

**ROLE OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN
STATES (ECOWAS) IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION OF LIBERIA**

BY

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation has been written by me and it is a report of my research work. It has not been presented in any previous application for M.Sc. degree. All quotations are indicated and sources of information specifically acknowledged by means of references.

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CERTIFICATION

This dissertation entitled “Role of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Conflict Resolution of Liberia” meets the regulations governing the award of Masters of Science (M.Sc), of the school of postgraduate studies of Nasarawa State University, Keffi for its contribution to knowledge and literacy presentation.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my beloved wife (Precious) and my children, Chasya, Magdiel and Chamdiel for building the peace of my life.

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I am most grateful to Almighty God, my creator, provider and protector, who built the wall of fire all around me throughout this journey.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation seeks to objectively X-ray the role of ECOWAS in conflict resolution of Liberia. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is a regional group of fifteen West African Countries which seeks to, among others promote cooperation and integration in order to create an economic union in West Africa. ECOWAS and the leaders of the regional body realized that there is a strong nexus between economic development and other human security issues, and this necessitate for conflict resolution in order to achieve the organisational goals. The study tried to bring out the role of ECOWAS in the conflicts that affected Liberia. The study empirically reviewed some literature and it was revealed that conflict is neither negative nor positive but an opportunity to change. The study adopted conflict theory. It was deduced from the theory that human behaviour in social context results from conflicts between competing groups. The research was carefully designed and descriptive method was applied in exploring the area of study. Secondary source of data was used. Different findings were made which lead to the objective of the study. The study found out that ECOWAS has done significantly well in conflict resolution, ECOWAS through its organised bodies brought peace to Liberia and restored a democratic government to the state. The study recommended that a clearly defined human security charter with specific priorities be formulated for the sub region. This should serve as a guide to conflict prevention and resolution among the member states of ECOWAS.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Conflict arises when people are pursuing opposing interests, and/or are engaged in competition to meet goals which are perceived to be incompatible. This is derivable from the possession of and pursuit of divergent ideas, goals, claims, interests and aspirations by people in their relations. This occurs between individuals, within states and between states. In the words of Stagner (2015), conflict is a situation in which two or more human beings desire goals which they perceive being obtainable by one or the other, but not both. This implies that conflicts have been part of mankind since creation, and that they continue to be so. In fact, if this is the case, the extent to which conflict affects human existence is determined by human capacity to reduce, manage or resolve it. In view of this, this study appraises the role of ECOWAS in conflict resolution in Liberia.

In December 1989, Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) launched an armed and violent campaign against the government of President Samuel Doe, with a view to ousting him from office. At the outset of the crisis, many hoped that the United States of America would intervene, considering the historical ties between the two countries. But instead, Washington was reported to have insisted that the crisis in Liberia was “an African one and so should be settled by Africans”. Doe then called for ECOWAS intervention to protect his government. In 1990, the first contingent of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was despatched to Liberia.

However, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is a regional group that comprises fifteen West African countries. It was created in 1975 and seeks to, among

others, to promote co-operation and integration in order to create an economic union in West Africa. The Article 58 of the 1993 Revised Treaty, makes provision for regional security. It contains the undertaking of member states to work together to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of peace, stability and security within the region in addition to its original preoccupation with social and economic functions of regional economic integration.

In considering the level to which ECOWAS has played a role in responding to conflicts in the West African sub region, more especially in Liberia, one is often kin to forget that ECOWAS was originally meant to foster economic integration and only got into the field of peace and security by default. In the last few years, ECOWAS has played a significant role in addressing conflicts in the sub region. However, its capacity has been more demonstrated in the field of peace keeping.

The thesis of this study is that while ECOWAS has performed significantly well in regional peace keeping, the extent of its involvement in overall conflict resolution is not certain. It is against this background that this work is set to x-ray the role of ECOWAS in the resolution of Liberia conflicts.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The conflict in Liberia which started since 1989, have claimed so many lives and properties. This has been attributed to bad governance. The exclusionary rule of the Americo - Liberian oligarchy, the brutal and inept rule of Samuel Doe, the deleterious effects that Doe's rule had on the armed forces of Liberia, ethnic rivalries and personal ambitions that resulted from Doe's rise to bloody power, and the destabilising effects of the withdrawal of the US support from Doe were seen as the major causes of the conflict. The insecurity in Liberia which affected the sub-regional economic integration made ECOWAS to find a way of resolving the conflict. This lead to the formation of ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) for the resolution of the conflict in Liberia.

However, Silas and Voil (2014) in a study entitled "the role of ECOWAS in the process of peace-keeping in Liberia", suggested that the conflict can be resolved when the process that affected the peace is identified and handled. The problem implies that, ECOWAS will hardly meet the expectation of conflict resolution if there is no proper understanding of the contradictions and contending issues that have thwarted the peace processes.

Molnár (2008) argues that ECOMOG is a viable solution for West African problems adding that its importance to handle regional crisis cannot be denied. It does seem undeniable that ECOMOG (and by extension ECOWAS), plays a key role in conflicts in the region (simply because it exists), but this does not inherently define its role as a "viable solution". Molnár (2008) admits the various contentious issues surrounding the involvement of ECOWAS, such as the "prolongation of the war itself", but does not seem to concede that such results are massively damaging to a state. Molnár (2008) concludes by arguing that "it [ECOMOG] has built the basis for further developments to create a viable state in Africa". This ambiguous statement purports all the hallmarks of eurocentrism, and disappointingly, the author offers no clear definition of what exactly a "viable" solution looks like, though she does offer the

means to that solution: ECOMOG. The approach by Molnár seems to lack any clear methodology, and she crassly highlights events that are pertinent to the argument being made, whilst at the same time spuriously disregarding vital facts such as ECOMOG's cooperation with militant groups, hence disallowing a balanced analysis.

Khobe (2012) is supportive of ECOWAS, praising the organisation in its role in the conflict, stating that “[ECOMOG] is a positive security development requiring some finetuning”, and that it “successfully...restored functional state structure in Liberia”. It may be stated that the development of ECOWAS is conducive to the state of intra-African relations, but his second declaration is very susceptible to criticism indeed. What he does not mention directly is that it took seven years for a long enough lull in violence so as to allow elections, and a further six before Liberia would be at peace after the second civil war, and only after the UN had intervened. The validity of the argument that Khobe purports falls flat furthermore as questions of bias arise, due to his being Commander of ECOMOG in its mission in Sierra Leone. He describes the ECOMOG mission in Liberia as one which sought to “reinstate law and order” by defeating the “drug addicted combatants”. The fact is that ECOMOG itself was committing acts of violence and other forms of criminality, as highlighted by Berman and Sams (2013) as well as Horvitz and Catherwood (2016), who at the very least partially nullify the praise Khobe so unapologetically dispatches. Furthermore, the methodology used certainly lacks any scientific rigour. Frequently ascribing acts of criminality unto rebels, he seems to lack or at least cite any evidence. Whilst he continuously sensationalises the topic, using the term “anarchy” throughout; he manages to conveniently disregard the severity of damage that ECOWAS caused to Liberia.

Khobe (2012), Molnár (2008), Jenkins (2005), Gberie (2013) and a plethora of other authors make their analyses based merely on the parties that contributed to ECOMOG. This is why I

argue that the discussion vis-à-vis this topic is severely lacking, and hence my dissertation seeks to consider the entirety of the Community in its relationship with Liberia, and how said relationship affected that particular state. Although Gberie (2013) treats the case of Liberia just by considering ECOMOG, he does sustain throughout his argument that ECOMOG, although well intentioned, was a failure; “[a] heroic failure”. It is clear though that Gberie could have gone much further in his analysis had he considered ECOWAS and not just ECOMOG.

Many reasons have been given for this conflict. For Adebajo, the conflict is generally attributed to bad governance. Adebajo identifies six key issues, as indices of bad governance, that contributed to the Liberian War: ‘the exclusionary rule of the Americo-Liberian Oligarchy, the brutal and inept rule of Samuel Doe; the deleterious effects that Doe’s rule had on the armed forces of Liberia, ethnic rivalries and personal ambitions that resulted from Doe’s rise to bloody power; and the destabilizing effects of the withdrawal of the U.S. support from Doe, a strategic Cold War ally’ (Adebajo 2002).

Despite my opposition to some of Jenkins (2005) methods, I do utilise his paper as it is a useful legal appraisal, as long as its inherent eurocentrism is kept in mind. In this dissertation I build on the work of the likes of Gberie (2013), Adeleke (1995), Aoi (2001), and others, in an attempt to disprove the likes of Molnár (2008) and Khobe (2012), whilst attempting to avoid the traps of ethnocentrism as succumbed to by the likes of Jenkins (2005) and Nanda (1998). I aim to unite various bodies of evidence to show that ECOWAS, as a sub-regional organisation, did not do extensively well in Liberia crisis.

The question has been: what led to a resumption of conflict following the end of the war in 1990 and the election of Charles Taylor as president of Liberia in 1997? Were the root causes of the conflicts that led to the first civil war from 1989 to 1990 addressed? If they were not,

what lessons can be learned by the present government of Liberia in this post-conflict period, and what policies are needed to maintain peace and stability in Liberia without a resumption of conflict?

This study intends to address these limitations or fill in some of the gaps in the approaches to ECOWAS conflict resolution in Liberia, especially by addressing the root causes of conflict, and showing how to maintain effective security policies that will prevent a return of conflict.

1.3 Research Questions

This study intends to answer the following research questions:

- i. How has the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mechanism on regulation of regional peace and security affect Liberia conflict?
- ii. To what degree has the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mechanism for conflict management affect conflict resolution of Liberia?
- iii. Has the protocol on conflict prevention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) affect conflict resolution of Liberia?
- iv. To what extent has the formal conflict resolution structure by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) affect conflict resolution of Liberia?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The main objective of this study is to examine the effect of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in conflict resolution of Liberia. Other specific objectives are:

- i. To determine how the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mechanism on regulation of regional peace and security affect conflict resolution in Liberia
- ii. To ascertain the degree to which the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mechanism for conflict management affect conflict resolution of Liberia.
- iii. To determine whether the protocol on conflict prevention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has effect on conflict resolution of Liberia.
- iv. To examine the extent to which the formal conflict resolution structure by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) affect conflict resolution of Liberia.

1.5 Significance of the Study

The importance of this study is better imagined when the Economic Community of West African States and other actors (both national and international) accept the recommendations and suggestions offered in this study. The work repositioned and reorganized all stake holders to be informed on the role of ECOWAS in the field of conflict resolution inn Liberia, which includes: humanitarian agencies, national and international actors, non-governmental organizations, governments, researchers and policy makers among others to redirect their views and perception for a total conflict resolution.

This work promises to be a major source of knowledge on issues of conflict resolution. ECOWAS and other actors as the main beneficiaries of this study can decide at any time to look at possible recommendations and conclusions drawn herein to guide against recurrence of conflict in West Africa. In furtherance of the significance envisaged from this study, younger generational scholars (students/researchers) can also appreciate the value of this literature when handed down to them by the succeeding generations to come. Nevertheless,

researchers and policy makers among actors (national and international) can have an in-depth knowledge about conflict resolution under the auspices of ECOWAS and apply a new fashionable strategy on how it can be improved for maximum conflict resolution.

1.6 Scope of the Study

This study focuses on conflict resolution in Liberia under the auspices of the ECOWAS from 1990 to 2015. It tried to x-ray the role of ECOWAS in resolving contending issues in Liberia.

1.7 Definition of Operational Terms

For the purpose of this study, the following key words are defined as follows:

Conflict resolution: An intervention aimed at alleviating or eliminating discord mediation arbitration and judicial settlement through conciliation, mediation, arbitration and judicial settlement. It is a way for two or more parties to find a peaceful solution to a disagreement among them. It is the process of trying to find a solution to a conflict.

Peacekeeping: In event of a conflict, the deployment of national or, more commonly, multinational forces for the purpose of helping to control and resolve an actual or potential armed conflict between or within states. It is the maintenance of international peace and security by the deployment of military forces for peace keeping in a particular area.

Disarmament: An attempt to eliminate or radically reduce armaments. It is the act of reducing, limiting or abolishing weapons. This means the reduction of arms and weapons through international treaties and agreements signed in between two or more states. It is often taken to mean total elimination of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear arms.

Demobilization: The formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces and groups, including a phase of “reinsertion” which provides short-term assistance to

ex-combatants. It is the release or “draw down” of wartime military forces as the nation resumes peacetime status following a war or major build up.

Reintegration: The process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. After ex-combatants have been demobilized, their effective and sustainable reintegration into civilian life is necessary to prevent a new escalation of the conflict. In the short term, ex-combatants who do not find peaceful ways of making a living are likely to return to conflict.

Preventive diplomacy: An action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

Peacemaking: A practical conflict transformation focused upon establishing equitable power relationships robust enough to forestall future conflict, often including the establishment of means of agreeing on ethical decisions within parties, or engaged in inappropriate responses to conflict.

Mediation: A dynamic, structured interactive process where a neutral third party assists disputing parties in resolving conflict through the use of specialized communication and negotiation techniques. It is a “party-centered” process in that it is focused primary upon the needs, rights, and interests of the parties. The mediator uses a wide variety of techniques to guide the process in a constructive direction and to help the parties find their optimal solution.

Peace Accord: An official agreement between parties to come to peace or end conflict.

Treaty: Means the Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) signed in Contonou on 24 July, 1993.

Protocol: Means the protocol relating to the mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacemaking and security signed in Lome on 10th December, 1990

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Conceptual Framework

2.1.1 Concept of Conflict

The word conflict is derived from the Latin word “Congligere” meaning to strike together. It could also mean a fight, struggle or battle, clash, contention, confrontation, a controversy or quarrel, active opposition, strife or incompatibility, to meet in opposition or hostility to contend, to be contrary or to be at variance.

Conflict also means contradiction arising from differences in interests, ideas, orientations, beliefs, perceptions and tendencies. Realistically, the ubiquity of conflict cannot be underestimated. It comes in many forms and involve vastly different kinds of parties, ranging from individual persons to large macro units such as nation states. Conflict originally has a physical rather than moral connotation which means two or more different things moving to occupy the same space at the same time.

Many scholars have come up with different concepts, and views of conflict. Wright (1990:19) sees conflict as opposition among social entities directed against one another, it distinguished competition and defined it as opposition among social entities independently and a means to the development of collective identity.

Blalock Jr (1989) posited that conflict is a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other. Conflict is a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resource in which the aims of the opponents are

to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals. It is also a purposeful struggle between collective actors who use social power to defeat or remove opponents and to gain status, power, resources and the other scarce values. Multullah (2013:171) postulates that conflict arises as a result of differences over goals, values, motives, ideals and resources. A conflict process is a situation in which at least two actors or their perception of mutually incompatible goals by undermining, directly or indirectly, the goal-seeking capability of one another. Aspiration for “potential future position” claims for power and resources and the use of “social power base” for struggles are very central to the outbreak of conflict. In situation where there are no sufficient structures that can facilitate the realization of the wishes of people to assume positions of power dissatisfaction may evolve into conflict. Political systems that do not provide a smooth transfer of power to the most able in the society are more incubators for trouble. It is worst when there are differences of people in terms of their culture and identity.

Wallenstein (2004) has pointed that, resources are not only economic in nature, and that the terminology might miss conflict involving economic orientation, human security, environment, historical issues, etc, and that such conflicts are not necessarily about resource, and when they are, these resources are, more importantly, not necessarily scarce. A conflict is, moreover, in many cases based on perceptions, rather than on attitude or behaviour as it has generally been seen.

Conflict, according to the Chinese, is an “opportunity to change”. This means that conflict is neither negative nor positive. What determine the way conflicts go are our own attitudes, how we were brought up (our backgrounds) and the information we have. These factors often dictate the way we manage any conflict.

Conflict is a situation in which two or more human beings desire goals which they perceive as being obtainable by one or the other but not both. Each party is mobilizing energy to obtain a goal, a desired object or situation and each party perceives the other as a barrier or threat to that goal.

Simmel (1984) sees conflict not simply as a pathological phenomenon to be prevented or adjust, but rather as an essential ingredient in the balance and vitality of group life, which emphasizes that conflict is positive and will always be a part of human nature.

Conflict resolution, as Mitchell (2001:117) writes, is a series of techniques that “aim primarily at altering conflict behaviour and then reaching a compromise solution in which the parties make ‘fair’ sacrifices of some of the goals in dispute in order to achieve others”. Conflict resolution aims at providing a solution which is generally acceptable to the parties to the conflict, which they themselves have evolved and which, for these reasons, is self-supporting.

According to Osisiogu and Onoja (2016), conflict resolution is a variety of approach aimed at resolving conflicts through the constructive solving of problems distinct from the management or transformation of conflict. Conflict resolution is multifaceted in that it refers to the process, a result, and identified field of academic study as well as an activity in which person and communities engage every day without ever using the term. The antagonisms in question may involve interpersonal relationship, labour management issues, business decisions, intergroup disputes, disagreements between nation-states, or international quarrels. Conflict resolution involves recognition by the clashing parties of one another’s interests, needs perspective and continued existence.

Zartman, (2004), it is obvious that conflict is an inevitable aspect of human interaction. Therefore, whether or not conflict plays a functional or dysfunctional role in human relation,

depends on the manner in which such a conflict is managed and resolved. To resolve conflict according to Abajide, is to turn the opposed position, then claims and its rejection into a single outcome. The objectivity of conflict resolution is not to terminate the conflict but to remove the fundamental cause of the crisis.

Conflict resolution is not just a technical task of making the best changes or just a question of having the right answer and then convincing the parties in conflict, it is a cultural and political task of generating support from the parties in conflict to reach an agreement and be satisfied with the outcome. Conflict is not always stationary but dynamic, and, therefore, grows or reduces and changes in form and shape. Conflicts escalate when people concerned or involved are not open and ready to settle it.

In addressing a conflict, the right to life is fundamental to all economic, social, civil and political rights. In a place where violent conflict continues, upholding the right to life and ensuring security for all people, these rest upon the resolution of such conflict.

The concern for security is a major preoccupation of those with whom we work with and the regional government alike. Conflicts must be avoided; this will be a meaningful action. The international assistance enables the government of the region to reduce poverty and deliver practical and equitable improvements to the people's lives. Avoiding conflict is the key to both sustainable development and reduction of tension.

However, poorly targeted aid can increase conflict by exacerbating inequalities between men and women, across generations, between families or clans or between people of different ethnic groups or geographical regions.

Conflict analysis can be carried out at various levels and seeks to establish the linkages between these levels. Identifying the appropriate focus for the conflict analysis is crucial: the issues and dynamics at the national level may be different from those at the grassroots.

This is a practical process of examining and understanding the reality of the conflict. Conflict analysis is not a onetime exercise; it must be an ongoing process as the situation is developing so that you can adapt your actions to changing factors, dynamics and circumstances. The concept of conflict analysis may seem quite remote to those who are engaged in practical work on conflict. It is sometimes seen as requiring objectivity and neutrality rather than personnel experience and strong emotion. There are several reasons why conflicts are analysed, to understand the background and history of the situation as well as current events, to identify all the relevant groups involved, not just the main or obvious ones, to understand the perspectives of all these groups and to know more about how they relate to each other, to identify factors and trends that under-pin conflicts, to learn from failures as well as successes.

There several ways of managing conflicts; an assessment of conflict between humans, organizations and groups resulting from changing interests and values; compound the problem of controlling and governing men and the societies. Yet, conflict itself is a natural concomitant of human interaction; and uncontrolled conflict can lead to devastating consequences at both intra-national and international levels.

This is why every society makes it a point of duty to apply strategies, technique or mechanisms for the management of conflict, in order to secure or ensure its survival, peace, continuity, security and development. At the world level, it took the sad experiences of the Second World War to establish the United Nations (UN) in 1945 with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. Through collective security

mechanism, this mechanism having been stalled by the Cold War, was however replaced with peace-keeping operations while African States emerging from colonial bondage formed the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. With the hope that the organization will pursue their independence to colonial territories, promote their unity, peaceful Implement of disputes and development; and also ECOWAS.

2.1.2 Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

Conflict is a natural concomitant of human interaction; and uncontrolled conflict can lead to devastating consequences at both intra-national and international levels. This is why every society makes it a point of duty to apply strategies, technique or mechanisms for the resolution of conflict, in order to secure or ensure its survival, peace, continuity, security and development. At the world level, it took the sad experiences of the Second World War to establish the United Nations (UN) in 1945 with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. Through collective security mechanism, this mechanism having been stalled by the Cold War, was however replaced with peace-keeping operations while African States emerging from colonial bondage formed the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. With the hope that the organization will pursue their independence to colonial territories, promote their unity, peaceful implementation of disputes and development; and also ECOWAS

Steps in Resolving Conflicts

- Analyze the conflict
- Determine resolution strategy
- Pre-negotiation

- Negotiation
- Post-negotiation

Source: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters

Step1: Analyze the conflict: The first step in resolving a conflict is to analyze the nature and type of conflict. To do this, it is helpful to ask questions.

Step 2: Determine Resolution Strategy: Once you have a general understanding to the conflict, the groups involved will need to analyze and select the most appropriate strategy available;

- Collaboration
- Compromise
- Competition
- Accommodation
- Avoidance

Source: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters

a) **Collaboration** - these results from a high concern for group's own interest, matched with a high concern for the interests of other partners. The outcome is "win/win." This strategy is generally used when concerns for others are important. It is also generally the best

strategy when society's interest is at stake. This approach helps build commitment and reduce bad feelings. The drawbacks are that it takes time and energy.

- b) **Compromise** - This strategy results from a high concern from group's own interests along with a moderate concern for the interests of other partners. The outcome is "win some/lose some." This strategy is generally used to achieve temporary solutions, to avoid destructive power struggles or when time pressures exist. One drawback is that partners can lose sight of important values and long-term objectives. This approach can also distract the partners from the merits of an issue and create a cynical climate.
- c) **Competition** - This strategy results from a high concern for group's own interest with less concern for others. The outcome is on use this strategy and excludes most attempts to bargaining.
- d) **Accommodation** - This results from a low concern for group's own interest combined with a high concern for the interests of other partners. The outcome is "lose/win". This strategy is generally used when the issue is more important to others than to one. It is a "goodwill gesture." It is also appropriated when you recognize that you are wrong. The drawbacks are that, your own ideas and concerns don't get attention. You may also lose credibility and future influence.
- e) **Avoidance** - This results from a low concern for group's own interests coupled with a low concern for the interests of others. The outcome is "lose/lose." This strategy is generally used when the issue is trivial or other issues are more pressing. It is also used when confrontation has a high potential for damage or more information is needed. The drawbacks are that important decisions may be made by default.

Step 3: Pre-negotiation: To set the motion for effective negotiation, the groundwork must be laid out; therefore, the following should occur prior to negotiation.

- (a) **Initiation** - One partner raises the possibility of negotiation and begins the process. If no one is willing to approach the other to encourage them to reach an agreement, a trusted outsider could be brought in.
- (b) **Assessment** - Conditions must be right for negotiation to be successful. Key players must be identified and invited. Each side must be willing to collaborate with the others. Reasonable deadlines and sufficient resources to support the effort must exist. Spokespersons for each group must be identified and involved. Parties need to determine which issues are negotiable and which are not.
- (c) **Ground Rules and Agenda** - The groups must agree on ground rules for communication, negotiation and decision making. They should agree on the objectives of the negotiation process. An agenda of issues to be covered needs to be developed.
- (d) **Organization** - Meeting logistics must be established, including agreed upon times and places. People must be contacted and encouraged to attend. Minutes must be taken so that information can be distributed before and after meetings.
- (e) **Joint Fact-finding** - The groups must agree on what information is relevant to the conflict and this should include what is known and not known about social and technical issues. Agreement is also needed on methods for generating answers to questions.

Step 4: Negotiation

- a. **Interests** - When negotiating, be sure to openly discuss interests, rather than stated positions. Interests include the reasons, needs, concerns and motivations underlying positions. Satisfaction of interests should be the common goal.
- b. **Options** - To resolve conflicts, concentrate on inventing options for satisfying interests. Do not judge ideas or favour any of the options suggested. Encourage creativity, not commitment.
- c. **Evaluation** - Only after the partners have finished listing options should the options be discussed. Determine together which ideas are best for satisfying various interests.
- d. **Written Agreement** - Document areas of agreement and disagreement, to ensure common understanding. This helps ensure that agreements can be remembered and communicated clearly.
- e. **Commitment** - Every partner must be confident that the others will carry out their parts of the agreement. Discuss and agree upon methods to ensure partners understand and honor their commitments.

Step 5 Post Negotiation

Once negotiation is complete, the group will need to implement the decisions made.

Some key steps include:

- a. **Ratification** - The partners must get support for the agreement from organizations that have a role to play in the agreement. These organizations should be partners and should have been involved in the previous steps. Each organization will need to

follow its own procedures to review and adopt the agreement.

- b. **Implementation** - You and your partners' jobs are not done when you've reached agreement communication and collaboration should continue as the agreement is carried out. The partnership will need to have a plan to implement and process document success, resolve problems, renegotiate terms and celebrate success.
- c. **Negotiation Skills** – Negotiation is an important skill for coming to an agreement when conflicts develop at home, at work and when dealing with issues like those related to watershed management. When negotiating.
- d. **Separate People from the Problem** - When negotiating; remember you're dealing with people who have their own unique needs, emotions and perceptions. Some conflicts are based on differences in thinking and perceptions. These conflicts may exist mainly in people's minds. It helps for each party to put themselves into the other's shoes so they can understand each other's point of view. Identify and openly discuss differences or perceptions, being careful not to apportion blame. In addition, recognize and understand the other side's emotions as well as your own.

2.1.3 Conflict Analysis:

In the event to resolving conflict, it is wise to do an analysis first. Conflict analysis is the systematic study of the profile, causes, actors, and dynamics of conflict. It helps development, humanitarian and organizations resolving the conflict to gain a better understanding of the context in which they work and their role in that context. Conflict analysis can be carried out at various levels and seeks to establish the linkages between these levels. Identifying the appropriate focus for the conflict analysis is crucial: the issues and dynamics at the national level may be different from those at the grassroots.

This is a practical process of examining and understanding the reality of the conflict. Conflict analysis is not a one time exercise; it must be an ongoing process as the situation is developing so that you can adapt your actions to changing factors, dynamics and circumstances. The concept of conflict analysis may seem quite remote to those who are engaged in practical work on conflict. It is sometimes seen as requiring objectivity and neutrality rather than personnel experience and strong emotion. There are several reasons why conflicts are analyzed.

Reasons for Analysing a Conflict:

- i. To understand the background and history of the situation as well as current events.
- ii. To identify all the relevant groups involved, not just the main or obvious ones.
- iii. To understand the perspectives of all these groups and to know more about how they relate to each other.
- iv. To identify factors and trends that under-pin conflicts.
- v. To learn from failures as well as successes.

Technique for conflict Analysis:

In analysing conflict, the following should be considered:

- a. Stage of conflict
- b. Timeliness
- c. Conflict
- d. The ABC (Attitude, Behaviour, context) triangle.

- e. The onion (or the doughnut)
- f. The conflict tree
- g. Force-field analysis
- h. Pillars
- i. The pyramid

Source: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of
Disasters

The order in which you use the tools can be flexible according to the situation you are analyzing. Often they are best used in combination with one to highlighting certain factors or issues or points in time, which are then analyzed with other tools.

2.1.4 Tools to be considered in Resolving Conflict

Time Line: In principle, this is a very simple tool. It is a graphic that shows events plotted against time. It lists dates (years, months or days depending on the scale) and depicts events in chronological order.

ABC Triangle: Stands for Attitude, Behaviour and Context. This analysis is based on the premise that conflicts have three major components, its analysis of factors relating to Attitude, Behaviour and context for each of the major parties.

The Onion: It is a way of analyzing what different parties to a conflict are saying. It

comprises positions that we take publicly, under laying our interests, what we want to achieve from a particular situation and the core are the most important needs we require, to be satisfied. It is useful to carry out this onion analysis for each of the parties involved. It is based on the analogy of an onion and its layers.

The Conflict Tree: Is a graphic tool, using the image of a tree to sort key conflict issues. It is best used within groups i.e. collectively rather than as an individual exercise. The conflict tree offers a method for a team organization group or community to identify the issues that each of them sees as important and then sort these into three categories core problem(s), causes and effects.

Force-field Analysis: It is a tool for analyzing both positive and negative forces in a conflict; it can be used to identify the different forces influencing a conflict. The tool officers have a way of identifying positive and negative forces that are either supporting or hindering what you are trying to achieve and tries to assess their strengths and weaknesses. It can also help to see more clearly what is maintaining the status quo.

Pillars: This is a graphic which illustrates the elements or forces that are folding up an unstable situation. It is based on the premise that some situations are not really stable but are held up by a range of factors or forces.

The Pyramid: Is a graphic tool showing levels of stake holders in a conflict. This tool is needed when you start to analyze conflicts that have more than one level; with this method you identify the key parties or actors at each level.

Source: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of
Disasters

2.1.5 Concept of Peace

Peace conceived as more than the absence of war has been described either as negative peace or as positive peace. Johan Galtung saw negative peace as the absence of war or armed conflict while positive peace is the absence of structural violence that occurs when institutions and policies are established that restrict access to the necessities of life, such as food, shelter, or medical care.

Negative peace is seen as the absence of armed conflict and warfare. Other terms used by peace scholars to define or describe negative peace include non-war, mutual deterrence, one-side dominance, a truce, or ceasefire. Negative peace is also seen as a state of readiness within and between countries not elimination of war and other forms of armed conflict.

Positive peace is seen as the absence of structural violence. It is the elimination of armed conflict, the elimination of economic inequalities, and as the presence of social justice. Positive peace includes the absence of indirect violence that is either organized or unorganized at both the macro and micro levels, resulting in forms of structural violence.

The Spheres of Peace

There are certain characteristics every party resolving conflict must take into cognizance; the personal, the social, the political, the institutional and ecological. These five spheres relate and function together as a peace system; each representing a unique, cross cutting, and reinforcing sphere of human organization and relationships.

Personal Sphere

In the personal sphere, we determine what it takes to live in right relationship with our self. Snauwaert (2013) describes personal peace as living with “the awareness of one’s authentic

being, and living from and relating to other from that awareness.” To understand and live with peace at the personal sphere requires inquiring into how we handle our own internal conflicts and emotions. It also requires inquiring into our own values, principles and attitude so we can develop the essential internal capacities that prepare us to live with integrity and wholeness within our self.

Social Sphere

In the social sphere, we determine what it takes to live in right relationships with others. In the social sphere, we inquire into the manifestation of right relationships of individuals with other individuals and to their collective co-existence. This is the sphere of right relationships that most peace building and conflict resolution practices give attention to. To understand and live with peace within the social sphere, we inquire into our attitudes, intentions, and actions regarding how we manage our interpersonal conflicts and differences so that we are honouring the dignity of others.

Political Sphere

In the political sphere, we ask what it means to live in right relationships with various groups of people, communities, and organizations. Here we need to explore how right relationships are established and maintained when diverse individuals and groups come together to discourse, collectively make decisions, and engage in action to create a world together. This is a very complex sphere of peace building in which the ethics and practices of diversity and inclusion are put to the test. To understand and live with peace at the political sphere, we have to inquire into how we engage in collective decision making processes as well as examine the institutions and mechanisms we establish for assuring peace and justice. Thus, a key question we must ask is; who determines those conditions of right relationships in society

and how are they determined? In this sphere we also ask what it means to be in community of states – as well as how we can work, learn and grow as sovereign yet in a confederation.

Institutional Sphere

In the institutional sphere we consider how we might “institutionalize” right relationships within and between all forms and systems of organizations to support the development and maintenance of peace systems. We thus examine the ways in which organizations and institutions are organized, and the systematic structures and processes through which power is mediated and human affairs are governed.

Ecological Sphere

In the ecological sphere we determine what it means to be in right relationships with earth and its ecosystems of which we are a part and on which our survival and quality of life depend. To understand and live with peace at the ecological sphere we inquire into our attitudes, intentions, and actions regarding how we take responsibility to shift our relationship to the natural environment from one based on control over to one based on interdependence and living with and within. Human systems are not separate from, but integral to all living systems and as such, human organization affects and is affected by all other ecological systems. Ecosystems are both resilient and fragile, and human life depends upon our respect for and stewardship of the entire planet.

Source: UN Co-operation with Regional Organisations in Peacekeeping.

2.2 Empirical Review

The following literature review is of course not indicative of the entirety of the literature available on the topic, but is rather an attempt to portray how the topic has been approached

in the past, and how such approaches have faltered or succeeded in their contribution to the study.

In this review, the researcher aims to highlight the chief gaps in the current debate; some of which the researcher intends this dissertation to contribute research to. The issue of Liberia has caught the world's attention intermittently over the past two decades, but the Tuareg uprising in Mali has sparked a resurgence of debate about the validity and usefulness of military interventions in African states (BBC, 2012), particularly, those states that occupy the western region of Africa. This renaissance of discussion is often fixated on the merits of the concept of 'allowing' African states to deal with African matters themselves, as opposed to inviting or submitting unto non-African states for support.

Molnár (2008: 55) argues that ECOMOG is a "viable solution for West African problems", adding that "its importance to handle regional crisis cannot be denied" (2008: 61). It does seem undeniable that ECOMOG (and by extension ECOWAS), plays a key role in conflicts in the region (simply because it exists), but this does not inherently define its role as a "viable solution". Molnár (2008: 60) admits the various contentious issues surrounding the involvement of ECOWAS, such as the "prolongation of the war itself", but does not seem to concede that such results are massively damaging to a state (HRW, 1997). Molnár (2008: 61) concludes by arguing that "it [ECOMOG] has built the basis for further developments to create a viable state in Africa". This ambiguous statement purports all the hallmarks of eurocentrism, and disappointingly, the author offers no clear definition of what exactly a "viable" solution looks like, though she does offer the means to that solution: ECOMOG. The approach by Molnár seems to lack any clear methodology, and she crassly highlights events that are pertinent to the argument being made, whilst at the same time

spuriously disregarding vital facts such as ECOMOG's cooperation with militant groups, hence disallowing a balanced analysis.

Khobe (2012) too is supportive of ECOWAS, praising the organisation in its role in the conflict, stating that "...[ECOMOG] is a positive security development requiring some finetuning", and that it "successfully...restored functional state structure in Liberia". It may be stated that the development of ECOWAS is conducive to the state of intra-African relations, but his second declaration is very susceptible to criticism indeed. What he does not mention directly is that it took seven years for a long enough lull in violence so as to allow elections, and a further six before Liberia would be at peace after the second civil war, and only after the UN had intervened. The validity of the argument that Khobe (2012) purports falls flat furthermore as questions of bias arise, due to his being Commander of ECOMOG in its mission in Sierra Leone. He describes the ECOMOG mission in Liberia as one which sought to "reinstale law and order" by defeating the "drug addicted combatants". The fact is that ECOMOG itself was committing acts of violence and other forms of criminality, as highlighted by Berman and Sams (2003) as well as Horvitz and Catherwood (2006), who at the very least partially nullify the praise Khobe (2012) so unapologetically dispatches. Furthermore, the methodology used certainly lacks any scientific rigour. Frequently ascribing acts of criminality unto rebels, he seems to lack or at least cite any evidence. Whilst he continuously sensationalises the topic, using the term "anarchy" throughout; he manages to conveniently disregard the severity of damage that ECOWAS caused to Liberia.

Khobe (2012), Molnár (2008), Jenkins (2005), Gberie (2013) and a plethora of other authors make their analyses based merely on the parties that contributed to ECOMOG. This is why I argue that the discussion vis-à-vis this topic is severely lacking, and hence my dissertation

seeks to consider the entirety of the Community in its relationship with Liberia, and how said relationship affected that particular state. Although Gberie (2013: 147) treats the case of Liberia just by considering ECOMOG, he does sustain throughout his argument that ECOMOG, although well intentioned, was a failure; “[a] heroic failure”. It is clear though that Gberie (2013) could have gone much further in his analysis had he considered ECOWAS and not just ECOMOG.

Although the literature in my avenue of investigation is limited, there is more than enough evidence to sustain my position throughout this dissertation. Particularly useful is the paper by Mortimer (1996) which deals with the francophone states’ involvement (or lack thereof) in Liberia, with a specific focus on Senegal. Mortimer (1996: 306) describes how the “political consensus so imperative for success” lacked prior to Senegalese involvement, but even remained “elusive over the period of direct Senegalese participation”. Much like Gberie (2013), Mortimer (1996) simply does not seem to draw the various issues together to finally and conclusively show that ECOWAS failed Liberia.

Aoi (2011) highlights the evidence that indicates that Nigeria was a highly biased actor within ECOWAS, a position shared by Adeleke (1995), who provides a highly relevant account of the Nigerian role within ECOWAS. Adeleke (1995: 591) explains that “Nigeria orchestrated the formation of ECOMOG”, a widely supported theory, including by Aoi (2011) and Nweke (2010). Though this would appear true to some extent, it is a drastic oversight to ignore the reality that many Community members were apathetic, and hence the balances and checks that should have been enacted against Nigeria simply were not, as shown by Mortimer (1996), and yet other states even sponsored and helped instigate the war in Liberia, as argued by Huband (1990). Adeleke (1995) does draw attention to this, but does not ascribe such a failure directly to ECOWAS.

Adeleke (1995: 593) seems to hold an ambiguous position with regards to his views on ECOMOG, arguing that it would be a “fatal error” for West African states to rely on ECOMOG as a counter-insurgency tool; but does not heavily criticise the organisation. Adeleke (1995) also states that to merely focus on the legality of the conflict is to ignore the reality of the violence, a similar position to that of Molnár (2008). Both authors discount the usefulness of a legal appraisal, yet both seem to be unaware that humanitarian causes were certainly not of chief concern for ECOWAS, as shown by Jenkins (2005).

The work of Jenkins (2005) is particularly pertinent as he conducts a legal assessment of the ECOMOG intervention, usefully showing that human rights were not a priority. Though the work is beneficial, it is merely so with regards to an analysis of ECOWAS and its position in situation of a UN contingent. Jenkins (2005) supports the intervention as it conforms to Nanda’s (1998: 827) framework for the “validity of humanitarian intervention. The framework is a lens with which to analyse a conflict and decide whether or not a humanitarian intervention is legal. Whilst Nanda’s overall methodology and research appears sound, the arrogance of purporting a legal framework based on such ethnocentric thought is clearly questionable, particularly considering Jenkins (2005) uses it to deliberate as to whether or not the intervention was legal.

In 1999, Yoroms discussed the structures of security cooperation in West Africa through a review of the accord on Non-Aggression and Defense (ANAD), the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense (PMAD), the Francophone and Anglophone rivalry in ECOWAS, and the effects of these on the resolution of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts. He viewed West Africa as a complex subregion interwoven with colonial legacies deepened by linguistic differences, and contended that the fear of Nigeria’s hegemony and the influence of France on its former colonies affected the resolution of both conflicts. Yoroms asserted that,

although ECOWAS has a new mechanism for conflict prevention and resolution, its inability to merge PMAD and the new mechanism together with ANAD is likely to reawaken the “cold war” between the Francophone and Anglophone countries. He viewed this to be detrimental to future efforts on conflict resolution in the subregion.

In 2000, Brigadier General Khobe, Nigerian Army (late), Former Force Commander of ECOMOG and former Chief of Defense Staff, Republic of Sierra Leone reviewed the evolution and conduct of ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone through the analysis of the background of ECOWAS conflict resolution mechanism deployment of the force and the concept and conduct of operations. He identified the following factors: (i) lack of economic resources by member states to sustain large-scale military operations; (ii) absence of political will of western powers to assist ECOWAS peace process; (iii) rivalry and deep suspicion between the ruling classes; and (iv) the different colonial experiences of the member states, as factors which affected ECOMOG operations. He asserted that the elimination of these problems would enhance the effectiveness of ECOMOG operations in future.

In 2007, Adedeji examined the pattern of cooperation which has been marked in a most remarkable manner by the mixture of colonial experiences among West African countries. He observed that the language barrier created by the pattern of colonialism and the perpetuation of the strong vertical link between former French colonies and France as opposed to the weak horizontal link between them and their British counterparts, discouraged meaningful relations across the Anglophone/Francophone divide. This situation, he said, is complicated by an ideological divide in which, Ghana, an Anglophone is on the radical left and Ivory Coast, a Francophone on the conservative right. He opined that, though ECOWAS objectives are to provide a pan West African economic organization to replace similar bodies of limited

membership and to eliminate the distrust among the Anglophone and Francophone states, ECOWAS still has a long way to go. He emphasized that the existence, side by side, of two security bodies, PMAD and ANAD not only dissipates energy and resources, which ought to have been concentrated into one body, but also accentuates the weaknesses of each of them. He therefore concluded that, for West Africa, the problem is not lack of mechanism but that of creating an effective body out of a multiplicity and that, the important issue of a focal point for conflict resolution and political co-operation may require a new approach.

In 2009, Samuel (2005), assessed African sub-regional organizations (and their member states) in a security context and identified their perceived place in conflict resolution endeavours. He observed that, despite their diversity, all sub-regional organizations in Africa (even the larger ones such as ECOWAS) lack institutionalized crisis prevention and management mechanism. Samuel believed that, as a result, regional military involvement in conflict resolution has been ad hoc and not in accordance with a specific operating procedure. He asserted that, despite the obvious shortcomings, these diverse 'subregional organizations' are regarded by many as primary units of security and conflict management for the African continent. Whereas, conflicts caused by political breakdown in African countries can rarely be remedied by short-term military interventions (peacekeeping or peace enforcement). Samuel rather believes, that a system of phased and prioritized facilitating processes is needed for their management. He concluded by stressing the need to institutionalize African mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. This he asserted would be facilitated by the subregions themselves reaching consensus on 'political' principles, standards, and organizational characteristics that would typify a functional and effective subregional mechanism for conflict resolution.

Despite my opposition to some of Jenkins (2005) methods, I do utilise his paper as it is a useful legal appraisal, as long as its inherent eurocentrism is kept in mind. In this dissertation I build on the work of the likes of Gberie (2003), Adeleke (1995), Aoi (2001), and others, in an attempt to disprove the likes of Molnár (2008) and Khobe (2000), whilst attempting to avoid the traps of ethnocentrism as succumbed to by the likes of Jenkins (2005) and Nanda (1998). I aim to unite various bodies of evidence to show that ECOWAS, as a sub-regional organisation, did not do extensively well in Liberia crisis.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

A theoretical framework seeks to provide a plank on which the study depends as a reference point to which the study is anchored. Theory is a useful reduction of the complexities of life of reality designed to explain certain things and to be used for a specific purpose like explaining, predicting human behaviour and making general statement. The building of a common theory has become elusive in administration, partly because of the unpredictability of human behaviour and partly because of the difference in belief, perception, values and attitude. However, the history of every existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes. These have given rise to the development of different theories in administration which lead this study to be underscored and guided by the conflict theory.

Conflict Theory

Conflict theory was propounded by Karl Max. It presupposes that human behaviour in social context results from conflicts between competing groups. It claims that society is in a state of

perpetual conflict because of competition for limited resources. It holds that social order is maintained by domination and power, rather than consensus and conformity. The theory has it that those with wealth and power try to hold on to it by any means possible, chiefly by suppressing the poor and powerless. The theory has been used to explain a wide range of social phenomena, including wars and revolutions, wealth and poverty, discrimination and domestic violence. It ascribes most of the fundamental developments in human history, such as democracy and civil rights, to capitalist attempts to control the masses rather than to a desire for social order. The theory revolves around concepts of social inequality in the division of resources and focuses on the conflicts that exist between classes.

According to the modern conflict theorists, social structures are created through conflict between people with differing interests and resources. Individuals and resources, in turn, are influenced by these structures and by the unequal distribution of power and resources in the society. In Liberia, the power elites had emerged from the fusion of the corporate elites. It is argued that the interests of this elite were opposed to those of the people. The policies of the power elite would result in increased escalation of conflict, production of weapons of mass destruction and possibly the annihilation of the people. The people believes that power is not monolithic; that is, it does not derive from some intrinsic quality of those who are in power. For the people of Liberia, political power, the power of any state—regardless of its particular structural organization—ultimately derives from the subjects of the state. Their fundamental belief is that any power structure relies upon the subjects' obedience to the orders of the ruler or rulers. If subjects do not obey, leaders have no power. In view of this, the crisis of governance in Liberia lies in the failure of the state to address competing demands by relying on the military, to harass, intimidate torture and silence dissidents. But that approach, like Thomas Hobbes' state of nature, which relies on brute force, grants only temporary relief or breathing space. It achieves negative peace (absence of violence) but does not bring in

positive peace (justice, security and development). Indeed, as William Zartman (1997) rightly points out, ‘governing a state is not only the prevention of violent conflicts from destroying the country; it is the continual effort to handle the ordinary conflicts among many groups and their demands which arise as society plays its role in the conduct of normal politics’. Implied in Zartman’s argument is that governance is about negotiation and conflict resolution; it is not about using state military apparatus to coerce and silence dissent, rather than addressing the demands of the various pressures and civil society groups. Thus preventing future conflicts is not solely about keeping rebels away from the use of violence, but is also about establishing accountable, transparent and participatory systems of governance. The resort to coercion is symptomatic of naked autocracy or totalitarianism, and in the long run, this undermines the capacity and legitimacy of the state to govern.

Application of Conflict Theory to Liberia Crisis.

In applying the conflict theory to the Liberia crisis, we should understand that, the rationale for determining rules and frameworks for development of societies that will release them from ‘conflict traps’ attributes economic dysfunctionality to the objectified societies, in their pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict stages, rather than to any dysfunctional economic precepts, structures and conditionalities generated by expressions of capitalist power and global governance. The causes of conflict and procedures for its resolution should be considered.

The Liberia conflict centres majorly on economic and political inequalities. Hence, conflict theory holds that society is in a state of perpetual conflict because of competition for limited resources. It believes that social order is maintained by domination and power, rather than consensus and conformity. The causes of conflict alongside the solutions should be prioritised for instance, one area of inequality that was problematic in Liberia was Liberia’s

position as a peripheral capitalist state in the global political economy. Peripheral capitalist state are states that serve the economic needs of core metropolis states through an exploitative international division of labour. This role had several consequences for the economic and political development of the country leading up to the first civil war. It ensured the perceptual economic under development of the country by facilitating the funnelling of the countries' resources to wealthy Western States and generating an influx of foreign corporations interested in benefits from the countries' industries.

It also had the effect of creating a political environment that enable elite members of the Liberian government to accumulate personal wealth through corrupt practice and patron-client relations with the Liberian population and foreign actors.

It was these combined process that led to a significant population of practically, socially, and economic marginalised youth in both urban and rural areas of Liberia. There is evidence to suggest that these youth were recruited for war through similar patrimonial networks that were historically used to recruit them for menial labour jobs on plantations and in similar industries; and there is equal evidence to suggest that their receptiveness to recruitment was largely a consequences of their belief that war would make it possible to achieve a level of mobility that was impossible under the existence structure.

Essentially, marginalised youth with few alternative options perceived conflict as an opportunity to become the powerful and wealthy players in the Liberia political and economic structure, making them ideal candidates for participation in conflicts.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design

A research design is the arrangement of conditions for collecting and analyzing of data in a manner that aims to combine relevance to the research purpose with economy in procedure. It is the structure on which research is conducted; it constitutes the blue print for the collection, measurement and analysis of data.

The researcher used the descriptive research design to explore and bring to light the role of ECOWAS in conflict resolution in Liberia.

Descriptive research design was adopted because it helps to focus on the nature, causes and the level of involvement of different actors in conflict resolution in Liberia.

3.2 Population, Sample and Sampling Techniques

This is made up of conceivable element, subject or observation relating to a particular phenomenon on interest to the study. Population is any group of beings the researcher has focused attention on which has been chosen and approved as an area of study. In this, the population will be four million (4,000,000) comprising of both male and female, young and adult. (Source: Liberia population adapted from ECOWAS bulletin 2017)

Sampling Techniques

Sampling techniques involve the skills used to gather information or data. The sampling technique used in this study is the random/purposive sampling technique. This type of sampling technique is used because it enables the researcher to know his focus area.

3.3 Method of Data Collection

The researcher, in collecting relevant data, used both the secondary source of data collection.

Secondary Sources of Data Collection: This is an essential source of data collection technique used in this study. Secondary sources used in this work include: Text books, seminar papers, conference papers, ECOWAS bulletins, Journals and Magazines. These documented source helped the researcher to bring to light the individual views on the role of ECOWAS in conflict resolution in Liberia.

3.4 Techniques for Data Analysis

The goal of analysis is to arrange the collected data so that the answer to the initial problem of the study reveals itself. The problem dictates what kinds of information has to be analysed, and on the type of information depends which tools can be used to handle it.

The researcher carefully described the tools and technique employed in analysing the data, therefore the researcher realized that a good research instrument is one that its result is measured and the result is accurate, objective, sensitive and efficient. The quality control criteria by Scott (2000), for analysing descriptive and documentary sources were applied. These are authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning. The researcher adopted the quality control criteria for analyzing his data such as authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning. **Authenticity:** refers to whether the evidence is genuine and from impeccable sources; **Credibility:** refers to whether the evidence is typical of its kind; **Representativeness:** refers to whether the document consulted are representative of the totality of the relevant documents; and **Meaning:** refers to whether the evidence is clear and comprehensible.

These helped the researcher to confirm the validity and reliability of data collected to be answered and presented in the study. Deductive reasoning has been employed in accepting, using the information and data obtained in addressing the research question.

3.5 Justification of Methods

The method adopted for this study is reliable and relevant; because all the data required for the study are in the custody of ECOWAS. The data are easily verifiable, relevant and available. However, the object of descriptive research is to generate an accurate understanding of behaviours, events or situations. Descriptive research is conducted to achieve different goals such as to describe the characteristics of relevant groups, estimate the percentage of units in a specific population, determine the perceptions, determine the degree to which such variables are associated and finally to make specific predictions. This method described who, what, when, where and how conflict resolution is handled by ECOWAS.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Data Presentation

4.1.1 Threats to Peace and Security and ECOWAS involvement

From the mid-1980s, new global dynamics and local responses had emerged to threaten a derailment of the ECOWAS economic integration efforts. The easing of Cold War tensions was accompanied by a dramatic spike in violent internal power struggles that threatened state implosion across the continent. It did not take long for ECOWAS to realize the changing nature of threats to stability. It became obvious that a nexus existed between the so-called internal conflicts and collective development efforts. Barely a decade after the creation of ECOWAS, violent internal conflicts erupted in Liberia (1989), as a new phenomenon not confined to the borders of individual nation state, but with serious regional implications, both in their causes and effects. So similar were the cause of the war that all the Member-States of the sub-region could identify with Liberia. It included the unequal and unfair burden of poverty on different social and ethnic groups within the community, bad governance and the denial of human rights and the rule of law. It also included endemic corruption, a lack of probity and accountability in political and natural resource governance, exclusion and, above all, a population explosion and infrastructure collapse that had created a major youth crisis.

Starting off as internal struggles for power and control over resources, these devastating conflicts soon took on a regionalized nature, fuelled by the illegal exploitation of and exchange of natural resources for the acquisition of small arms and light weapons and

characterized by the proliferation of private armies without borders made up of mercenaries, dispossessed youth and bandits.

It quickly became clear that the mechanisms that were put in place to safeguard national sovereignty and ward off external aggression were grossly inadequate to meet the challenges of an increasingly interdependent region in which the ripples of refugee flows, disrupted infrastructure, the proliferation of weapons and the export of violence, were felt far and beyond national borders.

The regionalized 'internal' conflicts threatened to derail the original economic agenda of ECOWAS. ECOWAS had to reposition itself and act locally to avert the looming regional crises. However, the legal instruments and protocols in the possession of ECOWAS at the time only anticipated inter-state and not intra-state conflicts. For example, the existing protocols were clearly designed to prevent conflicts between member states, nothing was in place for 'interference' in the internal affairs of member states. In the absence of an enabling legal framework for intervention there was division amongst its leadership, thus, complicating efforts to resolve the conflicts in the sub-region. While some States dragged their feet, citing the respect of the OAU's 'non-interference' principles to justify inaction, others argued quite rightly that 'non-interference' should not be equated with indifference to grave human rights violations. ECOWAS, led by a coalition of willing States, overcame the absence of an enabling legal framework for intervention by initially creating ad-hoc mechanisms and thereafter, more permanent structures through a systemic search for conflict prevention and conflict management tools to address the compelling dynamics of the new conflicts. The creation of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to intervene in Liberia and Sierra Leone was, therefore, an act of absolute necessity dictated by

the unfolding realities. It also heralded the period when, for a time, the military agenda overshadowed the economic preoccupation of ECOWAS.

Militarily, few ECOWAS Member States had the capability to undertake strategic force generation and projection without outside assistance.

The absence of interoperability - uniform operational doctrine and equipment - between the Anglophone and Francophone troop contributing States was further compounded by the fact that no structure existed at the then ECOWAS Executive Secretariat to manage peacekeeping operations since ECOWAS was designed primarily to serve economic integration. By August 1990, there were 225,000 Liberian refugees in Guinea, 150,000 in Cote d'Ivoire, and 69,000 in Sierra Leone. Source: Human Rights Watch (2001)

Furthermore, 5,000 people had been killed and about 3,000 Nigerian, Ghanaian and Sierra Leonean citizens were being held hostage by the insurgents from National Patriotic Front of Liberia led by Charles Taylor. The apparent global 'disinterest' in the unfolding drama and the humanitarian imperative left ECOWAS with no other choice but to react to stop the carnage. Source: Human Rights Watch (2001)

Under a shaky peace agreement, the ECOMOG Force that was put together in a rush was meant to supervise a cease-fire, while an interim government was to be established, which would organize elections after twelve months. ECOMOG was designed primarily as a peacekeeping force and had no mandate to enforce the peace. When the troops arrived, they were stiffly resisted by the rebel group. On the ground, the troops had to switch between self-defense, peace-enforcement, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. It took a lot of courage, trial and error tactics in uncharted waters, and commitment by a few member states,

particularly Nigeria, for ECOMOG to eventually emerge with a reasonable degree of credibility and accomplishment. In the end, though, the economic and human toll of the intervention on ECOMOG forced the regional organization to de facto cede control of the country to Charles Taylor through elections that he was bound to win not because he was loved, but because the population was tired of war and feared that any other outcome would prolong it. Thus began the disastrous reign of Taylor in 1997.

4.1.2 The Conflicts in Liberia

On 24 December 1989, conflict erupted in Liberia which quickly degenerated into chaos causing thousands of deaths and numerous refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries. Since it was declared a republic in 1847, politics in Liberia was dominated by the Freed Black American slaves also known as Americo-Liberians who were relocated to Liberia from the United States of America. The Americo-Liberian regimes held onto political power in Liberia to the exclusion of the indigenous Liberians. The regime also saw incessant monopolization of political, economic and social positions in favour of the Americo-Liberians. Source: Adebajo 2004 (Building Peace in West Africa). These form of governance by successive Americo-Liberian government continued at during President Tubman's regime generating resentment among the indigenous Liberians towards the Americo Liberians. Between 1963 and 1970, there were frequent attempts by officers from the AFL to assassinate President Tubman. But all the attempts failed leaving Tubman to die in office in 1971 after 32 years of presidency. William Tolbert, also of the Americo-Liberian descent completed Tubman's term before starting his own term in 1972.

Some decisions President Tolbert took during his regime enraged the already marginalised indigenous Liberians. For instance, he proposed an increment in the price of a 100-pound bag of rice from \$22 to \$26. The proposal was met with riots organised by the Progressive

Alliance of Liberians (PAL). Tolbert was also accused of failing to take care of the poor housing condition of the AFL personnel and relieving about 20% of the AFL soldiers for political expediency. It was against this background that a group of Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) led by Master Sergeant Doe of the AFL staged a successful coup in which Tolbert was assassinated on 12 April 1980. Majority of the NCOs including Doe belonged to the indigenous Krahn ethnic group with the rest coming from three other indigenous ethnic groups. After usurping power, Doe ruled Liberia and retained a military regime that lasted for a period of 5 years.

The regime was characterized by marginalization and class status. The bureaucracy, army, security forces, and public services became permeated with members of Doe's Krahn ethnic group. Civilians from the other ethnic groups especially Gios and Manos were brutalised, marginalized and suppressed. Although the Regime introduced some social reforms, there was no indication as to the political direction of the revolution. Added to these was a dramatic economic downturn that resulted in an increment of a bag of rice from \$20 to \$24. These economic hardships generated a lot of public outcry calling for an end to the regime. Doe did not step down as was demanded but rather contested and won the 1984 election on the ticket of the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDFL). However, many believed the election was flawed and the verdict stolen by Doe. A failed coup attempt by Thomas Qwiwonkpa an ethnic Gio in 1985 led to an increased persecution of ethnic Gios.

It was during this era of flawed elections, a failed coup attempt and an ever increasing dissatisfaction for the NDFL that Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) launched an incursion into Liberia on 24 December 1989. The incursion which was aimed at ousting Doe's Government had the support of Gio and Mano ethnic groups. Though the AFL fought back, the invasion was very swift and by May 1990, the NPFL was in control

of majority of Liberia's territory and very close to Monrovia. Carnage ensued as Taylor's NPFL battled the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The situation worsened when several other factions including the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), Lofa Defence Force (LDF), and the NPFL Central Revolutionary Council (NPFL-CRC) emerged and became involved in the conflicts.

Masked soldiers abducted and killed about forty refugees from a United Nations camp on 30 May 1990. This incident forced the UN to evacuate its employees from Liberia. On the night of 29 July 1990, about 600 people who had sought refuge at St. Peter's Church in Monrovia were massacred by militants. Many of those massacred were women with children.

The level of atrocities committed by the belligerents escalated to an alarming proportion by July 1990. Mutilated dead bodies could be found either dumped by the roadside or washed ashore. Acute shortages of basic supplies such as food and water coupled with lack of health care worsened the plight of the populace.

Mediation attempts made by the Liberian Christian and Muslim leaders under the Inter-Faith Mediation Commission (IFMC) failed. The expectation that the United Nations or the Organisation of the Africa Union (OAU) will intervene became a mirage when the conflict raged on without any sign of intervention by the international community.

4.1.3 ECOWAS Intervention in the Liberia Conflicts

The outbreak of hostilities in Liberia was a major challenge to the sub-region. In December 1989, Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) launched an armed and violent campaign against the government of President Samuel Doe, with a view to ousting him from office. At the outset of the crisis, many hoped that the United States of

America would intervene, considering the historical ties between the two countries. But instead, Washington was reported to have insisted that the crisis in Liberia was “an African one and so should be settled by Africans”. Doe then called for ECOWAS intervention to protect his government. In 1990, the first contingent of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was despatched to Liberia and since then ECOWAS has become known more for its activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in West Africa. The sub-region has undergone violent upheavals resulting in massive loss of lives, wanton destruction of property, untold suffering and desolation among its population. The populace has also suffered from famine and disease, and hundreds of thousands have been forced to seek refuge in neighbouring countries, or live as IDPs in their own countries.

In August 1990, Dauda Jawara, the then ECOWAS Chairman, conferred with President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria to convene a meeting on the Mano River Union in Gambia. It was at this meeting that the heads of state and government agreed to send a peacekeeping mission to Liberia. However, the Francophone countries were not favourably disposed to that decision. Hence, Guinea was the only Francophone country that contributed troops alongside Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Gambia. The first ECOMOG peacekeeping force deployed to Liberia was commanded by General Arnold Quainou from Ghana as an English-speaking group and General Magash from Guinea, as the only French-speaking country, which contributed troops.

The world watched while Liberia burnt. ECOWAS was at the time, barely able to survive. The bulk of the bills was picked by Nigeria, under President Babangida and later General Sani Abacha, at a time Nigeria was being treated as a pariah nation. Nigeria’s closest ally then was President Lansana Conte of Guinea. He visited Nigeria 17 times between 1996 and 1998 to confer with General Abacha on the situation in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Source:

Fagen (2005) “Remittances in Conflict and Crisis”. Government sources in Abuja estimated that Nigeria spent over \$10 billion for the campaigns in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The loss in terms of men and material to the sub-region was equally substantial. Day after day, the situation in Liberia became more and more complicated. Doe, who was elected President in 1985, was executed by a splinter group of the NPFL in 1990. In 1991, ECOWAS was able to secure an agreement with the NPFL to disarm and set up an interim Government of National Unity, but within months the rebels intensified their attacks on ECOMOG forces in Liberia, prompting a reprisal attack that chased the warring NPFL into the hinterland. It is on record that 40 different agreements were signed during the Liberian crisis, but the rebels seemed to adopt new strategies of destabilisation after each settlement. In August 1996, ECOWAS was able to secure an accord in Abuja, Nigeria, that prepared the grounds for disarmament, removal of land mines and road blocks. This enabled some refugees and some other displaced persons to return home. Under the close supervision of ECOWAS, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in July 1997 in which Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Party, won majority votes. Taylor was subsequently sworn in as president. Source: Human Rights Watch (2001).

An ex-warlord, President Taylor had to contend with the remnants of disgruntled rebels attacking from the north. Hostilities resumed soon after his inauguration. More than 25,000 people were displaced as a result of fighting between government forces and rebels in Voinjama, a village on the border with Guinea, during the first week of the renewed hostilities. Guinea accused Liberia of invading border villages in her territory, while Liberia accused Guinea of attacking her villages. The truth of the matter is that Taylor wanted to exert his influence on other countries of the Mano River Basin. His target was to provoke an equally difficult situation for the government of President Lansana Conte. And he felt it was easier to begin from the line of least resistance, and that was President Joseph Momoh of

Sierra Leone, who he accused of siding Conte of Guinea against his regime. With Sierra Leone in turmoil, he could go ahead to destabilise Guinea. His permutation was to begin from the Sierra Leonean town of Pamalak, about 120 kilometres from Conakry, the Guinean capital and incite an attack on Guinea in Macanta, a border town in Nimba region up north. This was meant to divert the attention of Guinean soldiers to the north, with troops drawn from Conakry. But his strategy failed because Guinea pre-empted his plans; instead of moving troops from the Conakry military base, they drew troops from Abagini to repel the attack in Macanta and when Taylor's men tried to enter from Pamalak, they met stiff resistance from the detachment of soldiers stationed in Conakry. That was why Taylor's rebellion did not succeed in Guinea.

When the decision to launch ECOMOG in Liberia was taken, the initial problem was how to enter the country. Entry through Sierra Leone was seen as a better option. It was agreed, first of all, to enter Sierra Leone and from there into Liberia. But before then, ECOMOG needed an ally in Liberia's rebel factions and this happened to be Prince Yormie Johnson. It was Johnson's troops that cleared the ports where ECOMOG troops landed. And because they came from Freetown, Charles Taylor was not seriously perturbed. He used Foday Sankoh to create a rebel group of mainly West Africans from Guinea, Gambia, and Sierra Leone to terrorise Sierra Leone. Rebel leader Sankoh was, at this time, living in Cote d'Ivoire and had participated in the meetings to end the Sierra Leone crisis. From Cote d'Ivoire he went to Lagos, Nigeria, where he had some drug dealings that landed him in jail.

ECOWAS was determined to bring the Liberian conflict to an end both militarily through ECOMOG and also using effective diplomacy. Various other concerned institutions and non-governmental organizations keyed into ECOWAS peace initiatives on Liberia. These included the Liberians in the Diaspora, the Mano River Union Women's Peace Network

(MAR WOPNET), the Inter-religious Council on Liberia (IRCL) and the Rabat Process. This led to the establishment of the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL), with a mandate to coordinate and complement existing peace efforts towards resolving the conflicts. In this direction and in coordination with the ICGL, the UN and African Union, ECOWAS was able to resume contacts with the Government of Liberia, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), prevailing on them to return to the negotiation table.

At this time, the peace process was completely deadlocked while fighting continued. To break this stalemate, former Nigerian Head of State, General Abdulsalami Abubakar was in 2003, nominated by ECOWAS to mediate and facilitate the Liberian peace talks with the sole aim of achieving a ceasefire and reaching a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The main issues he was to address included security sector reforms, reconciliation, reconstruction and elections.

His mandate also covered other areas such as human rights, creation of democratic space, refugees and IDPs, as well as respect for UN resolutions. It was also to deal with the implementation mechanisms, monitoring mechanisms and calendar of implementation. Abubakar undertook a tour of the sub-region to consult with the heads of state and different Liberian stakeholders within and outside Liberia in preparation for the peace-talks. During his mission, all the parties he met with committed themselves to the peaceful resolution of the crisis.

After due consultations with the Chairman of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, the peace-talks kicked off in Accra, Ghana on June 4, 2003, the same day President Taylor's indictment was announced by the United Nations. The meeting was to negotiate a ceasefire and also reach a comprehensive peace agreement. Represented at the

peace talks were the Government of Liberia, LURD, MODEL, 18 registered political parties, MARWOPNET and IRCL. Representatives of the Liberian Bar Association (LBA), the Civil Society Movement of Liberia and Liberians in the Diaspora were also present. The sessions, which were presided over by the Chairman of the Authority, was attended by five other heads of state. During the inaugural session, appeals were made to Liberians to seize the opportunity of the dialogue to engage in political and peaceful resolution of the conflict. It was right at this meeting that Taylor first indicated his willingness to remove himself from the political process in Liberia not later than the end of his tenure in January 2004, if he was perceived to be the problem. The discussions towards a ceasefire led to the signing of an agreement on June 17, 2003, by the three belligerent parties namely, the Government of Liberia, LURD and MODEL. The agreement included the cessation of hostilities, the fielding of a Joint Verification Team (JVT), followed by a Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC), and an International Stabilisation Force (ISF). The UN, AU and the ICGL were members of the JVT and the JMC. One of the major issues canvassed at the talks was the establishment of a transitional government, but the UN Security Council's indictment of Taylor for war crimes over his involvement in the conflict in Sierra Leone introduced a new dimension to the talk. On June 29, 2003, members of the UN Security Council visited the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja. The ECOWAS mediator on Liberia, General Abubakar, recommended that the international community should create a safe-passage for Taylor, to enable him leave Liberia to any country of his choice, as his departure would facilitate the peace process.

But despite the June 4 ceasefire agreement and the arms embargo imposed on Taylor by the UN Security Council in 2001, the battle to control Monrovia intensified between the rebels and Taylor's forces. At this point, it became clear that Charles Taylor was no longer in control of the situation as president of the Republic of Liberia. A detachment of Nigerian troops was sent to Monrovia to contain the situation. At the same time, an emissary of

President Olusegun Obasanjo was despatched to convince Taylor and accelerate his safe exit. The United Nations had decided that Taylor must be made to quit the scene to give the peace process a better chance of success. But the international community needed to persuade Taylor to leave and go on exile, and Obasanjo was charged with that herculean task.

This was a delicate job that called for an experienced diplomatic hand. The lot fell on Ambassador Raph Uwechue who was drafted from his post in Abidjan as head of the ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire, to handle the assignment. He travelled to Monrovia and met with President Taylor, and in a one-on-one, tense, but cordial discussion, explained the object of his mission. The strategy was that if Taylor agreed to relocate to Nigeria on exile, he and his family would be guaranteed a safe haven, so long as he refrained from interfering in developments in Liberia. This clear assurance of protection and safety for self and family from President Obasanjo, was the specific condition on which President Taylor accepted to proceed to Nigeria on exile, if his departure would help the course of peace in Liberia. This was how President Taylor left the Government House in Monrovia in August 2003, into exile in Nigeria's southern city of Calabar, Cross River State. There he was, until 2006 when he was handed over to the UN for trial at the International Court of Justice, The Hague, Netherlands, for atrocities allegedly committed during the war in neighbouring Sierra Leone. It is necessary to note that Taylor actually attempted to escape from Nigeria before he was arrested and turned over to the UN. international opinion, nonetheless, remains diametrically divided over the handling of the Taylor affair. While some diplomats agree that the former Liberian president must be brought to book for war crimes, others believe he was completely short-changed, because the international community reneged in the assurances given to him before his exit, by forcing Nigerian government to hand him over for trial.

With Taylor's exit, came peace as his deputy Moses Blah took over. An Interim Government headed by Gyude Bryant was later set up, which was able to reach an agreement with the rebels in Accra, Ghana. On September 19, 2003, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established to support the ceasefire agreement and the peace process, protect UN facilities and people, support humanitarian activities, and assist in security sector reform. Under the UN supervision, the interim administration conducted a transition programme that led to the election of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as President of the Republic of Liberia, and Africa's first woman president on November 23, 2005.

4.2 Data Analysis and Results

Research Question One: How has the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mechanism on regulation of regional peace and security affect Liberia conflict?

ECOWAS was determined to bring the Liberian conflict to an end both militarily through ECOMOG and also using effective diplomacy. Various other concerned institutions and non-governmental organizations keyed into ECOWAS peace initiatives on Liberia. These included the Liberians in the Diaspora, the Mano River Union Women's Peace Network (MAR WOPNET), the Inter-Religious Council on Liberia (IRCL) and the Rabat Process. This led to the establishment of the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL), with a mandate to coordinate and complement existing peace efforts towards resolving the conflicts. In this direction and in coordination with the ICGL, the UN and African Union, ECOWAS was able to resume contacts with the Government of Liberia, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), prevailing on them to return to the negotiation table.

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the political process in Liberia not later than the end of his tenure in January 2004, if he was perceived to be the problem. The discussions towards a ceasefire led to the signing of an agreement on June 17, 2003, by the three belligerent parties namely, the Government of Liberia, LURD and MODEL. The agreement included the cessation of hostilities, the fielding of a Joint Verification Team (JVT), followed by a Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC), and an International Stabilisation Force (ISF).

Research Question Two: To what degree has the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mechanism for conflict management affect conflict resolution of Liberia?

ECOWAS places a high premium on political governance, democratic institutions, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. Weak governance had blighted the development of Liberia. Manifestations of weak governance included bad government policies and an economic and political climate that discouraged investment in Liberia. They also included corruption and bureaucratic systems that were impervious to scrutiny and not answerable to the public as well as the absence of strong mechanisms that ensured that peoples' voices were heard and their rights upheld, such as parliaments, the media and the justice system. ECOWAS in resolving the contending issues focused on the following:

Establishment of Safety and Security:

- Reconstituting the security establishment
- Ensuring public order and safety
- Securing territorial borders
- Reforming security sector governance

Source: ECOWAS Journal on Peace and Conflict (2006)

Establishing or Strengthening Constitutional Governance:

- Constitutional reforms
- Strengthen mechanism for elections and citizen participation
- Guarantee of freedom for civil society and the media
- Guarantee human rights
- Strengthen key branches of government

Source: ECOWAS Journal on Peace and Conflict (2006)

Strengthening Justice and Reconciliation:

- Rebuilding or reforming the justice system
- Strengthen oversight of security agencies
- Support truth and/or reconciliation bodies
- Promote balanced application of international justice systems
- Promote better systems for integrating excluded groups including women, youth and other groups.

Source: ECOWAS Journal on Peace and Conflict (2006)

Promoting Economic Justice and Growth:

- Equitable distribution, management and control of natural resources

- Reforming financial, economic and regulatory institutions
- Promoting trade and investment
- Strengthening the private sector
- Promoting job creation and developing human skills
- Extending social safety nets

Source: ECOWAS Journal on Peace and Conflict (2006)

Recovery and Reconstruction:

- Rebuilding infrastructure
- Restoring public services
- Extending education and health facilities
- Extending social protection, in particular, for vulnerable groups
- Conduct of free, fair and credible elections

Source: ECOWAS Journal on Peace and Conflict (2006)

Research Question Three: Has the protocol on conflict prevention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) affect conflict resolution of Liberia?

It is important to restate that ECOWAS at the level of policy articulation has made substantial progress in addressing specific human security issues as reflected in its 1999 Protocol and 2008 ECPF. ECOWAS launched initiatives covering cross-border crime, small arms, security governance and interventions in civil war situations as witnessed in Liberia.

The organizations elaborate peace and security architecture thus provide a valuable take-off point for formulating a coherent human security policy. This involves incorporating human security specifically as a supplementary but a key principle into existing protocols and active engagement in emerging human security challenges, especially disaster prevention, monitoring and management, cross-border militia activities, and coordinated military and defence doctrines founded on common security sector reform programmes.

The transformation of the organization's secretariat into a commission in 2006, the inauguration of a sub-regional parliamentary and court system, the assumption of supranational powers in line with the 1993 revised treaty, and the acknowledged linkages between security and development issues harbours considerable potentials for enhancing human security in the sub-region. To this extent, ECOWAS supranationality offers an alternative voice and legitimising device for human security actions.

The formation of civil society groups and their representation (participation) together with the private sector in ECOWAS summits and their envisaged active and collective role under the draft conflict prevention framework is another resource for conflict resolution. The role of civil society groups, especially non-governmental organizations and the media can serve to expose and check the excesses of national regimes in undermining human security. Perhaps, building on the existing West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOF) framework, and with improved institutionalization and coordination with ECOWAS Commission, this can be transformed into a sub-regional human security partnership or network on human security.

The constraints and limitations to human security and conflict resolution in Liberia include changing the perception and understanding of member-states as the principal providers of human security in Liberia. This relates to the loose institutionalization of the normative component of human security. The extent to which the role of member states could be

changed from providers to facilitators of human security (through the creation of enabling socio-economic, political and safe environment), and from a traditional understanding and practice of security remains an overwhelming challenge. The second limitation lies in coordinating the internal conduct, ethos and rules of engagement for national armies involved in internal security operations. The prospect of a standard common defence doctrine through coordinated security sector reform programmes appear weak considering the strong influence of former colonial powers and legacies across the sub-region.

Another limitation to human security promotion in Liberia is the often slow responses or indecision or continued politicisation of clear human security issues. This underlines the continued failure of ECOWAS to adequately respond to human security needs in some areas on account of ostensible connections to regional and extra- regional territories and actors. Moreover, the failure to constructively engage in cases of internal clashes between groups and those involving the state underscores the continued toleration and perhaps the rationalisation of human insecurity within the context of sovereignty and non-interference. The reality suggests that in a majority of cases, the state itself is either the object of claim or a party to the clashes, thus requiring the intervention of an alternative authority to mediate and guarantee the fears and safety of populations.

In fact, Hussein, Gnisci and Wanjiru (2004) list the challenges to human security in West Africa to include translating the concept into practice; enhancing security system reform; laying the foundation for a coherent security regime in Africa; operationalizing the role of ECOWAS in stabilization and peacekeeping efforts; and achieving greater self-sufficiency in peace-keeping operations. Others are coordinating military assistance on a regional level and enhanced effort to halt the proliferation of small arms, light weapons and anti-personnel mines.

Admittedly, it could be argued that the 2003 creation of WACSOF (involving organizations like the West African Network for Peace — WANEP) could potentially offset some of ECOWAS limitations in relation to human security. This appears latent in WACSOF's goal of galvanizing the initiatives of civil society organizations (CSOs) and partner with ECOWAS for the improvement of human security, regional integration, as well as economic and social development in West Africa. The organization also aims to strengthen and institutionalize a relationship between West African civil society and ECOWAS; hold a biennial People's Forum for members of WACSOF with the purpose of submitting recommendations to West African ministers and heads of state on human security issues; audit the implementation and legislative domestication of ECOWAS treaties, protocols and decisions relating to human security and peace in the region; establish notional and sub-regional monitoring mechanisms on the status of human security in West Africa; popularise ECOWAS in the consciousness of West African - particularly youth - through appropriate programmes such as popular media; and to actively promote a sense of community citizenship between ECOWAS member states and CSOs. While the potential role of civil society groups like WACSOF in advancing human security cannot be underestimated, the challenge however, requires strong organization, strategic direction and leadership inherent in ECOWAS. Moreover, WACSOF appears to still suffer from acute lack of capacity, marked by its poor institutionalization, monitoring and reporting incapacity, and poor coordination between different national chapters. Also, there is a seeming tension and unease by national governments in relation to WACSOF at national and sub-regional levels. Moreover, the institutionalization of the normative elements of human security in the sub-region transcends a single organization (calls for partnerships).

Finally, there are acute organizational capacity needs, such as financial resources, and lack of capacity for effective advocacy and communication strategies, monitoring and evaluation

required for enhanced human security promotion by ECOWAS. This has been a perennial problem across the broad spectrum of ECOWAS activities, including its military and peace-keeping missions. Although a Peace Fund was created under the 1999 Protocol, and donor countries and agencies have intervened in specific areas of capacity building in recent years, however, the enormity of institutional capacity needs to undertake an effective human security strategy remains massive.

Research Question Four: To what extent has the formal conflict resolution structure by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) affect conflict resolution of Liberia?

The ECOWAS implementation of the peace and security architecture boasts an impressive array of instruments, not least the Mechanism, for the top-down approaches to interventions in times of crisis. The inadequacies of the Mechanism become glaring, however, when one considers the helplessness of ECOWAS when dealing with so-called internal conflicts, particularly in ungovernable spaces, such as Liberia. The Organization has been weak in promoting the bottom-up approaches to conflict resolution, using its resources on the ground and local peace constituencies. Remedying the situation calls for a conflict prevention mechanism that would promote cooperation between ECOWAS, member states and civil society in dealing with causes of conflicts, rather than their effects.

Recognizing these challenges, the Organization in January 2008 adopted the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework as a tool to encourage such cooperation among ECOWAS resources and stakeholders on the ground around key conflict-inducing factors. The rationale for adopting the ECPF is to raise conflict prevention and peace-building to the same status as the development agenda. Its core objective is to strengthen and consolidate the human security architecture in West Africa, i.e. the creation of conditions to eliminate pervasive

threats to people's and individual rights, livelihoods, safety and life; the protection of human and democratic rights and the promotion of human development to ensure freedom from fear and freedom from want. The Framework aims to encourage collaborative interventions by field ECOWAS resources (the Council of the Wise, field agencies and the Zonal Bureaux for Conflict Prevention) and local civil society peace constituencies in conflict prevention and peacebuilding around concrete initiatives.

These include natural resource governance, security governance, youth empowerment, gender equality and cross-border initiatives. Other areas of concern in the Framework include early warning and action, preventive diplomacy, political governance, human rights and peace education.

It is hoped that the active cooperation between civil society groups and ECOWAS in-country in the implementation of the Conflict Prevention Framework will enrich the ECOWAS peace and security architecture by filling the bottom-up approach gap.

4.3 Discussion of Research Findings

This concluding section of the study presents a summary of the major findings.

In the course of the study, it was revealed that ECOWAS proved to the world against every odd that it can handle the conflicts in Liberia. ECOWAS through its organized bodies brought peace to Liberia. It helped in the restoration of democratic government to the state. It is obvious that ECOWAS has moved away significantly from where it was at the time of its founding. It will remain one of the greatest achievements of the organization that it has succeeded in transforming itself from its original economic- focused organization to being a strong force in the management of human security. It has now positioned itself better to deliver on an issue that remains a challenge to the international community - how to better

connect the security and development community. Indeed, other regions of the continent are increasingly looking towards ECOWAS for leadership and direction on issue relating to peace and security.

However, for ECOWAS to further meet the desire of its population and assist countries that have fallen victims of major civil conflicts, it has to consolidate its security management structures and ensure that it plays a greater role in other area of conflict resolution. The need for agenda setting should not be taken lightly. It is a role that ECOWAS has the legitimate power to play in Liberia. Until it exercises intellectual conflict resolution and peace building in Liberia, it will be difficult for Africa's external partners to accord ECOWAS with the respect it deserves in this field. However, the new ECPF need to be harmonized for effective utilization for conflict resolution. The sooner the framework is translated into concrete initiatives on the ground, the sooner ECOWAS can become the driving force behind conflict resolution initiatives in West Africa.

ECOWAS measures and strategies for conflict resolution need to be strengthened. The security architecture has been informed largely by the sometimes bitter field experiences that the organization has endured in its attempts to respond to violence and insecurity in the sub-region. Consequently, it has been obliged to apply a trial and error methodology as it fathoms appropriate tools to respond to human and regional security challenges.

It is pertinent to recognize the limitations of ECOWAS in meeting the regional challenges that confront it. ECOWAS is yet to acquire a reasonable degree of real supra-nationality in relation to member states and consequently, its ability to intervene in member states to address grave insecurity is very much a function of the political will of individual member states. In particular, ECOWAS is constrained in its ability to bring large and medium states in line with the provisions of the protocols that they have ratified, particularly with regard to

political governance matters and local internal conflicts in Liberia. So far, ECOWAS has been able to intervene more decisively in member states whose internal governance institutions and processes have collapsed and where central authority is under severe challenges.

The ECOWAS current security architecture provides an invaluable asset to promoting human security. The 2008 ECPF represents an innovative milestone. In addressing insecurities connected to violent conflicts. However, the sub-regions overall security architecture cannot be said to conclusively insulate or protect its populations from emerging and even old threats to human physical security. In spite of the possible adaptability of the ECPF and other protocols to emergent human security threats, it is evidently too early to say the people of Liberia are safer from physical insecurity. Perhaps, the sovereignty of the state and ruling regimes could be said to still be more protected, than the security of the population. It can be argued that the sub-regions security architecture falls short on account of lack of a clearly defined human security.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

This dissertation focuses on the role of ECOWAS in Conflict Resolution in Liberia. The study concentrated rigorously and systematically on the conflicts that affected Liberia from inception to date. It brought to light different approaches to the explanation of conflict resolution in Liberia. Initially established for economic integration and cooperation among its member states, ECOWAS transformed itself in 1993 to a peace and security outfit in the belief that economic integration and cooperation cannot be achieved in an unsecured environment. The study outlines what ECOWAS has done in the field of conflict resolution in Liberia.

A number of questions came up which helped in determining the extent to which ECOWAS has contributed to conflict resolution in Liberia.

However, the views of different scholars were sought and an appropriate theory was adopted. The research was carefully designed and descriptive method was applied in exploring the area of study. Secondary source of data was adopted.

Different findings were made which led to the objective of the study. The study found out that ECOWAS has done reasonably well in Peace keeping operations in Liberia but its conflict resolution in Liberia has not been laudable.

5.2 Conclusion

The main objective of this study is to examine the role of ECOWAS in conflict resolution in Liberia. It was observed that ECOWAS has accumulated vast expertise in dealing with instability, but its response mechanisms to conflict resolution are far from perfect. The regional organization is regarded as a trail blazer in the continent. ECOWAS needs to prove to the international community its capability to handle conflict and equally build peace in Liberia. The regional organization is yet to acquire a reasonable degree of real supra-nationality in relation to member states and consequently, its ability to successfully intervene in member states to address grave insecurity remains a big challenge. Also for ECOWAS to meet the desire of its population and assist countries that have fallen victims of major civil conflicts, it has to consolidate its security management structure and ensure that it plays greater role in the area of peace building.

The Special Fund Account instituted by ECOWAS, most times does not serve the objective. Member states and other contributors/donors because of the Anglophone- francophone divide, have politicised the system. Francophone and Anglophone members respond easily only when their regional member is being affected. This really affected ECOWAS in actualizing the purpose of conflict resolution in Liberia.

The strong influence by former colonial powers on ECOWAS Member States has caused the prospect for a standard common defence doctrine through coordinated security sector reform programmes to be very weak. It now appears that the sovereign nations are more powerful than the West African confederation. Decision, rules and orders taken by the confederation are most times not being followed because of the colonial influence. This has drastically affected the role of ECOWAS in conflict resolution.

Among the factors that limit ECOWAS to human security promotion in the sub-region, especially in Liberia, is the slow responses or decision and continued politicisation of clear human security issues. Also, ECOWAS is constrained in its ability to bring large and medium states in line with the provisions of the protocols that they have been ratified, particularly with regard to political governance matters and local internal conflicts.

ECOWAS' current security architecture provides an invaluable asset to promoting human security in the sub-region. The security architecture cannot be said to conclusively insulate or protect members of the sub-region from threats to human physical security. In line with this, the sovereignty of the member states is said to be more protected than the security of the population.

ECOWAS needs to be transformed from current roles as the sole provider to facilitator of human security, and the need for existing security plans to transcend regular peace-keeping roles. However, it has moved away significantly from where it was at the time of its founding. It will remain one of the greatest achievements of the organisation that it has succeeded in transforming itself from its original economic focused organisation to being a strong force in the management of human security. It has now positioned itself better to deliver on an issue that remains a challenge to the international community-how to better connect the security and development community. Indeed, other regions of the continent are increasingly looking towards ECOWAS for leadership and direction on issue relating to peace and security.

5.3 Recommendations

The study recommends that a clearly defined human security charter with specific priorities be formulated for the sub-region. For ECOWAS to further meet the desires of its population and assist countries that have fallen victims of major civil conflicts, it has to consolidate its

security management structures and ensure that it plays a greater role in the area of conflict resolution. The need for agenda setting should not be taken lightly. It is a role that ECOWAS has the legitimate power to play in West Africa. Until it exercises intellectual leadership over the principles guiding conflict resolution in West Africa, it will be difficult for Africa's external partners to accord ECOWAS with the respect it deserves in this field. However, the new ECPF remains "work in progress" and those responsible for championing this project in ECOWAS are well aware of this. The sooner the framework is translated into concrete initiatives on the ground, the sooner ECOWAS can become the driving force behind peace building initiatives in West Africa. This is its rightful role.

To establish a functioning response mechanism to conflict, ECOWAS must recognise the enormity of the security challenges in the sub-region and appreciate the fact that achieving its set target would require not only the mobilization of its member states and organised civil society to accompany the effort, but also the forging of cooperation and collaboration with development partners. ECOWAS's desire and effort to constructively engage West African civil society and build lasting relations with EU and other partners in the realization of its agenda are informed by these realities.

Finally, much as it is necessary to prepare for active intervention to pacify violent enclaves and mitigate humanitarian emergencies, ECOWAS must place greater emphasis on prevention. ECOWAS must develop effective strategies to sanitize natural resource governance, facilitate in-country and regional infrastructure development, ensure youth employment and combat the HIV/AIDS and malaria pandemics. To this end, the operationalization of the supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance and the ECOWAS conflict prevention framework with critical stakeholders must constitute immediate ECOWAS priorities.

5.4 Limitations of the Study

In the course of this study, many problems were encountered. Getting necessary information from relevant departments/units of the Commission. Most of them refused to release their documents while some claim they were missing. The fear of the staff releasing information was a big challenge to the researcher.

At the Nigerian Archives Centre Area 11, Garki, Abuja; information gotten were mostly outdated and the online sources were requesting for purchase of the materials.

There was the problem of time and insufficient fund. Going to internet houses, printing of materials and movement to ECOWAS office and other government offices was a big challenge to me financially.

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**PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION,
MANAGEMENT, RESOLUTION, PEACE-KEEPING AND SECURITY**

PREAMBLE

**WE, THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE MEMBER STATES
OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS);**

MINDFUL OF the ECOWAS Revised Treaty signed in Cotonou on 23 July 1993 notably its
Article 58;

MINDFUL OF the relevant provisions of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity
(OAU);

MINDFUL OF the United Nations Charter, with particular reference to its Chapters VI, VII
and VIII;

MINDFUL OF the provisions of Protocols A/P1/5/79, A/SP2/7/85, A/SP1/7/86, A/SP1/6/88,
A/SP2/5/90 relating to the free movement of persons, the right of residence and
establishment;

RECALLING the Protocol on Non-Aggression signed in Lagos on 22 April 1978 and the
Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence signed in Freetown on 29 May 1981, notably our
resolve to give mutual aid and assistance for defence against any armed threat or aggression
on a Member State;

CONSIDERING the Framework Agreement of the Protocol on Non-Aggression and
Assistance in Defence (ANAD) signed in Abidjan on 9 June 1977;

CONSIDERING ALSO the Protocol on the enforcement of the above-mentioned Framework Agreement signed in Dakar on 14 December 1981, as well as the subsequent Protocols;

REAFFIRMING our commitment to the ECOWAS Declaration of Political Principles adopted in Abuja on 6 July 1991, on freedom, people's rights and democratisation;

RECALLING the relevant provisions of the ECOWAS Conventions on Mutual

Assistance in Criminal Matters and on Extradition, signed in Dakar on 29 July 1992 and in Abuja on 6 August 1994, respectively;

RECALLING ALSO the Cairo Declaration of 29 June 1993 on the establishment of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa adopted by the 29th Session of the OAU Conference of Heads of State and Government; **CONCERNED** about the proliferation of conflicts which constitute a threat to the peace and security in the African continent, and undermines our efforts to improve the living standards of our peoples;

CONVINCED OF the need to develop effective policies that will alleviate the suffering of the civil population, especially women and children, and, restore life to normalcy after conflicts or natural disasters, and desirous of making further efforts in the humanitarian sphere;

CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT that good governance, the rule of law and sustainable development are essential for peace and conflict prevention;

RECALLING the Declaration of the moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons, adopted by the 21st Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, held in Abuja on 30 and 31 October, 1998;

RECALLING also the conclusions of the meeting of ECOWAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the effective implementation of PCASED, held in Bamako on 24 March, 1999;

CONVINCED that cross-border crimes, the proliferation of small arms and all illicit trafficking contribute to the development of insecurity and instability and jeopardise the economic and social development of the sub-region;

AWARE that these phenomena constitute serious social and economic problems which can only be resolved within the framework of increased and well-coordinated multilateral cooperation;

RECOGNISING the need to make the relevant treaties and protocols more adequate, effective and pragmatic;

DESIRING to consolidate our achievements in the resolution of conflicts through the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).

RECALLING our Decision A/DEC.11/10/98 adopted in Abuja on 31 October 1998, relating to the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security;

DESIROUS to establish an operational structure for the implementation of the said Decision;

HEREBY AGREE ON THE FOLLOWING:

DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this Protocol;

"Treaty" means the revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) signed in Cotonou on 24 July 1993;

"Community" means the Economic Community of West African States referred to under Article 2 of the Treaty;

"Authority" means the Authority of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States established by Article 7 of the Treaty;

"Mediation and Security Council" means the Mediation and Security Council as defined by Article 8 of this Protocol;

"Defence and Security Commission" means the Defence and Security Commission as defined in Article 18 of this Protocol;

"Executive Secretary" means the ECOWAS Executive Secretary appointed in accordance with Article 18 of the Treaty;

"Council of Elders" means the Council of Elders as defined in Article 20 of this Protocol;

"Meeting of Ambassadors" means the meeting of Ambassadors as defined by Article 14 of this Protocol;

"Special Representative" means the Special Representative as defined by Article 32 of this Protocol;

"Deputy Executive Secretary" means the Deputy Executive Secretary in charge of Political Affairs, Defence and Security as referred to in Article 16 of this Protocol;

"Institution" means any of the structures provided for under Article 4 of this Protocol;

"Organ" means any of the structures provided for under Article 17 of this Protocol;

"Observation and Monitoring Centre" means the Regional Peace and Security

Monitoring Centre as provided for under Article 58 of the Treaty and referred to in Article 23 of this Protocol;

"ECOMOG" means the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group which constitutes the Community's intervention force as defined in Article 21 of this Protocol;

"Force Commander" means the Force Commander appointed in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of this Protocol;

"Trans-border crime" refers to all crimes organised or perpetrated by individuals, organisations or networks of local and/or foreign criminals operating beyond the national boundaries of a Member State, or acting in complicity with associates based in one or several States adjoining the country where the crimes are actually committed or having any connection with any Member State;

"Member State in crisis" refers both to a Member State experiencing an armed conflict as well as a Member State facing serious and persisting problems or situations of extreme tension which, if left unchecked, could lead to serious humanitarian disaster or threaten peace and security in the sub-region or in any Member State affected by the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government.

CHAPTER I

ESTABLISHMENT, PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES

OF THE MECHANISM

Article 1: Establishment

There is hereby established within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a mechanism for collective security and peace to be known as "Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security".

Article 2: Principles

Member States reaffirm their commitment to the principles contained in the Charters of the United Nations Organisation (UNO) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, particularly the following fundamental principles:

- a) that economic and social development and the security of peoples and States are inextricably linked;
- b) promotion and reinforcement of the free movement of persons, the right of residence and establishment which contribute to the reinforcement of good neighbourliness;
- c) promotion and consolidation of a democratic government as well as democratic institutions in each Member State;
- d) protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms and the rules of international humanitarian laws;
- e) equality of sovereign States;
- f) territorial integrity and political independence of Member States;

Article 3: Objectives of the Mechanism

The objectives of the Mechanism shall be as follows:

- a) prevent, manage and resolve internal and inter-State conflicts under the conditions provided in Paragraph 46 of the Framework of the Mechanism ratified as per Decision A/DEC.11/10/98 of 31 October 1998;
- b) implement the relevant provisions of Article 58 of the Revised Treaty;
- c) implement the relevant provisions of the Protocols on Non-Aggression, Mutual Assistance in Defence, Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment;
- d) strengthen cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention, early-warning, peace-keeping operations, the control of cross-border crime, international terrorism and proliferation of small arms and anti-personnel mines;
- e) maintain and consolidate peace, security and stability within the Community;
- f) establish institutions and formulate policies that would allow for the organisation and coordination of humanitarian relief missions;
- g) promote close cooperation between Member States in the areas of preventive diplomacy and peace-keeping;
- h) constitute and deploy a civilian and military force to maintain or restore peace within the sub-region, whenever the need arises;

- i) set up an appropriate framework for the rational and equitable management of natural resources shared by neighbouring Member States which may be causes of frequent inter-State conflicts;
- j) protect the environment and take steps to restore the degraded environment to its natural state;
- k) safeguard the cultural heritage of Member States;;
- l) formulate and implement policies on anti-corruption, money-laundering and illegal circulation of small arms.

CHAPTER II

INSTITUTIONS OF THE MECHANISM

Article 4: Institutions

The institutions of the Mechanism shall be:

The Authority;

The Mediation and Security Council;

The Executive Secretariat;

Any other institution as may be established by the Authority.

Article 5: Composition and Meetings of the Authority

The Authority is composed of Heads of State and Government of Member States as stipulated in Paragraph 1, Article 7 of the Revised Treaty.

The Authority shall meet as often as necessary.

Article 6: Functions

The Authority shall be the Mechanism's highest decision-making body.

It shall have powers to act on all matters concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution, peace-keeping, security, humanitarian support, peace-building, control of cross-border crime, proliferation of small arms, as well as all other matters covered by the provisions of this Mechanism.

Article 7: Delegation of Powers

Without prejudice to its wide-ranging powers as provided under Article 9 of the Treaty and in Article 6 above, the Authority hereby mandates the Mediation and Security Council to take, on its behalf, appropriate decisions for the implementation of the provisions of this Mechanism.

Article 8: Composition of the Mediation and Security Council

The Mediation and Security Council shall comprise nine (9) Member States of which seven (7) shall be elected by the Authority. The other two (2) members shall be the current chairman and the immediate past chairman of the Authority, each of whom shall have an automatic right to membership of the Mediation and Security Council.

The elected Members of the Mediation and Security Council shall serve for two (2) years renewable.

Article 9: Quorum and Decisions

The meeting of the Mediation and Security Council shall be properly constituted when at least two-thirds of its Members are present.

Decisions of the Mediation and Security Council shall be taken by a two-thirds majority vote of Members present.

Article 10: Functions

The Mediation and Security Council shall take decisions on issues of peace and security in the sub-region on behalf of the Authority. It shall also implement all the provisions of this Protocol.

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 7 of this Protocol and Paragraph 1 above, the Mediation and Security Council shall:

- a) decide on all matters relating to peace and security;
- b) decide and implement all policies for conflict prevention, management and resolution, peace-keeping and security;
- c) authorise all forms of intervention and decide particularly on the deployment of political and military missions;
- d) approve mandates and terms of reference for such missions;
- e) review the mandates and terms of reference periodically, on the basis of evolving situations;

f) on the recommendation of the Executive Secretary, appoint the Special Representative of the Executive Secretary and the Force Commander.

Article 11: Meetings of the Mediation and Security Council

Deliberations of the Mediation and Security Council shall be held at three (3) levels: Heads of State and Government, Ministerial and Ambassadorial levels.

All meetings of the Mediation and Security Council shall be presided over by the Member State elected as the current Chairman of the Authority.

Article 12: Meeting at the Level of Heads of State and Government

The Heads of State and Government of the Mediation and Security Council shall meet at least twice a year in ordinary sessions. Extraordinary Sessions may be convened by the Chairman when the need arises or at the request of a simple majority of the Members of the Council.

The Heads of State and Government of the Mediation and Security Council shall take final decisions on all issues under their authority and competence, including field missions and approve the terms of reference, for such missions.

Article 13: Meeting at the Ministerial Level

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Affairs and Security of the Mediation Security Council shall meet at least once every three (3) months to review the general political and security situation in the sub-region. They may also meet when the need arises.

The recommendations emanating from the Ministerial meetings shall be submitted to the member Heads of State and Government of the Mediation and Security Council.

Article 14: Meeting at the Ambassadorial Level

ECOWAS Member States shall accredit Ambassadors as permanent representatives to the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat. These Ambassadors may also be those accredited to the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

The Ambassadors of Member States of the Mediation and Security Council shall meet once a month to review issues relating to sub-regional peace and security. They may also meet when the need arises.

All reports and recommendations of meetings of the Ambassadors shall be forwarded by the Executive Secretary to all Member States of the Mediation and Security Council and to the Member States concerned. The Reports shall also be submitted for consideration by the meeting of Ministers of the Mediation and Security Council.

Article 15: Role and Functions of the Executive Secretary

The Executive Secretary shall have the power to initiate actions for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peace-keeping and security in the sub-region. Such actions may include fact-finding, mediation, facilitation, negotiation and reconciliation of parties in conflict.

The role of the Executive Secretary shall include the following:

- a) recommend the appointment of the Special Representative and the Force Commander for approval by the Mediation and Security Council ;
- b) appoint members of the Council of Elders;

- c) have responsibility for political, administrative and operational activities and provide logistic support for the mission;
- d) prepare periodic reports on activities of the Mechanism for the Mediation and Security Council and Member States;
- e) deploy fact-finding and mediation missions, on the basis of his/her assessment of the existing situation;
- f) convene, in consultation with the Chairman of the Authority, all meetings of the Mediation and Security Council, the Council of Elders, and the Defence and Security Commission;
- g) Implement all decisions of the Mediation and Security Council.

The ECOWAS Secretariat shall service the Mediation and Security Council and the Defence and Security Commission.

In implementing the provisions of this Mechanism, the Executive Secretary shall be assisted by the Deputy Executive Secretary in charge of Political Affairs, Defence and Security.

Article 16: The Deputy Executive Secretary

1. Under the direction of the Executive Secretary, the Deputy Executive Secretary in charge of Political Affairs, Defence and Security shall initiate and undertake all activities relating to the implementation of the Mechanism.
2. The office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defence and

Security, shall be headed by a statutory officer appointed in accordance with Paragraph 4 (a), Article 18 of the Treaty. He shall have under his supervision appropriate departments, divisions and sections, as may be necessary, including:

- a) the Department of Political Affairs;
- b) the Department of Humanitarian Affairs;
- c) the Department of Defence and Security;
- d) the Observation and Monitoring Centre; and
- e) such other departments as may be established by the Council of Ministers on the recommendation of the Mediation and Security Council.

CHAPTER III

SUPPORTING ORGANS OF THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE MECHANISM

In carrying out their missions, the Institutions stipulated in Article 4 shall be assisted by the organs enumerated in Article 17 of this Protocol.

Article 17: Organs

The following organs are hereby established to assist the Mediation and Security Council.

The Defence and Security Commission;

The Council of Elders;

ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).

Article 18: Composition of the Defence and Security Commission

The following representatives from Member States shall constitute the Defence and Security Commission:

- a) Chiefs of Defence Staff or equivalent;
- b) Officers responsible for Internal Affairs and Security ;
- c) Experts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- d) Depending on the agenda, Heads of any of the following services may be invited:
 - e) Immigration;
 - f) Customs;
 - g) Drug/Narcotic Agencies;
 - h) Border Guards; and
 - i) Civil Protection Force.

Article 19: Functions

The Defence and Security Commission shall examine all technical and administrative issues and assess logistical requirements for peace-keeping operations. It shall assist the Mediation and Security Council in:

- a) formulating the mandate of the Peace-keeping Force;
- b) defining the terms of reference for the Force;

- c) appointing the Force Commander;
- d) determining the composition of the Contingents.

The Defence and Security Commission shall meet once every quarter and when necessary. The Commission shall examine reports from the Observation and Monitoring Centres and make recommendations to the Mediation and Security Council.

Article 20: Composition and Mandate of the Council of Elders

The Executive Secretary shall compile annually, a list of eminent personalities who, on behalf of ECOWAS, can use their good offices and experience to play the role of mediators, conciliators and facilitators. The list shall comprise eminent persons from various segments of society, including women, political, traditional and religious leaders. The list shall be approved by the Mediation and Security Council at the level of the Heads of State and Government.

These Personalities shall be requested by the Executive Secretary or the Mediation and Security Council, whenever the need arises, to deal with a given conflict situation.

Whenever the circumstances require, the Executive Secretary shall assemble eminent personalities from the approved list who shall now constitute the Council of Elders.

The composition and mandate of the Council of Elders shall be defined by the Executive Secretary on the basis of the missions to be carried out.

Members of the Council of Elders selected to deal with a given situation shall report to the Executive Secretary.

The Executive Secretary shall report to the Mediation and Security Council on the initiatives taken in conformity with the provisions of Paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article

Members of the Council of Elders shall be neutral, impartial and objective in carrying out their mission.

Article 21: Composition of ECOMOG

The ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) is a structure composed of several Stand-by multi-purpose modules (civilian and military) in their countries of origin and ready for immediate deployment.

Article 22: Role of ECOMOG

ECOMOG is charged, among others, with the following missions:

- a) Observation and Monitoring;
- b) Peace-keeping and restoration of peace;
- c) Humanitarian intervention in support of humanitarian disaster;
- d) Enforcement of sanctions, including embargo;
- e) Preventive deployment;
- f) Peace-building, disarmament and demobilisation;
- g) Policing activities, including the control of fraud and organised crime;
- h) Any other operations as may be mandated by the Mediation and Security Council.

CHAPTER IV

SUB-REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY OBSERVATION SYSTEM

(EARLY WARNING)

A sub-regional peace and security observation system known as the Early Warning System or "The System" is hereby established for the purposes of conflict prevention and in accordance with Article 58 of the Revised Treaty. The System shall consist of:

- a. Observation and Monitoring Centre located at the Secretariat;
- b. Observation and Monitoring Zones within the sub-region.

Article 23: Observation and Monitoring Centre

The Observation and Monitoring Centre shall be responsible for data collection and analyses and preparation of reports for the use of the Executive Secretariat.

The Centre shall collaborate with the United Nations Organisation, the Organisation of African Unity, research centres and all other relevant international regional and sub-regional organisations.

Article 24: Observation and Monitoring Zones

Member States shall be divided into zones on the basis of proximity, ease of communication and efficiency. Each zone shall be identified by a number and each shall have a zonal headquarters. The following four (4) Observation and Monitoring Zones are hereby created:

ZONE N° COUNTRIES ZONAL CAPITAL

Cape Verde - Banjul

The Gambia

Guinea-Bissau

Mauritania

Senegal

Burkina Faso - Ouagadougou

Cote d'Ivoire

Mali

Niger

Ghana - Monrovia

Guinea

Liberia

Sierra Leone

Benin - Cotonou

Nigeria

Togo.

The zoning provided for in Paragraph 1 above may be altered, if necessary, by the Authority of Heads of State and Government.

Each zonal headquarters shall be provided with an office and placed under the authority of the Executive Secretary, through the office of the Deputy Executive Secretary.

Member States hereby undertake to guarantee the freedom of operations of the zonal headquarters in accordance with the privileges, immunities and security to property, assets and staff of the bureaux as provided by the ECOWAS General Convention on Privileges and Immunities and the Headquarters Agreement.

The Zonal Bureau shall maintain working relations with the host country and local and international institutions.

The Zonal Bureaux shall, on a state by state and day-to-day basis, collect data on indicators that impact on the peace and security of the zone and the sub-region.

The Zonal Headquarters shall process the data collected and prepare a report which they shall send to the Observation and Monitoring Centre. Accordingly, each of the Zonal Headquarters shall be directly linked by appropriate communication means to the Observation and Monitoring Centre.

CHAPTER V

APPLICATION OF THE MECHANISM

Article 25: Conditions for Application

The Mechanism shall be applied in any of the following circumstances:

In cases of aggression or conflict in any Member State or threat thereof;

In case of conflict between two or several Member States; In case of internal conflict:

- a) that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster, or
- b) that poses a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region;

In event of serious and massive violation of human rights and the rule of law.

In the event of an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government;

Any other situation as may be decided by the Mediation and Security Council.

Article 26: Authority to Initiate

The Mechanism shall be put into effect by any of the following:

- a) Upon the decision of the Authority;
- b) Upon the decision of the Mediation and Security Council;
- c) At the request of a Member State;
- d) On the initiative of the Executive Secretary;
- e) At request of the Organisation of African Unity or the United Nations.

Article 27: Procedure

The Mechanism shall be applied according to any of the following procedures:

The Executive Secretary shall inform Member States of the Mediation and Security Council and, in consultation with the Chairman, take all necessary and urgent measures;

The Mediation and Security Council shall consider several options and decide on the most appropriate course of action to take in terms of intervention. Such options may include recourse to the Council of Elders, the dispatch of fact-finding missions, political and mediation missions or intervention by ECOMOG;

The Mediation and Security Council shall issue a mandate authorising the Executive Secretary to set up a mission and define its terms of reference;

Where necessary, the Mediation and Security Council shall appoint the principal officers, such as the Special Representative of the Executive Secretary and the

ECOMOG Force Commander.

The Chairman of the Mediation and Security Council shall submit a report on the situation to the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations;

The Executive Secretariat shall mobilise all the resources required for the operations.

CHAPTER VI

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Article 28: Composite Stand-by Units

Member States hereby agree to make available to ECOMOG units adequate resources for the army, air force, navy, gendarmerie, police and all other military, paramilitary or civil formations necessary for the accomplishment of the mission.

Each Member State shall provide ECOMOG with a unit the size of which shall be determined after consultation with each Member State.

The strengths of these units shall be reviewed according to the situation on the ground.

Article 29: Mandates of the Force and Missions of Deployed Units

Whenever the force is deployed, the strength, mandates and missions of the units shall vary according to the evolving situation on the ground.

Article 30: Training and Preparation of the Composite Stand-by Units

The Executive Secretary, through the departments concerned and, in consultation with Member States, shall contribute to the in training of civilian and military personnel that shall be part of the stand-by units in various fields, particularly in international humanitarian law and human rights.

In this regard, he shall:

- a) Support the development of common training programmes and instruction manuals for national schools and training centres;
- b) Organise training and proficiency courses for personnel of the units in the regional centres in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana;
- c) Work towards the integration of these centres into sub-regional centres for the implementation of this Mechanism.
- d) Take the necessary measures for the organisation of periodic staff and commanders' exercises and joint operations.

Article 31: Observation Missions

Unarmed civilian and military personnel provided by Member States may be deployed alone or in conjunction with armed personnel. They shall, inter alia, supervise and monitor cease-fires, disarmament, de-mobilisation, elections, respect for human rights, humanitarian activities and investigate any complaints or claims brought to their notice. They shall undertake such other activities under the terms of reference as determined by the Mediation and Security Council.

The Observer Missions shall report on their activities and findings to the Executive Secretary.

Article 32: Appointment and Functions of the Special Representative

On the recommendation of the Executive Secretary the Mediation and Security Council shall appoint a Special Representative for each Operation undertaken by ECOMOG.

The principal role and functions of the Special Representative shall include the following:

- a) Serve as the Chief of the Mission and shall be responsible for the political orientation of the mission;
- b) Direct peace-keeping activities and initiate political and diplomatic negotiations with the parties, neighbouring States and other Governments involved in conflict resolution;
- c) Brief troop-contributing States and other States on the situation and operations of the mission as and when required;
- d) Coordinate activities of the sub-regional and international organisations, including NGOs involved in humanitarian relief and peace-building activities in the mission

area. Where necessary, he shall be assisted by a Deputy responsible for humanitarian affairs;

- e) Maintain constant contact with and submit regular reports to the Executive Secretary.

Article 33: Appointment and Functions of the ECOMOG Force Commander

On the recommendation of the Executive Secretary an ECOMOG Force Commander shall be appointed by the Mediation and Security Council and in consultation with the Defence and Security Commission for each operation.

The role and functions of the ECOMOG Force Commander shall include the following:

- a) He shall be responsible for the efficiency of operational, administrative and logistical plans of the mission;
- b) He shall issue instructions to contingent commanders for all operational activities.
- c) He shall ensure the security of personnel and materiel of humanitarian organisations' in the mission area.
- d) The ECOMOG Force Commander is accountable to the Executive Secretary, through the Special Representative.

Article 34: The Chain of Command

The Special Representative shall report directly to the Executive Secretary.

The Force Commander shall report to the Executive Secretary through his Special Representative.

All Contingent Commanders shall report directly to the Force Commander.

All Civil Units shall report directly to the Special Representative.

Article 35: Role of Member States

In addition to their responsibilities as stipulated by the Treaty and this Protocol:

Each Member State shall immediately, upon request, release Stand-by Units with the necessary equipment and materiel;

Member States hereby undertake to fully cooperate with ECOWAS in carrying out the mandates of this Protocol, including all forms of assistance and support required for the Mechanism, especially as regards the free movement of ECOMOG within their territories.

CHAPTER VII

FINANCING OF THE MECHANISM

Article 36: Funding

The Executive Secretariat shall make provision in its annual budget, for funds to finance activities of the Mechanism. As soon as the Protocol governing conditions for application of the Community Levy enters into force, a percentage of the said Levy shall be earmarked for these activities.

Special requests for funds shall be made to the United Nations and other international agencies.

Funds for operations may also be raised from the OAU, voluntary contributions and grants from bilateral and multilateral sources.

Article 37: Pre-Financing

The States contributing contingents may be invited to bear the cost of operations during the first three (3) months.

ECOWAS shall refund the expenditure incurred by the States within a maximum period of six (6) months and then proceed to finance the operations.

Article 38: Logistical Support

The organisation of logistics, including troop transport, shall be determined by the Executive Secretariat in consultation with the host country and the States contributing troops.

Article 39: Remuneration and Service Conditions

The remuneration and conditions of service of the personnel shall be determined by the Council of Ministers on the recommendation of the Mediation and Security Council.

CHAPTER VIII

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

ECOWAS shall take active part in coordinating and conducting humanitarian assistance.

Article 40: Responsibilities of ECOWAS

ECOWAS shall intervene to alleviate the suffering of the populations and restore life to normalcy in the event of crises, conflict and disaster.

In this regard, ECOWAS shall develop own capacity to efficiently undertake humanitarian actions for the purposes of conflict prevention and management.

Where the environment of a Member State is gravely devastated, appropriate steps shall be taken to rehabilitate it.

ECOWAS shall recognise, encourage and support the role of women in its initiatives for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peace-keeping and security.

Article 41: Cooperation with Other Organisations

ECOWAS shall cooperate with the following institutions and organisations:

- a) national, regional NGOs and religious organisations;
- b) Organisation of African Unity, the United Nations and its agencies;
- c) other international organisations intervening in the humanitarian sector.

The ECOMOG unit shall be adequately equipped to undertake humanitarian activities in their mission area under the control of the Special Representative of the Executive Secretary.

ECOMOG shall provide assistance to all national, regional and international agencies, particularly on security issues.

When necessary, ECOMOG shall coordinate the activities of humanitarian agencies in the field.

CHAPTER IX

PEACE-BUILDING

The Community hereby adopts a graduated strategy for building peace which shall be implemented as a continuum.

Article 42: ECOWAS Institutional Capacity for Peace-Building

To stem social and political upheavals, ECOWAS shall be involved in the preparation, organisation and supervision of elections in Member States. ECOWAS shall also monitor and actively support the development of democratic institutions of Member States.

ECOWAS shall endeavour to assist Member States emerging from conflicts to increase their capacity for national, social, economic and cultural reconstruction.

In this regard, all ECOWAS financial institutions shall develop policies to facilitate funding for reintegration and reconstruction programmes.

Article 43: Peace-Building During Hostilities

In zones of relative peace, priority shall be accorded to implementation of policies designed to reduce degradation of social and economic conditions arising from conflicts.

Article 44: Peace-building at the End of Hostilities

To assist Member States that have been adversely affected by violent conflicts, ECOWAS shall undertake the following activities:

- a) Consolidation of the peace that has been negotiated;
- b) establishment of conditions for the political, social and economic reconstruction of the society and governmental institutions;
- c) Implementation of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes including those for child soldiers;
- d) Resettlement and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons;

- e) Assistance to vulnerable persons, including children, the elderly, women and other traumatised groups in the society.

Article 45: Restoration of Political Authority

In situations where the authority of government is absent or has been seriously eroded, ECOWAS shall support processes towards the restoration of political authority. Such support may include the preparation, organisation, monitoring and management of the electoral process, with the cooperation of relevant regional and international organisations. The restoration of political authority shall be undertaken at the same time as the development of respect for human rights, enhancement of the rule of law and the judiciary.

CHAPTER X

SUB-REGIONAL SECURITY

Article 46: Control of Trans-Border Crime

In order to facilitate the control of trans-border crime, ECOWAS shall promote close cooperation among the security services of Member States.

The security services of Member States shall assist one another and ensure proper coordination for the apprehension of criminals.

Member States shall establish specialised departments within their ministries of Justice, Defence and Security with trained personnel and communication equipment for coordination and centralisation of cooperation matters in particular, mutual assistance in criminal matters, and extradition requests.

Member States shall supply the Executive Secretariat with documents setting out the details of criminal procedures in their countries. The information provided by Member States shall include a summary of the criminal process, from beginning to end, and shall outline what is needed for each State to grant a request for mutual assistance, extradition or the restraint or forfeiture of proceeds of crime. Member States shall also provide all the contract particulars for their national units and exchange information concerning any other relevant authorities and provide updated lists of the said units. The information shall be translated and circulated by the ECOWAS Secretariat to all the specialised units (Central authorities) established to handle requests and other related matters that may arise in the course of implementation.

With a view to strengthening national legal instruments on mutual legal assistance and extradition and making them more functional and efficient, all Member States shall harmonize their domestic law in accordance with the relevant ECOWAS Conventions on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and Extradition. Member States undertake to adopt a convention to incriminate and make punishable the most commonly committed crimes in the sub-region.

Member States shall keep statistics, in particular, on the number of mutual legal assistance and extradition requests received and sent, as well as results obtained. There shall also be periodic meetings of the specialised departments of the Ministries of Justice, Defence and Security and the Interpol National Central Bureaux for the purpose of exchanging information on past or on-going cases and on measures aimed at improving cooperation.

Member States shall develop simplified restitution procedures for vehicles and other stolen objects seized by the requested State.

The judicial and police authorities of ECOWAS Member States shall consider the red notices published by the ICPO-Interpol at the request of an ECOWAS Member State as valid

requests for provisional arrest for the purpose of Article 22 of the ECOWAS Convention on Extradition.

Member States shall establish a special fund for detected proceeds of crime. This fund can be used for preventive and criminal justice response to, inter alia, trans-border crime and drug trafficking. Member States shall also give consideration to the establishment of confiscated asset management offices, where required.

Legislation on forfeiture of proceeds of crime in Member State shall be applicable to all crimes.

ECOWAS shall establish a Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Centre (ECPCJS) to serve as focal point for mutual legal assistance. The Centre shall be part of the Legal Department within ECOWAS. This ECPCJC shall assist in linking up

ECOWAS Member States to non-ECOWAS Member States in Mutual Assistance

Matters. It shall also serve as a supervisory power to ensure that countries implement conventions they sign.

Article 47: Coordination of Policies

The Executive Secretary shall be responsible for the coordination and implementation of all decisions relating to sub-regional security.

Article 48: Anti-Corruption Measures

To eradicate corruption within their territories and in the sub-region, ECOWAS and its Member States shall promote transparency, accountability and good governance.

Article 49: Measures Against Money Laundering

The ECOWAS Secretariat and Member States shall adopt strategies for combatting the problem of money laundering, by extending the scope of offences, enabling the confiscation of laundered proceeds and illicit funds and easing bank secrecy laws within and outside the sub-region.

Article 50: Control of the Proliferation of Small Arms

While taking into account the legitimate national defence and security needs, and those of international peace-keeping operations, ECOWAS shall establish effective measures to:

- a) Control the importation, exportation, manufacture and eradicate the flow of small arms.
- b) Register and control the movement and use of legitimate arms stock;
- c) Detect, collect and destroy all illicit weapons;
- d) Encourage Member States to collect and destroy all surplus weapons.

Article 51: Preventive Measures Against the Illegal Circulation of Small Arms

ECOWAS shall take all the necessary measures to combat illicit trafficking and circulation of small arms. These measures shall include:

- a) developing a culture of peace;
- b) training for military, security and police forces;
- c) enhance weapons control at border posts;

- d) establishment of a database and regional arms register;
- e) collection and destruction of surplus and illegal weapons;
- f) facilitating dialogue with producers and suppliers;
- g) reviewing and harmonising national legislation and administrative procedures;
- h) mobilising resources.

ECOWAS shall strengthen its institutional and operational capabilities and those of its Member States for the effective implementation of the measures mentioned in Paragraph 1 above.

The Executive Secretariat's Department of Political Affairs, Defence and Security shall coordinate and monitor implementation of all programmes and activities and shall analyse information from the zonal headquarters.

In order to promote and ensure coordination of concrete measures at national level, Member States shall, in accordance with guidelines adopted by ECOWAS, establish national commissions made up of representatives of the relevant authorities and the civil society.

At the beginning of any ECOMOG peacekeeping operations, all dedicated light weapons and ammunition shall be declared to the Executive Secretariat so as to ensure their effective control as well as removal upon completion of the operations.

All weapons collected during any disarmament exercise shall be destroyed.

CHAPTER XI

COOPERATION WITH THE ORGANISATION OF

AFRICAN UNITY, UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

Article 52: Cooperation

In pursuit of its objectives, ECOWAS shall cooperate with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations Organisation (UNO) and other relevant international organisations.

In the implementation of this Mechanism, ECOWAS shall fully cooperate with the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.

In accordance with Chapters VII and VIII of the United Nations Charter, ECOWAS shall inform the United Nations of any military intervention undertaken in pursuit of the objectives of this Mechanism.

CHAPTER XII

SPECIAL PROVISIONS

Article 53: Abrogation

The provisions of this Protocol shall replace all the provisions of the ECOWAS Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance in Defence signed on 29 May 1981, which are in conflict with the spirit of this Protocol.

The provisions of the Protocol on Non-Aggression signed on 22 April, 1978, which are incompatible with those of the present Protocol are hereby declared null and void.

Undertakings devolving from the provisions of this Protocol shall not be interpreted as being against the spirit of Conventions or Agreements between one Member

State and a third State; provided such Conventions and Agreements are consistent with the spirit of this Protocol, otherwise, such provisions are null and void.

Article 54: Rationalisation of Subregional Institutions

ECOWAS shall take necessary measures to rationalise all mechanisms, institutions and organs of the sub-region, having similar aims and objectives with this Mechanism.

To this end, ANAD may be transformed into a specialised agency of ECOWAS.

CHAPTER XIII

GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 55: Amendments

Any Member State may submit proposals for the amendment or revision of this Protocol.

Any such proposals shall be submitted to the Executive Secretary who shall notify other Member States not later than thirty days after the receipt of such proposals. Amendments or revisions shall not be considered by the Authority unless Member States shall have been given at least one month's notice thereof.

Amendments or revisions shall be adopted by the Authority.

Article 56: Withdrawal

Any Member State wishing to withdraw from this Protocol shall give a one-year written notice to the Executive Secretary who shall inform Member States thereof. At the end of this period of one year, if such notice is not withdrawn, such a State shall cease to be a party to the Protocol.

During the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, such a Member State shall nevertheless continue to observe the provisions of this Protocol and discharge its obligations thereunder.

Article 57: Entry into Force

This Protocol shall enter into force provisionally upon signature by Heads of State and Government. Accordingly, signatory Member States and the Executive Secretariat hereby undertake to start implementing all provisions of this Mechanism upon signature.

This Protocol shall definitely enter into force upon ratification by at least nine (9) signatory States in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Member State.

Article 58: Depository Authority

This Protocol and all instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Executive Secretariat which shall transmit certified true copies to all Member States and notify them of the dates of deposit of instruments of ratification by the Member States and shall register it with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), as well as the United Nations (UN) and any other Organisation as may be decided by the Council.

IN FAITH THEREOF,

WE, THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) HAVE SIGNED THIS PROTOCOL.

DONE AT LOME, THIS 10TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1999

IN SINGLE ORIGINAL IN THE ENGLISH, FRENCH AND PORTUGUESE LANGUAGES, ALL TEXTS, BEING EQUALLY AUTHENTIC.

.....

H.E. Mathieu KEREKOU

H.E. Blaise

COMPAORE

President of the Republic

President of Faso of Benin

Chairman, Council of

Ministers of Burkina Faso

.....

Hon. Alexandre Dias MONTEIRO

H.E. Henri Konan

BEDIE

Minister of Commerce, Industry
Energy

President of the Republic and
of Côte d'Ivoire

For and on behalf of the
President of Cabo Verde

.....

H.E. Mrs Isatou NJIE-SAIDY

H.E. Flt.-Lt. Jerry John

RAWLINGS

Vice-President,
Secretary of State for Health, Labour,

President of the Republic
of Ghana

Social Welfare and Women's Affairs, For and
on behalf of the President of the Republic of
The Gambia

Hon. Zainoul Abidine SANOUSSI

Hon. José Pereira

BATISTA

Minister of Foreign Affairs in the
Affairs

Minister of Foreign

President's Office

and International

Cooperation

For and on behalf of the President

For and on behalf of the

President of the Republic of Guinea of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau

Hon. Enoch DOGOLEAH

Vice-President

For and on behalf of the President

Liberia

H.E. Alpha Oumar Konare

President of the Republic of

Mali of

Hon. Sidi Mohamed Ould BOUBACAR

Minister, Secretary-General at the Presidency

For and on behalf of the President of the

Islamic Republic of Mauritania

State of the

H.E. Olusegun OBASANJO

Commander-in-Chief

of the Armed Forces of the Federal

Republic of Nigeria

H.E. Ahmad Tejan KABBAH

EYADEMA

President of the Republic

Leone

H.E. Squadron Leader Daouda

Malam WANKE

President of the Council for National

Reconciliation, Head of

Republic of Niger

H.E. Abdou DIOUF President,

President of the Republic

of Senegal

H.E. Gnassingbé

President of the Togolese of Sierra

Republic