

**TERRORISM AND NIGERIA'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS, ASSESSMENT
OF BOKO HARAM**

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**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO SCHOOL OF POST GRADUATE STUDIES,
NASARAWA STATE UNIVERSITY KEFFI, IN PARTIAL FUFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF DEGREE OF M.Sc IN POLITICAL
SCIENCE (INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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NASARAWA STATE UNIVERSITY, KEFFI
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APRIL, 2019

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation has been writing by me and it is a report of my research work. It has not been presented in any previous application for the award of Master's Degree. All quotations are indicated and source of information specifically acknowledge by means of references.

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CERTIFICATION

This dissertation title “**Terrorism and Nigeria’s External Relations, Assessment Boko Haram**,” meets the regulations governing the award of Masters of Science (M.Sc), of the School of Postgraduate Studies, Nasarawa State University, Keffi, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge.

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DEDICATION

I dedicated this dissertation to my father Hwande David and my mother Hwande Felicia, my Wife Hwande Julcit for their advice guidance and sponsored me.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to the Lord, God Almighty, who by His infinite grace and mercy has kept me alive and enabled me to complete this study.

My appreciation goes to my supervisor Dr. Usman Abu Tom for his guidance as a father and lecturer, he subsequently make constructive criticism and offered creative suggestion concerning both the structure and the substance of the manuscript. His examination of the entire work was not only systematic and thorough but also imaginative and encouraging.

I therefore, register my immense gratitude for his valuable assistance.

I am also acknowledging the head of Department of Political Science, Dr. Bello Mohammed Baban'Umma. Some of the lectures in the department whose inspiration, moral assistance and otherwise contributed immensely to my success. Among whom are; Prof. Eugene T. Aliegba, Dr. Usman Abu Tom, Dr. Jacho David Sunday, Assoc. Jideofor Adibe, Assoc. Yahaya A. Adadu, Mrs. Ruth Caleb, Hafsat Kigbu, Mal. Abdullahi Muhammad Abdul, Dr. Musa Ogah Ari, and Mal. Shuaibu.

My appreciation goes to my father Hwande David and my mother Hwande Felicia who both taught is wise to let me go to school and also my brothers, and Sisters, Solomon, Mfa Hwande, Doofan, Sedoo, and my Children Msurshima, Varana, Mvena my friends Ojomo Muiyiwa, Bashir Mohammed who have also contributed in this dissertation work. May Almighty God reward and bless them to live long enjoy the fruit of their labour. Thank you all.

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ABSTRACT

Confronting insecurity issues among nations has become one of the burgeoning concerns of policies national government. The issue of terrorism on its own has remain very problematic to the international community as it has increasingly impacted negatively on the socio-political development especially the activities of Boko Haram which has resulted in huge destruction of lives and properties in Nigeria and her neighboring countries. It is against this background that this work seeks to interrogate the issues of terrorism and Nigeria's external relations with critical assessment of Boko Haram from 2009-2014. To address this problem therefore, the study adopted descriptive research design method. The main instrument utilized for gathering information was secondary source of data collection. The method of data analysis used was content analysis approach. The linkage theory was used as a frame work if analysis. The finding revealed that foreign investors are gradually diverting from Nigeria due to the worsening security crisis. The renewed interest of China in investing hugely in Nigeria has been dampened due to the inability of Nigeria's government to guarantee this investment. Local investors are also hardly hit as a large chunk of operational cost is diverted to security logistics. S&P (Standard & poor's) has also classified Nigeria's investment climate as risky due to advent of terrorism. The study recommend that trans-regional and global cooperation among countries in the fight against terror is also necessary. There is an urgent need for coordinated intelligence network analysis and policy making for all nations in the campaign and fight against terror, the government should undergo a foreign policy drive designed at rebuilding its image in the international environment. Going into bilateral and multilateral engagements with advance countries based on intelligence gathering and military cooperation will help tackle the problem of terrorism.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Confronting insecurity issues among nations has become one of the burgeoning concerns of policies of national governments. The issue of terrorism on its own has remained very problematic to the international community as it has increasingly impacted negatively on the socio-political development especially Nigeria thus, portraying the country as a terrorist state. Since the return of democracy to Nigeria in May 1999, the deteriorating internal security situation has been a source of growing concern to the Nigerian government (Onuoha, 2010).

The emergence of the Nigerian militant Islamic group Boko Haram as case in point is a cause for serious concern. According to the Nigerian Directorate of Defence Information, Brigadier General Rabe Abubakar, the sect has existed since 1995 under the name of Ahlulsunna Wal'jama'ahhijra (Taiwo and olugbode, 2009:4). It was then led by Abubakah Lawan who later left the country for studies at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia leaving the sect under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf in 2001. The original philosophy behind its formation seemed purely religious, rooted in the practice of orthodox Islam which in their interpretation abhors western education and working in the Civil Service but it has since then metamorphosed into a violent sect repudiating modernization and insisting on the imposition of Sharia Law across the North first and the rest of the country eventually. Boko Haram is not the name the group chose for itself. It was given by observers and outsiders trying to understand its ideology. Boko means "book" in Hausa and Haram means "forbidden" in Arabic.

Taken together, Boko Haram means “Western education is forbidden”. For the group’s members, the name “Boko Haram” is not representative of what they stand for and they do not like to be addressed this way. They call themselves Jama’atu Ahl al-Sunnah li Dawah wa-l-jihad, which means “People committed to the ways of the Prophet (Sunnah), Proselytization (Dawah) and Striving, Struggling or Holy War (Jihad)”. Boko Haram is against democracy. They believe that ruling with any kind of doctrines or legislation that is not Islamic law is adverse to Islam. They reject any kind of governance that is not based on Shari’ah or Islamic doctrines.

Boko Haram rejects Western education; they consider institutions, technologies and other forms of recreational entertainment antithetical to prior Islamic living. They are also adverse to the Darwinist theory on the evolution of man and to the big bang theory on the creation of the world, which are not part of what they know as Islam. Boko Haram abrogated to them the power of ‘Takfirism’, which means “excommunication”. As a group, they think they can determine who is Muslim and who is not. In their judgments, when they say people are not Muslims, it justifies spilling their blood, taking away their properties and their women as war booty. This is how Boko Haram justifies killing Christians and killing Muslims who do not practice Islam the way they think it should be practiced.

The Boko Haram first took up arms against the Nigerian state security forces on 24th December 2003, when it attacked police stations and public buildings in the towns of Geidam and Kanama in Yobe state. Since then several other attacks have been recorded

and this has led to a state of insecurity in Nigeria and adversely, severely affected Nigeria's socio-political development on both the home front and its foreign impact.

The activities of Boko Haram therefore have greatly influenced Nigeria's external relations in all its ramifications and even internal activities of both the government and the Nigerian citizens due to the diverse milieu instigated by the insurgence. This research tentatively examine the causes and especially effect of the activities of Boko Haram on Nigeria's external relations from 2009-2015 as the stronghold and trend of terrorism has become major concern in the entire global system.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

This research intends to critically establish the relationship between terrorism and Nigeria's external relations with particular reference to the activities of Boko Haram sect. This stems from the fact that it was never given much thought that it will come to a point in the history of Nigeria when terrorism, suicide bombing, destructions of lives and properties and other terrorist activities will become a front burner in national discuss. However, with the activities of the radical Islamic sect Boko Haram, it is manifest that Nigeria is not immune from terrorism. Hitherto, Nigeria was able to manage such uprising within a short time by the application of a superior military force as employed against Maitatsine in the 1970's. This strategy though has not been successful against Boko Haram whose activities supersedes that of the Maitatsine of the 70's due to their high degree attacks and sophistications in both arms and human capacity which has further been employed to threaten Nigeria's national capability as well as international relations.

Boko Haram insurgency which is threatening towards becoming an intractable conflict has been a source of concern to Nigeria and the international community. This development has necessitated research into the origin, activities and effects of the insurgency that has proved to be an effective threat to the sovereignty of Nigerian government. Boko Haram is an amoebic group with no definite form to guarantee a fixed definition as to its evolution, ideology, demands, type of group, sponsorship and its targets. Boko Haram did not emerge nor does it exist in a vacuum. Rather, it is a product of and responsive to Nigerian demographics, history, politics, and economics. Thus, in order to understand the growth of Boko Haram and to evaluate policy options to counter the group, it is necessary to contextualize Boko Haram within Nigeria, thereby reviewing key factors regarding Nigerian geography and demographics, its political history and current dynamics, the Nigerian economy, and Islamism in Nigeria.

Top on the national interest of every country of which Nigeria is no exception is the protection of her sovereignty from both external and internal interference. The recent Boko Haram insurgency which has really dented the image of the country in the international community has really affected the country's ability to protect her sovereignty which is tied to her national security. Nigeria's national security has really been under serious threat lately and this has placed a question mark on how dynamic and effective the nation's foreign policy is, as a reflection of her domestic policy. In Nigeria, since the increase in proportion of Boko Haram's insurgency, the number of international investors coming to Nigeria has reduced drastically while some foreign companies that had been in Nigeria years before the terrorist activities have migrated to other Countries

like Ghana and South Africa where they are sure of enjoying relative peace and security (Ogbu, 2011).

The problematique in this study is that the nefarious activities of the Boko Haram sect has greatly eaten deep into the Nigerian society and the government, state have not been able to come up with a formidable foreign policy to combat the menace and this has affected the foreign policy stand of the country in the international community.

1.3 Research Questions

The foregoing raises some major questions which the research attempt to answer:

- i) How has terrorism impacted on global security?
- ii) What is the relationship between Nigeria's and her neighbour in tackling Boko Haram terrorism?
- iii) How has Boko Haram activities impacted on Nigeria's foreign image?
- iv) What are the possible ways the international community can be involve in assisting Nigeria to tackle the Boko Haram activities?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The main aim of this study is to establish how the activities of Boko Haram sect has impacted on Nigeria's external relations. Other specific objectives include;

- i) to ascertain how terrorism has impacted on global security.
- ii) to determine the extent of Nigeria's neighbour fighting the Boko Haram terrorist.
- iii) to activates on Nigeria's foreign image?
- iv) to determine possible ways the international community can intervene in assisting Nigeria in restoring peace.

1.5 Research Propositions

The study is guided by the following propositions

- i) The loose and corrupt nature of the leadership and the political system has led to the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria.
- ii) The Boko Haram activities have affected the perception of the international community about Nigeria.
- iii) The lack of first grade military hardware's and negligence in surveillance and technological equipment has enhanced Boko Haram lethality.
- iv) The activities of Boko Haram has seldom affected Nigeria's image on every front
- v) Boko Haram foreign affiliation has further enhanced their strength at destroying Nigeria internationally
- vi) The quest for a permanent Security Council seat in the United Nations organisations has further been limited by Boko Haram lethality against Nigeria.

1.6 Significance of the Study

The significance of this research are enormous and indispensable in the fight towards alienating the milieu associated with the sect and towards re-establishing Nigeria as a vital force in not only the African continent but the global society at large. Firstly, this research work would serve as a material for upcoming researchers on subject matter of the activities of Boko-Haram and other conflict situations. Secondly, it will close the existing body of knowledge on the subject matter. Similarly, it will serve as a guide for policy thrust in the area of foreign policy. This study focuses on how Boko Haram insurgency as manifested in its terrorist acts and destruction of lives and properties, has

impacted on the relationships between Nigeria and the entire world. It contributes to the understanding of the effects of terrorism on international relations and how nations in the international system react and coordinate their relationships in the face of daunting terrorism challenge.

The practical significance on the other hand is to bring to the fore the hidden effects of the insurgency on Nigeria's relations with other nations, for it to be adequately addressed by policy makers. The study also makes contribution for a successful counter insurgency by analysing the response of both countries in confronting the challenges of Boko Haram insurgency. This research is relevant as the topic under study is a current phenomenon; it is one of the issues that tops national priority and attracts world attention.

1.7 Scope of the Study

The scope of this study is limited to the activities of the Boko Haram sect and its impact on Nigeria's external relations, between 2009-2015. The scope also captures Nigeria foreign policy, her external engagements with both the African neighbors and Europe in tackling Boko Haram. Finally, the scope captures global terrorism and the activities of Boko Haram and its affiliations.

1.8 Operational Definition of Terms

The key terms to be defined are Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Boko Haram, External Relations, Domestic Terrorism, and Insecurity.

Foreign Policy: Foreign policy is any programme pursued by a nation in its relations with other nations designed to achieve national objective. Foreign policy expresses self-

interest strategies chosen by the state and to achieve its goals within international relations milieu (Adefuye, 2004).

Terrorism: This is the indiscriminate and random use of different levels of violence such as bombing, shooting, kidnapping, assassination to obtain mainly political demands from government (Brass, 2013).

Boko Haram: A group of people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and Jihad. Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awatiWal-Jihad better known by its Hausa name Boko Haram is a Jihadist terrorist organization based in North-East Nigerian. It is an Islamic which strongly opposes man made laws and it seeks to abolish a secular system of government and establish Sharia law in the country is responsible for the state of insecurity in Nigeria (Wikipedia, 2012).

External Relations: It is defined as what countries do outside their domestic environment as it relates with other countries. It is a bilateral or multilateral relation between or among entities such that if they had not been in this relation with each other the nature of each would not necessarily have been different. This implies that nations as a matter of importance have relations with others in order to compliment areas where they are lacking and to consolidate on those in partial existence.

Domestic Terrorism: Domestic terrorism is terrorism practiced in one's own country against his own people. It involves violence against the civilian population or infrastructures of a nation. Often but not always by citizens of that nation and often with the intent to intimidate coerce, or influence national policy.

Insecurity: This is an unsafe feeling, a state of mind characterized by self-doubt and vulnerability. It is a feeling of being insecure; it is a feeling of being a target for hurt or harm. Insecurity includes loss of lives, kidnapping, armed robbery, bombings and other acts that threaten the cooperative existence of a state. The concern of this study is on the threat to lives, properties and the general wellbeing by the Boko Haram Sect on Nigeria and Nigerians and its spillover effects on the country's foreign policy (Isah, 2011).

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Conceptual Framework

2.1.1 Concept of Foreign Policy

Foreign policy as a social science concept defies general acceptability as to a universal definition as a result of various scholars with different interpretations on the concept of foreign policy. Aluko (1981) aptly describes this when he asserted that “nobody has really formulated a universally acceptable definition of the concept and probably nobody will ever succeed in doing so”.

Northedge (1968) defines foreign policy as interplay between the outside and inside. It implies that foreign policy is the intercourse between the domestic factors and external factors of a state. In other words, the foreign policy of a nation is the sum of exchanges between the domestic factors inherent within that particular society and the external factors from the international community. Also, this definition suggests that the outside and inside to a large extent are determining factors in foreign policy formulation and implementation.

Similar to Northedge, Professor Joseph Frankel opines that foreign policy is a dynamic process of interaction between the changing domestic demands and supports and the changing external environments (Frankel, 1975). This definition of Frankel lays emphasis on the dynamic nature of foreign policy, that is foreign policy is not static but rather it is a constantly changing phenomenon. Frankel also emphasizes the role of domestic pillars as determinants of a state’s reaction to external relations.

Reynold (1980) views foreign policy as the external actions taken by the decision makers with the intention of achieving long range goals and short term objectives. Foreign policy exposes self-interest strategies chosen by the state to safeguard its national interests and to achieve its goals within international relations milieu. In international politics, nations are particularly interested in achieving two basic things-national interest and foreign policy. The former begets the latter. National interest emphasizes taking action on issues that would improve the political situation, the economic and social wellbeing, health and culture of the people as well as their political survival. In other words, national interest is people oriented policies that have the capacity to improve the lot of people and make them stand among nations. It must be policies that would promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number of citizens. For instance, a policy that leads to the creation of full employment in the country and at the same time advance the nations march towards economic and political emancipation vis-a-vis other members of the international system (Ojo and Sesay, 1988).

A country's foreign policy also called "international relations policy" is a set of political and economic goals that seek to outline how a country will interact with other countries of the world. Thus, foreign policies are generally designed to promote, protect and defend a country's national interests, national security, ideological goals and economic prosperity. It consists of decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable extent, relations between one state and others. It is a set of explicit objectives with regard to world beyond borders of a given social unit and a set of strategies and tactics designed to achieve those objectives. This implies the perception of a need to influence the behaviour of other states or international organizations. The aim is to ensure that such states or

international organizations maintain the existing pattern of behaviour especially if the influencing state perceives such as contributing to the achievement of its own objectives, or to change the present pattern by initiating a new set of policies, or by altering or halting the implementation of existing ones (Frankel 1967; Legg and Morrison, 1971).

To pursue these objectives, states in the international system irrespective of their political orientation and levels of economic development use various methods and instruments of foreign policy to influence, sometimes even dictate the role, orientations, objectives and actions of other states. In inter-state relations therefore various instruments of foreign policy are used with different results. Thus diplomatic manoeuvres, bargaining, negotiations, persuasions, propaganda, moral warfare, blackmail, military coercion and in extreme circumstances war are used to achieve state foreign policy goals and objectives.

To Modelski (1962) foreign policy is the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment.

In essence foreign policy suggests stated set of attitude towards the international environment, an implicit or explicit plan about a country's relationship with the outside world, a conscious image of what is or ought to be the country's place in the world, or some general guiding principles or attitudes determining and influencing decisions on specific issues. This, however, buttresses Adeniran's (1983) assertion that foreign policy consist of three elements: one is the overall orientation and policy intentions of a particular country towards another. The second is the objective a country seeks to achieve in her relations or dealings with other countries and the third is the means for achieving that particular goal or objective.

The setting in which foreign policy is made is pivotal. Unlike domestic policies, the targets of foreign policy decisions are not domestic but entities external to the state. In other words, the process of foreign policy decision making is influenced by factors that are not only internal to the state initiating particular policies, but also by pressures from sources that are external to it. Hence, two environments of foreign policy can be identified: the domestic influence on foreign policy and the external environment.

We can argue that the influence of Domestic environment on foreign policy cannot be over emphasized. ‘Restricted by the pressures originating within the country, the internal political situation with due allowance for variations from one country to another will determine how forceful a government can play its diplomatic hand, what it cannot do for fear of losing support at home. What it must do or try to do if it is to hold its own against the opposition or to conciliate the opposition if under attack from its own supporters the tempter of domestic public opinion, the pattern of organised pressure groups acting as lobbies, the organs for articulating and shaping opinion on foreign affairs such as press, radio and television all have their part to play. “There is virtually nothing existing within the borders of the state which does not have some influence on postures its government assumes in international affairs” (Northedge 1968:21).

2.1.2 Concept of Terrorism

Clearly no intellectual discipline possesses monopoly on the study of terrorism, and allowing for different levels of individual skill, no single Scholar is more like than another to explain this phenomenon. If we view terrorism as a complex phenomenon into which we make incisions with different interpretations as to its meaning, each

interpretation reveals something about the whole but no single definition can explain everything.

The former UN Secretary, Late General Kofi Annan proposed that terrorism should be seen as any action that is 'intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or international organization to do something or not to do something' (The Guardian, 14 March, 2005). Terrorism is a deliberate and systemic murder, maiming and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends. In the latter part of 21st century, the phenomenon became popularised as one of the features of world politics and conflict. Hitherto terrorism is used by individuals, single minded small groups, state agents and broad insurgent movements to seek some political and military results perhaps considered difficult or impossible to achieve in the usual political forum or on the battle field against an army (Harmon, 2002).

According to Walter (1972), terrorism is not confined to anomalous circumstances or exotic systems; it is also potential in ordinary institutions as well as unusual situations. It has been variously described as both a tactics and strategy; a crime and holy duty; a justified reaction to oppression and an inexcusable abomination. Reigns of terror are not properly understood if they are conceived as ephemeral states of crisis produced by adventurous events or as alien forms of control. Systems of terror usually described as 'abnormal' by the conventions western social and political thought may be generated under certain conditions of stress by 'normal' political processes.

Merari (1994) for instance, describes terrorism as the use of violence by sub-national groups or clandestine state agents for obtaining political (including social and religious) goals especially when the violence is intended to intimidate or otherwise affect emotions, attitudes and behaviour of a target audience considerably larger than the actual victims. Wilkinson (1974) holds that as a of unconventional warfare, terrorism is designed to weaken or supplant existing political landscapes through capitulation, acquiescence or radicalization as opposed to subversion or direct military action.

Significantly, terrorism is a compulsive strategy of the relatively disadvantaged, the weak who seeks reversal of authority, an efficacious use of force to achieve a desired policy, a theatrical warfare whose drama involves the actors who actually carry out the violent act, the group against whom the violent act is targeted and the authority due to be influenced or compelled to act. Often times, those who are accused of being terrorist rarely identifies themselves as such, instead they use terms that represent their ideological or ethnic struggle such as: separatists, freedom fighters, guerrillas, Jihadist, revolutionaries.

Historically, the concept of terrorism dates back to the first organised human interaction. At minimum, it could be traced back to the period when Jewish zealots used terrorism to resist the Romans by killing many roman soldiers and destroying Roman property. It could also be traced to when Muslims used terrorism to fight each other (Shiites versus Sunni) and the crusades. It was a period in the religious circle when dying in the service of god, dying while killing the assumed enemies of God (Allah) loomed large (1984).

The modern development of terrorism as a tool to achieve political and religious goals began during the French revolution (1793-1794). During this period, Maximilien

Robespierre of France introduced government sponsored terrorism in order to maintain power and suppress opposition to the government (Hoffman 1998). Similarly, during the Soviet revolution in 1917, Lenin and Stalin, evolved government sponsored terrorism as a useful tool to maintain government control. These personalities systematically used the act of terrorism to frighten the entire society. To them, both terror and fear were veritable instruments for governmental operations.

Meanwhile, there is a wide spectrum of strategies of terrorist groups. No one type of group has a monopoly on any particular technique or strategy. Thus, different strategies can be employed by different, unrelated groups of terrorist. Strategy in this context is the considered application of means to advance ones ends objectives. This depends largely on the circumstances and the terrorists intentions. Harmon (2000) identifies some of the terrorists strategies which include; strategy to create or further a sense of societal dislocation, fear and even anarchy; strategy to discredit, diminish, or destroy a particular government and replace it with another economic strategy which is intended to directly harm the property owners and perhaps to vitiate the economic policies and programmes of government particularly in the areas of sabotage of oil pipelines, bombings, banks robberies and disrupting the export of manufactured goods and strategy for international effect. This finds explanation in some actions some governments embark upon to deter unnecessary foreign incursion or intervention in the business of the country.

A modern trend in terrorism is towards loosely organized, self-financed, international networks of terrorists. Another trend towards terrorism is that which is religiously or ideologically motivated. Radical Islamic fundamentalist groups, or groups using religion

as a pretext, pose terrorist threats of varying kinds to many nations' interests. A third trend is the apparent growth of cross-national links among different terrorist organizations which may involve combinations of military training or funding, technology transfer or political advice.

It is also pertinent to also examine some of the various dimensions of terrorism. Prominent among these include, state-bound; non-state terrorism and terrorism across boundaries. By state-bound terrorism, is meant one being orchestrated and aided by states. This can be in various forms: intimidation, selective political assassination, abduction and kidnapping. Some striking illustration includes the genocidal activities the Nazi regime carried out against the Jewish population between 1939 and 1945. The non-state terrorism is often carried out by individuals or groups who feel it is no longer worth it to accomplish political objectives within the law, a law which to them represents the power of an immoral and/or legitimate regime or government. These individuals are contemptuous of the society's political institutions and practices (Slann, 2010).

Some of the factors responsible for non-state terrorism are tied to relative deprivation: asymmetrical allocation or distribution of public resources, poverty, and political frustration. It could also be due to religious intolerance or fanaticism (Adeniran, 1996).

2.2 Review of Related Literature

2.2.1 Nigeria's Foreign Policy

Nigeria is known as one country whose foreign policy is essentially tailored to reflect her commitment to the wellbeing of all African countries particularly in the areas of peaceful co-existence, prevention of violent conflicts- at intra-national and international levels- restoration of peace where necessary; and maintenance of peace all over the world.

In post-independent Nigeria, the nation has maintained her foreign policy. Although the approach depends largely on the government of the day, based on the circumstances of the time and style of leadership; the substance is usually rooted in set objectives revolving around those principles which the nation had always held as her priorities in conduct of foreign relations.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008), Nigeria's foreign policy witnessed unreserved influence guided by a commitment of five principles as her own basic foreign policy objectives which comprise the placing of priorities on safeguarding national security through enhanced extra-territorial strategic arrangement, economic prosperity, defence of national honour, as well as maintenance of peace and security. Second in line-up of principles was Nigeria's commitment to the concept of legal equality of all states, irrespective of their sizes or capability. Then third principle is of "non-interference in the internal or domestic affairs of other nation states" (MFA, 3-23-08) while the fourth dwells on influences that guide Nigeria's foreign policy with complete loyalty to multi-lateral diplomacy as demonstrated by Nigeria's vigorous involvement in various international organizations among others.

The concepts that have bestraddle foreign policy thought in Nigeria in both official and non-official parlance are: national consensus in foreign policy, dynamic foreign policy, Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy, concentric circles, concert of medium powers, economic diplomacy, and citizenship diplomacy among many others. The concept of dynamic foreign policy first crept into intellectual discourse on Nigerian Foreign policy in the first republic. It was on the occasion of the parliamentary debates of Nigerian foreign policy wherein the then Foreign Minister Hon. Aja Wachukwu moved a motion that: this honourable house reaffirms the foreign policy of Federal Government as declared by the Right Hon Prime Minister and approved on the 20th August, 1960 and hereby declares its approval of the government's interpretation and conduct thereof, and congratulates the government on its achievement in the international field since independence of this country.

In his response to motion, the then shadow Minister of foreign affairs, Hon Anthony Enahoro moved an amendment to this motion to read that: the honourable house is of the opinion that the foreign policy of the Federal Government as declared by Prime Minister and approved on 20th August, 1960 by this Honourable House lacks dynamism and regrets that the Governments interpretation and conduct thereof is out of step with progressive opinion in Africa. By putting the concept of dynamism at the centre of this discourse, particularly making it appear as a core requirement of any foreign policy endeavour, the streak of dynamism gained currency as a fundamental basis of foreign policy making and endeavour in Nigeria. Foreign policies of successive administrations are seen as either being conservative or dynamic, while Balewa, Gowon and Shagari

administrations were deemed conservative, that of Murtala/Obasanjo, Obasanjo/Ya'ardua are deemed dynamic.

The idea of Africa as the centre-piece of Nigeria foreign policy is premised on the understanding that Nigeria's engagement in the international system will be looked at through the binoculars of Africa. As Hon. Aja Wachukwu averred on the imperative an Afrocentric policy, charity begins at home and therefore any Nigerian foreign policy that does not take into consideration the peculiar position of Africa is unrealistic. This enunciation is the philosophical origins of Afrocentrism in Nigeria's foreign policy thought; it was however, the Adedeji Report that coined the concept: 'Africa as centre-piece' (Inamete, 2001).

The issues that gave practical expression to this African-centeredness were the remnants of colonialism on the continent, apartheid in South Africa, liberation wars, ideological and proxy conflicts among others. Outside these politically pressing factors, the issue of a shared racial universe, of cultural neighbourhood, of shared historical experiences and the ideals of Pan-Africanism further lubricated the wheels of this foreign policy conceptualization. Indeed, in pursuing an Africa-centered foreign policy premised on racial and socio-cultural affinity of Africans, Nigeria was carrying out an exercise in anthropological diplomacy.

Under the framework of an Africa-centered foreign policy, Nigeria got involved deeply in the decolonization struggles in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and anti-apartheid struggles in South Africa and in the process earning for itself the appellation a 'frontline nation', even though she was geographically far removed from the theatre of the struggles

which was in the Southern African region. Nigeria is central to the formation of ECOWAS, as contained in the breakdown of social order in Liberia, Sierra Leone, etc, through its world acknowledged peacekeeping expertise, and has provided economic life wire to less economically resourceful countries. In terms of proactive engagement with major socio-political and economic issues of continental importance in the last fifty one years, Nigeria tower far above any other African country (Olayinwole, 2003).

Since this phraseology appeared on the Nigeria foreign policy scene, it has continued to reproduce itself, like the ever recurring mathematical decimal. The foreign policy elite and political leadership of successive governments seems to be carried away by its philosophical allure rather than its rational ideation. In this sense, therefore, considerations of the economic benefits, continental political leadership, national interests, and military partnerships and strategic engagements are sacrificed on the altar of good neighborliness and psychological gratification. Foreign Policy formulators have been more concerned on the issue of psychological gratification. This issue has to do with the psychological construction and mentality of Nigerians that verge on self-elevation, show-off and materialism. Beneath all these however, lies a massively gigantic emptiness and inferiority complex. Most often, the flagrant display of materialism among Nigerians is a product of psycho-social insecurity. Exported to the international arena, in this sense, Nigeria wants to present an image of a big brother image before the other African countries.

This reason accounts for why inspite of the huge financial expenditures and massive loss of human and material resources in the Liberian and Sierra Leone wars, for instance,

Nigeria has not been able to reap any economic benefits. To date, one cannot tell one single Nigerian company involved in the post-conflict reconstruction activities going on in these two countries. What major economic niche has Nigeria carved for herself in these post-conflicts countries? There is hardly anything one can point finger towards. Yet, the Africa-centeredness framework has continued to maintain a stronghold on foreign policy thinking in Nigeria. The theories of concentric cycles and concert of medium powers all take their bearing from this perspective. In sum, the concept of Africa as a centre piece of Nigeria foreign policy is also not grounded in considerations of economic growth and national development, and as such no matter how conceptually lush it may be, it remains substantially empty.

The concept of economic diplomacy as a foreign policy plank was introduced in Nigeria foreign policy during the Ibrahim Babangida administration. The government conceptualized economic diplomacy policy as, 'the promotion of export trade, investment and increased financial assistance from friendly countries'. Building on this, the then Foreign Affairs Minister, Ike Nwachukwu in his June 1988 speech entitled: The Dynamics of Nigeria's Foreign Policy, provided the policy direction when he stated that, 'it is the responsibility of our foreign policy apparatus to advance the course of our national economic recovery' (Olayinwole, 2003).

The imperative of an economic diplomacy foreign policy framework was inspired by the economic pressures that were exerted on the Nigerian economy as a result of the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The focus was on export promotion, encouragement of direct foreign investment, debt rescheduling, embracing of

neo-liberal economic measures and deep involvement in the interplay of the capitalist international political economy. The political wing of economic diplomacy agenda was that Nigeria will ingratiate itself and cultivate the goodwill and friendship of the leading countries of Europe, North America and Japan.

There is absolutely nothing new about the economy being used as a major component of a nation's foreign policy endeavour. Nigeria lacked the economic infrastructure to use economy as a major instrument of diplomatic engagement. This is so because the productive forces in the economy are grossly underdeveloped, there is the dearth of capital, a lack of entrepreneurial ingenuity; the economy is monoculturally dependent on oil, politicized, corrupt and rent oriented. It is part of the problem that Nigeria has not been able to make economic gains from her foreign policy adventures, particularly in the sub-region.

Again, no foreign policy agenda can succeed on the basis of reliance on a single factor, such as the economy. Foreign policy is borne out of a multiplicity of factors, such as; culture, politics, history, patriotism, geography, military power, etc. indeed, the very basis of embarking on economic diplomacy in the first place was the inability of the Nigerian economy to withstand pressures of the international political economy in the first place.

Citizen diplomacy is the foreign policy thrust that has been embarked upon since the advent of democratic governance in 1999. It was spearheaded by the Olusegun Obasanjo and has been in place since then through the administrations of Musa Yar'Adua and Jonathan Goodluck. Basically, citizen diplomacy contends that the citizens, that is,

Nigerians are the centre piece of Nigeria's foreign policy. Commenting on what the concept is all about, Ozoemenam Mbachu, posits that the basic thrust revolve around concern for the basic needs, human rights and socio-economic welfare of Nigerian citizens in conducting bilateral and multilateral engagements with other countries (Mamadu, 2006).

Through the instrumentality of the citizen diplomacy, it is envisaged that Nigeria will harness the resources and potentials of her diaspora, mainstream the doctrine of reciprocity, and create an enabling environment for her citizens to prosper and engage in broad issues of human importance at both the national and international levels. In the event too, it will enhance Nigeria's export portfolio and attract foreign direct investments. According to Mbachu (2007:9), critical issues that have been left unanswered by the citizen diplomacy policy thrust and for which if clear answers are not provided could endanger it are: A.) what are the objectives of Nigeria's bilateral and multilateral economic and political cooperation based on the framework of citizen diplomacy? B.)What should be the benefits of citizen diplomacy as a functional framework for bilateral and multilateral cooperation? C.)Who would aggregate the inputs of Nigerians in the diaspora? D.) How would the success or failure of citizen diplomacy be measured? Is the social responsibility of the State not primarily targeted at creating a conducive atmosphere for the citizens' fulfillment of their potentials, and realization of their yearnings and aspirations? This is the philosophical foundations of the state as encapsulated in the doctrine of social contractarianism. If so, which it is no doubt, what is special about citizen diplomacy as a conceptual framework of foreign policy? Since

1999, to date, what can we point at and say this is the benefit(s) of citizen diplomacy? Again, the answer is nothing.

As such, Nigeria prides herself as a “member of the United Nations Organization (UNO), African Union (AU), Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), African Petroleum Producers (APP), Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), and ECOWAS,” (MFA, March 19,2007). Nigeria has relative influence in all these international organizations as expected of a full sovereign nation.

Former president, Goodluck Jonathan said recently that Nigeria’s foreign policy needs overhauling (AA Nigeria, June 10 2011) Although the statement seem rather nebulous as the he did not elaborate on how he intends to refocus the policy, the statement was aimed at stimulating the foreign policy formulators to think out of the box, a new foreign policy direction that will properly position the country within the context of new realities in international relations. The world is faced with new realities: the challenges of poverty, civil war, terrorism, environmental degradation, threat of nuclear war and so on. The focus of our foreign policy should stand on two principles; principle of reciprocity and economic diplomacy. The principle of reciprocity should remain the guiding principle in our international trade and politics. Nigeria should pursue an aggressive economic diplomacy.

2.2.2 Terrorism and Nigeria's Foreign Policy

Terrorism across national boundaries is one that has external connection. The act is mostly drawn on external factors. Whereas at the national (territorial) level the source of the violent act could be traced and some solutions sought (such as in cases of kidnapping, abduction), extra-territorial terrorism does not subject itself to such scrutiny and resolution. Hence, it is often difficult to identify the actual source of some terror across national boundaries, and some times, if identified, it becomes pretty cumbersome to cope with it without the collaboration of other actors within the international system.

There are six major types of terrorism which includes; Nationalist terrorism, Religious terrorism, State sponsored terrorism, Left- wing terrorism, Right wing terrorism and Anarchist terrorism. Nationalist terrorist seek to form a separate state for their own national group, often by drawing attention to a fight for “national liberation”. State-sponsored terrorist groups are deliberately used by radical states as foreign policy tools-as Hoffman puts it, as “a cost-effective way of waging war covertly, through the use of surrogate warriors or ‘guns for hire’”. Left-wing terrorist are out to destroy capitalism and replace it with a communist or socialist regime. Because they see most civilians as suffering from capitalist exploitation, left-wing terrorist sometimes have limited their violence to avoid hurting their victims they say they want to save. Right-wing terrorist are among the least organised terrorists, often associated with neo-Nazi street rioting in Western Europe, especially in the early 1980s, these groups, often dominated by skinheads, seek to do away with liberal democratic governments and create fascist states in their place. From the 1870s until about 1920, anarchist terrorism was a major global phenomenon, revolutionaries seeking to overthrow established governments launched a

wave of bombings and assassinated a series of heads of state; one of such victim was President William Mckinley, killed in 1901 by a young Hungarian refugee influenced by anarchist sentiments. As regards this research work, more focus will be centred on religious terrorism (Olabanji and Eze, 2014).

Terrorism in the name of religion has become a predominant model for political violence in the modern world. Religious terrorism is terrorism by those whose motivation and aims have a predominant religious character or influence. Religious terrorist seeks to use violence to further what they see as divinely commanded purposes, often targeting broad categories of foes in an attempt to bring about sweeping changes. Former United States Secretary of State, Warren Christopher said that terrorist act in the name of religion and ethnic identity has become “one of the most important security challenges we face in the wake of cold war” (Nwagboso, 2012). Religious terrorism can be communal, genocidal, nihilistic or revolutionary. It can be committed by lone wolves, clandestine cells, large dissident movements, or government.

2.2.3 Global Terrorism in Perspectives

The Postmodern phase of human evolutionary advance which coincides at the cross-roads with the landmark trend of the end of the Cold War has resulted in the growth of shades of perspectives intended to shape both the theoretical and pragmatic global future. It was while responding to Francis Fukuyama’s (1992) triumphalists’ assumptions of the ‘End of History’ that Huntington (1996) conceived an equally potent model to give meaning to contemporary global conflict relations. In his ‘Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World order’ theses, Huntington has firmly held on to the thinking, which is at variance

with Fukuyama's position that man (the specie) will continue to threaten man; according to Huntington this may not be at the trans-national levels. Conflict in this phase will be at the ethno-religious and civilizational realm and these will unfold within the territorial margins of nation-states. In contemporary human and group socio-economic and political relations, this model has proven relevant in illuminating the unfolding incidences of violent conflicts including their asymmetrical variant.

The article posits from the onset that the acts of terrorist within the Nigerian geographical space are actually a declaration of war against the state. This conclusion is instructive because of the observable complex dynamics defining the unfolding phenomenon in all its gruesomeness. Contrary to the known tactic of terrorist globally which prefers the 'hit and run' approach, the Boko Haram variant is markedly distinct in the sense that its 'victories over the security institutions' have propelled them into crafting a new thinking to the strategy of terrorist movements which subsists on the assumption that renegade movements can literally invade and acquire territories. In this instance, the Boko Haram has conquered a large section of the north eastern Nigeria; a situation that informs Tatalo Alamu's (2014) conclusion that with this brazen effrontery, Nigeria has become effectively partitioned.

By war, we will be inferring 'organized violence carried on by political units against each other' (Bull. 1977: 184). However, violence could not be ascribed the tag 'war' until it fulfills the basic condition of its being 'carried out in the name of a political unit (Boko Haram) against another political unit (the state). For the purpose of dispelling any ambiguity between the legal definitions of war and peace, Hugo Grotius has constructed

the doctrine of *inter bellum et pacem nihil est medium* (Bull, 1977). Under this principle, Grotius attempts an understanding of the meaning of war by asking the question ‘at what point does the rebel band (the Boko Haram in this case) takes on the character of a political unit. We will provide the answer immediately by saying, the moment that rebel band bears arms, conquers territories and undermine the constitutionally acclaimed authority presiding over the conquered territory, the same rebel band has assumed the title of a ‘political unit’. Secondly, the principle operates under the normative assumption that if war is to be war, then the ‘persons conducting this hostilities must be activated (motivated) by the notion that they are engaged in an activity called war’ (Bull, 1977: 186). The Boko Haram has severally described their hostilities against the Nigerian state and its fatigued people as a Holy war against infidels (Salkida, 2009). In the same breath, Laderach (1997: 5) has joined in the discourse by stating that ‘war is reserved to describe a conflict in which at least one thousand deaths have resulted in a given year. The Boko Haram onslaught has met this bleak statistical requirement.

This is the background that will give us the meaning of the phenomenon of the Boko Haram threatening the national socioeconomic and political narrative. In this respect, it is necessary to maintain at the outset that what the world is transiting through is the challenge to global security order. Thus, the classical model of the social contract as originally constructed by ‘the humanists Thomas Hobbes (1651) and advanced by other like-minded classical thinkers like Locke and Rousseau (1754) is undergoing the process of radical re-definition’ (Kola, 2009). Individuals and human communities residents within national borders, previously suppressed and subjected to the authority of leviathan (the state) as the check to perceived human ‘excesses’ is currently being challenged and

its power to tame these ‘excesses’ increasingly questioned by groups that had earlier completely submitted their will to resist the state because of its monopoly of the instruments of coercion – arms and weapons sorely borne by military and security institutions. This rebellion against state authority is emanating from the open access that anarchist, religious extremist and irredentist; ethnic nationalists and criminal entities have to the floodgates of arms supply chains. The illicit weapons available to these elements since the end of the Cold War and the phenomenally catastrophic collapse of previously established centers of organized power like Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Libya under the firm grip of Muammar Gaddafi, Afghanistan and recently Syria under the relentless Assad have continued to facilitate the heinous occurrence of insecurity within fragile state formations (Kola, 2009).

Until now, a critical examination of Nigeria’s security portfolio easily reveals that previous national security concerns were focused primarily against threats posed the national interest by external militaries in the pursuit of their own strategic socio-economic and political interests on Nigeria’s air, maritime and land territorial spaces. Due to this limited orientation and understanding of the core elements constituting the concept of national security, the security establishment, charged with the responsibility of shielding the state from external threats have consequently decided it was not within its constitutional domain to manage internal security, until the dynamism shaping the movement of history permanently altered that limited mindset with the emergence into the political scene of the Boko Haram elements and their capacity for unleashing infamy on individuals and groups (Isyaku, 2013).

With specific reference to discourses on terrorist tendencies and religious fundamentalism, Huntington (1994) has maintained that because of the sweeping religious revival or what he describes as *la revanche de Dieu*, human spiritual being is being activated in a global religious revival and man's consciousness with regards his eternity in constant reckoning. He is constantly engaged in an exercise of self-inquiry. He asks the fundamental question bordering on the dual aspects of his temporal humanity and its accompanying opposite-his timeless eternity. In the process of this introspection that informs deep spiritual contemplation, such questions arise; who am I, what am I doing here (on earth) and where am I going afterwards? To each of these questions, he gains deeper spiritual insight that reveals and provides him with an answer that confirms that he has a destination in the hereafter, thus the need to engage in pious conduct that will reconcile him to his maker for the ultimate Day of Judgment (Huntington, 1994). On the same subject, Le Kuan Yew, commenting on the issue has referenced the East Asia locale when he opines that 'there is a quest for some higher explanations about man's purpose and about why we are here (Huntington, 1994:97).

Thus, the average religious bigot engages in fundamentalist acts with the hope that he will attain eternal life by these pious acts against those he perceives as 'infidels'. Accordingly, a Hezbollah functionary, Sheik Naim Qassém, 'the Hezbollah number two'; has developed in many of his treatises and interviews what is tortuously perceived as a well-reasoned justification for suicide bombings. He posits that in the real sense, these attacks have nothing to do with suicide. He captures his defence in the following quixotic epistle: Jihad is a fundamental basis for us. We do not use it as a means of imposing our views on others, but consider ourselves in a state of Jihad to defend our rights. When a

Muslim dies in a defensive Jihad, he fulfils his religious duty by waging a holy war as well as gratifying God by making the ultimate sacrifice since we believe that our moment of death is recorded and determined by God, it follows that whether one hides in a shelter, is crossing the road or is fighting the enemy, he will die when his time arrives (Reuter, 2002:64).

What the functionary is making effort at establishing is that every unfolding phenomenon affecting a person, whether they are positive or negative have been pre-ordained, thus the justification of the theological construct of predestination.

In other words, no man can escape what is due to him even if for one minute. This spiritual thought gives the adherent reasons to embrace doctrinal instructions that direct him in the path of suicide. In this vein, the demagogue sheik continues 'Having established this, it follows that when a fighter goes to fight a jihad we do not consider him to be taking any more risks than the next man nor do we think he is bringing his moment of death closer'. So, all he has done is to pick the way in which he will die. 'If you understand Islam, you will undoubtedly be able to comprehend that this person is not being killed prior to his time. From here we regard martyrdom as a Muslim's choice of the manner in which he seeks to die' (Reuter, 2002).

However, the above narrative, including Huntington's views which according to Chukwuma (2002) has demonized Islam, have been criticized by currently emerging thinking and the vast literatures containing these thoughts that are beginning to form new paradigms covering the terrorist question. This modified line of argument; that the terrorist link is not with all of Islam, but with a very literal interpretation of it, one found

in Wahhabi Islam is becoming the acceptable norm in religious interpretations (Chukwuma, 2002). It is very clear that no religion, endorses lethality or a killing culture in human society. Allah in the Qur'an 5: 32, has thus prescribed-as law-for the children of Israel that whoever kills a person otherwise than - in retaliation - for another person, or for causing corruption in the land, shall be as if he had killed the people in a body". This confirms that unlike the highly deceptive narrative of the above Hezbollah operative, as variously contained in the Qur'an does not endorse extremism in any form.

To discountenance the existence of any nexus between Islam and any terrorist activities, especially with regards the activities of the Boko Haram, President Muhammadu Buhari, has publicly ascribe the tag 'evil terrorist organization' to the Boko Haram. Recently stupefied at the staggeringly evil strategy of the Boko Haram, our referenced Muhammadu Buhari had declared, 'The perpetrators may look like human beings, they may have limbs, and faces like the rest of us but they are not like us. In killing innocent people, they have become inhuman'. According to the Maverick Military General these terrorists subsist outside the scope of rational humanity. Their mother is carnage and their father is cruelty. They have declared war on Nigeria and its people yet they shall fail and the good people of Nigeria shall triumph' (Ayuba, 2013:12). More so, throughout history, people claiming to be pursuing the propagation of certain religious tenets have been seen to be perpetrating terrorists' acts. For instance, in the 1st century AD, the Maccabees under Judah Maccabees, the Essenes and the Zealots, all Jewish Sects carried out acts of terrorism against the Roman Empire that had occupied Jerusalem after its conquest by General Titus in 70 AD (Ariela Pelaia, 2012). Still within Jewry, the Zealots-Sicarii, a group of Jewish terrorists took the oath to be seditious and riotous against the authority

that presided over the Jews of that day. Hence, they stirred revolts against Roman rule in Judea. In the process, they frequently murdered their chosen victims with the edge of the sword and daggers in broad daylight in the heart of Jerusalem during the roman occupation. 'Other early terrorist movements include the Hindu Thugs and the Muslim Assassins. Modern terrorism, however, is generally considered to have originated with the French Revolution' in the 18th Century. In recent times, the Irish who professed either Catholicism or Protestantism were all pronounced culpable in perpetrating extremist activities (Bernstein, 2012:105). This is apart from the Moists in India and many other such movements whose activities can be appreciated only when connected to the political narrative directing them.

2.2.4 Nigerian Policy and Domestic Terrorism

Domestic terrorism has an uneven growth in Nigeria, It has manifested in civil-government relations as well as in inter-relationships between the different ethnic nationalities making up present day Nigeria. In civil government relations, it is characterised by the use of force, brutality towards the people and the deployment of (hard) power to suppress civil resistance to state policies. In civil relations, it manifests as ethnic nationalism and militancy.

Today Nigerian terrorism is rooted in state sanctioned terrorism of its colonial period. In post-colonial Nigeria, domestic terrorism manifested itself as ethnic nationalism and militancy. With over 25,000 killed in terror related circumstances over a seven year period, domestic terrorism in Nigeria deserves more than the ad hoc attention it is currently accorded by the government of Nigeria (Okumu and Botha, 2007).

Domestic terrorism relates to those acts of terrorism that are carried out by persons or local groups within the state that are meant to redress domestic grievances. This is distinct from international terrorism, which relates to terrorist acts by persons or groups that are external to the affected states and whose objective is to advance an extra-territorial cause. It is important to note that the dividing line between domestic and international terrorism might not be as wide as it is generally imagined, especially with the revolution that has taken place in the global information highway, which has greatly facilitated networking between distant diverse groups, the possibility of some linkages between domestic and external terrorist groups cannot be ruled out.

The lack of acceptable definition of terrorism has also created room for different interpretations of the concept at the domestic level where the label of domestic terrorism has been selectively used by political leaders to target their enemies. Indeed, it is not uncommon to find the power elite in some countries inventing their own terrorist in order to win international sympathy for their ploy to neutralise opposition elements and forcefully hold on to power. They can legitimise their action by passing self-serving laws to back up their selfish plans. Below are two significant cases of domestic terrorism that occurred in Nigeria in 1999 and 2001.

Odi (Bayelsa State, Nigeria)

The invasion of the sleepy community of Odi at about 2a.m on 20th November 1999 was a consequence of an earlier clash between the youth and government officials in Yenagoa, the capital of Bayelsa state, in the Niger Delta region. The government had ordered the police and other security personnel to raid the Yenagoa Black Market,

believed to have been the base of restless youth in the town. After the foray which aimed at flushing out the agitated youth, the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) reported that 100 Ijaws, including men and children had been shot by the Security Personnel deployed to quell the riots at Yenagoa Black Market. On their part, the Bayelsa State government and the Nigerian Police Force issued press statements denying the claim of the IYC. While the trading of claims and counter-claims persisted, a number of the youth who survived the raid moved to Odi (four of them were said to be indigenes of Odi) and formed a gang called Asawana Boys (CLEEN and OMCT Report 2002).

Boys terrorized the Odi community and perpetuated armed criminality on commuters along the Warri Port Harcourt. The failure of the government and security actors involved to manage the misunderstanding peacefully culminated in the arrest, torture and death of eight police men by the Asawana boys (CLEEN and OMCT Report, 2002). The police had gone after the gang in Odi without the knowledge of the Amadaowei (the clan chief) of Odi and against the advice of Police Mobile Force (PMF) team they met at the junction leading to Odi. The Governor of Bayelsa State at that time, late Chief Diepreye Alameiseigha, was given a 14day ultimatum to apprehend the gang that murdered the policemen. However, seven days into the ultimatum, a detachment of the military moved in and sacked Odi, then the second largest settlement in Bayelsa State, on 20th November 1999 (CIEEN and OMCT 2002). The sophistication of the attack and the ambush strategies used smacks of domestic terrorism perpetrated by the State against its own people. While referring to the killing of policemen at Odi, Alameiseigha states:

This was an act involving few gang stars and not the whole community. The Federal Government's response was a mess. It launched an attack on Odi community but in the end, not a single member of the gang was captured or a single firearm recovered (New African, Dec 2004:17).

Another respondent at Odi had this to say: ‘the case of Odi was a case when the government of the country, instead of protecting its own people, went to war against them (CLEEN and OMCT, 2002). It is an understatement to say that the State demonstrated poor conflict management skills. Analyses of the tensions and violence in Niger Delta put the root causes at the doorstep of the government (national, state and local) and the economic actors in the region, mainly the multinational oil companies. Just as we can explain the state’s reliance on the reactive/power model of conflict regulation as fallout from the prolonged military rule in Nigeria, one is equally bothered by the persistent incapacity of the state institutions to proactively engage with conflict situation before they erupt into violence.

Zaki Biam and Gbeji (Benue State, Nigeria)

Vaase, a Tiv settlement, remains a flashpoint in the conflicts between the Tivs and Jukuns of Benue and Taraba states. On 10 October 2001, 19 soldiers from the 23rd Armoured Brigade, Yola, and Adamawa state were abducted and driven 50 kilometres to ZakiBiam community where they were handed to the police. However in the tension that built up subsequently, the soldiers were forcefully taken away from the police station and later killed by people believed to be Tiv militia. The ZakiBiam community was later quoted as being alarmed by the news of the killing of the 19 soldiers by a group of Tiv militia. The Federal Government announced that soldiers sent to keep the peace in restless Benue-Taraba axis of north-central Nigeria have been killed. Speaking about military reinforcement after the death of the 19 soldiers, a respondent, Dennis Gbeji, was quoted as saying:

The soldiers appeared in Gbeji town in a convoy of four armoured cars and nine personnel carriers. They told the villagers that they were on peace mission at the instance of State Governor, George Akume. The villagers hosted their guests; the town elders prepared food [sic] and brought drinks for the soldiers and even gave them tubers of yam. After the entertainment, the Major who led the team appealed to the Gbeji people to cooperate with his men who would be assigned to the village for peace keeping operations. Before he left for ZakiBiam, the local government headquarters, he demanded to know when the village's market was (CLEEN and OMCT 200; P.155-157).

On 22 October 2001, the Gbeji Market Day, the same day the bodies of the 19 soldiers were buried, the military invaded seven villages (Gbeji, Vaase, Ayiine, Ugba, Sankera, Kyado and Zaki Biam) traversing Ukum, Katsina-ALA and Logo local government areas. The events here can be classified under domestic non-state and state terrorism, which might have arisen owing to the failure of all parties effectively to engage in peaceful means to resolve conflict.

Domestic terrorism in Nigeria is necessitated by a myriad of factors such as poverty, deprivation, unpopular government or government policies e.t.c. These factors hold sway in the changing phase of terrorism in Nigeria today. Domestic terrorism post Obsanjo's rule has been carried out mainly by two clandestine groups, vis-a-vis the Niger Delta militants in the south-south axis and the Boko Haram in the Northern part of Nigeria.

The Niger Delta currently comprises a dangerous combination of poverty, marginalisation and underemployment, combined with environmental problems, crime corruption and local communities who see few benefits from oil production. This has fuelled a militant uprising, which not only threatens Nigeria's oil production and the country's fragile democracy. In April 2008, as a consequence of attacks on oil pipelines in Isaka and Abonema in Rivers state (This Day, April 22 2008), oil prices crossed

US\$117 a barrel for the first time (BBC April 21,2008) Barely hours after this attack the main insurgency group the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) put out a statement claiming that since they had been pushed to the background after the Nigerian elections in 2007, they had nothing to lose or protect and would fight to destroy all oil facilities until their demands are met. According to MEND, the new series of attack (which they called Operation Cyclone) was the insurgency's answer to the illegal government of President Umaru Yar'Adua. Thus, these attacks were meant to effectively dispel the impression that the government had tried to create that peace and security had been restored in the Delta as armed insurgencies with a political agenda, bandits or something in-between (e.g. social bandits), are a consequence of local grievances that must be addressed. The only way forward is through an embedded conflict analysis that investigates the social and economic reason for the existence of the militia groups, their connection to local communities and political elites and the measures that need to be taken in order to facilitate a more peaceful dialogue between all the stakeholders in this region (Okumu and Botha, 2007).

In Northern Nigeria, Boko Haram (BH) has been ramping up its violent campaigns against the local Nigerian state, raising political bells in the US and in other Western countries, Local communities and political elites, and the measures that need to be taken in order to facilitate a more peaceful dialogue between all stakeholders.

2.2.5 Boko Haram: History, Trajectory and Metamorphosis

In recent times, one major phenomenon which would remain pertinent in the consciousness of Nigerians is the magnitude of unbridled insecurity that has pervaded the

country. The issue of insecurity has become particularly insidious and hugely intractable on account of its association with the terrorist activities of the Boko Haram. In 2009, it was assumed that Boko Haram was a spent force having suffered critical losses in its leadership (Awortu, 2015). However, Boko Haram not only re-emerged as a threat to Nigeria, but its activities also placed it on the radar of international terrorism watchers with a series of daring and successful attacks.

The exact date of the emergence of Boko Haram sect is marred in controversy, especially if one relies on media accounts. Most local and foreign media trace its origin to 2002, when Mohammed Yusuf emerged as a leader of the sect. However, Nigerian security forces date the origin of the sect back to 1995 (Taiwo and Olugbode, 2009; P.4), when Abubakar Lawan established the Ahlulsunna Wal'jama'ahhijra sect at the university of Maiduguri, Bornu state. It flourished as a non-violent movement until Mohammed assumed leadership of the sect in 2002, shortly after Abubakar Lawan left to pursue further studies in Saudi Arabia. Since then, the sect has metamorphosed under various names like the Muhajirun, Yusufiyyah, Nigerian Taliban, Boko Haram and Jama'atu Ahlilsunnahlidda'awatiwal jihad (Onuoha 2011:6).

The philosophy of the sect is rooted in the practice of orthodox Islam in their interpretation abhors western education and working in the civil service. This explains why the sect is popularly known as the Boko Haram, literally meaning "western education is a sin". However, a statement allegedly released in August 2009 by the acting leader of the Boko Haram, Mallam Sanni Umaru, rejected a designation: Boko Haram does not in any way mean "western education is a sin" as the infidel media continues to

portray us. Boko Haram actually means “western civilisation is forbidden. The difference is that while the first gives the impression that we are opposed to formal education coming from the west which is not true, the second affirms our belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not education), for culture is broader, it includes education, but not determined by western education. The sect frowns at media’s description of it as the Boko Haram. Instead it prefers to be addressed as the Jama’atu Ahlisunnahlidda’awatiwal jihad, meaning a “People committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and Jihad” (Ezema, 2013).

Although the sect’s name has been changed over the years, its ideological mission is quiet clear, namely to overthrow the Nigerian state and impose strict Islamic Sharia law in the country. Members of the sect are motivated by the conviction that the Nigerian state is filled with social vices and corruption, thus, “the best thing for a devout Muslim to do was to “migrate” from the morally bankrupt society to a secluded place and establish an ideal Islamic society devoid of political corruption and moral deprivation” (Akanji, 2009:60).

In this wise, non-members were therefore considered as Kuffar (disbelievers; those who deny the truth) or fasiqun (wrong doers) (Da’wah Coordination Council of Nigeria, 2009). It is alleged that members wore long beards, red or black headscarves and reject the use of certain modern (purported western) goods such as wristwatches and safety helmets. The irony however is that they do not reject or refuse to use technological products such as motorcycles, cars, cellular phones and AK -47 guns, and other benefits that are derived from western civilization (Gilbert, 2014).

To date, Boko Haram's attacks have become increasingly daring and lethal, from sporadic skirmishes with police and sectarian violence prior to 2009 to attacks on well-guarded and heavily fortified targets such as the United Nations compound in the Nigerian capital city Abuja in the summer of 2011, killing of over 200 people (Isyaku, 2013) and a Nigerian military base in Kaduna in February 2012. In the case of the latter, the suicide bomber very nearly made it to the heart of the installation and the headquarters building, but was shot and only managed to detonate his bomb near the barracks of the 1st Mechanized Division of the Nigerian Army (British Broadcasting Corporation, February 8, 2012). As evidence of the growing alarm, in January at the African Union Summit in Addis Ababa, leaders of African Union countries voiced concern to the US Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns that this group was becoming a threat to regional stability (Burns, 2012).

The existence of the sect has become a subject of serious local and international concern in the aftermath of July 2009 anti-government revolt led by its leader, Mohammed Yusuf. A charismatic speaker, Yusuf was appointed the leader of the sect by a committee of shaykhs in 2002. He later altered the shaykhs who appointed him, on allegations of corruption and failure to preach "pure Islam". Mohammed Yusuf claimed not to believe in most of the tenets of Western science. He denied that the world is round or that rain is caused by evaporated water. Yusuf also preached a simple, ascetic form of life for his followers, but enjoyed Western luxuries for himself, including a Mercedes car and imported delicacies. The emergence of Mohammed Yusuf was a major factor in the sect's

shift to an Islamic extremist movement, intent on overthrowing the secular Nigerian state (Onuoha, 2012).

In its early transformative years to an extremist movement, the Boko Haram under Yusuf's leadership strove for self-exclusion of its members from the mainstream corrupt society by living in areas outside or far away from society in order intellectualize and radicalize the revolutionary process that would ultimately lead to violent overthrow of the Nigerian state. By disassociating from the larger society, members become more indoctrinated by the ideologues who inculcated in them anti-secular ideologies. Before his death just after the riot of July 2009, Mohammed Yusuf was then the Commander in Chief (Amir ul-Aam) or the leader of the entire group. He has two deputies (Na'ib Amir ul-Aam I & II), and each state where they exist has its own Amir (Commander/Leader) and each Local Government Area also has an Amir. Below the Local Government Amirs are the remaining followers. They also organised themselves according to various roles, such as Soldiers and Police, among others. Under Yusuf's leadership, the sect first took up arms on 24 December 2003 when it attacked police stations and public buildings in the town of Geiam and Kanama in Yobe state.

In 2004, it established a base called "Afghanistan" in Kanama village in Northern Yobe state. The activities of the sect became more worrisome from 2004 when students, especially in tertiary institutions in Borno and Yobe states, withdrew from school, tore up their certificates and joined the group. On 21 September 2004, members attacked Bama and Gworza police stations in Borno state, killing several police men and stealing arms and ammunition. It maintained intermittent hit-and-run attacks on security post in some

parts of Borno and Yobe states until July 2009 when it provoked a major anti-government revolt in Nigeria (Onuoha, 2012).

The fighting lasted from 26 to 30 July 2009, across five northern states: Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Kastina and Yobe. The revolt ended when their leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was finally captured in his residence. After a few hours in police custody, Yusuf was brutally murdered in what appeared to have been an extrajudicial killing, although the police officials claimed that he was killed while trying to escape. Over 1000 persons, mainly the sect's members were also arrested and detained for formal trial.

Since the July 2009 revolt, the sect has evolved from a group that waged poorly planned open confrontation with state security forces to one that increasingly uses improvised explosive devices, guerrilla warfare, and targeted assassination and suicide bombings in its violent campaign. Unlike the poorly coordinated hit-and-run attacks of its earlier years, recent attacks are more coordinated, and are authorised by an 18-member Shura, led by its new spiritual leader, Imam Abubakar Shekau. Attacks have focused largely on state security forces- police, soldiers, civil defence, and prison wardens, among others- and to lesser extent on centres of worship, community and religious leaders, politicians and other civilians who they consider as "enemies". However, the attack on the United Nations building at Nigeria's capital city, Abuja, on 26th August 2011 marked a departure from Boko Haram's traditional target set of government facilities and indeed signpost the possibility of a change in target selection in the future.

Between July 2009 and January 2012, the Boko Haram conducted roughly 160 separate attacks, resulting in the death of over 1000 people and international displacement of

hundred others. It also claimed attacks that have killed more than 200 people since the start of 2012 (Onuoha, 2012). The attacks had occurred mainly in Maiduguri, the capital city of Borno state. However, several of such attacks for which the group has claimed responsibility, have occurred in Bauchi, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Niger, Plateau, and Yobe state and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja. The sect has concentrated its attack on mainly in northern Nigeria, although analyst feared that it may extend its attack to the Christian dominated South as security agencies firm up counterinsurgency operations against the sect in these Northern states. Its threat on January 2012, asking Southerners and Christians to leave the North within three days, although caused serious initial panic, failed to trigger mass exodus of Christians and Southerners for the fear of ethno-religious cleansing by the sect.

Particularly worrisome however of the evolving threat of Boko Haram is the inclusion of suicide bombing to its violent tactics. Since it mounted the first suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices attack at the Police Headquarters in the Federal Capital City, on 16 June 2011, the sect has staged at least six other suicide bombings, with huge death toll and destruction of property resulting from these attacks. For instance, a series of coordinated gun assaults and suicide bombing attacks by the sect on 20 January 2012 in the city of Kano, the capital of Kano state, killed at least 211 people.

The consequences of the Boko Haram insurgency have been grave. An obvious implication is the destruction of human lives. Other costs include internal displacement of people, wanton destruction of property, fracturing of family structure, discouraging of local and foreign investment, and damage to a country's image, among others.

Below is a timeline of various attacks resulting in deaths by the sect since 2009-2015.

Table 1: Major Incidents of Boko Haram Attacks since 2009 to 2015.

Date	Casualties
July 26, 2009	Boko Haram launches mass uprising with attack on a police station in Bauchi, starting a five-day uprising that spread to Maiduguri and elsewhere with more than 800 people dead.
July 27, 2009	Attack on Potiskum, Yobe State Divisional Police Headquarters 3 Police men and 1 fire service officer died.
September 7, 2010	Boko Haram attacked a prison in Bauchi, killed about five guards and freed over 700 inmates, including former sect members.
October 11, 2010	Bombing/gun attack on a police station in Maiduguri destroys the station and injures three by the group.
December 24, 2010	The group carried out a bomb attack in Jos killing 8 people.
December 28, 2010	Boko Haram claims responsibility for the Christmas Eve bombing in Jos that killed 38 people.
December 31, 2010	The group attacks a Mammy market at Army Mogadishu Barracks, Abuja, 11 people died.
April 1, 2011	The group attacked a police station in Bauchi.
April 9, 2011	The group attacked a polling center in Maiduguri and bombed it.
April 20, 2011	A bomb in Maiduguri kills a policeman.
April 22, 2011	The group attacked a prison in Yola and freed 14 prisoners.
April 24, 2011	Four bombs explode in Maiduguri, killing at least three.
May 29, 2011	Bombings of an army barracks in Bauchi city and Maiduguri and led to death of 15 people.
May 31, 2011	Gunmen assassinate Abba Anas Ibn Umar Garbai, brother of the Shehu of Borno, in Maiduguri.
June 1, 2011	The group killed Sheu of Borno's brother, Abba El-kanemi.
June 7, 2011	A team of gunmen launch parallel attacks with guns and bombs on a church and police stations in Maiduguri, killing 5 people.
June 16, 2011	Bombing of police headquarters in Abuja, claimed by Boko Haram. Casualty reports vary.
June 26, 2011	Gunmen shoot and bomb a bar in Maiduguri killing about 25 people.

August 16, 2011	The Bombing of United Nations Office in Abuja, killing over 34 people by the group.
December 25, 2011	Bombing of St. Theresa's Catholic Church, Madalla, killing over 46 people.
January 3, 2012	Boko Haram gunmen attack a police station in the town of Birniwa in Jigawa State killing a teenage girl and wounding a police officer.
January 5, 2012	Six worshippers are killed and 10 others wounded when Boko Haram gunmen attack a church in Gombe city.
January 6, 2012	The Sect attacked some southerners in Mubi killing about 13 Igbo.
January 7, 2012	Three Christian poker players are killed and seven others wounded by BH gunmen in the town of Biu.
January 9, 2012	Boko Haram gunmen shoot dead a secret police operative along with his civilian friend as they leave a mosque in Biu, Borno State, 200km south of the state capital, Maiduguri.
January 10, 2012	A Boko Haram attack on a beer garden kills eight, including five policemen and a teenage girl, in Damaturu, capital of Yobe State.
January 11, 2012	Four Christians killed by Boko Haram gunmen in Potiskum, Yobe State, when gunmen open fire on their car as they stop for fuel. The victims had been fleeing Maiduguri to their home town in eastern Nigeria.
January 13, 2012	Boko Haram kills four and injures two others, including a policeman, in two separate attacks in Yola (Adawama State) and Gombe city in neighbouring Gombe State.
January 17, 2012	Two soldiers and four BH gunmen are killed in an attack on a military checkpoint in Maiduguri, Borno State.
January 21, 2012	Multiple bomb blast rocked Kano city, claiming over 185 people.
January 22, 2012	Boko Haram attacked Bauchi, killing 11 people and injuring several others.
January 29, 2012	Bombing of Kano Police Station at Naibawa Area of Yakatabo.
February 3, 2012	Boko Haram attacked a police station in Kogi State killing four people.
February 8, 2012	Bomb blast rocked Army Headquarters in Kaduna.
February 15, 2012	Koton Karife Prison, Kogi State was attacked by the sect and about 119 prisoners were released and a warder was killed.

February 19, 2012	Bomb blast rocked Suleja Niger State near Christ Embassy Church, leaving 5 people seriously injured.
February 26, 2012	Bombing of Church of Christ in Nigeria, Jos leading to the death of about 2 worshippers & about 38 people sustained serious injuries.
March 8, 2012	An Italian, Franco Lamolinara and a Briton, Christopher McManus, who were Expatriate Staff of Stabilim Visioni Construction Firm were abducted in 2011 by a splinter group of Boko Haram and were later killed.
March 11, 2012	Bombing of St. Finbarr's Catholic Church, Rayfield, Jos resulting in the killing of 11 people and several others wounded.
March 24, 2012	Boko Haram attacked Kano killing two and injuring unspecified number of people.
April 8, 2012	Boko Haram attacked another church in Jos killing 20 and injuring several others.
April 8, 2012	Boko Haram attacked Kaduna killing 40 and injuring several others.
April 25, 2012	Boko Haram attacked Maiduguri Police Headquarters killing seven and injuring many.
April 26, 2012	Bombing of three media houses (Thisday Newspaper in Abuja killing 3 & 2 security officers & injured 13 people; Thisday, the Sun & the Moments newspapers in Kaduna killing 3 persons & injured many others.
April 29, 2012	Attack on Bayero University, Kano, killing 13 Christian Worshippers, a senior non-academic staff & two Professors.
April 30, 2012	Bomb explosion in Jalingo, claiming 11 persons and several others wounded.
June 3, 2012	Boko Haram attacked Bauchi killing 12 and injuring several others.
July 30, 2012	Boko Haram attacked Zaria killing 5 and injuring several others.
May 7, 2013	Boko Haram attacked Bama killing 55 and injuring several others.
July 6, 2013	Boko Haram attacked Yobe killing 42 people and injuring several others.
February 12, 2014	Boko Haram attacked Konduga killing 39 people and injuring several others.

February 16, 2014	Boko Haram attacked a village in Borno killing 90 and injuring several others.
February 19, 2014	Boko Haram attacked Bama killing 60 people and injuring several others.
February 25, 2014	Boko Haram attacked Buni Yadi killing 59 people and injuring several others.
March 1, 2014	Boko Haram attacked Maiduguri killing 51 people and injuring several others.
March 1, 2014	Boko Haram attacked Mainokri killing 39 people and injuring several others.
April 10, 2014	Boko Haram attacked Bala Balge killing 60 people and injuring several others.
April 10, 2014	Boko Haram attacked Dikwa killing 8 people and injuring several others.
April 14, 2014	Boko Haram in a twin bombing in Abuja kills 88 people and injured several others.
May 1, 2014	Boko Haram attacked Abuja killing 19 people and injuring several others.
May 5, 2014	Boko Haram attacked Gamboru Ngala killing several people and injuring several others.
May 18, 2014	Boko Haram attacked Kano killing 4 people and injuring several others.
May 20, 2014	Gunmen suspected to be Boko Haram attacked Jos killing 108 and injuring 56.
May 21, 2014	Boko Haram attacked Chikongudo killing 25 people and injuring several others.
May 25, 2014	Boko Haram attacked Yobe killing 54 people and injuring several others.
May 27, 2014	Boko Haram attacked Borno killing 48 people and injuring several others.
May 31, 2014	Boko Haram attacked Kala Balge killing 40 people and injuring several others.
June 1, 2014	Boko Haram attacked Mubi killing over 40 people and injuring many others.
June 2, 2014	Gwoza massacre , at least 200 are killed in several villages in Borno State by Boko Haram.
June 20-23, 2014	Borno State attacks , at 70 people are killed and 91 women and children kidnapped by Boko Haram militants in Borno State.
June 23, 2014	Boko Haram attacked the city of Kano killing over 12 people and injuring many others.
June, 28, 2014	11 people are killed by a bomb in Bauchi.

July 14, 2014	The insurgents descended on Borno killing over 26 people and injuring many others.
July 18, 2014	At least 18 are killed by a Boko Haram attack in Damboa, leaving the town almost destroyed.
July 22, 2014	Boko Haram killed 51 people in Chibok.
July 23, 2014	The Boko Haram insurgents attacked Kaduna killing about 39 people and injuring many others.
September 19, 2014	About 30 people were killed by Boko Haram militants at a busy market in Mainok, Borno State.
October 31, 2014	At least 4 people were killed, 32 injured and 13 vehicles destroyed by an explosion at a bus station in Gombe.
November 2, 2014	Kogi prison break , 99 inmates in Kogi State were freed by suspected Boko Haram rebels.
November 3-10, 2014	Yobe State attacks , a double suicide bombing in Yobe State kills 15 Shiites on the 3rd and 46 students on the 10th.
November 25, 2014	Over 45 people were killed by two suicide bombers in Maiduguri, Borno State.
November 27, 2014	About 50 people were killed in Damasak by Boko Haram militants.
November 28, 2014	Kano bombing , at least 120 Muslim followers of the Emir of Kano, Muhammad Sanusi II, were killed during a suicide bombing and gun attack by Boko Haram.
December 1, 2014	5 people were killed by two female suicide bombers who detonated explosions at a crowded market place in Maiduguri, Borno State.
December 10, 2014	At least 4 people were killed and 7 injured by female suicide bombers near a market in Kano.
December 11, 2014	30 people were killed and houses destroyed by Boko Haram militants in Gajiganna, Borno State.
December 13, 2014	Gumsuri kidnappings , between 32 and 35 were killed and between 172 and 185 were kidnapped by Boko Haram in Borno State.
December 22, 2014	Gombe bus station bombing , at least 27 people were killed at a bus station by a bomb in Gombe State.
10 th Jan, 2015	Female suicide bomber attacked Maiduguri Monday market killing about 4 people
25 th Jan, 2015	There was attacks with gunshots in Mongono town in Borno state. 8 people were killed
2 nd Feb, 2015	A car bomb blast in Gombe state after Jonathan rally. 18 people were killed

11 th Feb, 2015	Armed attacks on Chadian troops in Gamboru, 13 people were killed
17 th Feb, 2015	There was a bomb blast in Biu Borno state killing 37 people
26 th Feb, 2015	A suicide bomber attacked in Biu, Borno state killing 21 people.
3 rd March, 2015	94 people were killed in an armed attack in the North East region by suspected terrorists
7 th March, 2015	Multiple bomb blast in Maiduguri town of Borno state killing about 58 people and injuring about 139
9 th March, 2015	Armed attack on Adamawa community killed about 10 people
19 th March, 2015	Boko haram recaptured Gamboru killing 20 people
28 th March, 2015	Armed attack on northeast Nigeria killing 25 people
3 rd April, 2015	4 fisher men beheaded by terrorist at lake-Chad area Borno state
6 th April, 2015	60 people killed in an armed attack in Borno state
15 th April, 2015	Boko haram slit the throat of 12 people in Borno state
23 rd April, 2015	Boko haram recaptured some towns in Borno and killed about 40 people
28 th April, 2015	Armed attack and about 25 women captive shot dead in Borno state
13 th May, 2015	Armed attacks on Borno villages killing 55 people
16 th May, 2015	Armed attack village in Adamawa, 11 people were killed and 6 women abducted
23 rd May, 2015	Armed attack on Borno state which killed about 43 people
31 st May, 2015	Armed attack on Mungono in Borno state and 48 people were killed
2 nd June, 2015	There was a bomb blast at Maiduguri Monday market and about 50 people were killed

3rd June,2015	Bomb blast at Maiduguri 2 people were killed and 33 others injured
8th June, 2015	Army attack in a village in Borno killing 19 people.
22nd June, 2015	Bomb blast at a Maiduguri market, 30 people were killed
23rd June, 2015	A suicide bomber attacked in Borno state killing 20 people
1st July, 2015	Armed attack on Kukawa in Borno state and 118 people killed with many displaced
3rd July, 2015	Armed attack by fleeing terrorists in Borno killing 29 people
10th July, 2015	Armed attack in Mungono, Borno state killing 45, scores injured
16th July, 2015	Twin bomb blast at Gombe main market killing 50people
17th July, 2015	Bomb blast and armed attack at prayer ground in Damaturu, Yobe state, 50 people were killed
22nd July, 2015	Bomb blast at Gombe state capital, 37 people were killed
27th July, 2015	Armed attack on a Borno and 29 people were killed
1st August,2015	Armed attack on Borno community, 13 people killed
11thAugust,2015	Bomb explosion and abduction in Borno, 47 people were killed and 8 women were abducted
18thAugust,2015	Armed attack on fleeing Yobe residents 160 killed
28thAugust,2015	Armed attack on horseback in Borno village and 68 people were killed
31stAugust,2015	A suicide bomber attacked a mosque in Maiduguri killing 26 people
3rd Sept, 2015	Armed attack in Borno state, 53 people were killed
4th Sept, 2015	Armed attack in Borno state, 30 people were killed
20th Sept, 2015	There was a bomb blast in Maiduguri, 117 people were killed
1st Oct, 2015	Armed attack in Adamawa state, 11 people were killed
1stOct, 2015	Armed attack in Gwoza, Borno state, 20 people were killed

6 th Oct, 2015	Bomb explosion at Gubio mosque in Yobe and 20 people were killed
15 th Oct, 2015	Bomb blast on worshippers in a Maiduguri mosque, 35 people were killed
23 rd Oct, 2015	Suicide attack at a Maiduguri mosque, 28 people were killed
23 rd Oct, 2015	Bomb blast at a Yola mosque killing 50 people
17 th Nov, 2015	Bomb blast in Yola Adamawa state, 34 people were killed
20 th Nov, 2015	Armed attack at Rika village, Yobe state, 7 people were killed
12 th Dec, 2015	Armed attacks on three north east villages and 30 people were killed
15 th Dec, 2015	Soldiers were ambushed in Borno state and two people were killed
25 th Dec, 2015	Bomb blast in Borno , 14 people were killed

Sources: Punch 30th April, 2012, p8; Punch, 27 April, 2012 p.2; *Reuters* November, 10, 2014; Musa, N. (2009); *The Guardian*. September 20, 2009. P.5; *Muscat* 6, December 2015.

2.2.6 The Boko Haram and its External Connections

The world is fast changing today. Every society is now associated with one terrorist group or the other. The ugly phenomenon of terrorism became known in the world in the 1970s, especially with the 1972 Black septembist kidnapping of Jews athletes during the Munich Olympic, and plane hijacking that led to the Israeli raid on Entebbe Airport in 1976 to free Jewish hostages. However, with the end of the cold war and the collapse of the soviet power and other communist party regimes in the Eastern Europe, a new set of terrorism has come to be added to those old ones. Islamic fundamentalist is now been

talked about as the source of the terrorist menace troubling today's world, and deliberately aimed at filling the void created by the collapse of internal communism.

In Nigeria, terrorist organizations can generally be described to have been created as a result of the perceived constant marginalization of a certain group of people. Numerous of these organizations in Nigeria include *Oodua* People's Congress(OPC), The Anambra Vigilance Service(Bakassi Boys), Egbesu Boys of Africa, *Arewa* People's Congress(ACP), Operation Zaki- Zaki and Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) among others. Of recent, there is the *Boko Haram*. The name "Boko" was derived from "Boka" or sorcerer-a character associated with shirk which is an automatic act of disbelief and the most repugnant act of Islam. With the foregoing analysis, we have established the fact that terrorism exists in Nigeria. Besides, recently, the United States of America (USA) classified Nigeria along other countries as Yemen, Iran, and Pakistan among others as terrorist countries (Kola, 2009).

However, *Boko Haram* does not exist in isolation. Evidence exists to suggest that there are links between international Terrorist organization such as Al-Qaeda and *BokoHaram*. Recently, the American Government declared three leaders of *Boko Haram*- Abubakar Shekau, Abubakar Kambar and Khalid Al-Barmawi global terrorist for their role within the *Boko Haram* group and close links with Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb. Middle men connect the groups in the country with the members of Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is fast establishing its presence in non-Arab of West Africa countries. Evidence also exist that there is a link between *Boko Haram* and Al Shahab in the Arabian Peninsula and Somalia. As of March 2010, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb confessed of helping Nigerian extremists with training and weapons to confront the Nigerian state. The group

was reputed to have said that ‘‘We are ready to train your people in weapons and give you whatever support we can in men, arms and munitions to enable defend our people in Nigeria’’. This was corroborated when about 100 foreigners in custody in Nigeria were linked with *Boko Haram* activities in Nigeria. Most of these people were from Niger Republic, Chad, Mali and some North African countries. In another development, the foreign affairs minister of the Niger Republic, Bazoum stated that sufficient link existed between *Boko Haram* and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, stating further that the *Boko Haram* got weapons and training from abroad. Information also revealed that the group also known as *Al- Muntada* Trust Fund with headquarters in the United Kingdom is financially assisting the sect. Besides, the sect is also receiving funds from Islamic World Society with headquarters in Saudi Arabia. Associated with funding and the training perspective, the former Chief of Army Staff, Lt General Azubuike Ihejirika during the Army Headquarters Command Mess at Abuja pointed out that from all indications, the type of weapon and communication equipment captured from the insurgents showed that there was a foreign involvement in the terrorism in Nigeria.

2.2.7 Boko Haram Sect and Nigeria’s External Relations

The *Boko Haram* without any shadow of doubt is linked to Al-Qaeda. Armed with the mission to subvert democracy in Nigeria, the sect started to unleash terror on Nigerians beginning with July 26, 2009 which was the first clash with security agencies in Bauchi state after an all-night attack on Dutsen- Tanshi Police station in which 39 members, 2 policemen and one soldier were killed. Terrorist attacks through *Boko Haram* have much impact on foreign countries’ policy and foreign relations. Many Nigerian nationals and

foreign nationals had lost their lives due to the attack of this sect. The sect has added another dimension to its attack which is the bombing of strategic areas.

The Federal Capital City, Abuja had a taste of this bombing by October 1 2010. This was followed by the bomb blast that occurred at Louis Edet House, Headquarters of the Nigerian Police. In a similar occurrence, there was the Mogadishu Barracks Bomb blast and to climax it all, there was the United Nations Office bombing that took the lives of at least 23 persons. Also recently, a British hostage Chris McManus and his Italian counterpart, Franco Lamolinara were killed by the Nigerian terrorists. The latter event prompted President Goodluck Jonathan to formally write to both the Prime Ministers of Britain and Italy, David Cameron and Mario to express sympathy with them on the death of these nationals. Touched by the monumental destructions of the *Boko Haram*, the Nigerian Government had decided to tackle the activities of Boko- Haram through bilateral and multilateral relations.

2.2.7.1 The Bilateral Relations

On Tuesday February 28, 2012, the Nigerian Government and the republic of Cameroon signed an agreement of Trans-border security team with Cameroon. Sources disclosed that the pact was part of the measures to curb the surge in the activities of *Boko Haram*. The sources added that the text of the agreement between the two countries would fight terrorism jointly. The former Nigeria foreign affairs Minister, Ambassador Olusegun Ashiru stated that Nigeria was committed to the pact, full implementation, and realization of its objectives in the interest of progress, peace and security of the people of the two countries believing that Cameroon would also demonstrate the same commitment.

Speaking on the pact, Alhaji Amadou Ali of Cameroun said the agreement showed that confidence had been restored through permanent dialogue, consultation and reinforcement of cooperation between both countries (Adali, 2013).

In another related development, Nigeria and Niger Republic signed an agreement for the immediate commencement of joint border patrols along the borders between the two neighbouring countries to curb the activities of the Islamic Religious sect, *Boko Haram*. The agreement was signed in Niamey the capital of Niger Republic. Similarly another bilateral agreement existed between Nigeria and Britain. The British foreign Secretary, Mr. Williams Hague pledged the assistance of Britain to Nigeria to fight the terrorist attacks following the bombing of United Nations (UN) headquarters at Abuja. In his words “The UK stands ready to provide any assistance we can to the UN and Nigerian authorities to bring those responsible to justice.

Other countries of the world that had bilateral relations with Nigeria on the menace of *Boko Haram* include Italy, Germany and Israel. Italy government had offered to provide security services to the federal government. A special envoy of the Italian Minister of foreign Affairs, Hon.Margherita Boniver while meeting with the Deputy Senate President Ike Ekweremadu stated that Italy would strengthen bilateral relations with Nigeria to help tackle terrorism, human trafficking and poverty. In the same vein, former president Jonathan had equally called on German government to deploy German technology to track down the terror group. The state of Israel had also pledged to Nigeria to combat the terrorist group. This was disclosed by Israel’s Ambassador to Nigeria, Moshe Ram.

2.2.7.2 The Multilateral Relations

Continued destruction of lives and properties perpetrated by the *Boko- Haram* in Nigeria has attracted much sympathy. Many countries of the world had expressed their willingness to assist Nigeria to curb the menace of the sect. The enthusiasm on the part of these countries stems from the fact that, the nationals from different countries of the world come to Nigeria. These nationals live in Nigeria and some are doing business or just as tourists to Nigeria.

However, at the multilateral level, President Jonathan attended an international conference in the United Kingdom in which some members of the international communities debated measures and steps to be effectively adopted to check the unprecedented growth of terrorism and violence in some African nations like Somalia and Nigeria.

At the sub-regional level members of the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) unanimously agreed at waging a relentless war against terrorists who migrate from neighboring nations to launch attack on Nigerian soil, several countries of this community (ECOWAS) recently reiterated this support for the country. Also worried by the incessant attacks, threats, killings by the Boko Haram sect activities in Nigeria, the World Council of Churches (WCC) from Geneva and the Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought (RAABIT) from Jordan, and many more religious leaders from other parts of the world. These bodies arrived at Abuja on May 22, 2012 with the aim of finding solution to the Boko Haram menace. The delegation visited different places including Kaduna and Jos, and in concluding their tour, the body stated that:

Nigeria is no doubt confronted with a new dimension of security problem as that of Boko Haram looms large on the horizon. Several lives had been claimed including those of foreign nationals. Rather than the ferocity of Boko Haram to decrease, it has unabatedly worsened. The reason for this is not farfetched; Osama Bin Laden had in a recorded statement identified Nigeria as an important arena for Al-Qaeda. Laden's statement was confirmed by Farouk Abdulmutallab, a young Nigerian who tried to ignite an explosive device in his underwear as the aircraft approached Detroit in December 2009. Seeing that the threat posed by Boko Haram cannot be solved by sovereign State of Nigeria alone, she had decided to solve this through both bilateral and multilateral moves. These efforts are designed to bring co-operation between Nigeria and her counterpart country at one hand and between Nigeria and among other nations of the world at the other hand. It is strongly believed that these efforts will go a long way if adequately utilized to remove the insecurity posed by Boko Haram (Gilbert, 2014).

2.3 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework for this study is anchored on linkage theory. The linkage theory in foreign policy analysis establishes the link between domestic processes and the external situation towards which foreign policy is aimed at. The linkage is considered by many scholars of foreign policy as a theory that defines a nation's foreign policy on the basis of strength of her internal political dynamics. The theory states that a nation's foreign policy is informed by what happens at the corridors of the nation's geographical location.

Commenting on the importance of domestic processes on the understanding of dynamics of foreign policy, Rosenau (1967) a major proponent of the study stated that domestic factors may be of considerable significance even if they are not primary sources of foreign policy and on some issues they may well be dominant.

Rosenau defined the linkage concept as "any recurrent sequence of behaviour that originates in one system and is reacted to in another" (Rosenau, 1967). He saw this

concept as a superior tool in analysing foreign policy. The linkage has two important features: they are the general context it provides for a link to be established between the domestic situation of a country, and the external environment in which foreign policy is analysed in general (Birai, 1996). The idea of linkage between the internal (domestic) situation and external environment allows for an analysis that adequately examines the extent to which interaction between the two environments can constitute a hindrance to the formulation of an effective foreign policy. Secondly, the linkage approach also provides a specific context for identifying the extent to which specific forces can positively or negatively impinge on the achievement of a given policy (Birai, 1996). Holsti also stressed the importance of the domestic environment on the formulation and implementation of foreign policy thus:

We can attempt to explain the behaviour of states by reference not just to the external environment but primarily to the domestic conditions that affect policy making. Many goals of diplomatic actions can be viewed as the results of domestic political pressure, national ideologies, public opinions or economic and social needs (Holsti, 1977:7).

The domestic variables that affects foreign policy includes environmental factors such as size, geographical location, type of terrain and resources of nation states. Political, economic, social needs and national attributes and social systems of a nation state are other attributes that seriously affect foreign policy making. Considering political variables, at the leadership level, the type of a leader a country has will determine to a certain degree the context and contour of its foreign policy. According to a former US Secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, a charismatic leader pursues a revolutionary oriented policy at the domestic level and a radical foreign policy at the international level, Nigeria

under the Late General Murtala Mohammed would be associated with this style of foreign policy.

Rosenau's work which defines Linkage Politics as the recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to in another basically situates the Boko Haram activities in Nigeria which has continued to attract reactions beyond Nigeria. Touched by the degree of monumental destruction of lives and properties perpetrated by the Boko Haram, the world religious bodies comprising the World Council of Churches (WCC) from Geneva and Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic thought (RAABIT) from Jordan with many religious leaders from many parts of the world came to Nigeria to find solution to the problem of Boko Haram. Again, both the United States of America (USA) and the Chief Prosecutor of International Criminal Court (ICC), Mrs Fatou Bensouda had expressed deep concern about the activities of the sect in Nigeria.

The description of what we have given above shows that there is causal relationship between what happens in a policy and its environments. The use of Linkage Politics in international politics is significant in understanding any event in our global system. For examples, the internal political process of a Latin American country cannot be understood properly without putting into consideration the role of the United States of America (USA). Also, the *coup d'etat* in Liberia which brought late Samuel Doe to power sparked off reactions worldwide.

Three types of linkage forms can be identified. These are penetrative, reactive and emulative. The penetrative linkage occurs when members of one polity serve as participants in the political process of another. There are many instances of penetrative

linkage politics in the international scene. Examples include the activities of the Cuban forces in Angola and that of Libyan soldiers in Chad. Others are staff of international organisations, the diplomatic agents, foreign aid missions and also representatives on multinational corporations getting involved in domestic political process.

Penetrative linkage is followed by reactive linkage which involves response and adjustment to polity output emanating from elsewhere. Thus during the June 12 annulment of election in Nigeria, the United States reacted by suspending non-humanitarian assistance to Nigeria. In the same vein, during the Middle East War in 1973, the Arab Oil States imposed embargo on supply of oil to the United States, and the Netherlands also decreased their production. This development prompted the European Community to issue a declaration that recognized the rights of the Palestinians. Many Western Countries adopted multiparty democracy today as a condition for granting aid to African Countries.

The third is the emulative linkage which is established when the input takes the same form as the output. For instance, it is observed that most of the things done by developing countries relating to political, social and economic are the same with what exist in developed polities. For examples, the Nigeria's cabinet system of Government was fashioned after the British System of Government and likewise, the Nigerian Presidential System of Government was fashioned after that of the United States of America (USA).

2.3.1 Relevance of the theory

The current security situation in Nigeria is a drag on its foreign policy stand because Nigeria's ability to command respect in the international system depends to a large extent

on the country's domestic condition. In other words, the current security challenge posed by the Boko Haram and Nigeria's failure to properly address the menace puts the country in a bad light internationally. Security is one of the most cardinal functions of any state, the inability of a state to maintain internal security jeopardises the chance to ward off external threats. In translation, this means that Nigeria's inability to tackle domestic security challenges impinges her drive to pursue radical external policies on security.

The linkage theory best explains this phenomenon as it examines the interconnectedness of domestic conditions and its influence on foreign policy formulation. Linkage Politics stresses the interdependence of domestic and international systems. It peeps into the perennial problems relating to the connection between domestic politics and foreign policy by taking the spheres of national and international politics as interacting system.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design

The study made use of descriptive research design to enable proper understating of the study findings under investigation. The main aim of descriptive design is to describe the event in question using the resulting data to explain the given situation. Research design refers to the overall strategy that a researcher chooses to integrate the different components of his study in a coherent and logical way, thereby, ensuring the research problem is effectively addressed; it constitutes the blueprint for the collection, measurement, and analysis of data. Research problem determines the type of design one can use in carrying out a research.

3.2 Method of Data Collection

By method of data collection, we are referring to the various means through which appropriate information needed for this study was sourced. There are mainly two sources for the collection of data i.e primary and secondary.

Given the nature of this study especially the type of data required to interrogate our propositions, we utilized secondary sources of data collection. Secondary sources of data refer to a set of data gathered or authored by another person, usually textbooks, journals articles conference papers, newspapers and magazines and internet documents and other survey evidence or empirical study by researchers..

Data for the study was also generated data from existing reports of both local and international observers, groups and reports on the terrorist activities as it regard to Boko Haram sect, articles published in journals, books among others.

3.3 Technique for Data Analysis

To analyze the data collected in this study, the content analysis approach was utilized. This approach is a data analysis method used primarily in qualitative social research. It is one of the most common methods used in qualitative data analysis. Content analysis as a research method is a systematic and objective means of describing and quantifying phenomena (Krippendorff, 1980; Sandelowski, 1995). It is also known as a method of analysing documents. Content analysis allows the researcher to test theoretical issues to enhance understanding of the data. Through content analysis, it is possible to distil words into fewer contentrelated categories. It is assumed that when classified into the same categories, words, phrases and the like share the same meaning (Cavanagh, 1997).

Content analysis is a research method for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context, with the purpose of providing knowledge, new insights, a representation of facts and a practical guide to action (Krippendorff, 1980).

3.4 Justification of Methods

The use of documentaries in this study is by every standard significant, considering the fact that, there is course for all to worry about the spate of security challenges in Nigeria and the world at large. This method also allowed the researcher on areas where he cannot have access to the respondents and this cannot study what is concerned with decisions

and dispositions among government officials. This goes on to rule out the possibilities of using survey methods like questionnaire and interview methods. Irrespective of the above argument, interview and questionnaire would have been conducted, but the actors may decline to respond. Reliable and expressible documents are capable of bringing the significant information which cannot be gotten through other methods. The issue is that where reliable documents exist, generalization appear more reliable than those emanating from limited data from the primary source. Another justification is that this method assist in collecting data stored in files, government archives, libraries, bookshops, internets and other international documents.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Data Presentation

4.1.1 Internalization of Boko Haram Terrorist Activities

The growing spread of Boko Haram insurgent's choice of attack on international institution and foreign nationals in Nigeria, and its affiliation with other regional and global terrorist groups, is an indication that the sect has 'foreign ambition' and links with other terrorists' bodies with international reach. Prior to 2011, the terrorist activities of Boko Haram within the Nigerian state manifests in various forms using bombs and or guns to attack public institutions such as Nigeria police stations, army barracks, prisons, churches, and schools. However, In August 2011, the group pursued an international objective for the first time by attacking an international institution, the United Nations' Headquarters in Abuja in suicide bombing attacks. After the attack, which killed 23 and injured 80, videos of the alleged suicide bomber were released. In the videos, the attacker praised Osama bin Laden, who American forces killed three months earlier, and referred to the UN as "a forum of all the global evil (Elkaim, 2013).

The incident was much more in line with other globalist terrorist organizations, and is strongly reminiscent of the suicide attack in Baghdad against the United Nations in August 2003, which was one of the opening blows of the Iraqi insurgency. Many experts on terrorism believes that the group's suicide bombing on 26 August 2011 that destroyed the UN building in Nigeria's capital, Abuja, reveals its link with al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). Before the attack, an internal Nigerian intelligence document had discussed possible links between Boko haram and AQIM. General Carter Ham, the general in front

of United States African Command (AFRICOM) speculated that Boko Haram might want to establish partnership with the Somali terrorist group, Al-Shabaab, in addition to AQIM. In January 2010, the leader of AQIM, Abd al-Malik Droukdal, released a statement offering to provide training and material assistance to Boko Haram (U.S African command 2012).

Another international attack occurred in March of this year, when Nigerian forces, with the assistance of British Special Boat Services (SBS) failed in a joint rescue attempt to free westerners, a British and an Italian citizen, who have been held captive since May 2011. The sum of Boko Haram's tactical evolution points to cooperation with ideologically similar groups that operate throughout Africa. Until they implemented the use of suicide bombings, only Al-Shabaab in Somalia and AQIM had used the tactic in Africa (Soria, 2012). This development has increased in importance because Boko Haram's use of explosives has reportedly grown increasingly sophisticated and bears hallmarks of bomb-making techniques used by Al Qaeda affiliates. The Republic of Niger's Foreign Minister, Mohamed Bazoum, on 25th January 2011 notes that, many experts on terrorism believes that the group's suicide bombing on 26 August 2011 that destroyed the UN building in Nigeria's capital, Abuja, reveals its link with al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). Before the attack, an internal Nigerian intelligence document had discussed possible links between Boko haram and AQIM. General Carter Ham, the general in front of United States African Command (AFRICOM) speculated that Boko Haram might want to establish partnership with the Somali terrorist group, Al-Shabaab, in addition to AQIM. In January 2010, the leader of AQIM, Abd al-Malik Droukdal,

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Do not think jihad is over, "Rather jihad has just begun. O America, die with your fury." In December 2012, Shekau praised Al Qaeda and said he and his fighters support the global jihad in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Chechnya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Algeria, Libya, and Mali. Documents seized at Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan in May 2011 showed that top-level Boko Haram leaders have been in touch with al Qaeda (Boggio, 2013).

Boko Haram is known to receive support from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and from Shabaab, an al Qaeda affiliate in East Africa. In the same vein, Boko Haram's spokesman, Abu Qaqa while speaking via phone to a handful of reporters on November 2011 noted:

We are together with al Qaeda...they are promoting the cause of Islam, just as we are doing. Therefore they help us in our struggle and we help them, too (Reuter, 2012).

According to Boggle, (2013), it has been alleged that Boko Haram has training base in the north of Mali as well as strong ties with the Tuaregs of Mali. In August 2013, it was reported that Boko Haram was among a number of jihadist groups such as the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, that participated in a series of communications with the top leadership of al Qaeda, which included Ayman al Zawahiri and Nasir al Wuhayshi, al Qaeda's general manager (Boggle, 2013). Further, the kidnapping of European citizens was interpreted as a clear sign of Boko Haram's shift to the adoption of classic al-Qaeda-style methods and tactics, and underscores their augmented ideology where they have essentially bought into the latter's narrative and cause. These occurrences, along with the creation of martyrdom videos and sophisticated, multi-location bombings (Thomson, 2012: 15), as well as AQIM leader Abdel Wadoud's announcement of support, clearly indicate the presence of cross-border and inter-organizational cooperation between al-Qaeda affiliates. Bodansky, (2010) noted that AQIM leader Abdel Wadoud stressed that the entire global jihadist movement affiliated with al- Qaeda, and not just AQIM, was committed to markedly expanding presence and operations in sub-Saharan Africa

because it provides for “strategic depth that would give the jihadists a bigger scope for maneuvers”.

It believed that it would be impossible for al-Qaeda to operate in West Africa without gaining a solid foothold in Nigeria, the region's leading power, leaving Boko Haram perfectly placed to profit from its increased importance (Bodansky, 2010). These disturbing developments, along with new evidence that Boko Haram is attempting to morph into a regional entity, with members and recruitment efforts across Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Mali, are likely factor in the United States Africa Command's (AFRICOM) decision to include Nigeria in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) (Elkaim, 2013). Further, the United States has recently taken preliminary steps to address the threat that Boko Haram poses to international security, by designating three of the group's members, Abubakar Shekau, Abubakar Adam Kamar, and Khalid al-Barna as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) in June 2012. In November 2013, the US government added Boko Haram to its list of terror groups 17 months after placing Abubakar Shekau, the emir of the Nigerian jihadist outfit, and two other operatives on the list of global terrorists. Boko Haram and its splinter group Ansaru were listed as number 52 and 53 respectively, on the foreign terrorist group (Boggle, 2013).

4.2 Data Analysis and Results

4.2.1 Impact of Boko Haram Activities on Nigeria's External Image

Nigeria's image in the comity of nations is very relevant in the direction of its external relations, because it determines the quality of respect she earns from other states and

other shareholders in the global community. The respect and acceptance that a nation holds globally is dependent on the core value that it upholds, the effective management of her domestic affairs and the promotion of her citizen's interests as well as the conduct of her external relations (Kehinde, 2008 cited in Adefuye, 2013). Unfortunately, the activities of Boko Haram have serious implication on Nigeria's external relations and have affected the perception of Nigeria's image.

The implications of Boko Haram on Nigeria's external relations are enormous especially has it manifested in the diminishing image of Nigeria in the comity of nations. First and foremost, the listing of Boko Haram group as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United States of America and Canada has led to a renewed campaign of calumny against Nigeria in which many western nations have advised their nationals to desist from travelling to Nigeria, especially the North East region where suicide bombing, kidnapping and killings has become rife. The United States and most European countries through their embassies in Nigeria has constantly issue travel warning to their citizens not to visit the north-eastern part of the country and Abuja, particularly after the killing of a British hostage Chris McManus and his Italian counterpart, Franco Lamolinara by the Boko Haram sect. In another vein, the designation of Boko Haram and its splinter group, Ansaru sects as Foreign Terrorists Organizations (FTO) by the United States of America and Canada, implies that Nigeria has now be grouped along with such terrorist states as Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, Libya, Iran and Iraq, to mention but a few; where people lives in perpetual fear, and indeed, where people lives in Hobbesian state of nature where life is "short, brutish and nasty". The implications remain that, the

collective will and support needed by Nigeria in her quest of becoming a respected player in global politics is being daunted by the negative image of being a terrorist state.

Another dimension to the image problems occasioned by the Boko Haram insurgency is the suspicion of most Nigerians at international airports in some countries, *as they are subjected to intense scrutiny before being allowed to board the flight*. As Adefuye (2013) posits that with the designation of Boko Haram and Ansaru as Foreign Terrorist Organisations, Nigerians are likely to be subjected to further travel restrictions to the United States and Canada. Another pointer to this global ostracism, also manifested in the American president, Barrack Hussein Obama's first visit to the Sub Saharan Africa, in which he choose Ghana, in place of Nigeria and in his all exciting speech to a large crowd of Ghanaian in Accra, including top government functionaries of the host country and Nigeria. The erudite president simply advised all the states in the sub-Saharan Africa to learn from Ghana, that is Nigeria inclusive. The choice of President Obama's visit to Ghana instead of Nigeria was considered as a major diplomatic failure for the Nigerian state, particularly judging by its size, resource endowments and its laudable leadership roles, over time, on the continent of Africa.

The crisis in the North East region, has continued to attract negative attention globally, especially by international right groups and humanitarian bodies like Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HURIWA), who have all written at various times damaging reports on the activities of the Nigerian state, especially as it concerns the North East region. This barrage of criticism to a very large extent has the potentials of reducing Nigeria to a pariah state among the comity of nations. The kidnap of 300

Chibok school girls to Sambisa forest, opened a new vista in the activities of Boko Haram and its implication on Nigeria's external image, as the kidnap draw the attention of the whole world and this led to the famous global campaign of "Bring Back our Girls". The kidnap of the school girls and the crisis within the Armed forces that led to the dismissal of some officers from the frontline exposed the weaknesses of the counter terrorist measures of the Nigerian government before the world. The above made analysts, the world over, to begin to see Nigeria as a 'failed state'. A state which lacks the potential of providing security of live and prosperity as well as inability to meet its constitutional mandate of providing basic amenities of life to its citizens.

Furthermore, Nigeria's status in Africa and international organizations continued to be threatened, the activities of the insurgent groups has negative implications on the big brother's role Nigeria play to other African nations, preaching and promoting peace, equity and justice, ethnic terrorism have sent a wrong signal. Therefore, her status as the 'giant' of Africa is at stake. This situation, Bariledum (2013) observes, made some countries in Africa to contest the leadership position with the country. For every available position in which Nigeria has an interest, there are usually some other countries which compete with her and, in some instance defeating the nation due to the image problem. Nigeria has lost important positions such as the ADB, on two occasions (1995 & 2006) Morocco and Rwanda had respectively defeated Nigeria for the ADB's presidency. In the same vein, the quest for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council is also threatened, as other contending states are assumed to be more stable in nature, politically, economically, socially, militarily.

Again, the capacity of the Nigerian military is questionable which is supposed to be boosting factor for the vibrancy of a state foreign policy. Due to the claims by the militias of strategic combat successes recorded against the states represented by the Nigeria military, the Nigeria military has severally been termed “sitting ducks” by the insurgent group. In agreement with this, the Cable News Network (CNN) in February 2014 corroborated with the above, that the insurgent group are having a field day conquering the Nigerian military. The Federal Government denied the report as bias and untrue. This necessitated government’s cancellation of her image laundering Heart of Africa project with CNN, compelling state government to do same. In the same vein, Nigeria has been predicted to be the next Afghanistan by an analyst from the west, Layinan Princeton, if the insurgent group is not comprehensively contained. Also worthy of note is the fact that when Hilary Clinton visited the country a period that coincided with the Boko Haram crisis, she warned against Al -Qaeda in Nigeria (Kemi, 2009) and this has manifested with Boko Haram pledging allegiance to ISIS.

The continued attacks of the Boko Haram sect and its breakaway faction, Ansaru, has come to challenge the sovereignty of the Nigerian state and thus portray Nigeria as not being on top of the crisis; a thing that has given Nigeria further negative image among the comity of nations. Such negative image could rub off on its nationals outside of the country. The incessant Boko Haram insurgency has made many Nigerians in the affected states to flee from the troubled areas for fear of further attacks, thus becoming refugees in their own country as many of the citizens of the troubled states had to flee to other states for fear of being victim of Boko Haram attacks; others are fleeing to neighbouring

countries of Niger, Chad and Northern Cameroon. This does not augur well for Nigeria's external image.

The unfolding crises of security occasioned by Boko Haram have far-reaching implications for the country's international politics, diplomacy and economic development. The spates of hostilities particularly bombing of houses, schools, government agencies in the Northern Nigeria are on the extreme. This situation demonstrates largely, the collapse of security in Nigeria which has further battered Nigeria's image. In this circumstance, most countries, especially America and Britain that are critical to the realization of Nigeria's developmental quest and relevance in the global politics had warned her citizens not to travel to North eastern part of Nigeria, while those working in the affected areas were advised to leave immediately. The activities of Boko Haram have adversely affected the inflow of foreign investment into Nigeria's solid mineral sector in the northern part of Nigeria as Daewoo; oil servicing companies, Julius Berger Construction giant, among others have pulled out their operations from the region, and prefer other African neighbouring countries, as a result of the insecurity situation. Similarly, the annual Kaduna international trade fair held in 2015 can be termed unsuccessful as almost the entire international stand was empty.

4.2.2 Boko Haram and Multilateral Relations

Ever since Islamist movements such as the Boko Haram began to challenge the security of States in Northern Nigeria, especially in the aftermath of September 11 Terrorist attack in New York, US defence and intelligence officials have focused on such Islamic groups in Nigeria and their potential to threaten US National security. This concern is understandable, given that terrorism poses a serious threat to the processes of liberal democracy, and States are expected to act decisively to curb terrorist groups (Lodge, 1981; Gause, 2005; Le Sage, 2007). One assessment conducted jointly by the Department of Defence and USAID in 2006 concluded that it ‘found little evidence that there is an active and growing terrorist threat in Northern Nigeria’(Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2006:2).

Following the July 2009 revolts and 9/7 jail break, concerns again resurfaced over whether the sect has turned into a sleeper terrorist cell. Some Observers contend that the sect is merely is a bunch of disgruntled and impressionable youth who ventilate their frustration at governance failure and corruption in Nigeria using a platform provided by radical Islamic teachers. Shortly after the July 2009 uprising, an analyst concluded that ‘there is no evidence of any link between Boko Haram and international terrorist networks such as al-Qaida’ (Schulze, 2009). Despite these conclusions, others contend that the sect has links with international terror networks, given that some of its members had received training in Afghanistan and Mauritania (known to be terrorist enclaves) just before the July 2009 uprising.

In this wise, the activities if the sect have continued to generate concern within academic and intelligence circles. An American Scholar, for instance, has recently warned that the platform for certain Islamic movements provide extremist ideologist in Africa can also create an Incubator for international terrorist. If not properly engaged, he argues, 'Africa's active Islamist movement pose a serious danger to security at the individual, national and international level' (Delvin-Foltz, 2010:2). This conclusion was drawn from an insightful examination and comparison of the nature of States' responses to Islamist movement operating in Algeria, Egypt, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Somalia.

Misguided policies to curb the activities of emergent Islamic movement have either further radicalize them or, at worst, pushed them to form an alliance with more established terror networks. The emergence of AQIM from remnants of Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat or Salafiste Group for Preaching and Combat in Algeria, known by its French acronym GSPC, is a case in point. In the case of Algeria, the use of a combination of oppression and amnesty by the Algerian government pushed moderate Islamist away from violence. However, the repressive component of that policy unintentionally drove the most extreme Islamist within the GSPC to join Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network, forming AQIM in 2006 (Le Sage, 2007; Delvin-Foltz, 2010; Okereke, 2010).

Given the global reach of international terror networks such as the al-Qaeda and the changing security environment in West Africa occasioned by the emergence of more franchise terror groups such as AQIM operating across the Sahara Desert in Mauritania, Morocco, Mali, and Niger, apprehension is fast growing among the Western diplomats that a Nigerian sleeper terrorist cell may be emerging (Fabiya, 2008; Walker, 2009).

Nigerian porous borders with Niger Republic, where AQIM is operating have actually sharpened such fears. Worthy of note in this regard is the alleged declaration in March 2010 by the Boko Haram, that it is joining al-Qaeda to avenge the murder of some of its members and leaders in a series of explosions across Nigeria (the Jihadi Website Monitoring Group, 2010, p.14). Although the authenticity of this announcement can neither be confirmed nor disproved, the expression of interest in June 2010 by AQIM to assist the Boko Haram in staging attacks on Nigeria further complicates the emerging terrorist landscape in Nigeria.

In an interview with Al Jazeera on 14 June 2010, AQIM leader Abu Musab Abd al-Wadoud claimed that his group has been talking to the Boko Haram and intends to supply it with weapons to ‘defend Muslims in Nigeria and stop the advance of a minority of crusaders’ (Stratfor, 2010). He further noted that al-Qaeda has an interest in sub-saharan Africa for ‘its strategic depth that would give it a bigger scope for manoeuvres’. Analyst, however, had dismissed the intent of AQIM to bond with Boko Haram as mere wishful thinking or rhetoric, arguing that ‘issuing statements claiming an alliance is easier than actually creating a meaningful accord, and several factors complicate AQIM’s intent to move into Nigeria’ (Stratfor 2010). Whether AQIM could or have managed to gain such an alliance with the Boko Haram remains to be seen, but such expression of interest surely opens a window of opportunity that can be exploited by global Jihadist to gain foothold in Nigeria. In the wake of the 9/7 jail break, a Western military pundit alleged that the Boko Haram ‘have aligned themselves with al-Qaeda’ (Shaw, 2010). Any existing or future bonding between the Nigerian extremist and AQIM or indeed any foreign established terror network will certainly not be unprecedented, as:

Al-Qaeda and more generally the global jihadist movement, have repeatedly attempted to hijack conflicts that were largely nationalistic (local) in nature and turn them, both rhetorically and operationally into battlefields of what they perceive to be a millenarian and global conflict between Islam and the World of infidelity. Local actors might maintain some of their parochial agendas, but by putting themselves under the banner of the global jihadist movement they benefit from outside support in terms of funding, recruits, propaganda, and military expertise. The global jihadist movement also benefit, as it can expand its influence and add credibility to its narrative that Islam is under attack from non-Muslims (Vidino et al, 2010:224).

The Boko Haram is in the very recent past has espoused propaganda that Islam is under attack in Nigeria when it declared in February 2011 that the group is carrying out these attacks in order to propagate the name of Allah and to liberate itself and Islamic religion from the hands of infidels and the Nigerian government (Mshelizza, 2011). Such a pronouncement is surely an open invitation to other transnational jihadists. In fact, the sect's increasing violent exploits in northern Nigeria not only underscores its growing strategic and operational maturity, but signposts possible tactical nexus with foreign jihadist.

4.2.3 Nigeria and her African Neighbors

On the platform of Economic Community of West African States and the African Union, Nigeria attempted to explore but countries in the organization did not and have not made a concrete effect in combating the insurgency. They are either inept in passing a resolution against Boko Haram or in its implementation. It is speculated that these countries fear attacks on their land. It is to be noted that, this insurgency has spurred Nigeria to take the policy of good neighborliness more cogent than ever for a

implementation amidst opposing forces of the French factor and President Idris Deby of Chad.

On Tuesday February 28, 2012, the Nigerian Government and the republic of Cameroon signed an agreement of Trans-border security team with Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger Republic also signed an agreement in Niamey the capital of Niger Republic for the immediate commencement of joint border patrols along the borders between the two neighboring countries to curb the activities of *Boko Haram*.

Trans-border movements, makes the insurgency more complex to combat and refugee problem which is a result of the insurgency has kept the Nigeria in a bit of a difficult situation in its relations with Chad most especially, despite the existence of a Multinational Joint Task Force agreement. Chad, exploiting this insurgency phase to demean Nigeria's status and exalt its territorial might, complicates the counter insurgency operations. This can also be said to be an instrument related to the French factor in West Africa opposing Nigeria's status, which is also a major factor being considered in its Foreign Policy towards West African States (Olawale, 2015).

Nigeria has a border length of 1,690 kilometers with Cameroon in the East, 1,497 kilometers with Niger in the North and 87 kilometers with Chad in the North East (Onuoha, 2013). Here, Nigeria is aware of the porous borders that facilitate the violent attacks of Boko Haram extremists using the Niger, Chad and Cameroon territories as headquarters or safe havens to flee (Adams, 2012). The insurgency can be said to have tasked policy makers towards border operations. The Boko Haram insurgency has to a great extent revealed the poor management of the Borders, therefore Nigeria placing

more importance for national security and making it a primary goal in Foreign Policy making and implementation with other countries.

4.2.4 Nigeria, Europe and the European Union

However, Nigeria has been pushed to exploit its economic advantage in Foreign Policy making and implementation. The Nigeria-European relationship tie took a leap further in its interactions. It must be comprehended that Nigeria is a pivotal country for the European Union for two reasons.

The first is owing to Nigeria's vast oil and natural gas reserves, their drilling and exportation to the European countries. It is an alternative energy field and source to the Middle Eastern oil exporters, particularly to Iran. Secondly, Nigeria is the leader country of the Economic Community of West African States and also the main contributor of peace and security in West Africa. For these reasons, Nigeria is indispensable to the European Union, considering the European Union involvement in economic activities in West Africa. Boko Haram being an influential factor on Nigeria's Foreign Policy, Nigeria and the European Union were both resolute on the insurgency, deploying security specialists in order to quell the insurgency and threat posed by Boko Haram. In addition, Nigeria, Niger and Algeria signed an agreement on the construction of Trans- Saharan gas pipeline (NIGAL pipeline), planned to carry 20.000 and 30.000 million cubic meters of natural gas every year which is about 25% of the needs of gas for the European Union countries (Calleja, 2013). Thus, with such interest, a more secure and stabilized Nigeria for the energy exports is pivotal, however, Nigeria being aware, uses this energy privilege as leverage for its gain in its European relations.

Similarly another bilateral agreement existed between Nigeria and Britain. The British Foreign Secretary, in Mr. Williams Hague words “The UK stands ready to provide any assistance we can to the United Nations and Nigerian authorities to bring those responsible to justice. Other bilateral agreements with Nigeria on the menace of *Boko Haram* include Italy, Germany and Israel. Italy government had offered to provide security services to the federal government.

Lastly, studying past antecedents of the civil war and the present situation, there was an obvious focus shift from the West to the East for economic and military assistance in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy. Not ignoring the West, but dependence considerably reduced. This lesson might not have been learned in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy implementations without the outbreak of the insurgency. Summarily, Nigeria has: input more energy its order operations, although, the first line of defense is beyond the border; used the economic leverage in gaining military assistance through its foreign policy; reduced too much dependence on the West for national strategy and national security, causing a focus shift to a more neutral stand point; established a more concrete security agreements with other states; and so on.

4.2.5 Economic Consequences of Terrorism in Nigeria

Here, a question needed to be asked ‘Can incentives to attack businesses increase the activities of Terrorist’. It could be observed that Terrorists are rational actors because they want to achieve their stated goal and objectives as efficiently as possible. The specific goals of a terrorist group may appear outlandish and difficult to appreciate by outside observers, but terrorists, nevertheless, will endeavour to reach these goals as

efficiently as they can. They strive to achieve a maximum effect through the actions chosen. Empirical research has convincingly established that terrorists indeed opt for those kinds of actions from which they expect the highest benefit–cost ratio. If, for instance, the police make some kind of terrorist act more difficult to accomplish, terrorists quickly shift to a different attack mode. Terrorists being rational actors, it is necessary to consider the benefit–cost relationships of various strategies from the point of view of the terrorists. It could be seen vividly that in recent years, terrorism has shown new patterns, shifting increasingly from military targets to civilian targets, including individuals and business activities. Recent terrorist attacks in Nigeria affected both the national and the global economy. The economic consequences can be largely broken down into short term direct effects; medium-term confidence effects and longer term productivity effects.

The direct economic costs of terrorism, including the destruction of life and property, responses to the emergency, restoration of the systems and the infrastructure affected, and the provision of temporary living assistance, are most pronounced in the immediate aftermath of the attacks and thus matter more in the short run. Direct economic costs are likely to be proportionate to the intensity of the attacks and the size and the characteristics of the economy affected. Major attacks in Bornu, Kaduna, Kano, Bauchi and Abuja by BokoHaram sect has caused major activity disruption especially the Abuja bomb that happened in April, 2014 and the abducted over Two Hundred female secondary school in Bornu State although, the direct economic damage was relatively small in relation to the size of the economy. The cost of terror attack and insecurity in Nigeria has slow down its infrastructure development.

Nigeria's federal government plans to spend a considerable 20% of its 2012 budget on security – equivalent to the share the US spent on security following the 11 September terrorist attacks, in 2001. In 2013 it was increased to 27.11 but in 2014, N845 billion (\$5.29billion) was provided for recurrent and service vote for security in Nigeria. As the economic impact of Boko Haram's terrorist attacks includes long-term indirect costs (security) and direct costs, the cost to Nigeria is at least the security cost of NGN1trn, or 2% of GDP, on Renaissance estimates. The impact of the terrorist attacks on financial markets was relatively small in renaissance's view; it will continue to be small unless oil facilities are attacked. Analysts note that the government's huge security spend has an opportunity cost it implies less spending on power infrastructure, education and healthcare, which combined have been allocated a smaller budget than security in 2012. The indirect costs of terrorism have the potential to affect the economy in the medium term by undermining consumer and investor confidence. The activities of terror attack can reduce the incentive to spend as opposed to save, this may led to reduction in the investment in an economy and this will have a multiplier effect on the economy development of the entire world through normal business cycle and trade channels. Falling investor confidence may trigger a generalized drop in asset prices and a flight to quality that increases the borrowing costs for riskier borrowers (IMF, 2001).

4.3 Discussion of Findings

From the foregoing study, it is however revealed that the mention of Nigeria of anywhere in the world, increasingly stirs up image of poverty, crime, ethno religious violence and terrorism. Indeed, these ascriptions, especially perennial Boko Haram terrorism, serve as

a seam that interminably threatens to tear at the core of Nigeria's stability, unity and prosperity as a nation. To say that the activity of the Boko Haram sect has had adverse effect on Nigerian domestic and international relations would be putting it mildly. The inability of the Nigerian government to effectively tackle the conundrum posed by the boko haram menace has increasingly put the Jonathan led administration under serious international pressure.

Since the advent of a new dimension to terrorism in Nigeria, it is clear that the fabric of Nigeria's economic foundation has really been shaking. The once peaceful and commercially active north has been crippled and brought to its knees by these enemies of the state whose agenda cannot be sanely articulated. The impact of the activities of the dreaded Boko Haram has brought physical, psychological and economic damage to Nigeria's economy. The domestic and global implication of this new order of terrorism can better be imagined if a comparative analysis is done looking at the sudden drop of commercial activities especially in the north and the sharp decline of foreign direct investment (FDI) as a result of worsening security situation especially in the northern part of Nigeria.

The findings also shows that foreign investors are gradually divesting from Nigeria due to the worsening security crisis. The renewed interest of China in investing hugely in Nigeria is been dampened due to the inability of Nigeria's government to guarantee this investment. Local investors are also hardly hit as a large chunk of operational cost is diverted to security logistics. S&P (Standard & Poor's) has also classified Nigeria's investment climate as risky due to advent of terrorism.

The Banking subsector has not been exempted as the profitability of the branches in the north has nosedived deeply; banks are closing down their business outfits as a result of decreased activities in the North. Employees of these institutions are opting to be posted out of these regions due to the fear and air of uncertainty that saturates these zones. The cost and risk of doing business in the north is at its highest height. Most markets in these regions are operating at a decreased capacity as most of the merchants who hail from the south east have gradually fled from these trouble waters. The impending food crisis in Nigeria could be directly linked to the security catastrophe in the North. In a communiqué released from the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) after its 83rd MPC meeting, Governor Sanusi blamed the terrorist activities of Boko Haram for affecting the agricultural output of the nation and slowing down GDP growth. Recently, the IMF forecasted a drop of 18% in the Nigerian GDP from its earlier broadcast (Okoronkwo, 2012).

The activity of the Boko Haram has both domestic and global undertones as it affects the Nigerian state. On the home front, other groups may be emboldened by Boko Haram's extrajudicial adventures. Seeing that the group is running circles over security and intelligence agencies in the country, they may be tempted to take to the streets instead of expressing their grievances through the appropriate channel. And of course, there may be copycats who may deem it fun to outgun and outman the government.

Boko Haram's successes make the security agencies look inept. As a result, there is a growing perception that the police and their allied organizations are weak, corrupt, and poorly trained. Above all, it paints these units as cowards who are unable to arrest,

dismantle, and bring to justice a ragtag group running wild at the edge of the Sahara Desert. This perception, whether true or not, will most likely have a negative impact on the trust and confidence level of those who see the police as their defenders.

The daily trouncing of the security and intelligence services is likely to have a demoralising impact. Low-ranking members may begin to doubt the ability of their leaders to make the right calls; and the senior ranks too may begin to doubt the vision and the ability of their superiors. These and other factors are likely to have a negative impact on the cohesiveness of the security and intelligence agencies. In addition, civilians and non-civilians may begin to doubt the leadership capability of the government; this in turn reflects a bad image of the country internationally.

What's more, a government that cannot, or that is unable to secure lives and property, will find it difficult to govern or command respect from the electorate. In the end, therefore, the stature of the President will diminish: he is likely to be seen as weak, lazy, incompetent, and undeserving of his office. This may further lead to a crisis of leadership. Considering the history of Nigeria, this may trigger extrajudicial takeover of government by the military or other forces, which is very undesirable. (Punch, Feb 1st 2012).

The incessant bombings may lead to equivalent retaliation: Boko Haram (a Northern group) may provoke one or two other groups or groups of individuals in the South to avenge the killing of their brethren – or the bombing of their churches. On the other hand, if Boko Haram were to bomb Lagos, such an act would most likely provoke equivalent retaliation and mass exodus of Nigerians of northern extraction from Lagos and adjacent

cities/states. And if the bombing and counter-bombings are prolonged, the country may witness pre-1967 conditions.

This condition will give rise to nationwide political instability. We already know that unstable political spaces are characterised by uncertainty, unpredictability, and suffocating apprehension and, ultimately, to economic deficits. For a country that is vastly underdeveloped, another bout of instability is likely to push it to the brink of anarchy and collapse. In the end, therefore, one of the unintended consequences of the Boko Haram's rampage may be the weakening of the state or the breakup of the country. Prolonged anarchy or the breakup of the country will definitely have a dire consequence on the African continent and beyond.

Moreover, without being told, one can safely deduce that Nigerian and foreign governments are watching the in and outflow of cash and weapons and ideologies into Northern Nigeria. The concern here is the importation and exportation of terrorism. The proximity of Northern Nigeria to Chad and Niger and other alleged hotbeds of fundamentalism has been a concern to western governments for many years. Related to the issue of terrorism is the safety of foreigners living in Nigeria.

To crown it all the fact that the bombings made former President Goodluck Jonathan appeared incompetent (in the estimation of western capitals). This greatly impairs Nigeria's image globally as she is seen as a weak state. Also, her status as protector of the African continent is seen as a hypocritical stance as she cannot remove the beam in her eyes yet she attempts to remove the log from the eyes of her neighbors.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

This study has examined the implications of terrorism on Nigeria's external relations with particular reference to Boko Haram. Terrorism in Nigeria especially the activities of the Boko Haram Sect is an issue that has really captured the hearts of Nigerians as its effects have been felt in several sectors of the country not exempting the nation's foreign policy. Several lives and properties have been lost by Nigerians and the country's image in the outside world has been affected.

The Boko haram sect that began as a lowly pious religious group had metamorphosed into a national nightmare. The evolution of the group has its roots in the terminal poverty of the region, religious intolerance, government high-handedness, injustice and an outrageous dichotomy between the have and have not's. The reign of terror of the Boko haram spans over eight years of destruction of lives and properties.

In our discussion the study was structured into five chapters. Chapter one is the general introduction. It covers primarily the following; background to the study, statement of the problem, research questions, objectives, research propositions, significance of the study, scope of the study as well as operational definition of terms. Chapter two presents the literature review and theoretical framework, whereby a number of scholarly contributions pertaining to the subject matter are explored in order to situate the study in proper conceptual and analytical perspectives. Chapter three is the methodology adopted which include; research design, population of the study, sample size/ techniques, method of data collection, method of data analysis and justification of methods. Chapter four deals with

the data presentation, analysis and interpretation on terrorism and Nigeria's external relations. Chapter five is the summary, conclusion, recommendations on major key findings and limitations of the study.

5.2 Conclusion

Terrorist activities are second nature to Nigeria. It is carried out by individuals, groups in both private and public places and offices including the government one least expect. It is government terrorism that has given birth to other forms of terrorism conducted by individuals and groups. The increased terrorist violence caused by the various terrorist groups in recent times is enormous and is a great challenge to security, peace, unity, development of the country and Nigeria's foreign policy. Besides terrorism instilling constant fears, and destruction of lives and properties, it has threatened the fragile foundation of Nigeria's Foreign Policy formulation.

On the basis of this research finding, it is obvious that terrorism in all its ramifications is a serious threat to Nigeria's national interest and foreign policy. It submits that issues of terrorism in Nigeria have been caused by governance failure which is indexed by the inability of government to provide the basic needs of its citizens which include job creation, health care services, education, maintenance of the rule of law and non the least security. Terrorism in Nigeria has also led to the deterioration of its foreign relations, government needs to tackle insecurity with utmost sincerity to enable it regain the confidence of the international community. The study is of the opinion that terrorism can be effectively tackled through collaborative effort by all and sundry involved in the quest to defeat terror.

5.3 Recommendations

The consistent failure of the Nigerian government in dealing with terrorism issues in Nigeria which has affected its relation with the other countries in the international environment is a major factor that warrants this research. An in-depth analysis has shown that terrorism is a menace that does not only affect the country's domestic policy but also its external relations. Thus, this study recommends that for Nigeria to pursue her foreign policy objectives and attain some level of global respect, it must be completely free from terrorism and thus put in place the following measures:

1. The Nigerian government should ensure the provision of good life for its citizens. Provision of basic social amenities like health care facilities, schools, electricity and very important security will go a long way in ensuring social stability and development. Also, ensuring good governance is also a solution for restoring peace and harmony in the country.
2. Furthermore, trans-Regional and global cooperation among countries in the fight against terror is also necessary. There is an urgent need for coordinated intelligence network analysis and policy making for all nations in the campaign and fight against terror.
3. The government should undergo a foreign policy drive designed at rebuilding its image in the international environment. Going into bilateral and multilateral engagements with advanced countries based on intelligence gathering and military cooperation will help tackle the problems terrorism.

4. Furthermore, government needs to be sincere, representative and fair in the treatment of her citizens; all forms of discrimination and marginalization in dealing with religious and development issues should be avoided. Reducing poverty should also be a major concern of government, as terrorists get their recruits from the unemployed and idle groups within the society.
5. Due to the increasing level of illiteracy in Nigeria, most Nigerian youth have become easily vulnerable to manipulate and recruit into criminal, terror and extremist groups. Although the right to education is one of the basic rights of every Nigerians, access and entitlement to this right is hardly attained. To reduce the number of people who are likely to fall prey to radical preaching and recruitment into violent groups, primary & secondary education should be made free and compulsory for every child in Nigeria especially in the northern region where education seems to be an issue. Thus, what is needed is for the local and state government to gather enough political will to deliver quality and accessible education to more children in Northern Nigeria through enhanced allocation and prudent utilization of funds allocated to the education sector.
6. That Nigerian diplomats should be allowed significant role on security matters. Nigeria missions abroad should have effective propaganda machinery and intelligence units.
7. Lastly, the border security by Nigeria should be overhauled in a way that it will meet the current regime “next level” project. By this one is advocating corruption free borders.

5.4 Limitations of the Study

The possibility of carrying out a research without limitation is inevitable. This research work is not an exemption. Thus, financing is a major constraint. The disparity between data obtained from articles, journals and newspapers since the topic is an ongoing issue posed some difficulty to this study. Another limitation is attributable to time couple with other academic engagements. The security implication of embarking on such a high profile research with a divided national opinion is also a limitation to this study. Notwithstanding the above, the research was able to overcome the limitations which aided the completion of the research work.

5.5 Suggestions for Further Research

Based on the analysis of the study, the following are the suggestions for further study:

First, Researchers should focus more on the failure of Nigerian state in providing it citizens which many believes is the fundamental reason for terrorist activities.

Secondly, the study should cover the role of neighbouring states in curbing terrorism in Nigeria.

Thirdly, other researchers should look at review of Nigeria's afro-centric policy to reflect the realities of contemporary African events

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