study would assist policy makers at the federal and state government levels in formulating new policies and adopting new conflict resolution mechanisms to address farmers-herdsmen conflict in Nigeria. In particular, it would assist the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) and National Orientation Agency (NOA) in developing programmes to address farmers-herdsmen conflicts. The findings of the study could be used to develop policies to promote cultural awareness in the country, as well as provide inputs for the formulation or review of agricultural policies and land resource allocation strategies.

Furthermore, the study would benefit security agencies such as the Nigeria Police, the Armed Forces of Nigeria, Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps and other security agencies in the effective discharge of their responsibilities. The outcome would provide useful insights to understanding of farmers-herdsmen conflicts, which could facilitate the adoption of preventive measures against future conflicts.

The study would benefit members of the academia and research communities who seek to understand the dynamics and causative factors of farmers-herdsmen conflicts in Nigeria. In particular, the outcome of this study could prompt discourse on the influence of socio-cultural factors on conflicts, thereby stimulating further studies. The outcome of this study would also add to the body of knowledge on farmers-herdsmen conflicts in Nigeria and its effect on national security. Prospective members of mediatory panels could find some of the proffered strategies useful in their assignments.

1.7 Scope of the Study

The study is designed to cover the period 2005 – 2017 being the period of intense clashes between farmers and herdsmen in many states of the country, which has necessitated increased efforts by government to resolve the conflicts. However, references will be made outside this period where necessary, for the clarification and analysis of issues being discussed. Furthermore, this study focuses on farmers-herdsmen conflicts in Benue State. The state was chosen due to its geographical position representing the North Central, thus increasing the likelihood that farmers-herdsmen conflict in the state is identical in nature and characteristics to similar conflicts in other parts of the country.

In terms of content, this study will only consider reported cases of conflicts between farmers and herdsmen in Benue state. This is because the Fulani herdsmen are the only pastoralist group in the Country that could be found in virtually every state of the nation. Also, the words herdsmen and pastoralists are used interchangeably in this research work.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Conceptual Framework

The two key variables of this study are farmers-herdsmen conflict and national security, which are the independent and dependent variables respectively. These variables are conceptualized and their relationship established.

2.1.1 Farmers- Herdsmen Conflict

Oladele and Oladele (2011) defined farmers-herdsmen conflict as a competition between two agricultural land users, comprising farmers and herdsmen, which often times turn into serious overt and covert hostilities and social friction. This definition views farmers-herdsmen conflict as a struggle over scarce resources, such as land and water. It underlines the importance of resources in farmers-herdsmen conflict but did not specify other influencing factors such the socio-cultural perceptions. It is restrictive and therefore not suitable for this thesis.

Audu (2013) views farmers-herdsmen conflicts as a struggle between crop farming and pastoral groups for land or other resources that are critical for the sustainability and/or development of pastoral and agricultural production systems, such as watering areas, wet lands and fertile lands which can assume violent or non-violent dimensions. This view outlines the importance of land and water resources to the development of pastoral and agricultural production, as well as emphasizing the influence of resource scarcity in farmers-herdsmen conflict. Other scholars who support this view include Odoh and Chilaka (2012) who believe that resource scarcity is the primary cause of farmers-herdsmen conflict. This perspective is, however, restrictive as it does not accommodate other possible political, social

and cultural factors that provoke farmers-herdsmen conflicts, such as social discrimination and cultural prejudices. This perspective is unsuitable for this study and therefore not adopted.

King (2013) defined farmers-herdsmen conflicts as conflicts involving farming communities and pastoralist occasioned by the struggle for land resources and socio-cultural dominance in a given environment. He postulates that management and resolution of farmers-herdsmen conflict could be enhanced through an in-depth understanding of the socio-cultural behavioural patterns of herdsmen and farmers. This definition highlights the importance of socio-cultural perspective as vital to understanding farmers-herdsmen conflict. King's view is supported by scholars such as Moritz (2012) who posited that farmers-herdsmen conflicts are influenced by socio-cultural factors such as religion, livelihood practices and other cultural practices. This study aligns with the socio-cultural perspective of farmers-herdsmen conflict and King's definition is therefore adopted.

2.1.2 National Security

Section 14 (2) (b) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on the Fundamental Objectives and Direct principles of state policy provides that "security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government". In view of this, the following definitions of national security shall be stated and examined within the context of this study.

Gbanite (2012) defines national security as the ability of the state to successfully pursue her national interests, protect her core values and be able to achieve victory in case of a war. He further noted that if the individual was not secured, the state cannot be secured and if the state is under attack from an external or internal source, the state and the individual cannot be

secured. This view perceives national security from the traditional threats and the protection of national interest through the use of military force.

Mandel (1994) defines national security as the pursuit of psychological and physical safety, which is largely the responsibility of national governments, to prevent direct threats primarily from abroad endangering the survival of these regimes, their citizenry, or their ways of life. This definition anchors national security on the use of military force, and considers this as the basis for maintaining security of the State. However, Lynn and Miller (1995), says national security is politics governed by a less narrow definition of security, will be concerned not only with military threats, but with other problems that threaten directly to degrade the quality of life for a national community. In his own view, Ngbale (2011) considers national security as the preservation of national values. This, according to him, can be achieved when standards are attained in the areas of economic, political, societal, military and environmental spheres of national life.

In another parlance, it is the conception of Bajpai (2000) that the conception of national security has two basic perspectives; the first being the traditional security paradigm in which the referent object of security is the State. This in effect, was the major reason why for almost half a century, major world powers entrusted the security of their nations to a balance of power among states. In this sense, international stability relied on the premise that if the state security is maintained, the security of citizens will necessarily follow. The primary focus of security was therefore, protection from invasion; executed during proxy conflicts using technical and military capabilities.

Nonetheless, as the cold war tensions receded, it became obvious that security of citizens was threatened more by hardships arising from internal state activities and less by external aggressors. Understandably, civil wars became common place and were exacerbated by

poverty, disease, hunger violence and human rights abuses. The scholar opines further that traditional security policies were basically militaristic and had effectively masked these underlying basic human needs in the face of state security. Owen (2004) notes the implication as being neglect of its constituents, nation states' failure in their primary objective.

Another perspective on national security which is still emerging asserts that the traditional conception of security which is still emerging avers that the traditional conception of security is no longer appropriate in the highly interconnected and interdependent modern world in which global threats such as poverty, environmental degradation, and terrorism supersede the traditional security threats of interstate attack and warfare. This perspective has been referred as 'human security'. Human security offers a critique of, and advocates for an alternative to, the traditional state-centric notion of security. Importantly, it argues that the proper referent for security is the individual and that state practices should reflect this rather than primarily focusing on securing borders through unilateral military action (Baylis, 1997).

National security objectively implies the absence of threats to acquired values and subjectively, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked, (Joseph, 1993). Harold Brown, the United States Secretary of Defence from 1977 to 1981 defined national security in his 1993 *Thinking about National Security: Defence and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World*. His definition captures essential elements such as economic security and environmental security. "National security therefore, is the ability to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to preserve its nature, institution, and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders."

Maier (1990) on his own part, views national security from the lens of national power: "National security is best described as the capacity to control those domestic and foreign

conditions that the public opinion of a given community believes necessary to enjoy its own self-determination or autonomy, prosperity and wellbeing”. Every nation has a wide variety of interests to protect. It is generally believed that the interest of a nation represents those goals and values for which she is willing to make ultimate sacrifices. These interests include the defence of her territorial integrity, economic resources and citizens amongst others. Nigeria’s interests are derived from shared values, goals and aspirations of her citizens such as good governance, and protection of social and economic well-being of her citizens. It also includes the protection of her territorial integrity, which involves having full control of the land, air space and maritime environment that legally belong to her (Nwosu, 2011).

Sarkesian et al (2008) see national security as the ability of constituted institutions to prevent adversaries from using force to harm citizens or their national interests and the confidence of those citizens in this capability. This definition outlines the importance of harnessing institutional capacity to protect national interest, but sees national security threats from the perspective of traditional external adversaries. The traditional view of national security from actions of adversaries does not explain the influence of factors such as unemployment, hunger and environmental issues that drive insecurity. This perspective is unsuitable for this study and will therefore, not be further explored.

Some contemporary scholars and professionals, perceive national security from both military and non-military terms. For instance, Abolurin (2011) views national security as the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats. This definition implies securing the individual against want, poverty, diseases, loss of income and other health hazards. Azazi (2012) defines national security, as the maintenance of the survival and prosperity of a nation through the protection of the personal, physical, economic, social, resource, environmental, food, natural borders and other threats to quality of life and State survival. Azazi’s definition

captures the broad view of national security which could be influenced by military and non-military factors arising from within or outside a nation. Dick-Iruenabere (2014) also agrees with this view when he identified national security to include not only military security against foreign invasion, but also include food, economic, environmental, domestic order, educational, old-age and natural disaster security. This perspective of national security adequately encapsulates the perspective of this study. Azazi's definition of national security is therefore adopted for the study.

2.2 Review of Empirical Studies

There are several empirical studies on farmers-herdsmen conflicts and national security in various parts of the world. Adisa (2015) examines the impact of farmers-herdsmen conflict on agricultural development in the country. He posited that farmers-herdsmen conflicts had far-reaching economic, social and cultural effects on the conflicting parties, and observed that conflict actors apply various strategies to cope with the effects of the conflict. He identified these strategies as problem-oriented strategies used by farmers and emotion-oriented strategies used by herdsmen. Adisa's work adequately explored the need for social support strategies in the design of resolution mechanisms for farmers-herdsmen conflicts. However, he did not consider the need for behaviour modification as a necessity for enhancing social support strategies.

Bello (2013) in his work, "Herdsmen and Farmers Conflicts in North-Eastern Nigeria- Causes, Repercussions and Resolutions", identified the competition for socio-economic advancement as a major cause of friction and conflict between herdsmen and farmers. He noted that herdsmen were victims of social and political discrimination in the society, which was also reflected in the allocation and use of land resources. He thus advocated the need for government to address socio-political imbalance and discriminations in the relationship

between farmers and herdsmen. Bello's work sufficiently identified social and political imbalances as drivers of farmers-herdsmen conflict. However, his work focused on government actions to address these imbalance, without tackling the need to address negative socio-cultural perceptions in the society which fuels unacceptable behaviour, leading to farmers-herdsmen conflicts that undermine national security.

Oladele and Oladele (2014) in their work, "Effect of Pastoralist-Farmers Conflict on Access to Resources in the Savannah Area of Oyo State", examines the impact of farmers-herdsmen conflict on agricultural development in Oyo State. They averred that uncontrolled grazing and aggressiveness of pastoralists were prominent causes of farmers-herdsmen conflicts. Their work adequately explained the influence of resource struggle as a driver of farmers-herdsmen conflict and the need for strict enforcement of laws to prevent future conflicts. They did not however consider the importance of cultural re-orientation and behaviour modification to reduce farmers-herdsmen conflicts in order to enhance national security.

Ahmadu (2011) in his work, "Farmer-Grazer Conflict: View of a Livestock Worker on Official Interpretation and Handling", traced the frustrations suffered by herdsmen due to systemic discrimination in the allocation of land resources, imposition of unfair taxation, undue criminalization of herdsmen and poor official treatment. He averred that poor official treatment meted to the Fulani herdsmen were compounded by socio-cultural stigmatization and discrimination by their host communities. He posited that most farmers-herdsmen conflict were a result of the frustrations suffered by the Fulani herdsmen due to poor treatment by the society. Ahmadu's work adequately brought new insights into the socio-cultural and environmental factors that influence farmers-herdsmen conflict. He, however, did not explore the influence of resource scarcity in instigating such conflicts.

Shem (2010) in his work, “Impacts of Government Policies on Pastoralist Livelihood in Semi-Arid Areas of Tanzania”, traced conflicts between pastoralists and farmers in Tanzania to the increased movement of pastoralists to new areas due to the combined factors of climate change and growing livestock populations. He averred that this movement creates serious land use conflicts between pastoralists and farmers. He further noted that these conflicts are exacerbated by government agricultural policies, which are generally unfavourable to the pastoralist. He advocated for good policies and economic support plans for pastoralists, as well as the maintenance of pastoralist traditional institutions. Shem’s work comprehensively outlines the challenges faced by herdsman, which influences farmers-herdsman conflict. However, he did not specify the factors that influence the response of farmers to intrusions by herdsman, which is necessary to appreciate the socio-cultural dynamics of such conflicts.

In the above studies, the researchers attributed farmers-herdsman conflict to various economic, social, political and cultural factors. Their resolution mechanisms were basically centred on strict law enforcement to address farmers-herdsman conflicts in the country. Their studies however, did not comprehensively address the influence of socio-cultural perceptions on behavioural patterns and how conflicts may be mitigated by creating positive behaviours through appropriate socio-cultural engineering strategies to enhance national security. This study therefore, intends to fill this gap.

Particularly, according to Ladan (2011), most of these conflict often result in internal displacement of persons to the extent that the volume and spread of Internal Displaced Persons in Nigeria accounts for about 1.4 million displaced persons in Nigeria with Akwa-Ibom State hosting 200,000; Cross River (115,000); Ebonyi (80,000); Bauchi (45,000); Kebbi (50,000); Jigawa (200,000); Plateau (250,000); Taraba (25,000); Benue (48,000); Gombe (100,000); Edo (250,000) and Borno State (16,000). From October 2010 to October 2011,

National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) accounted for a total 377,701 Internally Displaced persons-in Nigeria as a result of conflicts. Supporting these views, the National Commission for Refugees (2011) posited that as at January 10, 2011 alone, Nigeria accounted for about 1.4 Million of Africa's 11.1 million people internally displaced by conflicts resulting from farmers-herdsmen clashes and other generalised violence.

2.2.1 Relationship between Farmers-Herdsmen Conflict in Benue State and Implication for National Security in Nigeria

Farmers-herdsmen conflict portends a critical threat to food security as such conflict often result in the destruction of agricultural produce, as well as suspension of agricultural production, which further affect national productivity. In addition, such conflicts constitute a serious threat to lives and properties, as well as the means of livelihood of both the farmers and herdsmen, which present socio-economic problems in the society. National security, on the other hand, involves the physical protection of lives and property, as well as socio-economic and environmental threats to the quality of lives. It also entails the maintenance of national prosperity through the sustenance of productivity in all sectors of the economy.

It can thus be inferred from the above that destruction of lives, disruption of means of livelihood and generation of socio-economic problems as a result of farmers-herdsmen conflict constitutes serious threats to national security. It follows, therefore, that an increase in farmers-herdsmen conflict will threaten national security. On the other hand, curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict will enhance national security. There is therefore a negative correlation and inverse relationship between farmers-herdsmen conflict and national security in Nigeria. The review of some literature relevant to this study are highlighted in the subsequent paragraphs.

2.2.2 Issues involved in Farmers-Herdsmen Conflicts in Benue State and Implication for National Security in Nigeria

The issues involved in farmers-herdsmen conflict and national security in Nigeria include policy framework, development of grazing reserves and law enforcement. Others are conflict management mechanisms and socio-cultural dynamics. These would be discussed subsequently.

2.2.2.1 Policy Framework

Policy framework is an essential consideration in curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict for national development. Policy framework refers to the plan of action guiding the use of resources for agricultural activities. Some policies enacted in Nigeria are designed to facilitate equitable access to resources by farmers and herdsmen. However, these policies have often failed to achieve the desired results. For example, the Land Use Act 1978 vested land ownership and administration on State and Local governments, for equitable utilization and distribution of land resources for national development (Bello, 2013). However, land tenure in most rural areas has remained under the control of communities and families. This frustrates Government's efforts to allocate land for grazing reserves in many parts of the country. The land resource needs of herdsmen are, thus, not adequately addressed, providing a catalyst for farmers-herdsmen conflict thereby undermining national security.

In 2001, the Federal Government adopted a National Agriculture Policy which developed a framework for the improvement of livestock management. The Policy recommended a minimum of 10 per cent of the country's landmass to be legally acquired and constituted into grazing lands and grazing reserves for lease allocation to livestock grazers (Oladele & Oladele, 2011). Under the policy, each state was required to set aside 10 per cent of its land area for the establishment of grazing areas. So far, only 3 states (Kebbi, Zamfara and FCT)

have set aside the minimum 10 per cent land area for grazing land development. Significantly also, only Ogun State in the South has set aside land for grazing area. The reluctance by states to implement the policy has hindered efforts to manage resource sharing between farmers and herdsman, which exacerbates farmers-herdsman conflicts with grave implications for national security.

The failure to implement policies on land resource sharing has been attributed to the tendency of government to exclude stakeholders in the formulation of these policies. This has hindered cooperation by some stakeholders and created gaps in policy implementation. Thus, the problem of farmers-herdsman conflict remain unabated, with attendant negative effects on national security. Policy framework is therefore a major consideration for curbing farmers-herdsman conflict for the enhancement of national security in Nigeria.

2.2.2.2 Development of Grazing Reserves

The development of grazing reserves is an issue in farmers-herdsman conflict and national security. A grazing reserve is a piece of land that government acquires and develops for pastoralists to graze their livestock. Grazing reserves enable the government to protect pastures for herds, which helps to prevent conflicts between farmers and herdsman. Thus, as at 1992, the Federal Government had identified and earmarked over 300 areas around the country for establishment of grazing reserves covering about 28 million hectares (Ahmadu, 2011). Appendix II shows the details of the grazing reserves around the country. The details indicate that only 45 grazing reserves covering about 600,000 hectares had been gazetted. This represents 15 per cent of the proposed grazing reserves around the country. However, the inability of government to implement the plan for grazing reserves development has hindered efforts to curb farmers-herdsman conflict, with negative implications for national security.

Furthermore, the poor implementation has led to the abandonment of established grazing reserves. For instance, as at 1998, only 350 of the projected 2000 Fulani families earmarked for the Phase One of the scheme were using the reserves. However, a gradual abandonment of the reserves was witnessed around 2000 and by 2014, less than 50 pastoral families were using the reserves (Shem, 2010). The decline in the usage of the reserves is attributable to declining pastures due to desertification, which is exacerbated by the absence of necessary facilities required for the sustenance of livestock in the reserves. This has induced herdsmen to move out of the reserves for grazing resources, contributing to the persistence of farmers-herdsmen conflict, which threatens national security. The development of grazing reserves is, therefore, an issue in farmers-herdsmen conflict and Nigeria's national security.

2.2.2.3 Law Enforcement

According to Khan (2013), law enforcement is a vital consideration in curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict for national security in Nigeria. Sections 214 and 215 of the 1999 Constitution charge the Nigeria Police with the responsibility of law enforcement in Nigeria. The Police discharges this responsibility by being organized into Police Commands, Area Commands, Divisional Police Stations and Local Police Posts at State, LGA and community levels respectively (Moritz, 2012). According to the Encyclopaedia of Environment and Ecology (2015), the current strength of the Nigeria Police is about 380,000 personnel. This translates to police-citizen ratio of 1:447 which, compared to the global standard of 1:400, is fairly adequate to ensure the preservation of law and order. This indicates that there are 9,347 Police stations in the country. This structure of law enforcement is designed to quell unlawful acts, such as farmers-herdsmen conflict for the enhancement of Nigeria's national security.

Dagala (2017) asserts that the structure of law enforcement has been utilized to ensure the maintenance of law and order since independence. Indeed, it has been effective in quelling

farmers-herdsmen conflicts in Bauchi, Oyo, Imo, and Kwara states. However, the persistence of farmers-herdsmen conflicts in Benue, Nasarawa, Plateau and Kaduna states questions the effectiveness of this structure. There are concerns that the Police do not possess the necessary capability in training and equipment for effective policing, particularly in the rural areas. Many Police units in the rural areas do not have sufficient personnel, vehicles and equipment required for the discharge of their duties (Liechtenstein & Carmanchachi, 2012). Thus, unlawful acts such as encroachment and stealing of agricultural products are committed without deterrence, which stimulates farmers-herdsmen conflict, with grave implications for national security. Law enforcement is therefore, an issue in farmers-herdsmen conflict for the enhancement of Nigeria's national security.

2.2.2.4 Conflict Management Mechanisms

The existence of conflict management mechanisms is a consideration in farmers-herdsmen conflicts and national security in Nigeria. Conflict management mechanisms entail the availability of institutional mechanisms designed to provide alternative dispute resolution options for conflicts between farmers and herdsmen. The National Policy on Agriculture fosters upon states the responsibility of establishing effective mechanisms for conflict management on the use of agricultural resources in their territories (Liechtenstein & Carmanchachi, 2012). This is aimed at proactively addressing disagreements in the utilization of land resources and preventing their escalation into conflicts that could threaten national security. However, most states have no mechanisms to proactively address conflicts between farmers and herdsmen (Iruenabere, 2014). This has created a vital gap in the resolution of farmers-herdsmen conflict, with negative effects on national security.

Traditional institutions, however, form a veritable platform for conflict management in most rural areas of Nigeria. Traditional institutions have consistently bridged gaps created by the

absence of government presence in many rural areas. They are often looked upon for the allocation of resources, maintenance of law and order, societal development and conflict management, among others.

Traditional institutions have also played a vital role in mediating and resolving farmers-herdsmen conflicts in some parts of the country, thus enhancing national security. For instance, the Meyatti-Allah Cattle Breeders Association successfully mediated conflict between farmers and herdsmen in Bauchi and Gombe states (Adisa, 2015). Traditional institutions are, thus, vital elements for resolving farmers-herdsmen conflicts for enhanced national security in Nigeria. There are concerns, however, that the declining influence of traditional institutions has affected their authority and acceptance. This has hindered their ability to definitively mediate and resolve farmers-herdsmen conflicts, with grave consequences for national security. Conflict management mechanism is therefore a factor in curbing farmers-herdsmen conflicts for enhanced national security in Nigeria.

2.2.2.5 Socio-Cultural Dynamics

Socio-cultural dynamics within farming and herdsmen communities is an issue in farmers-herdsmen conflicts, which hinder national security. According to King (2013), animal livestock production in Nigeria is essentially the preoccupation of the Fulanis, who own over 90 per cent of the nation's livestock population. He asserts further that the Fulani socio-cultural lifestyle is remarkably different from most other ethnic groups they have contact with, which sometimes provide avenues for conflicts. For instance, a typical Fulani herdsman controls between 80 to 120 cows and a family with less than 40 cows is said to be poor. Ownership of cattle herds thus constitute a key criterion for the measurement of wealth in Fulani society. Furthermore, the safety and well-being of cattle is regarded as a priority

consideration in the Fulani society. This could lead to conflict with other socio-cultural groups who regard cattle as merely sources of meat.

The community modelling culture of the Fulani is another area of concern. For instance, the Fulani mode of encampment consist essentially of clearing any available area of unoccupied or un-utilized land. The Fulani culture recognises land, air and water as natural resources endowed by the Almighty Creator for everybody's use (Ahmadu, 2011). While according to Shem (2010), the Fulani therefore engage in the use of land on first come basis and could occupy any unused land without deference to anybody. According to him, the tendency of the Fulani to occupy areas of unused land which traditionally belong to communities has created a feeling of perceived threat of land grabbing and invoked the fear of Fulani domination. Such lack of awareness often amplifies conflicting traditional beliefs and practices and instigate farmers-herdsmen conflict thereby undermining national security. Socio-cultural dynamics is, therefore, an issue in farmers-herdsmen conflict and national security in Nigeria.

2.2.3 Effects of Farmers-Herdsmen Conflict in Benue State and Implication for National Security in Nigeria

The effects of farmers-herdsmen conflict on national security include safety and well-being of the citizenry, food security, humanitarian issues and employment generation. These are discussed subsequently.

2.2.3.1 Safety and Wellbeing of Citizenry

Farmers-herdsmen conflicts have constituted a significant threat to the safety of lives and property of citizens in many parts of Nigeria, which impinges on national security. Farmers-herdsmen conflicts undermine the safety and wellbeing of persons and imposes strain on government's ability to protect its citizens, thereby hindering national security in Nigeria.

Olayoku (2014) asserts that conflicts resulting from cattle grazing accounted for 35 per cent of all reported crisis between 2005 and 2014 in Nigeria. Furthermore, the Nigeria Social Violence Dataset records that farmers-herdsmen conflicts have resulted in the death of over 3732 people since 2008, while 1075 deaths were recorded in 2014 alone.

According to This day Newspaper (2014) on March 18, 2015, an estimated 94 people were killed when Fulani herdsmen attacked farming communities in Agatu LGA of Benue State. Benue State, along with Kaduna and Plateau states, have witnessed protracted incidents of farmers-herdsmen conflicts which have claimed many lives, thus threatening national security. According to Shehu (2015) conflicts between farmers and herdsmen have threatened the safety of lives in Nigeria more than any other threat except the Boko Haram terrorism. This is due to the immense loss of lives and property associated with farmers-herdsmen conflict. Farmers-herdsmen conflict thus threatens the safety of lives of citizens, which negatively affect Nigeria's national security.

2.2.3.2 Human Issues

Farmers-herdsmen conflict often creates humanitarian crises which undermine national security in Nigeria. Victims of farmers-herdsmen conflicts are usually forced to take refuge outside their homes and communities to preserve their lives. According Agbatse (2015), in April 2014, clashes between Fulani herdsmen and farmers in Benue State led to the displacement of over 25,000 people who were encamped in various Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps in Makurdi. In April 2013, the death of 2 cows by poisoning, belonging to Fulani in Zankan, Kaduna State, provoked mass attacks on communities in Kaduna and Plateau States, claiming over 50 lives and caused the displacement of about 10,000 people from their homes (Punch Newspaper, 2013). This resulted in over 200,000 Nigerians living as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) due to farmers-herdsmen conflict. Thus, farmers-

herdsmen conflict creates dislocation of families from their homes and means of livelihood, which impinges on national security.

Women and children are particularly vulnerable to farmers-herdsmen conflicts and the resultant humanitarian crisis. Difficult living conditions such as over-crowding and poor feeding in Internally Displaced Persons' (IDP's) camps often generate health problems and malnutrition. The IDP camps host s large contingents of displaced persons and further places strain on the facilities and resources of the host communities. Farmers-herdsmen conflicts, therefore, causes great humanitarian crises, which negatively affect national security in Nigeria.

2.2.3.3 Food Security

Another effect of farmers-herdsmen conflict on national security in Nigeria is in the area of food security. Conflicts between farmers and herdsmen have caused destruction of farm produce and pillaging of livestock. This has led to significant reduction of agricultural produce in many parts of Nigeria. According to Gberkon (2015) in Benue State, the harvest of major agricultural products have continued to decline since 2010 due to farmers-herdsmen conflict. The disruption of agricultural activities in major food producing states such as Plateau, Nassarawa and Taraba has significantly impacted negatively on food security, thereby endangering national security.

According to Umar (2017), most farmers in conflict areas of Kaduna State lose between 70 per cent and 90 per cent of their crops due to conflicts. Losses are also significant in livestock. For instance, over 300 cows were killed during the conflict between farmers and herdsmen in Benue State in February 2014 (Security brief, 2014). According to Ojo and Adebayo (2012), the persistence of farmers-herdsmen conflict has threatened access to food in many parts of the country. The Millennium Development Goals 2014 Report, indicates that

the proportion of Nigerians living below hunger level increased from 29 per cent to 33 per cent between 2010 and 2014. This is partly attributable to frequent incidence of farmers-herdsmen conflicts which have resulted in the destruction of farm produce and pillaging of livestock thereby hindering the attainment of food security in Nigeria. Thus, farmers-herdsmen conflict has a significantly negative effect on food security, which undermines national security in Nigeria.

2.2.3.4 Loss of Income

The persistent outbreaks of farmers-herdsmen conflicts have led to considerable loss of income by both parties throughout the Federation. In particular, farmers and herdsmen in states like Benue, Nasarawa, Taraba and Kaduna where these conflicts are prevalent have incurred huge economic losses due to the destruction of crops and livestock, as well as personal properties. For instance, persistent farmers-herdsmen clashes in Benue State in 2014 incurred losses to both farmers and herdsmen (Gberikon, 2017). Gberikon further asserts that the warring groups incurred losses estimated at over ₦77 billion in the 2014 conflicts. The huge losses to personal income could affect the ability of affected persons to meet obligations, like providing for the educational and health needs of family members, with negative implications for national security.

According to Na’Allah (2017), conflicts between farmers and herdsmen in Kaduna State has impoverished the local population in the affected areas. This is buttressed by the National Bureau for Statistics which estimate that rural poverty has been on the rise since 2011 as highlighted in the Nigeria Poverty Profile (National Bureau of Statistics, 2014). The details indicate that rural poverty increased from 63.3 per cent in 2011 to over 74 per cent in 2013. This could be attributed partly to persistent farmers-herdsmen conflict which mainly affect

the livelihood of local populations. The increasing number of poor people in rural areas could lead to greater rural-urban migration and exacerbate social problems such as hard drug use, prostitution and criminal activities, with grave implications for national security. Farmers-herdsmen conflict therefore has a negative effect on income generation, thereby undermining national security.

2.2.3.5 Employment Generation

In a Ministerial brief (2014) of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, it was revealed that Farmers-herdsmen conflict significantly affects employment generation, thereby undermining Nigeria's national security. The agricultural sector is the highest employer of labour in Nigeria, employing over 70 per cent of the country's labour force of 52.4 million people. Statistics indicate that over 35 million workers representing about 20 per cent of Nigeria's population are engaged in agricultural activity (Ministerial brief, 2014). The disruption of agricultural activities therefore negatively affects employment generation, with grave implications for national security. According to Gberikon (2014), the conflict between farmers and Fulani herdsmen which has persisted in 5 LGAs of Benue State has affected the livelihood of over 250,000 farmers. The disruption of means of income of large number of people results in high level of joblessness, which exacerbates the unemployment situation, thereby undermining national security in Nigeria.

Kolade is quoted in the Editorial of This day Online (2014), as implying that about 40 million Nigerians of working age are without jobs. The National Bureau of Statistics also reports that unemployment rate in Nigeria was steady at 14.6 per cent from 2006 to 2010, but rose sharply to 23.4 per cent in 2011 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2014). This indicates a steep rise in unemployment rate from 2011 and reached a high of 34.5 per cent in 2014. This

coincides with the period of intense farmers-herdsmen conflicts in Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa and Plateau states. The high rate of unemployment could increase social misdemeanour and crime rates, which undermines national security. Farmers-herdsmen conflict indeed negatively affects employment generation thereby hindering national security in Nigeria. The summary of effects of farmers-herdsmen conflict on national security and their relationship confirms the relationship which the theoretical framework sets in place.

2.2.4 Challenges Militating Against Efforts to Curb Farmers-Herdsmen Conflict in Benue State to Enhanced National Security in Nigeria

The challenges militating against efforts to curb farmers-herdsmen conflict include exclusion of stakeholders in policy formulation, human encroachment of grazing reserves and limited police capacity. Others are declining influence of traditional institutions and traditional beliefs and practices. These are discussed subsequently.

2.2.4.1 Exclusion of Stakeholders from Policy Formulation

The exclusion of stakeholders from policy formulation processes is a constraint to curbing farmers-herdsmen conflicts if national security is to be enhanced in Nigeria. Agricultural policies are designed to facilitate the development of the agricultural sector. Most agricultural policies in Nigeria however fall short in addressing peculiar needs of some stakeholders due to inadequate consultations between policy makers and stakeholders. For instance, the National Agricultural Policy 1996 which accorded special protection status to herdsmen did not address deep rooted concerns of the herdsmen such as multiple tax regimes and maintenance of family grouping systems in grazing reserves (Abbas, 2012). In the same vein, the National Agricultural Policy (2006) that directed states to set aside 10 per cent of their land area for grazing reserves has not been fully implemented because most state governments complained of exclusion in the formulation of the policy. These policies thus

suffered from lack of cooperation from stakeholders during implementation, thereby hindering efforts to curb farmers-herdsmen conflicts for the enhancement of national security.

Some laws and policies promulgated in various states to curb farmers-herdsmen conflicts were also enacted without the consultation of relevant stakeholders. For instance, the Kaduna State Grazing Law 2012 has not been fully implemented because government has not addressed the concerns of farmers in the quest to relocate them from earmarked grazing routes (Audu, 2013). The tendency of government to promulgate laws and policies without adequate stakeholder's consultation limits implementation and hinders efforts to curb farmers-herdsmen conflicts for enhanced national security. The exclusion of stakeholders from policy formulation is therefore a constraint towards curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict for enhanced national security.

2.2.4.2 Encroachment of Grazing Reserves

The encroachment of grazing reserve is a major constraint to curbing farmers-herdsmen conflicts for the enhancement of national security in Nigeria. Encroachment into the grazing reserves and grazing routes in many Northern states has led to increased abandonment of the reserves by herdsmen who move to the southern part of the country in search of fertile land for grazing. This movement usually crosses inter-state boundaries towards states with more fertile ecological systems such as Benue, Kogi, Imo, Oyo, Ogun States (Bello, 2013).

Blench (2010) supports this view when averred he that the Fulbe (Fulani) coping mechanism encourages migration from areas of conflict. The encroachment on grazing reserves have thus influenced the migration of herdsmen towards more peaceful and fertile areas in the south for water and pasture, thus providing additional competition for resources and instigating conflicts which threaten national security. Encroachment of grazing reserves is therefore a

major constraint towards curbing farmers-herdsmen conflicts for enhanced national security in Nigeria.

2.2.4.3 Limited Police Capacity

The limited capacity of the Police is an impediment to curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict, which hinder national security in Nigeria. The Nigeria Police plays important roles in crime prevention, enforcement of laws and maintenance of public order. However, Police units in most rural areas are inadequately equipped to maintain law and order in the communities. According to Onyeozoli, the Police face numerous constraints in training, equipment and logistics which hamper their operations (Onyeozoli, 2017). Shehu (2017), further asserts that deficiency in communication facilities often imposed delay in Police reaction in sending reinforcements to troubled areas. Such delays have contributed to the persistence of farmers-herdsmen conflict which impinges on Nigeria's national security.

Furthermore, the Police presence in terms of personnel in most rural communities is very low. For instance, the Police post in Torkula in Guma LGA had only 6 personnel when the community was attacked by Fulani militants in 2014. Deficiencies in personnel and equipment have limited the capacity of the Police in addressing breakdown in law and order, including farmers-herdsmen conflict with negative implications on national security. This has further led to the deployment of military units to quell such conflicts in many parts of the country. For instance, 82 Division conducted 'OPERATION RESTORE PEACE' in Benue State between April and May 2014, in order to combat farmers-herdsmen conflict in the State (Babatunde, 2014). Babatunde further avers that the poor perception of the police to issues of farmers-herdsmen conflicts often influence the circle of reprisal attacks, which contributes to the protractedness of farmers-herdsmen conflict thereby undermining national security.

Limited Police capacity according to the source, is a major hindrance to curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict for the enhancement of national security in Nigeria.

2.2.4.4 Declining Influence of Traditional Institutions

The declining influence of traditional institutions is an impediment to curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict for enhanced national security. Traditional institutions have existed since pre-colonial era and play important roles in community coherence and facilitate communal justice systems. The long period of establishment and respect that traditional institutions enjoy makes them more effective in conflict resolution than the official mechanisms. They are thus able to take pre-emptive actions through their familiarity with the different sections of the community, thereby forestalling farmers-herdsmen conflicts for enhanced national security in Nigeria.

In recent years, however, traditional institutions have witnessed a gradual waning of the reverence they enjoy from society and by extension their influence. In a conflict resolution forum organized by the Governments of Benue and Nassarawa States in 2013, following intense farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State, traditional rulers complained of the gradual erosion of their powers and authority which has made them less effective in mediating these conflicts (Gberikon, 2013).

The survey indicated that about 80 per cent of the respondents agree that the influence of traditional institutions have declined in recent years. Ahmadu also avers that several factors contribute to the dwindling powers of traditional institutions (Gberikon, 2011). These include social malaise, globalization and civilization, conflict of interest between political authority and traditional authority. As a result of these, traditional institutions no longer command the influence, authority and respect that they enjoyed in the past.

The consequence of traditional institutions' waning powers is the ineffectiveness in acting as authority in the adjudication or management of conflicts such as farmers-herdsmen conflicts. They are thus gradually limited in their ability to prevent communal conflicts such as farmers-herdsmen conflict, with attendant negative implications for national security. The declining influence of traditional institutions is therefore a challenge to curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict for enhanced national security.

2.2.4.4 Conflicting Traditional Beliefs and Practices

Conflicting traditional beliefs and practices constitute a serious impediment to efforts towards curbing farmers-herdsmen conflicts for enhanced national security. Most Nigerian societies are multi-cultural, and adherence to cultural beliefs and practices are often embraced with a high degree of tolerance which forestalls the emergence of conflicts among the various members of the society. The arrival of new cultural groups such as migrating herdsmen and the introduction of new cultures, traditional beliefs and practices could lead to conflicts that undermine national security.

This research work shall consider the differences inherent in traditional practices of the study area and find out the underlying misunderstandings that often result in farmers-herdsmen conflicts. For instance, the Fulani belief that land does not belong to anyone, but freely provided by the Almighty for collective use is alien to the beliefs of most other tribes in the country (Audu, 2013). On the other hand, bush burning which is a traditional practice by most farming communities after harvest to prepare the soil for the next planting season is perceived by herdsmen as a deliberate attempt to deny their flock access to pasture. The scholar continues that these conflicting beliefs and practices between the Fulani herdsmen and other communities across the country are often sources of farmers-herdsmen conflicts which impede national security. Traditional beliefs and practices therefore constitute

significant impediments to curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict for enhanced national security in Nigeria. Despite these challenges, there are prospects for curbing farmers-herdsmen conflicts which are discussed subsequently.

2.2.5 Prospects for Curbing Farmers-Herdsmen Conflict in Benue State for the Enhancement of National Security in Nigeria

The prospects of curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict for enhanced national security in Nigeria include the Strategic Plan for Livestock in West Africa (SPLWA), the Nomadic Education Programme (NEP), the Great Green Wall (GGW) Project and the Presidential Committee on Small Arms Proliferation (PRESCOM). These are discussed subsequently.

2.2.5.1 Strategic Plan for Live Stocks in Africa

The Strategic Plan for Livestock in Africa (SPLWA) is a prospect for curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict for enhanced national security in Nigeria. The Strategic Plan for Livestock in West Africa which was initiated by the West African Livestock Innovation Centre in 2012 and endorsed by the Economic Community of West African States in 2013. The Plan outlines a framework for enhancing the use of indigenous livestock resources within nations in the West African sub-region. The framework provides modalities for enhancing livestock resources, with regards to livestock health, investments and migration. The plan further focuses on livestock genetic resource database and developing capacity of actors along livestock value chains. It also addresses measures to develop policies for livestock development.

The SPLWA, if effectively implemented in Nigeria, could provide linkages between herdsmen and resources required for livestock development. It could also enhance the control and monitoring of migration among herdsmen and their livestock. This would facilitate the

establishment of effective management systems for grazing reserves to limit contacts between farmers and herdsmen, thereby curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict for enhanced national security. The SPLWA is therefore a prospect for curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict for enhanced national security in Nigeria.

2.2.5.1 The Nomadic Education Programme

The Nomadic Education Programme (NEP) of the FGN is a prospect for addressing farmers-herdsmen conflicts for enhanced national security in Nigeria. The NEP was introduced at a national workshop for nomadic education in Yola, Adamawa State in 1986, leading to the production of a blueprint for nomadic education in 1987 (Osokoye & Aminu, 2012). A National Advisory Committee on nomadic education was formed in 1988 which metamorphosed into National Commission for Nomadic Education in 1989. Since its establishment, the Commission has been committed to providing education to nomadic herdsmen. This has contributed to developing literate and enlightened herdsmen thereby reducing the propensity of farmers-herdsmen conflicts in areas such as Jigawa, Katsina and Niger States where the NEP has been effectively implemented. The NEP, if effectively supported and implemented in farmers-herdsmen conflict prone states, would improve the education and awareness of pastoralists thereby limiting conflicts. The sustainment of the nomadic education programme thus offers prospects for curbing farmers-herdsmen conflicts to enhance national security in Nigeria.

2.2.5.2 Great Green Wall Project

The Great Green Wall (GGW) Project is a prospect for curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict for enhanced national security in Nigeria. The GGW Project is a pan-African proposal to green the continent from west to east in order to combat desertification. It was initiated by former President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2005 and endorsed officially by the African Heads of State

and Government in 2007 (Langford, 2014). It aims at tackling the degradation in the Sahel-Saharan region, focusing on a strip of land of 15km wide and 7,100km long from Dakar to Djibouti. This would inevitably limit the effect of climate change on the environment and facilitate the development of grazing resources for livestock.

The Global Environment Facility (GEF) has granted \$100.8 million to the GGW Project participating countries to expand sustainable land and water management in vulnerable areas in West African and Sahelian countries (Federal Ministry of Environment, 2012). Presently, Nigeria has commenced the implementation of the project with the planting of over 10 million trees across 11 Northern states. The GGW Project if effectively implemented could improve the viability of the environment in states ravaged by desertification and improve the accessibility to fertile land and water. This will reduce migration of herdsmen, thereby curtailing farmers-herdsmen conflict, with positive benefits to national security in Nigeria. The GGW is therefore a good prospect for curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict for the enhancement of Nigeria's national security.

2.2.5.3 Presidential Committee on the proliferation and illegal trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons

The Presidential Committee on the Proliferation and Illegal Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons (PRESCOM) is a prospect for curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict for the enhancement of national security in Nigeria. The PRESCOM was established in 2013 and tasked with the responsibility of coordinating national efforts at controlling the proliferation of small arms in Nigeria (PRESSCOM, 2014). It also provides monitoring and supervisory framework for the implementation of government policies for the procurement of small arms.

Since its establishment, the PRESCOM has developed and commenced implementation of several programmes towards reducing the quantity of small arms proliferation in circulation in Nigeria. The PRESCOM initiates partnerships and collaborations with security agencies to facilitate capacity building and develop policy framework towards combating the proliferation of small arms. The effective implementation of the programmes and action plans of PRESCOM could reduce the proliferation of small arms, thereby enhancing National Security in Nigeria. The PRESCOM is therefore a prospect for curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict for enhanced National Security in Nigeria.

2.2.6 Adopted Strategies to Address Farmers-Herdsmen Conflict in Benue State to Enhancement of National Security in Nigeria

Farmers-herdsmen conflicts are often the manifestation of numerous immediate and remote grievances, factors and concerns. Addressing the issues holistically would mitigate their reoccurrence and reduce the possibility of future conflicts. Most farmers-herdsmen conflict in Nigeria are tackled by addressing their immediate causes. The measures taken in Tanzania to address the political, economic, cultural and social issues that fuel conflicts between Fulani herdsmen and farmers is thus a useful lesson for this study.

2.2.6.1 Strict Law Enforcement

Adherence to conflict resolution measures can only be ensured by the application of strict law enforcement. The enforcement of stipulated fines and penalties will deter encroachment. In Nigeria, farmers and herdsmen wantonly encroach into areas not allocated them and are not made to face the law. The resolve of Argentina and Tanzania to ensure strict enforcement of laws to deter herdsmen and farmers from taking the law in their own hands is thus a vital lesson for this study.

2.2.6.2 Elimination of Socio-Cultural Barriers

Farmers-herdsmen conflicts like, other communal conflicts, are compounded by numerous social and cultural prejudices that create barriers in the relationship between farming and pastoralist communities. These barriers exacerbate even trivial conflicts, and their elimination could facilitate resolution of conflict between farmers and Fulani herdsmen. The initiative by Tanzania to establish programmes that would foster cooperation and interaction between herdsmen and farmers is also a key lesson for this study.

2.2.7 Analysis of Farmers-Herdsmen Conflict in Benue State and National Security in Nigeria

The introduction of Cattle Tax by some native authorities in Northern Nigeria in 1923 caused a widespread migration of Fulani herdsmen towards the middle belts regions where such taxes were not in force. In the process, herdsmen clashed with farmers in communities along their migration routes, as their livestock strayed into farms causing destruction to crops. These conflicts between farmers and herdsmen were witnessed in several communities including Mambila, Benue, Plateau, Kaduna and Jalingo among others, up to the early post-independence era. This necessitated measures to forestall the conflicts in order to enhance national security in Nigeria.

Accordingly, the government of the Northern Region enacted the Northern Nigeria Grazing Law in 1965. The law provided for the establishment of grazing lands in order to encourage the nomadic Fulani herdsmen to adopt sedentary practices. In 1975, the Federal Government initiated the National Livestock Development Plan (NLDP) with the aim of enhancing livestock productivity, through effective and efficient management of livestock and grazing resources. These policies, however, did not comprehensively address the peculiar needs of

the herdsmen whose major concern was the elimination of multiple tax regimes. Thus, these policies did not attract the necessary cooperation for effective implementation.

Efforts to implement the Northern Nigeria Grazing Law led to the acquisition of 6.4 million hectares of forest reserve for the grazing reserve scheme. Land was earmarked for the establishment of grazing reserves at Sokoto, Bauchi, Zaria, Ilorin, Katsina, Wase, Zamfara and Udubo. The NLDP further necessitated the establishment and demarcation of about 4,125 grazing reserves across Nigeria, covering about 4.3 million hectares, as well as grazing routes. The well demarcated grazing reserves and grazing routes were designed to prevent contact between farmers and herdsmen during the seasonal migration of herdsmen, thus curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict for the enhancement of national security. However, most of the reserves have been encroached upon, while insufficient information on the stock routes has contributed to herdsmen straying away from demarcated routes into farming areas. This has further instigated farmers-herdsmen conflicts, thereby undermining national security.

Incidents of conflicts between farmers and herdsmen emerged again in 1991, when farmers and herdsmen clashed in Kaduna. Thereafter, intense conflicts were witnessed in Plateau, Benue, Taraba and Niger States. Between 1991 and 2005, farmers-herdsmen conflicts accounted for over 35 per cent of all reported conflicts in Nigeria. This period also witnessed the use of firearms and automatic rifles in farmers-herdsmen conflicts. The intensity of the conflicts necessitated the adoption of robust law enforcement measures to prevent further escalation of farmers-herdsmen conflict. The Police were deployed to quell these conflicts and restore law and order. However, the Police have shown considerable lack of capacity to do so in many cases. As a result, the Nigerian Armed Forces have also been mobilized in some cases to provide assistance to the Police to restore law and order during farmers-herdsmen conflicts. These law enforcement measures have however been unable to stem the

increasing trend of farmers-herdsmen conflicts which has posed serious threats to national security.

The persistence of farmers-herdsmen conflict necessitated efforts by government to establish various mediatory panels and judicial commissions to address these conflicts. These official conflict management mechanisms are supported by institutional mechanisms provided by traditional institutions, which in the traditional Nigerian community provide the basic conflict resolution mechanisms. However, these institutional conflict management mechanisms have been unable to curb the conflicts, due to the inability of traditional institutions to exert sufficient influence on the conflicting parties. Thus, farmers-herdsmen conflicts persisted particularly in states such as Benue, Bauchi, Plateau, Nassarawa, Sokoto, Kaduna and Taraba. The persistence of these conflict has led to colossal loss of lives and property, thereby jeopardizing national security in Nigeria.

Significantly also, many southern states have witnessed the eruption of farmers-herdsmen clashes. The increasing southwards movement of herdsmen towards the southern states of Nigeria, has created farmers-herdsmen conflict in states such as Oyo, Enugu, Anambra, Delta, Kwara and Rivers. In many cases, differences in socio-cultural background have created misunderstandings that fueled these conflicts. Cultural differences have influenced animosities and exacerbated farmers-herdsmen conflict, thereby undermining national security. This has brought to fore the influence of socio-cultural dynamics on farmers-herdsmen conflict. Thus, the overview of farmers-herdsmen conflict raises some pertinent issues that have implications for national security in Nigeria.

Most of the time conflict management has been used interchangeably with conflict resolution. Djadi (2016) contents that conflict resolution refers to the elimination of the causes of the underlying conflict, generally with the agreement of the parties. On the other hand, conflict

management refers to the elimination, neutralization or control of the means of pursuing either the conflict or the crisis. He adds that conflict resolution is a tall order. It is rarely accomplished by direct action and is more frequently achieved only over long periods although the proximate aspects of conflict can sometimes be eliminated by agreement among the parties. Although the emphasis on conflict management or resolution seems to be a vein discussion, literatures have attempted to indicate through practice measures that have been taken to solve or manage the various conflicts manifested in Africa. Globally, conflicts have been occurring and will continue occurring. It is perhaps a permanent feature in human social relations. Conflict in resource use is not uncommon and perhaps not unnatural between and within living beings, including people.

Moore (2005) noted that conflict is not bad: it is rather necessary in order for societies to evolve and develop over time. Social conflict theory sees social life as a competition, and focuses on the distribution of resources, power, and inequality. A struggle for dominance among competing social groups (classes, gender, races, religions). When conflict theorists look at society, they see the social domination of subordinate groups through the power, authority, and coercion of dominant groups. In the conflict view, the most powerful members of dominant groups create the rules for success and opportunity in society, often denying subordinate groups such success and opportunities; this ensures that the powerful continue to monopolize power, privilege, and authority.

The conflict between the owners of the means of production and workers was at the heart of Marx's thinking. In an industrial, wealthy, society, how can so many people be poor? At the heart of Marx's thinking was social conflict, which is the struggle between groups in society over scarce resources. Marx primary concern, however, was class conflict, which arises from the way society produces material goods. Marx believed the owners of these industries were

the capitalists, those people who owned and operated businesses in pursuit of profits. The system of capitalism turns most people in any society into proletariats, those people who sell their labour for wages. To Marx, such a system will inevitably lead to class conflict between the capitalist and proletariats. Conflict theory sees social change as rapid, continuous, and inevitable as groups seek to replace each other in the social hierarchy (Stuart, 2003).

Indeed, Brown (1983), quoted in Driscoll (1994) opined that “conflict management can require intervention to reduce conflict if there is too much of it, or intervention to promote conflict if there is too little.” But when conflicts degenerate to violent and destructive clashes, they become unhealthy and counterproductive. According to Aron (2002) Conflicts in general affect the capacity and credibility of states to allocate and regulate towards growth, education and improved living standard.” There is a sense in which the prevalence of conflict creates a vicious circle because of conflict, government resources are diverted from development activities and invested in livelihood promoting activities. There are several mechanisms proposed for solving and or managing conflicts. These range from third party intervention; use of standing committees or ad-hoc groups within the country or region; use of dignified leaders within the region who are perceived wise and adept of understanding, use of head of states within the same region who are mentors (Koffi, 2010). In emphasizing on the importance of African solutions from within Africa, Kasomo (2010) reveals that religion can be used to arrest or mitigate conflicts in Africa. In other words, Africa is liable for the solvency of her problems, including conflicts.

Understanding farmers and pastoralists relations is a key to conflict management and resolution. This will improve understanding of the proximate and underlying causes of conflict, the behavioural patterns that are most conducive to provoking or avoiding conflict and the main mechanisms by which conflict between the groups are resolved or managed

(Davis, 2015). The method used in resolving conflict depends on the nature and the magnitude of the conflict. In all cases where conflict has been occasioned by crop destruction and where the offending pastoralist admit guilt; interpersonal agreement may be reached, depending on the extent of the damage, compensation (varying in amount) is often demanded and paid where minimal crops have been destroyed. This is a situation where pastoralists and crop farmers have co-habited for a long time. In such cases, the herdsmen speak the local language very fluently, thereby enhancing social integration and neighbourhood. There are other instances where pastoralist and farmer's interpersonal relationship is not very cordial; conflict arises if such situation is not usually resolved by personal intervention. The village head and the head of pastoralists are usually involved in settling the dispute.

The conflict between herdsmen and farmers in Nigeria, centred in the Middle Belt but spreading southward, has escalated sharply. Since September 2017, at least 1,500 people have been killed, over 1,300 of them from January to June 2018, roughly six times the number of civilians killed by Boko Haram over the same period. The first half of 2018 has seen more than 100 incidents of violence and more fatalities than any previous six-month period since the conflict started worsening in 2014. The surge of violence is concentrated in Plateau, Benue and Nasarawa states in the North Central geopolitical zone.

In Benue state, tension rose sharply after 1 November 2017, when a state government law against open grazing – thus prohibiting herdsmen' longstanding practice of letting their livestock forage unrestrained – took effect. From 1 to 7 January, armed men widely believed to be herdsmen angered by the law raided six farming villages across Logo and Guma local government areas, killing over 80 people. The attacks have continued with over 300 more killed in the state since then. Logo and Guma, largely populated by farmers of the Tiv ethnic group, suffered the highest death tolls. As these areas abut Nasarawa and Taraba states, locals

say attackers usually strike across the boundaries and retreat. Nasarawa state has also suffered an increase in violence involving both herdsmen and farmer militias. From January to June 2018, over 260 people were killed in several incidents, mostly in the southern zone covering Doma, Awe, Obi and Keana local government areas. Most of these killings followed the influx of herdsmen driven there by the Benue state anti-grazing law.

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Plateau state, which had been relatively peaceful for about two years, has witnessed renewed confrontations, with herdsmen and farmers trading blame as to who triggered the resurgence. One report claims that at least 75 people were killed, some 13,726 displaced and 489 houses burned down, largely in Bassa local government area, from 8 September to 17 October 2017. The violence continued into 2018: since January, over 300 people have been killed in attacks on villages in Bassa, Bokkos, Barkin Ladi, Riyom, Mangu and Jos South local government areas. The deadliest sequence of events was the 23-24 June attack on eleven villages in Barkin Ladi and subsequent reprisals on a highway, which altogether killed more than 200 people.

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North-eastern Adamawa state has seen recurrent clashes between Fulani herdsmen and farmers from the Bachama ethnic group. Tensions rose sharply after 20 November 2017, when Bachama youth militias attacked three Fulani herdsmen' settlements – Shaforon, Kikem and Kodemti – in Numan local government area, killing at least 55 people, including 48 children. That incident sparked Fulani reprisals in five Bachama villages in nearby Demsa local government area in the first week of December. Bachama leaders say over 100 people were killed, some allegedly by two Nigerian Air Force aircraft – an Alpha Jet and an EC135 attack helicopter – deployed to disperse Fulani fighters who were advancing upon Numan town. The air force rejected the allegation, insisting its mission was to fire “warning shots” at the “hideouts of miscreants”. It insisted its intervention caused no casualties and stopped the Fulani attackers from destroying Numan town. Vigorous police and military interventions in Adamawa stopped further major attacks, but killings continue on a smaller scale.

The conflict in Adamawa state aggravated longstanding herder-farmer tension in neighbouring Taraba state, where the state government was also proceeding with a plan to ban open grazing, then scheduled to take effect in January. From 4 to 17 January, Fulani and Bachama (and also Yandang, another farming group) fighters traded attacks on each other's settlements, killing at least 124 people and leaving many houses burned, hundreds of livestock stolen or slaughtered, and large farms destroyed, across four local government areas – Wukari, Gassol, Lau and Ibi. Dozens more have been killed in incidents since then, including over 70 who lost their lives from 5 to 8 July in violence between Fulani herdsmen and Yandang farmers in Lau local government area. Many farming and herding villages remain on edge.

This report examines the causes of the upsurge in violence and the federal and state governments' responses thus far, and outlines steps that all those involved can take to stop the bloodshed. It is based on interviews with government and security officials, representatives of herdsmen, farmers, religious and other civil society groups, in Makurdi, Benue state; Lafia, Nasarawa state; and the federal capital, Abuja, between January and June 2018. It updates Crisis Group's September 2017 report, *Herdsmen against Farmers: Nigeria's Expanding Deadly Conflict*.

The sparks for herder-farmer clashes tend to be disagreement over the use of land and water, livestock theft or the obstruction of traditional migration routes. But the conflict's roots lie in the – often forced – migration of herders south from their traditional grazing grounds in northern Nigeria. As drought and desertification have dried up springs and streams across Nigeria's far northern Sahelian belt, large numbers of herdsmen have had to search for alternative pastures and sources of water for their cattle. Insecurity in many northern states, due to the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East and under-reported rural banditry and

cattle rustling in other areas, has also driven herdsmen southward. So, too, has the encroachment of settlements, farms and ranches on lands designated as grazing reserves by the post-independence government of the former Northern region (now split into nineteen states).

As the herdsmen migrate into the savannah and rainforest of the central and southern states, they enter regions where high population growth over the last four decades has increased pressure on land. Not surprisingly, disputes over crop damage, water pollution and cattle theft have become more frequent. With the decline of traditional mediation mechanisms and in the absence of mutually accepted alternatives, such quarrels increasingly turn violent.

Two additional factors have aggravated the conflict. While the jihadist Boko Haram indiscriminately killed both Christians and Muslims, it also heightened religious sensitivities, leading mostly Christian southerners to resent the influx of predominantly Muslim herdsmen, which some southern and Middle Belt Christian leaders portray as an Islamising force. The growing availability of illicit firearms – locally produced, circulating from other Nigerian conflict zones in the North East and Niger Delta or smuggled in from other countries – has also enabled the carnage. Against this backdrop, the 2018 escalation is the result of three more immediate developments: the rise of militias, the persistence of impunity and the passage of grazing bans that are anathema to herdsmen.

No group – whether Bachama, Berom, Fulani, Tiv or any other – publicly admits it has an organised militia, but all decry inadequate government protection and insist on a right to self-defence. Most militias are backed by ethnic and communal leaders, including politicians, traditional rulers and even holy men, who justify their actions and shield them from arrest and prosecution. Militias and vigilantes are not new phenomena in the Middle Belt. Over the last decade, some of the region's so-called indigenous groups – including the Berom and Tarok of

Plateau state, the Eggon of Nasarawa state and the Jukun of Taraba state, all predominantly farming communities – reportedly formed militias and vigilante groups to fend off Fulani herdsmen whose cattle grazed in their fields. These groups sometimes worked hand in hand with traditional authorities and government security forces, but at others attacked herdsmen in retaliation for alleged damage to farms or to force the “strangers” out of their domains. Over time, some of these groups have evolved into more deadly organisations. One of the best known is the Ombatse, a so-called spiritual organisation among the Eggon, which ambushed police and other security operatives in May 2013, killing more than 100. Similarly, as disputes over grazing resources have increased, some herdsmen who initially acquired arms to drive away cattle rustlers have organised or engaged fighters to avenge real or perceived wrongs by farmers or to gain access to fresh pasture.

More recently, militias – both herder and farmer – have been operating in larger numbers than in the past, ranging from dozens to hundreds. In addition to mobilising larger numbers, their operations are no longer spontaneous but increasingly premeditated. The assailants are also now better armed, including with AK-47 and other assault rifles, and sometimes dressed in military fatigues. In December 2017, the army commander in Yola, Adamawa state, Brigadier General Muhammed Bello, said herdsmen intending to attack Bachama villages were so well armed that troops had to use rocket-propelled grenades to disperse them. The quality of the arms suggests the militias have well-heeled patrons. The nature of attacks has also changed, now increasingly taking the form of scorched-earth campaigns that kill scores, raze villages and burn down farms. Operating more audaciously, the militias now obstruct and engage security units sent to stop violence and, in some cases, kill police and troops. On 25 January, Bello reported militias in Adamawa had killed seven policemen and two soldiers since the preceding month. They have killed many more policemen since then.

Armed bandits, essentially criminal groups, operating along the border between Benue and Taraba states compound the insecurity. One such group is headed by Terwase Akwaza (also known as Ghana or Gana). He once claimed to lead a communal defence brigade, but his gang is known to have perpetrated several massacres in order to protect their cattle-rustling racket. On 23 January, Akwaza's men killed two riot police and torched two vehicles belonging to the Benue state governor's special adviser on security. Fulani and other herdsmen's groups say Akwaza's gang is responsible for attacks on farmers in the area that have been erroneously blamed on herdsmen. It is not clear how much bandits are adding to the rising death toll. What is certain is that their activities, including attacks on security personnel, impede efforts to quell farmer-herder violence.

Both farmers and herdsmen complain that their demands for justice for past criminal acts and warnings of imminent attacks get little or no response from federal authorities. For instance, the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association (MACBAN), a prominent herdsmen's group, alleges that the government has arrested no one in the murder of, according to its own statistics, about 1,000 Fulani herdsmen, including women and children, and the slaughter or theft of two million cattle, over the period June 2017-January 2018. In another case, the Fulani were dissatisfied with an investigative panel the Adamawa state government set up after the November 2017 killings of over 55 Fulani in attacks by Bachama youth militias in Numan. They said the panel fell short because it lacked judicial authority. A Fulani youth group, Jonde Jam Fulani Youth Association of Nigeria (JAFUYAN), vowed reprisals "if the federal government fails to act fast", saying speedy justice for the victims was "the only way to peace". The aggrieved Fulani soon attacked Bachama villages nearby.

Similarly, Benue Governor Samuel Ortom reported that in the late months of 2017 he sent several letters to President Buhari and federal security chiefs, alerting them to the danger of

herder militia strikes on farmers in his state. He said he received no response. The police inspector general claimed the governor's alerts did not reach him. The presidency said the letter it received did not "mention any threat to any specific one of the 23 local governments ... so the best the law enforcement agencies could do ... was to await information or intelligence of an imminent attack. None came". According to a news report, organisations representing the Tiv, Idoma and Iggede also issued alerts of impending attacks by herdsman.

The warnings may not have provided precise actionable intelligence, but they appear to have been sufficiently clear that, had police followed them up vigorously, they may have prevented some of the January attacks. Indeed, even without these notices, there are questions around whether the police and other security agencies should have been able to gather their own information on the herder militias' plans.

Until the violence escalated dramatically in January, the government's response to most incidents had been long on condemnations, condolences and vows to stop further killings, but short on effective preventive action. This apathy is in marked contrast to the Buhari administration's vigorous response to other real or perceived security threats, such as the Shiite group, the Islamic Movement in Nigeria, cattle rustlers in Zamfara state and secessionist agitators in the South East. In the Middle Belt and south, many believe that Buhari is inattentive to the killings because he himself is a Fulani and complicit in herdsman's attacks, a charge the president and his aides totally reject. Indeed, given that the government has been unable to curb the parallel escalation of armed banditry and killings in predominantly Muslim Zamfara state, the charge of pro-Fulani bias is unsustainable. The government's failure to either punish perpetrators of previous violence or respond to distress calls has, however, emboldened militias involved in herder-farmer violence.

The third proximate cause of the heightened herder-farmer tension is the introduction of open grazing bans in Benue and Taraba states. Most people in Benue reject any connection between the new state law, which bars herdsmen from letting their cattle graze where they please, and the escalation of violence. They argue, with some justification, that killings preceded the law and take place in states far from Benue where there is no such prohibition. But introduction of the law further strained relations between farmers and herdsmen.

Governor Ortom signed the Benue state law in May 2017, and it took effect on 1 November. The law permits livestock to graze only on ranches; requires people who rear livestock to buy land and establish ranches; prohibits movement of animals within the state except by rail or road; and spells out punishments, including five years' jail time or a 1 million naira (about \$3,000) fine, for anyone whose cattle are grazing outside a ranch. In other words, it outlaws the pastoralism practiced by many Fulani for generations. The Taraba state law, the provisions of which are largely the same, officially took effect on 24 January 2018. But acknowledging herdsmen's concerns and seeking to avoid the deadly consequences suffered in Benue state, the Taraba government first said it would phase in the transition from open grazing to ranching, and then, on 20 February, agreed to suspend enforcement of the law altogether.

The Benue and Taraba laws' main rationale, according to state governors, legislators and other political leaders, is to curb conflicts – as open grazing and the destruction of crops by trespassing cattle are major factors in farmer-herder violence. In Benue state, there were 49 violent incidents across fourteen of the 23 local government areas from 2012 to 2017. The state government argues that the only solution is to compel cattle owners to confine their herds to ranches. The Tiv, Idoma and Iggede farmers, who together constitute over 90 per cent of the Benue population and consider themselves indigenes, strongly supported the Benue

state law. Many organised rallies demanding or supporting its enforcement from 1 November. But Fulani and other herder organisations, notably MACBAN and Miyetti Allah Kautal Hore (MAKH), oppose the law, with MAKH mounting a court challenge. Their opposition is based on at least five counts.

First, herder and Fulani groups insisted that the state government did not consult them prior to enacting the law and that, as a result, the law does not accommodate their members' interests. The state government disputes that claim, pointing out that all groups were invited to relevant deliberations, that the state house of assembly held four public hearings (one each in Otukpo, Gboko and Katsina-Ala for the three senatorial zones and a final meeting in the state capital, Makurdi) about the bill and that a majority of lawmakers representing all constituencies in the state passed the law. As constituencies are demarcated by geography and population rather than ethnicity, and Fulani herdsmen are small minorities in all districts, this last contention is misleading.

Secondly, herdsmen' groups argued, with some justification, that the law allowed cattle owners and herdsmen no time to purchase land, establish ranches and confine their cattle. The state government countered that the six months from May 2017 (when the law was signed) to 1 November (when enforcement began) were enough time for herdsmen to adjust. Any call for an extension, it said, was probably just "a clever way of evading the law".

Thirdly, herdsmen protested the law as inimical to their centuries-old pastoralist culture. Saleh Alhassan, national secretary of the Fulani socio-cultural association MAKH, said: "Anti-grazing laws are nothing but populist agendas designed by visionless and desperate politicians to destroy our means of livelihood. These laws are oppressive and negative and are fundamentally against our culture as Fulani pastoralists". The government responded that

culture is dynamic and that practices violating the rights and harming the livelihoods of other groups sharing the same geographical space must be modified.

Fourthly, herdsmen said the law denies them their constitutional rights to free movement and residence in any part of the country. On this point, the state government maintained that constitutional rights apply to citizens, not animals, and that the state has a right to regulate economic activities, especially when these infringe upon the livelihoods of others.

Lastly, herdsmen argued that certain provisions of the law, such as the requirements that ranchers can lease but not buy land, and that they must renew their permits annually, are not designed to encourage ranching but to chase herdsmen out of Benue. Indeed, this claim is arguably their fundamental objection to the law.

Regardless, the Benue state government forged ahead. It established a Livestock Special Task Force headed by the special security adviser to the governor (retired Colonel Edwin Jando) with security agents, traditional rulers and technocrats as members. It created six “pilot ranches” that in reality were holding pens for seized livestock, and it transformed a 2,500-member state-wide vigilante group, known as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), into a law enforcement agency, officially designated as the Benue Livestock Guards.

The ban kept cattle herds off farms and saved crops from being eaten or trampled. But it posed great challenges for herdsmen. Some herdsmen said livestock guards seized roaming cattle, arbitrarily imposed penalties on their owners and extorted fines before releasing the animals. In remote locales, others said, bandits unaffiliated to the guards seized cattle arbitrarily under the pretext of enforcing the law. Complying with the law meant confining cattle in pens but, with no arrangements for production and supply of feed, herdsmen had to

start buying grass, rice chaff and water for their cattle, costs they had never borne before. One herder leader said: “The cattle business cannot be profitable if we have to bear these costs”. The MACBAN coordinator in Benue state, Garus Gololo, said the situation was “unfortunate and unacceptable”, blaming the law for the escalation of violence in January 2018.

The law prompted an exodus of herdsmen from Benue state to Nasarawa, Taraba and Cross River states. In Nasarawa, MACBAN leader Alhaji Musa Muahhed-Mati asserts that two million cows from Benue state had crossed into Awe local government area as of 3 November 2017. This figure is likely exaggerated: on the same 3 November, the Benue MACBAN leader said “about 3,000 herdsmen have moved to neighbouring states in Nasarawa and Taraba” and on 7 November, the Benue state governor’s special assistant on herdsmen’ matters, Alhaji Shehu Tambaya, said about 3,600 of the 6,000 herdsmen had left, along with some 10,000 of the 16,000 cattle owned by Fulani in the state. Regardless of these discrepancies, the sudden influx of thousands of cattle into Nasarawa state created new tensions between the predominantly Fulani herdsmen and the mostly Tiv farmers. In spite of the state government’s efforts, the mistrust soon degenerated into deadly violence.

The surge of attacks and counter-attacks has exacted heavy humanitarian and economic tolls, with potentially serious political and security repercussions. The humanitarian impact is particularly grave. From September 2017 through June 2018, farmer-herder violence left at least 1,500 people dead, many more wounded and about 300,000 displaced – an estimated 176,000 in Benue, about 100,000 in Nasarawa, over 100,000 in Plateau, about 19,000 in Taraba and an unknown number in Adamawa. Two thirds of these people have fled since January.

Some of the displaced are staying with kin in safer parts of their home states, but many are taking refuge in IDP camps, many located on school and church premises, and run by state emergency management agencies. Crisis Group visited two of the ten camps in Benue state and found appalling conditions: IDPs, mostly women and children, had severely inadequate shelter and food, and were at risk of communicable disease. The camps are overcrowded and lack safe drinking water; poor sanitation is compounded by open defecation. Six of the camps are housed in primary schools; in some cases, up to 100 people are jammed into a classroom while others sleep in the fields, at the mercy of rains and mosquitoes. In early April, at least seven children died from an outbreak of measles at the sprawling Abagena camp on the outskirts of the Benue state capital, Makurdi, which houses an estimated 35,000 people. Others have died of malaria and diarrhoea.

Women and children are particularly hard-hit, many having lost the male head of household, a huge loss in a largely patriarchal society. Some were raped by attackers. Thousands of pregnant women and nursing mothers in IDP camps have little or no health and sanitary facilities. As most camps have no perimeter fencing and sleeping spaces are not gender-segregated, girls and women are exposed to the risks of sexual harassment, assault and rape, both by outsiders and by fellow IDPs, and vulnerable to desperate survival mechanisms involving sexual exploitation. Many women and children are traumatised by the killings, raising concerns for their mental health, with possibly long-term effects.

Children's education has also been badly hurt: in April, the executive secretary of the Benue state Teaching Service Board, Wilfred Uji, reported that persistent attacks had forced 300,000 children out of school; and twelve of the state's 24 nomadic schools (special schools for pastoralist children) were shut down. In Nasarawa state, armed attacks and the establishment

of IDP camps have forced over 35 primary schools to close, interrupting the education of thousands of children.

The growing humanitarian challenge has almost overwhelmed the capacities of state emergency management agencies. Particularly in Benue and Plateau, the state governments' resources are badly overstretched, undercutting their ability to provide medical care, food, clothing and infrastructure in the camps. Dickson Tarkighir, the member of the House of Representatives from the Makurdi/Guma constituency, said: "Our people are starving to death in their own land, and the irony is that we are farmers". On 18 July, the World Health Organization announced plans to build makeshift clinics and provide routine immunisation for children under five years old in the Plateau state camps. But much more needs to be done to meet the IDPs' food, health care, water and sanitation needs, particularly in Benue and Plateau states. Without scaled-up assistance, the ongoing rainy season (May to September), by limiting access to remote areas and heightening health risks, is likely to worsen the IDPs' plight.

If the escalating violence has brought a heavy human cost, its impact on local economies is also significant. Population displacements and continuing insecurity have disrupted agriculture in parts of Adamawa, Benue, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba states. Thousands of herdsmen displaced from Benue state cannot find enough fodder for their herds in Nasarawa state, as the cattle multiply and graze all the pastures bare. Thousands of farmers, fearing attacks, are unable to work their farms. In Benue, Nasarawa and Taraba states, food production is variously estimated to drop by 33 per cent to 65 per cent in 2018 as a result of attacks and population displacement in farming villages. This predicament, in states that make up much of Nigeria's breadbasket, could affect food production nationwide, drive up

already high food prices and imperil businesses related to agriculture. It may also deepen already widespread rural poverty in the North Central geopolitical zone.

The rising violence is encouraging the formation of armed community defence groups and ethnic militias. Across the Middle Belt and southern zones, several youth, farmers' and other groups have said they will resist any further influx of herdsmen and asked governors for logistical support in doing so. The prevailing insecurity could aggravate arms proliferation, already a major national concern.

The conflict is placing further strain on the already stressed police, military and other security forces. The army, deployed in internal security operations in virtually all of the Nigerian federation's 36 states, has insufficient men to ward off Boko Haram insurgents, particularly in Borno state. The deployment of more police and soldiers to states afflicted by the escalating farmer-herder violence, admittedly a necessity, is further stretching resources that could have been concentrated on countering the insurgency in the North East, possibly prolonging insecurity in that region.

The spiralling violence has eroded public confidence in the government's military and other security agencies, leading to calls for Buhari to sack his military and security chiefs. On 24 January, the Situation Room, a coalition of over 70 civil society organisations, issued a statement lamenting that the "Nigerian nation appears to be descending into chaos" and the security agencies "have exhibited unparalleled incapacity and incompetence to deal with the problem". It called on Buhari to hold his security chiefs accountable for failing to protect citizens, punish incompetence and urgently revamp the nation's security apparatus. Since then, many others, including retired senior military officers, have joined the call for new security chiefs who may respond to the violence more effectively. A herdsmen' group opposed these demands, however, saying "people calling for the removal of service chiefs are

either the corrupt politicians or the ones working for them”. So far, Buhari has not complied with the calls.

Moreover, with most of the military and other security agencies headed by officers from the North East and North West, many in the central and southern states believe the security establishment is biased. This perception may not be correct, but it has heightened demands from the Middle Belt and south for greater regional balance and inclusiveness in the National Security Council, which they claim would enable it to respond to the farmer-herder conflict more effectively.

The military’s deepening involvement in managing the conflict could also tarnish its image. For instance, in Adamawa state, where the air force was deployed in December 2017, the Bachama and Bwatiye, locked in conflict with Fulani herdsmen, claim warplanes sent to prevent Fulani attacks on their villages instead fired rockets upon the villagers. The air force strongly denied the charge, though some security sources told Crisis Group the villages were hit in error. On 24 March 2018, Theophilus Danjuma, a retired lieutenant general and one of the army’s most revered former chiefs, accused the armed forces of complicity in “ethnic cleansing”, urging citizens to rise and defend themselves. The army rejected the accusation and launched an internal investigation that reported it found no evidence of collusion or other wrongdoing. A senior Adamawa state government official claimed that report lacked credibility, as “the army made itself the judge in its own case”. In effect, the army’s public image – or at least that of local units – is being impaired by the conflict.

2.2.8 Lessons from Resolution of Farmers-Herdsmen Conflict in Argentina and Tanzania

Argentina is chosen because it depicts a developing country where effective and comprehensive government intervention towards resolving emerging farmers-herdsmen

conflict averted long term implications to its economy and national security. Tanzania is also chosen because it is an African country whose herdsmen communities have nomadic characteristics similar to Fulani herdsmen. The management of the conflict in these countries could provide useful lessons for this study.

2.2.8.1 Farmers-Herdsmen Conflict in Argentina

Argentina operates a well-established agricultural livestock management system. Pastoral livestock contribute significantly to the country's economy. Argentina is a major exporter of beef, milk, wool and hides. These livestock products contribute about 12 per cent to the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 25 per cent of its foreign exchange earnings (Davies & Hatfield, 2007). Pastoralism activities are concentrated in the Andes Region which has fertile grassland that is also suitable for farming. The major livestock include cattle, sheep and guanaco.

From 1990 – 1995, disagreements over access to grassland pastures between the farmers and pastoralist generated conflicts in the Andean regions that disrupted the Argentine economy and threatened its national security. Although human casualty in the conflict was low, the material losses included the destruction of millions of dollars' worth of farm produce, as well as the killing of over 100,000 livestock (Barrionuevo, 2008). The effect of the conflict was a reduction in livestock produce export by over 50 per cent, which adversely affected the Argentine economy as well as its food security thereby threatening national security. Government therefore took measures to resolve the conflicts for the enhancement of national security.

The Argentine Government responded, in the face of dwindling economic resources and national security threats, by instituting new land ownership policies, as well as guanaco conservation laws (Sili & Soumoulou, 2011). The new policies granted permanent land

ownership rights to pastoralists which was not available then due to the consideration that pastoralists were nomadic communities who only needed temporary land ownership. This measure delineated land accessibility between farmers and pastoralists which reduced competition for land between them, thus forestalling farmers-herdsmen conflict for the enhancement of Argentina's national security.

The Argentine Government's efforts to implement its new land ownership policies and guanaco conservation laws were confronted with several challenges. The major challenges however, were the dearth of sufficient grazing land for all pastoralist communities and the need for access to water (World Report, 2017). The Argentine Government addressed both challenges by investing extensively in the construction of irrigation channels to develop new grasslands in semi-arid areas, which also provided water for livestock needs.

2.2.8.2 Farmers-Herdsmen Conflict in Tanzania

Farmers-herdsmen conflict was prevalent in the Hai District of the Kilimanjaro Region between 1995 and 2009. During this period, drought conditions in the region forced pastoral Massai tribesmen to migrate southwards to territories occupied by farming tribes such as Chagga and Pare (Campbel, *et al*, 2003). The ensuing struggle for land resources, compounded by long-standing socio-cultural prejudices generated tribal conflicts between the Massai and various farming tribes. The conflicts led to widespread destruction of farmland and livestock, as well as loss of lives thus threatening Tanzania's national security.

Between 1996 and 2005, the Tanzanian Government instituted several measures to resolve the conflicts. These measures include the demarcation of grazing land from farming areas and the institution of fines for encroachment by either parties, as well as the establishment of various panels to mediate conflicts (World Report, 2017). However, these measures only achieved limited success as the conflicts persisted. In 2009, a group of Tanzanian scholars

and opinion leaders in collaboration with local and international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) initiated measures to resolve the conflicts in the Hai District of Tanzania (The Earth Institute, 2012). In this regard, the group employed a holistic approach targeted towards addressing the concerns of all stakeholders in the conflict. The resolution strategy also involved the identification and addressing of socio-cultural prejudices, identification of key conflict mitigation agents, as well as bridging communication gaps among conflicting parties through cooperation initiatives. The implementation of these strategies facilitated the restoration of lasting peace in the Hai District in 2011, thus enhancing Tanzania's national security.

The initiative to resolve farmers-herdsmen conflict in the Hai District was confronted with several challenges. The key challenges were the lack of trust by the various stakeholders and the unwillingness to adhere to resolutions on cessation of encroachment (Campbel *et al*, 2003). These challenges were mitigated by the inclusion of foreign observers into the group drawn from international NGOs and the strict enforcement of fines for encroachment. Furthermore, community incentives were instituted to reward acceptable conduct such as reporting of encroachment to security agencies rather than confronting encroachers.

The lessons from the resolution of farmers-herdsmen conflict in Argentina and Tanzania include the holistic approach to farmers-herdsmen conflicts, strict law enforcement and elimination of socio-cultural barriers. These are discussed subsequently.

2.2.9 National Security Strategy (NSS)

According to Backgrounder (2004), a national security strategy is a guide to action for the government. It is not a law, but its implementation may require changes in the legal framework that regulated the provision of security, management of security and oversight of

security. Thus, a national security strategy offers an opportunity to apply the principle of good governance to the security segment.

National security strategies put into consideration national interests and values, governance structures and decision-making processes that usually lead to a long-term vision of state and human security in the future. Thus, a national security strategy should reflect, not only the point of view of the current government and other states institutions, but also those of the people whose opinions are determined through democratic representation. A national security strategy may also be drafted on ad-hoc basis as the need arises. Four steps in formulating a national security strategy are: (1) initiation which involves agreement on scope and wellbeing raising a public awareness on the process, (2) consultation and drafting which will involve undertaking national dialogue and assessments, (3) review and reconciliation which will include reconciling differing views, (4) approval and dissemination which includes seeking executive approval.

NSS further contends that national security strategy provides a strategic framework for security oversight, coordination, alignment and guidance. For all key security sector agencies, all government departments and agencies, private sector and civil society organizations are covered in the national security strategy. National security strategy is expected to be aligned in such a way that scarce resources allocated to improving the national security are spent in a coordinated, realistic, cost effective and accountable manner.

Backgrounder (2004) also pointed out that a national security strategy is expected to guide the state in providing state and human security. It is intended to provide an overarching national vision as the basis for the development of other documents like a national security strategy or subsector plan. A national security strategy can take the form of a single document, but it can also be reflected in a collection of existing documents that together

compose a coherent integrated strategy. A national security strategy is defined by the purpose it served and not by its title. National security strategy can also be called a plan, strategy, concept, among others.

Threat to National Security observed that national security strategy is an official report of how a state wishes to provide its security and the security of its citizenry. It tries to establish a national understanding of the threat and risks of the security atmosphere, and the values and principles. National security is a state or condition where most cherished values and beliefs, democratic way of life, institutions of governance, unity, welfare and wellbeing as a nation and people are permanently protected and continuously enhanced. Fundamental elements of national security are: Socio-economic stability; territorial integrity; economic solidarity and strength; ecological balance; cultural cohesiveness; moral-spiritual consensus; and external peace.

2.2.9.1 Existing Laws on National Security in Nigeria

Law is defined as a system of rules created and carried out through social or governmental functions in order to regulate behaviour in the society. Essentially, Otto and Ukpere (2012) defined laws as a system help to regulate and ensure that community shows respect and equality among themselves. On the other hand, existing laws refer to laws that are currently in existence.

Law Nigeria opined that one of the existing laws on national security in Nigeria is the National Security Agencies Act. This Act provides for the disbandment of the Nigeria Security Organization, and replaces it with three security agencies. Each of the security agencies was given the duty of conducting relevant area of the national security as well as other related matters. To be sure, this law commenced on June 5, 1986. Specifically, the Act established the following security agencies:

1. Defence intelligence Agency (DIA);
2. National Intelligence Agency (NIA); and
3. The State Security Service (SSS).

Law Nigeria further asserted that the duties of the DIA includes prevention and detection of crime related to military threat against Nigeria; protection and preservation of all army classified documents or secrets that are related to both domestic and international security threats; and carry out related duties that may be assigned to the agency from time to time by the President or the Chief of Defence Staff. The NIA is charged with the duty of the general maintenance of the security of Nigeria outside of the borders of the country relating to issues that are outside of military issues; carry out such other duties that affects national intelligence cross the national borders as the National Security Adviser or the President may direct from time to time. The SSS is charged with the duty of prevention and detection of any crime against international security within Nigeria; protection and preservation of all non-military classified matters that are related to internal security; and protection and preservation of classified matters not related to the military and as may be determined, from time to time, by the President or by the National Assembly (Otto & Ukpere, 2012).

The Act also made provision in Section 1, sub-sections (1) (2) and (3) of the foregoing section that the Act has effect notwithstanding the provisions of any law that may be contrary to it or any other matter mentioned in the Act. Classified matters in this section is synonymous the provision of Section 9 of the Official Secrets Act. To pave the way for the coordination of intelligence activities in the country in line with Section 1 of the Act, the President shall appoint a National Security Coordinator. The person for this office shall be a

Principal Officer in the Office of the President. Section 7 (1) of the Act talked about transfer staff, posting staff, especially transfer and posting of the existing staff of the Nigerian Security Organization Act, 1976. Again, the composition, membership, and appointment to the Advisory Council for the National Security Agencies Act is regulated by Section 5(1) of the Act. Ogah (2019) is of the view that the Police Act and Regulation (CAP. PIa-LFN, 2004), The Robbery and Fire Arms Act (CAP. PTILFN) as well as the Fire Arms Act (LFN) CAP. F28, 2004) work to maintain security in Nigeria through maintenance of law and order.

Again, Section 29 (1) of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act of 2003 provides that without prejudice to any other law, the relevant law enforcement agency with the approval of the Attorney General of the Federation may with the approval of the coordinator of the National Security order for interception of communication in order to prevent terrorism. Section 29 (2) of the Act

orders the Judge before whom an ex parte application is made to with respect to terrorism matters to require the communication service provider to allow relevant law enforcement agency to execute covert operations in relation to an identified or supposed terrorist groups or persons for the purpose of gathering intelligence.

Ogah (2019) further opined that Section 29 (3) of the Nigerian Act requires such ex-parte order to “specify” the maximum time for which a communication service provider could be required to retain communications data. Section 29 (4) allows admissibility of such intercepted evidence if it is generated from abroad. The Nigerian Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment Act) 2013, has, in Section 1 A, made the office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) the coordinating body for all security and enforcement agencies under the Act. Section 2 (6) of the foregoing Act provides that law enforcement agencies may initiate, develop or improve on specific training programmes for its officers who are responsible for

prevention, detention, investigation, elimination and prosecution of terrorism activities in Nigeria.

Section 38 of the same Act as amended by Section 18 of the 2013 Act mandates the Nigerian Immigration Service to refuse an application for refugee status if the applicant is a terrorist. Sabastine (2017) is of the view that Section 3 (1) (b) (c) and (d) of the Nigerian Security and Defence Corps Act 2004 as amended by the Nigerian Security and Defence Corps (Amendment) Act, 2007. This Act provides, amongst other things that it is the duty of the aforementioned organization to monitor and supervise the activities of all private guard companies and keep a register for that purpose or seal up any security guard company that operates without a license.

2.2.9.2 Extant Policies on National Security in Nigeria

Bello (2017) submitted that governments across the world have to take various measures they deem crucial to enhance national security and insulate themselves from threats and attacks. Some of the national security measures taken by states are tough, while others may even be seen as funny and harmful to enjoyment of all the people. The measures taken by the government to checkmate security challenges can only arise after the government has detected a threat/problem that needs to be addressed. Essentially, public strategy is used as an instrument for tackling of national security concerns, concerns relating to government responsibilities such as protecting lives and properties of the people. The role of the public strategy process in matters of national security cannot be overemphasized because of the crucial role it plays in identifying problems, deciding on what measures to take to address the problem, assessing if the measures are effective or not, as well as in monitoring and implementation of the measures.

Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (2017) asserted that the National Security Strategy (NSS) was launched by former President Goodluck Jonathan. The NSS is a framework for a holistic and more coordinated approach and response to security concerns in the country. It identifies major security issues and assigns roles as well as responsibilities to the government, civil society, private agencies and individuals in addressing identified concerns. The NSS equally includes counter-terrorism and cyber security strategy.

Teniola (2016) observed that former President Olusegun Obasanjo's strategy focused on bringing together of the security interests in individuals, communities, ethnic nationalities, political groups and institutions that are located within Nigeria. Thus, the national security strategy focused on ensuring safety of Nigerians domestically and internationally and to ensure the protection of the sovereignty of the country. It is important to point out here that while this gives force to the fulfilment of these responsibilities by the government, the broad concept of national security requires the cooperation and participation of all stakeholders in ensuring security. The main objective of national security is to contain instability, control crime, eliminate corruption, and enhance genuine development, progress and growth. It also aimed at improvement of the welfare and well-being as well as quality of every citizen. The provisions of the Money Laundering Act of 2011 have vested powers over financial intelligence in the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), yet no concrete provision in that act focused on tracking, analysing and disseminating financial intelligence reports. Thus, the Nigerian legislation against organized crime is grossly inadequate and lacks bite to stem the tide of rapidly ravaging scourges³⁶.

2.2.9.3 Examination of Relevant Provisions of National Security in Nigeria

The purpose of national security in the country is to uphold critical national values, especially values related to survival, self-preservation and collective advancement. The national security strategy of Nigeria since 1960 has been tied to the issue of dealing with the problem of external aggression and addressing the problem of internal upheavals. Under such arrangement, the state and military power were the main focus. However, while the rest of the world now recognizes other variables that affect national security, Nigeria continues to adhere to an outdated model of national security. In the United States, Canada, and Europe, national security means national power and it is handled as such. This was eventually expanded to include economic concerns and even other concerns.

The national security tools or apparatus and agenda have been constantly attacked. In many instances, nefarious gangs and persons have committed crimes against various groups in the Nigerian society. In many places in the country, especially in Jos, Plateau State, and Maiduguri, Borno State, there have been incessant ethnic/religious conflicts. The foregoing is an attack on the ability of the Nigerian government to carry out its basic function, which is to provide robust security for the people and to protect properties of the citizenry.

The Global Agenda for Development opined that the first national security strategy in Nigeria which essentially centred on how to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat terrorism in the country was adopted during the administration of former President Goodluck Jonathan. It was drafted by the National Defence College (N.D.C.) in Abuja. That aside, the Nigerian strategy on counter-insurgency and terrorism is grossly deficient as it lacks focus and robust content. For example, the word “may” in the provision is advisory, not mandatory. Unlike what is obtainable in the United States model, the office that coordinates intelligence on counterterrorism in Nigeria is excluded from the training exercises of security officials;

instead the exercise is left in the hands of public security agencies. This is not likely to ensure security in the country.

Section 37 of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act of 2011 has merely made provisions mandating the Nigeria Immigration Service to prevent entering into Nigeria persons reasonably suspected of terrorism. This provision is not strong enough to prevent acts of terrorism in Nigeria. On the contrary, the United States Immigration Provision in Section 5402, which has been amended in Section 237 (a) (4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, to modulate deportation of aliens who have received military-related training from terrorist organization made elaborate provisions on that. Again, there is no such elaborate provision under Nigeria's law.

The Nigerian strategy made the ONSA a coordinator of the security of National Security in the country. However, the ONSA is too limited both in resources and other important things to singlehandedly coordinate all that are connected to anti-terrorism in Nigeria. In the United States, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Treasury, the Secretary of Defence, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, together with Director of National Intelligence converge under one platform known as the Joint Intelligence Community Council to tackle issues of terrorism. Again, even if a National Counterterrorism Centre is to be established in Nigeria, National Intelligence Centres should be established in each of the six geo-political zones in the country. This will, to a large extent, improve on intelligence gathering and sharing in the country, which is critical to fighting terrorism.

Nigeria always relies on budgeting money for security, which in most cases is siphoned into private bank accounts. That aside, Nigeria budget money for security every year for both recurrent and capital expenditures to the various security organizations in the country including the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian Police Force, Department for State Security,

National Intelligence Agency, Defence Intelligence Agency, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, Fire Service, Nigerian Immigration Service, Nigerian Customs Service, Nigerian Prisons Service, amongst others. Mere budgetary allocation is not enough to solve security challenges facing the country.

2.10 Farmers-Herdsmen Conflicts and Human Security

Bellamy (2011) view it as a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur (“Human Security”). He added that security might be considered as too militaristic but without security, it would be impossible to provide peace and develop human rights and economic welfare. Moreover, security to him is about the survival of humans and the prevention of wars, killings, massacres. Security could be generally classified according to their levels of operational analysis. State-to-state level of analysis deals with security issues between states. This type of analysis is especially important for scholars who are close to Realist school of thought, since they believe that nation states are the primary actors in international relations and they claim to be the ultimate authority in resolving conflicts between them (Bellamy, 2011). The state and transnational civil society (trans-state security) level of analysis is interested in relationships between state and nonstate elements and that within non-state elements and more available for scholars close to Liberal school of thought (Bellamy, 2011). The third level of analysis is international security which focuses on the relations between international and supranational organizations such as NATO, Warsaw Treaty Organization, EU etc. and states. International security studies try to develop a macro level analysis.

Similarly, the United Nations Development Programme has distinguished seven dimensions of human security to include:

- a. Economic security which assure every individual a minimum requisite income.

- b. Food security that emphasizes guarantee of physical and economic access to basic foodstuffs.
- c. Health security which is the guarantee of minimum protection from disease and unhealthy lifestyles.
- d. Environmental security that protect people from the short- and long-term ravages of nature, man-made threats in nature, and deterioration of the natural environment.
- e. Personal security, protecting people from physical violence.
- f. Community security for the protection of people from loss of traditional relationships and values and from sectarian and ethnic violence.
- g. Political security to ensure that people live in a society that honours their basic human rights (24–33). Consequently, human security as conceived by UNDP moves the focus away from states and towards individuals. It emphasizes human rights, safety from violence, and sustainable development.

Economic Security

Whatever the causes of Fulani herdsmen/farmers conflicts are, it is evident that the conflicts have been of great negative implications. According to research conducted by Bello (2013) on “Herdsmen and Farmers Conflicts in North-Eastern Nigeria: Causes and Repercussions” listed some of these negative consequences as ranging from economic repercussions such as loss of income through resources due to poor yield. According to this research, material losses and resources were, however, more widespread among farmers with income loss having the highest relative incidence among farmers, followed by loss of yield, household resources and stored products. On the part of herdsmen, losses – whether material or not, were minimal. In point of fact, 13.6%, 26.7%, 4.1%, and 3.6% of herdsmen claimed to have

suffered losses in respect of their, income, yield, stored products and household resources respectively (Bello, 2013).

From this research, it was observed that both farmers and herders incur losses owing to these conflicts, however, losses suffered by herdsmen were generally far less than those for farmers, meaning that farmers experienced more losses than the herdsmen. Findings confirm the positions of other researchers such as Ajayi and Allagenyi (2001) who agreed that effective and sustainable service delivery is normally affected by the quality of family life. They maintained that organizational factors in sustaining extension service delivery is enhanced through good family life devoid of instability and security (Ajayi & Allagenyi, 2001).

The implication of this development is that both farmers and herdsmen suffered several negative socio-psychological consequences relating to their respective family lives. Consequently, it becomes evidently clear that whatever happens at work could affect what happens at home. This affirmed the position of Potter, B.A. that, it is hardly possible to find a frustrated person at work that is energized at home (44). These effects were, however, found to be more pronounced among the farmers than herdsmen, probably due to the fact that farmers suffered more losses than herdsmen.

Food Security

Food security can be described as the condition in which a person have access to good, quality and sufficient food to consume in order to live healthy and productive life. United States Agency for International Development. (USAID) Bureau for Africa, defined food security as a situation “When all people at all times have physical, social and economic

access to sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a productive and healthy life” (Eme, Onyishi & Uche, 2004). Eme, *et. al.* (2004) added that food security is dependent on agricultural production, food imports and donations, employment opportunities and income earnings, intra-household decision-making and resource allocation, health care utilization and caring practices (55).

In a research conducted by Apenda (2011) on “An Assessment of the Impact of Farmers-Herders Conflict on Food Security in Benue State observed that these conflicts possess a great threat to food security. Following the data collected and analysed on socio-economic variables, the study found that the conflicts have negative impact on agricultural production activities in Benue State. It has affected the farmer's output in the study area. The research showed the agricultural output of the sampled respondents before and during Fulani herdsmen attack on Tiv farmers in Benue state (Apenda, 2011).

It is evident from the study that majority (87.5%) of the respondents have agricultural output of less than or equal to ₦100 000 during the Fulani herdsmen attack on Tiv farmers while 12.5% of the respondents have agricultural output of between ₦ 100 001 and ₦200 000 but no percentage of the respondents that have agricultural output of neither between ₦ 200 000 and ₦ 300 000 nor above ₦300 000 during the Fulani attack. Before the Fulani attack, the agricultural output of the sampled respondents showed 51.6% of the sampled respondent's agricultural output of above ₦300 000 as compared to the 0% when the respondents had been attacked by Fulani herdsmen. The percentage of those who have agricultural output of between ₦200 001 and ₦300 000 rose from 0% to 25% while the percentage of those with agricultural output of below ₦100,000 has increased during the Fulani herdsmen attack which indicate an increase in the agricultural output of the respondents during the times of no conflict (Apenda, 2011).

2.3 Theoretical Framework

The study is anchored on Political Ecology Theory, however, the Frustration and Aggression theory, Eco-Violence Theory and the Relative Deprivation Theory are support theories to analysed the conflicts between farmers-herdsmen and national security in Nigeria.

2.3.1 Political Ecology Theory (PET)

The Theory of Political Ecology was propounded by Eric Wolf in 1972 (Wolf, 1972). The theory asserts the political dynamics surrounding material struggles over the environment, particularly in developing countries. The theory of political ecology uncovers the root cause of conflicts between farmers and herdsmen, advocating that these conflicts are caused by changes in or limited access to natural resources, as well as policies that determine land use (Okoli & Altelhe, 2014). Political ecology deduces that conflicts between farmers and herdsmen arise due to imbalance in the rights to access, rather than the lack of resources due to natural causes such as population or climate change. Through this theory it could be deduced that addressing socio-political and cultural imbalances in the allocation and utilization of land resources would curb farmers-herdsmen conflict thereby enhancing national security.

The main strength of the theory of political ecology lies in its success in contextualizing political and ecological explanations of human behaviour (Quandt, 2016). It explains how human reactions to environmental events are rooted in political undertones and sees environmental conflicts as both a cause and effect of social marginalization. An understanding of the theory of political ecology could therefore be useful in designing measures to curb farmers-herdsmen conflict. Despite its strengths, this theory also has some weaknesses which are discussed subsequently.

The significant weakness of the theory of political ecology, which elicits criticisms, is that the theory may not be fully applicable in a world where political decisions are dominated by a global capitalist system (Homer-Dixon, 1999). The theory is considered problematic as long as there is resistance to Marxist theories. It can, thus, be inferred that any society governed by capitalist ideals would always harbour political, social and economic imbalances. However, the relevance of the theory to this study is discussed subsequently.

2.3.2 Frustration and Aggression Theory (F-A)

This theory was originally conceived by Dollard and Miller (1939) but later substantially refined by Berkowitz in 1969. The theory states that aggression is an outcome or result of blocking or frustrating a person's efforts towards a certain goal (Dollard, 1939; as cited in Myers, 2007). The theory further posits that frustration caused by interference in goal-directed activity produces a 'readiness' for aggression which if 'triggered' can result in aggressive response. According to Rationis (2014), the trigger could be an insignificant element of behaviour, such as a casual joke, gesture or mild criticism which would normally be overlooked, but to the frustrated individual who is already waiting for an opportunity to show his frustration it may provoke aggressive response or reprisal.

In application to this study, the goal or aim of every farmer during planting season is to have bountiful harvest, then sell the farm produce and make profits. On the other hand, the herdsmen would always want to have well fed and healthy cattle and be able to make profits as well. When any of these expectations was not realizable, either by the herd (cattle) eating up and destroying the farmers' crops or that the farmer encroached on grazing reserves or use water reserved for cattle to irrigate their farms, aggression would be triggered. Either of the parties that felt frustrated to achieving their economic goals may decide to reprise as to show their displeasure and as a result conflict will occur.

Furthermore, a clear readiness for aggression could be likened to the Fulanis' justification on why they attacked ten Agatu communities of Benue State on February 10th 2016 and massacred hundreds of persons. According to the leader of the Gan Allah Fulanis Association, the conflict was a reprisal attack against the killing of their prominent son by the people of Agatu who stole his cattle in April 2013 (Mayah, Tukur & Adebayo, 2016). This scenario depicts three years of frustration or grudge against the Agatus and perhaps repeated unsuccessful plots for attack, until the farmers' reaction on crops destruction by the herds triggered the aggression from the herdsmen.

Frustration-Aggression Theory will be adopted as part of the workable theories because it explains the reason for conflict. When individual expectation is not met, he can easily be frustrated and once he is frustrated, he will exhibit hostile behaviour which will lead to aggression hence result to conflict which is the situation between farmers and herdsmen in Benue State due to frequent failure of peace accord between farmers and herdsmen.

2.3.3 The Eco-Violence Theory

Homer-Dixon (1999) developed the theory of eco-violence which seeks to explicate the relationship between environmental factors and violent conflicts. Its basic assumptions are (a) decrease in the quality and quantity of renewable resources, population growth, (b) resource access acting singly or in various combinations to increase the scarcity, for certain population groups, of cropland, water, forests, and fish, thereby reducing economic productivity, both for the local groups experiencing the scarcity and for the larger regional and national economies, and (c) the affected people may migrate or be expelled to new lands, thereby triggering ethnic conflicts when they move to new areas, while decreases in wealth cause deprivation conflicts (Homer-Dixon, 1999).

Competition over scarce ecological resources has been aggravated in contemporary times owing to the impacts of climate change, which has exacerbated ecological scarcity across the world (Blench, 2004; Onuoha, 2007), thereby engendering violent conflicts. Therefore, the theory offers insights into the nature and dynamics of the arable land, resource conflict and underdevelopment indications in Nigeria. The pressure over arable land and the attendant resource conflicts get worse amidst ever shrinking resources, livelihood crisis, and imminent policy deficiencies on grazing and pastoral governance by Nigerian leaders. Increasing population growth rate has continued to exert great pressure on available land resources with varying environmental and socio-economic implications (Dietz, Ruben & Verhagen, 2001; Tarhule & Lamb, 2003; Fiki & Lee, 2004).

Farmer-herdsmen conflict has remained the most preponderant resource-use conflict in Nigeria (Ajuwon, 2004; Fasona & Omojola, 2005). The necessity to provide food of crop and animal origin, as well as raw materials for industry and export in order to meet ever growing demands, has exerted more pressure on land (Nyong & Fiki, 2005). The competition between these two agricultural land user-groups, however, has often times turned into serious overt and covert manifestation of hostilities and social friction in many parts of Nigeria. The conflicts have demonstrated high potential to exacerbate the insecurity and food crisis particularly in rural communities where most of the conflicts are localized, with reverberating consequences nationwide. According to de Haan (2002), destruction of crops by cattle and other property (irrigation equipment and infrastructure) by the pastoralists themselves are the main direct causes for conflicts cited by the farmers, whereas burning of rangelands and fadama and blockage of stock routes and water points by crop encroachment are important direct reasons cited by the pastoralists.

Haan (2002) reported that the key underlying causes of farmer-herdsmen conflict in Nigeria are: changing resource access rights, whereby traditional access rights to communal grazing and water resources are being obstructed by the individual tenure ship of arable farmers. This is particularly severe on the traditional trek routes, which become favourite cropping sites because of their better soil fertility resulting from the concentration of animal manure from the trekking herds in these areas. Within the fadama areas, this is exacerbated by the fragmented nature of the crop plots, which makes prevention of animals straying in the crop plots difficult. Inadequacy of grazing resources, as increasing crop cultivation (and increasing commercialization of the crop-residues) and poor management of the existing grazing reserves have resulted in a significant reduction in available livestock feed resources, in particular in the Northern States. Moreover, the high value crops introduced by NFDP (tomatoes and onions) produce almost no crop-residues for livestock feeding. Finally, the regulation that twenty percent of the fadama would need to be set aside for grazing has not been adhered to.

Decline in internal discipline and social cohesion, as the adherence to the traditional rules regarding grazing periods, and the authority of the traditional rulers is breaking down. This is exacerbated by increased rent seeking of the formal and traditional authorities in managing resource access. Resource conflict amongst farmers and herdsmen has increased in recent time in the middle belt and southern zones of Nigeria. Policy gaps and underdevelopment of grazing lands have been blamed for this worsening arable land resource conflict. Land ownership and utilization have directly and indirectly defined the dimensions of most agricultural land conflicts, which are becoming fiercer and increasingly widespread in Nigeria, largely due to increasing production activities for the increasing human population (Gefu & Kolawole, 2005; Fasona & Omojola, 2005).

Mutual fear of deep-rooted hostility exists among the Fulani herdsmen and host farmers. The age-old problem escalated in the last decade and has assumed a violent dimension whereby communities are being internally displaced, lives and property are being lost while hunger and insecurity have become the order of the day. The conflicts occur when Fulani herdsmen move into non-Fulani homelands with their cattle. This usually leads to the destruction of farm crops. Thus, the herdsmen provoke their victims to acts of communal and individual resistance (preventing entry into farms, killing or stealing cattle, or poisoning fields). In response, the herdsmen wage deadly attacks on host communities.

The theoretical significance of this theory is its ability to concisely explain the reasons for violent conflict between the farmers and herdsmen. Environmental conflict from the perspective of this theory is a product of the frustration of herdsmen as a result of severe ecological changes and Boko Haram incessant attacks in their home state with the resultant effects such as the death of many cattle which are their most treasured possession, cattle rustling and migration to the south. All of which makes the herdsmen put on aggressive behaviour which is a derivative of the previous frustration they have encountered as a result of grazing in the face of adverse weather condition, scarcity of environmental resources and security threats from Boko Haram attacks. Therefore, the destruction of farm crops, properties, houses and massive death toll that perpetually fill up the front-page of the national dailies are the product of aggression that evolves from frustration and sense of deep loss on the side of the herdsmen.

The theory of eco-violence is an emerging theoretical construct seeking to explicate the relationship between environmental factors and violent conflicts (Onuoha, 2007). Developed by Homer-Dixon (1999), the theory holds thus: Decreased in the quality and quantity of renewable resources, population growth, and resource access act singly or in various

combinations to increase the scarcity, for certain population groups, of cropland, water, forests, and fish. This can reduce economic productivity, both for the local groups experiencing the scarcity and for the larger regional and national economies. The affected people may migrate or be expelled to new lands. Migrating groups often trigger ethnic conflicts when they move to new areas, while decreases in wealth can cause deprivation conflicts (Homer-Dixon, 1999).

Implicit in the eco-violence theory is the assumption that competition over scarce ecological resources engenders violent conflict. This trend has been aggravated in contemporary times owing to the impacts of climate change, which has exacerbated ecological scarcity across the world (Onuoha, 2007). In effect, ecological scarcity raises the competitive stakes and premium that the various societal groups may place on available ecological resources. This condition tends to precipitate violent conflicts. Applied to the purpose of the present discourse, the theory of eco-violence offers insights into the nature and dynamics of the herdsmen/farmers conflicts in Nigeria. In this regard, it is to be observed that the conflicts have been driven by the desperation of the affected groups to protect and advance their livelihood interests in the context of an ever-shrinking ecological space, characterized by resource-scarcity, livelihood crisis, population explosion, and resource competition.

In the case of North Central State, which is by design the focus of this paper, the situation has been accentuated by the climate change-induced migration of pastoralists from the far North to the North-Central region of Nigeria in search of grazing fields (Blench, 2010). This trend has been succinctly captured thus: As the population is increasing, definitely there will be as well increase in demand for land, water, forest products and grazing land within the territories inhabited by Fulanis and farmers; these groups are forced to find new ways to cope with different types of conflict at once because of competition over marginal resources (Adogi,

2013). The outcome of this scenario has been the prevailing internecine herder/farmer conflict, which has so far tended to have defied all remedies. An extrapolation of the foregoing theoretical position has been nicely articulated in the analytical notion of ‘eco-survivalism (Okoli, 2013). The crux of the theory of eco-violence is that the desperate quest for survival by groups in a competitive and resource-scarce ecological sphere (ecosurvivalism) is likely to precipitate violent conflict.

2.3.4 Relative Deprivation Theory

To further investigate the security challenges and economy of the Nigerian state, the Relative Deprivation Theory will also be adopted in this study. This theory was propounded by Dollard (1939) in an effort to link socio-political and economic inequalities in the society to rebellions and insurrections. As individual and group-based theory of aggression, the relative deprivation theory argues that when expectation outstrips achievement regardless of the absolute levels of economic consumption or the provision of political rights, frustration is generated. Thus, the collective frustration turns to anger and violence (Dollard, 1939, Davies, 1962; Feierabend, 1966).

By application, this theory assists us to trace the historical antecedence of conflicts, agitations and frequent rise of individuals and groups against the Nigerian government. From the standpoint of the assumptions of Relative Deprivation Theory, we argue that the abysmal failure of the Nigerian government to addressing critical challenges to development in many parts of the country may be responsible for the internal insurrection by armed militia groups against the state. Further, we equally argue that security challenges or threats in some parts of Nigeria particularly the northern region, are clear indications that government seems to have failed in her constitutional role of protecting lives and properties of the Nigerian people. This is clearly because, available evidence demonstrates that there is increasing rate of poverty

among Nigerians. Also, unemployment looms large, per capita income is low and high rate of inflation has not been addressed. Similarly, Nigerians are still facing challenges of poor health status, poor state of infrastructures, high rate of illiteracy, low technological development, among others (Anosike, 2010).

The implication of Relative Deprivation Theory on security challenges and economy of the Nigerian state is that democracy is most likely to be undermined, thereby paving way for military incursion in the country. Also, the continuous internal insurrection by armed youths across the country could distort any meaningful efforts by the government to achieve radical economic development in Nigeria. Therefore, the improvement of the security apparatus of the Nigerian state as well as commitment of the government to address the core causes of insecurity, are likely panacea to the survival of democracy and achievement of desired economic growth. As Ebegbulam (2007) aptly observes, democracy only thrives where there is security and stability.

Relative deprivation has also been argued to have emerged from a feeling of dispossession by a group or individual who could trigger violence. According to Townsend (1979), Relative deprivation is the denial of access to resources for subsistence or livelihood of an individual or a group. This theory puts in proper perspective the understanding of the fundamental trigger of the violence in the particular case of our study namely land. Walter, Garrison and Runciman (1966) reinforced the basis of relative deprivation as informed by material choices and quest by —A to have possession of what —B has.

Runciman (1966) draws attention to the question of social justice as a modality to redress relative deprivation which increasingly accounts for inequality. Deprivation accounts for a number of factors such as rebellion, wars and rise in resilient social movements (Walker & Smith, 2001). Relative deprivation provides useful theoretical insights which could advance

knowledge on dynamics of rural violence in north central Nigeria. The violence is linked to distortion, alienation and deprivation of the rural farmers of their land by the herdsmen who forcefully graze on their farm resulting in destruction of their crops and subsequent violent crisis. The relative deprivation theory explores the causes and effects of some of the fundamental problems inherent in the existential realities of the rural farmers such as poverty, vulnerability, ethnicity, subsistence, insecurity, diseases, wellbeing, distortion of livelihoods and alienation. Most of these realities underpin the core development challenges and emancipation of the rural farmers and informs the need to advance theoretical knowledge of rural violence in the social sciences.

Such theoretical exploration linked to relative deprivation encompasses the struggle by the herdsmen to control land for the grazing of their cattle and earn a living at the expense of the rural farmers and their crops which constitute the farmer's means of livelihood. This is typified in core instances of political and socioeconomic intersections, where livelihoods and survival instincts are at the centre (Tonah, 2006).

The suitability of the theoretical debates of relative deprivation lies within the understanding of the consequences of alienation and deprivation of the farmers which has both social, economic and political consequences which at the same time helps to understand the existential realities of the rural farmers. Beyond the notion that the effect of poverty in the rural contexts is not enough to trigger violence, alternative emphasis and consideration is given to the challenges posed by deprivation, marginalization and violent expropriation demonstrated in the logic of herdsmen's grazing on the farmer land where the rural farmers derive their subsistence. Bringing economic survival and deprivation at the centre of rural violence reinforces the suitability of the deprivation theory.

In -intergroup contexts, Tajfel and Turner (1979) observe that there is causality from the intergroup struggle for survival and disarticulation of socio-economic realities of existence leading to violent conflicts. Such conflicts and their consequences particularly the increasing disempowerment, killings and displacement of the rural farmers through violent means underscore the basis for deprivation. Mayah (2016) argues that over 40% of the rural farmers have been displaced, and disposed of their means of livelihood as a result of attacks by herdsmen resulting in alienation from their daily subsistence. Similarly, Amadi and Anokwuru (2017) provide a data which suggest that the increasing attacks results in decrease in food production as the farmers who are vulnerable are scared of losing their lives to herdsmen attacks. Deprivation in this circumstance actually or potentially negates the social logic of productive capacity of the farmers as it is informed by the tendency of systemic dispossession of the farmers of their farmlands. Kwaja (2014) reinforces this dialectic and contends that in the region, herder's conflict has been directly linked with a central role in view of its linkage with livelihood issues that are organically tied to survival between farmers and herdsmen, which constitutes an integral part of Nigeria's political economy from the standpoint of agriculture.

This framework offers sufficient insight in exploring the dialectic relationship between the cattle herdsmen and the rural farmers. In particular, the theory reinforces the dynamics of vulnerability and struggle for survival as the rural farmers effortlessly strive for restitution. Such dialectical relationship between the contradiction or clash of economic struggle, and survival between the rural farmers and cattle herdsmen remains an ongoing concern pointing to the inevitability of an underlying policy response and intervention.

The Theory of Political Ecology is relevant to this study, as most rural societies in Nigeria function on cultural and traditional systems that have semblance to socialist systems. Group

dynamics play important roles in social, environmental and physical security, as well as the preservation of livelihood. It follows therefore that the theory of political ecology holds a key to understanding and initiating measures to curb farmers-herdsmen conflict for the enhancement of national security in Nigeria.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design

The researcher will use descriptive survey research method. This is found to be most appropriate for this study. As the aim of this study is an analysis of farmer-herdsmen conflict and national security in Nigeria. As per Kothari (2004), a great research design should yield most maximum data and give a chance to considering a wide range of parts of the problem. Surveys are valuable in depicting the attributes of a large population. Furthermore, high dependability is anything but difficult to get by giving all subjects a standardized stimulus which guarantees that eyewitness subjectivity is significantly dispensed with (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). Surveys as per Creswell (2012), is the gathering of data from a gathering through meetings or the use of questionnaires to an agent test of that group.

The descriptive survey research is one that studies both large and small population by selection of sample, chosen from the population in order to discover vital fact from people on their belief, opinion and attitudes. The research method to be use in this study is the survey research method. Questionnaire is necessary because the population to be studied is large to be observe directly. It is also suitable method to use to collect a vast number of data because it makes data arrangement and computation easy.

Using the descriptive survey design, the researcher will be able to describe the variables of study and derive predictive regression models for predicting independents and dependent variables. Most importantly, the descriptive design is the most appropriate for this study because it allowed the researcher to describe the characteristics of the population of the study. The population of the study will comprise of undefined number of farmers and herdsmen

involved in farming and cattle rearing. The research will depend on primary and secondary sources for data collection. The main source of data will be through the administration of structured closed-ended questionnaire.

Statistical tools will be employed for data processing, analysis and presentation. Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 20 and Microsoft Office Excel 2013 will be used for the processing of the data. Simple descriptive statistics such as mean, standard deviation, min and max will be used to analyze the data collected. These descriptive statistics will be used due to their ability to convey information to a good number of people easily because they are relatively simple to understand and interpret than rigorous mathematics. Then again, a multiple regression technique will be employed to examine the effect of the predictor variables on the criterion variable. In all cases, reliability will be extensively examined to bring to the fore the level of internal validity and reliability within the test items utilizing the Cronbach's alpha estimates for reliability test.

3.2 Population, Sample and Sampling Techniques

Population refers to the total number of people living in a giving place performing an activity individually or collectively. The target population of the study involved a total of 8000 farmers and herdsmen. 5000 registered farmers with All Farmers Association of Nigeria (AFAN) and 3000 registered herdsmen with Miyatti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) domicile in the state. The states were stratified into two groups, a group of all farmers and that of herdsmen. The sample size was determined using the Yamane (2000) formula which is given as follows;

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where;

n	=	Minimum sample size
e	=	Degree of error expected (0.05)
N	=	Population size (5000 and 3000)
1	=	Constant

The adoption of this approach was intended to establish the representativeness of the sample on an acceptable level of significance which in this study is 0.05. This represents the minimum sample size of respondents which was 377 for farmers and 315 for herdsmen to eliminate any form of bias.

According to Bailey (1994), a sample or sub-sample of 30 respondents is a bare minimum for a study in which statistical data analysis is to be done regardless of the population size. Moreover, most of the time decisions about the sample size are affected by consideration of time and cost. Therefore, invariably decisions about sample size represent a compromise between the constraints of time and cost, the need for precision, and a variety of further considerations that will now be addressed (Bryman, 2008).

The research locations for this study are the local Government Areas of Benue State which comprise of Logo, Guma, Katsina Ala, Zaki Biam and Agatu which are situated along the riverine areas of the state. The location of these local governments, the concentration and movement of farmers and herdsmen, the influx of illegal aliens and the incessant incidents of conflicts which has been observed to have been carried out within the research sites and the surrounding areas made them good locations for the collection of data for this study. The researcher is also very familiar with the research location.

The selection of the Local Government Areas is meant to give an insight into the incidents and effects of farmer-herder conflicts in varying environmental locations within the border areas. The justification for the choice of this period is because it is recent and the events can be easily recalled by the respondents. Furthermore, from my knowledge of the area, this period has witnessed increased incidents of farmer-herder conflicts.

The sample size of the study was divided into three categories. The first category consisted of selected adult residents of the selected border communities, while the second category consisted of community heads, vigilante groups and opinion leaders who have lived in the research location for at least 25 years or have had direct links to the issue of farmer-herder conflicts in the border communities either as security agents or prominent indigenes of the area. The third category consists of persons who have been victims of incidents of farmer-herder conflicts.

Sampling is a technique, which helps us in understanding the parameters or characteristics of the universe or population by examining only a small part of it. Therefore, it is necessary that sampling technique be reliable. Appropriate sample size depends on various factors relating to the subject under investigation like the time, cost and degree of accuracy desired (Creswell, 2014). But the sample size and the sample selection process procedure should assure the representativeness of the population. Sample size determination has its own scientific approach. But in this study to determine sample size, different factors such as research cost, time, human resource, environmental condition, accessibility and availability of transport facilities were taken into consideration. The sample technique used in the study was purposive sampling technique. The sample size was selected purposively based on the following predetermined conditions:

1. The respondents must have stayed in the conflict area for a minimum of 25 years

2. The respondents must be directly involved in the farmer/herder conflicts
3. The respondents must be an indigene of the area or law enforcement officer of the federal government posted to the conflict areas.

Sampling procedures regarding the selection of the respondents of this study varied according to the requirement of the particular data collection technique for which the sample is being drawn. For the purpose of selecting respondents for the survey, since it was not possible to compile an exhaustive list of elements comprising the target population, multi-stage cluster sampling techniques were used. Purposive sampling technique was used for selecting key informants from identified victims of farmer/herder conflicts, Police officers and prominent indigenes of the area. Hence, for the purpose of getting data as to the incidence of farmer/herder conflicts in such border communities for the years gone by, ten (10) community leaders, leaders of vigilante groups and opinion leaders who have lived in such areas for a minimum of 25 years were purposively selected while Four known victims of farmer/herder conflicts were identified for in-depth interview.

Out of the Ten (10) key informants, two (2) each were selected from the urban border communities of Logo, Guma and Katsina Ala making a total of six (6) key informants. Out of the six (6) key informants, one (1) Ward head and one Vigilante leader were selected from each of these urban border communities. From the Four (4) rural border communities, one (1) key informant each was selected. two (2) officials of the National Union of Road Transport Workers were selected so as to get the experiences of the drivers that ply the network of highways in the border communities, while an opinion leader and a leader of the Vigilante were selected from the communities respectively.

A total of Eleven (11) persons who were direct victims of farmer/herder conflicts were identified from police records and reports to Ward heads. ten (10) persons were identified

from police records while one of the victims was identified from report to a ward head. Out of the Eleven (11) victims, one (1) each was selected from respectively for in-depth interview. Six (6) Senior Police Officers who were in charge of the various Police formations in the selected study areas were purposively selected for in-depth interview so as to gain more insight into the problem under study because they were directly involved with issues relating to farmer/herder conflicts. Consequently, a total of 20 key informants were purposively selected from the residents, direct known victims of farmer/herder conflicts and the Police.

Since the sample population cannot be easily listed for sampling purposes, the various wards and streets were grouped into clusters, followed by the selection of elements within each of the selected clusters. A total of 120 respondents were selected from the various elements using simple random sampling technique. Fifty (60) questionnaires were administered in each of the three urban border areas while sixty (60) questionnaires were administered in each of the four rural border areas. The questionnaires were researcher administered.

Five (5) wards were selected from each of the urban border areas after which ten (10) households were again selected using simple random sampling technique. Ten (10) questionnaires were researcher administered in each of the five selected wards. From each of the selected households, the head of the household was the respondent. From each of the rural border areas, five (5) wards were also selected from each of the rural border areas and five (5) households were again selected using simple random sampling technique. From each of the selected households, the head of the household will be the respondent.

3.3 Method of Data Collection

Both primary and secondary data were collected. Primary data is a type of information that was obtained directly from first-hand sources by means of surveys and observation. It is data

that has not been previously published and was derived from a new or original research study and collected at the source while secondary data are those which were previously been collected that are utilized by a person other than the one who collected the data. Qualitative data describe some quality methods used to collect qualitative data from interviews, checklists, and observations of the real situation of conflict between farmers and herdsmen in the study area. Quantitative data describe the quantity in numerical values (Dodge, 2003).

These were collected from all 120 respondents by using interviews, where the instrument for data collection was interview schedule. Data collected through interview schedule includes, respondent's demographic information, conflict management strategies mechanism available in the study area, land ownership and use, the way farmers and herdsmen's concerns such as crop destruction, grazing land encroachment and water for animals and for irrigation are handled, effects of conflict to farmers and herdsmen, farmers and herdsmen assessment about the people responsible for fulfilling their concerns such as village leaders, district leaders and elders also perception of farmers and herdsmen towards each other.

Data from key informants was from Village Extension Worker, Village Executive Officer, three farmers' group leaders and three herdsmen's group leaders. The data from key informants included issues on village profile, elements of conflict management mechanism available in the study area, attitude of farmers towards herdsmen and herdsmen towards farmers and how people perceive on effectiveness of conflict management in a study area. All this information was collected by use of checklist.

Secondary data was obtained from records in District Heads and Agriculture and Livestock Development Officer from the local government office such as population in the district, district total land area, and land area used for cultivation and for grazing. In the village information such as number of people in the village, total land area used for farming and

livestock keeping, number and type of livestock kept in the village and type of crops grown in the village. Secondary data was also obtained by reading documents from previous studies on farmers' and herdsman conflict, journals and website.

The research instrument was divided into seven parts. Part one was concerned with personal data. Part two concerned with the prior existing relationship between farmers and herdsman, part three focused on issues involved in farmers and herdsman' conflicts, part four looked at the effect of farmers and herdsman' conflicts on national security. Part five also looked at the challenges of farmers and herdsman' conflicts. Part six focused the prospects of curbing farmers and herdsman' conflicts while part seven consider the strategies for curbing farmers and herdsman' conflicts in the study area.

The questionnaire was titled "Farmers-Herdsman Conflicts and National Security Questionnaire (FHCNSQ) and was delivered to the respondent by the researcher and 10 research assistants based on direct delivery and retrieval method. This gave the respondent enough time to fill in the questionnaires. The respondents were requested to indicate the extent to which they agree and disagree on the issues of farmers/herdsman conflicts in their respective communities. The response was rated on a likert scale of 1-5 where 1= undecided, 2= disagree, 3= strongly disagree, 4= agree and 5= strongly agree.

3.3.1 Validity and Reliability of the Instrument

A face-to-face validity was assured by subjecting the instrument to the experts in the area of the study for scrutiny. Content validity was also be ensured through the research supervisor who assured the representativeness of the hypotheses by the questionnaire items. The comments and suggestions of these experts and the supervisor was used to revise the instrument such that the objectives of the research will be covered. The researcher further administers the questionnaire to selected respondents who were not be included in the

population. This was to ensure that the questions were easily understood and meant the same to the respondents.

The research instrument was tested for validity by submitting two separate copies of the questionnaire to two Professors and researchers. These researchers were sourced from institute of security studies of Nasarawa State University Keffi. These comprised of individuals with backgrounds and expertise in security studies and conflict management. These experts vetted the set of questions to establish further validity and credibility assurance, by advising and commenting on the questionnaire design to ensure overall relevance and congruence with case context. This approach raised further the reliability of the instrument and data collected.

The reliability of the instrument was maintained by ensuring that the questions were unambiguous and clear. Moreover, standard instructions will be provided so to reduce errors. Again, to ensure the reliability of the instrument, a test-re-test reliability was adopted by administering the same questionnaire to the same group of respondents outside the population at different point in time. Consequently, the Cronbach's alpha reliability estimates for the variables measuring agribusiness innovations in this research's instrument are shown in the table below:

Table 3.1: Reliability Estimates for the Measurement of farmers/herder conflicts

Constructs	Number of Items	Cronbach's Alpha
Prior relationship between farmers and herdsmen	10	$\alpha = .82$
Issues involved in farmers/herder conflicts	10	$\alpha = .84$
Effects of farmer-herdsmen conflicts on national security	10	$\alpha = .84$
Challenges of farmer-herdsmen conflicts	10	$\alpha = .73$
Prospects for curbing farmer-herdsmen conflicts	10	$\alpha = .87$

Strategies for curbing farmer-herdsmen conflicts	10	$\alpha = .79$
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3.4 Techniques of Data Analysis

Data collected from respondents was edited, coded and summarized using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 20 computer software. Descriptive statistics such as frequencies and percentage distribution were used to analyse all specific objectives in this study. The hypotheses were validated using one sample t-test at 5% level of significance. By using one sample t-test statistics was used in order to assess level of dependency between one variable and another by using 5% as level of significance. Data from key informants was analysed by content analysis method.

3.5 Justification of Instrument Used

Descriptive statistics analysis is intended to reduce data, allow for easier interpretation. Analysis of the data would be facilitated if they were organized in some fashion such as pie charts, histogram, and Bar chart. Peck (2012) also acknowledged the fact that the descriptive statistical analysis is an efficient method been used to organise and summarise data into charts and tables for ease of interpretation and view, we will use these methods. Thus, during the course of the work, data collected were displayed in frequency tables which are the most frequently used of the techniques of descriptive analysis.

Primary data were also chosen because of the nature and requirement of the research topic. Several studies as reviewed in the literature used primary data inform of the questionnaire to gather information from the respondents. The justification of using the questionnaire is premised on the fact that questionnaire provide first-hand information and enable the research to have face to face contact with respondents.

3.6 Summary

This chapter discusses the research methodology framework developed for the research work. It basically reviews the research design, the population and sample selection, data collection instruments, data analysis techniques and associated methodological problems that may be encountered. The validity and reliability test as well as the justification of data analysis instrument adopted were also discussed.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Presentation of Data

The chapter presents the data which have been collected and analysed using frequency tables and descriptive statistic for its interpretation and discussion in relation to the research questions and objectives of the study. Also, the chapter describes the demographic and social economic characteristics of the respondents in terms of gender, age, level of education and years in settlement area. That information helps the researcher to know the reliability of the respondent for the study. The data is presented in the appendix section.

4.2 Demographic Information of Respondents

In examining the effectiveness and sustainability of management strategies for conflict between farmers and herdsmen over land use, discussion about respondents' demographic information and characteristics become imperative since the former influence's individual behaviour and therefore individual decision making. In this study, demographic information includes respondents' sex, age, marital status and education.

Table 4.1: Respondents Demographic Information

Description of Items	Farmers(n=60) %	Herdsmen (n=60) %	Overall (n=120) %
Respondent sex			
Male	78	82	80
Female	22	18	20
Total	100	100	100
Respondent age			
18-35 years	40	27	33
36-55 years	28	41	35
56-75 years	32	32	32
Total	100	100	100
Marital status			
Single	11	5	16
Married	62	77	72
Widowed	12	12	12
Separated	15	6	11
Total	100	100	100
Respondent education			
None	27	47	37
Primary	63	48	56
Secondary	10	5	8
Total	100	100	100

Source: Questionnaire 2018

For both farmers and herdsman, results in Table 1 show higher proportion of male respondents than female respondents. Results further show that 80% of the respondents involved in the study were male and 20% were female. Farmer's households consist of 40% young people aged between 18 to 35 years while herdsman have 27% young people of the similar age. At the same time result shows that farmer's households and herdsman households have got the same (32%) old people aged 56 – 75. This result indicates that both farmers and herdsman have got enough elders who are able to help in reaching a sustainable resolution between farmers and herdsman's conflict.

Married families are more responsible as compared to single families and this state of affair has an influence in decision making. Results in Table 1 show that 77% of the herdsman's

households are married while for farmer's households 62% are married. Farmers and herdsmen have got the same number of widowed families that is 12% and for separated families farmers have got 15% while for herdsmen is 6%. Herdsmen have 5% single families while farmers have got 11%. The result reflects herdsmen's tradition which does not allow young men who are not married to separate from their parents for fear of reducing family manpower to take care of animals.

In assessing the effect of farmer-herder conflict between farmers and herdsmen over land use in Benue state, the issues regarding respondent education cannot be ignored. Studies on the importance of education have revealed that education motivates self-assurance and provide things we need to partake in today's world. It makes us more independent and aware of what is going on in the world today, along with the awareness of opportunities and rights.

Results in Table 4.1 show a higher proportion of farmer's households with more education than herdsmen's households. Results show that 47% of the herdsmen households and 27% of farmer's households have no formal education. On other hand, while 63% and 10% of the farmer households have primary and secondary education respectively, for herder's households, about 48% have primary education and 5% have secondary education. In this study, on overall, there is significant variation of educational levels between farmer's households and herdsmen households. Results show that there is difference in education between these two communities which can cause differences in their thinking on how to solve conflict between them.

4.3 Relationship between Farmers-Herdsmen Conflicts in Benue state and National Security in Nigeria

One of the negative relationships between herdsmen and farmers perennial conflict, attacks and counter-attacks in Nigeria is massive death toll of many innocent lives and actors

involved in the conflict. Between the year 2006 and 2014, Nigeria recorded 615 violent deaths related to cattle in the year 2006, 22 deaths were recorded after the herdsman farmers conflict in 2006, 54 in 2007, 31 in 2008, 83 in 2009, 39 fatalities in 2010 and a massive increase in death toll in 2011 which puts the figure at 116, 128 deaths in 2012, 115 deaths in 2013 and a total of 27 deaths was recorded in 2014. Similarly, in the year 2015-2018, a total of 1,229 deaths between January 1 and May 20 in the North Central states of Taraba, Nasarawa, Plateau, Kogi and Benue states respectively.

Unlike deaths from Boko Haram which are mainly in the North, majority of the deaths accruable from herdsman farmers conflict occurred majorly in the North Central and some of the North Western, Eastern and some Southern states in Nigeria. Also, between February 8 and July 17, 604 farmers and locals were killed in Agatu, Guma, Logo and Tarkaa local government area of Benue state. Recently, 11 villagers were killed and two villages burnt down because of vengeance mission of the herdsman on Godogodo chiefdom in Jema'a local government area in Southern part of Kaduna state. Also, in Plateau state, a first-class traditional ruler, Sir Lazarus Agai, his driver and police men were killed on the way from his farm on 17th of October, 2016.

Another severe relationship of this conflict is loss of cattle to conflict as many herds are lost during the conflict to angry farmers who take advantage of the conflicts to steal cattle from the pastoralists. On the side of farmers, it is not uncommon to read about the destruction of crops on the farms and harvested products by the angry mobs of herdsman. The negative effect of this is huge loss on both sides for these two actors as a result of loss of income and capital. Another significant relationship of this conflict is destruction of farm properties and farm irrigation equipment, farming tools, houses and cars by angry herdsman who usually carry out organised violence as retaliatory act on the farming communities.

The persistent attack by the herdsmen has called the attention of Nigerians to the threat it poses to Nigerian unity and national security. Nigerian being a very ethnic conscious country that is polarised along ethno-religious lines is a very fragile and delicate union of culturally diverse ethnic groups. There is need for deliberate and proactive actions to end the incessant farmers and herdsmen clashes spreading across the country. Another lethal relationship of this conflict to national security is the displacement of people from their homes and community for safety reasons. This has become the persistent effect of the clash between herdsmen and farmers in North Central Nigeria. About 200,000 people are thought to have fled the wave of attacks which some locals say is the worst massacre by mainly Muslim Fulani herdsmen since 2010 when 400-500 died near Jos, in Plateau state, North Central Nigeria.

Table 4.2 Perceived Relationship of farmers towards Herdsmen

Farmers' opinion on herdsmen	Agree (%)	Uncertain (%)	Disagree (%)
Herdsmen are not responsible with crop destruction	0	0	100
Destruction of crops is not done intentionally by herdsmen	0	7	93
Herdsmen take care on other properties	1	6	93
Herdsmen tend to value only their animals	91	0	7
Herdsmen have got large number of animals; they fail to control their animals	78	0	22
Herdsmen are not involved in land degradation	10	5	85
Herdsmen are the main cause of farm encroachment	90	5	5

Source: Questionnaire 2018

In most cases farmers have a negative relationship and perception towards herdsmen which could be the main cause of conflict between these two groups. Results in table 6 show 91% of

farmers reporting that herdsmen tend to value only their animals. Results show that farmers agreed and reported as follows; 78% agreed that herdsmen have got large number of animals and that they fail to control their animals and 90% farmer respondent said that herdsmen are the main cause of farm encroachment. Findings go further by showing that 100% farmers agree that herdsmen are responsible for the crop destruction. Results which show farmers to disagree are such as; 93% farmers disagree on the statement that destruction of crops is not done intentionally by herdsmen, 93% farmers disagree that herdsmen take care on other properties and also 85% farmer respondents disagree on the account that herdsmen are not involved in land degradation. The study indicates that farmers see herdsmen as very bad people and see them to be responsible for every bad thing such as crop destruction, land degradation and farm encroachment. This tendency of farmers to look herdsmen in a negative way can increase hatred between these two groups which can increase the rate of conflict among these communities.

Table 4.3: Relationship and Perception of Herdsmen towards Farmers

Herdsmen' opinion on farmers	Agree (%)	Uncertain (%)	Disagree (%)
Farmers are not responsible for encroaching grazing area	0	0	100
Farmers are not responsible for cattle route encroachment	0	0	100
Poor farming method cause land degradation which is the main cause of grazing land encroachment	70	5	25
Water sources destruction is not done by farmers	2	0	98
More water is not used by farmers for irrigation	0	0	100
Farmers are not always good people	80	10	10

Source: Questionnaire 2018

On the other hand, herdsmen also perceive farmers in a negative way. Herdsmen see farmers as the barrier to their activities. They see farmers as being responsible for encroach grazing area, cattle route encroachment, poor farming method which is the main cause of land

degradation and the main cause of grazing land encroachment, water sources distraction and use of more water for irrigation. Table 4.3 show results on perception of herdsmen towards farmers.

The results show that 100% herdsmen respondents disagreed with the statement that farmers are not responsible for encroaching grazing area. Results further show that 100% herdsmen disagree with the following statement; farmers are not responsible for cattle route encroachment; water is not used by farmers for irrigation and water sources destruction is not done by farmers. 98% herdsmen did not agree on this statement. 80% herdsmen agreed that farmers are not good people and also herdsmen agree by 70% that poor farming method cause land degradation which is the main cause of grazing land encroachment.

The study shows that herdsmen also perceive farmers as very bad people and see them to be responsible for cattle route encroachment, responsible for encroaching grazing area, use more water for irrigation, water sources destruction and poor farming method which cause land degradation and the main cause of grazing land encroachment. The perception of farmers towards herdsmen and herdsmen towards farmers shows that each of the two groups is asserting each other the result which makes it difficult to resolve the conflicts.

The group of farmers and that of herdsmen have got negative perception towards each other and every group sees the other group as bad. Farmers see herdsmen as destructive to their crops; they believe that large number of livestock owned by herdsmen is responsible for land degradation and they graze on the area which could be suitable for crop production. Herdsmen blame farmers for encroaching their grazing area and cattle route. They blame farmers for using more water to irrigate their farms and use of poor farming method which cause land degradation which may results in grazing land encroachment.

4.4 Issues Involved in Farmers-Herdsmen Conflicts in Benue state and National Security

Table 4.4 Issues Involved in Farmers-Herdsmen Conflicts and National Security

Issues Involved in Farmers-Herdsmen Conflicts	Frequency	Percentage
Issues of scarce resources (land)	25	25
Issues of population Growth	23	23
Issues of land grabbing	12	12
Issues of Climate change	10	10
Issues of Drought and migration	16	16
Issues on national security	14	14

Issues of Scarce Resources (Land)

Analysis of the farmers-herdsmen conflict indicate that constant urbanisation and demographic shifts in the present-day Nigeria has increased the tendency and likelihood of farmers to move further afield for farming activities. At independence in 1960, the Nigerian population stood at about 35 million people. However, 58 years later, it has leaped to over 190 million people and the growth is expected to persist in the near future. Population increase of this magnitude also means a geometric increase in the demand for food products as a basic human need. This also implies an increase in the quest for farming space for farmers. Conversely, industrialisation and urbanisation have continued to claim all available land, leaving little or nothing for farmers' survival. The continued movement of herdsmen southwards in search of pasture for their animals has pitched them against farmers, eventually leading to conflict and destruction. For example, farming along the Benue River accounts for over 20 000 tons of grain annually. This same area is also fertile ground for herdsmen to feed their cattle. Thus, farmlands within the river bank areas are the most affected by the movement of the herdsmen – resulting in a number of clashes. The expansive use of land and

water for non-agricultural uses also often reduce the resource base available to herdsmen and farmers. In response to this, it is not uncommon to see herdsmen grazing along the street, and sedentary farmers cultivating on grazing route which often stimulate conflict from crop damages by herds, destruction of farm properties and escalation into violence. Competition over a scarce resource would increase the likelihood of the conflict. The cattle herdsmen's search for land and resources became one of the major causes of the fighting.

Issues of Population Growth

Population growth has worsened this conflict. It has pitted many southern communities and farmers against the Fulani. One cause is the growing population of Nigeria's cattle population to 25 million cows in Nigeria, and the number of cattle is expected to increase to 60 million by 2050. A large amount of food and water is required to satisfy massive numbers of animals when they are traveling over farmers' lands. Farmers accused the Fulani herdsmen of failing to control their cattle and allowing them to damage farmers' crops. However, the Fulani herdsmen accused farmers of stealing their cattle and sheep. This continued hostilities between farmers and herdsmen has often result to conflicts with it attendant consequence on national security as lives are been loss on daily basis.

Issues of Climate Change

Climate is a critical factor in the activities of herdsmen and farmers. The changing climatic condition, generally referred to as global warming, is no doubt taking a toll on the survival of herdsmen and farmers business. The desert encroachment from the Sahara towards the Sahel region and other associated climatic conditions have continued to affect the livelihood of herdsmen as they push further south in search of available space, pitching them against farmers and host communities. This global phenomenon is currently affecting many parts of the world with attendant consequences – including the herdsmen-farmer conflict in Nigeria.

Scarcity of water, land and harsh weather in the North Eastern and Western part of Nigeria is a major factor that necessitates the migration of pastoralist to the middle-belt where the ecology is more favourable to their herding business because of a more favourable weather and access to water which is necessitated by existence of river Niger and Benue.

Issues of Drought and Migration

Climate change and environmental degradation also lead to conflict. For decades, climate change slowly changed the landscape of Nigeria. Many Northern parts of Nigeria have turned to desert. Nigeria's rivers are at the lowest levels they have been in years and communities are dealing with droughts. This situation worsened the conflicts between farmers and herdsmen because they are fighting over diminishing resources. Despite the many advantages of Transhumance, this system of animal production usually brings the herdsmen and their entourage of cattle herds into contact and competition over land, water and grazing route which usually end up in non- violent and violent conflict with dwellers who are predominantly sedentary farmers and fishermen and are always bent on asserting their exclusive right to land tenure and land inheritance. Furthermore, the conflict is now being intensified with the transformation of the old pattern of transhumance from being the temporary abode of herdsmen in a particular region for a limited and defined period of time to staying permanently for a long period of time. Desert and droughts have swallowed up to 70% of grassland and droughts appear more frequently. Disagreements over the use and allocation of food and resources such as grazing areas between herdsmen and local farmers are intense because of the interest of both parties.

Issues of Land Grabbling

The mysticism and inclination to land ownership in Nigeria is also a major cause of the conflict. In Nigeria, the indigene – settler syndrome is always a factor necessitating conflict over land use especially when there exist a deliberate deprivation or perceived marginalization of one group in the allocation and utility of land and access to water. As a result of transhumance, pastoralist from North Eastern and Western Nigeria who migrate to the middle-belt in search of forage and water inevitably become host and settler and are often seen as strangers, settlers or foreigner despite being Nigerians. The attendant effects of this is that in case of any further deprivation of resources by the indigenes, the pastoralist often transfer aggression on the indigene for their previous losses and flee while the indigene respond by employing every means of evacuating ‘these troublesome stranger’ from their land.

Competing for land ownership is also an essential driver of the conflict. The Fulani see themselves as the owners of the land which was leased legally to them or their parents. The Fulani reject the views of those who see them as trespassers on grazing lands. However, many

Farmers consider Fulani herdsmen as strangers who are occupying the land of indigenous people.

Fulani herdsmen travel hundreds of miles with their cattle in search of grazing land. The Fulani group believe that farmers often steal from their herds. They often armed with weapons to protect their territory and livestock. The way to protect oneself is to threaten to retaliate in the hope of deterring the other side from using weapons. Both herdsmen and farmers describe themselves as victims of the conflict. The competition for land led to

tensions over the years between both parties. Necessary conflict management will help both groups in building peace in the affected communities.

National Security Issues

The conflict between herdsmen and farmers has become a regional security threat. As a result, the local authority is weakened in the enforcement of the agreement between the groups. According to Nigerian reports, thieves stole approximately 60,000 cattle in recent years. Many

Herdsmen have to arm themselves with weapons to protect their cattle and homes to ensure security. The government prioritizes the conflict as a threat to national security. President Buhari took swift action and tried to control the conflict. The conflict became a threat to Nigeria's national security because violent actions have caused deteriorating living conditions, and it will ultimately lead to more conflicts and breakdown of order in the region.

4.5 Impact of Farmers-Herdsmen Conflicts in Benue state and National Security in Nigeria

Table 4.5 Impact of Conflict on Farmers

Description	Mean Value of Loss (₦)	Total Value of Loss (₦)
Human life loss	474,000	2,432,004,000
Injured persons	90,000	2,640,000
Houses destroyed (property included)	1,083,470	998,920,410,00
Farm produced destroyed (crops, sheep, goat)	70,247,000	501,247,804,000

Source: Compiled by Researcher, 2018

The impacts resulting from farmers and herdsmen conflict involvement are many. Impact of conflict to farmers included; crop destruction, burning of homes, land given to herdsmen displacement from the village for five months, farming area taken by herdsmen, destruction of irrigation infrastructure and jailed suspected to involve in fighting. On the other side, the impact of conflict to herdsmen includes the following: animals were stolen, animals were killed, forced to leave grazing area, deaths, got wounded and injured, grazing land were taken by farmers, forced to pay cattle for the committee, grazing land was burned by farmers and grazing land taken by farmers.

Table 4.5 shows that the heaviest loss in monetary terms (₦998,920,410,000.00) arose from the loss of houses destroyed including properties and facilities belonging to farmers followed by farm and farm products such as crops, sheep and goats. This was more valid where about 200 incursions were made into the arable farmers' farm during the period. Livestock that were lost through the farmers-herdsmen conflict valued over 500 billion. 474,000 persons lost their lives during the period with anticipated economic contribution valued at ₦2,432,004,000.00. The number of persons injured in the farmer-herdsmen conflict as revealed by the study was 90,000 including incapacitated persons that could not perform their economic activities during the period of treatment. The cost implication due to the body injuries of those affected in this respect was about ₦2.64 million.

Table 4.6 Impact of Conflict on Herdsmen

Description	Mean Value of Loss (₦)	Total Value of Loss (₦)
Human life loss	22,000	2,844,000
Injured persons	12,000	2,579,000
Houses destroyed	940	2,650,410
Animals destroyed (cattle, sheep, goat)	247,000	71,879,006,000

Source: Compiled by Researcher, 2018

Table 4.4 shows that the heaviest loss in monetary terms (₦71 billion) arose from the loss of cattle killed and rustled belonging to herdsmen followed by loss in human life. Cattle that were killed through the farmers-herdsmen conflict valued over ₦71 billion. 22,000 persons lost their lives during the period with anticipated economic contribution valued at ₦2.8 billion. The number of persons injured in the farmer-herdsmen conflict as revealed by the study was 12,000 including incapacitated persons that could not perform their economic activities during the period of treatment. The cost implication due to the body injuries of those affected in this respect was about ₦2.5 million. Herdsmen settlements destroyed by farmers during the conflict period amounted to over ₦2.6 million.

Table 4.7 Impact of Conflicts on National Security

National Security Impact	Frequency	Percentage
Food security	108	90.0
Education security	43	35.8
Health security	58	48.3
Financial security	70	58.3
Poverty	92	82.8
Social security	81	73.7
Job/occupational security	35	25.0
Migration security	78	65.0
Refugees management security	38	31.7

Source: Field survey data 2018; * Multiple Responses

Farmer-herdsmen conflicts are generally considered as a negative phenomenon which often lead to loss of lives and properties which invariably impacts negatively on national security. Table 4.5 shows that reduction in farm production (food security) was the most serious impact on national security accounting for 90%, followed by increased poverty within and among the farmers and herdsmen (82.8%), social insecurity and migration security accounted for 63.7% and 65%, respectively. This could be brought about by scarcity and increase in cost of inputs including labour resulting from conflict. Consequentially, food items are scarce and there is reduction in income leading way to poverty. This may not be farfetched from why manifestation of poverty was rated second highest impact on national security.

From table 4.7 another devastating impacts of farmers-herdsmen conflict on national security is health security accounting for 48.3% while the conflict impact on financial security accounted for 58.3%. Other national security impact of the conflicts includes job/occupational security (25%) and refugees management accounting for 31.7% on national security in the country. In addition, the farmer-herdsmen conflicts have negative impact on educational security accounting for 35.8%.

This further buttressed the manifestation of poverty in the conflict communities. Project coordinating unit in 2012 identified social insecurity as one impact of conflict which often hampers the accomplishment of other life endeavour including economic activities such as production and marketing. Although, interruption of education of children and reduction in health care provision of the family represented relatively lower proportions (35 and 48%, respectively), they are critical issues in the life of the communities. The lower proportion might not be unconnected with the fact that most children of the respondents especially the farmers did not attend school. It has been established that most violent conflicts do not stop at

the boundary of the communities in which the conflict occurs, it often spill-over to neighbouring communities.

Social insecurity is a common manifestation in conflict situation especially when it is a violent one. People develop fear of being attacked unnecessarily which also negatively affect their ability to carry out their economic activities. Perhaps there were many refugees during the conflicts which were why refugee's management accounted for 31.7% leading to establishment of camps for internally displaced persons who survived the conflicts. However, it was one of the most important impacts of war or conflict, which creates a huge burden on the government or the neighbouring communities with it concomitant impact on national security in the country.

4.6 Challenges of Farmers-Herdsmen Conflicts in Benue state and National Security

Table 4.8: Challenges of Farmers-Herdsmen Conflicts and National Security

Challenges	Agree (%)	Uncertain (%)	Disagree (%)
Lack of political will	100	0	0
unauthorised encroachment into farmlands	93	7	0
climate change	93	6	1
Lack of Coherent Policy	91	2	7

Source: Field survey data (2018)

The study has revealed that the government at all levels has demonstrated near absence of needed political will to proffer lasting solutions to the conflicting claims of different actors in the ongoing conflict between the herdsman and farmers. Political leaders and actors have failed to invoke appropriate legislations to be backed by action that would define rules and limits for parties involved in the conflict. Lack of political will remains a hindering factor

among member states. Political will to implement this protocol and other frameworks remains an enabler to the conflict. The Federal government, in the past, has made efforts to regulate and control herdsmen activities, but it appears that adequate political will is needed to enforce laws. For instance, the government is perceived from some quarters, especially by opposition parties, as being sympathetic to the activities of the herdsmen. This perception is likely due to the fact that the President is Fulani, the same ethnic group that dominates the cattle business. Citizens, especially from the most affected states expected the federal government to deal with the herdsmen-farmer conflicts in all parts of the state with the same vigour and determination it showed in similar internal security issues in other parts of the country.

Lack of political will by the government to arrest and punish the offenders adequately is one of the factors fuelling the activities of the herdsmen in Nigeria today. The inability of government in most cases to respond quickly to distress calls and early warning signs is an issue that promotes conflict. This negative attitude has made it difficult to stop crises that would have been prevented if government had responded accordingly to distress calls and warnings.

The study also revealed that the challenges accompanying climate change is one of the major causes of conflicts between farmers and herdsmen. Unauthorised encroachment into farmlands is yet another challenge that have led to serious conflicts between the farmers and herdsmen in middle belt states, because of the damage they cause to crops and fallow lands left to replenish the nutrients after long years of use. The respondents are of the opinion that the herdsmen's cows often stray into their farmlands without permission and destroy crop nurseries or full-grown crops, which they hope to harvest and sell in the near future. The implication of the finding is that shrinking of ecological space and resorts creates an

atmosphere of eco-scarcity, which raises the stakes and puts a premium on the available resources. What usually results from this is fierce competition and a desperate struggle for subsistence. In this context, therefore, conflict not only becomes inevitable; it simply becomes a matter of survival.

Another significant challenge of farmers-herdsmen conflict is lack of coherent policy by the political leadership (91% in agreement). It appears the end is not in sight concerning the conflict, as there is no coherent policy framework to end the problem. The federal government is proposing to establish what it described as “cattle colonies (RUGA),” in all states across the country to accommodate nomadic cattle herdsmen however, the nature and shape of such colonies are still not clear to farmers. On the other hand, most state governments are opposed to the policy due to fear that it could cause a land use crisis between farmers and herdsmen. Findings from the study revealed that farmers are occupying most arable lands in the states and persuading them to cede such lands for grazing could be leads to conflicts. In Nigeria, state governments possess the constitutional rights over land allocation and many, especially in the middle belt and south, are not willing to establish cattle colonies. These states prefer tackling the problem by facilitating modern ranches established by private individuals. Moreover, there are suspicions that the federal government is attempting to render undue favour to private individuals and elites who own cattle through the proposed policy.

The perceived challenges of farmer-herdsmen conflict on national security is the inaction of the police and other state security apparatuses to provide sufficient protection for farmers and herdsmen in Nigeria has led to alternative forms of security, such as the mobilization of local hunters and vigilantes. This has led to the lynching of herdsmen who are seen as security threats in some communities by farmers. In retaliation, herdsmen have mobilized militias to

attack farmers, leading to the several deaths and destruction of farm produce. In many of the affected rural communities, farmers are driven out of villages, ultimately becoming refugees in neighbouring states. Those that remain in the villages are afraid to travel to farms in remote locations due to fear of violence from herdsmen. The implication of this situation is ominous on food security in the country. Farmers have left their villages in the Nasarawa, Taraba, Niger, Plateau and Kogi states and migrated to the Benue state, where the governor has voiced his inability to cope with food, health, shelter and education security associated with spillage of farmers-herdsmen conflict in the country.

4.7 Adopted Strategies to Address Farmers-Herdsmen Conflicts in Benue state and National Security in Nigeria

The adopted strategies are discussed based on content analyses of official gazettes and policy pronouncement. The federal government has adopted measures in response to the escalating violence. These range from consultations between senior federal officials and administrators and residents of affected states to the deployment of additional police and military forces, the prosecution of those responsible for violence, schemes for “cattle colonies”, or clusters of ranches with services for herdsmen and, most recently, a National Livestock Transformation Plan. Federal government officials – including Vice President Yemi Osinbajo, Interior Minister Abdulrahman Dambazau and, belatedly, President Buhari – have undertaken fact-finding and consolation visits to conflict zones, but these trips have produced little effective preventive or deterrent action. Buhari and other senior federal officials have convened several consultations on ending the violence. On 18 January, the National Economic Council constituted a ten-person working committee, headed by Osinbajo. Its mandate includes stopping the killings, addressing impunity and facilitating the government’s long-term plan to resolve the herder-farmer resource contest.

The committee has recommended enhanced military deployments in the worst-affected states and comprehensive dialogue with all parties involved in the conflict. In February and March, a subcommittee on dialogue, headed by Ebonyi state Governor David Umahi, with the governors of Adamawa, Benue, Plateau and Taraba states as members, visited Adamawa, Benue, Taraba and Zamfara states, consulted with various parties and submitted a report to the National Economic Council. Responding to public pressure, Buhari has also journeyed to some of the hardest-hit states, urging an end to violence. These gestures are an improvement upon the seeming aloofness of the past, but their outcome is unclear. It remains to be seen whether the Osinbajo committee's submissions will make a difference. In failing to stop the killings, the government is widely viewed not so much as lacking in ideas but as insufficiently determined to put them into practice. Furthermore, consultations, however welcome, cannot be a substitute for concrete steps to end impunity.

The government has also stepped up its security response. It has deployed more police and military units to the troubled states. In November 2017, the inspector-general of police, Ibrahim Idris, sent five mobile police (anti-riot) units to Adamawa state in order to prevent further clashes. Following the 1 January attacks in Benue state, he also dispatched 663 additional personnel to support existing units in the affected areas. He subsequently assigned five additional mobile police units to Nasarawa state. On 9 January, President Buhari ordered Idris to relocate to Benue state and remain there until the killings stopped – the police chief spent two days in the state and left.

The army has also deployed more troops. On 7 February, it announced what it called a “training exercise”, Cat Race, which it said would “dovetail with real-time operations” aimed at curbing conflict and criminality in Benue, Taraba, Kogi, Nasarawa, Niger and Kaduna states. The exercise ran from 15 February to 31 March and was followed by Operation Whirl

Stroke 1, deployed in Benue, Nasarawa and Taraba states, which continues today. The air force has also established new stations and deployed more assets, including 1,300 personnel and two Mi-35 helicopter gunships, to the region. On 19 June, the Whirl Stroke 1 force commander, Major General Adeyemi Yekini, reported that troops supported by the air force's helicopter gunships had carried out two major operations (code-named Deadly Strike and Dark Down) against armed militias in Benue and Nasarawa states, including a raid on about 40 "herdsmen", some armed with AK-47 rifles, camped at Kwantan Gyemi on the boundary between the two states.

These deployments signal, at least in principle, a more robust response to the conflict. But they have produced mixed results at best. They have curbed violence and repelled invading militias in certain areas, enabling some of the displaced in Benue state to return to their villages. Yet killings continue; many sacked communities remain deserted, and thousands of displaced are barred from returning home, as security forces say they cannot yet guarantee the villages' security. Several factors account for the limited effectiveness of the enhanced deployments. The personnel are still inadequate to secure many areas, and units are ill equipped to respond speedily to distress calls from remote villages. Some police units deployed in rural areas are operating cautiously, mindful that officers have been ambushed and killed. In many areas, the forces deployed are inadequate to deter heavily armed militias who attack villages at night and retreat to their forest camps before dawn. Failure to convict and punish the perpetrators of these and other noteworthy killings will likely feed the cycle of violence.

The police have made some effort to collect or confiscate illegal arms. On 21 February Idris ordered the public to surrender all illicit firearms during the 21 days from 22 February to 15 March. The police reported about 4,000 firearms surrendered or recovered countrywide. But

this total included only 453 firearms from the six states hardest-hit by farmer-herder violence. Moreover, the exercise did not disarm the groups responsible for the killings.

The government has arrested and started prosecuting some attackers. In early February, the police reported the arrest of 145 people suspected of involvement in killings, 120 of which would-be put-on trial. Many more have been arrested in connection with various attacks since then, notably including the head of the Benue Livestock Guards, Aliyu Teshaku, held by the army on 27 April. These are welcome, if small, steps toward tackling impunity. That said, given the snail's pace at which investigations and prosecutions are usually conducted, it is not clear how soon those responsible may be sanctioned. Failure to convict and punish the perpetrators of these and other noteworthy killings will likely feed the cycle of violence, deepening both the anger of the affected communities and the sense that people can get away with murder.

The government's security response appears constrained or indeed hampered by contradictory diagnoses of the challenge. For instance, following the killing of over 80 people in the early January attacks in Benue state, Defence Minister Mansur Dan-Ali said the attacks were linked to the blockage of longstanding herding routes and the enactment of anti-grazing laws. In contrast, the domestic intelligence agency, the Department of State Services, reportedly assessed – erroneously and unhelpfully – the attacks could be the handiwork of Islamic State in West Africa Province fighters who had infiltrated central and southern parts of the country. Police chief Idris has said at some times that the Benue killers were “hoodlums” and “miscreants” but at others that the escalated killings were triggered by anti-grazing laws.

During Buhari's meeting with Benue leaders, on 16 January, he urged them to accommodate their herder countrymen, implying the conflict was escalated by the exclusionary grazing

bans; he subsequently said the killers were fighters trained by the late Libyan leader, Muammar al-Qadhafi, who were now streaming across the Sahel to West Africa; and more recently charged that the killings are sponsored by opposition politicians seeking to blackmail him and discredit his government ahead of the 2019 elections. These contradictory theories suggest, at best, incoherence within the security system.

As a long-term solution, the government, in January 2018, announced a new plan to establish “cattle colonies” across the country. According to Agriculture Minister Audu Innocent Ogbeh, each colony was to cover 5,000 hectares (about 25km by 20km) and would be a cluster of ranches, with resources and facilities including grass, water, veterinary services, mills for converting agro-waste to livestock feed, schools, hospitals and markets, all secured by agro-rangers. States were expected to provide land and the federal government would bear development and maintenance costs – possibly with support from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Fund for Agricultural Development and others. Ranchers and herdsmen were to pay “a small fee”. The government argued that benefits would include protection from cattle rustlers, fewer farmer-herder disputes, healthier stock, higher meat and dairy production, and more revenue for state governments. The “cattle colonies” proposal has prompted criticism from or outright rejection by state governments.

According to Ogbeh, sixteen states, mostly from the North West and North East, endorsed the plan and promised to allocate land. These are states with large land masses, lower population densities and well-established pastoralist populations. In some North Central states, like Kogi, Kaduna and Kwara, the governors’ acceptance of the proposal met resistance from the so-called indigenous ethnic groups, largely farmers. Elsewhere in the Middle Belt and much of the south, the “cattle colonies” proposal has prompted criticism from or outright rejection

by state governments, ethnic pressure groups and other civil society organisations, on at least five counts.

First, many considered the name provocative. To many Nigerians' ears, the term "colony" connotes an administrative space acquired not through negotiation and with indigenes' consent but by force, conjuring memories of British imperial conquest. As narratives of "Fulani colonisation" already aggravate the farmer-herder problem and passions still run high over the Benue killings, the government's adoption of the term was ill advised.

A second objection concerned the government's subsidies for livestock production. Critics contended that some cattle owners were millionaires who should be able to establish ranches without such subsidies. They asserted that the government had introduced no special schemes for crop farmers so should not do so for cattle owners and herdsmen. This argument was inaccurate: over the years, successive governments have rolled out programs to help farmers. In principle, therefore, there was nothing new or wrong in a federal government plan for supporting livestock producers. A related objection centred on the nature of support to be offered. Opponents of the proposal argued that the government's assistance to farmers had been largely in the form of movable capital and services, rather than land, which is a fixed asset. They urged that if the government was to assist cattle dealers and herdsmen, it should offer interest-free loans, free veterinary services or herd improvement programs, but leave herdsmen to acquire land only with locals' permission.

A third concern centred on the availability of land. Some state governments, including those of Benue, Taraba, Ekiti and Abia, emphasised they have no land to spare. Indeed, given already high population densities and pressure on farmland due to the widespread practice of allowing land to lie fallow in order to improve its yield, it was doubtful that any southern

state could afford to allocate 5,000 hectares for a cattle colony, either practically or politically. Establishing the colonies amid farms that lack sufficient land for their crops risked creating more problems. Establishing the colonies amid farms that lack sufficient land for their crops risked creating more problems.

Fourthly, many farmers in the Middle Belt and southern zones viewed the proposal as an indirect attempt by the federal government to take their ancestral land and hand it over to Fulani herdsmen at their expense. The government rejected that accusation and insisted that Nigerians of all ethnic groups were welcome to establish ranches. But many opponents of cattle colonies remained unconvinced. Some argued that colonies would eventually become “mini-states within states” with implications for demography and local culture.

The last objection was that the cattle colonies would not solve the problem of open grazing, since it would be voluntary for herdsmen to move into them and, more to the point, many herdsmen are foreign transhumant migrants. Many are citizens of other West and Central African countries; they come to Nigeria in search of pasture during the dry season and leave when the rains begin. They may have little interest in settling in Nigeria, where they would be required to pay for cattle feed, water and use of amenities. Thus, while the colonies could reduce indiscriminate grazing, they would not eliminate it.

As the colonies’ critics waited for the government to address their concerns, Agriculture Minister Ogbeh on 19 June announced yet another policy initiative, a National Livestock Transformation Plan aimed at encouraging a more gradual switch from open grazing to ranching. “Open grazing is no longer viable; that’s why we’re switching to ranching”, he said. The plan, running from 2018 to 2027, is a multifaceted intervention intended to modernise livestock management, improve productivity and enhance security.

Under the new plan, ten states – Adamawa, Benue, Ebonyi, Edo, Kaduna, Nasarawa, Oyo, Plateau, Taraba and Zamfara – have been selected as the pilot states, with 94 ranches to be established in clusters of four at 24 locations spread over those states. To participate in the plan, cattle herdsman are expected to organise and register as cooperatives that will then be able to rent land from state governments and also benefit from loans, grants and subsidies. The federal and state governments are expected to provide a total of 70 billion nairas (about \$195 million) for the pilot phase, spanning three years, while private interests are expected to invest in excess of 100 billion nairas (about \$278 million) between the fourth and tenth years.

The plan is a laudable effort at resolving the farmer-herder conflict, but like earlier initiatives, it has drawn mixed responses. The major herdsman' and farmers' associations, MACBAN and the All Farmers Association of Nigeria (AFAN), respectively, have cautiously welcomed it. Saleh Alhassan, the MAKH national secretary, said, “we are fully in support of this policy”, but added that “if we want to completely transform from open grazing to highly mechanised form of livestock production, which is ranching, we need a period of not less than 25 years”. But some of the states designated for the start-up phase, including Ebonyi and Edo in the south and Benue in the Middle Belt, again reject inclusion in the project. They argue that they lack sufficient land for ranches, but their opposition is more fundamentally driven by fears that allowing Fulani groups to settle in their midst risks further conflicts in the future. The federal government will have to address these fears in order to overcome resistance in the opposing states.

To end the farmer-herder killings, the federal government needs to demonstrate more decisive leadership, notably by further improving security, tackling impunity head-on and pressing states to suspend enforcement of open grazing bans until herdsman' objections are

properly addressed. It also should expedite rollout of the National Livestock Transformation Plan. Four measures are crucial for quickly improving security arrangements. First is to boost the numbers of security personnel, particularly in the most vulnerable areas of Benue, Nasarawa and Taraba states. In the short term, some of the soldiers currently engaged in policing duties in the South East and South West should be redeployed to the troubled states; the large numbers of police personnel still guarding politicians and other privileged elite in Abuja and state capitals should also be reassigned to these areas.

The federal government should further provide the army and police units deployed to these states with additional logistics support, including more patrol vehicles and especially more motorcycles for moving through difficult terrain and reaching remote communities. Security services must also improve on their ability to gather intelligence and predict attacks, including through closer engagement and communication with local residents. Moreover, the police should put to better use information gleaned from interrogations of arrested armed group members to apprehend and disarm militias camped deep in forests. The government needs to ensure that both herdsmen and farmers responsible for violence are held to account.

Second are steps to hold perpetrators of violence accountable. President Buhari has pledged repeatedly that those responsible for the killings will be arrested and prosecuted. But as Crisis Group argued last year, the government needs to ensure that both herdsmen and farmers responsible for violence are held to account, transparently and even-handedly. The government should set up an independent high-level commission to investigate all major cases of farmer-herder violence that occurred since it assumed office in 2015 – including those in the Mambilla plateau, Numan, Kajuru, Nimbo, Agatu and southern Kaduna. This commission should make recommendations on how to hold to account not only the killers but also any individual or group found to have sponsored or been complicit in the atrocities.

Investigators should also address allegations of military complacency and connivance, and recommend sanctions for any officers or rank-and-file soldiers found to have acted unprofessionally. For persons already arrested and others who may be indicted by the commission, the government should make special arrangements to expedite trials, provide justice for victims and send a strong signal against impunity. Leaving cases to the slow-grinding judiciary without special steps to speed up trials will mean long delays, deepening grievances and the risk of further violence.

The third priority is the disarmament of militias and vigilantes. Security agencies need a comprehensive disarmament program. On 22 February, the police issued an order for all illegal weapons countrywide to be surrendered by 15 March. Given that most armed groups did not comply with this directive, the police and other security agencies should step up efforts to identify and arrest illegal arms producers and dealers. With the aid of informants, they also should detect and seize illegal stockpiles in remote areas. The customs and immigration services should scale up their monitoring of Nigeria's land borders, to curb the inflow of illicit firearms and mercenaries. Security services should also liaise more closely with locals to persuade militias to disarm. Such persuasion, however, will yield results only when the government institutes policies that assure the armed groups and communities that support them that their interests are being addressed and that their security will be protected.

The Benue state government should freeze and review its open grazing ban, as Taraba state has done. In enacting the ban, it acted in accordance with its constitutional prerogatives and in the interest of the majority of its people. But given cattle owners' and herdsmen' objections, it should apply such laws in a manner that does not aggravate existing tensions or create new problems.

Following Taraba's example, the Benue state government should suspend enforcement of its anti-grazing law, amend the provisions to accommodate herdsmen's interests and encourage a phased transition to ranching. In reviewing provisions of the laws that herdsmen find noxious, it should particularly address those relating to land acquisition, allowing for longer leases rather than requiring annual lease renewal. It should clarify the administrative procedures for obtaining credit, getting ranch management training and entering into private-public partnerships, in order to encourage investors to establish ranches. It also should establish pilot ranches in at least three zones, in order to demonstrate to herdsmen how such projects would work to their benefit. It should carry out herder sensitisation campaigns explaining the new law, as well as the incentives for moving to ranching. Where possible, it should lend greater support to herder-farmer dialogues at local or community levels.

Dialogue between herdsmen and farmers, particularly at the local level, is crucial to ending the violence. In some states, governments have established structures that could facilitate such dialogue. These include the Committee on Reconciliation and Development of Gazetted Grazing Reserves in Adamawa state, the Peace Agency in Plateau state and the multi-level conflict resolution committees in Nasarawa state, whose establishment was formalised on 27 June. State governments should strengthen these structures to ensure sustained engagement with, and effective mediation between, the parties in conflict. There are hopeful new initiatives as well. On 12 July, AFAN and MACBAN leaders met in Abuja and agreed to collaborate to ensure peaceful coexistence among their members countrywide. In furtherance of the agreement, they formed a fourteen-person joint committee to recommend strategies for ending violence and building peace between the two groups. On 21 July, leaders of the Yandang and four other ethnic groups in Lau local government area of Taraba state signed a peace accord with the Fulani, agreeing to immediately withdraw all militias, jointly comb troubled areas and arrest any person(s) found with arms, and set up a peace and reconciliation

committee. These initiatives are still very fragile, endangered by mutual distrust. They need to be supported by federal, state and local governments, and security agencies, as well as non-governmental organisations with expertise in grassroots conflict resolution and peace building.

4.8 Prospect for Curbing Farmers-Herdsmen Conflict in Benue State for the Enhancement of National Security in Nigeria

Creation of Grazing Reserves: In 1965 the northern regional government initiated one of the first attempts to respond to the herdsmen-farmer conflict in the country. The grazing reserves allocated large portions of land to be exclusively used by herdsmen to rear their livestock. However, the grazing reserve system was not supported adequately. The government was still in the process of initiating legislations to legitimise the grazing reserves before natural factors such as population growth and other related consequences like urbanisation, and migration encroached on these designated areas reducing the herdsmen' chances of accessing the reserves.

Establishment of the National Commission for Nomadic Education (NCNE): The federal government in 1989 established the NCNE and it is supported by the Nigerian legal system. The main goal of the programme was to integrate nomadic pastoralists into national life through mobile basic education and skill acquisition. The programme intended to integrate them into society through education.

The Use of the Armed Forces to Curb Internal Security. One of the Federal government's immediate measures to address the herdsmen-farmer conflicts is the engagement of the Armed Forces of Nigeria as enshrined in the Constitution. For example, in Plateau state, in 2001, the government deployed a Special Task Force called Operation Safe Haven (STF-OSH) to check insecurity resulting from the herdsmen-farmers clashes. Recently, the OSH

mandate was expanded to replace Operation Harbin Kunama II in Southern Kaduna state whose mandate was similar to that of OSH in Plateau. Presently, many are calling for a total declaration of a state of emergency in Benue and Plateau states as a result of the gruesome killing and displacement of thousands of people in those states. Nigerians also expect the government to activate all the necessary sections of the constitution regarding the use of the military in internal security. This call came as a fall-out of recent action taken by the government to suppress the Indigenous People of Biafra's (IPOB) agitations in the South-East and similar uprisings in other parts of the country. The military was deployed in September 2017 in an operation code-named Operation Python Dance to suppress the IPOB agitation and protests.

Sustenance of the National Grazing Reserve Bill 2016. A National Grazing Reserve bill was sponsored in 2016 at the parliament to address the herdsmen-farmer conflicts. The Bill did not survive due to opposition from different stakeholders. Those that opposed the Bill hinged their rejection on the provisions of the Land Use Act of 1978 which vests all powers related to the regulation of ownership, acquisition, administration, and management of Nigerian land with the state governors. Thus, the Land Use Act is an Act of the National Assembly, and by implication, a binding legislation, unless it is amended. State governments and their representatives at the parliament have always opposed any attempt to establish grazing reserves in their domain. They consider it to be usurping the constitutional powers vested in them.

Proposed Cattle Ranching System 2018. In reaction to increasing conflicts and mass killings resulting from seasonal pastoral movements, the government in 2018, as a matter of policy approved a 10-year National Livestock Plan at a cost of about 179 billion naira. The plan would culminate in the establishment of 94 ranches in 10 pilot states of the federation. Again,

state governments, especially in the South and North Central areas rejected the proposal on the grounds of not having enough space for such projects.

Legislation Prohibiting Open Grazing. As part of measures to end the persistent conflict between herdsmen and farmers in various states, government at state levels began enacting legislations prohibiting open grazing in their state. This, they hope, would reduce the risk of herdsmen destruction of farm lands and the associated conflicts. Benue, Ekiti and Taraba states are leading this opposition by enacting state laws prohibiting open grazing. On 22 May 2017 Benue state enacted the Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law (2017) and its implementation began on 1 November 2017. Ekiti and Taraba states have also signed Bills prohibiting open grazing in their states. This makes open grazing under any guise, an illegal activity punishable by law.

4.9 Analysis of Herdsmen-Farmers Conflicts in Benue State and National Security in Nigeria

Table 4.9: Herdsmen-Farmers Conflicts in Nigeria between January 2016 and May 2017.

S/n	Place	Date	Immediate cause(s)	Death toll/Casualties/Degree of Destruction
A.	Incidences of 2016			
1.	Udeni Ruwa, Nasarawa state	January 6	Destruction of farm crops	Between 12 and 38 people were killed and many wounded.
2.	Gareji village in Taraba State	January 17		3 people were killed
3.	Agatu, Benue State	February 2	Reprisal attack	7 people were killed and the community was thrown into mourning.
4.	Tom-Anyiin and Tom-Ataan communities, Tombu in Buruku LGA, Benue State	February 7	Clash between Fulani herdsmen and farmers	10 persons were killed and the community was raided.
5.	Agatu, Benue State	February 24 & 28	Reprisal attack against the alleged killing of a prominent Fulani man by the people of Agatu in 2013	Between 300 and 500 persons were killed and wounded. Others were displaced.

6.	Mbaya-Tombo, Benue state	March 7,8 13 & 17	Dispute and destruction of farm crops	Over 35 persons died and properties were destroyed.
7.	Angai, Dashole, Dori and Mesuwa villages of Taraba State	April 10	Farm land dispute	Between 15 and 44 people were killed.
8.	Agatu, Benue State	April 20	Policemen attacked	Some persons were injured and a policeman was declared missing.
B. Incidences of 2017				
9.	Ipiga village in Ohimini LGA, Benue State	January 24	Grazed cattle and destroyed farmlands	15 persons were killed. A bloody fight that took the lives of two of the herdsmen and about 13 of the villagers.
10.	Mbahimin community, Gwer East LGA, Benue State	March 2	Renewed hostilities between herdsmen and farmers in Mbahimin community	No fewer than 10 persons were killed.
11.	Tiv community, Mkgovur village in Buruku LGA, Benue State	March 11		7 people were killed.
12.	Umuobasikwu, Ozuitem	March 14	Clash between herdsmen and the people	1 person was killed and several others
13.	Adam Village, Kwande LGA, Benue State	March 27	Herdsmen farm attack	1 killed, 1 injured, women raped in their farms.
14.	Tse-Akaa village, Ugondo Mbamar District of Logo LGA, Benue State	May 8	Clash with herdsmen	3 persons were killed.

Source: *Authors Compilation (2018).*

Clashes between cattle herdsmen and crop farmers have been a major cause of increasing violence and general insecurity in Nigeria. There has been increasing economic adverse effects and social or relational implications such as indicated in table 4.9. Table 4.9 revealed that in most of these encounters, human and animal lives were regularly lost. From the table, on April 5th, 2016 Fulani militants killed four individuals in Benue State. Again, between 10 and 11th of the same month they killed about 17 persons in Taraba and 40 people were massacred in Enugu State on the 25th of that same month. Following a rivalry between the Tiv and Fulani ethnic groups, a total of 853 people have lost their lives since June 2014. While the Fulani herdsmen claimed to have lost 214 people in addition to 3,200 cows, the Tiv people reportedly killed are estimated to be 633 excluding children and women who died in ramshackle camps in 2014. More so, six soldiers attached to the 72 battalion in Makurdi were

said to be killed in the cross-fire that ensued between the two groups during the period. They emphasized that five of the soldiers were killed in Agatu in January 2015 while one, a captain, was beheaded in Guma LGA of Benue State. So far, the Tiv people in Guma, Gwer-West, Makurdi and other towns at the border with Taraba state have recorded about 458 deaths and over 350 communities have been sacked and are now living in IDP camps.

In addition, more than 40 million worth of crops are usually lost annually due to invasion of cattle in the South-South region of Nigeria, especially Delta and Edo States. This has not only created an impediment to the survival of the host communities but has forced many crop-farmers to abandon farming for lesser occupations like Okada (commercial motorcycling) riding and other artisan work. The conflict has continued to lead to destruction or loss of properties and crops in Katsina State leaving an already endangered populace even poorer. The food security welfare of urban dwellers especially residents of Calabar that depend on these farmers for food supply has been negatively affected since the incessant clashes in Yakurr, which is predominantly a farming community and prices of available food supply skyrocketed.

There were reports of displaced farmers and herdsmen alike. In the host communities, nomadic herdsmen relocate as a result of conflict. Host farmers especially women who stayed behind stop going to distant farms for fear of attack by nomads in the bush. Such displaced farmers have become a source of liability to other farmers whom they have to beg for food for themselves and their families. This has created a vicious cycle of poverty in such communities.

It is noteworthy that majority of the members of the expanse Fulani ethnic group are solely pastoralists without connection to militant violence. Even these peaceful ones, however, are largely viewed with suspicion and anger by the sedentary communities on whose land they

take their cattle, largely as a result of the actions of the violent group. This has created distrust and altered the mutual relationship that has existed between them and most of their host communities.

4.10 Results of Regression Analysis (One Sample t-test)

Hypothesis One: There is no significant relationship between farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State and implication for National Security in Nigeria

Table 4.10: One sample t-test of the mean ratings of prior relationship between farmers and herdsmen.

One-Sample Test

Test Value = 0						
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean	95% Confidence Interval of Difference	
					Lower	Upper
FRAMERS	25.050	119	.000	10.52941	9.6904	11.3684
HERDSMEN		120	.000	11.35294	10.6920	12.0139

Table 4.10 revealed that a t-value of 25.050 was obtained with associated probability value of 0.00 using 2-tailed one sample independent test. Since the associated probability (0.00) was less than 0.05, the null hypothesis (H_{01}) was rejected. Thus, there is a significant relationship between farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State and implication for National Security in Nigeria

Hypothesis two: There is no significant relationship in issues involved in farmers-herdsmen conflicts in Benue State and implication for national security in Nigeria

Table 4.11: One sample t-test of the mean ratings of the issues involved in farmers and herder's conflicts and national security.

One-Sample Test

Test Value = 0						
	T	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
					Lower	Upper
HERDSMEN	34.286	120	.000	11.35294	10.6920	12.0139
FARMERS		119	.000	8.52239	7.9229	9.1219

Table 4.11 revealed that a t-value of 34.286 was obtained with associated probability value of 0.00 using 2-tailed one sample independent test. Since the associated probability (0.00) was less than 0.05, the null hypothesis (H_{02}) was rejected. Thus, there is a significant relationship in issues involved in farmers-herdsmen conflicts in Benue State and implication for national security in Nigeria

Hypothesis three: Impact of farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State has no significant implication for national security in Nigeria

Table 4.12: One sample t-test of the mean ratings of the impacts of farmer-herder conflicts and national security.

One-Sample Test

Test Value = 0						
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
					Lower	Upper
HERDSMEN	30.774	120	.000	11.35294	10.6920	12.0139
FARMERS		120	.000	13.83824	12.9407	14.7358

Table 4.12 revealed that a t-value of 30.774 was obtained with associated probability value of 0.00 using 2-tailed one sample independent test. Since the associated probability (0.00) was less than 0.05, the null hypothesis (H_{03}) was rejected. Thus, farmer-herder conflicts have a significant impact on national security in Nigeria.

Hypothesis four: Challenges militating against efforts to curb farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State has no significant implication for enhanced national security in Nigeria

Table 4.13: One sample t-test of the mean ratings of the challenges of farmer-herder conflicts on national security.

One-Sample Test

Test Value = 0						
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
					Lower	Upper
FARMERS	32.415	120	.000	11.35294	10.6920	12.0139
HERDSMEN		120	.000	10.23529	9.6050	10.8655

Table 4.13 revealed that a t-value of 32.415 was obtained with associated probability value of 0.00 using 2-tailed one sample independent test. Since the associated probability (0.00) was less than 0.05, the null hypothesis (H_{04}) was rejected. Thus, there is a significant difference between mean ratings of the challenges of farmer-herder conflicts on national security.

Hypothesis five: There is no significant relationship between adopted strategies to address farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State and enhancement of national security in Nigeria

Table 4.14: One sample t-test of the mean ratings of the strategies of curbing farmer-herder conflicts.

One-Sample Test

Test Value = 0						
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
					Lower	Upper
FARMERS	36.407	120	.000	11.35294	10.6920	12.0139
HERDSMEN		120	.000	19.52941	18.4587	20.6001

Table 4.14 revealed that a t-value of 36.407 was obtained with associated probability value of 0.00 using 2-tailed one sample independent test. Since the associated probability (0.00) was less than 0.05, the null hypothesis (H_{05}) was rejected. Thus, there is a significant difference between the mean ratings of the strategies to mitigate the challenges militating against efforts at addressing farmer-herder conflicts for enhanced national security.

4.11 Discussion of Results

Results from the study showed that the main cause of conflict between farmers and herdsmen in Benue state is land which is used by farmers for cultivation and grazing for herdsmen. This concern was not solved neither by leaders nor elders. Results show that leaders rejected the

concept of separating farming from grazing area the idea which could have reduced direct collision between farmers and herdsmen. The study indicates that farmers see herdsmen as very bad people and see them to be responsible for every bad thing such as crop destruction, land degradation and farm encroachment. This tendency of farmers to look herdsmen in a negative way can increase hatred between these two groups which can increase the rate of conflict among these communities. The finding is in support of the study of Oladele and Oladele (2014) who concluded that uncontrolled grazing and aggressiveness of pastoralists were prominent causes of farmers-herdsmen conflicts.

The study shows that herdsmen also perceive farmers as very bad people and see them to be responsible for cattle route encroachment, responsible for encroaching grazing area, use more water for irrigation, water sources destruction and poor farming method which cause land degradation and the main cause of grazing land encroachment. The perception of farmers towards herdsmen and herdsmen towards farmers shows that each of the two groups is asserting each other the result which makes it difficult to resolve the conflicts. Leaders in any society are responsible in peace maintenance within a particular community. The results show that farmers and herdsmen do not trust their leaders because they blamed them for involving in corruption. These results indicate that strategies for managing the conflict between farmer and herdsmen and the resolution obtained are not sustainable. The finding is in disagreement with the study of Ahmadu (2011) in his work, "Farmer-Grazer Conflict: View of a Livestock Worker on Official Interpretation and Handling", traced the frustrations suffered by herdsmen due to systemic discrimination in the allocation of land resources, imposition of unfair taxation, undue criminalization of herdsmen and poor official treatment. He concluded that poor official treatment meted to the Fulani herdsmen were compounded by socio-cultural stigmatization and discrimination by their host communities.

The study shows that there is no good result can be obtained by using power in solving conflict between farmers and herdsmen. The study shows that conflict kept occurring despite extra power used especially by police force. The study further shows that, sustainable resolution is obtained by creating awareness to the community members to know the importance of peace keeping in their society, and involve people and especially the conflicting groups to find out for their own what are the causes and what are the strategies suitable to end conflict. The finding is in tandem with the study of Shem (2010) in his work, “Impacts of Government Policies on Pastoralist Livelihood in Semi-Arid Areas of Tanzania”, traced conflicts between pastoralists and farmers in Tanzania to the increased movement of pastoralists to new areas due to the combined factors of climate change and growing livestock populations. He averred that this movement creates serious land use conflicts between pastoralists and farmers.

The study indicates that farmers perceive herdsmen as very bad people and see them to be responsible for every bad thing such as crop destruction, land degradation and farm encroachment. This tendency of farmers to perceive herdsmen in a negative way it can increase hatred between these two groups which can increase conflict among these communities. The finding is in tandem with the study of Ladan (2011), who contend that most of these conflicts often result in internal displacement of persons to the extent that the volume and spread of Internal Displaced Persons in Nigeria.

The study indicates that herdsmen also perceive farmers as very bad people and see them to be responsible for cattle route encroachment, responsible for encroaching grazing area, use more water for irrigation, water sources distraction and Poor farming method which cause land degradation and hence the main cause of grazing land encroachment. The perception of farmers towards herdsmen and herdsmen towards farmers shows that each of the two groups

is blaming each other the result which makes it difficult to resolve the conflicts. Basing on the results of this study, both farmers and herdsmen share the same opinions about conflict meaning that both farmers and herdsmen have the same experience on the impacts of conflict. In the first place both farmers and herdsmen agree that conflict leads to loss of life and destruction of properties and social relationship which make life to become difficult. The finding from the study agrees with the conclusions of Umar (2017) and Ojo and Adebayo (2012), that the persistence of farmers-herdsmen conflict has threatened access to food in many parts of the country.

The study shows that village leaders were blamed by farmers and herdsmen for being corrupt, for using bad approach to end conflict, not being transparent, being in favour of herder and selfishness. These were bad things which leaders can do because instead of putting down the conflict these acts were speeding up the conflict. These results show the need to use elders in resolving farmers and herdsmen conflicts because in African culture elders are most respected and they are able to give constructive ideas which may be useful in their community, they know the root causes of the conflicts, they are close to their people and they are part of a particular society and therefore they do not need favours from their people like corruption so that to solve the conflicts in their societies. These results indicate that strategies set to managing the conflict between farmers and herdsmen and the resolutions obtained are not sustainable instead it's a short lived resolution. The finding supports the conclusion of the study of Bello (2013) who asserted that leaders in any society are responsible in peace maintenance within a particular community. The results show that farmers and pastoralists do not trust their leaders because they blamed them for involving in corruption.

From the data analysis and interpretation of the results from the one sample t-test, the following findings emerged:

The prior or existing relationship between farmers and herdsmen conflicts include: Better understanding of what caused the conflict, focusing on the management strategy that best address the problem between both parties, allowing parties in conflicts to find a reasonable solution on their own and resolving conflicts by ensuring that both parties accept fair terms of settlement. The result from the hypothesis reveal that there is a significant difference between the mean ratings of the prior relationship between farmers and herdsmen. The finding from the study agrees with the conclusions of Umar (2017) and Ojo and Adebayo (2012), that the persistence of farmers-herdsmen conflict has threatened access to food in many parts of the country.

The main issues involved in farmers and herdsmen' conflicts include: crop destruction, land degradation and farm encroachment, cattle route encroachment, responsible for encroaching grazing area, use more water for irrigation, water sources distraction and Poor farming method which cause land degradation and hence the main cause of grazing land encroachment. The result from the hypothesis reveal that there was a significant difference between the mean ratings of the issues involved in farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria. The finding is in tandem with the study of Shem (2010) in his work, "Impacts of Government Policies on Pastoralist Livelihood in Semi-Arid Areas of Tanzania", traced conflicts between pastoralists and farmers in Tanzania to the increased movement of pastoralists to new areas due to the combined factors of climate change and growing livestock populations. He averred that this movement creates serious land use conflicts between pastoralists and farmers.

The study finding also revealed the challenges of farmer-herder conflicts and national security to include: farmers and pastoralists for being corrupt, for using bad approach to end conflict, not being transparent, being in favour of pastoralist and selfishness. Finding from the hypothesis indicate that there was a significant difference between the mean ratings of the

challenges of farmer-herder conflicts and national security management in Nigeria. The finding from the study contend that resource conflict amongst farmers and herdsmen has increased in recent time in the middle belt and southern zones of Nigeria. Policy gaps and underdevelopment of grazing lands have been blamed for this worsening arable land resource conflict. Land ownership and utilization have directly and indirectly defined the dimensions of most agricultural land conflicts, which are becoming fiercer and increasingly widespread in Nigeria, largely due to increasing production activities for the increasing human population (Iro, 2015; Ladan, 2012).

In relation to the impact of farmer-herder conflict on national security, the findings show that the conflicts have led to loss of life and destruction of crops, animals, houses, properties and social relationship which make life to become difficult. The tested hypothesis revealed that there was a significant difference between the mean ratings of the impact of farmer-herder conflicts on national security in Nigeria. The finding of the study is in agreement with the study of Gbanite (2012) who concluded that the persistence of farmers-herdsmen conflict necessitated efforts by government to establish various mediatory panels and judicial commissions to address these conflicts. These official conflict management mechanisms are supported by institutional mechanisms provided by traditional institutions, which in the traditional Nigerian community provide the basic conflict resolution mechanisms. However, these institutional conflict management mechanisms have been unable to curb the conflicts, due to the inability of traditional institutions to exert sufficient influence on the conflicting parties.

In relation to the strategies to mitigate the challenges militating against the efforts at addressing farmer-herder conflicts for enhanced national security, the findings of the study show that taking time to study what caused the conflicts, promoting an atmosphere of

understanding between farmers and herdsmen and allowing the conflicting parties to air their views, Discourages resentment and grudges between the groups. Result from the tested hypothesis reveal that there is a significant difference between the mean ratings of the strategies to mitigate the challenges militating against efforts at addressing farmer-herder conflicts for enhanced national security. The finding agrees with the study of Na’Allah (2017), Olayoku (2014) and Ngbale (2011) who in their various conclusions arrive a compromise that mutual fear of deep-rooted hostility exists among the Fulani herdsmen and host farmers. The age-old problem escalated in the last decade and has assumed a violent dimension whereby communities are being internally displaced, lives and property are being lost while hunger and insecurity have become the order of the day. The conflicts occur when Fulani herdsmen move into non-Fulani homelands with their cattle. This usually leads to the destruction of farm crops. Thus, the herdsmen provoke their victims to acts of communal and individual resistance (preventing entry into farms, killing or stealing cattle, or poisoning fields). In response, the herdsmen wage deadly attacks on host communities.

4.12 Summary of Findings

The summary of major findings arising from issues, analysis of data on farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue state and national security in Nigeria are enumerated below. The study finds that:

- i. Policy framework, grazing reserves and law enforcement are identified in this study as critical factors in farmers-herdsmen conflict and national security in Nigeria. Other identified issues include conflict resolution mechanisms and socio-cultural dynamics.
- ii. There is a negative correlation and inverse relationship between farmers-herdsmen conflict and national security.

- iii. Farmers-herdsmen conflict has significantly negative impacts on national security.
- iv. Farmers-herdsmen conflicts are influenced by differences in social and cultural dynamics between farmers and herdsmen. This is a proof of the theory of Political Economy that conflicts between farmers and herdsmen are caused by social-cultural and political imbalance in access to resources, rather than lack of resources.
- v. It could be deduced from the above that the persistence of farmers-herdsmen conflicts in Nigeria is a result of inability to address political and socio-cultural factors that influence the conflicts.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

Over the years, government at all levels in Nigeria has applied various instruments to address emerging conflicts between farmers and herdsman in various parts of the country. Yet, Farmers-herdsmen conflicts have raged intensely for decades in Nigeria, leading to loss of lives and threatening national security. The study has appraised farmers-herdsmen conflict in Nigeria in order to suggest strategies to curb its recurrence, for the enhancement of national security in Benue State, North Central Nigeria.

Chapter one of the study looks at the background of farmer-herdsmen conflicts in general and Nigeria in particular. The background centred on farmer-herdsmen conflict which has attracted considerable empirical and theoretical analyses within the academia in recent times. However, most of the previous studies conducted in Nigeria has failed to take into consideration the security management strategies but rather concentrate on other aspects of herder-farmer conflicts. The introductory chapter also looked at the causes, nature and challenges of herder-farmer conflicts in Benue State, North Central Nigeria which has not been adequately research by academicians. The thesis highpoint the challenges of political authorities and security apparatuses in addressing the implications of farmer-herdsmen conflicts. The chapter also look at the specific objectives, research questions, significance and scope of the study.

Chapter two of the study presented the relevant literature review and theoretical framework for managing farmers-herdsmen conflict. The chapter extensively reviews previous related studies, observations, opinions, comments, ideas and knowledge that shed light on the key

concepts under discussion. The essence is to situate the study in proper context and to create a link between related previous studies and the research work as well to identify the gap in knowledge with respect to the study of the subject matter. The empirical review centred on relationship between farmers-herdsmen conflict and national security, issues involved in farmers-herdsmen conflicts and national security, impacts of farmers-herdsmen conflict on national security, challenges militating against efforts to curb farmers-herdsmen conflict, prospects for curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict and strategies adopted to address farmers-herdsmen conflict for the enhancement of national security in Nigeria.

In addition, the chapter also review relevant theories that have the potential of explaining the research problem in a bid to identifying suitable model(s) that could satisfactorily address the problem of conflicts between farmers and herdsmen which is widespread across the African continent and Nigeria in particular and the reasons for their occurrence are varied, stemming from the incompatibility of livelihood patterns between farmers and herdsmen, alterations of symbiotic relationship, resentment of herdsmen, destructions of farms by cattle and cattle rustling among others.

The theories reviewed include political ecology theory, frustration aggression theory, relative deprivation theory and ecological theory. However, farmers-herdsmen conflict may be best understood from the theory of political ecology, propounded by Eric Wolf in 1972. The theory explains the political dynamics surrounding material struggles over the environment, particularly in developing countries. The theory of political ecology uncovers the root cause of conflicts between farmers and herdsmen, advocating that these conflicts are caused by changes in or limited access to natural resources, as well as policies that determine land use. Political ecology deduces that conflicts between farmers and herdsmen arise due to imbalance in the rights to access, rather than the lack of resources due to natural causes such as

population or climate change. Through this theory it could be deduced that addressing socio-political and cultural imbalances in the allocation and utilization of land resources would curb farmers-herdsmen conflict thereby enhancing national security.

Chapter three of study presented the research methodology. The study adopted the descriptive survey research method, because only one entity was studied with the ultimate aim of gathering data from the respondents on the impact of farmer and herdsmen conflict on national security in Nigeria. In addition, survey designs are valuable in depicting the attributes of a large population as is the case in the study. The chapter review the research design, the population and sample selection, data collection instruments, data analysis techniques and associated methodological problems that may be encountered. The validity and reliability test as well as the justification of data analysis instrument adopted were also discussed. The study collected primary and secondary data. Primary data provided a presentation of the actual information that was obtained to accomplish the aim of the study. This primary data was gathered using both open ended and closed ended questionnaires. The questionnaires were self-administered to the respondents who were picked for the purpose of analysis. Empirical and theoretical literature from books, journals and the internet were sourced for the purpose of collecting the secondary data. Descriptive statistics in the form of frequencies, percentages were used for analysis in the study. Multiple regression analysis Statistical Package for Social sciences (SPSS) computer software version 20 was be used to test and validate the hypotheses at 5% level of significance.

Chapter four of the study presented that data analysis, presentation and interpretation. The research questions were tested and results presented with discussions and interpretation. The results were presented and discussed based on the research questions and specific objectives of the study. Findings from the analysis, interpretation and discussion of results revealed that

the main cause of conflict between farmers and herdsmen is land which is used by farmers for cultivation and grazing for herdsmen. This concern was not solved neither by leaders nor elders. Results show that leaders rejected the concept of separating farming from grazing area the idea which could have reduced direct collision between farmers and herdsmen. The study indicates that farmers see herdsmen as very bad people and see them to be responsible for every bad thing such as crop destruction, land degradation and farm encroachment. This tendency of farmers to look herdsmen in a negative way can increase hatred between these two groups which can increase the rate of conflict among these communities.

From the data analysis and interpretation of the results from the one sample t-test, the following findings emerged:

The prior or existing relationship between farmers and herdsmen conflicts include: Better understanding of what caused the conflict, focusing on the management strategy that best address the problem between both parties, allowing parties in conflicts to find a reasonable solution on their own and resolving conflicts by ensuring that both parties accept fair terms of settlement. The result from the hypothesis reveal that there is a significant difference between the mean ratings of the prior relationship between farmers and herdsmen.

The main issues involved in farmers and herdsmen' conflicts include: crop destruction, land degradation and farm encroachment, cattle route encroachment, responsible for encroaching grazing area, use more water for irrigation, water sources distraction and Poor farming method which cause land degradation and hence the main cause of grazing land encroachment. The result from the hypothesis reveal that there was a significant difference between the mean ratings of the issues involved in farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria.

The study finding also revealed the challenges of farmer-herder conflicts and national security to include: farmers and pastoralists for being corrupt, for using bad approach to end

conflict, not being transparent, being in favour of pastoralist and selfishness. Finding from the hypothesis indicate that there was a significant difference between the mean ratings of the challenges of farmer-herder conflicts and national security management in Nigeria. The finding from the study contend that resource conflict amongst farmers and herdsmen has increased in recent time in the middle belt and southern zones of Nigeria. Policy gaps and underdevelopment of grazing lands have been blamed for this worsening arable land resource conflict.

In relation to the impact of farmer-herder conflict on national security, the findings show that the conflicts have led to loss of life and destruction of crops, animals, houses, properties and social relationship which make life to become difficult. The tested hypothesis revealed that there was a significant difference between the mean ratings of the impact of farmer-herder conflicts on national security in Nigeria. These official conflict management mechanisms are supported by institutional mechanisms provided by traditional institutions, which in the traditional Nigerian community provide the basic conflict resolution mechanisms. However, these institutional conflict management mechanisms have been unable to curb the conflicts, due to the inability of traditional institutions to exert sufficient influence on the conflicting parties.

In relation to the strategies to mitigate the challenges militating against the efforts at addressing farmer-herder conflicts for enhanced national security, the findings of the study show that taking time to study what caused the conflicts, promoting an atmosphere of understanding between farmers and herdsmen and allowing the conflicting parties to air their views, Discourages resentment and grudges between the groups. Result from the tested hypothesis reveal that there is a significant difference between the mean ratings of the

strategies to mitigate the challenges militating against efforts at addressing farmer-herder conflicts for enhanced national security.

The age-old problem escalated in the last decade and has assumed a violent dimension whereby communities are being internally displaced, lives and property are being lost while hunger and insecurity have become the order of the day. The conflicts occur when Fulani herdsmen move into non-Fulani homelands with their cattle. This usually leads to the destruction of farm crops. Thus, the herdsmen provoke their victims to acts of communal and individual resistance (preventing entry into farms, killing or stealing cattle, or poisoning fields). In response, the herdsmen wage deadly attacks on host communities.

5.2 Conclusions

The study has analysed farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue State in order to suggest strategies to curb its recurrence, for the enhancement of national security in Nigeria. Specifically, the study has examined relationship between farmers-herdsmen conflict and national security, ascertain the issues involved in farmers-herdsmen conflicts and national security, impacts of farmers-herdsmen conflict on national security, challenges militating against efforts to curb farmers-herdsmen conflict, prospects for curbing farmers-herdsmen conflict and strategies adopted to address farmers-herdsmen conflict for the enhancement of national security in Nigeria. The following conclusions are drawn from the study:

The study concluded that main cause of conflict between farmers and herdsmen is land which is used by farmers for cultivation and grazing for herdsmen. This concern was not solved neither by leaders nor elders. In addition, farmers and herdsmen conflict management actors have rejected the concept of separating farming from grazing area the idea which could have reduced direct collision between farmers and herdsmen. Further, farmers see herdsmen as very bad people and see them to be responsible for every bad thing such as crop destruction,

land degradation and farm encroachment. This tendency of farmers to look herdsmen in a negative way has increased hatred between these two groups leading to the escalation of conflict.

The study also concluded that herdsmen also perceive farmers as very bad people and see them to be responsible for cattle route encroachment, responsible for encroaching grazing area, use more water for irrigation, water sources destruction and poor farming method which cause land degradation leading to unending conflicts. The perception of farmers towards herdsmen and herdsmen towards farmers shows that each of the two groups is asserting each other the result which makes it difficult to resolve the conflicts. In addition, the study concluded that farmers and herdsmen do not trust their leaders because they blamed them for involving in corruption.

The study concluded that no good result can be obtained by using power in solving conflict between farmers and herdsmen. The result showed that conflict kept occurring despite extra power used especially by police force and army. The study further concluded that, sustainable resolution can be obtained by creating awareness to the community members to know the importance of peace keeping in their society, and involve people and especially the conflicting groups to find out for their own what are the causes and what are the strategies suitable to end conflict.

The study concluded that village leaders were blamed by farmers and herdsmen for being corrupt, for using bad approach to end conflict, not being transparent, being in favour of herder and selfishness. The study further concluded that the strategies set to managing the conflict between farmers and herdsmen and the resolutions obtained are not sustainable instead it's a short-lived resolution.

The study also concluded that the main issues involved in farmers and herdsmen' conflicts include crop destruction, land degradation and farm encroachment, cattle route encroachment, water sources distraction and poor farming method which cause land degradation and hence the main cause of grazing land encroachment.

The study concluded that the challenges of farmer-herder conflicts and national security include policy gaps and underdevelopment of grazing lands. In addition, land ownership and utilization have directly and indirectly defined the dimensions of most agricultural land conflicts, which are becoming fiercer and increasingly widespread in Nigeria, largely due to increasing production activities for the increasing human population. In relation to the impact of farmer-herder conflict on national security, the concluded that the conflicts have led to loss of life and destruction of crops, animals, houses, properties and social relationship which make life to become difficult.

In relation to the strategies to mitigate the challenges militating against the efforts at addressing farmer-herder conflicts for enhanced national security, the study concluded that taking time to study what caused the conflicts, promoting an atmosphere of understanding between farmers and herdsmen and allowing the conflicting parties to air their views and discouraging resentment and grudges between the groups has the potential of alleviating the conflicts between farmers and herdsmen.

5.3 Recommendations

Based on the findings and conclusions drawn from the study, the following recommendations are made for conflict policy making and other stakeholders for enhancement of national security in Nigeria:

1. On the issues involved in farmer-herder conflicts, it is recommended that conflict management committees should be set up by government in collaborate with farmers' and herdsmen's unions and associations. This should have focused on creating comprehensive awareness and compliance with designated resolutions. The collaborations should be at State, zonal, local governments, and village/community levels through jointly established committees.
2. The study recommended that the strategies of Anti-Open Grazing law should be sustained to curtailed the menace of unaccounted wandering of herdsmen and cattle encroaching on farm land leading to conflict. This will avoid competition for the available few resources of land and water because it will enhance farmers and herdsmen to make impactive use of their respective areas.
3. On the finding of the impacts of farmers-herdsmen conflict on residents, victims and relatives of victims who suffer psychological trauma whereby they lose money, material and are maimed or injured, it is recommended that farmers or herdsmen found guilty for the conflict should be made to pay compensation to the affected group and be made to sign an undertaken to forestall future conflicts.
4. On the finding that the failure on the part of government security agencies in efforts to prevent and control herder-farmer conflicts, it is recommended that, government should recognize vigilante groups while also resuscitating local community policing systems to compliment the efforts of the conventional security agencies. They should be properly trained in rules of engagement and be adequately motivated and equipped to unauthorized invasion.
5. In relation to the strategies to mitigate the challenges militating against the efforts at addressing farmer-herder conflicts for enhanced national security, the study

recommended the adoption of post conflicts coping strategies such as problem-oriented coping strategies (POCS), emotion-oriented coping strategies (EOCS) and social-support coping strategies (SSCS).

6. On the issues of the challenges of land tenure system as a security risk to socio-economic and environmental development between farmers and herdsmen, the study recommends the need for urgent review of land use and arable land development policy in the country that will fair and acceptable to all interested parties.

5.4 Limitations of the Study

The basic limitation was the lack of statistics at the various communities visited in terms of records of conflict activities. All the security agencies claim not to have records of encounters of such activities or were afraid to disclose such information for security reasons and due confidentiality of their operations. As such, the research was based largely on unstructured interviews and questionnaire to collect data for the study.

The study is limited to the interior conflict communities of Benue State. In this regards the findings may not necessarily be applicable to all the other local government areas and states in Nigeria, but could shed some light as to the possible consequences to be suffered by such communities should they also experience incidents of farmer-herder conflict.

In addition, since the area and location of study is prone to herdsmen attacks, few of the respondents were not available to answer the questionnaire. However, the sample size was not deterred by the responses. Also most of the respondents could not speak English fluently, so translating and interpreting the questionnaire was a bit be difficult. However, this limitation was overcome as the research employ the services of research assistants who understand the native language and were familiar with terrain.

5.5 Suggestions for further Research

The present study analysed farmer-herder conflict in Benue state and national security in Nigeria. Further studies can be conducted in other geopolitical zones having borders with neighbouring countries such as Niger and Chad to examine the nature, causes, patterns and consequences of herdsman attack on such communities.

There are other independent variables which if taken care of can facilitate impactiveness and sustainability of management of conflict. Such independent variables include corruption, interest of farmers, interest of pastoralists, and interest of leaders. Other independent variables include crop destruction, water source destruction, land degradation, farm encroachment and cattle route encroachment. Future studies can consider such variables to examine their impact on farmer-herder conflict.

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APPENDIX I
QUESTIONNAIRE

Nasarawa State University,
Keffi,
Institute of Governance and Development Studies,
Security and Strategic Studies Programme.

Dear Respondent,

QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE IMPACT OF FARMERS-HERDSMEN CONFLICTS
ON NATIONAL SECURITY IN BENUE STATE NIGERIA

I am a Ph.D. student of the Nasarawa State University, Keffi, currently conducting a research on: **“ANALYSIS OF FARMERS-HERDSMEN CONFLICTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN BENUE STATE NIGERIA”**.

I will appreciate if you would kindly complete the attached questionnaire in respect of my thesis. Please, be assured that all information collected for this exercise would be used strictly for academic purposes, and your response would be treated in utmost confidence.

Accordingly, you are please, requested to tick or fill the spaces provided in the attached questionnaire. In case you are not literate, I request your consent to enable an interpreter assist you with the filling of this questionnaire.

Kind regards,

TYOOR, Fredrick M. Terhemba

NSU/GDP/SSS/0006/16/17

SECTION A: BIODATA

1. Occupation:

- a. Farmer. ☐
- b. Herdsman. ☐

2. Tribe:

- a. Hausa. ☐
- b. Fulani. ☐
- c. Tiv. ☐
- d. Kataf. ☐
- e. Agatu. ☐
- f. Yoruba. ☐

3. Sex; a. Male. ☐ b. Female. ☐

4. Age ; ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
- 17 – 25yrs. b. 26- 35 yrs c. 36-45yrs. d. 46-55yrs
- e. 56yrs and above. ☐

5. Educational Background;

- a. Literate. ☐

b. Illiterate. ☐

SECTION B

6. Have you ever witnessed any conflict between Farmers and Herdsmen?

a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐

7. Were you personally affected? a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐

8. In what ways were you affected? _____

9. Specifically, how was the response of the Police and other security agencies?

a. Very adequate ☐ b. Adequate ☐ c. Inadequate ☐

10. What is your general impression of law enforcement by the Police in your area?

a. Very poor ☐ b. Poor ☐ c. Adequate ☐ d. Very Adequate ☐

11. Do you think Keeping Herdsmen in specific camps or Grazing Reserves can reduce conflicts between farmers and herdsmen?

a. Yes ☐ b. Adequate ☐

12. Do you think Government policies on agricultural development have been effective in dealing with the conflict?

a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐

13. Suggest measures that could be adopted to end the crisis _____

SECTION C

THE IMPACT OF FARMERS-HERDSMEN CONFLICT

14. In Section C, please tick (x) to indicate your agreement with each of the statements in relation to the causes and impact of farmers-herdsmen conflict in your locality. Please note that positive statements will be rated as; SA-Strongly Agree (5 marks), A – Agree (4 marks), U-Undecided (3 marks), D – Disagree (2 marks), SD – Strongly Disagree (1 mark).

Item No	Statements	SA	A	U	D	SD
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
a.	Farmers-Herdsmen Conflict affect food production in the country					
b.	Farmers-Herdsmen Conflict is a threat to the safety and well-being of citizens in rural communities					
c.	Farmers-herdsmen conflict affect revenue accruable to Government					
d.	Traditional leaders can play vital roles in ending farmers-herdsmen conflict					
e.	Traditional institutions no longer have the influence and authority they had 30 or 40 years ago					
f.	The decline in pastures due to desertification has contributed to herdsmen moving southwards					
g.	Mutual lack of understanding of cultural/traditional practices also fuel conflicts between farmers and herdsmen					

15. Comment generally on how farmers and herdsmen could live together

APPENDIX II

CURRENT STATUS OF GRAZING RESERVES IN NIGERIA

S/No	State	No. of GRs	Total Size (HA)	No. Gazetted	Size Gazetted (HA)	No. Ungazetted	Size Ungazetted (HA)
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
1	Adamawa	69	195,432.44	31	122,143.33	38	73,289.01
2	Bauchi	42	244,478.3	27	230,285.30	15	14,193
3	Benue	10	28,000	NIL	NIL	10	28,000
4	Borno	56	446,583	15	108,799.00	41	337,784
5	Gombe	23	221,378	04	152,857.00	19	68,521
6	Jigawa	02	13,555	02	13,555	NIL	NIL
7	Kaduna	07	129,112	02	84,612	05	44,500
8	Katsina	01	122,000	01	122,000	NIL	NIL
9	Kebbi	24	822,378	01	557,000	23	24,000
10	Kogi	05	20,775	01	7,620	04	13,155
11	Kwara	17	147,340.3	01	21,156	16	126,184.3
12	Nasarawa	07	128,000	07	128,000	NIL	128,000
13	Niger	18	104,308	02	44,302	16	60,007
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
14	Sokoto	15	88,783	08	65,883	07	22,900
15	Taraba	39	137,800	09	27,400	30	110,400
16	Yobe	28	263,208.6	17	92,134.60	11	171,074
17	Zamfara	37	969,194	06	830,044	31	139,150
18	Plateau	08	132,000	01	74,000	07	58,000
19	Ogun	01	61,000	NIL	NIL	01	61,000
20	Oyo	02	---	NIL	N/A	NIL	N/A
21	FCT	04	33,485	04	33,485.00	NIL	33.485
	TOTAL	415	4,308,811.64	141	2,715,276.23	274	1,513,642.31

Source: Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 2014

APPENDIX III

PREVALENCE OF HERDSMEN-FARMERS CONFLICT IN NIGERIA

S/n	Place	Date	Immediate cause(s)	Death toll/Casualties/ Degree of Destruction
A.	Incidences of 2016			
1.	Udeni Ruwa, Nasarawa state	January 6	Destruction of farm crops	Between 12 and 38 people were killed and many wounded.
2.	Gareji village in Taraba State	January 17		3 people were killed
3.	Demsare, Wunamokoh, Dikajam and Taboungo of Adamawa State	January 23		Between 30 and 60 people including a police DPO were killed and properties destroyed.
4.	Agatu, Benue State	February 2	Reprisal attack	7 people were killed and the community was thrown into mourning.
5.	Tom-Anyiin and Tom-Ataan communities, Tombu in Buruku LGA, Benue State	February 7	Clash between Fulani herdsmen and farmers	10 persons were killed and the community was raided.
6.	Abbi, Enugu State	February 11		2 persons were killed and some were declared missing
7.	Agatu, Benue State	February 24 & 28	Reprisal attack against the alleged killing of a prominent Fulani man by the people of Agatu in 2013	Between 300 and 500 persons were killed and wounded. Others were displaced.
8.	Ossissa, Ndokwa, Delta State	March 2		Some people were wounded and residents were forced to flee their homes as houses were destroyed.
9.	Mbaya-Tombo, Benue state	March 7,8 13 & 17	Dispute and destruction of farm crops	Over 35 persons died and properties were destroyed.

10.	Ugwunesi in Awgu LGA, Enugu State	March 26	It was a reprisal attack by the Fulani herdsmen after armed farmers killed a Fulani traditional ruler- Ardo of Kardorko- Alhaji Habibu Domo, and four others	2 Soldiers, 18 others were Killed. Thousands were displaced and more than 1000 homesteads were destroyed.
11.	Ohali-Elu, Rivers State	April 3-7	Clash with communities	About 7 to 16 people were killed.
12.	Ilado, Ondo State	April 9	Hon. Olu Falae, former SGF, was attacked by herdsmen and they killed his security guard	Herdsmen attacked and killed the security guard of Chief. Falae.
13.	Angai, Dashole, Dori and Mesuwa villages of Taraba State	April 10	Farm land dispute	Between 15 and 44 people were killed.
14.	Agatu, Benue State	April 20	Policemen attacked	Some persons were injured and a policeman was declared missing.
15.	Ndiagu Attakwu, Nkanu-West LGA, Enugu State	April 25	Herdsmen were alleged to have entered the heart of the community that afternoon and a woman sounded a gong, after which the cows scattered: the herdsmen gathered the herds and left, only to return in the night and raided the village.	Many were murdered, including a catholic church seminarian and a pregnant woman whose stomach was cut open. Also houses were destroyed,
16.	Nimbo Community of Uzo-Uwani LGA, Enugu state	April 25	Herdsmen were said to have earlier disagreed with the villagers over the use of farmlands as	46 people were killed and 10 houses were burnt, including Christ Holy Church International during the

			grazing fields.	invasion.
17.	Dungun Mu'azu, Sabuwa LGA, Katsina State	November 25	Reprisal attack	8 people were massacred (7 men and 1 woman)
B.	Incidences of 2017			
18.	Abraka and Obiaruku, both in Ethiope East and Ukwuani LGAs, Delta State	January 9		No fewer than 5 persons were killed.
19.	Zango-Kataf Local Council of Kaduna State	January 17	Herdsmen opened fire in Samaru Kataf market	3 persons were killed and five injured.
20.	Ipiga village in Ohimini LGA, Benue State	January 24	Grazed cattle and destroyed farmlands	15 persons were killed. A bloody fight that took the lives of two of the herdsmen and about 13 of the villagers.
21.	Jema'a LGA, Kaduna State	January 24	Commercial car taking students to school from Kafanchan was waylaid by alleged herdsmen	5 students of the College of Education, Gidan Waya were shot dead.
22.	Rukumawa Tsafe LGA, Zamfara State	February 10	Clash between community members and suspected herdsmen	8 people were confirmed dead.
23.	Southern Kaduna, Kaduna State	February 21	Fulani herdsmen launched attacks on four communities	About 21 people were killed.
24.	Mbahimin community, Gwer East LGA, Benue State	March 2	Renewed hostilities between herdsmen and farmers in Mbahimin community	No fewer than 10 persons were killed.
25.	Omumu community, Ika South LGA, Delta State.	March 6	Clash between suspected herdsmen and residents of Omumu	6 persons died.

			community	
26.	Tiv community, Mkgovur village in Buruku LGA, Benue State	March 11		7 people were killed.
27.	Umuobasikwu, Ozuitem community in Bende LGA, Abia State	March 14	Clash between herdsmen and the people of Umuobasikwu	1 person was killed and several others injured.
28.	Adam Village, Kwande LGA, Benue State	March 27	Herdsmen farm attack	1 killed, 1 injured, women raped in their farms.
29.	Emuhu community in Ika South LGA, Delta State	March 28	Attack by suspected herdsmen	3 persons were killed while six others sustained injuries.
	Obio Usiere in Eniong Abatim, Odukpani LGA, Cross River State	April 1	Raid a community	killed no fewer than 10 persons
30.	Tse-Akaa village, Ugondo Mbamar District of Logo LGA, Benue State	May 8	Clash with herdsmen	3 persons were killed.
31.	Ossissa community in Ndokwa East LGA, Delta State	May 12	Farmers who worked with Ugo Farm were ambushed on their way home	Suspected herdsmen beheaded a commercial motorcycle rider and six farmers.
32.	Afam Uku, Oyigbo LGA, Rivers State	May 18	Herdsmen attack	2 persons lost their lives.
33.	Ewu community, Esan Central LGA, Edo State	May 22	Herdsmen entered farmland raped two women and strangled them to death	2 people were killed and 1 was wounded. Crops were destroyed and lots of persons sacked from their farmlands.