

**SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY FOR NIGERIA
AND NIGER REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (2009-2015)**

BY

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STUDIES,
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AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY,
ZARIA, NIGERIA**

NOVEMBER, 2016

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P13SSPS9014**

**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE
STUDIES, AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
AWARD OF MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY (M.PHIL) INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES,
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES,
AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY,
ZARIA, NIGERIA**

NOVEMBER, 2016

DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation entitled “Security Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency for Nigeria-Niger Republic Diplomatic Relations (2009-2015)” has been carried out by me in the Department of Political Science and International Studies. The information derived from the literature has been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided. No part of this dissertation was previously presented for another degree or diploma in this or any other institution.

Abbas Ayodele TAIWO

Signature

Date

CERTIFICATION

This dissertation entitled “Security Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency for Nigeria and Niger Republic Diplomatic Relations (2009-2015)” by ABBAS AYODELE TAIWO meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy (M.Phil) in International Relations of the Ahmadu Bello University, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to Almighty Allah my Creator for His Inspiration and Mercy over me.

AKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I give praise and thanks to Almighty Allah for His Inspiration and Blessing over me and for making the completion of this dissertation successful.

I am highly grateful to my amiable supervisors, Professor Hudu Ayuba Abdullahi and Dr. Umar Mohammed Kao'je for their encouragement and efforts in ensuring the successful completion of this dissertation.

My appreciation also goes to Professor Kayode Omojuwa, Dr. Yusufu Yakubu, Professor Rauf Ayo Dunmoye, Professor Paul Pinder Izah, Dr. Mohammed Faal, Dr. Edgar Agubamah, Dr. Audu Jacob, Dr. David Moveh, Dr. Aliyu Yahaya, Dr. Tafida, Mallam Garba Aminu and all the lecturers and members of staff in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria for their immense contribution towards the success of my studies.

I express my gratitude to the officials of the Embassy of the Republic of Niger, Abuja particularly the Ambassador and First Counsellor in person of Ibrahim Traore, the Academic Attache, the officials of the West African Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja, particularly the Assistant Director; Nasiru Waje, First Secretary James Dung Pam, Officials of European Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja, particularly Olufemi Olafeso, Adekunle Okunade, Dr. Fred Aja Agwu; Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, the Head of Department, Political Science, University of Maiduguri, Dr. Ibrahim Umara, the Garrison Commander, 7 Division Nigerian Army, Maiduguri, the Chairman Borno State Emergency Management Agency Ahmed Satomi and his predecessor Grema Terab, Sector 5 Commander Civilian Joint Task Force Baba Kura, the Pressure Group leader, Maina Soroa, Diffa, Niger Republic Mahamadou Buhari Ismaeel for the warm reception given to me and for granting me the audience to conduct the interview used for the accomplishment of this dissertation.

Special thanks to my good friends Usman Mohammed, Musa Damboa, brother Zakariya Muhideen, Dr. Kilani Muhideen and all members of their families for accommodating me in Maiduguri and Abuja respectively in the course of my field work for the dissertation.

I thank my late father Mr. Taiwo Hassan for the great role he played towards my studies. May Allah grant him paradise (Ameen). Special thanks to my wonderful Mum Mrs. Caroline Kofoworola, my sister Mrs. Taohid Ramat, and all members of my family for their support and prayer in ensuring the success of my studies, may Allah reward them abundantly.

This acknowledgement would be incomplete without appreciating someone who is very dear and precious to me for her tremendous support, and prayer towards my success; my wife - Lateefah. I thank you very much. May Allah crown your efforts with success.

I say a very big thank to all my course mates, my friends Sanni Kazeem, Wasiu Marshal, Bro. Muhideen, Abdullahi Labo, Lawal Akibu, well wishers and those who in one way or the other contributed towards the completion of this dissertation. I pray Almighty Allah will bless you all.

ABSTRACT

This study examines the Security Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency for Nigeria-Niger Republic Diplomatic Relations. The dissertation deploys the linkage theory to posit in its key argument that there is a connection between the spread of Boko Haram insurgency from Nigeria to Niger Republic and the responses of the two countries toward each other in tackling the insurgency collectively. Data were collected basically from in-depth interview from the Embassy of the Republic of Niger, Abuja, West African Affairs Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, Abuja and analysed thematically as they relate to the research objectives by qualitative data analysis. It was discovered that despite the spread of Boko Haram insurgency and the challenges encountered in the course of fighting the insurgency, the fight against the insurgents has strengthened diplomatic relations between the two countries. Nigeria and Niger Republic through joint military operation coordinated by the Multinational Joint Task Force comprising the Lake Chad Basin Commission Countries have come together to fight the insurgency. The study strongly recommends creating a permanent joint military operation on the borders of the two countries to end Boko Haram insurgency.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation	Meaning
AAFC	Allied Armed Forces of the Community
ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
AFISMA	Africa led International Support Mission in Mali
AU	African Union
CAEC	Central Africa Economic Commission
CJTF	Civilian Joint Task Force
CBN	Central Bank of Nigeria
CEAO	Communaute Economique de l' Afrique de l' Ouest
EAC	East African Community
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group
EU	European Union
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
LCBC	Lake Chad Basin Commission
MSC	Mediation and Security Council
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

NSA	National Security Adviser
NEPU	Northern Elements Progressive Union
NNJC	Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission
NIIA	Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OCAM	Organisation Commire Africaine et Malgache
OAS	Organisation of American State
PDP	People Democratic Party
PMAD	Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence
RIFU	Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SALWs	Small Arms Light Weapons
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organisation
UDEAO	Customs Unions of West African States
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title.....	i
Declaration.....	ii
Certification.....	iii
Dedication.....	iv
Acknowledgements.....	v
Abstract.....	vi
List of Abbreviations	vii
Table of Contents.....	ix
Appendices.....	xiii

CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1: General Background	1
1.2: Statement of Research Problem.....	4
1.3: Aim and Objectives of the Study.....	4
1.4: The Significance of the Study.....	5
1.5: Research Assumptions.....	5
1.6: Scope and Limitations of the Study.....	5
1.7: Organization of Chapters.....	6

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1: Introduction.....	7
2.2: Socio-Cultural Dimension of Nigeria-Niger Republic Diplomatic Relations.....	7
2.3: Nigeria and Niger Republic Relations- Consolidation of National Power and Sovereignty, their Political Interactions within Africa, Attitudes toward each Others, and their Interactions within UN.....	8

2.3.1: Nigeria's Attitude towards Niger Republic during the Period the Niger's Opposition Leader-Djibo Bakary was trying to overthrow Diori Hamani's regime.....	14
2.3.2: Niger's Attitude towards Nigeria during Nigeria's Civil War.....	16
2.3.3: Niger's Attitude towards Nigeria over Dialogue with South Africa, and in the Ghana-Nigeria Tension over Leadership Tussle in Africa.....	17
2.3.4: Nigeria and Niger Republic Voting Patterns in the United Nations.....	18
2.4: Economic Dimension of Nigeria-Niger Republic Diplomatic Relations.....	19
2.4.1: Aid Relations between Nigeria and Niger Republic.....	22
2.4.2: Industrial Cooperation between Nigeria and Niger.....	23
2.5: Security Matters in ECOWAS.....	26
2.5.1: Security.....	26
2.5.2: Collective Security.....	28
2.5.3: ECOWAS Collective Security.....	32
2.6: Insurgency.....	37
2.6.1: Nigeria's Security Challenge.....	43
2.7: Boko Haram in Perspective.....	44
2.7.1: Relational or Vengeance Perspective of Boko Haram Insurgency.....	46
2.7.2: The Political Feud Perspective of Boko Haram Insurgency.....	47
2.7.3: Socio-Economic Perspective of Boko Haram Insurgency.....	51
2.7.4: The Conspiracy Perspective.....	57
2.7.5: Theocratic Perspective.....	59
2.8: The Effects of Boko Haram Insurgency on Regional Security.....	63
2.8.1: The Effects of Insurgency on International Relations	68
2.8.2: Regional and International Response to Boko Haram Insurgency.....	70
2.9: Theoretical Framework.....	71

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1: Introduction.....	75
3.2: Study Area.....	75
3.3: Population of the Study.....	77
3.4: Sources of Data Collection.....	78
3.5: Instrument of Data Collection.....	79
3.6: Sampling Procedures.....	80
3.7: Sampling Techniques.....	80
3.8: Validation of the Instruments used for the Study.....	81
3.9: Reliability of the Instruments used for the Study.....	81
3.10: Data Transcription and Analysis.....	81

CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY FOR NIGERIA-NIGER REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

4.1: Introduction.....	83
4.2: Perception of Security Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency for Nigeria and Niger Republic by Respondents.....	83
4.3: Perception of Respondents on the Closure of Borders by Nigeria with Niger Republic.....	90
4.4: Perception of the Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency for the Diplomatic Relations between Nigeria and Niger Republic by Respondents.....	91
4.5: Security Cooperation between Nigeria and Niger in Combating Boko Haram Insurgency Perceived by Respondents.....	97
4.6: Research Findings.....	102
4.7: Discussion of Findings.....	102

4.8: Verification of Assumptions.....	105
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CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1: Summary.....	106
-------------------	-----

5.2: Conclusion.....	107
----------------------	-----

5.3: Recommendations.....	107
---------------------------	-----

5.4: Contributions to Knowledge.....	108
--------------------------------------	-----

REFERENCES.....	109
-----------------	-----

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Questions Asked From the Respondents.....	121
-------------------------------------------	-----

APPENDIX B

List of Person(s) Interviewed.....	122
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CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 General Background

Boko Haram originally known as Jama'atu Alhlissunnah Lidda'awati wal Jihad (Followers of the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad for Propagation of Islam and Jihad) (Adamu, 2012) or the Yusuffiya Movement came into limelight in July 2009 during the administration of the late President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua following a deadly clash which erupted between the movement and the security forces over the violation of the law on the use of crash helmet by the movement in Maiduguri, Borno State. The deadly clash left several of the Boko Haram members dead. Prior to that incident, Boko Haram had existed peacefully in Borno State preaching against Western values that contradicted their belief. The pervasive corruption, inequality, injustice, unemployment, immorality believed to have been caused by the infiltration of Western values into the country influenced Boko Haram and its adherents. Their campaign against aspects of Western schooling earned them the name "Boko Haram"- a Hausa word which means Western knowledge is false (Adamu, 2012) contrary to the media's interpretation of the word as Western education is sinful or forbidden. The anti Western posture of the Boko Haram led to more confrontations between the government and the movement. Boko Haram was briefly curtailed by the Nigerian security forces in July 2009. The virtual destruction of the Yusufiyya Movement by the Nigerian security forces in July 2009 and the death of their leader, Mohammed Yusuf, drove the movement underground for almost six months (Hajeej, 2011). The killing of Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram's leader, perceived as an injustice by the movement was believed to have radicalised and emboldened them to carry out more deadly attacks in the country. In 2010, they began a systematic insurgency against security forces- the police and the army as well as those who collaborated with the security forces leading either to their capture, or shooting (Hajeej,

2011). The Boko Haram insurgents metamorphosed from the use of simple weapons like sticks, clubs, machetes, cutlasses, to sophisticated weapons like guns, rockets, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for their operations. From January 2010 to June 2011, they carried out more than 20 documented attacks which included shootings, bombings, including suicide bombing (Hajeej, 2011).

The insurgents eventually extended their activities to the neighbouring states of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. The capability of Boko Haram to attack the neighbouring states of Nigeria in the Lake Chad region became serious concern to the West and Central African Sub-regions and Africa in general. It was in realisation of the dangers Boko Haram posed to the African continent that the African Union acting under the clause of collective security as ratified by the United Nations Charter of 1945 authorised the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to fight the Boko Haram insurgents collectively through the Lake Chad Basin Commission States comprising Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon plus Benin Republic.

In the contemporary world, insurgency is not restricted to a country. Apart from the spill over effects it could have on other countries, it could also influence the behaviour of a state towards another state which may cause diplomatic row between them. For example, Kenyan government blamed Eritrea for supplying arms to al-Shabaab-a Somali insurgent group that had claimed responsibility for several deadly attacks in the Kenyan territory over the country's deployment of troops to fight the insurgents in Southern Somalia. That intensified diplomatic row between the two countries. In 2010, Kenya's Foreign Affairs Minister, Moses Wetangular summoned Eritrean Ambassador to Kenya over his country's supply of arms to al-Shabaab, a claim the Eritrean government denied (Lough, Sheik, 2011). Similarly, cross-borders attacks by insurgent groups between Indian and Pakistan have also intensified diplomatic row between the two countries. India blamed Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)-a group it claimed has close ties to Pakistani intelligence of carrying out several attacks in Uri in

India-administered Kashmir. Pakistan in turn accused India of colluding with insurgents and separatists to cause mayhem in the province of Balochistan, Pakistan (Kugelman, 2016) and so forth.

Nigeria and Niger Republic have had over five decades of diplomatic relations and share common historical and cultural affinities particularly in the north-eastern and north-western parts of Nigeria and south-eastern part of Niger. Looking at Nigeria-Niger diplomatic relations with regard to Boko Haram insurgency, the activities of the insurgents could affect the diplomatic relations between the two countries. For example, if the Boko Haram insurgents operating in Nigeria are using Niger Republic as hide-out. Nigeria would not be able to fight them in Niger's territory without the cooperation of Niger Republic because it is against international law to encroach on the territory of another state. If the cooperation is not forthcoming, Nigeria could blame Niger for allowing the insurgents to use its territory as hide-out. This could cause a diplomatic row between the two countries. Similarly, the closure of borders by Nigeria with Niger Republic in the course of fighting Boko Haram insurgency and the escalation of the insurgency to Niger Republic could also trigger off a negative reaction from Niger. Moreover, the accusation against the Nigerian soldiers that unlike their Nigerien counterparts were running away from the battle against Boko Haram insurgents by Niger's Ministry of Defence and the reaction of Nigerian Military in February 2015 raise concerns about the commitment and behaviour of the two countries toward each other in combating the insurgency. The former Director of Defence Information, Nigerian Army; Major General Chris Olukolade while reacting to the accusation, denounced it and described the Nigerien soldiers as looters and accused them of providing fighters to Boko Haram (Ibeh, 2013). Therefore, it is imperative to examine the security implications of Boko Haram insurgency for Nigeria-Niger diplomatic relations.

1.2 Statement of Research Problem

This study examines the security implications of Boko Haram insurgency for Nigeria and Niger Republic diplomatic relations-security cooperation between them in combating Boko Haram insurgency with a view to examining whether the activities of the insurgents have affected the diplomatic ties between the two countries or not. In order to address this problem, the study provides research questions below:

- (i) What are the security implications of Boko Haram insurgency for Nigeria and Niger?
- (ii) Why did Nigeria close its borders with Niger Republic in the course of fighting the insurgency?
- (iii) How has the Boko Haram insurgency affected Nigeria-Niger Republic diplomatic relations?
- (iv) What security framework did Nigeria and Niger Republic adopt in combating Boko Haram insurgency?

1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Study

The aim of this study is to examine the security implications of Boko Haram insurgency for Nigeria-Niger Republic diplomatic relations.

The specific objectives of the study are:

- (i) To examine the security implications of Boko Haram insurgency for Nigeria and Niger.
- (ii) To examine why Nigeria closed its borders with Niger Republic in the course of fighting the insurgency.
- (iii) To examine how the Boko Haram insurgency has affected Nigeria-Niger Republic diplomatic relations.
- (iv) To identify the security framework Nigeria and Niger Republic adopted in combating Boko Haram insurgency.

1.4 The Significance of the Study

This study provides an in-depth understanding of the security implications of Boko Haram insurgency for Nigeria and Niger Republic diplomatic relations and serves as future reference for further studies on the topic.

1.5 Research Assumptions

This study establishes the following Assumptions:

- (i) Boko Haram insurgency has altered the security situation between Nigeria and Niger Republic.
- (ii) Nigeria closed its borders with Niger Republic for allowing Boko Haram insurgents to use its territory as hide-out.
- (iii) The activities of Boko Haram has caused diplomatic row between Nigeria and Niger Republic.
- (iv) Nigeria and Niger Republic did not adopt a common security framework in combating Boko Haram insurgency.

1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The study covers a period between 2009 and 2015. The period is very significant because it captures the escalation of the Boko Haram insurgency from Nigeria's territory to Niger Republic and its security implications for the diplomatic relations between the two countries. However, the study also makes reference to vital issues relating to the work before and after the period under study.

The major limitation of the research was the delay encountered in getting the audience of the respondents due to bureaucracy at the Embassy of the Republic of Niger and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, Abuja. However, this did not affect the quality of the research because through patience, perseverance and consistency the researcher was eventually

granted the permission to conduct the interview which helped tremendously in achieving the objectives of the research.

1.7 Organisation of Chapters

This study is organised into five chapters. Chapter one focuses on the general background, statement of research problem, research questions, aims and objectives of the study, research assumptions, the scope and limitations of the study. Chapter two reviews relevant literature on the dimensions of Nigeria-Niger Republic diplomatic relations, ECOWAS collective security, insurgency, causes of insurgency, Boko Haram insurgency and its regional implications in a thematic order. Chapter two also looks at the linkage theory as the theoretical framework of the study and the relevance of the theory to the topic under study. Chapter three focuses on the methodology used to carry out the research. Chapter four presents and analyses data on the security implications of Boko Haram insurgency for Nigeria and Niger Republic diplomatic relations. It also discusses the research findings and verifies the assumptions posed in chapter one. Chapter five contains the summary, conclusion, recommendations, references and appendices.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

In order to examine the security implications of Boko Haram insurgency for Nigeria-Niger Republic diplomatic relations, this chapter reviews relevant and related literature on socio-cultural ties, political and economic dimensions of diplomatic relations between Nigeria-Niger Republic since independence-1960, it conceptualises security, collective security, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) collective security, insurgency, Boko Haram insurgency and the effects of the insurgents on regional security in a thematic order. It also looks at the linkage theory as the theoretical framework and the relevance of the theory to the topic under study.

2.2 Socio- Cultural Dimension of Nigeria-Niger Republic Diplomatic Relations

Nigeria and the Republic of Niger share common historical affinity and development. To Boureima (1997) apart from attaining independent status the same year-1960, both have boundaries cutting across each other's territorial land mark. In fact, the two countries have their political boundaries arbitrarily and artificially redrawn by colonialists. Furthermore, they both have ethnic affinity that is, Hausa, Fulani, Dendi, Buduma, Dulani, Shuwa and Kanuri. They had both been bound together too by the influence of Islam as reflected in the prosecution and outcome of Shehu Usman Danfodio's Jihad. It is within this context that Nigeria-Niger diplomatic relations can better be understood and situated. Some people from the Nigerian states bordering Niger that is, Sokoto, Katsina, Kano, Borno, Kebbi and Yobe can trace their maternal or paternal lineages to Niger Republic. Likewise a number of people from the neighbouring region of the Niger Republic have their roots in Nigeria. The relationship that existed and still exists among the people of the two countries is manifested through inter-marriages and trade. There have also been free movements of people and goods

between the two countries even before the inception of ECOWAS (Asiwaju and Barkindo, 1993). The level of cordiality is greatly influenced by the fact that Nigeria particularly the northern beliefs, economic and socio-cultural affinities tally with those of Niger and cannot be separated. The two countries have thus continued to work together towards enhancing the aspirations that bind them together (Boureima, 1997). As a matter of fact, since 1970 when the late Hamani Diori attended the Argungu Fishing Festival in Nigeria and subsequently when his family spent holidays with Gowon's family at Dodan Barracks, highly placed officials of the two states have participated in each other cultural festivals (Nwokedi, 1992).

2.3 Nigeria and Niger Republic Relations- Consolidation of National Power and Sovereignty, their Political Interactions within Africa, Attitudes toward Each Others, and their Interactions within UN

Nwokedi (1992) in his work titled: "Nigeria and Niger: The Mechanisms of Compatibility and Consensus" explained in details the relationships between Nigeria and Niger Republic since independence, the consolidation of national power and sovereignty. The relationships between Nigeria and Niger at the early years of independence were at best, correct as the political leadership in the two state devoted much time to the consolidation of their national power and sovereignty. In Nigeria, the Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, had the most challenging task of building a consensus within a Federal Constitution from its disparate ethnic groups which constitute the country. In Niger Republic the President Hamani Diori, who had been aided to office by the colonial establishment saw his power contested by his main rival, Djibo Bakary (Chaffard, 1967). Thus, the correct bilateral relations between Nigeria and Niger were also characterised by instances of benign neglect as the two states looked inward (Nwokedi, 1992).

If the foreign policies of the two states were conceptualised at this period as consisting of three major concentric circles then similarities existed in their patterns of foreign policy behaviour. For both Nigeria and Niger, the inner most of the concentric circles represented the priority relations with erstwhile colonial powers and with their zones of influence. Thus, there were Britain and the Commonwealth for Nigeria, and France and Francophone Africa for Niger. Bilateral relations between the two states were subsumed under the layer framework of their inter-African relations which constituted the second concentric circle. The third concentric circle was made up of their interactions within the United Nations as well as with other states or areas not covered by the preceding circles (Nwokedi, 1992).

Ahmad (1984) in his work titled: Political and Diplomatic Interactions between Nigeria and Niger wrote that in terms of intra-African relations, Niger policies fall in line with those of Nigeria. On the contrary, on international issues outside Africa, Niger's policy is guided by her own national interests, no matter if it comes in conflict with Nigeria's foreign policy preferences.

On African unity according to him, the two countries were united about African unity. By the end of 1960, most of the French African colonies as well as Nigeria had become sovereign and began to address their minds more seriously to African problems. Niger, as one of the Francophone African countries, attended the Brazzaville Conference in December 1960 to discuss the Congo situation. The Conference achieved nothing except the inception of a moderate and pro-French African bloc which came to be known as the Brazzaville group and supported Kasavubu, the first President of the independent Congo, in his conflict with the country's Premier, Patrice Lumumba. In 1960, independent African states were divided into two blocs when the Casablanca Conference repudiated Kasavubu and supported Lumumba's cause. Nigeria, Liberia and Sudan were left as middle-rovers. To bridge the gulf that had taken place between the two groups, Nigeria spearheaded a campaign to arrange a conference

of heads of African states and Malagasy. Niger was one of the heads of the members of the Brazzaville group that had been won over by Nigeria and it subsequently participated in the Monrovia Conference held in May 1961. The Conference was not attended by the states of the Casablanca bloc. Various resolutions passed by the Monrovia Conference reflected the principles which Nigeria had vigorously advocated. The Conference rejected the idea of a political union of African states. Nigeria's stand on this point had been unequivocal.

Speaking on this question at the Addis Ababa Conference, in 1960, the Nigerian delegate Alhaji Maitama Sule said: "We must not be sentimental: we must be realistic. It is for this reason that we would like to point out that at this moment the idea of forming a union of African States is pre-mature. On the other hand, we do not dispute the sincerity and indeed the good intentions of those peoples who advocated it. But we feel that such a move is too radical-perhaps too ambitious to be of any lasting benefit" (Thompson, 1969).

The Monrovia Conference, however, allowed African states to form a voluntary union with other states, if they so wished. The Conference agreed to establish a commission of technical experts to work out plans for cooperation in economic, educational, cultural, scientific and technical fields. On the eve of the foreign minister's conference held before the Addis Ababa summit of 1963, four different attitudes to African unity had emerged. Libya, Sudan advocated for a single African Charter on the lines of Atlantic Charter to which all African states could subscribe. The second view advocated for a loose association of African states to be set up within the framework of an all-African organisation. The third group was of the opinion that it was too early to talk of organic unity, because what the situation called for was economic cooperation among African countries. Nigeria, Ethiopia and some members of the Brazzaville group advocated for a step by step approach for African unity through regional organisations. The fourth view, advocated by Ghana and other Casablanca

members, aimed at bringing about a real and organic unity among the continental states (Cervenka, 1969).

The Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), approved at the Addis Ababa summit in 1963, was a victory for the Nigerian view of African unity. This feeling of success was echoed by Justice Elias when he said:

The new Charter is substantially the same as the Lagos Charter (December 1962) as a close study of both documents would really show. The new organisation, it is important to emphasise, is essentially the same as the one outline in Monrovia and affirmed in Lagos (Elias, 1965).

The Republic of Niger endorsed the views held by Nigeria and by implication accepted its leadership role, as did many states who had accepted the invitation and participated in the Monrovia and Lagos Conferences. That Niger's attitude towards African unity was in agreement with Nigeria was reflected in the speech of Hamani Diori, President of Niger, at the Addis Ababa summit. He urged African nations to suppress their differences and become united. He declared his support for an African Charter which should respect the sovereignty of each state and disallow interference in the internal affairs of others (African Diary, June 1963). In fact, respect for sovereignty and non-interference are two basic principles of Nigerian foreign policy and they found a place in the Monrovia, Lagos and OAU Charters. The two countries, Niger and Nigeria, held identical views on the question of African unity and agreed to adopt a cautious and gradual approach towards achieving it. Both had rejected the idea of a cohesive political union of African states, both had proclaimed at the Monrovia Conference a non-political but functional approach, and both resisted institutionalisation in African Relations beyond the barest minimum and were vehemently opposed to the creation of supra-national decision making pan-African bodies. These they regarded as incompatible with state sovereignty. The Nigerian leaders believed that African unity could be best attained through functional cooperation in various fields such as transport, trade, communication,

currency, education and science. Prime Minister Balewa emphasised this theme at the OAU Council of Ministers meeting in Lagos in 1964:

We in Nigeria believe that by taking genuine political steps in the economic, educational, scientific cooperation and by trying first to understand ourselves we should get nearer towards the solution of the problems and establish unity and cohesion (African Diary April, 1964).

Niger's policy was in harmony with Nigeria and there seemed to be no misgivings about it. In pursuit of this policy both countries have taken many steps. To improve economic cooperation, trade and customs agreements were signed between them. In 1962, the Chad Basin Commission was formed to develop Lake Chad for irrigation and power producing purposes with Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon as members. By 1964, the River Niger Commission was set-up which, besides Niger and Nigeria comprised Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, and Upper Volta (Ahmad, 1984).

The tendency by both states to maintain privileged relations with their different colonial masters was quite understandable but in the case of Niger the quest for Francophone solidarity had other explanations. It has often been argued that France's desire to encourage diverse institutional networking between states that used to be members of its colonial possessions in Africa was to preserve these as its privileged zone of influence on the continent. It has since been established that with the disintegration of France's two conglomerate possessions in Africa- Afrique Equatoriale Francaise (AEF) and Afrique Occidentale Francaise (AOF) the encouragement of Francophone solidarity was hypothetically an insurance for Niger, for example, against territorial, political and cultural incursions from countries such as Nigeria (Nwokedi, 1992).

The establishment of the Conseil de l'Entente to which Niger belongs was, on the one hand, a manifestation of the close personnel ties and a convergence in the political and ideological beliefs between Felix Houphouet Boigny and his counterparts from Niger, Benin, Togo and

Burkina Faso. This organisation was used on the one hand, as a machine de guerre against the federative inclination of Senegal's former President Leopold Sedar Senghor and Kwame Nkrumah's revolutionary fervour. It could therefore be argued that to the extent that both Nigeria and Niger sought close identification with colonially inspired organisations their bilateral relations suffered an unintended neglect (Nwokedi, 1992). Niger's apprehensions of Nigeria as is evident from Diori Hamani's statement according to Nwokedi (1985) are not altogether justified. Nigeria did not share Nkrumah's revolutionary immediate unification approach to African unity- a prospect that would have affected the national sovereignties. It worked for the gradualist approach to continental unity as was to be enshrined in the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Moreover, Nigeria has been one of the African States that scrupulously adhere to the 1964 OAU declaration on the intangibility of inherited boundaries in Africa. According to Hamani:

Do not be surprised if we are swallowed up by Nigeria. Our national routes are directed through Nigeria. Our cattle are exported to Nigeria and many of our people come from there. If we are swallowed up, it will be as much your fault for leaving us alone as it is ours (West Africa 7 July, 1972).

Nevertheless, Nigeria's decision to break diplomatic relations with France in 1961 over the country's atomic test in the Sahara and to prevent French aircraft and merchant vessels from overflying its airspace and calling at its port respectively left Niger in a precarious predicament. Although this Nigerian action against France did not come within the framework of its bilateral relations with Niger, it had consequences for this country which depended then almost entirely on Nigeria port facilities, roads and railway for its export and import of goods. It was pressure from Niger, among other neighbours which induced Nigeria to lift the restrictions placed on French aircraft and vessels (Nwokedi, 1992).

2.3.1 Nigeria's Attitude towards Niger Republic during the Period the Niger's Opposition Leader- Djibo Bakary was Trying to Overthrow Diori Hamani's Regime

Nwokedi (1992) stated that the activities of certain political groups in Nigeria, especially Aminu Kano's Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) had security implications for Nigeria-Niger relations during the period Djibo Bakary was trying to overthrow President Diori Hamani in Niger. Djibo Bakary, a leading Niger's politician had been largely favoured to win the pre-independence election but owing to his radical bent and indeed his close association with Sekou Toure of Guinea, the colonial authority, turned the tables against him as Diori Hamani was elected (Chaffard, 1967). Djibo Bakary whose political base was the Hausa speaking districts of Niger Republic went underground as he sought to redress his electoral fortune through an extra constitutional method. Bakary was first supported by Benin (Dahomey) Republic which had axes to grind with Niger over the unceremonious expulsion of its nationals from that country and over the inconsequential Lete Island on the River Niger. As Benin's support waned, Bakary found support from NEPU, whose members share similar cultural affinity and ideological purity with Bakary's Sawaba Party. Using Kano as a base, Sawaba elements infiltrated easily back into Niger where they caused disaffection against Diori Hamani. It was quite obvious that Sawaba's activities in Nigeria had the blessing of neither the Northern Regional government nor the Federal government. No wonder then that this party was banned by the Federal government in 1964. But its activities had served to raise the security consciousness of Niger Republic as its national power and sovereignty were being consolidated (Nwokedi, 1992).

Ahmad (1984) stated that during the two decades of the Nigeria-Niger relationship, there could have been no better opportunity for Nigeria to extend her territorial boundaries rather than supporting the banned Sawaba Party and its leader, Djibo Bakary, when he was trying to overthrow Diori Hamani's regime. As early as 1958, Djibo Bakary, the leader of the majority

party in the Territorial Assembly of Niger, had announced that Sawaba Party would vote 'No' in the ensuing referendum for the establishment of the Franco-Africa Community. He said Niger would become independent and then join, not the community, but the Association of Free States without prejudice to a possible future federation with Nigeria (Mortimer, 1969).

This was an opportunity for Nigeria leaders to annex Niger Republic by supporting Djibo Bakary Sawaba's leader with money and weapons. Nigeria in line with her foreign policy principle accepted the colonial boundaries between the two countries and advocated for non-interference in the internal affairs of another state. This principle helped develop fraternal relations between the two states. Nigeria's weak neighbours in general and Niger in particular must have felt a sense of security. In line with this principle, Nigerian government refused to give any verbal and material support to Sawaba. Djibo Bakary was reported to have requested Nigeria for support but Prime Minister Balewa turned a deaf ear to the request. Alhaji Shehu Shagari the former president, who was then Minister of Economic Development, happened to meet Bakary in 1960 in Bamako. Djibo assured Shagari that once he got power, Niger would federate with Nigeria (Alhaji Shehu Shagari, 1978). Later, when Shagari personally conveyed Bakary's message to the Prime Minister (PM), the PM replied:

It is premature for Nigeria to start encouraging dissident groups in the neighbouring countries. We do not want to offend our neighbours. Nigeria has had enough problems herself (Alhaji Shehu Shagari, 1978).

President Diori Hamani of Niger felt greatly indebted to Nigerian leaders for their policy towards Sawaba. Seven years later, the Civil War in Nigeria provided an opportunity to Diori to reciprocate this gesture of goodwill. Whereas Niger's efforts at consolidating its national power and sovereignty were yielding positive result thanks to the series of bilateral and multilateral agreements which it signed with France and other French-speaking African

countries, Nigeria's efforts proved more difficult as the country suffered two successful coups d' etat in 1966 alone before sliding into a civil war in 1967 (Nwokedi, 1992).

2.3.2 Niger's Attitude towards Nigeria during Nigeria's Civil War

The Republic of Niger thought itself duty-bound to reciprocate the goodwill gesture earlier extended to it by Nigeria in Sawaba's case. President Diori in considering the Nigerian crisis had to bear in mind the land-locked Niger's dependence on Nigerian railways as its vital link with the sea. He could ill afford to alienate Nigeria because of his country's proximity to and economic ties with Nigeria. The economic aspect aside, the President was fully aware that as fellow Muslims, the people of Niger had a natural affection and attachment to the people of the Northern Nigeria; they also claimed the same ethnic origin. While Niger openly supported Nigerian cause and condemned the secession, it was for her own national interest that she took an active part in the peacemaking efforts to bring an end to the tragic and serious situation in Nigeria (Ahmad, 1984). The outbreak of the Civil War adversely affected Niger's foreign trade as it could no longer export its produce mainly groundnut through, or received its imports from the Port-Harcourt harbour in the South East of Nigeria (Africa Research Bulletin 30 June 1968). Although an alternative arrangement was made for Niger to channel its foreign trade through the ports of Lagos and Cotonou, these were definitely longer, riskier and costlier routes. According to Nwokedi (1992) the foregoing consideration coupled with the dense socio-cultural and economic relations between Nigeria and Niger no doubt influenced Niger's Government in not just supporting the Federal Government of Nigeria, but in working for a quick return to normalcy in Nigeria. Firstly, Niger was a member together with Cameroon, Zaire and Ethiopia of the ad-hoc committee of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) which was charged with the responsibility for resolving the Nigerian crises. It was at the meeting of this committee held in Niamey in July 1968 that General Gowon then Nigeria's Head of State and Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu the leader of the secessionist Biafra

were able to put in personal appearance. Secondly, apart from peace brokerage, Niger according to General Olusegun Obasanjo purchased arms and ammunition on her (Nigeria's) behalf from countries that would not sell direct to Nigeria (Obasanjo, 1980).

Nwokedi (1992) stated that as a matter of fact, Niger's total support for Nigeria's territorial integrity and national unity was not a straight forward matter for that country as it seems. It was a courageous decision. In spite of Diori's flimsy proposal in 1961 to form a Nigeria-Niger political union, his apprehensions of Nigerian economic and demographic size were common knowledge. It was these apprehensions which induced first, Felix Houphouet Boigny, and later General Charles De Gaulle at the prompting of the Ivorian leader to seek to dismember Nigeria by supporting Biafra during the Civil War (Baker, 1970). The personal and official ties between Diori Hamani and Felix Houphouet-Boigny were quite close; the former was the leader of Niger's section of the latter's Rassemblement Democratique Africain. In the course of the war, Diori Hamani was the President of the influential Francophone body, Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM) (Bach, 1978). It was therefore both ironical and remarkable that Niger, one of the intended beneficiaries of a positive outcome from the Ivorian and French pro-Biafra stance was doggedly in support of the Federal Government of Nigeria. This was a realistic stance because a successful Biafra would never have offered land-locked Niger an access to the sea. Before the Nigerian Civil War came to an end in 1970, Nigeria and Niger had reached some agreements such the trade agreement of 1969 whose faithful implementation would be expected to increase the value of their bilateral transactions (Nwokedi, 1992).

2.3.3 Niger's Attitude towards Nigeria over Dialogue with South Africa, and in the Ghana-Nigeria Tension over Leadership Tussle in Africa

Regarding dialogue with South Africa, Ivory Coast President Houphouet suggested in October 1970 that dialogue could be used to persuade South Africa to abandon her apartheid

policy. This proposal infuriated General Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria, Mobutu of Congo, and Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. Ivorian President won the support of Ghana, Mali, Benin and so forth. Relations between Nigeria and Niger were more strengthened. Diori was not able to condemn Houphouet openly because of his personal friendship with him. In order not to annoy Nigeria, Niger abstained from voting on the declaration rejecting the dialogue proposal (Ahmad, 1984). In the Ghana-Nigeria tension over leadership tussle on the continent of Africa, Niger rejected Ghana's policies and supported Nigeria morally, politically and diplomatically. Niger accused Ghana of supplying material support to the Sawaba party to overthrow the government of Niger in 1963 (Ahmad, 1984).

2.3.4 Nigeria and Niger Republic Voting Patterns in the United Nations

According to Ahmad (1984), in the United Nations, Niger pursued an independent line. Niger's voting pattern in some issues in the United Nations showed that on international questions her behaviour was determined by domestic interests and dependence on France for economic assistance. Niger voted with the United States against the People Republic of China's (PRC's) membership. Contrary to Niger's policy, Nigeria supported PRC's representation in the UN and voted against the United States' resolution. Niger and Nigeria were also committed to the struggle against the racist policies of South Africa by supporting the expulsion of South Africa from the UN. The voting attitude of Nigeria and Niger on resolutions relating to the Middle East wars and Palestine questions present a different picture of the relationship between the two countries. Before 1966, Nigeria's behaviour was not sympathetic to the Arab cause; Prime Minister Balewa's policy was neutrality. On seventeen occasions when votes were taken at the UN, Nigeria voted six times for pro-Arab resolution, four times favoured neither Arabs nor Israel and abstained seven times. The pro-Arab resolutions supported by Nigeria, dealt with the plight of Palestinian refugees. However, Nigeria's attitude changed after the Civil War. Israel was reported to have supported the

cause of the Biafra rebels while the Arab world strongly supported the Nigerian government. Egypt supported Nigeria materially by sending pilot and arms. Nigeria then realised that her true friends were those who upheld Nigerian unity. This led to a change in its Middle East policy in favour of the Arab. On the other hand, Niger supported the Arab cause all along, and condemned Israel's forcible occupation of Arab land. After the Civil War, Nigeria joined hands with Niger and began to vote in favoured of the Palestinian right of self determination (Ahmad, 1984).

2.4 Economic Dimension of Nigeria-Niger Republic Diplomatic Relations

Nigeria and Niger Republic by both design and sheer coincidence are very important commercial partners whose economies complement (Nwokedi, 1992). It could therefore be asserted that each state has a large stake in ensuring that the other maintains a more or less healthy economy. This is a critical component in the search for mutual security. All the same, these efforts have not completely dissipated Niger's apprehensions of Nigeria (Nwokedi, 1992). With the problem of consolidation of national power and sovereignty resolved in both Nigeria and Niger Republic as it appeared their bilateral relations seemed-set to attain new heights. At the local level, trade flourishes between Nigeria and Niger Republic particularly through border markets at Ilela, Jibia, Mai Aduwa, Garki, Maigatari, etc. The agreement that ushered in a trade treaty and later on, Joint Commission for Cooperation between the two states was designed to address not only the disparities in their policies which encouraged unwholesome trade practices across their international frontiers but also to boost trade. Although smuggling across the 1,600 kilometres long border which separate Nigeria and Niger has been as old as the states themselves, it was the latter's deliberate use of pricing policy to attract Nigerian groundnuts that was significant. Groundnut was then Niger's major export produce and therefore, its main foreign exchange earner (Nwokedi, 1992). According to David Collins, the four districts of Maradi, Tessaoua; Metameye and Magaria, each of

which has a southern border with Nigeria accounted for the purchase of over ninety percent of Niger's commercial groundnut crop destined for the European market (Collin, 1984). This pricing policy was reflected in both the subsidy to groundnut farmers and in the relatively higher purchase price and other inducements which the Niger government offered to sellers. Because Nigeria was a larger groundnut producer than Niger and counted on other cash crops, both the Northern Regional Government and its agent, the Marketing Board, seemed more or less nonchalant about the cross-border commerce that led to loss of revenue. According to Collins the very low producer prices offered in the late 1960s and early 1970s in Nigeria and the continued weakness of the Nigerian pound relative to CFA franc combined to produce a situation where Niger enjoyed the best of both worlds: a competitive producer price in the border areas, a socially desirable rise in the producer price, and the accumulation of large surpluses from its groundnut trading operations (Collins, 1984).

Indeed, this kind of attitudes was symptomatic of the gross neglect which befell Nigeria's agricultural sector when petroleum gained prominence and predominance in the export profile as from the early 1970s. However, it should not be assumed that smuggling is a uni-directional phenomenon because there are other aspects to it such as the case of cattle smuggling into Nigeria from Niger. With the decline in Nigeria's groundnut production in the early 1970s as a result of the nation's unprecedented oil revenue, cattle from Niger to Nigeria became the major object of illegal cross-border commerce (Nwokedi, 1992). Since the 1980s Nigerian traffickers have specialised in smuggling into Niger petroleum products and consumer goods as they seek to exploit the disparity in the exchange rate between the CFA Franc and the Naira. This phenomenon as well as the influx of West African nationals into Nigeria was said to have been partly responsible for Nigeria's sudden decision in 1984 to shut all its international borders thereby affecting adversely trade relations with its neighbours (The Guardian March 7, 1990).

The 1969 trade set the formal framework for Nigeria-Niger trade relations (Africa Research Bulletin Economic, September 30, 1969). As is customary with such agreements, the two states granted each other the most-favoured-nation status in all matters affecting import and export trade with the exception of non-area origin products and other concessions or exemptions which either party would have granted to adjacent countries or to fellow members of a Customs Union, Free Trade Area or a Monetary Zone existing or yet to be established (Nwokedi, 1982). At this point in time Niger belonged to the Customs Unions of West African States (UDEAO) and to the Franc Zone Monetary Arrangement. As a member of the Conseil de l'Entent, Niger boycotted in 1968, a meeting sponsored by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) which Nigeria supported for discussions on the possible creation of an all-embracing West African Economic Community (Nwokedi, 1992).

Moreover, the agreement granted transit rights within each other's territory as well as the use of ports facilities for landlocked Niger. Goods to be traded ranged from agricultural produce to manufactured products. Whereas Nigeria was to supply Niger with about seventeen manufactured products and purchase five of such goods from Niger, the latter would sell about twelve agricultural produce and eight semi-manufactured products to Nigeria and receive, in return, five respectively of the same categories of goods from Nigeria. Payment for these various goods was to be made in mutually agreed convertible currencies through the normal banking channels (Nwokedi, 1982). This agreement came into force in 1970. Both countries decided in November of the same year during Diori Hamani's official visit to Nigeria, to establish a Joint Commission for Co-operation within which framework their bilateral relations would henceforth be addressed. The Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission for Co-operation (NNJC) was the first of such Commission between Nigeria and other countries to have its permanent Headquarters built at Niamey and manned by an international staff

headed by a Senior Nigerian government functionary. Its establishment reflects the importance of the trade relations between both countries (Nwokedi, 1992).

2.4.1 Aid Relations between Nigeria and Niger Republic

In terms of aid relations between the two countries, aid as instrument of foreign policy became prominent in Nigeria's African diplomacy as from the early 1970. This was a logical consequence of its newly found oil wealth. Most aid was in the form cash grants which were quite often misused by the recipient states and was not always intended to secure political, economic and security advantages for Nigeria in the recipient nation (Nwokedi, 1992). Nevertheless, in spite of the strongly humanitarian dimension to Nigeria's aid to Niger there is no doubt whatsoever that they are equally intended to promote their search for compatibility and consensus with the diverse security framework for their interactions. Nigeria's aid to Niger has sought mainly to guarantee food security to this drought stricken country. Apart from bringing immediate relief to Nigeriens, the drought aid has always been intended to help Niger rehabilitate both its livestock and agriculture whose product finds ready market in Nigeria. It can be assumed; in addition, that the success attained in these areas would help keep Nigeriens at home instead of their mass exodus as has often been the case, to Nigeria in search of relief and security (Nwokedi, 1992).

Besides relief assistance Nigeria has accorded other forms of aid to Niger Republic. The first is about road construction which is designed to facilitate their commercial exchanges. In 1978, for example, Nigeria officially handed over to Niger Republic a double-carriage bridge built at a cost of 668, 000 Naira and which links the two countries. On that occasion the Nigerian Minister of Works and Housing General M. Shuwa recalled that in 1974 the Nigerian government had similarly handed over to Niger, the road which it built to Illela-Nigeria and Birni-Nkoni-Niger (Federal Ministry of Information, 1978). These gestures no doubt encouraged Seyni Kountche to request Nigeria during his official visit to Lagos in

November 1980 to help his country finance the Zinder-Agaden section of the so-called Uranium highway (Le Sahel Niamey, 14 November, 1980). Furthermore, scholarships have been awarded to Nigeriens to study in Nigerian Universities in keeping with the Cultural and Technical agreement which the two states signed in December 1976. On a non official level, Nigeriens from Maradi and Zinder districts attend Koranic schools in Sokoto and Kano (Bach, 1984).

2.4.2 Industrial Cooperation between Nigeria and Niger

There is also significant industrial cooperation between Nigeria and Niger. In January 1972 Nigeria agreed to supply about 30,000 kilowatts of electric power to Niger from its Kainji dam. The construction of the grid through the 600 kilometres separating Kainji from Niamey and the greater part of which runs through Nigerian territory facilitated Nigeria's electrification programme (West Africa No 2849, 21 January 1972). The success of this scheme no doubt influenced the two states to reach agreement in 1988 to construct a 132 kilovolt power extension project from Katsina-Nigeria to Maradi in Niger Republic (The Guardian 29 April, 1988). It is significant that has gone ahead in spite of Niger's decision to proceed with the construction of the Kandadji dam over the River Niger (West Africa No 3762 25 September 1989).

As part of their industrial cooperation, Nigeria invested directly in Niger's mining sector. Nigeria's participation in Niger's iron ore and phosphate mining is well within its overall objective of solidifying intra-ECOWAS links. At the same time Nigeria needs Niger's iron ore and phosphate for its Ajaokuta Steel Complex and fertiliser plant at Kaduna respectively. The objective of Nigeria's interest in Niger's uranium industry is not clear (Nwokedi, 1992). Indeed, by a 16 percent interest in Niger's uranium industry for which it paid an initial sum of 1.6 million naira (Federal Ministry Information New Release, 1977), Nigeria was merely responding to Niger's request to have an African finance capital represented in an industry

where Western-French, Japanese, West Germany and British capital predominates (Nwokedi, 1992).

Nigeria and Niger have encouraged the development of other infrastructures which should enhance their search for compatibility and consensus. An air services agreement exists between the two countries and direct telephone links were established between Niamey, Lagos and Kaduna and between Katsina and Maradi as part of their common neighbouring link project (West Africa No 3713, 10 October 1998).

There is no doubt whatsoever that Nigeria and Niger have endeavoured to institutionalise their bilateral relations through the establishment of a Joint Commission. Nigeria has offered assistance to Niger by way of loans, grants and direct investment in the latter's economy. Thus, their economic relations, especially trade links, are particularly important. This is not obscure, however, other relations which have consequence for their bilateral relations (Nwokedi, 1992).

Niger policy towards Nigeria has been rather ambivalent at times. It seeks close cooperation with Nigeria at the same time as it seeks Francophone solidarity as an insurance against a spurious Nigerian hegemony. Diori insisted that it would be unrealistic for any West African Economic grouping to exclude Nigeria from membership. Yet, he took his country into the all Francophone Communaute Economique de L'Afrique de L'Ouest (CEAO) and went ahead to become its first president despite the largesse which his country derived from Nigeria's spraying diplomacy in support of ECOWAS (Ojo, 1980). Niger's close relations with France and with other Francophone African States were instrumental in its joining the CEAO. France remains Niger's largest aid donor and its best economic partner. Yet, once Franco-Nigerien relations experienced difficulties in the 1970s it was first to Canada and later to Libya that Niger turned to in order to counter-balance French predominance. Diori Hamani's insistence

on breaking French monopoly on Niger's uranium which included the fixing of its selling price contributed to France's reluctance to save his regime from collapse (Higgoty and Fuglestad, 1978). Part of the disenchantment with Niger's first President might have been the nature of the wide range relations he established with Colonel Gaddafi. Apart from a military agreement between Libya and Niger which was signed in March 1974, economic, cultural and technical conventions were also signed between the two states, in one breath a joint bank and a joint company for the exploitation of livestock and meat were established. Libya encouraged Niger to adopt an arabisation policy in which the language would co-exist with French as language of instruction in Nigerien schools. The point is that Niger preferred Libya to Nigeria in this countervailing diplomacy whose aspects threatened both the Hausa language project Nigeria had with Niger and Nigeria's vital economic interests in that country (Nwokedi, 1992). Although Seyni Kountche went ahead to downgrade his country's military relations with France and abrogated the Negro-Libyan treaty, his room for manoeuvre was slim. While Libyan troops occupied Chad, Colonel Gaddafi proclaimed himself the protector of the Toureg population part of who inhabit Northern Niger (Langellier, 1987) Nigerian response in the early 1980s to the Libyan presence in Chad which threatened Niger's security was, on a bilateral basis (Nwokedi, 1992). Furthermore, Nigeria examined in what way Niger's diversification of its access to the sea through Benin Republic and Cote d' Ivoire affected the intensity of their bilateral relations. Assurances from Nigeria to Niger on this score would include avoiding a situation as was the case in 1977, where Nigeria muscled its way to a UN Security Council seat at the expense of Niger which has been endorsed earlier for that position by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). To be sure, Nigeria-Niger bilateral relations are not altogether exclusive of their other multilateral linkages. Thus, the Kamudugu-Yobe irrigation projects within which the two states have undertaken under the framework of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and other projects

within the Niger Basin Authority are bound to affect their bilateral relations (Nwokedi, 1992).

The cordiality of relationship between Nigeria and Niger Republic is informed by the forces of history and other aspects of their socio-cultural norms, and values. This is extended to the military aspect of their relations. Military cooperation between Nigeria and Niger Republic is an attempt by the two countries to control illegal activities within and around their border posts (Boureima, 1997). The activities or menace of drug trafficking, prevention and detection of crimes, repatriation of criminals and their loots among others have all made the issue of military cooperation necessary today. In spite of the fact that there is yet to be a coherent and finalised military pact between Nigeria and Niger, through mutual trust, understanding and consensus they have been able to cooperate militarily with each other. This form of military cooperation is however fluid (Boureima, 1997).

2.5 Security Matters in ECOWAS

2.5.1 Security

Security matters in ECOWAS can better be comprehended when the term security and collective security are understood. There is no consensus among scholars on the meaning of security. To Folarin, Ajayi and Olarewaju (2011), security is generally linked with the improvement of threats to cherished principles, particularly the survival of groups, individuals or objects in the future. Accordingly, concern for survival entails a preoccupation with security (Art, 1993).

Security is “Survival-Plus” and the world “plus” could be understood from the standpoint of being able to enjoy some freedom from life-determining threats and some life choices (Booth, 2007).

Security is not an independent concept. It is always related to individual or societal system (Brauch, 2003). Nye averred that based on the assumptions of the realist theory of international relations that security is the dominant concern for states, that force is the major instrument that governments preserve their unity as they interact with one another-security is achieved once threats to security can be prevented or at least managed (Nye, 1988).

Lippman based the security of a nation in terms of its core values. He believed that, a state is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war and is able, if challenged to maintain them by victory in such a war (Lippman, 1943). The protection of a nation's core values from threats constitutes a state's national security. National security is tantamount to national interest (Morgenthau, 1948). For Okorofo, Nzenwa, and Oti (2012), national security can be described as the sum of the efforts, energy, intelligence, commitment and the use of institutions and their products to enforce and ensure adequate protection of interest, people and properties of a nation. It also involves the overall protection of a nation's integrity and sovereignty through the use of economic resources, diplomacy, power projection and political power.

Mcsweeney (1999) unlike the state centric definition of security opined that security should accord priority to human beings since without reference to humans, security is of no value. Contrary to the realist theory, social constructivism perceives security as resulting from the interactions of various actors, with societal values and identities shaping these relations. Once the perception of security has changed, and the fear of one another is overcome, security is achieved (Ulusoy, 2003).

Security can only be achieved by combined efforts (Booth, 1999). In this perspective, security entails that a certain level of trust between actors needs to be achieved by sharing commitments. The common security approach reflects this: International security must rest

on a commitment to joint survival rather than on the threat of mutual destruction (Palme, 1982).

In Mc Namara view, the security of any nation or entity does not lie on its military preparedness alone. Security is not force though it may involve it, security is not traditional military activity though it may encompass it; security is not military hardware though it may include it, security is development and without development, there can be no security (McNamara, 1968).

The various perspectives of security given above indeed give insight into the word security. Security is very vital to human survival and the development of the society. Nothing meaningful can be achieved in a chaotic and violence environment. Thus, if Nigeria and Niger Republic are facing serious security challenges threatening their national interests along their borders from the insurgents or armed bandits, it can affect their trade relationships and impede growth and development in the two countries. For them to solve this common problem there is the need for the two states to collaborate through collective security mechanism.

2.5.2 Collective Security

The growing concern for peace and security has necessitated states to protect themselves either on individual or collective basis in the international system. The contemporary international system does not encourage isolationism. It is characterised by interdependence among states. States come together in order to solve their common political, economic and security problems. This has led to the increase in the establishment of many international organisations across the world such as the League of Nations, the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), Organisation of American State (OAS), Arab League, South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), European Union (EU), Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS) and so forth to promote their interests, peace and security at the global, regional and sub-regional levels.

Wight (1996) argued: “If there is an international society, then, there is an order of some kind to be maintained, or even developed. It is not fallacious to speak of collective interest and security acquires a broad meaning- it be enjoyed or pursued in common.” According to Abdullahi (2014) the world is concerned about security, be it on individual basis or collectively. The continent of Africa has witnessed various types of crises such as militancy, religious crisis, insurgencies, political, and economic conflicts, territorial disputes and so forth. Some of the conflict ridden zones are Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Central Africa Republic, Egypt, Libya, Mali, Nigeria and so forth. Scholars have given reasons for the causes of conflicts on the continent of Africa. The continent is confronted by lots of security problems occasioned by cultural, political and socio-economic conditions. The crises across the continent have necessitated the need for collective security and collective action among the countries in the continent in order to resolve the conflicts under the umbrella of national, sub-regional, regional and Global levels respectively (Folarin, Ajayi and Olarewaju, 2011).

Collective Security therefore, is a strategy adopted by members of international system to collectively restrain the use of force among its members. The principle stipulates that members would take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace and for the suppression of aggressive acts and breaches of the peace (Omede, 2004). Apart from its being instrumental to the establishment of regional security arrangement, the collective security concept has also been adopted in many instances around the world to maintain international peace and security, a responsibility which is generally referred to as peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace support and in some instances peace enforcement operations (Omede, 2004).

The United Nations Charter (1945) in maintaining international peace and security takes collective measures to acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and this can be done either by the Security Council of the United Nations or the regional and sub-regional collective security bodies. Chapter VII of the UN Charter in article 39-50 provides for Collective defence. Also, chapter VIII of the same Charter in articles 52-54 makes provision for the creation of regional and sub-region collective security arrangements.

Asogwa (1999), in his own contribution to the concept of collective security viewed it as a system of world order in which aggression by any state will be met by a collective response. It is a system which could be global or regional in which all member countries insure each other against every member, no state is singled out in advance as the enemy and each might be an aggressor in the future.

Orakhelashvili (2011) described collective security as a collective action in response to a collectively identified threat. Multiple regional arrangements have been established to compensate for the insufficiency of the United Nations by providing a regional capability to deal with regional crisis. According to Orakhelashvili the process of multiplying institution raised the question on how and in what manner these institutions are supposed to co-habit within the same international legal system. While acknowledging the position of Orakhelashvili on the concept of collective security, his question is already addressed by Article 52 of the UN Charter which provides the legal basis for the establishment of regional institutions. The United Nations Charter provides the framework for the existence of a regional security organisation. It approves their formation provided their actions and activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It further states it can use the arrangement or agencies for enforcement activities where necessary and the Security Council shall be informed at all times of activities undertaken or in

contemplation under the regional arrangement or agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security (Article, 52-54, United Nations Charter, 1945).

This could be reiterated that the concern and interest of the United Nation regional action for peace and security was considerably heightened by the incessant intra-state conflicts which in most cases were limited in geographical scope. It is in accordance with the global purposes and the principles of the United Nations that the Security Council had over the years encouraged the formation and also supported the activities of such regional organisations like North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The priority accorded these regional organisations was the task of preventing, containing and reconciling conflicts within their respective regions (Omede, 2004).

Kelsen (2001), said collective security is usually distinguished as the security of states in their relations to other states, sometimes called international security, from individual security as the security of individual human beings in their mutual, inter individual relations. It is imperative to note that unilateral use of force is an action that is not authorised by a competent representative of the international community, whereas collective security is an action that is authorised by a competent organ of the international community and used on behalf of the latter (Abass, 2012).

Onoja (1998) looked at collective security from the perspective of aggression. To him aggression is the root cause of international conflicts and that it is precisely because of aggression that the idea of collective security came into existence. He opined that Iraq's attack on Kuwait could be regarded as a threat to peace and international security and that the US and its allies acted lawfully and legally for and on behalf of other states when they attacked Iraq with the ultimate aim of preventing it from committing further acts of

aggression. Onoja did not acknowledge that the US and its allies intervened in Iraq in order to safeguard their interests in the region and wage war against potential enemies in the region.

Johnson and Niemeyer (1954) looked at concept of collective from a different perspective. To them the idea seems unnatural because a system of independently conceived national security policies implies the expectation of war as a dominant factor. But recent activities of these bodies show that nation states are no longer at war with each other, that internal conflicts like in the case of Liberia are mostly the problem.

Kolb (2007) stated that collective security seems too rational an abstract construct to fit political realities. That in reality state interest and position do not suit collective security requirements conceptually and that collective security is one of those things which are eminently reasonable but cannot be fully realised.

The contemporary world is interconnected. If there is any aggressive act or conflict in a country and is not quickly brought under control, it may affect other states in the international system. Regardless of the opinion of any scholar or analyst on the concept of collective security, there is the need for states in the international system to come together under a platform or an organisation to prevent aggression from any state and solve their security challenges collectively.

2.5.3 ECOWAS Collective Security

The ECOWAS collective security mechanism came into being with the adoption by member states of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security on December 10, 1999 in Lome-Togo (Abdullahi, 2014). The mechanism can be regarded as the organisation's constitution on collective security in the West African sub-region (Ibrahim, 2008). This mechanism in the opinion of Ladan (2009) "In science, it can be described as ground-breaking legislation on collective security within

the West African sub-region". It is the mechanism that controls the activities of the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Article 17 of the Mechanism establishes it as one of the supporting organs to assist the Mediation and Security Council (MSC) which has been designated with great powers to act on behalf of the Authority of Heads of State and Government. The funding of any mission is done by its member states, with the mechanism providing for such funds to be part of the organisation's annual budget (Ladan, 2009).

Prior to the adoption of the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in 1999, attempts had been made toward collective security through the signing of the Protocol on Non-aggression pact in Lagos in 1978, and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence (PMAD) in Freetown in 1981. Abdullahi (2014) stated that the West African leaders recognised the fact that economic integration was not enough to move the region forward, but that addressing security problems that threatened the economic growth itself was paramount. This is because security problems of various member states start as internal struggle that escalate across the state to neighbouring states. This early recognition that the success of an insurgent or revolutionary movement in one country is bound to spread to other states led to the signing of a Non-aggression pact in Lagos, Nigeria in 1978. That was the first step towards collective security in West Africa. The Protocol on Non-aggression only addressed the issue of giving open support to the various rulers in power by other rulers against their opponents. The treaty failed to address the issue of various insurgent movements that were threatening most of the regimes internally (Khobe, 2000). The fact that the Non-aggression Treaty did not provide mutual security against the threats of internal insurrection, led the Member States of ECOWAS, prodded by Nigeria and Ghana to negotiate and sign the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence (PMAD) in Freetown, Sierra Leone on 29 May, 1981 (Khobe, 2000).

To Abdullahi (2014) that was the second Mechanism aiming at collective security in the West African sub-region. The Protocol provides for a non-standing military force to be used to render mutual military aid and assistance to a member state that falls to a victim of external aggression. Article 4 (b) of this protocol provides the actual purpose of its creation that is, for a collective response where a member state falls a victim of internal armed conflict engineered and supported actively by external forces and which is likely to endanger the peace and security of other member states (Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence, 1989). Article 18 (2) states that member states are not entitled to military intervention in internal armed conflict that poses no danger to other states and does not have external support. That in order to secure military assistance, from ECOWAS, the president of affected state must write to chairperson of ECOWAS requesting formally for its assistance. Once received, such a letter serves as signal for the military force of the community to be placed on an emergency footing. In Chapter V, Articles 13 and 14 of the protocol states how the nature and composition of the military force should be (Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence, 1989).

The military force was known as the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC). Each state was required to earmark units from its national armed forces that in an emergency would be placed at the services of the community. The AAFC was to be under the command of a force commander who is appointed by the Chairman of the Community on recommendations of the Defence Council of the Community, which consists of the Ministers of Defence and foreign affairs of member states (Khobe, 2000).

According to the Protocol, the AAFC would be used in two situations; first where two member states are in conflict, the community will interpose the AAFC between them as a peacekeeping force. Second where a member state is the victim, of internal armed conflict supported from outside and its Head of State has requested military assistance from the

community in writing, then the AAFC will be sent as an intervention force (Khobe, 2000). Although the protocol was invoked with respect to the Liberian war of 1989/90, the AAFC never came into being as the protocol envisaged. Rather a smaller group of ECOWAS states put together an intervention force known as ECOMOG (Khobe, 2000).

Folarin, Ajayi and Olarewaju (2011) while examining the formation of (ECOWA) and its mandates stated that ECOWAS was originally established as a regional economic grouping with the specific aim of establishing customs union and establishing a common market. Years after, its scope expanded beyond just achieving economic integration to security management in the West African Sub-region. African leaders have collaborated in areas such as conflict prevention, management, resolution, and peace-building, control of the proliferation of Small Arms Light Weapons (SALWs), containment of refugee crisis, war against money laundering and terrorism (Alli, 2010).

Similarly, Ladan (2009), stated that though ECOWAS was mainly created for the economic integration of member states, it later had to adopt Protocols to extend the scope of its activities to cover collective security and mutual defence of the region adding that this collective security role was to be tested through the deployment of a West African Peace Keeping Operation in Liberia and later in countries like Sierra-Leone, Guinea Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire.

The decision to set-up ECOMOG was informed by the principles that regional stability, unity, mutual trust and good neighbourliness was necessary for achieving the ultimate ECOWAS' goal of a harmonious and united West Africa (Omede, 2012).

Khobe (2000), while trying to justify the West African Peace Keeping Operation averred: West Africa is a hot bed for political, economic and social agitation that resulted in the growth of insurgent and revolutionary movements supported largely by the economically

marginalized youth and estranged members of the elite. The problem of multi ethnic nature of member states' struggles for power and economic privileges and more led to the formation of ECOWAS Monitoring group (ECOMOG).

The ECOMOG intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone was the first of such action by a sub-regional organisation in Africa, relying principally on its own men, money and military material. It was also the first time the United Nation (UN) had sent military observers to support an already established sub-regional force (Adekeye, 2004).

Ladan (2009) stated that some shortcomings affected the ECOMOG operation in Liberia. The first according to him was the lack of legal basis for the operation ab initio. This is because the treaty establishing ECOWAS did not provide for a collective security or peacekeeping role; it was merely for economic integration.

There was also the question of neutrality, because the peacekeeping force was seen as a mercenary and an invasion, thus denting a cardinal principle of peacekeeping under international law (Ladan, 2009). The involvement of General Ibrahim Babangida the then Head of State of Nigeria who was believed to be a friend of Samuel Doe made the ECOMOG operation in Liberia to appear one sided. However, the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia helped in maintaining peace in the country. It ended the violence in the country. ECOWAS has earned respect for its conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanism. ECOWAS has achieved success in resolving security issues at the sub-regional level. As a result of this, it was believed that a broader organisation would be able to address the security issues in Africa (Folarin, Ajayi and Olarewaju, 2011).

Sesay and Akonai (2010) averred that unlike the ECOWAS, the East African Community (EAC) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) did not help much in their own sub-regional crises, such as during the violence in Kenya over election disputes, and

during the simmering one in Zimbabwe, respectively. They further argued that a major challenge to the effectiveness of the regional organisations is lack of consensus over what to do.

In Africa, the task to tackle security challenges in the continent fell on the defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU) now African Union (AU). Until recently, the OAU Charter prevented the organisation from intervening in the internal conflicts of African states (Bujra, 2002). One of the mandates of the AU as contained in its Constitutive Act is to promote peace, security, and stability in the continent. The peace and Security Council (PSC) formed by the AU is collective security arrangement of the organisation (Folarin, Ajayi and Olarewaju, 2011). Apart from the collective security arrangement by the sub-regional and regional organization, efforts have also been made by the superpowers to ensure stability in the world. This is as a result of the protection of their interests in the areas (Folarin, Ajayi and Olarewaju, 2011). Imobighe (2010) mentioned that technological backwardness and the need for regime security and preservation of military and autocratic governments are reasons for reliance on external security forces. Relevant example in this regard is the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). The US proposed the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) purposely for training African Crisis Response Force, provides logistics and funds.

2.6 Insurgency

In order to have a better understanding of Boko Haram insurgency, there is the need to look at global perspective of insurgency-meaning, causes, types, objectives and their mode of operations among scholars, commentators and analysts. There are divergent opinions among scholars, commentators and analysts about the meaning, causes, types, objectives and mode of operations of insurgency in the world. According to Fafowora (2012) insurgencies go back to times of antiquity, as far back as the old civilizations of the Greek city state and the Roman

Empire when the rulers of these ancient civilisations often had to face the challenge of insurgencies, insurrections and revolts. The main aim of insurgencies has always been the overthrow of the established order and its replacement by new social and political order. It is for this reason that insurgents take up arms to overthrow those in power. Ultimately, both the Greek and Roman Empires fell as a result of these rebellions and insurrection and external attacks. New states replaced them in a situation that has been described by historians as the rise and fall of great states and Empires in modern era. The objectives of modern insurgencies remain the same, the overthrow of the existing order and its replacement by a new order or government.

Evans and Newnham (1997) viewed insurgency as an armed insurrection or rebellion against an established system of government in a state. If the violent challenge by the insurgents is forcefully resisted by the incumbents civil or internal war situation will result. Such outcomes lead to protracted violence between the parties.

Kwanashie (2012) also viewed insurgency as a rebellion against a constituted authority when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognised as belligerents. To him, there are different forms of rebellion. It could be riot or uprisings or political actions to undermine the state. It could be violent or non-violent. Method of insurgency includes various forms of subversion and armed conflict.

Nwala (2012) on the other hand said not all rebellions are insurgencies because there have been several cases of non-violent rebellions, using civil resistance. Mahatma Gandhi's non-violent political resistance against British colonialism in India as well as the Civil Rights Movement of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. against racism in America, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's Movement of Positive Action against British colonialism in Ghana are classic cases of non-violent rebellions that cannot be classified as insurgencies.

Evans and Newnham (1997) identified two types of insurgencies- centripetal and centrifugal insurgencies. Centripetal insurgencies seek to replace the incumbent regime with a system of government more conducive to the interests and inclinations of the insurgents. Typical within this category are movements for the independence of colonial peoples and territories which seek via the insurgency to end formal colonial control. Because colonial systems relied upon coercion rather than consent as their principal means of social control, even a fairly low level of insurgent violence will be perceived by the authorities as a threat which has to be resisted. Centripetal insurgency is also a typical form of violent opposition to authoritarian regimes within states that are formally independent. In this sense the term is isomorphic with the idea of revolution although not all revolutions take the form of insurgencies, of course. Centrifugal insurgencies, on the other hand, are aimed at secession from the incumbent state and the formation of a new entity. In this present system centrifugal insurgencies are likely to be associated with the expression of ethnic nationalism. Although less common historically than centripetal insurgencies, contemporary instances such as Eritrea and South Sudan show the salience of this category. According to them, individuals and groups are recruited into insurgency movements by two principal appeals: To their sense of ethnic identity and to their political allegiance. These two appeals may fuse. Insurgencies proceed by using the strategy of unconventional warfare, including guerrilla war, particularly in their earlier stages. Centripetal insurgencies normally move beyond this guerrilla mode in their later stages when it becomes necessary physically to liberate areas of the disputed territory from the control of the incumbents. Eventually the violence may become essentially conventional if there is no short cut available to removing the last vestiges of the status quo. In all cases insurgency situations are paradigm instances of the Clausewitzian tradition of viewing the military instrument as the means of achieving political goals.

Scholars have identified different factors as possible causes of insurgency. In the opinion of Fafowora, (2012) global insurgencies are deeply rooted in the history of the various states involved. They are reflection of the history and the political and economic systems of the states affected by insurgencies, terrorism and other forms of political violence.

Nwala (2012) identified the following as causes of insurgency- injustice such as denial of rights, inequality, persecution, discrimination, marginalization; illegitimacy of the regime when it comes to power through seizure of power, electoral fraud, tyranny and abuse of power and denial of human rights, corruption; longing for freedom and self-determination; poverty especially when the regime is deemed to be weak and incomplete and incapable to protect the poor masses in the midst of plenty; weak government; ideological (religious, ethnic and political factors) influences; the militarization of the society due to long reign of the military as well as the proliferation of insurgency and terrorism in the contemporary world etc.

Mackinlay (2002) distinguished between lumpen, clan, popular and global insurgency arguing that insurgency could be driven by greed, grievances or both. Kilcullen (2005) stated that there is one set of insurgents who take the entire world, rather than one country, as the field for insurgency, and who seeks in the name of global jihad to overthrow the existing international order. There are also separate insurgencies rooted in local grievances and middle layer insurgents who glom onto local insurgencies globalize them. Carol (2012) argued that all insurgencies regardless of the regional, religious, or cultural commonalities have roots in local political failings. According to Carol al-Qaeda, as the benefactor of the global insurgency has become a decentralized network that only expands when a local grievance allows dissents and political subversive to take up the al-Qaeda's banner in their local cause (Abdullahi, 2015).

Muzan (2014) in his work titled: “Insurgency in Nigeria: Addressing the Causes as Part of the Solution” attributed the cause of insurgency to political alienation. According to him conflict and strife usually result where an individual is denied the freedom to participate in the political decision making processes of the society. Man, being a political animal, always sees himself as such and as being free to engage in politics, formally or informally. Nonetheless, he may withdraw tactically, strategically or voluntarily for psychological or other reasons where the prevailing conditions are not conducive to his participation in the political process. In this latter circumstance of withdrawal, especially where it is involuntary, he is said to be politically alienated from society. Political alienation of the individual person or of a group or segment of society breeds conflict and unrest. Political alienation or contempt can be manifested by both the rich and the poor in some instances, simultaneously. Situation of this type occurred in the petroleum-producing regions and elsewhere in Nigeria. He cited the Ogoni situation at the inception or formative period of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), as a prime example. It is reported that MOSOP was initially, and has in fact continued to be, a mass movement of the Ogoni People of the Niger Delta oil-producing area with a membership consisting of both the elite and the masses of the Ogoni people. Political alienation resulting in this type of unity of purpose and resolve between the rich and the poor becomes more formidable and intractable for any government, since it makes it more difficult for the government to penetrate the movement and possibly break the rank and file.

Muzan (2014) further identified the growth of social class awareness and desire for equality as another factors causing insurgency. Social class awareness and consciousness have the potential for conflict generation. A society where the middle class is small with an equally small or smaller upper and a robust lower class is prone to dangerous conflict. Such a society is usually characterised by great instability. This is because the lower class looks at the upper

class with envy. Similarly, inequality results in bitterness, and bitterness generates envy and hate. This is across the political spectrum at the national, state and local levels. To him, there is no African state which does not have a social class structure in which the lower class is bloated, the middle class a mere shoestring and the upper class one big, fat head. The middle class in any society is usually the natural medium of effective communication, contact and information transmission between the lower and upper classes. Where this wire of transmission is too thin, fragile or non-existent, a given society is inviting turbulent mass action, a revolution. The Niger Delta, the settler situations in Jos and perhaps, the Boko Haram movement all evoke issues of inequality in Nigeria.

Muzan (2014) also identified discrimination in the distribution of political and socio-economic goods to the population of a country as another cause of insurgency. This type of discrimination often results in deprivation of basic infrastructural amenities and diminished opportunities for employment, particularly at the upper echelons of governance and economic activities. Ethnic minorities are often victims of this type of discrimination and it has often led to movements of terrorism and insurgency. This type of discrimination was the primary motive force behind the realignment of the erstwhile warring forces of the Ijaw, Itsekiri and Urhobo in Warri against the Federal Government of Nigeria.

He posited that the prevalence of poverty makes it easier for extremist groups to mobilise disenchanted mobs in pursuit of their own political goals. There is the added factor of youth unemployment, especially within the growing stratum of university graduates. When people are pushed to the lowest levels of desperation and hopelessness, they can fall easy prey to religious demagogues who offer them a sense of belonging.

2.6.1 Nigeria's Security Challenge

According to Folarin, Ajayi and Olarewaju (2011), the general security challenges prevalent in Africa are also observable in Nigeria. The security of the Nigerian people is endangered by poverty, hunger, unemployment, health hazards, environmental degradation, and depletion of ozone layer, ethno-religious conflicts, political assassinations, militancy, poor governmental policies and ecological problems affecting food security. In addition to the above, Nigeria is experiencing a host of other challenges such as increase in cross-border crimes, including illegal oil theft and piracy, drug trafficking, modern day slavery and trafficking in persons, corruption, lack of development, poor security network, infrastructural challenges, inequality in the sharing of resources, illiteracy, proliferation of small arms and light weapon, money laundering and illicit arms transfer, which all pose threat to national security (Onuoha and Ezirim, 2013).

Ecological activities by both man and non-human that result in natural disaster, such as erosion, volcanic eruption and earthquakes, do not respect state boundaries. In Nigeria, the Niger Delta is the most susceptible region to ecological challenges. It is the region mostly challenged by the non-human threats to security. The Niger Delta is considered the wealth-hub of Nigeria. It is endowed with crude that fetches Nigeria about 90% of its external revenue. Despite the wealth of the region however, it is grossly underdeveloped and most of the people are poor and live in abject poverty (Akpobibibo, 2004).

Worst still, the activities of the multinationals, such as the flaring of gas and oil spillages have destroyed the means of livelihood of the people. Their farmland have become so spoiled and the soils bad for agricultural activities. The contaminated atmosphere has brought untold critical health hazards and untold hardships (Ogundiya, 2009). More worrisome has been the collusion between the Federal Government, community leaders and the oil companies in the

exploitation and neglect of the people's plight. According to Ogundiya (2009), there are about 150 groups that claim to be voicing the desire of the people. The movement for the emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is the most dreaded of the militant groups. Some of the strategies they use include kidnapping and hostage taking of expatriates and top Nigerian officials, vandalism of pipelines, bunkering, sabotage of company properties etc. The struggles for justice earned activist such as Ken Saro-Wiwa and nine other Ogoni leaders' death sentences from a military leader, General Sani Abacha. Since then, the hitherto peaceful struggle has taken a violent dimension.

According to Folarin, Ajayi and Olarewaju (2011), following the Niger Delta militancy has been the increasing attack of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria and the dangerous dimensions this has taken. The advent of Boko Haram group changed the content, context and texture of national insecurity. While the militants in the Niger Delta operated mostly within that region, the Boko Haram has earmarked the whole of the country as their terrain. However, most of their operations have been in the northeast of Nigeria. This has resulted to loss of lives and property, increase in refugee crisis, humanitarian crisis, flight of investors and investments, closure of schools, to mention just a few. Boko Haram has spread to the neighbouring countries of Nigeria; Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.

2.7 Boko Haram in Perspective

Boko Haram insurgency has generated the concern of scholars, commentators, policy makers and analysts over the last five years because of its security implications to Central and West African Sub-regions, Africa and the world in general.

The causes of extremism and outright acts of terror have been linked to a number of factors, which include the culture of militarism that has its antecedents in military rule, failure of the state and its institutions, economic disempowerment of the people, politics of exclusion,

failed political leadership and the poor immigration policy and watch, which have caused porous borders and inflow of illegal migrants from other countries, as well as free flow of arms into the country (Ibrahim and Igbuzor, 2002: Alli, 2010).

According to Adibe (2014), a better and more comprehensive view of the Boko Haram and Ansaru phenomena in Nigeria and the sub-region is to see them as symptoms of the crisis in Nigeria's nation-building processes. While the bombings, kidnappings, and other unsavoury acts linked to the sects are condemnable, it is important to underscore that Boko Haram is only one of the several groups in the country that purvey terror and death because there is an increasing tendency to discuss the spate of insecurity in the country as if it all began and ended with Boko Haram or as if without Boko Haram Nigeria would be a tranquil place in which to live.

There is everywhere in the country a pervasive sense of what the German-American political theorist Hannah Arendt called the "banality of evil" (Arendt, 1963). Her argument is that the great evils in history are not executed by fanatics or sociopaths but rather by ordinary people who accept the premises of their actions and therefore participate in them on the grounds that those heinous actions were normal. This is the so-called notion of normalising the unthinkable or the routinization of evil. This argument captures an important element of what is happening throughout Nigeria: Violent armed robberies across the entire country, kidnapping especially in the southeast, turf war by militarised cults and gangs in Bayelsa, and senseless intra-and inter-communal warfare are all increasingly common (Adibe, 2011). The crisis in Nigeria's nation building mixes with the crisis of underdevelopment creates an existentialist crisis for many Nigerians. For many young people, a way of resolving the consequent sense of alienation is to retreat from the Nigeria project the idea of fashioning a nation out of the disparate nationalities that make up the country and instead construct meanings in primordial identities, often with the Nigerian state as the enemy.

This perspective on Boko Haram fails to acknowledge the fact that in spite of the crisis facing Nigeria in the task of nation's building, Boko Haram has proved to be the deadliest insurgents taking over some local government areas in north-eastern part of the country in April 2015. Nigeria fought a Civil War and emerged from it stronger. The Niger-Delta militancy though affected the Nigerian economy did not lead to the seizure of the country's territory in the area. It was however, curtailed to some extent with the declaration of amnesty for the militants unlike the Boko Haram that has defied negotiation and amnesty. Similarly, there are some countries in West Africa like Benin, Togo, Ghana and so forth composed of multiplicity of ethnic nationalities that are not witnessing insurgency like the Nigeria's case.

2.7.1 Relational or Vengeance Perspective of Boko Haram Insurgency

Relational or vengeance perspective of Boko Haram insurgency attempts to provide explanation for violent conflicts between groups by exploring sociological, political, economic, religious and historical relationships between such groups. The belief is that cultural and value differences as well as group interests all influence relationships between individuals and groups in different ways. Thus, a number of conflicts grow out of a past history of conflict between groups that has led to the development of negative stereotypes, racial intolerance and discrimination, (Faleti, 2006). The difference in value invariably creates the "We" and "Others" dichotomy: "The fact that 'others' are perceived as different makes us feel they are entitled to less or are inferior by reason of values. This disrupts the flow of communication between us and them and to that extent, twists perceptions that we have about each other".

The state and other members of Nigerian society who are targets of Boko Haram's violence may indeed find it difficult to understand the sect's penchant for blood-letting. On the one hand, the former group becomes in this context the "We" and all efforts are being to secure it from savagery of the "Others", the Boko Harm members. On the other hand, the latter group

bond either by the common purpose of fighting the “unbelievers” or feeling of deprivation or both sees the remaining member of the Nigerian society as the “Others”. In the circumstance mutual antagonism existed and can be violently expressed. On the part of Boko Haram, killing of a member by government security forces the “Other” attracts reprisals from it, the “We”. The retaliatory attacks against Muslims in the Gonin Gora area of Kaduna state by an irate mob following the multiple suicide attacks on churches in the state on Sunday June 17 2012, also highlights the vengeance thrust of the “We” and “Others” psychology. In this instance, the avengers, presumably Christians now constituted the “We” while Muslims became the “Others” (Alozieuwa, 2012). The establishment of Alfurgan Islamic School, solely dedicated to the teaching of ethic opposed to Western civilisation in Jalingo, capital of Taraba state (ACSRT Journal, 2011), exemplified an effort to institutionalise the “We” and “Others” dichotomy.

The dimension of Boko Haram above ignores the fact that difference in cultural values; the establishment of “We and Others” are not peculiar to Nigeria. It is found in Cameroon, Niger, Chad, Togo, Benin and so many states in the region and it has not resulted to insurgency like Boko Haram.

2.7.2 The Political Feud Perspective of Boko Haram Insurgency

The political feud perspective is premised primarily on the argument that the extra-judicial killing of the leadership of Boko Haram in 2009 could have triggered a violent confrontation with the state. The severity that the violence has now assumed was the fallout of a fierce political battle in 2011. According to Omotosho (2014) Boko Haram sect engaged in their militant activities as a reaction to perceived or real loss of power by Northern elites. That is, there are some disenchanted politicians behind the scene who instigated and supported the Boko Haram in an attempt to use it to either hold on to power or to destabilise the new civilian government (Abdu, 2008). Agwu (2013) stated that the politicisation of Boko Haram

insurgency assumed a naked dimension within the context of the April 2011 Presidential election, the suggestion that the Boko Haram was the response of the North to the arms-twisting, the reneging from the zoning arrangement in the People's Democratic Party (PDP), and the hijacking of the Presidency by Goodluck Jonathan, when the North was supposed to be allowed to finish its second term that the illness and eventual demise of President Musa Yar'Adua denied that geopolitical zone. It was against this background that the late National Security Adviser (NSA), Andrew Owoye Azazi, used the platform of the South-South Economic Forum in Asaba to admit that the national security challenge in the Boko Haram was actually provoked by the PDP's decision to torpedo its internal zoning arrangement (The Guardian April 28, 2012). The outcry at the time resonated around forcing Jonathan to give up his 2011 presidential ambition to allow for a return of power to the north pitted some formidable political forces in the north against similar forces in the south especially from Jonathan minority ethnic Ijaw nationality of Southern Nigeria who saw in Jonathan's ambition an opportunity to placate the restive region over perceived decades of political and economic marginalization in the Nigerian union. The post 2011 election violence in part of the north, therefore, did not only symbolize a rejection of the poll's results and or Goodluck Ebele Jonathan presidency, but was also a precursor to the current mayhem (Azazi, 2012).

Like Azazi, Sam Omatseye (2012) advised that the declaration of a state of emergency would not end the insurgency, as it ought to have been declared on economic team, which needs to take a course on the Nigerian economy, with emphasis 'on the Karl Polanyi school of economic anthropology that emphasises society...' should get to the root, using consultation, friendship with those aggrieved over zoning and the last election held in 2011 (Omatseye, 2012). According to Agwu (2013) by implication, Omatseye's view here is that the essence of Boko Haram movement is political, a reaction against the People Democratic Party (PDP) and the entire southern Nigerian political elites and their accomplices in the north that

abandoned the zoning arrangement with the foisting of President Jonathan, as distinct from the religious form (between Muslims and Christians) that the expression of the movement's anger has taken.

However, this interpretation is not new in the Nigerian scholarly and political thinking, for it has often been said that contrary to the generally held view, the dynamics of conflicts in Nigeria is not necessarily engendered by its multi-ethnicity, but by specific structural and systemic factors embedded in the very process of national political development (Kalu, 2009). In other words Agwu pointed out: whereas the capture of political power (political contradiction) and the consequent control and distribution of state resources (economic contradiction) are the essence or scientific causes of conflicts in the Nigerian political system. These conflicts find expression or manifestation in ethnic and religious forms. It is this kind of thinking that has brought about the not infrequent declaration by Nigerian leaders after the country's spasmodic bouts of inter-ethnic and sometimes intra-ethnic mayhem that the conflicts are neither ethnic nor religious, even when what is usually concretely observable are religious, ethnic and sometimes intra-ethnic confrontations. This is the dialectics of form and essence into which the Boko Haram syndrome has often tended to draw some analysts.

For Ohaeri, there can be no doubt that the Boko Haram issue and the post-election violence in the North are clearly reactions to perceived or real loss of power by an elite stratum that is predominantly 'Northern' even if the leading figures in this agenda do not necessarily count religious piety among their greatest attributes. He further argued that, the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency is a clear manifestation of contest over raw political power- who lost power, who won power, and who wants power back. The processes that threw up President Goodluck Jonathan as the candidate of this elite stratum were intimately bound up with the political crisis that gripped the northern political class (Ohaeri, 2011).

In a similar dimension, Tieku (2012) argued further that the spread of Boko Haram has political undertone. He averred: “There is also a widespread idea that the agreement on rotating the Nigerian presidency between Christians and Muslims has been broken. Late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua was a Muslim that succeeded former President Olusegun Obasanjo and he was supposed to serve two terms. When Yar’Adua died, President Jonathan succeeded him and dismantled that gentleman’s agreement on rotating the presidency in Nigeria. The northern elite are extremely unhappy with this. He maintained: “The northern elites are using the Boko Haram’s activities as a mobilising tool to create insecurity for the Nigerian government. According to him, Boko Haram’s refusal to reveal its identity and table its grievances actually erodes the relevance of the previous explanation of the crisis in favour of the political feud perspective, whether in terms of Herskovits suggestion that while the original core of the group remains active, criminal gangs have adopted the name Boko Haram to claim responsibility for attacks when it suit them.

Omotosho (2014) stated that Boko Haram became highly politicised and used in the contest for power between different group of elites purporting to represent one religious or the other, especially within the context that Sharia has gained popularity among the masses of Northern Nigeria (Abdu, 2008). It should be noted that, the Boko Haram sect maintain close connections to political entrepreneurs in the Northern parts of the country. On assumption of office, some governors presented Sharia as a panacea to the socio-economic problems. This is similar to the argument that, the problems are as a result of governance devoid of the fear of God, and under Sharia, governance and power will be in the name of God and the overall interest of the people. Power will therefore be exercised according to the tenets of Islam and in the interest of all citizens (Kukah, 1993; Kenny, 2004). The Boko Haram insurgency can be argued to have emerged as a result of the abandoned Sharia project by some northern Nigerian Governors. It should be noted that, when the northern Governors introduced the

Sharia legal systems in their states, the Boko Haram leaders thought that the ‘Sharia governors’ were truly interested in the practice of Sharia, but when the governor recklessly abandoned the Sharia and the political dividends had been reaped by the Governors, the Islamists started all manners of projects considered best for deepening Islamic traditions in northern Nigeria (Albert, 2008).

The weakness of those attributing political feud to the cause of Boko Haram insurgency could be situated in the fact that none of the arrested Boko Haram members has provided substantial evidence that the insurgency is used by certain northern elements in order to dominate the political affairs of Nigeria. They have also not provided enough evidence against former Jonathan’s administration in order to perpetuate himself in power beyond 2015. If truly the northern political elites want to make the country ungovernable for Jonathan, the Boko Haram might not concentrate their attacks in the north killing their brothers and sisters and destroying the economy of the area.

2.7.3 Socio-Economic Perspective of Boko Haram Insurgency

On the other hand, some scholars ascribed socio-economic dimension to the cause of Boko Haram insurgency. The Socio-economic perspective of conflict attributes social conditions to the cause of conflict. This is based on the human need theory of social conflict which states that all humans have basic needs which they seek to meet and their inability to meet these needs leads to conflict. This theory is similar to the frustration aggression theory of violence, which posits that aggression is always a consequence of frustration (Dougherty and Pfaltzgrate Jr, 1990: 266). Ted Gurr (1970) deprivation theory explains why the youths are always taking to violence. “Aggression is always a consequence of frustration” and “frustration always lead to aggression” (Leeds, 1978). “The poor are led to violence owing to their relative deprivation and needs” (Odumosu, 1999). Insecurity, terrorism, conflicts and violence are caused by the high poverty rate in most societies (Gurr, 1970 and Burton,

1997). Human needs theorists such as Burton (1990) and Maslow (1943) would argue that one of the primary causes of the protracted conflicts in Nigeria is the people's drive to meet their unmet needs. Those who have sought to explain the Boko Haram phenomenon within this framework point out that, despite a per capita income of \$2,700 before the rebasing of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and an impressive annual GDP growth rate for over a decade, the north has one of the poorest populations in Nigeria (Adibe, 2014).

According to Omotosho (2014), Boko Haram sect symbolises people's anger and rejection of their socio-economic condition and an attempt to fashion out a system that will give them a sense of belonging. The failure of the state and those associated with it to cater for fundamental needs and aspirations translate into material deprivation and alienation which made the people to begin to question prevailing ideas and institutions that directly affect them (Sheme, 2011; Marama, 2011). Furthermore, the excessive urban and rural abject poverty, while excessive wealth lies in the hands of a few aristocrats and the vicious cycle of national underdevelopment has in turn cultivated fundamentalism among the poor. However, the root of the rise and agitation of the Boko Haram in the Northern parts of the country is the failure of government to propel modernisation in order to deliver its promises of improvement to the mass of ordinary people within the present political dispensation (Omotosho, 2014). Boko Haram insurgency carries within it the disillusionment with progress and the disenchantments of the first twelve years of our democratic dispensation (Ohaeri, 2011).

Tieku (2012) while contributing to the socio-economic perspective on the cause of Boko Haram in addition to the political perspective he gave as reason for the spread of Boko Haram insurgency went further and asserted: "Boko Haram is usually conceptualized as a religious movement but it has strong social and economic undertones. That is part of the reasons why it has attracted so much attention. There is so much discontent in Nigeria's society and to some extent; Boko Haram is feeding on this. Its message is also resonating because there is a

broader feeling among some Nigerians that society would be better off with going back to the old days of the Sokoto Caliphate. This segment thinks that moral decay, as well as economic problems, would be resolved because the Caliphate and the Islamic Shariah promoted Zakat-a tenet of Islam that wealth has to be shared. This segment thinks that inequality and gross disparity between the rich and poor in Nigeria could be dealt with through an Islamic government.

Similarly, Awoyemi (2012) affirmed the socio-economic perspective on the rise of Boko Haram. He stated: ‘‘Boko Haram phenomenon has a deep economic root more than any other perspectives from which the investigating intelligence can suggest’’. These realities are much more obvious in rural areas. A factual indicator is the result of the Harmonized Nigeria Living Standard Survey published by the National Bureau of Statistic in 2012 which showed that the North scored badly and accounted for the large proportion of Nigerians living in poverty. Others have contended that violence in the north is orchestrated by the betrayal of peoples’ trust in government. The low level of government presence provided criminals and terrorists a platform to launch insurrection being witnessed across northern Nigeria (Benjamin *et al*, 2012).

According to Agwu (2013) since the advent of Boko Haram insurgency some policymakers, commentators and analysts hold that the problem of Boko Haram insurgency has so much to do with infrastructural decay, unemployment, poverty and lack of education. Former President Goodluck Jonathan himself admitted in the height of the Boko Haram attacks that military confrontation alone would not eliminate terror attacks and that an enabling environment for young people to find job was also an imperative measure (ThisDay January 27, 2012). He stated that the Obama’s administration also shared this materialistic sentiment of Boko Haram insurgency. According to him when Johnnie Carlson, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, spoke at the Washington Centre for Strategic and International

Studies, his view was that: “Nigerians are hungry for progress and improvement in their lives, but northern Nigerians feel this need most acutely. Life in Nigeria may be tough for many, but life in the north is grim for almost all. Public opinion polls and news reports suggest there is a strong sentiment throughout the country but especially in the north that government is not on the side of the people and their poverty is a result of government neglect, corruption, and abuse” (Nigerian Tribune April 11, 2012). Adamu Ciroma, said that the operations of the sect were related to poverty and other things affecting the well-being of the ordinary people, things like the problem of education, health and agriculture, most of which had been severely ignored, particularly by the state governments in the Nigerian federation (The Nation April 3, 2012). The Borno State Governor, Kashim Shettima, spoke in the same vein when he attributed the Boko Haram to the grievances of the poor against previous leaders for failure to provide basic social amenities such as potable water, electricity and healthcare in the state and across the northern part of the country (The Guardian April 21, 2012). The former Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, blamed the Boko Haram on the regional imbalance in revenue allocation, saying that there is clearly a link between the very uneven nature of distribution of resources and the rising level of violence, and insisting that when you look at the figures and look at the size of the population in the north, you can see that there is a structural imbalance of enormous proportion. Those states simply do not have enough money to meet basic needs while some states have too much money (ThisDay January 28, 2012). Shehu Sani also held the materialistic view of the emergence of the sect, arguing that there is disparity between northern and southern part of Nigeria, and this has left northerners poorer and more economically disadvantaged making the region prone to the growth of extremist ideas (MacDougall, 2012).

Haruna (2012) recounted former President Clinton's account in his autobiography 'My Life' of the mid-1960s riots in the United States and the conclusions of the Otto Kerner-led Commission of Enquiry instituted by President Lyndon Johnson that the riots were the result of police racism and brutality and the absence of economic and educational opportunities for blacks, with the verdict: According to Agwu (2013), Haruna substituted America's racial differences with Nigeria's regional differences and stated that Kerner's commission might as well have been talking about present-day Nigeria. Agwu stated that when later the governors of the entire 19 northern states demanded that the revenue allocation formula be reviewed urgently because a situation where a state like Niger State, for instance, got between ₦4.2bn and 4.5bn as monthly allocation whereas some other states received 20 times that amount was grossly unfair (The Punch February 24, 2012), it became clear that there may be geopolitical conclusion on Sanusi's viewpoint. He averred that the governors of the South-South states were quick to denounce the association of Boko Haram phenomenon with the country's derivation fund, pointing out that even the prevailing 13 percent derivation revenue allocation formula is meagre, and insisting that there should be an upward review of the whole principle as well as the introduction of the fiscal federalism in Nigeria (The Guardian March 15, 2012). Agwu stated that whereas Sanusi and by implication, the 19 northern governors may be selling a decoy to the populace with their dialectical materialist thesis on the Boko Haram, the ultimate implication of Haruna's exegesis was the transcendence of the material determinant rather than the millenarian.

According to Agwu the dialectical materialistic sentiment also resonated in the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs' (NIIA) Fourth Brainstorming Session on "Current Security Challenges in Nigeria" that was held in its Conference Chambers on Friday, September 9, 2011. One of the conclusions of the participants is that if Nigeria can fix its infrastructures, the economy, provide job for the teeming jobless population and provide education, among

others, the tide of terrorism and the local al-Qaeda's onslaught will be minimized or even completely eradicated. In the same vein, the Seven-Man Presidential Committee on Security Challenges in the North-East, where the problem of the Boko Haram was more acute, submitted that the insecurity resulted from the failure to deliver services in the wake of huge resources accruing to governments, the inability of the Federal Government to complete useful/ crucial projects that have high development impacts (The Punch September, 2011).

Agwu on the other hand stated that the dialectical materialist definitely is an undue politicisation or trivialisation of a serious problem, the same pattern of responses that led to the worsening or degeneration of the extremism-related insecurity in Nigeria to this unfortunate level. Much as socio-economic factors are relevant in the explanation of problems like this, they should not be made fetish of, for such dialectic materialistic approach does not in any way explain why, for instance, despite the United States' prosperity, some cases of local adherence to the al-Qaeda still evolve on the country's soil (the New York Times December 19, 2011).

Herskovits (2012: 16) also argued along the line of materialistic causation of Boko Haram. While writing in the New York Times asserted: It was clear in 2009, as it is now, that the root cause of violence and anger in both the north and south of Nigeria is endemic poverty and hopelessness. Influential Nigerians from Maiduguri where Boko Haram is centre, pleaded with Jonathan's government in June and July not to respond to Boko Haram with force alone.

The socio-economic perspective above provides useful explanations and understanding of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. It cannot be ignored. Whatever factors adduced for the causes of Boko Haram insurgency by any objective analyst, the pervasive poverty, and unemployment in the country make the youths to be willing tools in the insurgents' operations.

The weakness of the perspective of Boko Haram above is that poverty and unemployment are not limited to the northern part of Nigeria. We also have poverty in other countries of West Africa like, Togo, Benin, the Gambia, and Guinea etc and yet it has not resulted to Boko Haram-like insurgency. It also fails to explain how Boko Haram acquired expensive weapons to facilitate its operations within Nigeria's and Niger's territories. If truly Boko Haram is poverty induced, where are the insurgents getting their funds, recruitment, and other logistics for their activities? While this explanation cannot be ignored it has also not provided sufficient explanation for the causes of Boko Haram.

2.7.4 The Conspiracy Perspective

The conspiracy perspective attempting to explain the Boko Haram insurgency can be marked into two broad categories: one focussing on machinations of internal factors, the other on external actors. Internal factors are related to political feud perspective explained in this work. It may include the disgruntle northern power elites who, having lost power, are bent on bringing down Nigeria under a southern leadership as well as the Jonathan administration itself which may be sponsoring the insurgency in order to rally southern support behind his administration, and there is also the perception that Boko Haram may be a secret society controlled by some 'invisible' hands that seek to destroy the north ahead of 2015 so as to forestall or weaken its bid for the Presidency at that time (Adibe, 2012). Another conspiracy is that Boko Haram is actually sponsored by the Jonathan administration to make Islam look bad or give the impression that the north is out to pull down his administration or to make him fail as President of the country. This would be a way for the President to mobilise the support of his "southern and Christian brethren" behind his administration (Adibe, 2014).

External actors, on the other hand, may include powerful western states like France, United Kingdom, United States of America, or neighbouring African States envious of Nigeria's progress and stability. While corroborating the role of external forces in the protracted Boko

Haram insurgency, Ayu (2014) said the emerging economic contest over control of oil among big political powers in West Africa “is the inconvenient truth about the insurgency in North East Nigeria.” Ayu (2014:4) argued that:

Boko Haram has no clear or coherent message. They indiscriminately attack Christians, western institutions, such as schools, Muslims alike. It is made up Nigerians and a large number of Chadians from the Chadian Provinces of Lac and Hadjer Lamis. These two Chadian states share a long border with north-eastern Nigeria around Lake Chad region and provide Boko Haram with trained Chadian fighters.

He went further and stated: “Two things about this area are central to understanding the Boko Haram phenomenon. First and important is that the Lake Chad Basin is estimated to have a reserved of 2.32billion barrels of oil and 14.65 trillion cubic feet of gas flows underground across the countries sharing the Lake Chad Basin. These are Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon. Using 3 Drilling, it is believed that Chad is not only tapping oil within its territory, but also from Nigeria to push up its production level.”

Boko Haram insurgency is delaying the exploration and production of oil on the Lake Chad side of Nigeria to the advantage of Chad and a few other stakeholders. Prominent businessmen and politicians in both Nigeria and Chad, in association with French companies, have invested heavily in the Chadian oil industry, and as a result, benefits from Boko Haram’s destabilization of the north-eastern part of Nigeria. It is widely believed that it is they who are the principal financiers and arms suppliers to Boko Haram (Ayu, 2014).

Like Ayu, Alhaji Maitama Sule described the activities of the sect as the handiwork of some fifth columnists, both local and foreign, that are bent on destabilising or dismembering Nigeria (Sunday Mirror April 29, 2012).

This dimension of Boko Haram insurgency could be criticised because up till date 2016, none of the arrested Boko Haram members has confessed that the insurgency is used by certain elements in the north in order to dominate the political affairs of Nigeria. Similarly, none of

the arrested members of the group has indicted former President of Nigeria Goodluck Jonathan of using the sect in order to cling on to power beyond 2015. None of their video postings on the YouTube and the press released by the insurgents supports the claim of the external forces in the destabilisation of Nigeria for economic advantage.

2.7.5 Theocratic Perspective

Lengmang (2011) on the other hand, adopted a theocratic perspective for the explanation of Boko Haram insurgency. He corroborated the allegation that some segments of the northern Muslim population may be unhappy with the compromise of the state-level Sharia co-existing side by side with a secular federal system. This segment may arguably be small; they are increasingly becoming radicalized and more willing to periodically express themselves through violence. Lengmang attributed resentment to the Sharia co-existence with secular federal system to the view by many northerners that western education is incapable of stimulating meaningful development and prosperity in the region, and so shares the fallacy of western education being incompatible with Islam.

According to Omotosho (2014) Boko Haram insurgency in the northern parts of Nigeria cannot be divorced from religion in the country. According to him the politics of religion and Islamic insurgency in the northern parts of Nigeria centre on the nature of the states, especially its secular tradition and legal framework. The contention is that, the Islamic fundamentalist believes that there is no separation of the sacred and the profane and the legal system that governs them. These Muslim actors have found a linkage between Nigeria secular state and Christianity and has vehemently opposed it and demanded an Islamic state based on Sharia Law (Elaigwu and Galadima, 2003; Abdu, 2008)

Every religion has a unique way of responding to different issues involving God, the Boko Haram insurgency is a protest and an opposition towards any form of power that is not guided

by a divine scripture (Egwu, 2001). Boko Haram insurgents are motivated by the neo-imperialism as well as the liberal underpinning of Western culture which is threatening the tradition and also prioritising the individual over the basic tenets of Islam. The Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria shows that the upswing of Islamism notwithstanding all the international dimensions cannot be comprehended without a consideration of the disastrous social and political situation in the country (Agbo, 2011b; Sheme, 2011). The Boko Haram sect move against everything considered to be 'Western'. Furthermore, the gerontocratic rule and the continued contempt of Islamic tenets by an oligarchy courted by the West will definitely lead to a much stronger proliferation of armed uprisings in different parts of the country (Awosusi, 2011).

Mehrdad Mozayyan traced the rise of radicalism to Iranian revolution and anti western sentiments in the Middle East. According to him the Iranian revolution that ushered in a widespread rejectionist philosophy, changed the Muslims' view of themselves and their position in the world, as well as their approaches to daily life and politics. The anti western feelings in the Middle East claims that it brought a corruption influence (Mozayyan, 2009).

Reinares (BBC, 2006) argued that political influence such events in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East generally; Chechnya, Bosnia, etc could motivate Jihadists (BBC online, 2006). For Boko Haram sect, the inspiration derived from Afghanistan, for instance, may not be limited only to the victory of the Mujahedeen over the Soviet, but rather symbolises the triumph of Islam over secularity. It derives essentially from the fact that the victory was scored with the primitive and improvised arms (Mazayyan, 2009) as compared to the modern weapons of the Soviets. Boko Haram started its campaign of terror in Nigeria with comparatively primitive weapons but it has moved to improvised explosive devices (IEDS) and chaos in Libya has been of great value in terms of weapons and training, (Reuters, 2012).

Even if some truth exists in the dialectical materialist explanation of the phenomenon of the Boko Haram in Nigeria, this would still not diminish the sect members' primary millenarian motivation as people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and Jihad (the New York Time, December 19, 2011).

Agwu (2013) opined thus, the socio-economic or even the political explanation of the incidence of al-Qaeda franchise (the Boko Haram) in Nigeria is far from viable. This terror is international in character, and it is unmistakably fuelled by the sentiment that is inherent in the clash of civilisations. Samuel Huntington has contended that 'so long as Islam remains Islam which it will and the West remain the West which is more dubious according to Agwu, this fundamental conflict between the great civilizations and ways of life will continue to define their relations (Huntington, 1996: 212). And in this conflict, terrorism must continue to count because it is one between the strong and the weak in which the West possesses the nuclear weapons and terrorism has the reputation of being the weapon by which the weak compensate for conventional inferiority (Huntington, 1996: 187). The theory of the clash of civilisations in this matter thrives on the assumption by the proponents of terror that Western civilisation has taken over the world and is entrenching injustices. Thus, they take up arms and use every conceivable accoutrement of modern Western civilisation, the refined science and technology, to drive the violence. One of the illustrations of the use of these modern implements being the 9/11 attacks in the United States, in which the terrorist attackers flew airplanes into the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon (Agwu, 2013).

This clash of civilisations thesis on modern international insurgency in general and its variant or franchise in the Sahel region and tropical Africa in particular was vindicated in the wake of the UN bombing in Nigeria when the Boko Haram within the context of its war against the enemies of Islam (National Mirror September, 2011) declared that it bombed the UN because the UN is an ally of the US, a country that it alleged is an enemy of Islam (The Vanguard

August 28, 2011). In fact, the extremist sect declared that it had former President Olusegun Obasanjo within its firing range on September 15, 2011, when he visited Borno State to attempt to initiate negotiations with Babakura Fuggu, the in-law of the slain Mohammed Yusuf, but only spared his life because ‘Obasanjo was good to us’, having tolerated the Sharia movement during his presidency (The Vanguard January 24, 2012).

As an al-Qaeda franchise in Nigeria, it is difficult to explain the activities of the Boko Haram outside the context of the al-Qaeda mindset, which is by mere reference to the country’s domestic socio-economic and political conditions. This is particularly because Nigeria’s home-grown terror group, the Niger Delta militants for instance, do not have any suicidal bent or inclination. The Niger Delta militants never did suicidal bombings, not even the Maitasine group in some northern Nigerian states in the early 1980s. They all love life and live it to the fullest (Agwu, 2013). The advent of contemporary suicide bombing is essentially the handiwork of the al-Qaeda and its associates that seek millenarian goals. The suicide terrorist tactic is never deterred by any secular compensation or deprivation because its practitioners are driven by a fierce loyalty to their peculiar small band or community, and an ideology that seeks ethereal honour. In other words, they seek martyrdom, even though they are never isolated martyrs (Richardson, 2006).

Boko Haram does not possess the coherent religious ideology and justification to impose Sharia in Nigeria because they evolved from attacking Christians to attacking Muslims as well over the last five years. This perspective does not explain why states like Kwara, Sokoto, Kebbi, Oyo, Osun states in Nigeria mostly populated by Muslims are not facing insurgency as witnessed in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States. Similarly, there are no Boko Haram-like insurgents in some countries in West Africa like Gambia, Senegal, and Guinea with a very large Muslim population. All the perspectives of Boko Haram indeed give insight into the causes of Boko Haram and its escalation into a regional threat. Their criticisms are not meant

to discard them but to subject them to test in order to advance the frontiers of knowledge on the topic under study.

2.8 The Effects of Boko Haram Insurgency on Regional Security

Insurgents have caused lots of damage to the African continent over the decades. Some insurgent groups in the continent include the Central Africa Republic's Seleka coalition, the Tuareg rebels in Mali, Somali pirates, National Liberation Force in Burundi, Congolese Revolutionary Forces (DR Congo), Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, West Sid Boys (Sierra Leone) the Lord's Resistance Army (Uganda), and the Boko Haram in Nigeria among others (The Punch, 2013).

In Central Africa Republic, a ragtag army ousted President Francois Bozize from power in 2013. Bozize himself had in 2003 seized power after a successful rebellion. In Democratic Republic of Congo, the late Laurent Kabila ousted one of Africa's longest serving dictators, Mobutu Sese Seko, from power in 1997 after a protracted Bush war. But his benefactors, Rwanda and Uganda, sponsored a counter insurgency that killed him. However, his son, Joseph Kabila, succeeded him, though his government is being hobbled by truculent political waves. Cote d'Ivoire managed to survive a war to restore democracy after the then President, Laurent Gbagbo, manipulated the electoral process and held on to power despite his defeat in a presidential election. France, Nigeria and the ECOWAS military forces had to step in. Mali would have capitulated to the insurgents but for the intervention of a multi-lateral coalition led by France. After two months under superior fire power, the insurgents were pushed to the desert and mountainous fringes. The rebels exerted their own authority in northern Mali by issuing, security passes or travel documents to residents and officials, stamped in the name of "Azawad Republic" (The Punch, 2013).

In Nigeria, the senseless carnage caused by Boko Haram in Borno State, Yobe State, and other parts of the North has attracted international condemnation. The Governor of Borno State Shettima (2016) while speaking at the First National Economic Forum organised by the Nation in Lagos stated “In financial terms, up to \$6 billion (N2trillion) has gone down the drain, about 20,000 people killed and two million others displaced in Borno”. He said the \$6billion losses do not include losses incurred by local and international businesses located in the capital city, Maiduguri. He said before the insurgency, a branch of the one of the tier one banks in Maiduguri was processing a billion naira daily, the biggest cash centre in the country.

Boko Haram’s brazen attacks and open identification with the al-Qaeda are surely a source of concern for Nigeria, Africa and the rest of the world. In fact, the US General Ham of the Africom was reported to have lamented that a coordination of efforts between the al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and the Boko Haram, even in loose partnership with the al-Shabab, would be the most dangerous thing to happen not only to Africans, but to us as well (The Guardian August 18, 2011).

According to Bekele (2015) since 2009, and increasingly since mid 2013, the Boko Haram has carried out several hundreds of attacks against civilian and civilian’s structures in schools, market places and places of worship. An estimated 3,750 civilians were killed by Boko Haram in 2014, in what like amounts to crimes against humanity. The group has also abducted hundreds of women and girls and forcefully conscripted young men and boys. Nearly one million people have been displaced by the fighting within Nigeria and across its borders.

Boko Haram attacked villages in Cameroon, and kidnapped businessmen, religious representatives, and tourists, holding them for ransom. During an attack on February 4, 2015, in the town of Fokotol, Boko Haram allegedly killed scores of people, burned Churches and

Mosques, and used civilians as shields. On February 8, 2015, the group abducted numerous civilians from a bus taking people to a local market. Some were reportedly later killed (Bekele, 2015).

Like Bekele, Onuoha (2014), in his book titled: “A Danger Not to Nigeria Alone- Boko Haram Transnational Reach and Regional Responses” gave a detailed analysis of the effects of Boko Haram on Nigeria and its neighbouring states. According to him Boko Haram poses security threat to several bordering countries in the sub-region, notably Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, by organising direct attacks on their soil. Cameroon has hitherto been the main stage for planning cross-border attacks which increased at a time of growing counter activities by the Cameroonian government. In May 2014, suspected Boko Haram militants attacked a Chinese work site in northwest Cameroon, killing at least one soldier and abducting 10 Chinese workers. Chad and Niger are also facing threat of instability and insecurity deriving from attacks by Boko Haram militants. On the activities of Boko Haram insurgency on Niger, he stated that in Niger’s eastern Diffa Region, there was a violent incident in May 2014 between Nigerien forces and suspected Boko Haram insurgents, with at least a dozen of Boko Haram members being arrested. Some were arrested after they attacked an army patrol in the region of Diffa. These cross-border attacks reveal a web of an originally Nigeria-based insurgency and how it has become a vector of insecurity in neighbouring countries. He affirmed Boko Haram has spread its insurgency beyond Nigeria and has grown into a regional threat. Thus, he recommended that the disturbing trend required an effective strategy and a swift implementation to contain the transnational reach of Boko Haram.

Onuoha (2014) observed further that Boko Haram’s regional security implication manifests in the transnational consequences of the growing violence for humanitarian, economic and diplomatic stability in the countries. It has created dire humanitarian situation. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), no

fewer than 6 million residents of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States have been directly affected by Boko Haram attacks. Increasing violence perpetrated by Boko Haram has created a huge number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, a number that is growing with each passing attack. According to the UNOCHA, nearly 300,000 people in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe States- 70 percent of them women and children-have fled their homes early 2013. The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR) put the figure of IDPs in Nigeria at a more than 650,000, with a majority of them staying with families in other parts of Nigeria (Human Rights Watch, 14 March, 2014). The majority victims are predominantly the most vulnerable of the society-children and women many of whom have been orphaned and widowed as a result of the activities of the insurgents.

These numbers exclude those that have fled as refugees across Nigeria's borders, to proximate villages in neighbouring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The UNHCR estimated that over 60, 000 Nigerians sought refuge in neighbouring countries in May 2013. For instance, there are about 40,000 Nigerian refugees in Niger Republic and about 28,000 in Cameroon with majority coming from bordering communities. Many of those refugees fled without any food or water, thereby intensifying the strain on scarce resources and social services of the host communities (Onuoha, 2014).

Boko Haram violence has led to the destruction of health facilities in the north-eastern states of Nigeria, forcing health workers to either flee or shut down clinics. This in turn has compelled residents to seek refuge and medical attention in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, thereby adding to the pressure on limited health facilities in the communities. Added to this is the problem of worsening food insecurity caused by the destruction of livelihoods and social support systems, bombing of infrastructures, displacement of farmers and pillaging of livestock and foodstuff. A big majority of farmers in the north had been displaced by Boko Haram's violence just before the start of the 2014 planting season. Owing to worsening

insecurity, farmers are no longer able to cultivate their lands or harvest their products for fear of being attacked by Boko Haram members. Also, cattle herders and households have lost their livestock to Boko Haram pillaging, further compounding the situation of severe food insecurity (Onuoha, 2014).

Onuoha (2014) ascribed the cost of transportation of goods and services in the sub-region to insecurity occasioned by Boko Haram. Additional cost increases the cost of doing business services, products and food prices in the sub-region. Furthermore, cross-border abductions by Boko Haram, for instance, have scared off potential tourists in the far northern region of Cameroon, leading to a sharp drop in customs revenues for the Central African Country. Overall, the violence has severely impacted the local economy of the sub-region, as well as the well-being of the economies of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin among other countries, which are tied to the Nigerian economy.

Another implication of Boko Haram according to Onuoha (2014) concerns Nigeria's ability to continue to play the vital role of a regional stabilizer in West Africa, including sustaining her contributions to peace support operations worldwide. Since the attainment of independence in 1960, Nigeria's diplomatic and military leadership has helped to resolve major political and security crises in West Africa from the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crises in the 1990s to the political instability in Guinea, Niger, Cote d'Ivoire, and Mali (Sherman, 2013). In fact, Nigeria deployed about 12,000 troops within the framework of the ECOWAS monitoring Group's (ECOMOG) missions and spent well over \$10billion. Nigeria also committed about \$34million to the deployment of troops and logistics support to the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) and pledged an additional \$5million in further assistance for the stabilisation of Mali. To Onuoha, while Nigeria deploys more human and material resources to address the Boko Haram insurgency, her capacity to contribute to regional and international security as well as stability is gradually being eroded.

For example, Nigeria which had consistently ranked as the fourth largest contributor to UN peace operations behind India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and also as the largest contributor among African countries, has since December 2011 lost that position to Ethiopia due to the imperative of addressing internal security challenges. Pressing demand for troops at home to help combat the Boko Haram insurgency and other internal security challenges contributed to Nigeria's withdrawal of some of her troops in July 2013 from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

These developments reveal how the insurgency is gradually diminishing the contributions Nigeria makes to regional security therefore supporting the conclusion of Sherman that "Nigeria cannot fully achieve its potential as a stable regional leader until Nigeria successfully overcomes the challenge of Boko Haram" (Sherman, 2013). This poses a serious dilemma to ECOWAS. The worst case scenario will be a situation where Boko Haram's growing attacks exploit Nigeria's sensitive religious and ethnic backgrounds to plunge the country into anarchy or possible implosion. As the world's 7th most populous country, Nigeria's implosion would lead to a regional destabilization as the wave of refugee flows would sweep across the neighbouring countries. More so, ECOWAS will suffer the absence of a regional security stabiliser in the event of eruption of political crisis in any of its member states (Onuoha, 2014).

2.8.1 The Effects of Insurgency on International Relations

Looking at the effects of insurgency on international relations, Agwu said insurgency obstructs Africa's international relations in the sense that it breeds distrust between and among states that had not developed some fully functional mutual confidence-building measures that dispel all suspicions that one or more of them in a terror-infested neighbourhood is a culprit in the sponsor of the malaise. Africa's porous border is a major antithesis in the fight against terror; it has tended to contaminate the relationships between

states, that is, the international relations on the continent (Agwu, 2013). The porosity of most of the borders in the continent was orchestrated by the colonial experience that unilaterally imposed them. Thus, the arbitrary colonial territorial arrangements culminated, for instance in the partition of Borno people between Nigeria, Niger, and Chad, the Kebbi people between Nigeria and Niger and so forth (The Guardian February 11, 2012). These have constituted the trans-border that straddle countries and make dealing with the influx of aliens, smuggling of goods and arms, a nightmare. The former spokesperson of the Nigerian Immigration Services, Joachin Olumba in 2012, emphasised the challenge posed by the trans-border communities when he reiterated: “The problem is the fact of historical and cultural links between Nigeria and our neighbours. The relationship that has existed over the years among those who come from border areas is historical. You find situations where Yoruba exists in Benin Republic, then Hausa/Fulani in Niger Republic. These people have lived in border towns for so long” (The Nation February 7, 2012). The border town dwellers with common ethnic characteristics mix so easily and make it difficult for security agencies to isolate the aliens, especially the illegal ones among them. In this situation, the borders can never be made impregnable as they should be. Worse still, the security agencies at the Nigerian borders, for instance, lack the vital or critical resources to function and the equipment and sundry logistics to do effective border patrol Agwu (2013).

According to Agwu (2013) the declaration of a state of emergency and the closure of Nigeria’s borders with those neighbouring African countries that are contiguous to the most affected states of the Nigerian federation were actions that partly emanated from the belief that Boko Haram foot soldiers were infiltrating the country from such Nigerian neighbours. These desperate measures perfectly illustrate how insurgency contaminates orderly border controls and thereby contributes in the disruption of Africa’s international relations. In taking those actions, President Jonathan was understandably conscious of the

fact that Nigeria was breaching its international obligation under ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and that the actions would hurt the weak economies of these neighbours that are actually dependent on Nigeria for a lot of their needs (The Guardia January 1, 2012).

2.8.2 Regional and International Response to Boko Haram Insurgency

According to Onuoha (2014) ECOWAS adopted a Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism in 2013, which provides for regional Counter Terrorism and an Implementation Plan to help member states combat terrorism. ECOWAS faces several challenges in combating Boko Haram threat. Tactically and operationally there is very little the ECOWAS can do, since it is only as strong as its member states. It lacks both intelligence architecture and an operational standby force it could use in counter-terrorism operations. Its programmes and activities are largely influenced by donor funding and priorities, further limiting what it can do regarding combating Boko Haram. In addition, it cannot effectively ring fence Nigeria for the purposes of curtailing Boko Haram's transnational operations, given that Nigeria's neighbours such as Chad and Cameroon do not belong to the regional organisation. Nigeria signed bilateral agreements on security with her neighbouring countries and engaged joint operations with Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Benin focusing on efforts to restore security along the borders by employing the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) on the Lake Chad Basin (Onuoha, 2014). MNJTF was established in July 1988 as a joint operation made up of soldiers from Chad, Niger, and Nigeria to ensure security within their common borders and engender international cooperation. It commenced operation in September 1988 after a tripartite agreement was reached by the heads of State of the three countries but went almost moribund afterwards. It was however resuscitated in April 2012, and its mandate expanded to include the fight against the activities of Boko Haram. Since then, the MNJTF has been battling the insurgents, especially in the Lake Chad area. In July

2014, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria agreed to speed up the creation of 2, 800 strong regional force to tackle the Boko Haram insurgents to which each member will contribute 700 troops. The initiative is in line with the action plan defined at the Paris Summit and the follow-up meeting on June 12 2014, in London aimed at strengthening regional cooperation in the fight against insurgency (Onuoha, 2014).

According to Onuoha (2014), Nigeria's neighbours have also taken unilateral measures to shore up security against Boko Haram's infiltration and operations in their territory, while collaborating with Nigeria in some areas. Niger strategy has been to stop Boko Haram from crossing into its territory rather than to confront them openly.

The literature on Boko Haram insurgency are extensive and inexhaustible but from those that were reviewed above, little or no attention is given to the security implications of the insurgency particularly for the formal diplomatic relations between Niger and Nigeria. The spread of the insurgency from Nigeria to Niger Republic, the influx of refugee and humanitarian crises between the countries and the actions taken by both countries in fighting the insurgency would have impacts on their diplomatic relations. Thus, the study addresses the security implications of Boko Haram insurgency for Nigeria-Niger diplomatic relations in order to fill the existing gap in the literature on the topic.

2.9 Theoretical Framework

This study employs linkage theory as the theoretical framework and guide for the understanding of the security implications of Boko Haram insurgency for Nigeria-Niger Republic diplomatic relations.

The original proponent of the linkage theory is James Rosenau. According to Evans and Newnham (1997) linkage ideas were first advanced in a significant way in the 1960s by Rosenau (1969). Other writers Leary (1969) in his work entitled "Domestic Politics and the

International System”, Bamgbose (2013) and so forth buttressed the position of Rosenau that is, a linkage between domestic politics and international politics.

(i) The basic assumption of the linkage theory is that hard and fast boundaries cannot be drawn between, for instance, domestic policy and foreign policy (Evans and Newnham, 1997).

(ii) It peeps into the perennial problems relating to the connection between domestic politics and foreign policy by taking the sphere of national and international politics as interacting system (Bamgbose, 2013).

(iii) It denotes any behaviour that originates in one system and is reacted to in another (Rosenau, 1969).

To Adelusi (2008) the initial and the terminal stages of linkage described as “inputs” and “output” are differentiated according to their origin within the state or within its external environment. The input and output are linked together by three major types of linkage namely; the penetrative, the reactive and the Emulative.

The penetrative linkage occurs when members of one polity serve as participants in the political process of another. For example, the activities of the Cuban forces in Angola and Libyan soldiers in Chad. Others are staff of international organisations, the diplomatic agents, foreign aid missions and representative of multinational corporations getting involved in domestic political process. Penetrative linkage is followed by reactive linkage which involves a response and adjustment to polity output emanating from elsewhere. Thus, during the June 12 annulment of election in Nigeria, the United States reacted by suspending non-humanitarian assistance to Nigeria (Bamgbose, 2013). In the same vein, during the Middle East War in 1973, the Arab Oil States imposed embargo on supply of oil to the United States. This prompted the European Community to issue a declaration that recognised the rights of the Palestinians. The third is emulative linkage which is established when the input takes the

same form as the output. For instance, it is observed that most of the things done by developing countries relating to political, social and economic are the same with what exist in developed polities. For example, the Nigerian Presidential System of Government was fashioned after that of the United States (Bamgbose, 2013).

In international relations the term linkage is used in two senses: first in foreign policy analysis, second in diplomacy. Analytically, linkage theory argues that hard and fast boundaries cannot be drawn between, for instance, domestic policy and foreign policy. Foreign policy is a boundary problem in the sense that there is a lack of clarity about where the boundary should be. Through a system that communication theorists would call a feedback loop events internally influence events externally and vice versa (Evans and Newnham, 1997). The idea of the state as clearly defined unit is seen to be redundant as a result of, among other things, the erosion of the concept of external sovereignty because of the linkage between national systems and other actors. State actors are seen as being penetrated to such an extent that they often cease to be effective operative units.

Linkage may often be used in the diplomatic sense where during negotiations one side may seek to link concessions in one field for those in another. For example, in the Helsinki Accord process western negotiators specifically linked arms control measures to human rights issues in their dealings with the Soviet Union. In southern Africa in the 1980s US negotiator Dr. Chester Crocker successfully connected the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola with the retreat of the South Africans from Namibia, thus paving the way for Namibian independence in 1990 (Evans and Newnham, 1997).

The major weakness of the theory is over-generalisation as it states that any behaviour that originates in one system is reacted to in another.

Despite the weakness, the theory is relevant to the research. The area of the theory that is relevant to the research is the reactive linkage which involves a response and adjustment to

polity output emanating from elsewhere as explained above. Hard and fast boundaries cannot be drawn between the spread of Boko Haram insurgency from Nigeria to Niger and Niger's reaction towards Nigeria in fighting the insurgency. The same Boko Haram insurgents operate in both countries. The insurgents not only constitute security threat to Nigeria but also to Niger Republic. Due to this, the two countries have found it necessary to collaborate and solve their joint problem. Therefore, there is a connection between the spread of Boko Haram insurgency between the two countries and their behaviours and reactions toward each other in tackling the insurgency collectively.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction


Research Methodology is the systematic procedure used in carrying out an investigation on a given phenomenon. This chapter outlines the methods and procedures employed in achieving the objectives of the study. It also outlines the location of the study area, sources of data and techniques of data collection, sampling procedures, sampling technique and technique of data analysis.

3.2 Study Area

The study area is Nigeria and Niger Republic. Nigeria was colonised by Britain. Nigeria got her independence on First of October, 1960. The population of the country is 140 million according to the 2006 Census. Nigeria is made up 36 States and is very rich in mineral resources such as petroleum, coal, bitumen, and cash crops such as cocoa, coffee, palm oil and so forth. Nigeria shares borders with Niger Republic in the north-western and north-eastern zones of the country. Boko Haram insurgents mostly affected Nigeria's borders with Niger in the north-eastern part of the country that is, Borno and Yobe states. Borno State is the most affected state by the insurgency. Borno State is sharing border with Diffa Region of Niger through Damasak the headquarters of Mobbar Local Government Area of the state.

Niger Republic was colonised by France. Niger attained her independence in 1960. The population of the country is 11,666,000 (2005 estimate, www.infoplease.com, 2015). Niger is made up 7 Administrative Regions and is very rich in uranium and noted for the production of crops such as groundnuts, millet and animals such as goats, sheep and cattle for export. Niger shares borders with Nigeria in the south-eastern part of the country. The area mostly affected by the activities of Boko Haram is Diffa which is one of 7 Administrative Regions of the Republic of Niger. Diffa is sharing border with Borno and Yobe States.

Chart 1



Map of Nigeria showing the border towns-Kannamma in Yobe State, Damasak in Borno State with Diffa region of Niger. The areas mostly affected by Boko Haram insurgency between the two countries (Source: www.westafricainsight.org May Edition, 2014).

Chart 2



A Map showing Diffa Subdivision in Diffa region of Niger and Borno State, Nigeria where Boko Haram insurgents mostly carry out their operations (Source: BBC, 2015).

3.3 Population of the Study

The Population of Nigeria is 140 million according to 2006 Census while that of Niger is 11,666,000 (2005 estimate, www.infoplease.com, 2015). Security and diplomacy are issues of interstate relations that cannot be left in the hand of anybody except those saddled with the responsibility for managing such relations for their countries. Thus, the sample population is 12 consisting of Assistant Director and First Secretary- the West Africa Affairs Division (WAAD), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, First Counsellor- Embassy of the Republic of Niger, Abuja, security agents and experts. 12 respondents were interviewed at the end of the field work. The researcher did not visit the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Niger because the First Counsellor-the Deputy Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Niger, Abuja officially provided the answers to the questions raised in the in-depth interviews. Furthermore, apart from the data collected from the in-depth interview conducted with the Assistant Director and First Secretary-WAAD, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, two officials of the European Affairs Divisions -Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria who were privy to some of the security summits on Boko Haram insurgency responded to the questions in the in-depth interview. Other stakeholders were the military officer-7 Division, Nigerian Army, Maiduguri, the Police Public Relations Officer- Borno State Command, Sector 5 Commander-Borno State Civilian Multinational Joint Task Force (Civilian JTF), the former and the 2016 State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) Chairman-Maiduguri, Borno State, a security expert and a youth leader, Diffa Region of Niger.

The justification for the sample population was based on the objectives of the research. The sample population are officials of the institutions of the area of study who have access to facts, information, and evidence very useful in answering our research questions. For example, the Assistant Director and the First Secretary; West Africa Affairs Division are officers in the department that coordinates how Boko Haram's activities affect Nigeria-Niger

relations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria. The two Foreign Officers; European Affairs Division -Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, were privy to some of the security summits on Boko Haram insurgency. The First Counsellor- Embassy of the Republic of Niger is the Deputy Ambassador. He also coordinates the effects of Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria and Niger Republic. Other stakeholders like the military officer-7 Division, Nigerian Army, Maiduguri, the Police Public Relations Officer- Borno State Command, Sector 5 Commander- Borno State Civilian Multinational Joint Task Force (Civilian JTF), are all involved in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency. The Security forces coordinate their operations in the area of resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Nigeria with State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) Chairman-Maiduguri who is in charge of internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps and responds to emergency situations including the distribution of relief materials to Nigerians who are taking refuge in Diffa, and Maine Soroa, Niger Republic. He was also privy to some of the security summit on Boko Haram insurgency. The youths in Diffa Region of Niger supply the security forces with vital information on the activities of Boko Haram in their areas.

The information from the West Africa Affairs Division, European Affairs Division-Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, the Embassy of the Republic of Niger, the military, the police and State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) represent official views while those from the Civilian JTF- Borno State, the youth leader from Diffa Region of Niger and the security expert represent non official views. The two views corroborate each other and help to achieve the aim and objectives of the study.

3.4 Sources of Data Collection

The study used both primary and secondary sources of data. The primary data were collected mainly from the field work through in-depth interview from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

of Nigeria, Abuja, the Embassy of the Republic of Niger, Abuja, and stakeholders like the military and the police forces, expert in the field of security and strategic studies and Nigeria-Niger relations, the Civilian Multinational Joint Task Force (Civilian JTF), and a youth leader, Diffa Region of Niger.

The secondary data were collected from relevant documents, textbooks and journals on Nigeria-Niger Republic relations, Boko Haram insurgency and its security implications for the diplomatic ties between the two countries from the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Embassy of the Republic of Niger, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, Abuja. Others were newspapers, magazines, published and unpublished works relevant to the topic under study and the internet. The reason for the combination of the two sources was based on the need for one to complement the other in order to achieve the objectives of the study.

3.5 Instrument of Data Collection

This study used in-depth interview and discussion to collect data from the respondents.

In-depth Interview

This study used structured interview to collect data on the security implications of Boko Haram insurgency for Nigeria-Niger Republic diplomatic relations from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, the Embassy of the Republic of Niger, Abuja, military personnel, the Police, Civilian JTF, security expert and a youth leader, Diffa Region of Niger Republic.

Data were also collected from official documents and publications relevant to the topic under study from the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Embassy of the Republic of Niger, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, Abuja. The data collected were synthesised and inferences were drawn to respond to our research questions.

3.6 Sampling Procedures

Data were collected mainly from the stakeholders from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, Abuja, the Embassy of the Republic of Niger, Abuja, the security agents-the military and the police forces, expert in the field of security, strategic studies and Nigeria-Niger relations, the Civilian Joint Task Force (Civilian JTF), and a youth leader, Diffa Region of Niger. The selection of these institutions was based on the objectives of the research. They are institutions of the area of study that have access to facts, information, and evidence very useful in answering our research questions. Data were also collected from the related documents and publications to complement the data from the in-depth interview conducted.

3.7 Sampling Techniques

The research purposively selected the respondents, that is, meeting the representatives of the area of study, specialists and experts with access to information, facts and evidence useful in answering our research questions. They included the First Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Niger, the Assistant Director and First Secretary-the West Africa Affairs Division, and two officials of the European Affairs Divisions -Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria who were privy to some of the security summits on Boko Haram insurgency. Data were also collected from other stakeholders like the military personnel; Seven Division, Nigerian Army-Maiduguri, the Police, Civilian JTF, security expert and a youth leader, Diffa Region of Niger Republic affected by the activities of Boko Haram. Data were also collected from the related documents and publications from the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Embassy of the Republic of Niger, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, Abuja to complement the data from the in-depth interview conducted.

3.8 Validation of the Instruments used for the Study

The validation of the instrument used for the study was done by meeting experts in qualitative research before going to the field work to look at the questions in the in-depth interview and ensure that responses to them would generate sufficient answers to the research questions. The researcher also consulted his supervisors before going to the field work to conduct the in-depth interview.

3.9 Reliability of the Instruments used for the Study

For testing of reliability, a pre-field work in-depth interview was conducted with experts in security and diplomatic relations between Nigeria and Niger Republic as pilot study before going to the field work to interview the stakeholders from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, Abuja, the Embassy of the Republic of Niger, Abuja, the military and the police forces, Civilian Joint Task Force (Civilian JTF), and a youth leader, Diffa Region of Niger Republic.

3.10 Data Transcription and Analysis

The relevance of data transcription and analysis is to transcribe raw data collected into an instrument for analysis. Before the interview was conducted, those to be interviewed were contacted and informed about the purpose of the research and why they were selected for the interview. The interview was recorded through a tape recorder after obtaining the permission of the respondents.

After that, the transcription starts with the first reading of the note that was transcribed from the interviews. The second reading was to identify the main themes in the data in accordance with the research problem under study and objectives. The third and final reading was to identify new themes and relevant quotes in the themes identified.

The in-depth interviews were thematically analysed as they relate to the objectives of the research by qualitative data analysis and deductions were drawn from them to answer the research questions.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY FOR NIGERIA-NIGER REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents and analyses data collected from the field work. The in-depth interviews conducted were tape-recorded and transcribed. The views of the respondents were thematically analysed as they relate to the research objectives by qualitative data analysis to answer the research questions. This is then followed by the research findings and verification of assumptions posed in chapter one.

4.2 Perception of Security Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency for Nigeria and Niger Republic by Respondents

From the in-depth interview conducted with specialists in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, the Embassy of the Republic of Niger; Abuja, majority of the respondents said: “Boko Haram insurgency has altered the security architecture between Nigeria and Niger Republic.” They stated that the two countries had not experienced Boko Haram-like insurgency before. The respondents stated that the kind of security challenges that existed along their borders before the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency were smuggling and armed banditry which did not degenerate to insurgency like the Boko Haram. Similarly, the Niger-Delta insurgency in Nigeria and the rebellion against the central government in Niger did not degenerate to cross border insurgency like the Boko Haram. Other said: “It has led to the displacement of people along the border areas and the disruption of commercial activities between the countries. From their responses, it can be inferred that Boko Haram insurgency has altered the existing security situation between the two countries. Today, the same Boko

Haram insurgents operate in Nigeria and Niger Republic and cause lots of damage to the two countries.

This is supported by a respondent who said: “Boko Haram insurgency causes general state of insecurity in Nigeria and Niger by carrying out cross-border operations between them which has resulted to loss of lives and property, displacement of people and influx of refugees from Nigeria to Niger Republic.” The insecurity caused by Boko Haram insurgency has adversely affected farming activities along the border towns between the two countries. People have abandoned their farming activities and relocated to safe zones because of the danger of being attacked by Boko Haram insurgents (Interview, 2016).

The view above is further corroborated by an informant who stated: “The lack of security in the border areas as a result of Boko Haram activities has badly affected the food production.” It has restricted the movement of people, goods, and services in the areas. He said that before the emergence of Boko Haram, the people of Niger used to cross the contiguous border towns of Nigeria to farm and transact businesses without much stress, without fear of being attacked or killed by insurgents. They used to take their machines to Kanamma in Nigeria which is about 16km from Maine Soroa, Diffa Region of Niger Republic to sell their products or buy Nigerian made products and bring them to Niger. Even in the night, Nigeriens used to enter Geidam and buy different items and return to Niger Republic in peace. The security agents would not bother about the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS’) passport once identity card was shown to them; they would allow people to move across the border. All these have stopped due to insecurity caused by Boko Haram insurgency. The security situation has changed, people are now afraid of their lives and property. Some have abandoned their homes for safety elsewhere (Interview, 2016).

Furthermore, a respondent asserted: “The disruption of economic activities and displacement of people across Nigeria’s borders with Niger are manifestations of the insecurity caused by Boko Haram operations.”

He stated: “The insecurity caused by Boko Haram insurgency has resulted to disruption of the economic activities between the border towns in Borno State, Yobe State and Diffa Region of Niger. He said no business can thrive in an atmosphere of violence. The activities of Boko Haram make the areas unsafe for businesses and farming activities.”

To buttress the view above an informant stressed:

Boko Haram activities have created security problems and resulted to the total closure of the roads from Maiduguri to Niger’s border that always witness movement of trucks, cars, and lorries carrying made in Nigerian products to Niger and in return coming back to Nigeria with goods produced from Niger which claimed up to about 35 to 40 percent of the volume of trade between them (Interview, 2016).

The above is a confirmation of the Linkage theory used as the theoretical framework in this research. There is a linkage between Boko Haram insurgency and the step taken by the Nigerian government in closing its borders with Niger Republic and the reaction of Niger to Nigeria in combating the insurgency collectively because it jeopardises their common interests.

In corroboration of the above, a respondent averred: “Due to the closure of the roads, the trade relationship between Nigeria and Niger particularly the informal trade has been badly affected at Damasak, Mobbar Local Government area of Borno State axis and Diffa Region of Niger Republic.” This has led to trade diversion, that is, the continuity of economic activities in the same location with different direction. Those people in Maiduguri, Borno State who are going for trade activities in Niger have diverted their trade because of lack of safety to lives and property. They now leave Borno territory and move to Yobe State. From Yobe State, they move from Geidam or Kanamma, following the Diffa axis and come

northwards deep into the territory of Niger. They then engage in trade activities and then cross back again. The same thing is happening to those goods that are coming from or going out from Chad to Nigeria or from Nigeria to Chad. They have also diverted their trade activities following the Yobe axis to Geidam to Niger Republic into Republic of Chad due to lack of security. The difficulty and the colossal reduction in the volume of trade between Nigeria and Niger and the reliance of Niger on Nigerian infrastructural facilities make life very uneasy for the people in the south-eastern region of Niger that border the Lake Chad Basin (Interview, 2016).

In a similar dimension, an informant stressed that the essence of economic development could not be isolated from peace and security. He said: “If there is no security within Nigeria and Niger, the rate of growth and development would reduce because development cannot take place in an atmosphere of insecurity. Due to insecurity, there is restriction in the movement of people, goods and services between the two countries” (Interview, 2016).

By extension, Boko Haram insurgency constitutes security threat to the Lake Chad Basin region. This is buttressed by an informant who said: “Boko Haram poses serious security threat to the region by carrying out cross-border attacks in the area. The insurgency which started in Nigeria has spread to the neighbouring countries-Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Boko Haram insurgency in the region has led to the destruction of lives and property; put a halt to the agricultural activities, irrigation and water project in the Lake Chad region” (Interview, 2016).

This is also in line with the submission of Onuoha (2014) in chapter two of this work that Boko Haram poses security threat to several bordering countries in the sub-region, notably Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, by organising direct attacks on their soil.

This is further buttressed by an informant who stated: “Boko Haram insurgency affects movement of people, goods and services which is so sensitive and central to the other parts of the Lake Chad Basin region.” The activities of the insurgents have great effects on the West and Central African Sub-regions that rely on Nigeria-the economic hub of both West and Central African states particularly the states that are landlocked and rely on Nigeria’s facilities for transportation of their goods and services both imports and exports. For instance, Maiduguri is the landline and life- line of both Chad and Niger. Most of the goods that are in Maiduguri are exported to these countries and once there is security problem there, definitely it would have effect on them especially by the step taken by the Nigerian government in closing the borders. The fierce engagement between the Nigerian Armed Forces and the insurgents has led to retreat, reconfiguration, metamorphosis and conscription of other who may not necessarily belong to the insurgents to be possible conscripted into it and once this type of thing exists within Nigerian borders and considering the socio-historical ties between the north-eastern region, West and Central African sub-regions, it would lead to security conundrum in the region (Interview, 2016).

Similarly, the Lake Chad region is known for its farming and business activities. A lot of activities take place between Nigeria and Chad, Niger, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Gabon, up to Sudan. Chad Basin where a lot of farming and business activities take place is no more as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency. A lot of businessmen lost their investments and jobs as a result of the insurgency in the area. The insurgency has scared foreigners away from Borno State. Gone are the days when the citizens of the neighbouring countries come to Maiduguri to transact businesses. Chadians, Nigeriens came to Maiduguri to buy food items like grains, clothing, fuels, cement and so forth. Now they are afraid to come to Maiduguri while Nigerians are afraid to go to their countries due to insecurity along the border areas. The cement exportation in Maiduguri is one of the biggest routes to Chad.

Chad with the recent oil boom is into construction of lots of infrastructures most especially in the state capital and other parts of the country. The cement importation from Maiduguri axis to Chad has come to a standstill due to insurgency (Interview, 2016).

Some respondents said: “The alteration of security equation in the Lake Chad is a manifestation of insecurity occasioned by the activities of Boko Haram in the region.” This view is supported by the interview conducted with an informant who said: “Boko Haram insurgency has redefined regional security in the Lake Chad region. The Lake Chad is a fringe that demarcates the West and Central Africa and a region of common socio-cultural and historical linkage between the Lake Chad side of Nigeria, Lake Chad side of Niger, Lake Chad side of Cameroon, Lake Chad side of Chad down to Sudan and Central Africa.” The insurgency has also redefined regional integration in West Africa. Hitherto, there was a sort of developmental regionalism; economic regionalisation particularly with respect to facilitating cross-border movement and cross-border trade in West African Sub-region. At the time ECOWAS was formed, the West African sub-region was not challenged by serious security threat. The issue of joint military operation did not come into fore. Issue of joint military operation came into fore when there were crises in Liberia and Sierra-Leone. Even in Sierra-Leone and Liberia, Nigeria contributed 85 to 90% of the military to ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) operation in the countries. The crisis in Liberia and Sierra-Leone were only domiciled within their own territories. It did not spill over to other territories like the way Boko Haram insurgency has spread across both West and Central African Sub-regions. The insurgency has changed the security equation between Nigeria and Niger and the Lake Chad region.

To this effect, an informant while assessing the existing insurgencies and crises in the Lake Chad region asserted: “There is element of insurgency in Niger especially the armed rebellion that is fighting the central government. In Chad, there was never central government until the

emergence of Idriss Deby as the President of the country. The history of the Republic of Chad is characterised by armed rebellion with one guerrilla leader pushing out another guerrilla leader and it was with the emergence of Idriss Deby as the President that Chad has a semblance of a unified military Armed Forces.

The Central African Republic is still in crisis. In Sudan, there is armed insurgency against the government in Darfur and before there was the issue of South Sudan. And within South Sudan even though they are now independent, there is a factional fighting in the country. Democratic Republic Congo (DR) and Congo Brazzaville are still part of the Lake Chad Basin. They are observer nations even though they belong to the Congo Basin region. There is crisis in Congo (DR) particularly the movement of intra-armed militia that have no border like Boko Haram that cross over to Congo (DR) down to Uganda, up to Sudan, down to Central African Republic and Chad. These are parallel lines of security conundrum that have permeated from one region to another, from country to another and there is a tendency of interface between the armed insurgency of Boko Haram in Nigeria and armed insurgency of these countries (Interview, 2016).

From the above, it can be inferred that Boko Haram insurgency has redefined the security situation between Nigeria and Niger. The insurgents cause insecurity which negatively affects all spheres of lives in terms of trans-human and commercial activities in Nigeria, Niger and the Lake Chad region. The activities of the insurgents cause death and destruction of property in the study area. This creates displacement and fear among the people particularly the residents of the border towns. This therefore, shows that Boko Haram insurgency has become regional insurgency and changed the existing security situation between Nigeria and Niger Republic and the Lake Chad region as a whole.

4.3 Perception of Respondents on the Closure of Borders by Nigeria with Niger Republic

Majority of the respondents said that the closure of borders by Nigeria was meant to curtail Boko Haram activities within Nigeria and prevent them from escaping to Niger after attacking the country and not because Niger Republic supported the insurgents or allowed them to use its territory as hide-out. Other opined that it was meant to prevent the infiltration of Boko Haram insurgents from Niger Republic.

Based on the responses of the respondents, it could be inferred that the essence of the closure of borders by Nigeria was to curtail Boko Haram insurgents within the country and prevent them from escaping to Niger. This view is supported by a respondent who said that Nigeria closed its borders with Niger because it discovered that when the insurgents struck in the north-eastern part of Nigeria they escaped to Niger and other neighbouring states. The Nigerian government closed the borders in order to forestall this.

The view above is further supported by an informant who asserted that the closure of borders by Nigeria with Niger was meant to control the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria and to prevent the insurgents from running to Niger Republic through the borders areas for protection. He stated further that the closure of borders by Nigeria adversely affected cross border trade and movement of people across the two countries and was in breach of ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons across the sub-region.

The above is in line with the submission of Agwu (2013) in chapter two of this study that the declaration of a state of emergency and the closure of Nigeria's borders with those neighbouring African countries that are contiguous to the most affected states of the Nigerian federation were actions that partly emanated from the belief that Boko Haram foot soldiers were infiltrating the country from such Nigerian neighbours. These desperate measures

perfectly illustrate how insurgency contaminates orderly border controls and thereby contributes in the disruption of Africa's international relations. In taking those actions, President Jonathan was understandably conscious of the fact that Nigeria was breaching its international obligation under ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and that the actions would hurt the weak economies of these neighbours that are actually dependent on Nigeria for a lot of their needs (The Guardia January 1, 2012).

Despite this, the closure of borders by Nigeria was not specifically targeted at Niger Republic. It was meant to bolster security in the border areas, block supply line to Boko Haram insurgents and ultimately to defeat them. Moreover, the two countries now see Boko Haram insurgents as their common enemy that must be dealt with collectively because the insurgency has also spread to Niger (Interview, 2016). This is in tandem with the linkage theory as explained in chapter two of this study. There is a connection between the Boko Haram insurgency and the responses of the two countries toward each other in fighting the insurgency collectively.

4.4 Perception of the Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency for the Diplomatic Relations between Nigeria and Niger Republic by Respondents

Majority of the respondents said: "The fight against Boko Haram insurgency has deepened diplomatic ties between Nigeria and Niger Republic." Few respondents said: "It has led to misinterpretation of Nigeria's Government action, and distrust between the two nations." From their responses, it can be inferred that the fight against Boko Haram insurgency has strengthened formal diplomatic relations between the two countries instead of causing diplomatic row between them.

In corroboration of the view above, an informant stated: "The relation between the two countries is further strengthened because there is political will and cooperation between Nigeria and Niger to end Boko Haram insurgency." The view above is also supported by an interview conducted with a respondent who stated: "Boko Haram insurgency has not strained Nigeria-Niger diplomatic relations." It has actually helped to strengthen their relationships because there are collaborations between the two states through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to fight the insurgency. Apart from the collaboration through the MNJTF, there has also been assistance from Niger in terms of intelligence sharing with Nigeria. Niger Republic has assisted the Nigerian security agencies with intelligent reports that have worked in curtailing the insurgency in both countries.

Moreover, Boko Haram insurgency mostly affected Nigeria's borders in Borno and Yobe States with Niger Republic through Diffa Region. The insurgency has not seriously affected Nigeria's borders with Niger in Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Zamfara, and Sokoto States. The economic activities in the areas have continued unabated unlike the borders in Borno and Yobe States with Diffa Region that have been badly affected by the insurgents (Interview, 2016).

Another informant asserted: The activities of Boko Haram across Nigeria's and Niger's borders have not really affected negatively the formal relations between Nigeria and Niger. He based his assertion on the collaboration between the two countries and the assistance Nigeria gave to Niger for the conduct of the February 2016 election in the country.

In the election conducted in Niger Republic in February 2016, Nigeria assisted Niger with logistics, financial support and security (Interview, 2016).

The presence of a high-level delegation of the Nigerian Government led by the Vice President- Professor Yemi Osinbajo at the inauguration of President Mahamadous Issoufou

for a second term in Niamey, Niger Republic is a confirmation of the assertion above. Professor Osinbajo (quoted in the Daily Trust, April 4 2016: 4) said that President Buhari could not attend the ceremony because he was in Washington DC, United States, for the 4th Nuclear Security Summit. He stated: “As you know, Niger is an important partner and also an important ally in the war against terrorism and also we are good neighbours. Mahamados investiture has great significance because first, Nigeria understands President Issoufou well. He is an old hand, and Nigeria has worked well with him as a partner. So, his re-election brings continuity and it is good for the fight against Boko Haram and insurgency in general.” He stressed: “Nigeria holds the Nigerien President in high esteem. He is an old friend of President Buhari. The Nigerien President’s inauguration is also an opportunity to honour a strong ally and to reinforce all our important diplomatic and military ties.”

Niger’s resolve to support Nigeria towards eradicating Boko Haram insurgency, was contained in President Issoufou’s inaugural address (quoted in the Daily Trust, April 4 2016: 4). He stated that the current security challenge transcended boundaries. He reiterated his country’s commitment to join force with Nigeria and other neighbours in the fight against insurgency at the sub-regional level. He noted that defeating Boko Haram has several benefits, particularly for the economic integration of the region. He expressed optimism that defeating insurgency would facilitate trade between Niger and Nigeria.

The cordiality of relationship between Nigeria and Niger is further supported by another informant who stressed that Nigeria bilateral relations with Niger since independence- 1960 have been cordial. He stated: There has not been any incidence of serious disagreement between the two countries because Nigeria and Niger see each other as brothers. Apart from the fact that they have common border spanning about 1500km, they have cultural affinity, the same people found in Nigeria are also found in Niger Republic such as Kanuri, Hausa, and Fulani. People on both sides of the borders intermarry. That strengthens the relationship

between the two countries. Apart from cultural affinities, Nigeria also has bilateral economic relations with Niger under the auspices of the Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission for Cooperation (NNJC).

There have also been high-level visits from both countries. Nigerian President has visited Niger Republic and Niger's President has also visited Nigeria. After the inauguration of General Muhammadu Buhari as the President of Nigeria, the first country he visited was Niger to strengthen Nigeria's relations with Niger in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency (Interview, 2016).

The view above is further corroborated by an informant who stated: At the state level, the Borno state government has cordial relations with the Niger's government. They share ideas on how to tackle the Boko Haram insurgency. There is collaboration and cooperation between the Nigerian Civilian Joint Task Force and some youth leaders in Diffa Region of Niger Republic on how to tackle the insurgency and how to camp the refugees on both sides of the countries. The Nigerien youth leaders used to come to Maiduguri for meeting. Some of the people of Damasak, Mobbar and Abadam Local Government Areas of Borno State who were displaced by the activities of Boko Haram and sought refuge in Niger because of their proximity to Niger's region of Diffa and Maina Soroa are being taken care of by the Borno State Government with the cooperation of the government of Niger (Interview, 2016).

Echoing similar view, an informant said: The relations between the two countries have been cordial to the extent that Nigeria supplies Niger with light. Nigeriens come to Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna and Command and Staff College, Jaji for military training. On security issue along their borders, he said: "Nigeria has not had serious border problem with Niger like the case of Cameroon. Armed banditry used to be the security challenge along Nigerian borders with Niger Republic before the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency in 2009 which has posed serious security threat to the two countries and the region as a whole."

The two countries are sharing military intelligence in their quest to defeat the insurgents through the joint military operation formed by the Lake Chad Basin Commission tagged “Multinational Joint Task Force” to put an end to Boko Haram insurgency (Interview, 2016).

In 2015, there was an accusation and counter accusation between Niger’s Defence Ministry and Nigerian military in the course of fighting Boko Haram insurgency. The Niger’s Defence Ministry accused Nigerian military of running away from the battle field. The accusation was rejected by the then Director of Defence information; Major General Chris Olukolade (Ibeh, 2015). A respondent asserted that the accusation has no negative consequence on Nigeria-Niger formal diplomatic relations. He buttressed his view by the closer cooperation that has continued to exist between them in the battle against the insurgents. He averred that it was as a result of lack of political will and commitment on the part of Nigerian government that warranted such an accusation. He buttressed his point and stated: For the whole of Baga town, Ngala, Gworza, Abadam in Borno State, and about 16 local government areas in the state to be under the control of Boko Haram, something must have gone wrong. If the most powerful armed forces in the black world were running away from Boko Haram insurgents, something untoward must have happened. The scenario generally is not because of lack of capability or cowardice of the Nigerian military. It is because they might not be given order to stand there and protect and even if they were given the order, they were not supplied with enough military equipment to fight. If a soldier is given nine bullets against the enemy with hundreds of bullets, the nine bullets would always be for self-protection not to fight the enemy. To him in warfare, the defence of a fighter is basic requirement followed by protection of high valued assets such as machine guns, attack helicopters and military tanks. All these are of high values that should be protected and if given adequate protection, it would not fall into the hand of the enemy. The combined armed forces of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon are not a match to the Nigerian military capability. With the new administration of

President Muhammadu Buhari, the situation on the frontline has changed for better and the level of cooperation between the two countries has improved in tackling the insurgency collectively (Interview, 2016).

On the other hand, a respondent stated: “Boko Haram insurgency has led to distrust between Nigeria and Niger Republic.”

The view above is supported by an informant who asserted: “When looking at the fact that the Boko Haram insurgents have their base in Nigeria and that Nigeria should take urgent step to curb the activities of the insurgents by extension to stop their spill over to Niger. Seeing Boko Haram as a Nigerian problem by Niger shows some elements of misinterpretation of actions” (Interview, 2016).

In the same vein, when there is no clarity of any action taken by a particular state in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency, the other state might misinterpret it and take steps that would actually lead to the clarification of the issue. For instance, before the initiative of right of hot pursuit which allows a country to pursue a criminal beyond its border contrary to international law which does not allow that, if the insurgents operating in Nigeria run to Niger Republic, Nigeria would not be able to pursue them without the permission of Niger. This area could actually lead to friction and distrust between the two countries if the understanding is not there (Interview, 2016).

This is similar to the position of Agwu (2013) in chapter two of this research that insurgency obstructs Africa’s international relations in the sense that it breeds distrust between and among states that had not developed some fully functional mutual confidence-building measures that dispel all suspicions that one or more of them in a terror-infested neighbourhood is a culprit in the sponsor of the malaise. Africa’s porous border is a major

antithesis in the fight against terror; it has tended to strain the relationships between states, that is, the international relations on the continent.

Furthermore, the influx of refugees from Nigeria to Niger as a result of Boko Haram insurgency could put pressure on the economy of Niger Republic and impact negatively on the relations between the two countries if not properly handled (Interview, 2016).

It can be deduced that despite the level of misinterpretation and distrust envisaged by the respondents between Nigeria and Niger Republic over Boko Haram insurgency, the relationship between them has not been strained. The two countries have realised that the insurgents constitute threat to their common goals. Instead of the activities of the insurgents causing diplomatic row between them, the two countries have come together to fight the insurgency.

4.5 Security Cooperation between Nigeria and Niger in Combating Boko Haram Insurgency Perceived by Respondents

From the interview conducted majority of the respondents stated: “Nigeria and Niger have common security cooperation in fighting Boko Haram insurgency.” Other respondents stated: “The two countries fight Boko Haram insurgents by general consensus.” Therefore, it can be deduced that the two countries have common security cooperation in fighting Boko Haram insurgency.

This view is supported by an informant who asserted that Boko Haram as a transnational insurgent group might not be well appreciated by Niger initially when it started in Nigeria. Overtime, the fight against the insurgents has led to more security cooperation between the two countries. Insurgency is a global phenomenon that is not restricted to one country and not defined by geographical border. Niger Republic through the numerous security summits like the Paris and London Summits in 2014 that were organized to nip the insurgency in the bud

has come to the realisation that it must work and cooperate with Nigeria to tackle the menace of the insurgents. During the Paris and London Summits in 2014 which were extended to the neighbouring countries of Nigeria, the leaders resolved to fight the insurgents collectively. Initially, the Cameroonian President Paul Biya was not cooperating but through the effort of President Francois Hollande-the French President, Paul Biya attended the conference in Paris in which all of them pledged their common cooperation to ensure that Boko Haram is tackled collectively. These were the events which gave birth to Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit (RIFU), and the resuscitation of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) with the mandate to fight the insurgency. Cameroon was expressing reservation on the fact that it wanted to go solo in curbing the activities of Boko Haram but along the line there was an agreement that it should be a joint task force of all the states involved so that there would be clarity of purpose.

Through Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit (RIFU) an initiative of the neighbouring countries affected by the activities of Boko Haram, Niger Republic and Nigeria have been cooperating to fight the insurgency. The right to hot pursuit that is, the right of a country to pursue a criminal beyond its boundary to the other side was put in place to tackle Boko Haram insurgency (Interview, 2016).

Nigeria and Niger are cooperating bilaterally to see that the Boko Haram insurgency is brought to an end (Interview, 2016).

This is in tandem with the submission of Onuoha (2014) in chapter two of this study that Nigeria signed bilateral agreements on security with her neighbouring countries and engaged in joint operations with Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Benin focusing on efforts to restore security along the borders by employing the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) on the Lake Chad Basin.

Furthermore, another informant said that the effects of Boko Haram activities forced the government of Niger to actively participate in containing the activities of the Boko Haram insurgency. Niger is one of the leading partners in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) that helped Nigeria to capture some of the territories under the control of Boko Haram in 2015 in Abadam, Mobbar, and some parts of Kukawa and Guzamala Local Government of Areas of Borno State. He stated: “There are also Chad, Cameroon and Republic of Benin which by proxy affected by the insurgency taking part in the joint military operation against Boko Haram in the region.” Their participation in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is predicated on regional security paradigm, that is, if your neighbour is in a crisis and you do not act, there is the tendency that the crisis would spread to your area. That makes Benin Republic to engage in pre-empting activities by helping to bolster security operation in the Lake Chad region (Interview, 2016).

In the same vein, a respondent while responding to the security cooperation between Nigeria and Niger in the fight against Boko Haram said: Nigeria and Niger share security intelligence and cooperate militarily in fighting the insurgency. Niger has close communication and cooperation with Nigeria within the auspices of Lake Chad. If Boko Haram members are being chased from Nigerian territory by the Nigerian troops and they run to the borders of Niger, they would meet the Nigerien troops there. Similarly, when the Nigerian Air Force make a surveillance, if the area is identified as the territory of Niger, it would be communicated to the Republic of Niger that the fleeing Boko Haram are there regrouping. The Nigerien Army may give them the mandate to fire or they would say they are coming to do it. Some military operations are conducted under the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) while some are acting within their own military jurisdiction. The troops of Niger were no longer in the areas it helped Nigeria to liberate in Damasak, Mobbar and Abadam local government areas of Borno State. The Nigerian troops are in charge there. But there are

certain areas of patrol by the troops of Niger that have blocked supplies line for free movement, for free ride to the Boko Haram insurgents as a result of the intensity of security cooperation and collaboration between the two countries (Interview, 2016).

The fight against Boko Haram insurgency has brought about a rebirth of a new beginning, a new era of collaborative effort towards fighting insurgency between the two countries. This may ultimately lead to the formation of a standing army aimed at containing any sort of insecurity within the Lake Chad Basin Region (Interview, 2016).

If Boko Haram is left alone to Nigeria; there is a tendency of Boko Haram activating the remnant of rebel elements in Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Central African Republic, and Sudan. The operation of the Multinational Joint Task Force has largely been effective and successful. The security atmosphere being presently experienced in 2016 cannot be compared with that of the past two years or early 2015 (Interview, 2016).

A respondent while examining the similarity between ECOMOG in West Africa and Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Region, stressed that just as we have economic integration accentuated by free movement of goods and services until the emergence of ECOMOG that changed and added to the objectives of the ECOWAS as military operation in the sub-region the same is applicable to the Lake Chad Basin Region. Joint military operation was virtually non-existent. Lake Chad is a region that comprises the countries that share the conventional water resources and it was one of the oldest regional organisations in Africa. The Lake Chad Basin Region was formed for agricultural and irrigation purposes and also to give accurate information to other member countries in terms of over flooding. If the water of the river over flow its bank or exceeded their storage capacity, it will definitely lead to flooding in the region. Boko Haram insurgency has added to the objectives of the Lake Chad Basin region. The region has never experienced Boko Haram-like insurgency apart from the territorial domiciled remnant of armed elements. But

with Boko Haram insurgency, the same Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria operate in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. That has led to regionalisation of Boko Haram phenomenon. That also added like ECOMOG in West African Sub-region in the Lake Chad Basin Commission the Multinational Joint Task Force with a mandate to combat the insurgency. It seems 70% of the attention of Lake Chad Basin Commission has now shifted from agricultural production, water resources utilisation to security and that is why President Muhammadu Buhari called for harmonisation of policy between ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Nigeria happens to be in the centre. One part belongs to West Africa, the other part belong to the Central Africa. Unless and until these security, economic and cultural activities are harmonised, Nigeria is always to be on the brink and on the fence of not even determining where it should belong to (Interview, 2016).

From the above, it can be inferred that Nigeria and Niger have common security cooperation in combating the insurgency. That emphasises the importance of the linkage theory as explained in chapter two of this research. The need to defeat the insurgents has redefined their attitudes toward each other to cooperate security-wise and combat the insurgency collectively.

It can also be inferred from the above that insecurity occasioned by Boko Haram has changed the security atmosphere in the Lake Chad region. As a result of this, the Lake Chad Basin Commission Countries have come together to combat the insurgency through the Multinational Joint Task Force. This is because if Boko Haram insurgency is allowed to thrive in the region without appropriate response to their activities, it would jeopardise their common interests and make the region to become a base for Boko Haram to carry out their nefarious activities across the region, Africa and the world at large.

4.6 Research Findings

The following research findings are derived logically from the data collected and analysed above.

- i. Boko Haram insurgency has redefined the security situation between Nigeria and Niger Republic.
- ii. The closure of borders by Nigeria was not targeted at Niger but to prevent the insurgents from escaping to the country after attacking Nigeria.
- iii. The fight against Boko Haram insurgency has strengthened diplomatic relations between Nigeria and Niger Republic instead of causing diplomatic row between them.
- iv. It can be deduced that Nigeria and Niger have joint security cooperation coordinated by the Multinational Joint Task Force to fight Boko Haram insurgency.

4.7 Discussion of Findings

The following highlights and discusses the research findings in order to test the assumptions posed in chapter one of this study.

The First Finding: Boko Haram insurgency has redefined the security situation between Nigeria and Niger Republic.

Discussion: From the above, it can be deduced that Boko Haram insurgency disrupts the peace and security along the border towns in the north-eastern part of Borno State, Yobe State of Nigeria and Diffa Region of Niger Republic thereby leading to death, destruction of property, displacement of people and influx of refugees across both countries. The insurgency also affects the volume of trade between the two countries. Nigeria and Niger have not witnessed this type of Boko Haram insurgency before- an insurgent group operating in both countries. The internal rebellion against the central government in Niger Republic was domiciled within the country. The Niger Delta insurgency in Nigeria has also not spread to

Niger. Today, the same Boko Haram insurgents operating in Nigeria operate in Niger Republic. That has altered the security situation between them and raised their level of security consciousness along their borders. They are now working together to defeat Boko Haram insurgents because the insurgents pose threat to their common interests.

The Second Finding: The closure of borders by Nigeria was not targeted at Niger but to prevent the insurgents from escaping to the country after attacking Nigeria.

Discussion: The closure of borders by Nigeria was meant to bolster security in the border areas, block supply line to Boko Haram insurgents and defeat the insurgents. Even though it affected cross border trade and movement between them, it was not specifically targeted at Niger Republic. With the spread of the insurgency to Niger, the two countries have come together to fight the insurgents their common enemy.

The Third Finding: The fight against Boko Haram has strengthened diplomatic relations between Nigeria and Niger Republic instead of causing diplomatic row between them.

Discussion: Boko Haram insurgency spread from Nigeria to Niger Republic. Despite this and the challenges encountered in the fight against the insurgency by the two countries, the formal diplomatic relations between them continue to be strengthened. Nigeria is not blaming Niger Republic and Niger Republic is not blaming Nigeria on account of Boko Haram insurgency at the formal diplomatic level. The two countries realise that Boko Haram insurgency constitutes dangers to their common interests. As a result of that, instead of Boko Haram insurgency causing diplomatic row between them, it further strengthens their relations and brings them together to fight the insurgency.

The Fourth Finding: It can be deduced that Nigeria and Niger Republic have joint security cooperation coordinated by the Multinational Joint Task Force to fight Boko Haram insurgency.

Discussion: The insurgency has destabilised the security and peaceful atmosphere of Nigeria and Niger. Due to this, the two countries have come together to fight the insurgents because if Boko Haram insurgents are allowed to thrive in Nigeria, it would jeopardise the security of Niger Republic and the Lake Chad region as a whole. The Lake Chad Basin is noted for its agricultural activities such as crop farming, fishing, livestock breeding and irrigation. All these activities have stopped due to the activities of Boko Haram. The Lake Chad Basin region has not experienced this type of Boko Haram-like insurgency before. The armed rebellion against the central governments in Niger, Chad, conflicts in Congo (DR) and Congo Brazzaville were domiciled within their respective countries. They did not spread to other countries in the region like the way Boko Haram insurgency is spreading. Today, the same Boko Haram insurgents which started in Nigeria operate in Niger Republic, Chad, and Cameroon. This could activate the remnants of armed gangs in the sub-regions and make the areas ungovernable and bases for their insurgent activities in Africa and the world at large. The need to maintain security in the region has shifted the attention of the Lake Chad Basin Commission Countries from agricultural activities and water resources utilisation to security because without security, no meaningful development can take place in the region. The Lake Chad Basin Commission Countries are now combating Boko Haram insurgency through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) with the headquarters in N'Djamena comprising Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon plus Benin Republic.

4.8 Verification of Assumptions

The following research findings establish the validity or the invalidity of the assumptions posed in chapter one:

The First Research Finding: Boko Haram insurgency has redefined the security situation between Nigeria and Niger Republic validates the first assumption in chapter one-Boko Haram insurgency has changed the security situation between Nigeria and Niger Republic.

The Second Finding: The closure of borders by Nigeria was not targeted at Niger but to prevent the insurgents from escaping to the country after attacking Nigeria invalidates the second assumption in chapter one-Nigeria closed its borders with Niger Republic for allowing Boko Haram insurgents to use its territory as hide-out.

The Third Finding: The fight against Boko Haram insurgency has strengthened diplomatic relations between Nigeria and Niger Republic instead of causing diplomatic row between them invalidates the third assumption in chapter one-the activities of Boko Haram has caused diplomatic row between Nigeria and Niger Republic.

The Fourth Findings: Nigeria and Niger Republic have joint security cooperation coordinated by the Multinational Joint Task Force to fight Boko Haram insurgency invalidates the fourth assumption-Nigeria and Niger did not adopt a common security framework in combating Boko Haram insurgency.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

This study examines the security implications of Boko Haram insurgency for Nigeria and Niger Republic diplomatic relations. Data were collected basically from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, the Embassy of the Republic of Niger, Abuja, military personnel, the Police, Civilian JTF, security experts and a youth leader in Diffa Region of Niger Republic affected by the activities of Boko Haram through in-depth interview, documents, published and unpublished works and the internet. The data were thematically analysed as they relate to the objectives of the research by qualitative data analysis and deductions were drawn from them to answer the research questions.

Boko Haram insurgency which began in Nigeria escalated and extended its operations to Niger Republic and the neighbouring states of Nigeria. Boko Haram affects the security of the two countries by carrying out cross-border operations in both countries. Consequent upon this, Nigeria and Niger have intensified their efforts to end the insurgency collectively. If Boko Haram is allowed to operate freely without being checked and nipped in the bud, it would jeopardise the security of not only Nigeria and Niger but also the entire Lake Basin region and Africa as whole.

The research revealed that Boko Haram insurgency has altered the security situation between Nigeria and Niger Republic and the Lake Chad region in general. The fight against Boko Haram insurgency has strengthened diplomatic relations between the countries instead of causing diplomatic row between them. The research also revealed that Nigeria and Niger have a common security framework coordinated by the Multinational Joint Task Force to fight Boko Haram insurgency.

5.2 Conclusion

In this research, it was established that Boko Haram insurgency has altered the security situation between Nigeria and Niger particularly in the north-eastern part of Nigeria and Diffa part of Niger Republic. The data analysed indicated that the fight against Boko Haram insurgency has solidified diplomatic relations between the two countries despite the fact that the insurgency has spread across both countries. The two countries have synergised their efforts to fight Boko Haram insurgency through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) instead of engaging in a blame game about the spread of the insurgency. The research further shed more lights on the security conundrum created by the Boko Haram insurgents in the Lake Chad region thereby shifting the attention of the countries in the region from agricultural production to security issue. The policy option for the government is that with the devastating security impacts of Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria, Niger and the Lake Chad region, it is imperative for Nigeria and Niger and the Lake Chad Basin Commission Countries to have a permanent joint military operation to boost the security architecture of the region and end Boko Haram insurgency.

5.3 Recommendations

In order to end Boko Haram insurgency, it is recommended that:

- (i) Nigeria and Niger Republic should establish a permanent joint military operation along their borders to end Boko Haram insurgency.
- (ii) There should be more security meeting between the security chiefs of the two countries to enhance their level of cooperation in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency.
- (iii) Nigeria and Niger Republic should demarcate their borders properly to prevent borders infiltration by Boko Haram insurgents.

(iv) The Economic Community of West African States and Economic Community of Central African States should adopt a unanimous military strategy in terms of intelligence sharing, logistics and equipment to end Boko Haram insurgency in the region.

5.4 Contributions of the Research to Knowledge

The study established that:

- (i) Boko Haram insurgency has redefined security situation between Nigeria and Niger Republic and the Lake Chad region in general.
- (ii) The fight against Boko Haram insurgency has strengthened diplomatic relations between Nigeria and Niger Republic despite the fact that the insurgency has spread across both countries.

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APPENDIX A

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA, NIGERIA

STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS ON THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY FOR NIGERIA-NIGER REPUBLIC FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Dear Respondents,

I am a postgraduate student of the Department of Political Science and International Studies conducting a research on the Security Implications of Boko Haram for Nigeria and Niger Republic formal diplomatic relations.

Please, kindly respond to these questions as objective as possible. Your responses will be treated as confidential and will not be used for any other purposes outside of the research objective and will not be transferred to a third party.

Thank you.

Abbas Ayodele Taiwo
M.Phil. International Relations
P13SSPS9014

1. What is your name sir?
2. What is your position?
3. How long have you been in this office?
4. What is your view about Boko Haram insurgency?
5. What are the security effects of Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria and Niger?
6. What were the reasons why Nigeria closed its borders with Niger Republic?
7. What are the impacts of Boko Haram insurgency on the formal diplomatic relationship between Nigeria and Niger?
8. What are the security mechanisms put in place by Nigeria and Niger in combating Boko Haram insurgency?

APPENDIX B

SERIAL NUMBER	NAME	POSITION	DATE OF INTERVIEW
1	Ibrahim Traore	First Counsellor, the Embassy of the Republic of Niger, Abuja	21th March, 2016
2	Mahamados Buhari Ismaeel	Youth Leader, Maina Soroa, Diffa, Niger Republic	10th March 2016
3	James Dung Pam	First Secretary, West African Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja	8th March, 2016
4	Dr. Ibrahim Umara	Security Expert, Maiduguri, Borno State	23rd February, 2016
5	Baba Kura	Sector 5 Commander, Borno State Civilian Joint Task Force	21st February, 2016
6	Lit. Col. P.U Nnaji	7 Division, Nigerian Army, Maiduguri	22nd February, 2016
7	ASP Isuku Victor	Police, Public Relations Officer, Maiduguri Borno State	19th February, 2016
8	Ahmed Satomi	Chairman Borno State Emergency Management Agency	19th February, 2016
9	Waje Nasiru	Assistant Director, West African Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja	15th January 2016
10	Adekunle Okunade	Foreign Officer 1, European Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja	15th January 2016
11	Olafeso Olufemi	Foreign Officer 1, European Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja	12th January 2016
12	Grema Terab	Former Chairman Borno State Emergency Management Agency	26th January 2016