

**PARTICIPATORY COMMUNICATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE 2008 AND 2010 ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN
JOS**

BY

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ZARIA**

DECEMBER, 2016

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**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE
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**DEPARTMENT OF THEATRE AND PERFORMING ARTS,
FACULTY OF ARTS,
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DECEMBER, 2016

DECLARATION

I declare that the work in this dissertation entitled “Participatory Communication And Conflict Resolution: An Examination of the 2008 and 2010 Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Jos” has been written by me in the Centre of Excellence on Development Communication, Department of Theatre and Performing Arts, Ahmad Bello University, Zaria. The information derived from the sources of this study has been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided. No part of this dissertation was previously been presented for another degree or diploma at any university.

ORIFA Tona Elizabeth
(MA/ARTS/8488/2009 - 2010)

Date

CERTIFICATION

This dissertation entitled “Participatory Communication And Conflict Resolution: An Examination of the 2008 and 2010 Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Jos” by **TONA ELIZABETH ORIFA** meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of Master of Arts (Development Communication), Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to God Almighty for giving me the grace to complete it.

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I give thanks to God for giving me the grace to finish this work. It is not by my strength that I was able to complete this research but the immense inputs and constructive criticism of my teachers were relevant to the completion. My boundless gratitude to my supervisors, Dr Victoria Lagwampa and Dr Victor Ayedun-Aluma for their deep-seated contributions and dedications to making this work a success.

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ABSTRACT

The spate of Ethno-Religious conflict in Nigeria is becoming a permanent problem and measures to curb it are proving abortive. This dissertation, using the Conflict Trap Theory and the Mass Media and Modernization Approach, argued that protracted communication stimulated the ethno-religious conflicts in Jos. This thesis entitled, “Participatory Communication and Conflict Resolution: An Examination of the 2008 and 2010 Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Jos” explored the role of participatory communication in resolving and minimizing the insistent ethno-religious conflicts confronting the people of Jos, Plateau state and Nigeria. Methodologically, the study utilized both primary and secondary sources of data which included books, periodicals, internet sources and other unpublished materials. Significantly, the study found out that communication is two-edged; the way it has been used in Jos has caused more distrust, fear and disunity more than the way it has united the people. However, acting upon any information is largely dependent on what is understood and the content or message of what is shared. Hence, communication becomes an important tool in suing for development and, or, peace-building. The study went ahead to make some recommendations some of which are that the constitution as regards indigenes and citizenship should be reviewed and also that professionalism is important when reporting or dealing with information on conflicts.

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CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background to the Study

Communication is a process of “convergence” in which participants create and share information with one another in order to reach a mutual understanding. (Kincaid, 1979) “Mutual” understanding builds the foundation for mutual agreement, which in turn makes collective action possible. Effective communication begins with the audience and continues over time as a process of mutual understanding and convergence (Piotrow et al, 1997). The primary aim of communication is to promote social change and economic development through knowledge, beliefs, thoughts and information sharing. Communication is a key in social interaction responsible for peace-building, social change, national development, religious expression of beliefs and thoughts, and economic growth. Vital programmes, policies and concepts need communication to succeed. Without communication government and many inventions that humankind enjoys today would not have been. Communication helps the human population to understand and interact with one and another notwithstanding the diversity in ethnicity, religion and race. Communication is key in peace-building process and conflict resolution.

The breakdown of communication leads to anarchy and may plunge mankind into underdevelopment. Though the human being is among the class of animals that is able to coordinate its affairs and also systematically organize its activities in such a unique process for its comfort and security, communication offers man the basic means of ensuring societal organization and socio-cultural cohesion. The basic tool by which man is able to co-exist despite the diverse beliefs, ethnics, race, cultures and values is communication.

Communication is the means of passing or ability to exchange through (sounds, words, symbols or gesture) messages, ideas, information through the various media like interpersonal, print or electronic. Communication is a vital tool towards interpersonal relationship in human being. Without communication acting as a process of creating and stimulating understanding, there cannot be development. So far, it is the bedrock on which the development of the human race lies.

According to Soola (2003), the interactions amongst the early men were conflicted because of their inability to share ideas or to understand each other. Many of the tribal wars of the early 18th century, Soola affirmed, were fought because of the inability of the 18th century men to understand each other. Communicating to different groups within the social structures was difficult and violence was the readily available method to protest. This is not to state that the early man had no developed system of communication; the systems of that time were too one-directional as they could only communicate within their lingual and cultural borders. Though the early man was able to develop his own system of thoughts and his own systems of communicating *these* thoughts, he faced the existential problem of soliciting understanding among the larger society. The many wars and hardships the hunter-gatherer faced stem from aberrance in communication in that period. This leads Kafewo (2011) to assert that communication is naught without understanding.

Again, protracted communication can birth crises. Religion, ethnicity, peoples and society without understanding their communicated thoughts, either as groups or as individuals, clash from seemingly fear arising from the dominance of one ethnic. Lack of it in essence is the failure of the articulation of the social thoughts and beliefs among members of society. Hence,

fear becomes a concern as civil disobedience invariably leads to breakdown of the set down societal laws and order; and by extension could shoot-out crisis that may question the very essence of humanity. It is worth noting that with communication human beings can better understand his reason for being by relating with other members of his community and seeking understanding. While communication can be held responsible for the development of many economies, in terms of its social relations to others, it could also be responsible for the disintegration of others. At the base of this belief is understanding. What members of the society make out of communication determines the good that communication serves.

The several crises in Jos provide this research with a reference case. It is an important reference case because both the natives and settlers have lived together for a very long time and without any crisis, or, at best, little crisis. How did the natives and settlers communicate at that time that they peacefully lived together? What could have changed? What is the communication channel like in contemporary Jos and how is communication used to build peace or conflict? All these are questions that cut across development communication and they are begging for answers.

More than any other city in Nigeria, Jos has seen the most of ethno-religious crises arising from communication or protracted communication from both fringes of belief-systems of the people and the state machineries. It is pertinent to examine how and where the communication that leads to ethno-religious crisis develops from. The principal actors of ethno-religious crises are the certain fragments of the people who either by ethnic or religious consciousness fear the existential threat thrown to their belief or ethnic by *the* other worldliness (other people) or by the series of efforts which they put to resist aggression. Either way one looks at it, violence is

birthed by the existential threat and the resistance to such threats. Soyinka (2006) submits that the climate of fear in religiously diffused society springs up when one ethnic or religious group stem to ride on the other in order to attain completeness. Soyinka draws his analogy from two sides of the screen. Firstly, the Miss World experience in Nigeria and the fatwa placed on *The Guardian* journalist, Ijeoma Daniel by the then Zamfara State Government; and the caricaturing of one religion's prophet by a Danish Tabloid that generated religious violence all over the world. Here, Communication, nay, protracted communication and misreported understanding were responsible for these crises. The doing was not to deride but to express the state of things as they were using both verbal and diagrammatic expressive model. However, communication were interpreted differently, digested and re-interpreted to produce violence.

It must be stated here that communication, as vital as it is to conflict resolution, may be used to fuel ethnic and religious crisis. The religious places of worship and traditional palaces play immense roles in this process of communicating beliefs. Religious crisis happens as a result of piousness. A largely diffused society like Jos with different ethnics, both native and settlers, and more, with mixed religious affiliations seething within one family and ethnics, is a fertile ground for crisis when communication is not properly managed.

Effective communication has not been positively engaged to sue for peace or conflict management in Jos as there seem to be no defined method or bases for agreement. Instead, the communications in religious places of worship mostly emphasize one worldliness against the other worldliness, and the supremacy of one over the other. This, Eagleton (2000), described as "us" versus "them". Soyinka (2006), again, copiously re-emphasized Renes Descartes

assertion on the causes of crisis as the belief of: “I am right; you’re dead”. Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am” manifest in Jos. Soyinka’s affirmation that crisis stem from the misrecognition of the *other* to exist, the disrespect of the rights of other ethnics, be they natives or settlers make Jos volatile.

Again, it must be acknowledged that religious piety and ethnic bigotry are strands that cannot be removed completely from Nigeria. Thus, it is pertinent to dig into the roles communication plays in conflict resolution and deepening understanding of the communication process that fuels ethnic or religious conflict. This research sees the embers in Jos as microcosm to judging the larger parts of Africa where ethnic and religious conflicts have caused a divide among peoples of the same descent or the same cultural catchment. Today, we hear of such naming as Jos-north, Jos-south, Kaduna-north, Kaduna-south and these naming carries with them relics of either the ethnic divide in states or the very fear of cocooning amongst one’s kindred. Thus far, this divide, or the reasoning of settling amongst one’s kindred has not prevented crises. At the centre of this divide, communication is needed to build bridges and to amend the bias that one worldliness holds against the other.

1.1. Statement of the Research Problem

A study of twenty-four states within which conflict occurred in 2008 would show that 83.3% of these states were experiencing conflict influenced by either religious or ethnic considerations and 25% of these states had to deal with conflict involving both religious and ethnic influence (Project Ploughshares 2009). The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (2009) includes six more states, but this does not significantly alter the above figures.

Even though many are unwilling to consider the conflict in Jos as a typical case of ethno-religious conflict between different beliefs of different ethnicities, the reality is that peoples who have been involved on these conflicts belong to either a religion or an ethnic group. Thus, attempts to see the crises as only ethnic has made the conflict protracted and elusive of lasting solutions, with police security (where available) almost the only barrier to conflict. Various causes of the conflict have been proposed by individuals, the media, influential government officials, and scholars alike. In all of these, the role of religion and traditional palaces has not been dwelled upon; not only because religion and the palace affects crises but because it plays major roles in communication.

However, a deep problem of the fall-out of communication has created a divide in Jos and this constitutes a major problem for the humanity in Jos. Other issues which constitute a problem for this study include;

- Distortion in communication strategies of native-settler widens communication gap in Jos.
- The divide among ethnicities resulting from religious beliefs or ethnic affinities breeds fear and affects communication.
- Communication tools have not been fully engaged to build peace; thus far, it has been the major reason for crises itself.
- Ethnic hate is fueled by little or no communication acknowledging the existence of ‘the other’ and protracted communication is liable for the resulting violence.

1.2 Aim and Objectives

This study examines communication as one of the potent tools in conflict resolution and management of the ethno-religious divide in Jos. It examines the strategies engaged in managing the conflicts in Jos and attempts to develop a communication strategy that will better manage the ethnic and religious conflict.

The objectives of this study include:

1. To establish the pattern of communication or communication strategies of early native-settlers interaction in Jos.
2. To examine the rise of ethnic and religious conflict in Jos and its implication for communication.
3. To assess the role and importance of communication in conflict resolution and management.
4. To examine protracted communication and its impact on conflict management and resolution.
5. To establish the roles of religious and traditional institutions in conflict and conflict management.

1.3 Research Questions

To further understand communication and conflict management in Jos, the research attempts to find answers to the following research questions:

1. What communication strategies or conflict resolution approaches were deployed by the early natives-settlers in Jos that they lived peacefully despite their diversity. What was the communication network like?

2. How, when and from whence did crisis begin to arise?
3. What are the factors that stir crisis in Jos?
4. What are the conflict resolution methods on ground?
5. What type of information or communication is shared when fear seethes within and among peoples of different socio-cultural affinity?

1.4 The Significance of the Study

This study is important because it attempts to find out the degree to which ethnicity and religion influenced violence among the Jos ethnics, be they native or settler and the wider manifestation of ethnicity, religion and its implication on international politics and relations.

By transforming existing grievances into ethnic or religious grievances which are too fundamental to be ignored, the prevailing protests and crises, in Africa, Eastern Europe to the Middle East are rooted on the culture of ethnicity religion, politics, rights, lands and native-settler. Communication therefore is a tool which is being used to address grievances. Presently, in Europe and parts of Africa, the narrativity or system of communication thought is undergoing change. The old narrative of communication for development is being supplanted by alternative narrative which the government of Jos (Plateau State) as well as Nigeria as a whole must begin to adopt.

It is the desire of this study to take a deep look into the situation in Jos and suggests, through the development of an alternative narrative, strategies through which communication can be meaningfully utilized in managing conflicts in Jos.

1.5 Justification of the Study

Nigeria is a state holding within its borders over 250 ethnic groups, most of which have nothing in common, and some of which were already ‘enemies’ and rivals long before Nigeria was drawn out on a table in Berlin. To complicate the ethnic cleavages, foreign religions came into the country from two different ends: Islam from the North and Christianity from the South. This created a situation where ethnic and religious divides have met, and the Jos region is one area of such an occurrence. Located in the mid-belt zone of Nigeria, Jos is a typical example of an ethno religious community. The conflict which has crippled the socio-economic life of the city serves as a typical example of conflict occurring between ethnic groups of different religions.

The conflict has become enmeshed and embroiled in different factors, and the causes, escalators and solutions have all been mixed up. The multiplicity of factors involved in the Jos crisis is what makes it a worthy case to study and how the failure of developing a new narrative for communication can further fan the embers for crisis. The emergent rise of ethnic groups and fundamentalist groups, all seeking to be heard is largely hinged on protracted communication and the misunderstanding which has developed into today’s chaos. The groups (ethnic, religious, etc) which belongs to the “demand centre” are insisting on their demands and the “supply centre” (government, institutions) are either withdrawn or demanding from the demand-centres as well. Thus, understanding is thrown out. Conflict is borne. However, communication holds the key to bridge the gaps between the Demand and the Supply Centre though its emerging trends has not been fully and hitherto examined to chart a new course for Jos as well as Nigeria. What is best available are academic papers in the departments and libraries of universities in Nigeria.

1.6 Scope and Limitation of the Study

The study focuses on the role of communication in human relation and how lack of it can lead to conflict as exemplified by the recurring ethno-religious crisis in Jos.

This study undertakes an examination of the crisis that has happened in Jos between the periods of 2008 to 2010. Jos has seen several crises prior to that of the period under examination. However, the selected years provide this researcher the needed data in examining the communication and the application of alternative strategy in conflict management and resolution.

1.7 Definition of Terms

For the purpose of this study, the following key terms are defined as:

Development: For the sake of this study, development is seen as the removal of barriers in human society for inhabitants to lead long and healthy lives, to be knowledgeable, to have access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living and to be able to participate in the life of the community. In other words, it is the empowerment of people to take control of their own lives, expressing their demands and finding their own solutions to their problems.

Communication: Communication is defined as the opening of dialogue, source and receiver interacting continuously, thinking constructively about the situation, identifying developmental needs and problems, deciding what is needed to improve the situation, and acting upon that.

Development Communication: Development communication or communication for development involves understanding people, their beliefs and values, the social and cultural

norms that shape their lives. It involves engaging communities and listening to adults and children as they identify problems, propose solutions and act upon them. It is a two-way process for sharing ideas and knowledge using a range of communication tools and approaches that empower individuals and communities to take actions to improve their lives.

Conflict: Conflict refers to some kind of friction, disagreement or discord arising within a group when the beliefs or actions of one or more members of this group are either resisted by or unacceptable to one or more members of another group. It can occur on different groupings.

Conflict resolution: Conflict resolution is the conceptualized methods or processes involved in facilitating the peaceful ending of conflict and retribution. It thrives on communicating information about the conflicting motives or ideologies of the conflicting groups and by engaging in collective negotiation.

Conflict management: Conflict management is the process of limiting the negative aspect of conflict while increasing the positive aspect of conflict. The aim of conflict management is to enhance learning and group outcomes.

Ethno-religious: this coinage means an ethnic group of people whose members are unified by a common religious background. Ethno-religious communities define their ethnic identity neither exclusively by ancestral heritage nor simply by religious affiliation, but often by a combination of both; that is a long shared history; a cultural tradition of its own; either a common geographical origin, or descent from a small number of common ancestors; a common language, not necessarily particular to the group; a common literature particular to the group; a common religion different from that of neighbouring groups; being a minority or being oppressed or a dominant group within a larger community.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.0 Introduction

The intent of this literature review is to provide a critical overview and review of key concepts and related materials. It also examines the relationship between communication, ethno-religious crisis and crisis resolution.

2.1 The Study Area

According to the International Crisis Group (ICG) (2012), Jos is located approximately in the centre of Nigeria, Plateau state, the country's twelfth largest, self-described as "the Home of Peace and Tourism" and the "most endowed state", is a veritable mini-Nigeria, with its mosaic of indigenous ethnic communities (over 50 by most accounts, about 100 linguistic groupings and 40 spoken languages) (Adesoji and Alao 2009). Other ethnic groups (mainly the Hausa-Fulani, but also the Igbo, Yoruba and Urhobo) from other parts of the country are also inhabitants of the state (or so-called settlers). Plateau state is the 26th most populous state (out of 36), with a population of more than three million, much of which is young – over 60 per cent between fifteen and 24 years old. Nigerians from across the country, as well as a sizeable number of Europeans, were attracted to the then famous, Jos industrial-scale tin and columbite mines between 1904 and the 1980s.

Mining ruined much arable land and although there is a thriving potato and vegetable market, the land is not Nigeria's most fertile. This has contributed to rising unemployment, idleness and a high crime rate among the youthful population. The main indigenous ethnic groups – the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere (BAA) – are aggrieved that mining, as well as colonialism,

dispossessed them of much of their customary land (Adetula 2005). British rule marginalized them economically and indirect rule placed them under the authority of the core North, but they were, and have remained, predominantly Christians.

Located on the cusp of the Core North, Jos, a relatively new city then, grew rapidly to become the country's ethnic melting point. It emerged in 1910 during British colonial rule as a metropolis and became a political division in 1927. It was named the capital of Benue-Plateau state during the first exercise of state creation by General Yakubu Gowon's regime in 1967. In 1976, it became the capital of Plateau state following another round of state creation.

Plateau state and the Middle Belt – which represents, roughly, the centre of the country – used to be a bridge between north and south. Between 1980 and 2000 – except during the 1994 crisis, a period that witnessed widespread inter-communal violence in key northern towns such as Kano, Kaduna and Bauchi – Jos enjoyed relative peace and calm. The city mirrored the peaceful coexistence of Nigerians from different ethnic backgrounds and religious persuasions. Cosmopolitanism, anchored in multi-ethnicity and multiple languages, evinced a culture of tolerance and friendly relations between Christians and Muslims. All that has changed since the September 2001 meltdown, described as “the first episode of mass violence in Jos since the anti-Igbo pogroms in 1966”.

The cycle appears interminable. Since 2001, violence has become tellingly more frequent and deadlier. Between 1999 and 2004, there were more than 80 episodes of violence involving the BAA and Hausa-Fulani communities (Higazi 2009). Attacks have increased in number and intensity since 2004, but no exact figures are available. As Nanpak (2011) notes, about 4,000 people were killed in the past eleven years. Non-indigenous communities, particularly the

Yoruba and the Igbo, claim they have lost 1,654 people and property worth 970 billion naira (\$6.4 billion) since 1994 (Gai 2012, Onwuamanam 2012). Increasingly sophisticated and deadly terror attacks and suicide bombings by Boko Haram, mainly in the northern states, especially in the North-East, since 2010, have compounded insecurity. Plateau state has not been spared from the group's menace, but its presence and strength there remain for now limited.

The Jos crises mirror other parts of the country, but there is a specific local dimension with the indigenous groups ranged against the Hausa-Fulani. The latter is not only the most politically dominant ethnic group in the country; historically its relations with much of the Middle Belt have been characterized by tension arising from its attempts to subjugate and repress the BAA. The Hausa-Fulani are the only communities that claim to be also indigene, which is why violence has not implicated other settler groups such as the Igbo, Urhobo and Yoruba, except as collateral victims.

Violence in Jos is defined and worsened by both local and national dynamics. The failure of Nigeria's ruling elite to satisfactorily address and resolve crises woven around the key issues of citizenship, identity and political inclusion aggravated the situation. The use of the indigene principle rather than residency to determine individuals' citizenship rights creates a national malaise, even though this does not give rise to conflict everywhere. A major challenge in Plateau state is managing the unique ethnic, linguistic and religious pluralism with minimum group disaffection; and promoting, through public policy targeting the younger generation, a culture of tolerance, understanding and cooperation between the different communities.

2.1.1 Indigene-Settler Divide in the Middle Belt

The settler-indigene crisis in Plateau state can only be properly understood in light of the historically tense relations between the Middle Belt region (contemporary north-central geopolitical zone) and the Far North. The former is mainly Christian with pockets of animists and Muslims; the latter is largely Muslim but with a significant Christian population, including southern immigrants. Memories of deprivation, subordination and exploitation since the slave raids by the Far North between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries continue to run deep in the Middle Belt.

The British first used the notion of “Middle Belt areas” in reference to the southern tip of the northern region as a political identity distinct and separate from the north-west and north-east geopolitical zones. Because the region is predominantly Christian, the disparate groups also tend to use religion as a socio-cultural identity. The Middle Belt consists roughly of the following states and areas: Adamawa, Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau, Taraba and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. Some Plateau public intellectuals and activists tend to include southern fringes of Kebbi, Kaduna, Borno, Bauchi and Gombe states because they are not dominated by Hausa-Fulani people.

Throughout the eighteenth century, during UsmandanFodio’s jihad and the establishment of an Islamic theocracy in Sokoto and Borno, the Middle Belt was defined as “peripheries to be exploited” by the Jihadists. Subsequent British colonial rule legitimized the Far North’s “indigenous imperialist system” over the Middle Belt’s ethnic minorities. In the eyes of the BAA, British rule empowered the Hausa-Fulani community to subjugate the indigenes, and, by so doing, establish the hegemony of the north over the country – which jihad could not

achieve because Islamisation of the Middle Belt had failed. Marginalization and oppression had driven these minorities to embrace Christianity as a tool of political emancipation. Middle Belt Muslims have also complained of treatment as second-class citizens by Hausa-Fulani Muslims.

Between the late 1940s and late 1960s, the Middle Belt expressed itself politically in two major ways: first through the creation of the Non-Muslim League (NML) of Northern Nigeria and, later, through the creation of the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC). In 1959, the Middle Belt Movement clamoured for the creation of a political entity separate from the Islamic-leaning Northern People's Congress (NPC). The Middle Belt describes itself as non-Hausa speaking, non-Fulani and non-Kanuri – the major ethnic groups in the Far North. On the eve of independence, the country's ethnic minorities had “expressed fears of domination in a post-colonial Nigeria, but a 1958 commission largely dismissed their concerns” (Logjams 2004). Since 1960, the Middle Belt has never been at ease with the fact that it was faced with *fait accompli* incorporation within northern Nigeria and not granted a separate existence. The BAA remain angry that the Hausa-Fulani they had forced to retreat during the jihad became their political masters during the colonial period and today prosper through politics and democracy at their own expense.

For some Plateau state politicians, the primary function of the state government is to ensure that its indigenes, who feel threatened by perceived central government support to the settlers, enjoy the tangible benefits of emancipation from the Far North. The BAA do not trust the Hausa-Fulani, arguing that they have a hidden agenda to Islamize the entire Middle Belt, though this narrative does not mean that they want the total exclusion of all non-indigenes

from power and resources. The suggestion during an August 2011 national debate to amend the constitution to solve the indigene-settler problem was shot down by much of the Middle Belt, because it was perceived as a subtle way to entrench Hausa-Fulani domination over the indigenes and their land. Concerns were also raised that such amendments would empower the Fulani herdsmen to take over lands and grazing areas. According to a local official from the region, “before long, the Core North will be in charge of the north-central zone”.

2.1.2 The Jos Paradigm

During the colonial period, unlike their Middle Belt counterparts in Adamawa, Southern Bauchi and Southern Zaria, where Hausa-Fulani and Islamic leadership had almost complete control over society, the Berom in Jos division had a district head, control over local courts and a police force. In 1947, Rwang Pam, head teacher of the government school in Riyom, was appointed as the chief of the Berom and the chief of Jos (the *GbongGwom*Jos), as a result of protests led by the Berom Progressive Union (BPU). Rwang was subsequently named paramount chief of Jos Native Authority (the equivalent of today’s local council), a position which made him politically superior to the district chiefs in Jos division and gave him political authority over non-Berom villages. To counter growing Berom influence, the Hausa-Fulani leaders increased their claims, particularly between 1910 and 1954, over the political control of Jos and its environs.

Mutually exclusive claims to the “ownership” of Jos notwithstanding, virtually all commissions of inquiry into the Jos crisis since April 1994 concluded that the city is “owned” not by the Hausa-Fulani, but by the BAA. “Ownership”, granted through indigeneity, means not only that all the land belongs to the rightful claimants but also that they have the right to

rule the city. The Niki Tobi Commission argued that “the claim by the Hausa to the ownership of Jos is not authenticated beyond the oral evidence of persons” and “the Hausa-Fulani community should be encouraged to dialogue with other communities and accept the ownership of Jos by the BAA. Anything short of that will not make for peace”.

The commission said this conclusion is based on several pieces of documentary evidence. The first was a 1934 colonial account in the *Gazetteers of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria*, which described the BAA and other groups that formed the former Jos division as people “sharing a common native treasury at Jos” (Steed 1991). Only these communities were judged to have proof of ancestral land in Jos.

The second document was a 28 February 1945 letter written to the secretary of the Northern Provinces in Kaduna (the capital) by the resident of the Provincial Office in Jos about the management of immigrants by the Berom authorities. The resident expressed anxiety about the tendency of the Fulani to squat on the land and insisted they should “seek formal authority from the appropriate Native Authority to settle”. Another letter by the same author referred to the Hausa as “the majority tribe of the stranger settlement”, including the Igbo and the Yoruba. The third piece of evidence was that the Fulani paid tributes to the BAA to obtain grazing land from them, which the commission argued “is consistent with the right of ownership”.

The commission may have made a persuasive case for the ownership of Jos by the BAA but there are other historical proofs that appear inconsistent with this position. As in other parts of the country, both parties use similar artefacts to establish their respective supposed pre-

eminence. These include traditional history and colonial records, as well as oral tradition and genealogy. None of these is wholly reliable. Ancient landmarks, such as which group controls the first or oldest cemetery, have also been contested as some communities bury their dead in their homestead.

Ownership has also proved difficult to establish as existing historical indications do not always appear definitive. The processes of migration of the Berom from “somewhere in the south” probably began in the eighteenth century, partly to escape Hausa slave raids, and were completed by the end of the nineteenth century. In 1873, the BAA and many other Plateau groups saved themselves from the all-conquering Fulani jihadis by taking refuge in mountains, hills and caves across the state, a probable indication of prior settlement. Some Hausa-Fulani groups, notably from southern Bauchi and southern Zaria, escaping from the same conquest, migrated to Plateau during the nineteenth century to take refuge. There have been several other migration waves since then, including in the 1980s and 1990s, due mainly to intercommunal conflicts, drought and desertification in several northern states. Further migration after 2000 was largely a fallout of conflicts in Sharia-compliant states.

To get around this problem, the Plateau Peace Conference in May 2004 recommended that the state government direct all the local government councils to find original names of towns and villages which reflect the cultures and traditions of the people so that they could be officially gazetted for permanent public use. The April 2010 draft report of the Presidential Advisory Commission on the Jos Crisis claimed that all reports of judicial commissions of inquiry (as well as the 2004 Plateau Peace Conference Report, also known as “Plateau Resolves”) attributed ownership of Jos to the BAA but omitted to add that the Hausa-Fulani community

had challenged this in court. The same draft report acknowledged that questions over the ownership of Jos remain the major reason for the persistent indigene-settler crisis. While the indigenes appeal to ancestral origin, the settler community evokes historical antecedents and its contribution to the development of the city.

Another way of addressing the contestation is to look at the demographic pattern and sectarian distribution of the Jos area over time. The 1952 census showed that 84.5 per cent of the state's inhabitants are Christian, 12 per cent are Muslim and 3.5 per cent are traditional religion adherents.

Over the last decade, the Christian population increased to 95 per cent. The BAA is unanimous that, as the different commissions of inquiry have recognized, they sold land to the Hausa-Fulani and not the other way around when the latter arrived. The Anaguta people would go as far as saying that Jos started from Naraguta (derived, according to them, from Anaguta, their ethnic name) but that they accepted the two other groups (Afizere and Berom) as co-natives because they have lived together for long and share similar history and interests. The 2006 census showed that the BAA continues to enjoy overwhelming numerical superiority and have remained predominantly Christians. The exact percentage is not known, however, because contemporary population counts in Nigeria have been silent on religion.

2.2 Ethnicity, Religion and Conflict

The study of Uhumwunagho and Epelle (2011) gives a deep insight into the theorization of ethnicity, religion and their relationship to conflict. Uhumwunagho and Epelle (2011:109) define ethnic groups as 'social formations distinguished by the communal character of their

boundaries'. To them, the essential communal factors may be language, culture or both. Similarly, according to Suberu (1996:4), an ethnic group can be idealized as a "social collectivity whose followers not only share such objectives, characteristics as language, core-territory, ancestral myth, culture, religion, and/or political organization, but also have some independent awareness or perception of common descent or identity". This ethnic identity results from contact with other groups. But Suberu argues that ethnic pluralism is necessary but an insufficient condition for ethnicity.

Ethnicity therefore is a 'social phenomenon associated with interactions among members of different ethnic groups' (Nnoli, 1978:5). It emerges when the members of an ethnic group become characterized by a common consciousness of their identity in relations to other groups with in-group and out-group differences becoming marked with time. Such exclusivist, identity-based discrimination undoubtedly results in conflicts over scarce economic resources and socio-political goods.

However, ethnicity hardly exists in pure forms. It is a consequence of ethnic group identity mobilization and politicization especially in a competitive ethnically plural environment or context (Suberu 1996; Nnoli 1978). Also, Wolff (2006) observes that ethnicity on its own does not cause conflict as several factors are always at play in each conflict situation, arguing that identity is a fact of human existence, and that it is what people make of it or to what use they deploy it that makes the difference between ethnic cohesion, harmony or conflict.

The manner in which activists define the in-group and out-group relationship (the 'us' versus 'them' sentiment) is crucial in conflict dynamics: "The more confrontational the definitions –

that is, the more ‘our’ poor situation is a result of ‘their’ oppression, or the more superior ‘we’ are compared with ‘them’ – the more likely are inter-group relations to take a turn for the worse” (Wolff 2006:35).

Religion is an indefinable and imprecise concept (Ihidero 2013). It is difficult to pin down with precision and objectivity because it is emotion laden (Egwu 2011, Agarwal et.al 1994); Religion has been variously defined as a body of truths, laws and rites by which a man is subordinated to transcendent being (Adeniyi 1993). To Bellah (1970), religion denotes a set of symbolic forms and actions that relate man to the ultimate conditions of his existence. Drawing similar concern, Peter (1988) conceptualized religion as system of symbols which act to establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting mood and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.

Ogburn (cited in Agarwal et.al 1994:236) defined religion as attitude towards superhuman powers. In the same vein, Maclever (1946) opined that religion is a relationship not merely between man and man but also between man and some higher power. According to Christopher Dawson (cited in Agarwal et.al 1994:236) “wherever and whenever man has a sense of dependence on external powers which is conceived as mysterious, and higher than man’s own, there is religion, and the feeling of awe and self-abasement with which man is filled in the presence of such powers is essentially a religious emotion, the root of worship and prayer”. Milton (1994) conceived religion as “the attempt to bring the relative, the temporary, the painful things in life into relations with what is conceived to be permanent, absolute and cosmically optimistic”. To Sapir (1994) religion is a man’s never ceasing attempt to discover a

road to spiritual serenity across the perplexities and dangers of daily life. Lowie (1995) conceptualized religion as a “spontaneous response to the awe-inspiring extra-ordinary manifestation of reality”.

In a broader perspective, religion can be understood in two related, yet distinct ways, material and spiritual (Mbiti 1979). In the material perspective, it is conceived as religious establishments (i.e. institutions and officials) as well as social groups and religious concerns. On the other hand, in the spiritual perspective, religion is concerned with models of social and individual behaviour that help believers to organize their everyday lives. It is in this way that religion is characterized as transcendence, supernatural realities and sacred (Alanamu 2004).

As noted by Wolff (2006:2), conflict is used to describe “a situation in which two or more actors pursue incompatible, yet from their individual perspectives entirely just, goals”. He further argues that sometimes, conflict is as a result of the struggle for power and material gain by leaders and followers alike. Because of such vested interests, the conflict entrepreneurs prefer conflict to cooperation and privilege violence over negotiations. To have a thorough grasp of conflict, therefore, one must cautiously examine the various actors and factors and their interrelationship in each conflict situation (Wolff 2006:3). The material value or economic viability of the territory is also vital in conflict dynamics. For example, if the territory is rich in natural resources such as oil, gold, diamond, timber or if there are cultural attachments to the territory, there would be more stakes in it.

Similarly, Otite (1999:20-22) argues that most conflicts in Nigeria are premised on land space and resource competition; disputed jurisdiction of traditional rulers; creation and location

of local government council headquarters; scarce political and economic resources; micro and macro social structures of Nigeria; population growth; and disregard for cultural symbols. Conflict may either be non-violent or violent. Notably, what constitutes violence and non-violence varies depending on the context or perception of the legitimate use of force or challenge of authority. Max Weber in conceptualizing the state contended that violence is legitimate in the rule over men (Wolff 2006). To Wolff (2006), violence is the illegitimate or unauthorized use of force to effect decisions against the will or desire of others. The criminal model of violence differentiated between legitimate and illegitimate violence. It places emphasis on the identification of criminal in the target domain. In this perspective, the problem of violence is ascribed to outlaws and thugs who unleash terror on the law-abiding citizens and cause social and political instability in the society. This model tends to ignore the socio-cultural factors that breed violence (Turpin and Kurtz 1999).

In an attempt to provide an analytical framework for a deep appreciation of the causes of violence and conflicts, it is pertinent to analyze the various forms in which violence manifests. Violence can be categorized as either small or large-scale depending on the intensity. Large scale violence is difficult to control and its consequences are hard to predict (Coady, 1999). Violence has also been categorized as physical and psychological. Psychological violence is an act of violence in the absence of a violent act. The destructive effects are gradual and cumulative. It involves brainwashing, indoctrination and threats. On the other hand, physical violence is an act that palpably involves physical means such as bombardment, whipping, stabbing to death, overpowering, poisoning, forceful intrusion, malevolent intrusion among others. Its destructive effects are swift and direct (Turpin and Kurtz 1999). It is instructive to

note here that the distinction between the two is for the purpose of analytical clarity, as the borderline between both is little and sometimes difficult to draw.

Beyond the conceptual and categorical perspectives, violence has been part of human history. In this perspective, the social contract theorists held that man prior to the emergence of the contemporary state lived in a state of nature.

According to Thomas Hobbes, in the state of nature “life is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”. Several other theories and models have been developed to explain violence. The micro and macro approach to violence is one of the several approaches. This approach draws a web of casual links between the personal biological impulse and psychological disposition on the one hand, and global structures, processes, and behaviour on the other. At the micro level the propellant of violence is identified as individual psychological factors and biological impulse, while at the macro perspective socio-cultural factors are adduced for violence (Turpin and Kurtz 1999).

Studies have also shown that violence has been perceived as an instrument of survival under difficult circumstance. In this perspective, the frustration-aggression theory is the most explored. The exponents of the theory identified major conditions in which the individual or group deploy violence. To them, the obstruction or blockade of efforts by the individual intended to achieve desired ends such as power, wealth, social status, security, equality and freedom leads to frustration that breeds violence. Also, a causal link has been drawn between unfulfilled rising expectation and violence. In this perspective, it is contended that tension or violence arises from unfulfilled expectation to people who had experienced hardship or

enslavement but suddenly promised improved material condition or freedom. Furthermore, a relationship has been drawn between relative deprivation and violence. In this sense, the objective material condition is believed not to nurture violence but rather the sense of deprivation in relation to others around them, or their own past condition is believed to be responsible for violence with the intent to redress the situation (Dowse and Hughes, 1982).

The greed and grievance analytical framework ascribes violent conflicts to grievances arising from limited economic opportunities, poverty and inequalities. There are two strands of contentions in this analytical framework. The first perceive violent conflicts as under-girded by irrationality originating essentially from hatred. In the second perspective, violent conflict is hinged on a number of grievances such as systematic discrimination and gross human rights violation, inequality in economic and political power, or dearth of resources especially in multi-ethnic state. In this regard, violence is perceived as instrumental like any means for seeking redress. Violent conflict has also been explained from the industry perspective. It is believed that the dominant propellant of violence is economic benefits and commercial interest rather than grievance. This presupposes that the preoccupation of the belligerents and insurgents is the economic spoils and booty that they appropriate from the protracted violence.

Another theoretical explanation for the etiology (study of causes) of violent conflicts is systemic pathologies arising from the dialectical changes in the structures and processes of society. According to Potholm (1979:149 cited in Deeka 2003) when a system does not deliver what its leaders had promised and the political elites continue to ask the masses to make sacrifices that the elites themselves are unwilling to make much of the aura of legitimacy gained during the decolonization period will be dissipated.

In another theoretical prism, eruption of violent conflicts is linked with group pluralism and interactions to achieve their diverse objectives (Deeka 2002). In seeking relevance or retention of political power, the elites manipulate and massage religious and ethnic sentiments. Many of the ethnic clashes and sectarian conflagrations are rooted in the context of the group conflict theoretical assumption (Jega 2002). Violence has also been perceived as structural and institutional (Coady 1999). Structural violence is the form of violence rationalized on the basis of a great range of social injustice and inequalities prevailing in a state. In this perspective, reformers, leftists and even terrorists rationalize their violence and opposition against the state on the basis of seeking to correct the prevailing social injustice and inequalities in the state. The form of violence in this context often involves a direct physical attack in response to and defence against acts perceived as unjust and inequitable in the society. On the other hand, institutional violence is a quiet violence that arises due to systematic deprivation in the way of transactions within a state (Abah, 2009).

Several other factors such as over population, impotence, loss of power, displacement, the quest for social values, as well as natural phenomena such as natural disasters, earthquake, environmental scarcities, disease outbreak, drought, and famine can be identified as contributory to violence. But in the case of Jos, Plateau State Nigeria, one of the causes of violence there has been native-settler disagreements which has taken different hues in what is been generally accepted as 'ethno-religious' conflicts. The mass media has also influence the nature of the conflicts that Jos has experienced over time and as a result, the need to study the mass media in tandem with agenda setting for conflict resolution are getting attention.

2.3 Historical Overview of Ethno-religious Conflicts in Nigeria and Communication

The history of conflicts in Nigeria is very long. However, the best way to proceed is to start from the conflicts that came with the 1914 amalgamation. According to Jija (2012:113) in Olaniyi (2007:56), since the 1914, an inexhaustible range of conflict dominated the Nigerian landscape. Notable among these, is the protracted Niger-Delta revolt which erupted in the year 2000. The intractable and disparate upheavals are deeply rooted in socio-economic factors as the insurgents' demands of commensurable rewards for the exploration of crude oil and its attendant effects on humans, vegetational and aquatic systems. Elsewhere, the Zagon-Kataf communal outbreak in southern part of Kaduna State was recorded in May 1992. Apparently, the rift, according to reports appears to have remotely reared its head from 1863 and had its prominence around the 1990s. It is affirmed that the main conflict arose over the land between the Hausa and Kataf tribes. According to Tasau (n.d) in "This claim is False":

The Kataf claims the land on which the Hausas live was theirs, and that the Hausas were only settlers. Easily, they counted their oral tradition dating back to 1767 when Mele, an itinerant Hausa trader from Niger was given a portion of land in the heart of the town to settle after many years... Mele was joined by his kinsmen. Hence, the Zango-Kataf (which means transit camp in Kataf). But the Hausa community said the claim by the Kataf was humbug.

Also worthy of note is the Tarok-Hausa-Fulani conflict and the Jos unrest which occurred in Wase Local Government of Plateau State between 2002 and 2004, and that of Jos municipality respectively. Whereas the former conflict is traced to "the violent expression of some historically cultivated grievances" that border fundamentally on socio-economic and cultural issues" as informed by Gambo (2007:38), Amango (2007:77) observes that the Jos clashes have dominant records from the 19th century, precisely coming to lime-light in 1902 till date. Of equal relevance to this study also are the perennial inter-ethnic Tiv-Jukun feuds across the

Benue-Taraba axis. The account by Ahiane (2000) presents an initial mixture of relationship between the Tiv and their fellow Jukuns which predates the foundation of the modern Nigerian state. According to Ahiane: “Even during the time of Lord Lugard, the first Governor-General of Nigeria, the colonial regime had difficulty subduing the Tiv but with the Jukun they (the British) encountered little problem”. In another breadth, Makar (1994:54) asserts that “the Tiv had allied with the Jukun to fight the Hausa-Fulani in the past, but over time, an interface of circumstances engendered enmity and distrust between them”. He therefore situates the Tiv-Jukun period of crisis around the 1900s.

For Anifowose in Alueigba (2008:2), the inter-group relationship between the Tiv and Jukun predates colonialism. Avav (2002:15), Stut (2007:101), who say this relationship was particularly cordial, however lament that “the tide of that amiable co-existence changed and progressively turned sour between the 1930s and 1950s because of ecological... changes”, and the emergence of overt conflicts between the two ethnic groups and their continuation since then has turned them into what Nnoli (1995:220) has described as “the deadliest inter-ethnic clashes” (Alueigba,2008:2). Mention must be made also of the Aguleri-Umuleri communal outburst in Anambra State of Nigeria. As Eke (1992:2) and Ibeanu (2003:192) submit in Alueigba (2008:10), the discrepancy between this ethnic group is both homogenously and genealogically motivated:

The Aguleri-Umuleri conflict is an intra-ethnic antagonism between sub ethnic factions that belong to the same homogenous Igbo ethnic group, the same state and even the same Anambra East Local Government Area. This conflict over the right of ownership of Otuochaland, first occurred in 1904. It has been linked to a genealogical factor.

Last, but not the least of the selected instances of communal clashes in this study is the inter-ethnic stand-off between the Ife and Modakeke in Oyo State. Albert and Peters in Alueigba (2008:10) trace the antecedent of this feud to 1840 and hold that the opposing arguments here have continually centred on settler-migration and illegitimate occupation of land:

The Modakeke migrated to the Oyo old empire because of the Fulani Jihadists invasion of Yoruba land. They were given a permanent settlement by the Ooni of Ife, Abaweila, in 1840. However, the Ife people have always declared that, the Modakeke are not indigenes in the area they now reside and should leave.

The upheavals of communal outbursts which this study have illustrated in this work are a microcosm of the innumerable volume of both intra and inter-group conflicts which Nigeria has had to contend with over a long period of time. From these illustrations, it can be asserted that the problems that have resulted to conflict over time have been one of information, communication, historical distortion (which communication could solve), and the issue of native-settler. The crises in Jos exhibit all these issues and hence, it is imperative to look into how communication could be deployed to manage the divergent development issues which has affected the city.

2.4 Causes of Conflicts in Jos

The struggle over the right of ownership to access land and resources has been a major driver of conflict in Jos. Both groups – the BAA and the Hausa-Fulani – have sought to preserve their cultural autonomy, cultivate close relations between their community and the land, have a firm grip on their traditional institutions and be in charge of development, politics and the economy. A combination of factors – economic, political and identity – has instigated violence over the years, producing segregation in the city mainly along ethnic lines.

2.4.1 The Interplay of Identity, Politics and Economy

According to Nanpak (2011), identity – through ethnic citizenship – is an instrument for granting indigenes access to economic and political resources from which non-indigenes are excluded. Because the Hausa-Fulani are almost entirely Muslim and the BAA predominantly Christian, whenever a political crisis erupts, the ownership struggle tends to be expressed in religious terms. Yet, such violence is a smokescreen for disputes over “such issues as citizenship, group and individual rights and communal distribution of public resources”, which boil down to competition over power and resources. Cultural differences are also a potent source of conflict.

The major debate among the BAA in the early 1980s was how to improve the conditions of their people in the local economy dominated by the Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa-Fulani. Apart from purchasing land from the indigenes, the settlers were also buying stalls in the markets, thus economic ownership started changing hands. Politics has become a means to access citizenship rights, entitlements and opportunities. The Jos North local council, through its elective and appointed positions, is a platform for advancing personal and group interests. Post-1999 governments in the state have shown much interest in who gets to power in the council.

In the absence of credible, trustworthy and transparent state authorities, local politicians in Plateau state tend to exploit intercommunal tensions for personal and group gain. This is one of the major drivers of conflicts in Jos. Other interrelated factors have aggravated the crisis in Jos. Deepening poverty, lack of opportunities and growing youth unemployment; beginning

from the late 1980s, have exacerbated tensions in Jos and the rest of the country. Rampant military and civilian corruption worsened the situation.

Another aggravating factor is persistent problems between cattle grazers (always on the move in search of green pasture) and farmers. This is not peculiar to Plateau state, but the non-regulation of the trans-border movement of Fulani herdsmen and their cattle compounds the crisis: they trample on other groups' grazing fields and by allegedly carrying out sporadic attacks, mainly nocturnal, on unsuspecting victims, mainly indigenes. The nomads are beneficiaries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol on Free Movement, but are hardly required to honour their approved intentional migration routes. The problem appears to be worsening despite a high-profile intervention of the federal authorities in 2010.

The Yoruba used to cluster in the NasarawaGom area of Jos, but after the 2001 killings and house burnings, they moved out, with only a handful of families left there. The Igbo have abandoned the houses and shops along Bauchi road, where the Hausa-Fulani community now holds almost complete sway, for Zaria and Bukuru roads. Bauchi road, a popular road that links the famous, albeit ancient, Terminus Hotel with the University of Jos, is now almost a complete no-go area for other settler groups. In residential neighbourhoods, people swap houses along communal lines. Those whose houses have suddenly been found on the wrong sides of town sell them, sometimes while still under construction, and move to perceived safer areas.

Segregation has also taken place in markets, impacting negatively on access to, and quality of, commercial activities. Some markets, such as Igbo and Yam, have been moved, the latter far away from its original location, resulting in a loss of customers. There are some positive, if paradoxical, dividends, however, such as the gradual withering away of an ethnic division of labour and the possibility of varied economic opportunities. Since 2002, for example, Berom boys have been selling *Suya*, the popular smoked meat, which was until then an exclusive economic activity of the Hausa-Fulani. Many churches have begun to run butcheries and sell meat as a way of avoiding, according to them, Muslim cows and cattle being slaughtered with what they sometimes allege to be the same knives used to kill Christians during conflicts. Hospitals and schools have not been spared by polarization. The Hausa-Fulani are said to be scared that wrong medication may deliberately be administered to them in public hospitals, dispensaries and clinics by medical and paramedical staff from the BAA; and they are finding it increasingly difficult to find good schools for their children because of a new settlement pattern largely driven by ethnic-sectarian impulses.

As violence persists, greater spatial polarization and segregation tend to accentuate social and political divisions between Muslims and Christians and along ethnic lines. Consequently, as the ICG note, “more people are directly affected by and conscious of social divisions ... and articulate their religious and ethnic allegiances more categorically than they did previously”. These developments have reduced formal meeting points or spaces where different groups can interact, build bridges and share ideas about how to end the mutually destructive violence.

2.5 Overview of Communication

Communication is an integral part of human existence. It is an important study on the

appraisal of the development of man, his relation to the society, human coexistence, diplomacy and international development. From the period spanning from the Stone Age to the birth of the 21st century, man has constantly sought for ways (and are still seeking) to communicate with his world through various means. As a result of this, the concept of communication has been difficult to define because of its ubiquity in other areas of studies such as philosophy, community medicine, diplomacy, psychology, and sociology; hence, a universal consensus or general conceptualization of communication has not been agreed upon across the extant various disciplines. Thus, there have been numerous explanations given to the term. The linguistic implication that could be inferred from various explanations is that it has to do with the process of sending and receiving information. It is the path through which members of a society are informed (Chaffe, 1982:112). It is relevant to note the word 'informed' when they know about happenings around them. On the other hand, people are informed when they receive information that influence or modify their attitudes, opinions or behaviour (Fee, 1987:112).

The latitude of communication within the ambience of conflict resolution includes 'agenda setting', ethnic differences and management, religious (in)tolerance, politics and differing interests, as well as the enhancement of peaceful coexistence and development of individuals within the community. This may also include conflict management, the mass media, shifts in power distribution or relationship and native-settler's concerns.

Mass communication plays a vital part in the society; its objective is to enlighten the public about existing and past events. Mass communication is described as the process whereby specialized communicator(s) user(s) use technological devices to share messages over great

distances, to influence large audiences. Within this process, the media, which can be a newspaper, a book, radio, television, takes control of the information the community see or hear. The media then use gate keeping and agenda setting to control the audience's access to news, information and entertainment (Wilson:2004: 14). The media set agenda of social change in every modern society. According to Asemah (2009:11), through mass communication, the community members can be bound together. John (1997:6) noted that the mass media bind communities together, by giving messages that become a shared experience. However, the submission of John (1997) has not been proven to be holistically correct because of the spate of violence which Jos as well as many city-states experienced from supposedly 'shared experience'. The media may have been playing important roles in integrating members of societies in times of conflicts, whether religious, ethnic or political, however, when such media are not steered to enhance communication, not information sharing, peaceful coexistence or conflict itself is threatened. The mass media can be used to preach peaceful coexistence in order to bring about peace insofar as the narrative is dialogical rather than commentaries.

Many schools of thoughts consider communication as the exchange of understanding. This explanation is vital when communication is understood as an agent of development. Some other schools define it as language of signs; flow of information; interaction; exchanging of understanding. One may say that communication consists of transmitting information from one person to another. In fact, many scholars of communication take this as a working definition, and use Lasswell's maxim, "who says what to whom in what channel with what effect," as a means of circumscribing the field of communication theory. Nonetheless, the rise of several development concerns have gone beyond Lasswell's maxim as society are seeking

to develop newer narratives to solicit understanding. Newer narratives such as the use of participatory video, short films, photographs are some of the many tools that are being used both to portray share information. With these tools, communities are empowered to tell their stories as information flows between communities who in turn respond by developing their own narrative to seek understanding. One of the dangers of emerging narratives of communication remains the media with which information are diffused as excessive gate-keeping or editing may mean that such videos, films or alternative narratives may become too restrictive or inciting and hence may not get the result it is meant to achieve. Having looked closely at communication, it is expedient that this researcher also take a look at development. Vilanilam (2006) writing on the basic indicators of development in underdeveloped societies stated in one of his assumptions that all early development models (in the West) were vertically the offspring of Rostow's (1960) theory of the stages of economic growth (Nair and White, 1993:91). He faulted this approach revealing that the pioneer scholars of this school of development thought led by Rostow (1960) including Lerner (1958), Schramm (1964), Rogers & Lenning (1969) looked at development as economic growth in stages, without emphasizing the need for structural changes in society (Nair and White, 1993).

The frontier of communication study, according to Fagorusi (2012) was deepened in the mid-20th century and from the international development of that time. Fagorusi affirms that the World War II, inasmuch as it was a socio-economic and political war, was also a war about communication and the mass media. He traced the development of the functionality of the mass media to Harry Truman's inaugural speech of 1949 and the birth of Modernization Paradigm. The paradigm envisioned real development as a challenge to bring the

“underdeveloped countries” out of their conditions of poverty by modernizing them and by promoting economic growth spurred by free-market approaches. The main role of communication under the modernization paradigm is to persuade people to embrace the core values and practices of modernization. It was expected to help modernize people’s attitudes and ways of thinking, which would support the economic model already adopted successfully by the West, in accordance with the belief that individuals had to change before development could truly take off.

2.6 Communication Effects Approach

The first models of mass media effects put forward the influence of the mass media as straight, powerful and uniform on individuals living in modern, industrial societies termed as mass societies by sociologists. The Bullet and Hypodermic Needle theories were vibrant terms used to label the model of powerful mass media effects. The early models established by Lasswell, Shannon and Weaver, Berlo, Schramm conceptualized communication as a linear and one-way process flowing from a powerful source to a passive receiver. However, there was a shift in opinion among scholars after World War II. New research shared the rather weak nature of the mass media in affecting important behavioural and attitudinal changes among receivers. Communication scholars suggested that the mass media rather than being sole agents of attitudinal and behavioural change were more agents of reinforcement.

The shift in emphasis regarding the role of the media from one of dominant and powerful influence to that of minimal effects did not make any significant difference to formulations advocating the use of the mass media for development in Third World countries. Here, the orientations of communication as transmission of information and communication as

persuasion were to fields such as agricultural extension, health, education and public relations. The mass media were perceived by administrators and policy makers in the Third World as important means of bringing about quick behavioural change among their people, particularly in favour of the modernizing objectives of the state.

The communication approaches of the dominant or modernization paradigm are classified as: Diffusions of Innovations Approach, and the Mass Media and Modernization Approach.

2.7 Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution, according to Alozieuwa (2010), started in the 1950s and 1960s. This was at the height of the Cold War, when the development of nuclear weapons and the conflict between the superpowers seemed to threaten human survival. A group of pioneers from different disciplines saw the value of studying conflict as a general phenomenon, with similar properties whether it occurs in international relations, domestic politics, industrial relations, communities, families or between individuals. They saw the potential of applying approaches that were evolving in industrial relations and community mediation settings to conflicts in general, including civil and international conflicts. Since then, the concept of conflict resolution has been a subject of much debate as scholars of international studies and development studies are arguing over the choice of terminology. For scholars like Lederach (2003), the term, conflict resolution has become outmoded and out of place for the 21st century. For him, conflict cannot be utterly resolved in the 21st century but only managed. Thus, the idea of ‘conflict management’ is birthed. Francis (2002) disagrees with the position of Lederach. For him, conflict resolution is a different area from conflict management. He deepens the debate by suggesting the idea of conflict transformation that conflict resolution or

management is nothing unless it transforms the lives of peoples or conflicting communities. Although Francis's position is solid, it falls short in conceiving conflict resolution as holistic term. Conflict transformation is rather the deepest level of the conflict resolution tradition, rather than a separate venture. Okwori (2011) validates this claim when he notes that: it does not matter in the end what label is used as the umbrella term, so long as the field is coherent enough to contain the substance of what is being advocated in each case. He believes that the field retains its coherence that it is best left intact, and that conflict resolvers and conflict transformers are essentially engaged in the same enterprise. Thus, conflict resolution is a generic term that covers the emerging concepts theorizing conflicts.

Conflict resolution is a more comprehensive term which implies that the deep-rooted sources of conflict are addressed and transformed. This implies that behaviour is no longer violent, attitudes are no longer hostile, and the structure of the conflict has been changed. It is difficult to avoid ambiguity since the term is used to refer both to the process (or the intention) to bring about these changes, and to the completion of the process. A further ambiguity is that conflict resolution refers to a particular defined specialist field (as in 'conflict resolution journals'), as well as to an activity carried on by people who may or may not use the term or even be aware of it. Nevertheless, these two senses of the term are tending to merge.

2.7.1 Models of Conflict Resolution

Several models for conflict resolution exist depending on the areas of discipline. In development communication, one of the most mentioned models is Johan Galtung (1996) model of conflict that encompasses both symmetric (where the contradiction is defined by the parties, their interests and the clash of interests between them) and asymmetric conflict

(defined by the parties, their relationship and the conflict of interests inherent in the relationship). Galtung suggests that conflict could be viewed as a triangle, with contradiction (C), attitude (A) and behaviour (B) at its vertices. Here the contradiction refers to the underlying conflict situation, which includes the actual or perceived 'incompatibility of goals' between the conflict parties generated by what Mitchell (1981) calls a 'mis-match between social values and social structure'. Attitude includes the parties' perceptions and misperceptions of each other and of themselves. These can be positive or negative, but in violent conflicts parties tend to develop demeaning stereotypes of the other, and attitudes are often influenced by emotions such as fear, anger, bitterness and hatred. Attitude includes emotive (feeling), cognitive (belief) and cognitive (will) elements. Scholars who emphasize these subjective aspects are said to have an expressive view of the sources of conflict. Behaviour is the third component. It can include cooperation or coercion, gestures signifying conciliation or hostility. Violent conflict behaviour is characterized by threats, coercion and destructive attacks. Analysts who emphasize objective aspects such as structural relationships, competing material interests or behaviours are said to have an 'instrumental' view of the sources of conflict.

Galtung argues that all three components have to be present together in a full conflict. A conflict structure without conflictual attitudes or behaviour is a latent (or structural) one. Galtung sees conflict as a dynamic process in which structure, attitudes and behaviour are constantly changing and influencing one another. As the dynamic develops, it becomes a manifest conflict formation as parties' interests clash or the relationship they are in becomes oppressive. Conflict parties then organize around this structure, to pursue their interests. They develop hostile attitudes and conflictual behaviour. And so the conflict formation starts to

grow and intensify. As it does so, it may widen, drawing in other parties, deepen and spread, generating secondary conflicts within the main parties or among outsiders who get sucked in. This often considerably complicates the task of addressing the original, core conflict. Eventually, however, resolving the conflict must involve a set of dynamic changes that involve de-escalation of conflict behaviour, a change in attitudes and transforming the relationships or clashing interests that are at the core of the conflict structure.

A related idea due to Galtung (1990) is the distinction between direct violence (children are murdered), structural violence (children die through poverty) and cultural violence (whatever blinds us to this or seeks to justify it). One ends direct violence by changing conflict behaviour, structural violence by removing structural contradictions and injustices, and cultural violence by changing attitudes. These responses relate in turn to broader strategies of peacekeeping, peace-building and peacemaking. Galtung defined 'negative peace' as the cessation of direct violence and 'positive peace' as the overcoming of structural and cultural violence as well.

Another extant model of conflict is the escalation and de-escalation model. Escalation is an unpredictable model that can lead to the emergence of new issues and conflict parties can emerge, internal power struggles can alter tactics and goals, and secondary conflicts and spirals can further complicate the situation. The same is true of de-escalation, with unexpected breakthroughs and setbacks changing the dynamics, with advances in one area or at one level being offset by relapses at others, and with the actions of third parties influencing the outcome in unforeseen ways. Here we offer the simplest model in which escalation phases move along a normal distribution curve from the initial *differences* that are part of all social developments,

through the emergence of an original *contradiction* that may or may not remain latent, on up through the process of *polarization* in which antagonistic parties form and the conflict becomes manifest, and culminating in the outbreak of direct *violence* and *war*. Escalation model is popular with scholars and analysts who try to find objective criteria for measuring statistical changes in conflict levels in different countries from year to year. They are also used by scholars who attempt to match appropriate conflict resolution strategies to them (Glasl, 1982; Fisher and Keashly, 1991).

The Hourglass Model is mainly a spectrum for conflict resolution responses. This model is a combination of Galtung's ideas on conflict and violence with escalation/de-escalation phases to produce the 'hourglass' model of conflict resolution responses (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999). The hourglass represents the narrowing of political space that characterizes conflict escalation, and the widening of political space that characterizes conflict de-escalation. As the space narrows and widens, so different conflict resolution responses become more or less appropriate or possible. This is a contingency and complementarity model, in which 'contingency' refers to the nature and phase of the conflict, and 'complementarity' to the combination of appropriate responses that need to be worked together to maximize chances of success in conflict resolution. Conflict transformation is seen to encompass the deepest levels of cultural and structural peace-building. Conflict settlement, which many critics wrongly identify with conflict resolution, corresponds to what is called 'elite peacemaking' – in other words, negotiation or mediation among the main protagonists with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement. Conflict containment includes preventive peacekeeping, war limitation and post-ceasefire peacekeeping. War limitation is made up of attempts to constrain the fighting geographically, to mitigate and alleviate its

intensity, and to bring about its termination at the earliest possible moment. In this model, most scholars distinguish between the elite peacemaking that forms the substance of conflict settlement, and the deeper levels of peacemaking (including reconciliation) that are better seen as part of cultural peace-building.

2.8 The Role of Communication in Conflict Resolution in Society

The media as the fourth estate of the realm is susceptible to manipulation positively and otherwise, regardless of place and time. This is partly why media-conflict study is gaining currency globally. The role of the media in conflict prevention, resolution and escalation is now of global concern to both peace and conflict scholars and public policy makers. The kind of information the media disseminate is critical to sustaining peace and harmony in society and vice versa. It is on this note, that this study is examining the role of the Nigerian media in the Jos crises. To what extent has the media shun the principle of ‘who pays the piper dictates the tune’, a tendency that promotes and escalates conflict in society and concentrate on the issues fuelling the conflict in order to get the government to respond to the grievances of the people before it degenerates into conflict. Thus, in Nigeria, it is common for many political players to own a media outlet. In Jos alone, over three local media outlets have emerged and this is not to mention the daily use of the social media to pass information. All these are testaments to the influence of communication qua the media as major control in conflict.

Commenting on the role of the media in conflict resolution, Obot, in Nwosu and Wilson (2004:105) notes that:

In resolving conflict in modern societies, communication, to a great extent, provide rendezvous for all the interest groups or the aggrieved parties to sit and express their minds on issues in contention. This would be possible by providing and guaranteeing every citizen, easy access to media facilities. All the groups in conflict

have to be represented in news and other programmes in which issues in conflict are discussed. The fact that divergent views are represented in the news and discussion programmes usually goes a long way to calming frayed nerves. Thus, the mass media should go beyond reporting eruption of conflict, to investigating and reporting remote and immediate causes of the crises.

The above assertion by Obot aptly captures the relationship between communication and conflict resolution. Meaning that the extent to which the media can be used to promote peace in modern societies cannot be overemphasized. Asemah (2011:49) notes that whenever there is crisis in any community, the media are quickly employed to preach oneness, unity and emphasize the need to leave in peace and harmony. In the same vein, Ndolo (2005) says that the media gain insight into circumstances of others, they identify with others and gain a sense of belonging, thus, they are so useful in times of crisis. According to Okunna (1999), integration has automatically become a function of mass communication, which is of particular importance in our society (modern) whereby, ethnic, religious, political and other diversities divide people, both nationally and internationally. The mass media, according to Okunna provide messages, which people from different groups and nations, require in order to know understand and appreciate each other.

However, it must be stated that all these are only an exhibition of the prospects of the mass media, and not communication in the real sense of the world. The various media channels in Jos, or Nigeria for that matter, be they print or electronics, do not 'share' information or understanding; their essential *modus operandi*, for long time now, has been principally information giving. The media agenda is organized in a way that it gives information without opening any tunnel to soliciting feedback from groups, especially to the ethnics in Jos. Thus, the claims of Asemah (2011), Ndolo (2005) and Okunna (1999) cannot be said to be

completely correct because communication is said to be about the exchange or sharing of information between and among peoples. The narratives of such sharing, again, is another factor which, thus far, has not been considered by many scholars who have written on the role of communication in resolving or managing the ethno-religious conflicts of Jos.

According to Kafewo (2011), the crises of Jos, beyond its current conceptualization, requires 'religio-ethnic' exchanges between affected or warring ethnics; one rich enough to solicit interdependence for group survival. Whilst it can be noted that Kafewo's suggestion is germane, it remains ambiguous how two warring ethnics or groups with conflicting interests will, firstly, agree to dialogue when a robust communication for such exchanges have not been developed.

Communication is both the pedestal and the bastion for minimizing conflicts and its impact on society. It is a tool that thrives on the skillful use of language to express thoughts and concerns. In conflict resolution or conflict management, there is an established tradition of conceiving communication as verbal. Thus, such misdemeanour has gone far to undermine the role of other forms of communication in conflict resolution. In fact, the use of other means of non-verbal communication has hitherto not been explored. For instance, in the United States and parts of Euro-Asia, alternative means like Sanskrit performance, (diversity) groupings, pictures, animation, folk music, and many others have been used as therapy to healing divergent conflicts. Though these may not make direct impact that the conventional verbal communication will have, it is a quick and viable way to pacifying aggrieved minds and relieving tensions that snowball towards conflict which usually finds expression in violence.

Communication, Ayegba (2011) assert, is holistic. It is that means or systems of communication that employs three-dimensional methods of information sharing that climaxes in action. For Ayegba, communication, or its method, should have depth, width (liberality of views) and breadth, that is, freedom from prejudice and intolerance. Like this, communication can be effective and would solicit the type of action which will prevent or better manage conflict.

The history of conflicts in Africa, especially in Nigeria is about the inadequacies of communication. Contrary to the belief that Africans had no network of communication before colonialism, communities in Nigerians have lived together for a very long time and have developed a very effective network and communicative systems amongst themselves; the traditions, customs, values, ethos and the general understanding of the ways of others helped to fertilize the ground for traditional methods of communication to thrive. The role of these traditional methods proved to be effective in sharing information. However, as society develops, the effectiveness of the roles of the traditional media began to wane until its present state. A cursory look into the crises in Nigeria will further explain the role to which communications, or its inadequacies, have resulted to conflicts in Nigeria.

2.8.1 The Media Reportage of Jos Crisis

The media reportage or communication of the Jos crises is one-sided. As the term, “reportage”, suggests, it only passes information whose response or reply is not spontaneous. It hardly opens or creates a platform form for feedback. Hence, the media merely allow for commentary rather than dialogue. It does not seem to mind the fact that there is a symbiotic and mutually reinforcing relationship between media and society that every report about, or,

on, conflict should be open-ended so that dialogue can ensue between the two variables. Firstly, it should be noted that the relationship between these variables could be negative or positive. It is positive when it enhances peace and stability in society and negative when it is vice versa. Second, the environment and the kind of information the media disseminates are symbiotically related. This is succinct because the environment shapes the information that comes out of the media and the media also reinforces dominant philosophy in the environment. Third, the nature of the environment and the kind of media reportage that it produces largely influence the quality of governance, peace and stability within any given political system.

In certain circumstances, the media reportage can be an independent variable, while in some situation, it can be dependent variable not minding other intervening variables like government policy (in the case of government own media) and the policies of private media practitioners. In other words, in reporting the Jos crises the media, either as a result of its media policy or the religious-cultural affinities of its reporters have taken sides with either of the conflicting groups. Thus, objectivity in media reporting seems to be on the decline. The media, instead of communicating information that would help the Jos crises, they have rather contributed to heating the tension in Jos. Thus, to understand the role of the media in the Jos conflicts, one needs to first understand the environment in which the media operates. It is on this note that this study presents a graphic image of the Nigerian environment as captured by Herskovits (2010):

 Ten years of supposed democracy have yielded mounting poverty and deprivation of every kind in Nigeria. Young people, undereducated by a collapsed educational system, may “graduate”, but only into joblessness. Lives decline, frustration grows, and angry young men are too easily persuaded to pick up readily accessible guns in

protest when something sparks their rage. Meanwhile, those in power at all levels ignore the business of governing and instead enrich themselves. Law and order deteriorate. The Nigerian police, which are federal, are called on, but they have grievances of their own. Ill-trained, ill-paid, and housed in squalid barracks, they are feared for their indiscriminate use of force. The military, though more professional, is not prepared for dealing with unrest and unrest has proliferated more and more.

According to Akpan, Ering and Olofu-Adeoye (2013), what Herskovits thesis suggests is that the political, socio-economic, sectarian, ethnic and other crises bedeviling the country, by implication, Jos, are products of this turbulent system. These conflicts are consequences of bad governance. This is the same environment in which the media operates, so it is very easy to see why it is difficult for them (government owned media most especially) to avoid the communication or report of “who pays the piper dictates the tune” (a tendency that is anti-people most of the time, in the sense that no matter how genuine the grievances of people or groups are, it hardly gets the expected publicity from government owned media; both print and electronic). As a matter of fact, but for the coming of private media (both print and electronic) and most recently, social media like Facebook, Twitter and others, media reportage was a one-sided affair. For the fear of losing their jobs, government media reported mainly what the government of the day wants to hear instead of illuminating societal problems confronting individuals and groups to those in government so that they can find solutions to the problems. For instance, it is interesting to note that the grievances of the oil producing communities of the Niger Delta region did not receive much media attention until the youths of the region began to respond to government repressive policy with violence, vandalization of oil installations and kidnapping of foreign oil workers. This is what gave rise to the evidential militancy in the region and the corresponding media attention it is now getting. More perturbing, a typical case of bad news sells more than good news.

Against this background, the media report of the Jos crises also follows the same trajectory with the Niger Delta crises. It is not as if the media was not aware that these crises were being brewed. However, very little attention was paid to them until it escalated into full-blown conflicts. In recent times, individuals and groups have used social media to inform both the media and security agencies about intending conflagration between groups but they hardly respond to it until the crises gets out of control.

It is also important to note that sometimes even when private media organizations put up these issues and grievances in the public realm, those who are supposed to do something about them at all levels of governance (federal, state and local governments), hardly know what to do. This is because Nigeria, in terms of robust policies and institutions has no clearly defined methods of dealing with crises. The panacea Nigeria has for the Jos crises has been the massive deployment of armed forces to quell the crises in Jos and this, as many has seen, has failed as the grievances and crises are in continuum and evasive.

The media owes the society that feeds it the responsibility of ‘communicating’ development. It should create a symbiotic relationship in the society that sues for peace. Its survival is dependent on peace. For the media to become a veritable tool and further perform this transformative role in a deeply divided and conflict prone society like Jos, Plateau, it is important that the media undergo a paradigm shift from its current posture and selective exposure of social and conflict reportage in the country. In other words, the media must be seen as helping to report issues and conflict as they occur without selective coverage. This shift must be such that would provide a place for peace media orientation and operation in order to reduce the tendencies for violent manifestations of conflicts.

2.9 Theoretical Framework

In this study, Conflict Trap Theory and the Mass Media and Modernization Approach are adopted as the framework of analysis. The exponents of the Conflict Trap theory are Paul Collier, V.L. Elliott, Havard Hegre, Ankle Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol and Nicholas Sambanis. To them, Conflict Trap denotes that once a conflict has erupted, it tends to develop a momentum of its own. Peace seemingly becomes elusive and hard to restore. Even when peace is restored it often does not endure (Collier et. al 2003).

The exponents of conflict trap ascribed the lengthy pattern of a typical conflict to a number of interlocking factors. Conflicts in multiethnic societies are enduring possibly on account of their ready vulnerability to the rallying, massaging and mobilization of ethnic sentiments for both the warring groups and the government. In addition, in a plural society, particularly where the population has significant grievances, conflict usually becomes an effective political strategy for pursuit of their interests and goals. Also, even if the custodians of power and authority in the society are willing to concede to the demands of the groups, they are usually neither trusted nor believed to have credible means of committing the warring factions to agreement. The warring groups might be afraid that once they hold the olive branch the custodians of power and authority would renege on any agreement (Collier et. al 2003).

Furthermore, it is also contended that it is even difficult for the custodians of power and authority to concede to demands of the warring groups because such could encourage the flowering, proliferation, mushrooming and radicalization of other groups, which often have opposing objectives. Also, a significant pattern to lengthy conflict is the extremely unequally distributed income and a very low average income, possibly on account of the cost of

sustaining conflict is low if there is an expansive layer of economic destitute and possibly significantly weak institutions such as the security agencies, which are unable to deter and apprehend violators of the laws. More so, sustaining conflict has become easier because the warring groups have easy access to armaments for prosecuting conflict (Collier et. al 2003).

Yet, very important to the lengthy pattern of conflict is that once a conflict has occurred a template is raised. It becomes difficult to return to status quo. Presumably, conflict reinforces hatred, and may shift the balance of influential interests in favour of continued conflict. Also, the criminal entrepreneurs that profit from the conflict would do anything including sabotaging peace process for it to continue. According to Paul Collier et. al. (2003:12):

Violence entrepreneurs, whether primarily political or primarily commercial, may gain from conflict to such an extent that they cannot credibly be compensated sufficiently to accept peace. Those who see themselves as political leaders benefit from war because they can run their organizations in hierarchical, military style with power concentrated in their own hands, something much more difficult to justify in peacetime. Those who see themselves as extortionists benefit from the absence of the rule of law in the areas they control. However, leaders see themselves as if they will have invested in expensive military equipment that will become redundant once they agree to peace. Asking a rebel leader to accept peace may be a little asking a champion swimmer to empty pool.

Following from the above assumptions, the conflict trap theory is apt and relevant for the appreciation of the challenges of ethno-religious conflict management in Nigeria. It offers deep insights to the interlocking factors that sustain conflict. It presupposes that once conflict has occurred it lengthens and becomes challenging to restore peace on account of a number of factors such as ethnic pluralism, proliferation of arms, existence of income disparities, existence of expansive republic of hoodlums and the activities of criminal entrepreneurs.

The conceptual and theoretical excursion reveals various perspectives for the appreciation of violence. Notably, each of the perspectives may be perfunctory, deficient, incomplete and restrictive but in sum they are illuminating and complementary.

The mass media functioned as proxies and indices of modernization in the developing nations. At the tiniest level, inquiries in this tradition focused on social psychological characteristics of individuals which were considered necessary for an efficacious transition from a traditional to a modern society. The mass media was said to have had the potential of blowing the winds of modernization into isolated traditional communities and replacing the structure of life, values and behaviour there with ones seen in modern western society.

In this approach, the mass media were considered as the ideal vehicles for transferring new ideas and models from the developed nations to the Third World and from urban areas to the rural countryside. The mass media were entrusted with the task of preparing individuals in the developing nations for rapid social change by establishing a climate of modernization. They were thought to have powerful, uniform and direct effects on individuals in the Third World even though this premise was discarded in North America in the 1940's.

Research in this tradition generated high expectations from the mass media in that they were considered as magic multiples of development benefits to the Third World nations. Also the connexion between the availability of mass media and national development was considered crucial. Both Lerner and Schramm shared a high correlation between the indices of modernity and availability mass media outlets. What this means was that, the modernity of a society depended on the efficacy of the mass media.

Information therefore was considered to be the missing link in the development chain. The quality of information available and its wide dissemination was a key factor in the speed and smoothness of development (Agbonika (2011) citing Schramm, 1964). Adequate mass media outlets and information would act as spurs to education, commerce and chain of other related development activities.

To conclude this section, it must be highlighted that several perspectives to communication in the ethnic and religious crises in Jos abound. These perspectives are not without problems themselves. From the quantum of literature reviewed, one of the primary problems noticed is the fact that several efforts to resolve or manage the crises in Jos have not been successful because the grassroots peoples have not been actively involved in the resolution process. This problem has other salient implications; one of which is the will of the conflicting groups to end the crises. Is there a willingness of the BAA and Jasawa groups to live in peace? This question has been left hanging for some time as there is hitherto no effort to create a peaceable environment. This when considered with the statement of research problem of this study highlight the reason while the communication gap between the natives and settlers is widened and account for the divide, mistrust, fear and hate which permeate the ethnics in Jos.

The media reportage of Jos crises are still very polarized along ethnic and religious lines because those who reports them share in sentiments however hard they try to distance themselves from it. More, it is even problematic that the basis for reporting crises have not been set many media outlets. For instance, several reports from the several panels of inquiries have mentioned the number of Christians or Muslims killed in the Jos crises, not the amount or number of Nigerians killed. This type of reporting sustains bitterness, hatred and prepares

the ethnic to take their revenge for future battle. Even though figures of destruction or deaths recorded have been overtime exaggerated, the several Jos crises can be seen as either a victory or a defeat of/by one group over the other.

The aim of this study therefore is to propose or suggest a communication environment where peace can thrive irrespective of the ethnic or religious empathy of the peoples in Jos.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter discussed the methods used in this study and also looked at the research design, data collection and analysis, and the limitations of the study. The possible problems in the approach will be highlighted as well.

3.1 Research Method and Design

According to Babbie and Mouton (2001:74), research design is a layout of how the researcher intends to carry out the research process in order to answer the research questions. This study will use a qualitative approach to examine the length to which interpersonal communication has been engaged to manage the conflict in Jos.

This study adopted the qualitative research design and itemized the processes on which communication can be engaged to transform the situation in Jos. To do this, the study identifies with the “Stage of Conflict” and “Strategic Response” approach.

3.2 Population Size

Population size is the totality of the collection of individuals, objects or measurements whose properties are under investigation. This research studies the efficacy of communication in soliciting action in managing the conflicts in Jos.

3.2.1 Sample Size

A sample is a part of a population. It is a proportion chosen to stand in for the entirety of all the subjects or observations under consideration. To be effectively used to draw inferences

about population, a sample, Eguzoikpe (2008) note, must be representative of the population. A representative sample is one that has all the characteristics of the population from where it has been chosen. This research samples the opinions of Rukuba and DogonKarfe communities. These communities were selected because they were two of the most active stakeholders of the 2008 and 2010 conflicts. The study samples the opinions of five elders of the BAA population and five elders of the Jasawa group.

The opinion of the youth population is also sampled in the FGDs which will be done in two sessions. The opinion of eight youths from the BAA and Jasawa ethnics are sampled.

3.3 Research instruments and justification

Data will be obtained from primary and secondary data sources. The primary source of data of this study comes from direct observation of the crises, responses to unstructured interview questions and Focus Group discussions.

The unstructured interview uses circuitous or indirect questions to get information on distribution to a group of people or population in relation to factors such as age, status and involvement in several negotiations. This instrument is chosen because it guarantees uniformity of responses and makes analysis easier and saves time.

The secondary source of data comes mainly from bibliothecas such as books, journals and the internet among others.

Questions for the unstructured interview will also be designed following the many reports of different commission of inquiries. Nevertheless, questions such as causes of the Jos crises,

their feeling towards unrest and solution to the Jos crises will be included. The advantage of using qualitative analysis method is that the analysis of the FGDs and interviews within a limited sample size, help to avoid bias, which could result if the results are described in percentages and the conclusion, is drawn from the percentage only. Furthermore, the variation of the data will facilitate the process of drawing more information for analysis.

The limitations associated with this study are related to the FGDs and the questionnaires. Since there is no identified audience group, the researcher will have to use randomly selected youth associations and community gatherings to conduct the FGDs. On the whole, obtaining compliance to conduct the FGDs and distribute the questionnaires and confirming it with respondents will take considerable time and effort.

Questions for the interviews are divided into two parts: one for the elders of BAA group representing the native population; and the other for the Jasawa Elders Foundation, the sociopolitical group of Hausa-Fulani who is claiming right to citizenship on parts of Jos. The same questions would be asked of both groups. For the FGDs, the opinion of the BAA and the Jasawa youth groups, the chief drivers of conflict will be sampled in two different independent sessions. The sessions will climax in selecting five persons from both groups for a joint discussion. Only youths who have participated, observed, instigated and/or mobilized others in crises will be selected.

Because the interviews are largely unstructured, the questions will not be written. It will develop from data gathered in the course of the interviews. This is chosen because it removes any hindrance or distortion which a midget or a tape recorder might cause. More, it offers the

respondent the chance to say it all out as it concerns him and allows him explore the logic and counter logic of the conflicting groups.

The questions to be asked for the FGDs are in set of two. The youths of both groups will respond to the same question in separate discussions and youths from both divide will discuss together in another session. The numbers of participant to be engaged in these discussions are eight. This is because the amount of discussant in FGD should not be too large or too small. Nominally about six to twelve discussants are encouraged. This study chose eight participants because it allows this researcher to exercise greater control over the discussions and to minimize the risk of getting repeated answers to question.

3.4 Method of Data Collection

For this study, the researcher makes use of several data collection processes to carry out this research. These include *covert unstructured interview method*, observation method and FGDs. Covert unstructured interview, according to McKeshnie (2008) is a particular type of participant observation in which the identity of the researcher, the nature of the research project, and the fact that participants are being observed are concealed from those who are being studied. This method is chosen to remove the encumbrance which a direct interview would have had. This research is different from ethnography because it does not concentrate on the cultural codes of the groups under study. It instead focuses on the nature of the communication in ethnic and religious crises in Jos.

3.4.1 Observation:

This includes looking and listening very carefully in order to discover particular information about behaviours, events and so on. Observational research, like any research, begins with the selection of a research problem. This problem is often presented as an area of research interest, with more specific research questions being articulated after more is learned through observation in the field. Although some researchers prefer to enter the field and begin observation immediately without the potential blinders of preconceived notions, many conduct a literature search to identify relevant indicators and explanatory concepts that may inform the project. Researchers gather both descriptive and relational data through observing behaviour in the setting of interest. Findings are articulated, often with an explanatory model or one or more explanatory theoretical constructs, in reports of the research. Qualitative observation is characterized by an emergent research design. This design involves a cyclical process, moving back and forth between inductive and deductive reasoning: Themes are identified through the analysis of observed behaviour; these themes suggest areas for focusing subsequent observation; subsequent observations suggest new themes that then initiate more observations. Data collection continues until saturation, the point at which the observer learns nothing new from continued observation.

Types of Observation

3.4.1.1 Lived Experience/Direct Observation: Lived experience or direct observation is distinguished from participant observation in a number of ways. First, a direct observer doesn't typically try to become a participant in the context; however, the direct observer does strive to be as unobstructive so as not to bias the observations. Secondly, direct observation suggests a more detached perspective. The researcher is watching rather than taking part.

Consequently, technology can be useful part of direct observation. Thirdly, direct observation tends to be more focused than participant observation. The researcher is observing certain sampled situations or people rather than trying to become immersed in the entire context. Finally, direct observation tends not to take as long as participant observation.

What is Observed

Observation is holistic in its approach, with researchers collecting data about many aspects of the research setting and its participants. Researchers pay attention to the actors or participants in a setting, collecting socio demographic (for example, age, gender, education, class) and descriptive (for example, dress and stature) information, trying to determine who the people are. Acts, activities, and events are observed and recorded to discover what people do and with whom, what is happening, and if there are any trends and patterns discernible in these activities.

For this study, the extant intercommunal communication channel is observed side by side the roles they play in education, empowerment and quality of information shared.

Reasons for using observation

Observation allows the researcher to study people in their “natural setting” without their behaviour being influenced by the presence of the researcher. Observation data usually consists of detailed information about particular groups or situations. This kind of data can “fill out” and provide a deeper richer, understanding than survey work which tends to produce less detailed information about a larger number of people. For this study the researcher make use of the direct observation/lived experience method because it allows the researcher to observe research process without interrupting or influencing anything during the production.

Interview

Interview is a conversational practice where knowledge is produced through the interaction between an interviewer and interviewee or a group of interviewees. Unlike everyday conversations, the research interview is most carried out to serve the researcher's ends, which are external to the conversation itself.

In most cases, research interviewing involves a "one-way dialogue" with the researcher asking questions and the interviewee being cast in the role of respondent. The qualitative research interview has become one of the most widespread knowledge-producing practices across the social scientific disciplines. Although interviewing was a marginalized practice in many social science disciplines for years, it is part of the mainstream today. Many different forms of interviewing exist. Interviews can be formally conducted in surveys, covertly, through the internet, over the telephone, or in face-to-face interaction, and they can be informally conducted; for example, as part of ethnographic fieldwork. Research interviews can be more or less structured.

This research adopts the covert interview method to gather data for this study. This is because of the unease and fear which thrusting a midget, or any devices, before the respondents may cause.

The Process of Interviewing

The concrete interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee is just one stage in the process of doing interview research. The interview itself is carried out to enable the researcher to answer one or more of his or her research questions. These are formulated in advance when

the researcher thematizes and designs the study. However, for this research, the interviews were largely unstructured. It moved with the information exchange between this researcher and respondents.

3.5 Procedure for Data Analysis

The data of the study was analyzed and interpreted using descriptive methods. The responses will be arranged in simple tabulation. That is, percentage method will be used in the presentation of response for easy analysis and interpretation. This method fits well into the conflict trap theory in that it attempts to submit tactical responses, in terms of “(re)conciliation” techniques of conflict resolution.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION OF DATA AND ANALYSIS

4.0 Introduction

A total of 200 copies of questionnaire containing 13 items each were distributed in two cosmopolitan areas of Jos town; *Rukuba* representing the predominantly Christian areas and *DogonKarfere* representing the Muslim areas respectively. Out of the total number distributed, only 178 representing 89% of the total copies distributed were retrieved from the respondents for subsequent analysis. The data gathered from the field were analyzed using the simple descriptive statistical tools in line with frequencies and percentages, the explanation is below the tables.

4.1 Interpretation of Data on Audience Perception of Communication in Conflict Resolution

The explanations and tables below are based on findings from the questionnaires that were administered on the respondents.

The table comprises of two (2) sections. A; deals with the socio-demographic data while B; contains the audience perception on the role of Communication in conflict resolution.

Characteristics of Respondents

A: Socio-demographical information on respondents

Table 1: Age of Respondents

Variable	Frequency	Percentage %
18-25	50	28.28
26-35	88	49.24
36-45	34	19.19
46 above	6	3.29
Total	178	100%

Source: Field survey, 2015

The first tables (1) on age distribution of respondents shows that 18 to 25 years of age were 50 (28.28%), 88 respondents representing (49.24%) were between the ages of 26-35, while those between 36-45 constitute 34(19.19%), and only 6 (3.29%) respondents were between the ages of 46 and above.

Table 2: Sex of Respondents

Variables	Frequency	Percentage %
Male	102	57.32
Female	76	42.67
Total	178	100

Source: Field survey, 2015

In the above table data, male respondents are 102 constituting (57.32%) while the remaining 76 (42.67%) are female.

Table 3: Level of Education of Respondents

Variable	Frequency	Percentage %
Primary	12	6.82
Secondary	45	25
Informal	11	6.31
Tertiary	110	61.86
Total	178	100

Source: Field survey, 2015

From the data in table 3 above respondents of primary school level were 12 (6.82%), respondents with tertiary level education were the majority with 110 (61.86%) while 45 (25%) respondents were for secondary school and 11 (6.31%) are informally educated respondents respectively.

Table 4: Religion of Respondents

Variables	Frequency	Percentage %
Christian	93	52.11
Muslim	85	47.89
Total	178	100

Source: Field Survey, 2015

From the data in table 4 above respondents that are Christians were 93(52.11%), while respondents who are Muslims were 85(47.89%) respectively.

B: Audience perception on the role of Communication in conflict resolution

Table 5: Audience Responses on communication Reports on conflict by the media from their respective areas

Variable	Frequency	Percentage %
Yes	129	72.47
No	49	27.53
Total	178	100

Source: Field survey, 2015

From the data above in the table, majority of respondents 129(72.47%) responded that the media reports conflict from their affected communities while 49 (27.53%) responded no, that the media does not report conflicts from their area.

Table 6: Media through Which Respondents Normally Get Conflict Information

Variable	Frequency	Percentage %
Radio	53	29.59
Television	11	6.06
Newspaper	23	13.20
All of the above	91	51.15
Total	178	100

Source: Field survey, 2015

Result in the above table, shows that 53 (29.59%) respondents got to know about conflict through the radio 11 (6.06%) watch such reports on TVs 23 (13.20%)reads about conflict from the pages of newspaper and 91 (51.15%) responded all of the above.

Table 7: Audience Responses on the Positive or Negative Roles of Media in Conflict Management and Reconciliation

Variable	Frequency	Percentage %
Positive	104	58.34
Negative	74	41.66
Total	178	100

Source: Field Survey, 2015

The above result shows clearly that 104(58.34%) respondents were of the opinion that media reports on conflict affected their community positively which means that the media affects society, shape people’s behavior and so on. While 74(41.66%) respondents were of the believe that the affect was negative to the community by causing unnecessary tensions and disaffection to their wellbeing.

Table 8: Respondents Views on the Nature of Conflict in Jos

Variable	Frequency	Percentage%
Ethno-religious	147	82.83
Political Violence	24	13.38
Socio-economic Crisis	2	1.01
Others (unspecified)	5	2.78
Total	178	100

Source: Field Survey, 2015

The provision of the above table shows that the highest respondents were 147(82.83%), who considered the prevalent crisis in Jos as ethno-religious, while 24(13.38%) sees the conflicts as political, 2(1.01%) responded that the common crisis is economic, while 5(2.78%) were for other reasons unspecified on the questionnaires.

Table 9: Respondents Views on the cause and Nature of Conflict in Jos

Variable	Frequency	Percentage%
Intolerance	15	8.33
Diversity	7	3.79
Disrespect	4	2.27
Mistrust	2	1.26
All of the above	150	84.35
Total	178	100

Source: Field Survey, 2015

The table above shows that the highest respondents (84.35) agreed that all the factors mentioned are responsible for the incessant conflict in Jos and the north in general, while 15(8.33%) thought intolerance could be the cause(s) of conflict in the state, 7(3.79%) opined

that diversity is the cause of conflict in Jos, 4(2.27%) responded that disrespect is the reason while just 2(1.26%) were for mistrust as the responsible factor for such conflict accordingly.

Table 10: Respondents Views on the sources of information on Conflict in Jos

Variable	Frequency	Percentage%
Local Media	45	25.25
International Media	56	31.56
Both	77	43.19
Total	178	100

Source: Field Survey, 2015

The provision of table 9 shows that the highest respondents were 77(43.19%) considered the both local and international media as their sources of news on conflict within Jos, while 45(25.25%) sees local media as their reliable source of information on conflicts and 56(31.56%) responded sourcing news from the international media.

Table 11: Respondents Views on information on Conflict in Jos

Variable	Frequency	Percentage%
Factual	71	40.15
Biased	34	19.19
Balance	62	34.59
Don't Know	11	6.07
Total	178	100

Source: Field survey, 2015

The result in the table above indicates that 71(40.15%) are of the opinion that the information on conflict in Jos is factual that is the reason for relying on both international and local media for news on conflict while 34(19.19%) answered that either local or the international may be biased, 62(34.59%) responded balance of report was their reason, while on 11(6.07%) were undecided or have no reason.

Table 12: To what extent does the Media take side or not in Reporting Conflict and Conflict Related Issues?

Variable	Frequency	Percentage%
Yes, completely	32	17.83
To some extent	55	30.95
To larger extent	45	25.20
Not at all	46	26.02
Total	178	100

Source: Field Survey, 2015

The result in the table above indicates that 32(17.83%) responded yes with the view that the media take sides in reporting on conflicts and related issues while 45(25.20%) agreed with the view to larger extent, and 55(30.95%) answered to some extent, while 46 (26.02%) responded not all, disagreeing that the media does not take side while reporting at all.

Table 13: Rating Media Reports on Peace and Conflict Management

Variable	Frequency	Percentage%
Educative	42	23.73
Balanced and accurate	72	40.41
Biased	51	28.54
Boring	13	7.32
Total	178	100

Table 12 indicates that 42(23.73%) respondents are of the opinion that Media Content are educative, many of the respondents 72 representing(40.41%) rated the media reports on peace and conflict as balanced and accurate some 51(28.54%) shared the opinion that the media reports are biased while some 13(7.32%) sees media reports on conflict as being boring

Table 14: Respondents Views on Media contribution to peace Building, Preaching Tolerance, Respect, Trust and Understanding among the diverse people of Jos, Plateau State.

Variable	Frequency	Percentage%
Strongly agree	72	40.66
Agree	50	28.02
Disagree	46	25.81
Strongly Disagree	10	5.51
Total	178	100

Source: Field Survey, 2015

The result above clearly indicates that 72(40.66%) and 50(28.02%) strongly agree and agreed respectively that the media and communication in general contributes to peace building by preaching tolerance, respect, trust and understanding among the diverse people of Jos, while 48(25.81%) disagreed and 10(5.51%) the lowest respondents strongly disagreed. This indicates that the media has been contributing positively to achieving peace through preaching tolerance, respect, trust and understanding among the people of Jos.

Table 15: Responses on media contents on conflict management and reconciliation

Variable	Frequency	Percentage%
Yes	110	61.87
No	68	38.13
Total	178	100

Source: Field Survey, 2015

The above table has it to show that 110(61.87%) were for yes that they are satisfied with the media contents on conflict management and reconciliation in Jos and beyond, while 68(38.13%) were not satisfied with the contents of the media.

Table 16: Respondents Opinion on Improved Professionalism in Peace Journalism and Communication Approaches used in achieving peaceful Co-existence among the People.

Variable	Frequency	Percentage%
Strongly believe	73	41.16
Believe	41	22.73
Disbelieve	45	25.25
Strong disbelieve	19	10.86
Total	178	100

Source: Field Survey, 2015

The result above clearly indicates that 73(41.16%) and 41(22.73%) strongly believe and just believe respectively, while 45(25.25%) disbelieve and 19(10.86%) the lowest respondents strongly disbelieve.

This indicates that improved professionalism on peace and conflict reporting can be a tool to achieving peaceful co-existence among the populace of Jos and Nigeria in general.

Table 17: Responses on how the Media can be used to Better Influence Positive Change and Value among the People of Jos.

Variable	Frequency	Percentage%
Education	21	11.61
Dialogue	10	5.81
Sensitization	5	2.53
Entertainment	4	2.27
All of the above	138	77.78
Total	178	100

Source: Field survey, 2015

The table above shows that the highest respondents were 138(77.78%). Most of the respondents considered all the reasons mentioned in table 17 above as the ways the media can better influence positive change and values among the good and peace loving people of Jos, while 21(11.62%) thought education could be of better influence to people in Jos, 10(5.81%) answered dialogue is a better tool for positive change, 5(2.53%) responded that sensitization is the way out, while just 4(2.27%) were for entertainment as better influence towards the desired change needed for peaceful co-existence in Jos.

Based on the findings from the questionnaires, it shows that there is a significant relationship between the audience exposure to media messages, communication approaches and conflict management / reconciliation. It means that those who are exposed to media messages have better awareness concerning conflict management and reconciliation. Hence, Communication as a tool for conflict resolution has significant relationship between audience exposures to media messages (communication approaches) and conflict management/reconciliation.

On level of significance, based on findings from the tables, emphasis are that the media of communication plays a significant role in conflict prevention, peace building and national development.

4.2 Discussion of Finding Based on Research Questions

To what extent are the audience exposed to media messages on conflict management and resolution?

The extent of exposure of audience to media reports on peace and conflict is quite appreciative as 129(72.47%) in Table 5 indicate that the media reports situation on conflict from their affected areas while 49(27.53%) responded that the media never reported conflict from their areas.

Most of the respondents in Table 8, 147(82.83%) were of the belief that ethno-religious conflict is the type of conflict that is very common in Jos, Plateau State, while 24 representing (13.38%) responded that political violence is, 2(1.01%), responded that it is socio-economic crisis, others 5(2.78%) with unspecified reasons. Still concerning the frequency of exposure in table 7, most of the respondents 104 representing (58.33%) responded that the media reports on conflict affects their communities positively while only 74(41.66%) act in response against positive impact of media in their communities.

From the above, findings have revealed that ethno-religious crisis is actually on the increase, religious violence, communal clashes, ethnic and political conflict, are the causes of great unrest that hinders development in all spheres of life.

Research Question Two

The second research question dwells on the audience perception of communication in conflict Resolution.

Most responses showed that many of the respondents are satisfied with the role of communication in the area of conflict resolution and reconciliation. The various communications by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is educative, professional and balance as regards the safety, peace and security of the people.

In table 15, 110(61.86%) of respondents were on side of the importance of communication in conflict Resolution while 68(38.13%) on the other hand had the opinion that communication and the different media has no relevance.

Table 9, shows the highest respondents which were 150(84.34%) considered all the mentioned causes being responsible for the continuous conflict in Jos, while 15(8.33%) were of the opinion that intolerance may be the cause(s) in Jos. Diversity 7(3.79%), opined that disrespect could be the cause, on the other hand 2(1.26%) went for mistrust as the possible reason respectively.

The result in table 12, shows that 32(17.92%) responded in affirmative with the view while 45(25.50%) agreed to the view to a larger extent, 55(30.56%) replied to some extent, while 46(26.77%) responded not all, disagreeing that communication and the media are not bias at all.

Table 13 shows that 34(23.73%) respondents are of the opinion that communication and media content are educative, many of the respondents totaling 84 which represents (40.40%) rated communications and media reports on peace and conflict as balanced and accurate and some 46(28.54%) are of the opinion that the media report are one sided. Some 14(7.32%) on the other hand see communications and media reports as not interesting.

The results in table 14 show that 80(40.40%) and 56(28.28%) strongly agree and agree respectively, while 50(25.51%) disagree and 11(5.81%) the lowest respondents strongly disagree that the media does not contribute to peace building, preaching tolerance, respect, trust and understanding among the diverse people of Jos, Plateau state. This indicates that the various communication to foster tolerance, respect, trust and understanding among the people of Jos is effective. Table 15, shows that 110(61.86%) indicated Yes, that they are satisfied with the various communication medium contents on conflict resolution in Jos and beyond, while 68(38.13%) were not satisfied with the contents of the various communication medium.

In the table in 17, it shows that the highest respondents were 138(77.76%) considered all the mentioned reasons as the way communication can effect positive change and values in order to foster peace and development in Jos, while 21(11.62%) thought that the education is a means of communication that can have better influence on the people, 10(5.81%) indicated that dialogue can be used, 5(2.53%) responded that using communication as sensitization is a better option, on the other hand just 4(2.27%) went for entertainment as a better form of communication towards positive behavioural change.

Findings in the tables show that most of the respondents are satisfied with the role of communication in conflict resolution. Peace has always been the bedrock of positive development, and communication is a non-ignorable tool for positive change towards meaningful development.

Research Question Three: what is the impact of local and international media of communication on Conflict, Peace and Development?

In the table 10, it shows that the highest respondents were 77(43.18%), agreed that both the local and the international media as their sources of information on conflict in Jos and Nigeria as a whole. 45(25.25%) see local media and sources of information as their own source of information on conflict, 56(31.56%) responded that they source for information from the international media. The result in the table 11 indicates that 69(40.15%) having genuine information is the reason why they depend both on local and international media for information on conflict while 37(19.19%) answered that bias was the reason, 61(34.59%) responded that they needed balanced information as their reason, 11(6.06%) were either not decided or had no reason.

Results in table 6, shows that 53(29.59%) respondents got to know about conflict through the radio, 11(6.06%) watch such reports on TVs, 23(13.20%) read about the conflicts from the pages of newspapers and 91(51.15%) which is the highest response, responded all of the above.

Also the result obtained shows that there is much dependence on information communication both print and electronic media by people between the ages of 18-25 and 25-35 which could be

attributed to the fact that these people are predominantly civil servants with access to media and news sources at home, office, libraries and other places where they are able to watch Televisions, listen to transistor radio or surf the internet for news daily.

On local and international media, Christopher Giwa reasoned that “for me I think that the local media reports are guided by patriotism, there is this social responsibility to protect the country from crisis, thereby withholding some information that may lead to violence and breakdown of law and order.”

Research Question Four: what are the impact of religious and traditional institutions on Conflict, Peace and Development?

Research question four is based on the interview conducted by the Researcher with different people and focus group discussions on their perception on the role of communication in conflict management and reconciliation as exemplified by the 2008/2010 ethno-religious crisis in Jos, Plateau state.

1. Dawn Osakue is a masters degree holder of School of International Relations and Diplomacy At the American Graduate School in Paris (her masters degree project was titled “Has Religion influenced conflict in Jos?”).
2. Christopher Giwa, is a carpenter, who lives in DogonKarfe, he also acted as the translator during the field work in DogonKarfe. A Berom indigene.
3. Mallam Mohammed Ibrahim, a resident of DogonKarfe, a retired civil servant
4. Engr. Itafe Victor Adacha, an engineer a resident of Rukuba area, in Jos
5. Imam Muhammed, is an imam, he resides in DogonKarfe, Jos
6. Reverend John Iliya, a clergy from Berom

7. Grace Tokura, a resident of Rukuba area, in Jos

And the main questions asked during these open-ended interviews were

- How and when did the conflict begin
- Personal opinion on causes of the conflict
- What factors are prolonging the conflict
- Personal opinion on solutions to the conflict.

Major drawbacks to this study include language differences, a tense environment and researcher bias. Some content were only available in Hausa. Translations were relied on in such instances, but the credibility of information, which the researcher has not understood first hand, is reduced. This limitation was countered by carrying out translations personally, rather than relying on generic or unverified translations alone. Closely related to this is the prevalent tradition of storing and passing information in oral rather than written form, meaning certain information and claims were based solely on oral testimonies. Effort was made to back these testimonies with information gotten from other sources from more than one individual. Also, the tense environment in Jos was a hindrance to free and direct observation of certain groups, and limited the range of possible interviewees (the researcher was not able to visit more of the core Muslim areas of Jos because of the invisible Muslim/Christian walls in Jos). This was not a very damaging occurrence, as information on those areas were obtained using DogonKarfe as a focus area. Another major issue is the inefficiency of the Nigerian government in keeping records and pursuing objectivity, as well as making information accessible to the public and for research. Most of the government reports in this research were obtained after a lot of difficulty, and others which would have been relevant were unavailable.

Cause(s) of the 2008 and 2010 Ethno-religious conflicts in Jos, Plateau state

Christopher Giwa stated that:

Let me start by going to the 2001 conflict. This conflict was caused by a girl. The girl was going home, it was a Friday and the Muslims had already called to prayers at Kongo-Russia mosque and were gathered in the mosque and around it for prayers. The road beside the mosque was closed, but she insisted on taking that road, but the security guys in the mosque prevented her. The girl must have gone home to report that she was beaten because soon after she left she returned with some people believed to be people from her area that was how they started vandalizing things belonging to those that were at the prayer ground. The fight soon spread to other parts of Jos. Mind you, there were already areas that were predominantly occupied by Muslims and Christians respectively even before that crisis of 2001, there were previous ones as far back as 1989. About the 2008 crisis on the other hand, that one was caused by protesting youths who assumed that the election may have been rigged. They took to the streets before the results were announced. The crisis of 2008 and 2010 had link with that of 2001.

The conflict in 2008 was more organized because it started not on an individual level but from rioting. It was reported that trouble first started when hundreds of youths in Jos North Local Government Area who were from a particular political party in the state took to the streets to protest an alleged attempt to rig the election in the local government. That was after voting had ended and results was being awaited.

The first scene of the growing tension was at Kabong, where the results for Jos North Local Government were being collated. The supporters of the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) candidate for the Local Government, Mr. Aminu Baba, were said to have suspected that the election was about to be rigged in favour of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) candidate, Mr. Timothy Buba. For that reason, as early as 5.30 am, the ANPP supporters allegedly poured into the streets, chanting war songs. In the ensuing fracas, churches were burnt around SarkinMangu, close to the old Jos North Local Government secretariat. Counter attacks from

the supporters of the PDP then spread to other areas starting in GadaBiu. It was from that stage that the riot assumed a sectarian dimension as churches and mosques were being razed in parts of the city. Several residents were caught off guard as parents taking their children to school quickly beat a retreat while those already in school were sent away. Schools, shops and banks were hurriedly shut as the violence spread.

However while it is not illegal to visit certain areas, common sense dictates that one should be careful where they go and at what times they go there. The fact is some areas of Jos have become “flash points and hot beds of crisis” (Plateau State Government 2010, 126) in which conflict can erupt at any time. A more immediate concern is the blocking of roads by both groups before and during worship, which at a time was a very rampant practice in Jos. The mosques justified this action on necessity, claiming that congregation often outstrips size of mosque and they have to pray outside; besides the prayer usually does not exceed 30 minutes. The Christians quoted security, since church services are long and members’ cars are parked outside on the street, for the security of both the members and their cars the street is blocked (Plateau State of Nigeria 2009: 71-74).

Dawn Osakue, Mohammed Ibrahim and the other interviewees were all in agreement with Christopher Giwa’s account that a girl who insisted that she would pass beside the mosque during a Friday Muslim prayers as the cause of the 2001 crisis. Dawn Osakue went further to add that during the course of her research on the crisis in Jos, she was informed that “both sides (the Christians and Muslims) were seriously affected by this trend of blocking the roads during their worship, and that letters of protest were written to the Commissioner of Police concerning the street-blocking by the mosque at Kongo–Russia when it first became a place of

worship in 1996. It is remarkable that the same mosque later became the immediate cause of a deadly conflict some years later when a lady attempted to ‘trespass’ the street during prayers. The government feebly attempted to rein in the trend by prohibiting the blocking of roads by both Christians and Muslims, but this attempt was ignored and even labelled as unconstitutional by a group of Muslims who claimed it was infringing on their right to free assembly.”

Various accounts have been given for the 2010 conflict which ironically took place while the Judicial Panel on the 2008 conflict was holding in Jos. Dawn Osakue on the other hand narrated that the most believable though is given by Kabir Muhammed to Daily Trust Newspapers (How Jos Crisis Began - By Man on the Spot 2010).

During the 2008 crisis [in Jos], my house was burnt and I had to relocate elsewhere while I started renovating it gradually. By weekend, I had reached the level where I was going to put on the decking. The residents in my area had earlier volunteered to help me when I come to put on the decking. Therefore yesterday (Sunday, January 17th) people came to the site to help in putting on the decking. We did a significant level of the work when the sand finished, so I rushed to Yan Tifa [area] and ordered two trucks of sand.

When the driver went for the second round to supply the sand, I saw from afar that some people were stoning the people in the tipper truck, while the people in the truck too were stoning them. I went down there to see what was happening, and they told me that they were insulting them. Many people gathered there and consoled the tipper men and everybody dispersed. Then the person that was stoning the people in the truck went and told his people that he was beaten by some Hausa youths and before you know it, a mob gathered at the site where I was renovating my house and demanded that we should stop the work. I then realized that the situation might become uncontrollable, so I rushed with my car to call soldiers who were posted at Yan Trailer [garage].

He goes further to state that:

Even before I got there, someone had informed them because they were already in their van heading towards the area. So I turned back and followed them. When we arrived at my house with the soldiers, the people popularly known as Yan Kasa [i.e. natives] demanded that the renovation work should be stopped. One particular Bajari man was the one that insisted that I must halt the work. I explained to the soldiers that I had

already started this work when they proposed that the work should be stopped so that the matter can be resolved. One of the soldiers even collected my number and said that about five of us will go and sit down to resolve the matter. Then all of a sudden, we saw one Achaba boy [commercial motorcyclist] heading towards us with blood all over him. Someone was pushing his motorcycle, then another old man followed suit with similar injuries. I told my people to station the two victims so that they can serve as witnesses to us. So I asked the workers to stop the work, but the workers insisted that we must continue with work since we had already mixed the cement, sand and stone.

I told them that they should stop the work since I was the one that bought the cement, but they refused. So the soldiers said that they should continue the work with the cement that was mixed and when they finish it, they should then stop. But before you know it, we saw a group of youths from afar and they started stoning us. We later heard that they had set up a road block around Baptist area and they were beating people. So we all dispersed. That is as far as I can remember.

They said that they don't want any Muslim to come back to that area again. That is what they said, that no Muslim should return to that area. There are some Muslims, but my house happens to be at the boundary which separates our area from their area. Down inside the area there were Muslims. There are even some that renovated their houses and returned during the [Ramadan] fasting period, but my house happens to be at the boundary and there are no Muslims there.

The conflict soon spread to other parts of Jos, and at least 17 deaths were recorded. As at January 2011 at least 9 deaths had been recorded apart from 62 Christians killed during bomb attacks in December 2010.

Chronology of Contemporary Violence in Jos

According to the African Report of the International Crisis Group (2012), virtually all the inter-communal conflicts have been centred on, and originated from, Jos North, the biggest, richest and most contentious LGA in Plateau state. Its creation in September 1991 by General Ibrahim Babangida's military junta (1985-1993), alongside 88 others across the country, was a watershed in the politics and governance of Jos city. Created at the insistence of the Hausa-Fulani community in Jos, the exercise, by design or default, fundamentally altered the city's political equation in two major ways. Indigenous peoples were no longer the most populous in

Jos North and they no longer had total control over the palace of their paramount leader, the *GbongGwom*, located in the heart of Jos city. The decision also gave the settlers the space for group expression that they had always clamoured for without the relevant authorities putting up any communication strategy to harmonize the native-settler's difference. As a result, the local council's creation came at a huge cost. Relations between the indigenes and settlers became increasingly strained; latent tension was awakened and, over time, has become unduly politicized. Since then Jos has experienced several carnages and conflicts with the worst outbreaks of violence coming in 2001, 2004, 2008 and 2010.

The onset of protracted crises in Jos took place in 1994 in the appointment of a Hausa-Fulani Muslim in Jos North. While this was a victory for settlers, the natives saw this as an imposition on them by the then military government of General SaniAbacha. The long standing disagreements between the natives and settlers over farmland and other land issues increased violence.

Peaceful demonstrations by some members of the BAA communities at the office of the military administrator and at the palace of their paramount ruler took place on the 5th of April to reject the appointment of AminuMato, the then chairman and on the 8th April they stopped him from being sworn in and assume office. Three days later, some members of the Hausa-Fulani community expressed their anger at the government's perceived backtrack by slaughtering cows and other animals on the highway near the abattoir. At a meeting the same evening, the president of the Jasawa Development Association (JDA) and the Plateau state chairman of the Butchers' Association mobilized their members to protest perceived discrimination against their community by the state government. Hausa- Fulani youths clashed

with their BAA counterparts. At least four people were killed and key public properties, most notably the popular Jos main market, were destroyed.

According to the ICG (2012), an enduring outcome of this crisis is that non-indigenes have been excluded from becoming chair of the Jos North local council. Since the Hausa-Fulani, as the most populous group within the LGA, is likely to win free elections, the strategy of the BAA-dominated authorities in the state has been to either manipulate polls or, where possible, avoid or delay holding them.

As in 1994, the immediate cause of the September 2001 conflict was the appointment of another settler, MukhtarUsman Mohammed, by the civilian government of OlusegunObasanjo.

Two other immediate factors intensified the conflict: the expansion of the application of Sharia in twelve northern states, prompting a section of the Hausa-Fulani in Jos to demand its introduction in Plateau state; and street blockage for Friday prayers, a practice that began in early 1996 but was hardly a major issue before.

The 2001 crisis had a fairly long gestation period. Between 1991 and the 29 May 1999 handover of power to elected officials, military governors in the state, all of them Hausa-Fulani, and the Jos North caretaker chairmen, all indigenes, had worked together to deliver indigene certificates to everybody. This changed with the election of Joshua Dariye as Plateau state governor in 1999 and 2003 and Frank Bagudu Tardy in 1999 as the Jos North local council chairman (African Report 2012). Both men from the BAA community did not accept

or recognize the presence of Hausa-Fulani and hence, this led to different agitations. Firstly, this affected the issuance of certificate of origin to Hausa-Fulani settlers; secondly, without certificates, the Hausa-Fulani would be denied citizenship claims and rights by the state. These agitations were finally unleashed on the 7th and 8th of September.

The trigger was the attack in early September against a female Christian pedestrian who was alleged to have disrupted Friday prayers by crossing a blocked street near a mosque, in Kongo-Russia area, a sprawling squatter camp, the closest route to her work place. According to the Niki Tobi Commission, after one of the three guards at the mosque who refused her passage slapped her, she rushed to her house nearby and was pursued by the same aggressor with a pistol. Her brother managed to snatch it but more Muslims arrived at the scene after prayers. The growing crowd injured the girl's father by stoning him; destroying her mother's car and setting Christian houses ablaze in the neighbourhood. The girl and several other people were forced to take refuge for a week at the Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN) in Chwenyap.

According to Nankpak (2011), loudspeakers were engaged to mobilize adherents of Christians and Muslims on 7 and 8 September. The Hausa-Fulani community was reportedly the first to go on the offensive. At various locations in Jos and Bukuru, repeated appeals were made to Muslims to "come out and fight the infidels as God has given them into their hands".

The Christians retaliated shortly afterwards. Within a week of violence, indiscriminate killings by militants and youths from both sides had resulted in the death of over 1,000 people and several thousand internally displaced. Mosques, churches, schools, shops, homes and vehicles

were extensively damaged in several parts of the state. The Central Mosque was not damaged but churches in its vicinity (notably COCIN, SarkinMangu and the Assemblies of God Church) were destroyed (ICG 2012). In addition, several villages and communities in AngwanRogo, Dilimi, Trade Centre, Heipang and Tahoe were decimated. The military, asked to restore order because the police were overwhelmed, reportedly killed many people indiscriminately and, by so doing, sowed the seeds of future violence.

There were three major differences with the 1994 crisis: for the first time, religious or sectarian rhetoric and identity were massively used; the scale of killing and destruction was more significant, with guns freely used; and the crisis was not limited to Jos metropolis but spread to other parts of the state (Niki Tobi Commission 2009).

The violence broke out again twice: on 30 and 31 December 2001 in Vom, Turu and Vwang districts of Jos South LGA and Kwall and Miango districts of Bassa LGA; as well as in 2002 during a ward election in Naraguta community in Jos North, the result of which the BAA allegedly sought to reverse in their favour. Violence was also fuelled by the killing of some indigenes by Hausa-Fulani gangs in other parts of the state. In short, in 2001 and 2002, identity politics were overtly encapsulated by both ethnic affiliation and religious confession.

In February-May 2004, massive killings took place in Yelwa, an important market town and commercial centre in the Muslim-majority Shendam LGA. In February, Christians, most of them in COCIN, were killed. Reprisal killings of Muslims followed in May. Some 1,000 people died, with over 700 of them in two days. Between September 2001 and May 2004, about 5,000 people perished in the clashes (*New Nigerian* 2005) and over 250,000 people

were displaced from their homes. In May, President Obasanjo announced a six-month state of emergency in the state and replaced governor Dariye with retired general Chris Alli, a Plateau indigene but not a BAA.

The 27-28 November 2008 conflict was mainly electoral and political even though rioters again used religion and ethnicity to justify their attacks. As in the past, there was ample evidence of large-scale preparation. Attacks took place simultaneously in six places and were reportedly masterminded by men in fake military uniforms. The crisis, which started from AngwanDalyop Pam-Osumenyi, a neighbourhood slum of Ali Kazaure in the early hours of 28 November, was apparently orchestrated mainly by residents of the slum and Gangare, including over 200 Hausa-Fulani youths and children. They were said to be “brandishing dangerous weapons such as cutlasses, swords, machetes, clubs, bows [and] arrows and... guns”. They mounted roadblocks, and even though their attempt to forcibly enter the collation centre was repelled by the police, they still were alleged to have maimed and killed non-Muslims in areas such as Laranto, NasarawaGwong and AngwanRogo where they dominate.

The BAA and other settler groups were apparently caught unawares. Their main targets were nearby churches. Muslim youths also reportedly destroyed and burned down houses of their Christian neighbours. Tudun Wada Christian Youth Vanguard was accused of retaliating by setting Muslim houses and businesses ablaze (*New Nigerian* 2008). The Igbo-controlled Katako timber market, the city’s largest, was badly torched. The same fate befell the Hausa-controlled grains and yam market. Hausa car traders along Zaria road lost hundreds of vehicles to arson. Over 200 people died in the attacks, and another 130 perished in alleged

extra-judicial killings by soldiers going from house to house, apparently randomly, without targeting any religious or ethnic group in particular.

The Ajibola Commission, established by then-President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua in January 2009, reported that at least 312 people were killed and 323 sustained varying degrees of injuries.

The 2010 conflict is a hangover of the 2008 violence. It was precipitated by rising mistrust and lack of meaningful communication between the BAA and the Hausa-Fulani. Positions had hardened during the proceedings of the 2008 Ajibola Commission. Members of the Hausa-Fulani community did not make any representation at the commission and ultimately rejected its October 2009 report. Sparks may, however, have been drawn from pre-existing divisions and previous violence, the first half of 2010 saw separate and apparently planned intercommunal and inter-faith clashes, which “began and ended at roughly the same time on the same day”, in January and March. Attacks started at Dogo Na Hawa village, outside the Jos South local council, a predominantly Berom area, went on for four days in January and resulted in over 500 casualties. At least 300 people, mainly women and children, were murdered allegedly by Fulani herdsmen and their surrogates. Violence engulfed the entire council and spread to the north. Reprisal attacks by the BAA resulted in Hausa-Fulani loss of life in rural areas in three LGAs: BarkinLadi, Jos South and Riyom. A number of businesses and houses were destroyed and scores of people relocated within and outside the state. Two months later, a further 80 people were estimated killed in an overnight attack apparently masterminded by some members of the Hausa-Fulani community.

Multiple bomb blasts, a new phenomenon in Jos, which killed about 80 people on Christmas Eve, worsened the situation. Boko Haram claimed responsibility, but there are many conflicting reports on the true identity of the perpetrators.

2011 was a particularly bloody year. Hundreds were killed during the first six months. Between 15th August and 12th September, over 150 lost their lives, with 50 in a week. These included pregnant women, children and an entire family.

In November, a vicious face-off between Muslim and Christian gangs, which resulted in the loss of an unidentified number of lives in Barkin-Ladi, prompted the military to impose a 24-hour curfew.

The city witnessed three suicide bombings between December 2011 and March 2012 which Boko Haram was suspected of orchestrating. The first on Christmas Day 2011 killed about 50 people, mostly in churches. Blasts at the Mount of Fire and Miracles Church were accompanied by a shooting spree by suspected Boko Haram militants who exchanged fire with members of the Special Task Force (STF).

The headquarters of the Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN) and St Finbarr's Catholic Church were also targeted by suicide bombings on 26 February 2012 and 11 March, respectively. There were further attacks in April and June. On 24 April, one person died and nine soccer fans were wounded in a bomb blast close to a football television viewing centre in Tudun Wada area of Jos metropolis. It was the third bomb targeting soccer fans during high-profile European matches. On 10 June, suspected Boko Haram gunmen and a suicide bomber

attacked two churches, including ECWA church, during Sunday services. At least seven people were killed and 50 others were injured. These and more are the conflicts that have gripped Jos and the best efforts several governments have put to salvage the situation is to set up committees of inquiry, 24-hour curfew, or to deploy the armed forces.

Even if the problems have been on the inadequacy of the communication strategy deploy in Jos, much efforts have not been put to channel understanding between the natives-settlers populations and knowledge about intercommunity channel of communication in Jos still remains watery even as distrust and tension increase.

Grip on their traditional institutions and be in charge of development, politics and the economy. A combination of factors – economic, political and identity – has instigated violence over the years, producing segregation in the city mainly along ethnic lines.

Personal Opinion on Causes of the Conflict

Mallam Mohammed Ibrahim stated categorically that “All these crisis is purely political. If some political party have issues with the results from an election, it’s so quick for them to start talking about indigenes and non-indigenes most especially if they are not settlers but acclaimed indigenes. Afterall, we all have been staying together for decades. For me, it can be influenced by religion too. Look at the 2001 crisis, I am a Muslim and it is wrong for a woman to be indecently dressed to the mosque, talk less of passing through men who were already set for prayers. This is wrong but I heard she’s an indigene. This is disrespect; we are supposed to respect our religion and that of other people. Basically I see three main causes of this conflict, one ethnicity, politics and religion.”

In relation to Mallam Mohammed Ibrahim's view, the Imam of the DogonKarfe's mosque stated that, "we do not like distractions during prayers, and that is why we like to avoid distractions during our prayer sections. Our prayers are not long; the crisis of 2001 may have been avoided if only we teach our children to respect themselves and others that include the other person's religion. More and more youths do not attend places of worships anymore. We teach them all of these so that we can coexist" Entirely different from the opinions above are that of MrBitrus Peter, an indigene of Berom, he stated emphatically that "these settlers want to take over our homes, they came to our land, we welcomed them into our land, now they want to take over our land from us! You know what? For many years we were quiet, giving them all they wanted even our lands freely for them to build, now they even claim indigenes with us and they want to rule us. That is the problem. So the crisis is actually ethnoreligious and political. My people are predominantly Christians; religion is used as tools for violence by these settlers in order to extinct us from our birthright. If a settler becomes a governor in plateau state it is like a slap on our faces. In support of this, Christopher Giwa, who lives in DogonKarfe, a predominantly Muslim settlement of Jos, affirmed MrBitrus Peter's Assertions that the crisis is both ethnoreligious and political. In his words "the causes of these crisis is that the settlers want to dominate the indigenes."

What Factors are prolonging the conflict?

Dawn Osakue, states that because of the complex nature of Jos, conflict cannot be totally eliminated but can be minimized.

As Malam Mohammed Ibrahim opines, "respect for others and good knowledge of the religion would help. Islam is a religion of peace, it preaches peace and respect. If we both respect each

other the conflict will not have been prolonged”. Furthermore, that prejudices and stereotype behaviours include the reasons why people are unable to tolerate one another. Thirdly, wrong information, rumours are capable of fueling crisis. Information is like a two edged sword, it will protect or destroy.

Mr Bitrus Peter stated that “wrong information is the major cause of the protracted conflict. That even when there is peace, rumour mongers can fuel crisis, if people verified information before taking actions it will help in the long run. Secondly, the settlers should regard the indigenes as the owners of the land thereby allowing them to rule the land because it belongs to them. That if all can respect their boundaries the prolonged crisis will be a thing of the past. He goes further to list the divides in Jos. He stated that today, Muslims in their numbers are crowded in Gangare, AngwanRogo, Bauchi Road, DogonKarfe, Ali kazaure, Yan Shanu, Tudun Wada and Dilimi. Most Yoruba Muslims are resident in the fairly mixed area of NassarawaGwong. While Apata, JentaAdamu, Alheri, TafawaBalewa and Rukuba are the prominent Christian areas.

Imam Mohammed, a Muslim Clergy, said that:

The prolonged crisis is as a result of negligent on the part of the community as regards training up good and responsible children. Most of these young men who take arms at the slightest provocation do not attend worship gatherings. I know I can use my position as a clergy to address the youths but I can only address the ones I see at the Mosque. Politicians use these same youths to do their dirty job. If only politicians will know that they should accept success or failure.

Engineer Victor Adacha, a resident in Jos, listed three reasons for the prolonged crisis. According to him:

Joblessness, false information dissemination and impatience are major factors. Jobless youth can go on rampage just for a little money. These three listed factor are connected. The first thing is that some idle youths are paid to cause trouble, they spread wrong information which in turn is not verified before people react to it.

Personal Opinions on solutions to the Conflict

Dawn Osakue, opines that Organisations do exist to promote and protect each group's cultural and other interests and some of the groups she encountered through her research include the

- Jasawa Development Association
- Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association
- Du Elders Council
- Berom Elders Council
- Berom Educational and Cultural Organisation (BECON)
- Anaguta Youth Movement
- Berom Youth Movememnt
- Afizere Youth Movement
- Plateau Youth Council
- Yoruba Community
- Igbo Community Association
- Hausa – Fulani Youth (under 25)

These organizations she added can be used as agents of peace and conflict resolution in Jos.

She reiterates that communication is key to conflict management and resolution. Engr Victor Adacha had a similar view to Dawn Osakue, he stresses that communication of positive behavioural change messages is key to sustainable peace and development in Jos. He goes further to add that job creation, recreational centers and communal partnership could help savage the situation.

Imam Mohammed and Bitrus Peter had similar views on these, they talked about respect for oneself, others and the society at large. Bitrus Peter went further to stress that the settlers must allow the indigenes rule Plateau state.

Overview of Findings/Results

The researcher noted some important issues that relate to the perception of the audience on the Role of Communication in Conflict Management and Resolution using the 2008/2010 Ethno-religious Crisis in Jos as a case study. All findings from both the questionnaire and the in-depth interview were discussed in relation to the research questions of the study which entails addressing issues relevant to communication as a tool for Conflict Management and Resolution. Furthermore, the various problems confronting Jos and offering possible solutions and suggestions as to how these problems can be remedied.

By observation, it is a fact that no society can develop successfully without peace and security, which can be achieved through effective communication to create a conducive atmosphere for trade, commerce and investment. This security consideration is more demanding in the face of the reoccurring challenges that Boko Haram now poses (An Islamic terrorist sect).

1. According to research findings, majority of the respondents believe that communication played a vital role in conflict management and resolution.

2. Findings reveals that majority of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed with the fact that communication is positive contribution to peace building through preaching tolerance, respect, trust and understanding among heterogeneous people of Jos.
3. As regards to the 2008/2010 ethno-religious conflict, respondents reacted that they both started as mere ethno-religious misunderstanding with political undertone.
4. Table 10 confirms that majority of the audience prefer getting information about internal conflict 67(43.18%) from both local and international media but then quite a good number 61(31.56%) prefer foreign media to local media because of accuracy, balance and credibility.
5. This research findings confirmed that Religious leaders, just as the politicians and media are at fault of communicating improperly in favour of some ethnic groups, affiliations of political candidates using hate speeches and incitement. The research also views the value of communication and media in the society, economy and politics.
6. The research findings further advised media practitioners to be cautious and exercise understanding of the terrain in which they are reporting and the reports should be peace building and not conflict escalating in Jos or the country.
7. The research discovered that conflict cannot be completely eliminated in our complex society but it can be reduced to the barest minimum and communication has a unique role to play in that it can be of positive behavioural change effect by being educative, enlightening, patriotic, balance and objective in approach and reportorial.
8. Government and it Officials are advised to be fair, equitable and treat every citizen equally without any form of discrimination.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Summary

Communication (from Latin *communis*, meaning *to share*) is the activity of conveying information through the exchange of thoughts, messages, or information, as by speech, visuals, signals, writing, or behaviour. It is any act by which one person gives to or receives from another person, information about that person's needs, desires, perceptions, knowledge, or affective states. Communication may be intentional or unintentional, may involve conventional or unconventional signals, may take linguistic or nonlinguistic forms, and may occur through spoken or other modes. It is a tool that implicates development. It conveys development through the mass media as well as other alternative media. As a tool, it requires a sender, a message, and a recipient. Communication requires that the communicating parties share an area of communicative commonality. The communication process is complete once the receiver has understood the message of the sender. Hence, communication is thus a process by which meaning is assigned and conveyed in an attempt to create shared understanding. This process, which requires a vast repertoire of skills in interpersonal processing, listening, observing, speaking, questioning, analyzing, gestures, and evaluating enable collaboration and cooperation. However, sharing the same commonality may not by itself bring about understanding. In an heterogeneous society sharing the same communicative commonality, protracted communication may be a problematique. The diverse ethno-religious conflicts in Jos, Plateau State Nigeria is a case in point. This study, thus, examined communication and conflict resolution in Jos, Nigeria. It used the 2008 and 2010 ethno-religious conflict as a case in point.

This dissertation addressed the divergent issues and peculiarities of Jos several other conflicts in the city of Jos. It identified protracted communication, dislocation in the communication strategy of native-settler cum Christian-Moslem relationships, poor communication tool for peace-building as the problem of the study. The Chapter examines the strategies engaged in managing the conflicts in Jos and attempts to develop a communication strategy that will better manage the ethnic and religious conflict. As way of achieving the aim of this research, the study used the following objectives; firstly, to establish the pattern of communication or communication strategies of early native-settlers interaction in Jos. It also examined the rise of ethnic and religious conflict in Jos and its implication for communication. It assessed the role and importance of communication in conflict resolution and management. It also examined protracted communication and its impact on conflict management and resolution. One of the objectives also established the roles of religious and traditional institutions in conflict and conflict management.

Review of relevant literature on communication, ethno-religious conflicts in Jos and issues in conflict resolution were made. It examined the area under study and commented on the divide between native-settler in the Middle Belt region with the attempt to locate the Jos paradigm within context. It proceeded from there to look at the interplay between ethnicity, religion, conflict and the historical antecedent of ethnic-religious crises in Nigeria. It also assessed the chronology of recent violence in Jos and their causes. The study goes further to analyze how communication has affected the politics of identity and economy of the area of study. Conflict resolution strategies, the media reportage of the Jos crises and the theoretical framework are also examined on this chapter.

Furthermore, it embodies the methodology for conducting this research. This paper adopted the qualitative research design and itemized the processes on which communication can be engaged to transform the situation in Jos. To do this, the study identified with the “Stage of Conflict” and “Strategic Response” approach. The population size is the residents of Jos who experienced or participated in the 2008 and 2010 conflicts in Jos. For the sample size, this research sampled the opinions of five elders of the BAA population and five elders of the Jasawa group. The opinions of the youth population (both Moslem and Christian population) are also sampled in two sessions of FGDs. The data of the study are analyzed and interpreted using descriptive methods. The responses are presented in simple tabulation. The data gathered from the field are both tabulated and descriptive. Summary, conclusion and recommendations were drawn from the finding of the study.

5.2 Conclusion

Communication, whether it served desired purpose or not, is the result of intentional or unintentional information sharing, which is interpreted between multiple entities and acted upon in a desired way. Effective communication should generate the desired effect and maintain the effect, with the potential to increase the effect of the message. However, concerning the crises in Jos, the content (of message) of communication is one that takes a unidirectional strand. Communicated messages across the divergent ethnic divide hardly gets feedback; hence, resulting in a protracted communication which leads to conflict.

While communication itself is a solution or one of the essentials to resolving conflicts, it can, arguably, be a problem and a cause of conflict. This, for example, is evident on the kind newspaper and, or, television/radio reports on the conflicts. This is deepened again by the kind

of information given out in religious places of worship. Again, the city of Jos, like some other states in North-west and Middle-Belt, is divided into Jos north and Jos south settlements. This very cocooning is caused by a communication problem and on the other way, affects the circulation of information across Jos north-south divide. Economically, conflicts have forced certain businesses to remain domiciled in only some parts of Jos as a result of fear. Communication hitherto has not been to dispel this or reintegrate Jos into a society devoid of carnages as it were. Nevertheless, human society has moved from simplicity to a far more complex one and Jos is one of the many cities in Nigeria caught up in that web. However, the communication strategy that kept both the native and the settler population of Jos in peace in the 19th and 20th centuries remain a strategy that should be tailored into modern realities for peaceable coexistence.

5.3 Recommendation for Communication Use

In regards to the lapses observed in the communication use in the resolution of the lingering crisis in Jos, the researcher hereby gives the following recommendations:

1. There is a need to focus on human behavior. On programs that are aimed towards positive human behavioural changes. That change can affect reactions to crisis.
2. There is a need for the media to be professional in dealing about crisis. The radio is a vital tool for wider coverage, there is a need for professionalism on issues of crisis.
3. There is a need for direct participation of all the association and various groups towards information dissemination in crisis, even in peace, their roles towards reaching the grassroots is so important.
4. It is very important that the constitution as regards indigenes and citizenship be reviewed.

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APPENDIX I

LIST OF KEY INTERVIEWEES

- 8. Dawn Osakue is a masters degree holder of School of International Relations and Diplomacy At the American Graduate School in Paris (her masters degree project was titled “Has Religion influenced conflict in Jos?”).
- 9. Christopher Giwa, is a carpenter, who lives in DogonKarfe, he also acted as the translator during the field work in DogonKarfe. An indigene of Berom.
- 10. Mallam Mohammed Ibrahim, a resident of DogonKarfe, a retired civil servant
- 11. EngrItafe Victor Adacha, an engineer a resident of Rukuba area, in Jos
- 12. Nasiru Muhammed, is a Muslim clergy, A resident of DogonKarfe, Jos
- 13. Reverend John Iliya, a Christian clergy from Berom
- 14. Grace Tokura, works with Plateau state Radio and Television (PRTV). a resident of Rukuba area, in Jos
- 15. Focused group discussion with some men at DogonKarfe
- 16. Focused group discussion with men and women at Rukuba

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS/FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

I am Tona Elizabeth Orifa, a postgraduate student of Development Communication, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. I am undergoing a research thesis on the topic “The Role of Communication in Conflict Resolution: An Examination of the Ethno-Religious Crisis in Jos”

Information of Respondents

- i.** Sex-----
- ii.** Educational Background of Discussants/Respondents-----
- iii.** Religious Background of discussants-----
- iv.** Community/location of resident in Jos-----

CHECKLIST

- What communication strategy or conflict resolution approach was deployed by the early natives-settlers in Jos that they lived peacefully despite their diversity. What was the communication network like?
- 6. How, when and from whence did crisis begin to arise?
- 7. What are the factors that stir crisis in Jos?
- 8. What are the conflict resolution methods on ground?
- 9. What type of information or communication is shared when fear seethes within and among peoples of different socio-cultural affinity?

APPENDIX II

Questionnaire

This questionnaire is for a research thesis by Tona Elizabeth Orifa, a postgraduate student of Development Communication, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. I am undergoing a research thesis on the topic “The Role of Communication in Conflict Resolution: An Examination of the Ethno-Religious Crisis in Jos”

Section A (Demographic data)

1. Age: -----18-25 {__} 26-35 {__} 36-45{__} 46 Above{__}
2. Sex:----- Female {__} Male {__}
3. Education-----Primary{__}Secondary{__}Informal{__}Tertiary{__}
4. Religion-----Christian{__} Muslim{__}

Section B(the extent of the perception of Respondents on media and communication)

1. Do you get reports on conflict from your area: Yes{__} No{__}
2. What media do you get conflict information through: Radio {__} Television {__}Newspaper {__}All of the above {__}
3. How positive or negative is the role of the media in Conflict management and Reconciliation: positive {__} Negative {__}
4. What is the nature of the Conflict in Jos: Ethno-Religious {__} Political Violence {__} socio-Economic crisis {__} others (unspecified) {__}
5. What is or are the causes of the Conflict in Jos: Intolerance {__} Diversity {__} Disrespect {__} Mistrust {__} All of the above {__}
6. What are your sources of information on conflict in Jos: local media {__} international media {__} Both {__}
7. What is your view on the information reports on conflict in Jos: Factuality {__} Biased {__} Balance {__} Do not know {__}

8. To what extent would you say the media take sides in reporting conflict and conflict related issues: Yes {__} To some extent {__} To a larger extent {__} Not at all{__}
9. How would you rate Media reports on Peace and Conflict Management: Educative {__} Balance and Accurate {__}
10. {__} Biased {__} Boring {__}
11. Would you agree that the Media is contributing to Peace building by preaching tolerance, respect, trust and understanding among the diverse people of Jos: Strongly agree {__} Agree {__} Disagree {__} Strongly Disagree {__}
12. Would you say that the Media contents on Conflict Management and Reconciliation is helpful: Yes{__} No{__}
13. Would you say that there has been improvement in professionalism in Peace journalism communication approaches use in achieving peaceful coexistence among the people of Jos: Strongly believe {__} Believe {__} Disbelieve {__} Strongly Disbelieve {__}
14. How can the Media be use to influence positive change value among the people of Jos: Education {__} Dialogue {__} Sensitization {__} Entertainment {__} All of the above {__}