

**ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY'S PEACEMAKING ROLE IN
AFRICAN CONFLICTS: THE CASE OF THE RWANDA GENOCIDE**

AYUBA CALEB

(SPS/09/PPS/00004)

BA (ED), PGDPA, MPA

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE, BAYERO UNIVERSITY KANO, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

SEPTEMBER, 2016

DECLARATION

I, AYUBA CALEB, hereby declare that this work is the product of my own research undertaken under the supervision of Professor Kamilu Sani Fage of the Department of Political Science, Bayero University, Kano. This thesis has neither in whole nor in part been presented for the award of a degree elsewhere. All sources have been duly and appropriately acknowledged.

.....

AYUBA CALEB

.....

DATE

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that this thesis has been examined and approved for the award of the degree of PhD Political Science.

External Examiner

Internal Examiner

Date:.....

Date:.....

Supervisor

Head of Department

Date:.....

Date:.....

Dean, Faculty of Social and Management

Sciences Date:.....

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I appreciate the Almighty God for the grace to complete the course. I acknowledge the role of my supervisor during the programme; Professor Kamilu Sani Fage was painstaking, extraordinarily patient and resilient in the face of fatiguing questions. Most importantly, Mallam (Prof) was gentle and calm while correcting observed inadequacies that emanated from woven perspectives and arguments. I also wish to appreciate my internal examiner, Dr. Abubakar Jiddere for his availability and speed in addressing academic and administrative concerns.

Kindly permit me to thank all those who made this work possible, including my parents, Dakachi and Mrs. Ayuba M., the management and Staff of the Department of Political Science, Bayero University, Kano, Nigeria. This research would not have been possible without the contributions of relatives and very good friends: Ruth Daniel, James Sarki, the Ayubas – Yakubu, Polina, Daniel, Kazachiyan, Phoebe, Micah and George. Others are, Anrew Paul Gwaza and Hassan Taiye Iyiola,. Special thanks to my colleagues at the Institute for peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja.

I will also appreciate my uncle James Sarki for his encouragements throughout these past years. My brothers in Christ Jesus; Taiye Iyiola, Paul Andrew Gwaza, Gerald Okafor, Zachariah Ishaya.and Jonah Bakut are appreciated. I also wish to

give thanks to my directors Dr. Bakut Tswah Bakut, Barrister, Gabriel Jiya, Dr. Bosede Awodola, Dr. Ochogwu, Peter Oparah and Manshop Garba for their understanding while I ran the programme. I must equally acknowledged the friendship and love of Muhammadu Yallo and Abubakar Aliyu (Miller) for decades of faithfulness to true friendship.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE PAGE.....	i
DECLARATION.....	ii
CERTIFICATION.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	v
LIST OF ACRONYMS.....	xi-xii
ABSTRACT.....	xviii

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY.....	1-- 3
1.2: STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM.....	3- 11
1.3: OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY	11- 12
1.4: RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....	12-12
1.5: SCOPE	13-13

1.6: LIMITATIONS.....14-14

1.7: JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY.....14-15

1.8: METHODOLOGY/ RESEARCH TECHNIQUES.....15-17

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1: INTRODUCTION18-19

2.2: THE AGGRESSIVE NATURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.....19-23

2.3: MIGRATION AND THE POWER STRUCTURE IN RWANDA.....23--32

.

2.4: WHAT IS GENOCIDE?32--35

2.5: ROLE OF ARMS IN THE EXACERBATION OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE..... 35-41

2.6: THE ETHNIC QUESTION IN THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE.....41--55

2.7: POVERTY: A MAJOR CAUSE OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE55-73

2.8: THE ROLE OF CASTE SYSTEM IN THE GENOCIDE.....	73-80
2.9: BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY.....	80-83
2.10: THE ROLE OF EARLY WARNING SYSTEM IN CONFLICT PREVENTION.....	83-88
2.11: THE MEDIA AND THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE.....	88-94
2.12: THE 1948 UN CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE.....	94-98
2.13: THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY.....	98-100
2.14: AFRICAN CHARTER OF HUMAN AND PEOPLES RIGHTS	100-120
2.15: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	120- 129

CHAPTER THREE

3.1: OVERVIEW OF GENOCIDE IN HISTORY.....	130-135
3.2: BUILD-UP TO THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE.....	135-136

3.3: THE REMOTE FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GENOCIDE.....	136-140
3.4: EVOLUTION AND STATE FORMATION: UNDERSTANDING THE CAUSES OF THE GENOCIDE.....	140-145
3.5: THE IMMEDIATE FACTORS LEADING TO THE GENOCIDE: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN HABYARIMANA’S DEATH AND THE GENOCIDE	146-150

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ROLE OF THE OAU IN THE GENOCIDE

4.0: INTRODUCTION.....	151- 151
4.1: THE OAU’S PEACEMAKING ROLE IN RWANDA	151-157
4.2: THE RPF: A REASON FOR THE FAILURE OF THE ARUSHA ACCORD	157-163
4.3: FOREIGN INFLUENCE AS REASON WHY THE ARUSHA ACCORD FAILED.....	164-165
4.3.1: UGANDA.....	165-167

4.3.2: THE ROLE OF THE BRETTON-WOODS FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN THE GENOCIDE	167-172
4.3.3: THE ROLE OF US IN THE GENOCIDE.....	172- 179
4.3.4: THE ROLE OF THE FRENCH IN EXERCABATING THE VIOLENCE	179-182
4.4: CHALLENGES CONFRONTED BY THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) IN RWANDA.....	182-183

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1: SUMMARY.....	184-188
5.2: CONCLUSION.....	189-191
5.3: RECOMMENDATIONS.....	191-194
5.4 REFERENCES.....	194-205
APPENDIX 1.....	206-208

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACHPRs	African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights
AFRICOM	Africa Command
AHC	African High Command
AL	Arab League
AR	Africa Rights
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CCR	Cooperative Conflict Resolution
CENTCOM	Central Command
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
EU	European Union
FEWER	Forums on Early Warning and Early Response
GLR	Great Lakes Region
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IMF	International Monetary Fund

IMT	International Military Tribunal
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MNC	Multi National Corporations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non Governmental Organizations
NIO	New International Order
NIIA	Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OAS	Organization of American States
PAP	Pan African Parliament
PARMEHUTU	Movement for the Emancipation of the Bahutu
PhD	Doctor of Philosophy
PKO	Peace Keeping Operation
PSC	Peace and Security Council
RADER	Democratic Association of Rwanda
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RTLTM	Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation

TCC	Troops Contributing Countries
UN	United Nations
UNAR	Rwandese National Union
UNCPPCG	United Nations Conventions for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UK	United Kingdom
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
USIP	United States' Institute for Peace

Abstract

Two decades ago, precisely in 1994, Rwanda experienced a genocide that led to the death of between 800,000 - 1,000,000 people. The destruction of these lives took place within a period of a hundred days. The study is important because the elimination of between eight hundred thousand (800,000) to one million (1,000,000) people within such a short period should attract genuine concerns. Thus, the study was driven by the need to

examine the factors responsible for the genocide. The study also sought to understand the role played by the OAU as the continental body responsible for the promotion of peace and security in Africa to either prevent or manage the violent conflict. In addition, the work leaned primarily on the content analysis of relevant literary materials in the liberal art and social science academic domain to weave its perspectives. Content analysis as used means a careful, thorough, systematic analysis and interpretation of the content of texts to identify patterns, themes, and meanings. In other words, the work will be anchored on traditional normative analysis of content of literary works; that is (i) non numerical data/information (ii) specific population coverage, in this instance, the Rwandan space is referenced (iii) active population involvement including the Hutu and Tutsi belligerent actors to the violent conflagration (iv) inductive inference methodology including the utilization of an inter-disciplinary framework in the overall analysis of collated data. Also, to give meaning to the issues examined, the work depended on the Just Peacemaking theory. The choice of the theory was informed by the realization that the theory addresses such important issues as the implications of injustice in deeply divided societies like Rwanda. The theory has succeeded in explaining the background, buildup to the conflict and the overall process that characterized the dynamics of the genocide. The thesis has established that the OAU did a lot in organizing series of peace effort including the ratification of the Arusha Accord. The Accord had the potential for resolving the complex questions that challenged Rwanda as a country; unfortunately, there were many other issues and actors operating behind the scene that thwarted the OAU peace initiatives. For instance, while the OAU was engaged in diplomatic shuttle to suppress the violence, Western powers and even African countries were pushing arms to the warring factions. By way of recommendation, the thesis has suggested that if Africa is to escape from the narrative of violent conflicts as the march into the 21st Century gains momentum, it is imperative on the continent to develop her own independent defence mechanism as other continental bodies care to do.

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The decade of the 1990's, which incidentally marked the end of the Cold War, coincides at the cross roads with the period in African history when the continent's insecurities were exacerbated by newly attained human freedoms and the liberal spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs). This period saw civil wars in Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan to mention a few. In particular, the Rwandan genocide, unlike any other African conflict and war, has exposed the incapacity of the OAU and the United Nations systems to properly articulate the best approach and responses to regional and international conflicts with a view to either preventing or resolving them. Around the middle of 1994, over 800,000 - 1,000,000 Tutsi and those considered moderates amongst the Hutu stock were massacred (Destexhe 1995; Cooper, 2002; Prunier, 1995).

This particular genocide deserves studying because Rwanda has experienced other genocide before the one of 1994. For instance, there was the genocide of 1967 and the one of 1972, apart from the Tutsi genocide against the Hutu in the early 1970s in Burundi. It will be relevant to mention here that because the world has experienced incidences of genocides before the ones mentioned above,

international and regional organizations responsible for maintaining international and regional peace and security have proactively fashioned legal instruments to protect human groups within national borders against the extremism of stronger actors. The UN and the OAU have therefore operationalized the UN Convention on genocide in 1948 while the OAU drafted and put to operation by 1986, the African Charter of Human and People's Rights (ACHPRs). This makes Elizabeth More (2007: 1) to say that certainly we can blame the United Nations (especially its Security Council), and those states that failed in the will and commitment to resolve the tragedy by meaningful international action using the legal justifications available as pointed above.

It is necessary to quickly observe that, considering the anarchic world environment from the First World War, world leaders and global policy making/implementation establishments converged to put in place a viable international peace and security architecture to be responsible for international stability and development. A structure that was to ensure the growth of a secure and peaceful world devoid of bloodshed and war that was becoming the norm in the relations amongst state actors in the Post Cold War environment. Instructively, the principles and mind-set that informed the conception of the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations and other regional institutional frameworks like the Organization of African Unity (OAU) were premised on the perceptions that they were to be

responsible for global conflict prevention through the maintenance of regional and world peace and security. “It was hoped that this was to be achieved through the promotion of unity, cooperation and the resolution of extant conflicts amongst national actors in the international environment” (Sanda, 2004).

The fact that the seventh Chapter of the U.N. Charter and specifically its Articles 39-50 makes provision for the best strategy for the maintenance of international peace and security needs to be brought to the fore. Furthermore, Chapter VIII Articles 52-54 also provides for an arrangement within the regional framework wherein regional organisations could mobilize troops and material resources for peacekeeping operations (Golwa, 2011: 68). It is this mind-set that makes the study of the genocide under the OAU framework important so as to ascertain the level of its success in managing regional conflicts.

1.2: STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Statement of the problem is the fundamental question that requires an answer. It is the most worrying issues that need to be properly examined and understood. It is a fundamental question because many other specific research questions are derived from it. The research problem is the fulcrum upon which the research objective and hypotheses revolve (Obasi, 1999: 56). Under the statement of problem the researcher is expected to examine the ‘why’ related issues. The researcher does not

only describe as such but rather raises question that attracts curiosity and expectation in terms of answer.

Having made this clear, it is important to prod further by saying that Conflict seems to be a recurring decimal in Africa both between and within the various countries that make up the continent. Some of the countries that have experienced violent conflicts include Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Guinea, Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. All these is a result of the failure of the OAU to provide the needed moral compass that should steer Africa out of the painful experiences of stagnation, occasioned by violent conflicts that are increasingly becoming the norm in most states of the region especially after the cold war.

The conflict in Rwanda in 1994 and those experienced at different point in its history wears the garb of caste and ethnicity, but most importantly, they also bear socioeconomic and political characteristics. The conflicts could be traced to as far back as the state formation process of the distinct nationalities constituting the modern Rwandan state. The condition of violent conflicts within the continent was however heightened by the integration of diverse peoples (who evolved separately) into a commonwealth (of countries within specified territories) occasioned by the

historical experience of the Berlin conference that intensified the contact between Europe and Africa from the scramble and partition in the 19th century (1884-1885). It is necessary to reiterate the fact that the study of the Rwanda conflict is crucial in this chaotic world environment because of the immense lesson it provides on the need to prevent conflict from occurring and ensuring that those that have begun are mitigated immediately.

It is also important to state that the colonial experience of the 19th century is also responsible for the inherent social contradictions that led to the Rwandan genocide of 1994. For instance, the deeply etched Rwandan caste phenomenon was exacerbated by the colonial administrations of the colonial period. This heightened the sharp distinction between the traditional Tutsi, Hutu and Twa identities. It has been confirmed that it was this class subdivisions turned into caste systems that worsened Rwandan insecurity throughout its post colonial history (Africa Rights, 1995).

The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 was a truly traumatic and horrifying event. It was one of the most brutal acts of murder ever committed in the course of human history without any doubt. More than 6 men, women and children were murdered every minute of every hour of every day while the violence lasted. This brutally efficient killing was sustained for more than 3 months. At the end of the violence,

between 300,000 to 400,000 fighters were killed; 250,000 and 500,000 women were raped while up to 20,000 children were born to women as a result (Amnesty International, 2014).

In the same infamous vein, more than 67% of women who were raped were infected with HIV and AIDS. In many cases, this resulted from a systematic and planned use of rape by HIV+ men as a weapon of genocide. The records have established too that there are 10 times as many widows than widowers. This is apart from the fact that 75,000 of survivors were orphaned as a result of the genocide. Of those that survived the genocide, over half the children stopped their schooling because of poverty. As of 2007 too, 40,000 survivors were without shelter because many of these had their homes destroyed in the violence (Amnesty International, 2004).

The deeply etched ethnic rivalry was actually heightened by the colonial experience of the 19th Century that made more rigid an already sharp distinction between the traditional Tutsi, Hutu and Twa ethnic identities. This rigidity ensured that members of each class category remained where they were with the arrival of the colonial powers and the institutionalisation of their new ethnic policies (Africa Rights, 1995). It was this ethnic subdivision turned into a deeply ingrained and unalloyed social order and the internal contradictions that spawned within their

socio-economic and political institutions that actually culminated in the frequently referenced genocide. Rwandans destroyed or maimed each other with the use of machetes and other crude weapons (Mamadami, 2001: 19). A few questions are compelling here: from where and when was such massive lethal cache sourced? Were they fabricated locally or imported from some other countries □ and by whom? Whatever the answers, the evil perpetrated by deploying these weapons was as horrendous as it was unconscionable. The USIP says; armed with machetes, the killers were both vicious and organized, torturing their victims, murdering them in cold blood, and dumping their bodies in mass graves. In numerous cases, such killings took place while international peacekeepers stood by ‘helplessly’ (USIP, 1999: 101).

This conflict has greatly impacted on the entire sub-regional bloc fundamentally due to the heterogeneity of the ethnic composition of the Great Lakes Region This is in the basic sense that these three caste/ethnic groups, the Twa, Hutu and the Tutsi constitute the ethnic quality and social composition of the region; wherever one goes to across the GLR, these ethnic groups, especially the Hutu and the Tutsi run the socio-economic and political systems that sometimes result in competition for scarce resources and conflict of the violent kind amongst these groups. Hence we see Hutus locking horns in fierce conflicts with the Tutsi in Burundi, the DRC, Uganda and the same people replicating the scenario in Rwanda. Thus, even

though the Rwanda question is an important theme yearning for investigation, a more important theme is the widespread nature of the Hutu and Tutsi competition wherever they are found. This study will reveal that beyond the remote and immediate issues often identified with the Rwandan violence, other more compelling and forceful issues abound that makes the replication of the Hutu/Tutsi violence inevitable wherever these groups are located.

Although the Rwandan conflicts received considerable global attention, the extent to which both internal and external dynamics have exacerbated the conflict is not clear. In the same vein, the extent to which these forces have moderated or aided its resolution is yet to be thoroughly ascertained. This obvious void in the clear comprehension of the interlocking issues in the conflict has in turn complicated the adaptation of the right tool by the OAU in its successful resolution of other conflicts.

This study is motivated by the desire to understand the complex paradoxes that defined the Rwandan human security challenge. Paradoxes covering issues like, while the Hutu/Tutsi conflict raged for a period of one hundred days, and despite the fact that almost one million souls were butchered, troops were not mobilized by either the UN or their regional variant – the OAU to prevent and manage the challenge. In fact, it is on record that there was heavy and conspicuous presence of international organizations in the GLRs. This is apart from the early warning

signals dispatched to the United Nations in New York by UN's security experts.

Observers have in obvious exasperation lamented

In debates and soul searching across the world, following the genocide, there have been little agreements over what exactly could have been done when and by whom. However, on two points analyst generally concur; that individual nations, regional organizations and the international community need be better prepared to prevent such catastrophes in the future, and that part of this preparation is attempting to understand what went wrong in Rwanda (USIP, 1999: 21).

This recommendation has become relevant in the light of the fact that the principles that resulted in the conception of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity were premised on the understanding that they are to be responsible for the maintenance of world and regional peace and security. "This is through the promotion of unity and cooperation and the resolution of conflicts amongst nations" (Sanda, 2004: 274). For instance, even the UN under Boutros Ghali, has accepted that the Rwanda conflict/genocide raged because the mechanism of preventive diplomacy as an instrument of nipping conflicts in the bud was not sufficiently explored as observed earlier. So why was the preventive diplomacy instrument not used? This is despite the unique nature of the UN Charter that endows the organization with massive powers. Specifically, "Article 42 empowers the security council to "take such action by air, sea and land as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security" (Ebo, 1994: 87).

In the pursuit of this unique conflict management mechanism, other such equally catastrophic conflicts across the world were successfully resolved and peace restored to the beleaguered countries/zones by these international bodies. The ECOMOG, with the express permission of the UN proved invaluable in its performance in the peace building and the conflict management processes of the Liberian and the Sierra–Leonean conflicts in the West Coast of the African continent. In recent years, the role of the African Union Missions across conflict zones cannot be measured—the activities of the Union in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and post election Kenya for the purpose of restoring order is worthy of note (USIP, 1997: 27).

Despite the impressive credentials of these international bodies in conflict prevention and resolution, they could not prevent the civil war in Rwanda from occurring; neither were they able to manage it appropriately as it unfolded. Duke (1994: 1) says

The biggest challenge facing the UN in the post cold war period is intra-state conflicts. The three problems posed by intra-state conflict are the willingness of the UN members, particularly the strongest members to intervene; the structural ability of the UN to respond; and whether the traditional principles of peacekeeping should be applied to intra-state conflicts. It is argued that after the passage of PDD-25, the US has little enthusiasm for involvement in intra-state conflicts and that the UN still has serious structural problems addressing this type of conflict.

The research problem is therefore why couldn't the institutions responsible for conflict management in Rwanda at the time able to forestall the violence despite the clear powers they had to do this? In international Relations, missions aimed at the prevention and resolutions of conflicts are driven by a combination of factors, viz. actual goals of actors and the stated objectives of these actors. Nations agree to partake in international peace missions in the pursuit of their individual national interests. Could it be that the powerful nations of the world in the UN Security Council ignored the plight of ordinary Rwandans because of the poverty profile of this landlocked economy? Rwanda is a tiny landlocked country with little mineral wealth, except scattered nickels deposits. "The lucrative mineral deposits occur on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) side of the border". It depends mainly on the fertile but inadequate land, a resource not enough even for the production of food, not to mention the requirement for grazing. A number of indices point to the fact that "Rwanda and Burundi could easily have the highest percentage of disturbed, over-populated land in Africa" (African Rights, 1995).

1.3: OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The story of killings, rape, damage to human properties and the refugee dilemma of the period makes this study imperative. This is because without embarking on this endeavour, it will be impossible to appreciate the magnitude of the issues that

constitutes that challenging period. To achieve this goal, the following specific objectives will direct the analysis.

1. To examine the causes of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994.
2. To assess the role played by the OAU in preventive and violent conflict management diplomacy in the Rwanda genocide.
3. To examine the effort or otherwise made by the OAU in the resolution of the Rwandan conflict.
4. To identify the challenges faced by the OAU in the attempt to intervene in the Rwanda genocide.

1.4: RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research questions to help in the achievement of the above stated objectives are as follows;

1. What were the remote and immediate factors responsible for the genocide in Rwanda?
2. What did the OAU do to prevent or mitigate the genocide in Rwanda?
3. What were the lessons learnt by Rwanda, the AU and Africa's deeply divided countries from the genocide?
4. What challenges did the OAU encounter in resolving the Rwanda conflict?

1.5: SCOPE

The focus of the study is to examine the role played by the Organization of African Unity in her conflict resolution role in the Rwandan conflict of 1994. Thus, a general synopsis of the historical overview that will give depth, meaning and understanding to the entire conflict scenario and the issues contained therein will form a central thrust of the argument within the main body of the work. Of course the spatial coverage is Rwandan.

This study is very broad. This is because it will go back in time to the pre-colonial period, specifically to the period when the different peoples of Rwanda began their migrations to this mountainous area around Lake Kivu. In addition, the work will further cover the entire colonial period from around the 16th Century. It becomes clear therefore that the study will examine the German and Belgian suzerainty over the Rwandan state (Orbis Agency, 1981: 580).

Finally the scope of the thesis will also include the post colonial period after the independence of the country. The subject to be covered will focus mostly on the relationship between the Hutu and the Tutsi especially the socio-economic and political aspects that often resulted in conflicts between them.

1.6: LIMITATIONS

It was the intention of this work to include primary sources as part of its methodology. The interview of actors to the violent conflict would have been challenging due to the constraint of money. Therefore, financial constraints have frustrated efforts to embark on a proposed historical excursion to Rwanda. This would have strengthened the insights and overall perceptions of the thesis.

In addition, because of the immense interest that the genocide in Rwanda has generated, there is presently a vast amount of document that makes it difficult to sieve out relevant materials for making meaningful conclusions pertaining serious subjects. For instance, it is possible to encounter varied data that will sometimes confound the conclusion on very important issues. It is also a fact most of the work on Rwanda are in the French language. This makes translation difficult; hence a large portion of data becomes inaccessible.

1.7: JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

This study will be relevant as a resource for future researchers in the field of peace and conflict resolution. It is true that at the moment, there is in existence a huge data base containing massive volumes of relevant literature and documentary resources; yet this modest effort will further contribute to the ever increasing body of secondary data.

In addition, while it is clear that there are in existence substantial reference material for policy making/implementation establishment and allied Think-Tank working groups to depend on, this dissertation could play some significant role in equally contributing, as a dependable resource for this subject thus enhancing the capacities of conflict management practitioners to make sound predictions, and achievement of conflict prevention.

1.8: METHODOLOGY/ RESEARCH TECHNIQUES

The thesis will be driven by the use of extant written historical facts and information, secondary data. From the above, it is clear that the work will dependent largely on documentary written works of scholars that have worked in the specific fields of area studies, history, political science, strategic studies, peace and conflict resolution and the phenomenology of violent conflicts especially their genocidal variant in Africa and the world at large.

In other words, the work will be anchored on traditional normative analysis of content of literary works; that is (i) non numerical data/information (ii) specific population coverage, in this instance, the Rwandan space is referenced (iii) active population involvement including the Hutu and Tutsi belligerent actors to the violent conflagration (iv) inductive inference methodology including the utilization of an inter-disciplinary framework in the overall analysis of collated data. Therefore the approach may, based on the nature of the phenomenon being

examined, naturally concern itself with a subjective assessment of attitudes, opinions and behaviours of actors to the issues under examination (Asika, 2009).

Content analysis is here applied to imply a method or technique for describing in a systematic way, the content of communication, and more importantly for exploiting communication content of research objectives (Creswell, 2009).

These facts were derived from diverse points for the singular purpose of coherence and clarity in presentation and analysis as these relate to the different shades of the colossal phenomenon of genocide in Rwanda. This encompassed the varied subjects of causality, the execution of the genocide 'project', their typology, character/nature and ultimately their consequences on Rwanda

To achieve the above stated objectives, this research focused on relevant books, book chapters, Think Tank policy statements and NGO reports. Other sources will include conference papers, gazetted documents, and scholarly articles covering this broad area. In addition, materials will be sourced from journals, newspapers, monographs, magazines, manuals and professional handbooks.

Data obtained from the qualitative methods of data collection are presented and analyzed using the descriptive and narrative styles. In other words, the method of data analysis in this research has been largely descriptive and qualitative. The nature of the data collected, the stated objective of the study, which is to describe, explain and analyze the role of the OAU in peacemaking in African conflicts with

specific concern on the Rwandan genocide is the focus here. In this vein, as have been severally stated, details for the work will be assembled from a collection of documents such as classified documents, policy statements, official reports, gazettes, and correspondences from archival sources and many other such materials.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1: INTRODUCTION

This Chapter has two objectives in view. These are, to draw from an array of existing literatures and review them. It is hoped that when this has been achieved, our understanding of the Rwandan question will be enhanced. This is because the different subject of Rwanda and its thematic anchor will be better situated after a review of the literatures. It is hoped that the effort will augment understanding and an appreciation of the entire national question as highlighted within the entire work.

Secondly, the chapter will focus on analysis of theories to serve as apt model for explaining the phenomenon of the Rwandan genocide. Specific attention will be paid to what should be the ideal Rwanda community and the initiatives in Rwanda that should result in conflict prevention. Of course, the theory to be adapted will deliberately seek to address a wide range of the Rwandan conflict scenario. This will include the build-up to the genocide, the violence as it unfolded and the initiatives (if any) conceived to address the post conflict peacebuilding processes.

The literature review will focus on discourses that concern the Rwandan catastrophe. This way, it is hoped that any hazy aspect of the subject will be

appropriately addressed with the eventual result of shedding light to the issues raised. Furthermore, the literature identified for review will be reviewed on the basis of their thematic interconnectedness to the overall discourse. Hence, the work has selected sub-subjects like the nexus between the colonial experience and the exacerbation of most African state conflicts and so on.

2.2: THE AGGRESSIVE NATURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

In the process of scouring through literatures on conflict, war and the management of these phenomena, it was discovered that experts have made effort at identifying the reasons for instability between human groups and between states—the geographical space that accommodates these human beings. These studies have begun with the individual as the unit of analysis and broadened their scope to the realm of the state and the international system ultimately. The results of Preliminary investigations have revealed different assumptions including that;

1. Aggressive behaviour is innate and biologically programmed into the human species (Mitchell, 1985: 123).
2. Aggression is the result of frustration by other humans or circumstances; these frustrations create massive back-lashes leading to violent conflicts (Mitchell, 1985: 123).

3. A third school posits that aggressive behaviour is essentially learned or a modelled behaviour which is usually (but not necessarily) copied by the young from their elders in both formal and informal socialization processes (Mitchell, 1985: 123).

By this provision, younger/weaker societies/communities emulate the aggressive behaviour of older/stronger societies/communities. These perspectives are relevant in linking the nexus between individual aggressiveness and general social and political violence (Mitchell, 1985). From the above, it has become evident that the aggressive tendency of man subsisting in what is called 'society/community' has origin in his biological constitution (Paige, 2009). It is this make-up that has produced the multiple wars that have littered the firmament of the history of human relations (Paige, 2009). Again this violent tendency in man has ensured that conflicts are hardly preventable nor resolved amicably by the use of traditional conflict resolution mechanism. Consequently, by the time most domestic and international conflicts come to an end, the incurred damage to human beings and their holdings are often devastating. For instance, by the time the world was emerging from the bunkers of World War II, over ten million people had been killed, empires devastated, new states birthed and the old geo-political order permanently altered (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1995: 76).

The truism of this reality (as articulated by the realist model) was captured by the theologian scholar, Reinhold Niebuhr, the quintessential diplomat, George Kennan (cited from Fukuyama, 1992) and Professor Hans Morgenthau (1985). All these realist classicists had sustainably articulated the classical thoughts that the starting point for understanding world politics is to recognize that the course of human history shows that nations active in international politics are continuously preparing for, actively in, or just emerging/recovering from the throes of organized violence in the form of war with its attendant bloodshed, devastations to national, regional and international peace and security becoming the norm (In Fukuyama, 1992: 247). Even in ancient times Plato (cited in Sagan, 1979) had submitted the hardly disputable thesis that ‘war must be regarded as the fundamental fact of political life, indeed of all life, and that every decision of consequence must be made with that fact in mind’. This trend and conflict dynamic has by 1991 produced twenty seven battle fields across the world (Fung, 1996: 65). In fact many more theatres are being created as the years roles by and individual nation’s interests and those of the strategic coalitions they align with becoming increasingly more complex (Fung, 1996: 65).

In fact the realist thinking that has shaped the nature of relations between states in the international environment since the treaty of Westphalia could be connected to the classical orientation of Niccollo Machiavelli (1469-1527). In ‘The Prince’

Machiavelli has explicitly contributed what he calls the justification for rulers to assert their power to maintain their positions of authority and to ‘advance the virtue, fame, and honour of their states’ if they are to survive and influence international activities to their benefits (Paige, 2009). ‘It is better to rule by craftiness of a “fox,” but when necessary rulers should not shrink from the bold lethality of a “lion.” He prescribes citizen militias to strengthen the power of the republican state’ in their competitive stance against other state actors (Paige, 2009).

These perceptions have greatly influenced the behaviour of every unit within the system to conduct affairs in a manner that promotes its benefits and reduces its losses (Craig 1994: 17). This condition has clearly made every actor extremely selfish in the pursuit of its will and interest. Therefore, in the light of the non-existence of state actors to moderate the global environment in an egalitarian and equitable manner, the imperative for the mobilization of neutral international troops to confront international insecurity has become a necessity (Waltz, 1971).

Ironically, in referencing earlier epochs, it was discovered that in the 19th Century international peace and stability was largely dependent on parity in power relations between coalitions. In the century following on the contrary, peace was a product of what Rueck (1985: 113) had described as the ‘preponderance of the leading

coalitions' to achieve peace. Thus, without mincing words, it could be safely asserted that the major instruments that determine peace and security in an anarchic global system are undoubtedly the ability to acquire and maintain power which deters any potential threat (Waltz, 1971).

2.3: MIGRATION AND THE POWER STRUCTURE IN RWANDA

Rwanda is a country in the central African region. According to a World Bank (1994:1) record, it has a large population size – somewhere around 7.2 million prior to the bloodshed. Uvin (1998:180) has also opined that the population of the country is still growing at the rate of more than 3 percent per annum – this makes the country the most densely populated country on the African continent

This work will be quick to observe that it will expound on certain basic facts that needs clarifications from the beginning. This goal will revolve around how the history of Rwandan is understood, construed transmitted or narrated through the time and space dimension by classical scholars as they make effort at analyzing the anthropological challenges of ethnic nationalities of this country. In the effort to explain Rwanda, it has become common to read and hear, through oral tradition analysts say Rwanda's history was shaped by a combination of three distinct ethnic nationalities. According to these historians/anthropologists, the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa peoples are indisputably part of the formation of Rwanda as a state.

Therefore, these different people were core aspects of Rwanda during its state formation process.

It was Takeuchi (2000) who maintained that prior to 1994, Rwanda's population consisted of two main, indigenous ethnic groups – the Hutu, who accounted for approximately eighty-five per cent of the population, and the Tutsi, who accounted for most of the remaining fifteen per cent (with the Twa group accounting for probably less than one percent). The Tutsi are often associated in historical narration with nomadic and pastoral lifestyle. These are also often associated and portrayed as invaders whose origin and aboriginal home was the Horn of Africa, specifically from Ethiopia and imposed a harsh monarchical regime on the earlier settled Hutu who are seen as farmers and cultivators of the soil having settled the land long before other groups like the Tutsi stock. “However, other assessments indicate that *all* of the different groups may have arrived in migratory waves over many centuries” (Takeuchi 2000:185). This aspect of the historical narrative of insists that the theoretical thinking of conquest of one group over the other often peddled must be abandoned” (Takeuchi 2000:185) because the history of these people does not confirm any of these claims.

Some commentators of Africa's social relations have suggested that the terms Hutu, Tutsi and Twa refer basically more to social status than to ethnicity in pre-colonial times (Hintjens 2001:27–28) . Thus, a direct opposite of this narrative is

the thrust driven by other scholars who insist in their submissions that in the real sense, the triple human sub cultural categorization of the Hutu, Tutsi and the Twa nationalities are one and the same people – in terms of their language, the religious creed they profess and the geographical location inhabited by these nationalities – of course, this development may be a result of deep acculturation of these people over time. According to Van Hoyweghen (2000: 2) the Hutu and Tutsi ethnicities coexisted “side by side, spoke the same language (Kinyarwanda), and shared membership of ethnically crosscutting clan, religious and neighbourhood groups”. This hypothesis is equally portrayed by the Orbis Agency (1981: 580) wherein it maintained that,

The first inhabitants of Rwanda were the Pygmy Batwa some five centuries ago. Rwanda’s territory was seized by the Hutu (in Bantu this means ‘men’) and two centuries later came the Tutsi. The latter were culturally absorbed by the Hutu and adopted their language and their way of life.

These categories of scholars insist thus that the subdivisions and categorizations of these people only became pronounced in the latter history of the people of Rwanda – specifically with the emergence of the Germans and later the Belgians on the scene after the Berlin conference. According to this narrative, the colonial policies of these colonial overlords played a major role in exacerbating the difference existing between these people (Africa Rights, 1995; Orbis Agency, 1981).

Still on the correct narrative, most historians of the GLRs and specifically Rwanda are unanimous in their conclusions that the earliest settlers of the Rwanda region were hunters and gatherers whose modern day descendants are the small minority groups of Twa. Later, cultivators – the Hutus – and nomadic cattle breeders – the Tutsi – “and Rwanda consisted of a patchwork of a small chiefdoms and principalities, with the groups living side by side” (Africa Rights, 1995: 2). According to Ogot (in Africa Rights, 1995: 2), the claim made by an earlier generation of historians that the Tutsi’s invaded and conquered the region has proven to be incorrect. Ogot (in Africa Rights, 1995: 2) continues that the “migration/conquest hypothesis is more in the nature of bad habit, leftover from the now discredited racial theories of ethnicity in Africa, than a fact established by rigorous inquiry”. But before Ogot’s liberating perspective, John Hanning Spekes (in Sanders, 1969: 524) views had dominated the African racial discourse.

Upon discovery of the kingdoms of Buganda with its complex political organizations, (Speke) attributed its ‘barbaric civilization’ to a nomadic pastoralist race related to the Hamitic Galla (Ethiopian Oromo) thus setting the tone for interpreters to come. The Hamites were designated as early culture – bearers in Africa owing to the cultural superiority of intellect and character in all Caucasoid

A fact that cannot be ignored about Rwanda’s history is the fact that relationship between the ethnic groups has been deeply competitive and segregated. The social hierarchy instituted by the Tutsi monarchy had at its peak the Mwami (literarily, the king), “who presided over all political, judicial and religious powers. Then

came the Tutsi-cattle raisers and warriors – further down the social ladder were the farming Hutu, and right at the bottom the pygmy Twa, hunters and foragers” (Orbis Agency, 1981: 580). The competing relations saw the Tutsi at the top, the Hutu in the middle rung and the least was the Twa. The Tutsi discriminated against the Hutu and the Hutu were severe too in discriminating against the Twa (Africa Right: 2). The discrimination against the Hutu by the Tutsi minority was so severe, but this was with the support of the Belgians. According to the Orbis Agency (1981: 580), by 1957, “the Hutu had only two representatives in the Supreme Council charged with local administration, while the Tutsi had 31”. This was the socio political structure in operation in Rwanda when the first missionary Church movement came to Rwanda in the 19th Century (1870s).

It is necessary to state the fact that for over four hundred years, from the 16th Century up to the 20th Century, specifically 1959, Rwanda’s history was shared with Burundi’s (Orbis Agency, 1981: 580). Thus, immediately after the Berlin Conference in 1884, German imperial military force established its outpost in Usumbura (in present day Burundi) and from this location proceeded to occupy the whole of the territory. Just before the turn of the century, 1899, the whole region became part of German East Africa.

During World War 1, in 1916, the area was occupied by Congolese troops under the command of Belgian officers. In 1919, under the Treaty of Versailles, the territory of Ruanda-Urundi was turned over

to Belgium and in 1920 the Belgian mandate was confirmed by the League of Nations. Later on, in 1946, the United Nations transformed Ruanda-Urundi into a trust territory under Belgian administration. (Orbis Agency, 1981: 580).

According to the historians of colonial Africa, the arrival of the Belgians into the area was marked by the plundering of the country's natural resources and they used repressive means to oppress the native peoples. "In 1920, they crushed a popular uprising that led to the killing of many Rwandese" (Orbis Agency, 1981: 580). Of course these repressive actions always happened when the people became conscious of their rights and determined to protect them.

Apart from the above referenced works, another dependable literature of socioeconomic and political developments in Rwanda is Martin Meredith's (2011) 'The State of Africa'. It begins its well articulated and coherently presented work with a presentation that captures the picturesque imagery of a land of beauty - Rwanda. Rwanda was a land whose brewing ferment of convulsing internal contradictions was well crusted beneath the unique quality of its natural formations. According to this work, it was the social relation of Rwanda that in ironic twist informed the disharmonious character of its treachery and even betrayal of one people against the other—in this case, the Hutu majority against the Tutsis minority.

The structure of this book is most helpful to the reader in the sense that it is woven thematically which greatly enhances comprehension and understanding. In the light of the book's introduction as hinted above, Meredith presents this island of beauty in the following poetic genre: "In the Tourist literature, Rwanda was known as 'the Land of a Thousand hills because of its geographical location in the midst of mountain massifs; a country of magical beauty tucked away in the heart of the African continent, with breathtaking views of and crystal-clear lakes, like a tropical version of Switzerland. "The country has innumerable rivers and lakes and a rich fauna. The average altitude is 1, 500 m" (Orbis Agency, 1981: 580).

In terms of spatial description, he maintains that in the North-west, towards the Congo-Nile crest, was the enormous Peaks of the "Virunga Mountains rising to 14, 000 feet, a volcanic range covered with thick woodlands, the domain of highland gorillas made famous by the work of American primatologist Dian Fossey, and her book "Gorrillas in the Mist".

Beyond Meredith's exposition on geography and ecological issues, giving a lucidly vivid description of man's (the people of Rwanda's) subsistence on a very fertile but extremely inadequate land resource that served as the foundation of his work, he proceeds to attempt presenting the nature of Rwandan socio-political development from the late 1950's to the early 1990's. This period marked the anticlimax in the caste/ethnic relations that had been brewing from the period when

these groups established their distinct identities as unique human entities. As mentioned above, this cultural subdivision was crystallized to the level of an institution (as against the fluid and flexible categorization that defined the nationalities' beginnings) by the colonial establishment's severe policies. Meredith (2011) successfully establishes that throughout the close to four decades of the history of Rwanda's self governance, it had experienced intense social tension as a result of contest for economic and political dominance and pursuit of power of one group over the other.

Another issue the work focuses on is the matter of the near subjectivity evident in the articulated perspective by the author. Of course this perspective is consistent with 'other equally established traditional paradigms' by scholars of this subject, whose studies delve into the history and politics of Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region (Orbis Agency, 1981). Virtually every document one stumbles on or lays hand on, the obvious becomes manifest - that the motivation that shapes the thrust of authors' discourse is sometimes influenced by the emotional pains that the genocide naturally invokes. This is because of these authors' realization and perceptions that the violence was avoidable. This is seen as a major shortcoming of the work.

Another major weakness of this otherwise literary masterpiece is the fact that the work focused mainly on the political and power relations between these

antagonistic groups. As would be expected of such works, Meredith fails to delve, in an in-depth style on the economic relations that could be advanced to explain the antagonism that eventually laid the foundation for the genocide. Of course, it is very important to state that the history of the struggle between the Hutu and the Tutsi can only be understood when examined from the economic dimension of the relation between the groups.

The Africa Rights (1995) has also articulated in a document the different dimensions of the genocide. But the work by this body focuses mainly on attempting a scientific explanation for the sources of the violence. Thus, beyond what it describes as the ‘pathology of Genocide’ (meaning the scientific study of the causes of a phenomenon, including the causes of genocide) – the Africa Rights (1995: 1-44) presented thematic issues like race distinction, religious and political economy (poverty) factors as causal elements to the violence; the ‘overpopulation myth’, and manipulation of fear and frustrations were also advanced as major forces in stirring and sustaining the challenge of insecurity at this time in the evolutionary advance of the GLR. It is noteworthy to appreciate that these are issues and areas that are not often delved into in many works. For instance, the authors of this rare document have crafted a viewpoint that does an exposition of the vast network of the perpetrators of the killing culture during the violent genocide. These include the hierarchy of the military apparatus, the media, the

interahamwe killing machine (a Hutu youth militia of the *akazu* – the inner cabinet of the ruling party - The National Revolutionary Party for Development (MRND), a movement that featured prominently in the genocide), and the authority presiding over the Rwandan prefectures. Without any doubt, the careful and painstaking manner that shaped the weaving of the literature leaves no one in doubt that the content of the work is reliable.

In addition, the work by the Africa Rights (1995) is a compendium of the facts about the Rwanda question in its entirety. The only identifiable area of weakness of the book, ironically, lies in its non-specificity; that is paying specific attention to particular subjects as against its generalizations.

2.4: WHAT IS GENOCIDE?

The term genocide is of recent origin considering the fact that the term was non-existent before the Second World War. A combination of the Greek word *geno* (race, ethnic group or nation) and *-cide* (a Latin word for killing). Therefore, Genocide has been given many definitions from the time Lempkin showed interest on the subject. Lempkin, a Polish lawyer, in 1944 integrated the two Greek and Latin words to create the word genocide. Genocide as conceived by Lempkin means a coordinated action aimed at annihilating an identifiable group of people (Ezeani, 2013: 127-128). Lempkin's definition of the term is broad based:

By genocide, we mean the destruction of an ethnic group....Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion and economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups (Lempkin, 1944).

This framework advanced by Lempkin to describe genocide has proven useful in the study of the subject. In fact his definition has greatly enhanced the understanding of the international community which today takes genocide to mean the deliberate killing of a large section of human group, nation, and ethnic groups. Presently, it has become institutional in UN conventions that whoever makes deliberate target of a particular segment of people with the objective of attacking them, denying them of their liberties or properties will be guilty of the crime of genocide (UN Convention of Genocide, 1948).

It is important to note that it was based on Lempkin's initial works that the international panel of eminent personalities emerged to broaden the study of genocide. The work by the international panel of eminent personalities has also proven useful in the genocide studies as they have continued to dominate academic discourse around the world. This conclusion is arrived at mainly due to the nature

of the personalities in this panel. Another consideration is the different variables captured in their exposition on the genocide subject. This Particular report captures the essence of any genocide phenomenon to the extent that any conflict that manifests the same or even similar tendencies could be ascribed the tag 'genocide'. Thus, this makes the study a specialized and scientific area. The main issues are the target of attackers, the perversity perpetrators exhibit in the course of carrying-out their acts; what they do to women and children who under international law should be exempted from any form of attack during violent conflicts. These eminent personalities advance the generally accepted wisdom that the perpetrators of genocide are driven by the conscious resolve to murder others. These categories of people are not merely culpable of crimes against humanity but go beyond to the realm of the ultimate depth of human perversity. It sets as objective the extermination of a part or even entire human peoples for the crime of bearing the identity by which they are distinctly known and recognized universally. Genocide is intrinsically contrived and purposed as a 'final solution' to a national question. It is an attempt to rid the world of a group that can no longer be tolerated. Unlike in conventional warfare, in genocide, the making of women and children deliberate targets of attacks are not inopportune by-products of a conflict or a collateral damage in the jargon of military bureaucracies. On the contrary these vulnerable human category-women and children- "are direct targets since they ensure the

future of a group can no longer be allowed to survive” (UN Convention of Genocide, 1948).

In conclusion, it is important to mention that it was the work of Lempkin on December 9, 1948 that made the UN to give approval for the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) (Bruno, 1946: 227-230). The convention established genocide as a crime against humanity which is punishable. It was on the basis of the effort of Lempkin and the UNCPCG that the UN put in force the Nuremberg trials and the post genocide trials in Rwanda.

2.5: ROLE OF ARMS IN THE EXACERBATION OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE

Arms are very important in the understanding of the Rwandan violence. Beyond the exacerbation of the challenge of insecurity in the post cold war Rwandan environment, the proliferation of arms also ensured that the peace mechanism put in place by the OAU failed to achieve its purpose of peacemaking and conflict resolution. Irrespective of the nature of arms, whether licit or illicit, the phenomenon of small arms supply to the continent has never meant anything good to Africa. Beyond the massive shedding of blood, arms have also negatively impacted the development agenda of Africa and Africans.

With regards Rwanda, arms supply, both licit and illicit by western and ironically African countries; members of the OAU played a very important role in the genocide. The Belgium, the US, Eastern European countries, France, Egypt, South Africa and China were all prominent actors in the supply of arms to the government of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF. It is therefore safe to say that the massive collection of these countries all pushing arms into Rwanda made the parties to the conflict confident that they could defeat their opponents hence their refusal to adhere to the peace agreements put in place (Africa Rights, 1995).

A major literature depended on to furnish the work with statistical data is the Africa Rights (1995). The work successfully chronicles the level of participation of the above mentioned countries in the violent conflict culminating in genocide. The most important measure of this involvement had to do with their volume of arms supply to the parties to the conflicts. But before we go to the specifics of the role played by each actor, it is necessary to say that most of the people that died at the beginning of the genocide were killed with low technology weaponry (Africa Rights, 1995: 66). It was implements like machetes, the *masu* (a club studded with nails), spears, knives, bows and arrows that were used. On the other hand, automatic rifles, mortars, and grenade have been deployed for the genocide by the military, the police and the gendarmes (Africa Rights, 1995: 66).

Of course the greatest contributor of the machetes used in the violence was China. In the period marking the build-up to the genocide, China had sent a lot of these weapons to Rwanda. The Africa Rights (1995: 66) had made the following interesting revelations with regards the subject,

Machetes, often referred to as a ‘traditional weapon’ had been imported *en mass* over the preceding few years from China and other suppliers. In January, 1993, at Kibungo, crates of machetes addressed to Seraphim Rwabukumba were found in a lorry from Nairobi.

However, it is germane to state the fact that the low technology usage does not in any way undermine the huge import of sophisticated weaponry to Rwanda before and during the violent genocide. The thesis will be quick to mention that even though Belgium had been prohibited by its national law from providing lethal military supplies to any country at war, “before the war however, Belgium was a major supplier to the Rwandese military” (Africa Rights, 1995: 67).

France in the same vein played a major role in supporting the Hutu governments of Juvenal Habyarimana. France’s support to the government was unique and quite different from those provided by the governments of other friendly countries. This assistance was spread across four different segments including arms supply, personnel training, the provision of troops to the theatre of military engagement and the outright cash financing of the governments’ military expenditure.

During the infamous period, it is on record that the government of France had provided assistance to the government of Rwanda to the tune of over six million dollars. This money was in the form of military hardware including “mortars, light artillery, armored cars and helicopters”. Again, in an ironic twist –contrary to the generally held tradition of US culpability – there is evidence that “French -supplied ground –to–air missile brought down the presidential plane” of Habyarima while in the company of the Burundian president, Melchior Ndadaye on the 6th of April, 1994 (African Rights, 1995: 67).

Secondly, in the face of war, the French quickly enlarged the presidential guard and provided it with sophisticated weaponry; until the arrival of the UNAMIR, the French provided the ground troops to assist the Rwandan military to maintain peace and public order. Most importantly, it was to protect foreign nationals including French citizens resident in Kigali at the time. However, “observers had noticed French troops manning checkpoints on main roads and inspecting the identity cards of travellers (African Rights, 1995: 67). During the period before the arrival of UNAMIR, the French had six hundred and eighty troops in Rwanda (African Rights, 1995: 67). This was more than the number needed to demobilize most of the militia according to the UNAMIR commander, General Romeo Delleire (Thomson, 2007: 14). Fourthly, French money was responsible for arms procurement through third party. Most of the weapons procured for the Rwandan

military were procured from Egypt, another strong ally of the Rwandan government of President Juvenal Habyarimana. This was possible through “credit extended by the French bank Credit Lyonnais against the shipment (HRW, 1994: 15).

Beside France, another important source of arms for the government of Rwanda was another important friend of the regime – Egypt. According to the Human Rights Watch’s Arms project for 1994, the second largest supplier of arms to Rwanda was Egypt. Egypt shipped 450 AK 47 assault rifles and somewhere around three million ammunitions were shipped into Rwanda when the purpose for the arms procurement was evident. Other important SALWs supplied by the Egyptians included fifty mortars, sixteen thousand mortar shells, two thousand rocket-propelled grenades, two thousand anti personnel land mines, six long-range artillery guns in addition to three thousand shells (HRW, 1994: 15).

South Africa also found economic opportunities in arms sales due to the genocide. While the Egyptian government was an ally of the Rwandan government, the South African government supplied arms to Rwanda on mercantile grounds. Therefore by the time the genocide was coming in 1994, South Africa had sold a large quantity of arms cache to Rwanda. South Africa supplied mortars, machine guns, ammunition and tens and thousands of fragmentation grenades. In an ironic twist of fate, it has been observed by analyst that in the same week that post

apartheid South Africa was celebrating the advent of democracy, the same country's lethal arms were being used as an instrument of genocide in a fellow African country - Rwanda (Africa Rights, 1995: 68). It has been noted by Ingridiis (2016) that "While, for example, 1994 Rwanda was going through one of the most barbaric moments in its history, 1994 South Africa was experiencing one of the best moments in its history".

This is a confirmation of the dictum that there is no morality in international affairs; all that drive human actions and that of the states from where they operate is interest.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the massive arms and military build-up could not have resulted in anything other than the genocide the world saw in 1994. This conclusion is informed by the fact that when the different issues around Rwandan socioeconomic and political formation are aggregated and brought into consideration, then the least thing the belligerents should be made to access was arms and the implements of war as highlighted above. Unfortunately, despite the record of the acrimonious relations between these traditional enemies, the international community, as if in a conspiracy availed these belligerents huge amount of arms while fully knowing what the consequences of this action was going to be.

The history of the Hutu and the Tutsi of Rwanda has revealed concrete evidence that the animosity between them was deep rooted; traversing over a millennium of fierce contest for power and control. All they have been interested in the cause of their national life has been to dominate each other through whatever means including the use of force. Therefore, they have attacked and killed themselves from the moment the country attained independence. The massive illicit and licit arms supply to Rwanda therefore had genocide as the ultimate goal. This conclusion is inevitable considering the fact that early warning signals and the publication of hate speeches like the HUTU TEN COMMANDMENTS in both the print and electronic media suggested what the future of Rwanda had in store for its people immediately after the cold war. Thus, to give the people this amount of arms meant the die was cast for the end game.

2.6: THE ETHNIC QUESTION IN THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE

It is impossible to delve into any meaningful discourse covering the Rwandan genocide without articulating the nexus between the violence and the ethnic elements that fired its embers. There are two different schools of thought which have formed the dominant paradigms shaping any discourse on the African conflict scenario; the one that emphasizes the sanctity of the ethnic element as far as the African cosmological worldview is concerned, and the other dimension which

maintains that ethnicity is guilty in its culpability as a major agent of conflict orchestration, any time African violent conflict comes up for examination.

By way of definition, “Ethnicity is the consciousness that one belongs to a cultural background that is different from other members of the groups in such instance, his activities tend towards favouring people/members that share similar background” (Kingdom and Nnabuike, 2013: 125).

In this regards, scholars with different shades of opinions, irrespective of their logical orientation and intellectual leaning are sometimes unanimous in their concurrence that indeed the ethnic categorisation of the society is as guilty of causing the genocide as any other factor. In this respect, Meredith (2011: 487) has asserted in his work ‘The State of Africa’ that, in relation to the violence, the genocide that “followed was caused not by ancient ethnic antagonism but by a fanatical elite engaged in a modern struggle for power and wealth using ethnicity and its fiery instrument as their principal weapon”. This viewpoint is complemented by the Africa Rights (1995: xviii) position, whose thesis has proven consistent with those of others like Meredith’s that have remained vehement that “The genocide of the Rwandese Tutsi and murder of many moderate Hutus was a political strategy adopted by a clique of powerful people at the centre of the government of Rwanda”. Of course their grand strategy was to hold onto power at all cost. These powerful people within government unfortunately used the ethnic

card with its potential for invoking the highest sense of primordial affiliations and loyalty to the ethnic nation. In this regard, it will be safe to reference Beyene Bezawit. Bezawit (2012: 54) has made the following observation “various ethnic conflicts have occurred among the constituencies of the country.....most conflicts have not arisen from the existence of irreconcilable ethnic differences, but from competition over state resources”. Edward Azar (1990: 7-10) concluded the argument when he maintained that protracted social conflicts occur when people are not given opportunity to “acquire the means to meet their basic needs”. Basic needs as defined by Azar will encompass the following, “security, recognition, and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation”. Apart from the scarcity of the resources to be distributed to various developmental needs, the component ethnic groups are divided and in continual struggle for their own shares of national resources. In addition, national identity is in some countries virtually non-existent. These pose special problem to administrators in most Third World countries, especially in Africa where ethnic consciousness still rates very high at the expense of central political institutions” (Ojo, 1983: 97).

Babalola (2013: 89), while making bare the construct of his mindset on the genocide, especially with specific regards to its ethnic coloration opines that because of the nature of state creation processes original to African peoples and the equally relevant delineation colonial policies, most African states ended up multi-

ethnic and multi-religious. It is therefore normal to presume that “the social and political, as well as the economic import of ethnicity cannot be ignored if an insightful analysis of the African state’s development is to be undertaken”. Accordingly, Babalola (2013: 188) has sounded a word of warning to the end that it might be too simplistic to limit the complex interplay of the existent forces in African politics mainly to ethnicity even when this social phenomenon cannot be ignored “it remains a considerable factor in African politics. It is erroneous to dismiss ethnicity as an irrational relic of the past, bound to be wiped out by the process of development”.

He continues;

In Africa, ethnicity partly determines who gets what and when, and this explains why the ethnicity variable is of paramount importance to our understanding of failures of statehood in most parts of Africa. In deeply divided societies, ethnic cleavage, unlike other forms of cleavages such as class, appears permanent and all-encompassing, predetermining who will be granted and denied access to power and resources. More often than not, Political pressures from ethnic groups have had tremendous influence on a country’s politics. The inherent centrifugal forces, including ethnic diversity, that have resulted in the birth of some African states, sometimes explain why ethnic conflicts have become utmost in such states.

Of course as variously maintained by many African and western scholars, ethnicity was a core factor in orchestrating the genocide in Rwanda. - For example there is the work, “Jonah Jang and the Jasawa: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Nigeria”

by Philip Ostien (2009) - This position finds life in the multiple evidences provided to confirm that the violent phenomenon in Kigali and the surrounding prefectures was a consequence of the two dominant ethnic groups locking horns in a violent duel for the control of the valuable but scarce resources within the borderlines of the African Inter-lacustrine region.

The strength of Babalola's thesis is easily located in the indisputable place of ethnicity as a potent conflict generator in Africa's post independence history as variously postulated by scholars of the Rwandan phenomenon. The challenge to the same assumption is easily located in the fact that he did not emphasize on other equally important source(s) of the genocide like the specific roles played by the political class in fanning the embers of the genocide; the indisputable place of the political economy that characterised the socio-economic and ultimately political relations of the Hutu/Tutsi social division or even the history of suspicion and hate that shaped the same socio-economic and political relations referenced throughout the history of the country.

Some scholars have concluded that ethnicity should be construed as a phenomenon that is constructed, invented, or even created for the specific purpose of serving the interest of certain elements within the human community (Barth, 1969; Anderson, 1983; Saul 1979; Sharp, 1988; Cohen, 1978). With regards to the perspective concerning the invention of the ethnic entity, Glazer and Moynihan (1975) observe

that in Africa where poverty and deprivation are becoming endemic mostly as a result of distributive injustice, ethnicity remains an effective means of survival and mobilization. Ethnic groups that are formed for economic reasons, easily disband after achieving their objectives. Again, the failure of this position to specifically establish that these unjust distributive conditions are unique to Africa exposes the limitation of this perspective.

As a follow up, Ake echoes the same view even though with a large dose of sarcasm. He states, “Often associated with this view is the notion that the ethnic group has no concrete existence but is rather a figment of the human imagination”. Thus, it is an “ephemeral concoction of falsehood and a vitiated consciousness” (Ake, 1992: 7).

On the complexity of the problem, Ake (1992: 12) insists that:

Conventional wisdom suggests that ethnicity is phenomenally problematic in Africa. It is held partly responsible for the ‘irrationalities’ of the development project, political instability and weak national identity. It has been blamed for outmoded values and regressive consciousness, for fostering corruption and destructive conflicts. And now there is concern that the ongoing process of democratization in Africa may release the politically disintegrative potentialities of ethnicity.

According to him, the attempt to discountenance ethnicity in the evolutionary process of human existence is grossly ahistoric. He succinctly establishes that

ethnicity is a crucial element in the anthropological and cosmic realm that defines humanity as a universal system. Usman (2000) too has concurred with the above position by maintaining that the universality of Africans in history emanates only from their particularity in humanity's historical process. A particularity that cannot be exorcized of its ethnic configuration and content. It is in this vein that Joseph Mbiti (in Bakut, 2008:102), maintains that just as land, another thing that defines the uniqueness of the African is their ethnic ties and categorisation. However, both Usman's and Ake's (1992) leaning with regards to the overall thrust of their arguments can only be described as the over-romantisization with the African ontology and evolutionary formation. Hence, the sense of pan-Africanist affiliation which has informed the authors' approaches are only evident to the extent that they hold sacred what they feel makes them who they are. This is the weakness of the above perspective. The thesis intends to harmonize the Pan-Africanist position with the western narrative that interpret ethnicity as the cause of Africa's multifaceted problems. It is believed that a complementary (and not an alternative) approach will be best in providing a balanced view of the situation. That is by exposing the weaknesses of ethnicity in stirring violent conflicts and identifying ethnic leaders' potential strength in the stabilization of African states through its management of ethnic diversities.

Pursuing the argument further, Ake (1995), insists in addition that apart from its historicity, it could be seen as a 'being', a living entity, in the sense that it becomes, (it is birthed) it lives (exists) and ultimately ceases to exist (dies) within the twin dimensions of time and space. From the above, Ake (1995) sees the ethnic constituent of the African ontology as a living entity whose organic nature undergoes the differential processes of creation and recreation until the internal contradictions inherent within its being causes its disintegration and ultimately death.

Furthermore, he debunks the perspective that holds tenaciously onto the assumption that ethnicity is created, invented and manipulated by the elites in society for the eventual goal of capturing power and resources to the end of determining who gets what, when and how. He premises his arguments and protestations of the ethnic constructivist paradigm on the perceived dialectical contradiction extant in the ethnic question as presented by the advocates of this philosophy. Ake, (1992: 3) says that Ethnic groups may be imagined as inventions or even constructions but when closely examined, they will prove to be real even in the same way that states are said to be real. This position is informed by his understanding that because the ethnic 'being' does not conform to what is considered a modern construct in line with western standards does not invalidate

its existence as a veritable element in the African universe. He wraps his thoughts in the following manner.

Apart from the question of its historicity, the logic of the argument for the non-existence of ethnic groups is flawed. Ethnic groups are no less real for existing intermittently, for having fluid boundaries, for having subjective or even arbitrary standards of membership, for opportunistic use of tradition or even for lacking a propriety claim over a local space. They are real if they are actual people who are united in consciousness of their common ethnic identity however spurious or misguided that consciousness may be. The concreteness of ethnic group is invariably affirmed by ethnic markings which society categorically pins on them, markings which underscores the social existence of ethnicity even when they are arbitrary or shifting (1992: 1).

In agreeing with the argument presented above, Bala Usman (2000: 12) insists that the term tribe, ethnic group and nationality are applied to smaller, or more dispersed groups, which are yet to attain 'proper nationhood', as they are seen to be economically, culturally and politically backward or non progressive in comparison with the nations of Western Europe, which are presented as representing the standard models of the nation since the inaugural treaty of Westphalia in the 17th century. He argues that the problem of Africa is not ethnicity by itself. It is the manipulation of the ethnic concept and its application in the politics of the people. In this respect, he is specific when he observes "most of the civil wars devastating Africa today; in Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Congo Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Burundi, Ethiopia, Sudan and

Somalia, were ignited by attempts to institutionalise or operationalise ethnic differences in the political systems with selfishness as motivation”.

As further argued by Ake, ethnicity is a non fossilized determination but a living presence produced and driven by material and historical forces. “It begins, becomes and passes away. It can only be understood and interpreted through the complex dialectics of its being, dissolution and sometimes reconstitution” (Ake, 1992: 2).

He observes that ethnicity began to have challenges only when it became politicized, thus agreeing with the perspective he is vehemently contending against. He further argues that with the advent of the colonial administration over most of Africa, the colonialist depended heavily on the institutions, including ethnic groupings to run their governments. The classic case of the indirect rule system of the British in colonial India, Uganda and Nigeria is relevant here. Accordingly, the “instantiation of political ethnicity is politicized, politics is ethnicized and consequently, ethnic groups tendentially became political formations whose struggles with each other and competing interest may be all the more conflictual for the exclusivity of ethnic group membership” (Ake,1992: 11).

This thesis without any doubt appreciates the highly academic and the philosophical depth of the perspective of Ake (1992) and his colleagues - this is

apart from the desperate effort they have demonstrated in protecting those values that are dear to the African ontology. To the African, three things are dear; the family unit, tribal configuration and the land upon which these units – family and ethnic groups subsists. As we have variously mentioned above, however, we find it difficult not to establish the connection between some violent conflict scenario and the ethnic identity that is becoming increasingly prevalent in Africa. This is becoming most evident with the democratization wave that is spreading across the continent; especially with its potential for appropriating power and control of resources to a particular group of people who identify themselves as a unique ethnic conglomeration. This truism is becoming most evident every day in Nigeria where religion and ethnicity have increasingly determined who gets what, when he gets it and how he gets it ultimately.

The ethnic question has been dealt with exhaustively in this section. The above argument has confirmed the fact that indeed the manipulation of the ethnic factor has negatively impacted Rwandan social relations especially in its post colonial history. With ethnicity becoming a major determinant of resource appropriation in Rwanda, a new kind of fierce contest in the political and economic spheres developed to determine who gets what, when and how in the relation between the Hutu and the Tutsi. This is significant in leading the country towards the kind of violent conflict recorded in 1994. It has been observed that;

the introduction of 19th century European racial theory into Rwanda was disastrous. It radically changed the meaning of the terms ‘Hutu and Tutsi’. Unfortunately, the racial theory came to be accepted and disseminated by a number of educated Rwandese, particularly those who were particularly ambitious (Africa Rights, 1995: 7).

In addition,

Indirect rule and divide and rule strategies were common in colonized Africa. What was unusual in Rwanda and Burundi was the way in which the Hutu – Tutsi difference was given a racial and religious component. This has come to have enormous significance (Africa Rights, 1995: 7).

The hypothesis commonly called the Hamitic hypothesis suited the western sensibilities because of their policies that determined to govern conquered territories. To achieve this objective, it became expedient that the colonizers found an accomplice with whom to do business. The solution was provided by the already crafted hypothesis which linked physical characteristics to intellect and leadership qualities. Thus, “those who closely resembled Europeans being naturally considered superior” (Seligman, 1930: 96). This was the seed the sowed the fruit of contest between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Note that even though Seligman’s (1930), thesis concentrates or seem to be referencing the Hamitic Hypothesis, his latter works were specific to the Tutsi as the natural leaders of Rwanda. Even though a disproved thesis in modern scholarship, its impacts on the relationship between the Hutu and the Tutsi were quite significant.

An evidence of the unhelpful relationship between ethnicity and the political development of Rwanda came to the fore during the country's independence movement. This period showed very clearly how the colonial government of Belgium influenced the worsening of the contest for power between the Hutu and the Tutsi groups. As is typical with its policy of divide and rule, Belgium at the point of arrival to Rwanda supported the Tutsi to consolidate their power and control over other nationalities within the country. However, on realizing the massive exploitation of the resources of the country by the colonial government, the Tutsi monarchy and its elite groups began agitating against the practice and demanding independence at the same time (Orbis Agency, 1981: 581-582). This posture of the Tutsi against the colonial authority was responsible for the colonial authority's immediate decision to shift its support to the Hutu (Orbis Agency, 1981: 581-582).

After the Second World War – 1939-1945, Tutsi politicians began demanding a change in the political order and specifically focused its demand for an independent Rwanda. The reasons for these agitations were two. Firstly, the Tutsi elite politicians were motivated by the fact that the end of World War II saw a general decolonization of most colonial countries in both Asia and the African continents. Secondly, they also strategically imagined that because of the mass movement against political discrimination and exclusive politics as a whole, the

Belgians might soon begin to think of handing over power to the majority Hutu population (Africa, Rights, 1995: 11). This fear turned out to be correct. Note that the colonial system of divide and rule thrives in the manipulation of ethnicity for its own benefit. Therefore when it served the colonial interest best, they supported the Tutsi and when it became evident that it was to their benefit to support the Hutu, they saw no qualms about changing their support.

It was against the above background that the agitation for independence gained momentum and major political parties evolved to champion this cause. These political movements demanded an end to the trusteeship that gave Belgium political control of Rwanda (Orbis Agency, 1981: 581). These political movements, later turned into political parties were the Rwandese National Union (UNAR); a party sorely controlled by the Tutsi political elites led by the Mwami Kigeri V and the Democratic Association of Rwanda (RADER) (Orbis Agency, 1981: 581).

It was at the height of this power struggle that Belgium made a counter move deliberately aimed at checking the Tutsi hegemony in Rwanda's political life. Belgium at this juncture supported the formation of a rival political party. This was christened the Movement for the Emancipation of the Bahutu (PARMEHUTU). The goal of this strategic move was to break the national liberation struggles of the

period. Therefore, in the pursuit of this objective, the colonial overlords in 1959, provoked a major clash between these traditional rivals. They were also responsible for initiating a major political putsch of the national leaderships of the UNAR leading to their arrest and the proscription of the party thereby making many of them to flee the country (Orbis Agency, 1981: 581).

It was these activities and their ethnic content that characterized the period up to the elections; an election whose result was contested by the Tutsi. It was issues like these that generated the kind of violent conflicts that characterized Rwanda's post independence history.

2.7: POVERTY: A MAJOR CAUSE OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE

Diverse scholars have in the attempt to shed light on the developments that culminated to the genocide found themselves engaging in analysis of the colonial history upon which they ascribe the responsibility of the failure of the African state formation project. It is this failure status that is responsible for the weakness that occasioned the inability of African authorities and their peoples to address the myriad of problems responsible for the generation of violent conflicts (including genocide) and wars. This failure is evident in the inability of the post colonial state to construct a viably competent military force to check any threat to its authority. It is also these colonial legacies that failed to create the kind of environment to

promote the kind of development necessary to assuage socioeconomic and political tension plaguing African people. It also includes the weak infrastructural base of the colonial system; this is in addition to the equally conspicuous inability of the state institutions to fashion out organic and cohesive human societies that should naturally ensure a stable polity. It is this understanding that makes it imperative for us to make the analysis of the perspectives of some works that share in this thinking.

Two paradigms are in constant contest with regards the implication of the colonial mission on the African state formation project from the early 20th Century. The first subsists on the thinking that the impact of the colonial experience is almost solely responsible for the development stagnation and its active role in conflict generation on the African continent. Another perspective is the one that submits that colonialism did a lot in laying the framework for the development of the continent. This perspective is of the view that the failure of the states of most of Africa could only be located in other active forces like the ethnic and leadership deficiency question. But for the purpose of this thesis, attention will be paid solely on discussing the thoughts of thinkers who are focused on establishing the connection between colonialism and the failure of the state in Africa.

With regards this perspective, the work by Ikoku, E.A.U. (1976) will be most relevant. This literature contends that Western liberal academic traditions and

their apologists insist that the stagnant station of Third World economies (including African economies) should be explained and sourced in the preponderance of subsistent agriculture, a lack of technical education, a low propensity to save, a weak financial system, and most importantly, inefficient government policies and not the structure of the international economy and the colonial history that informed the international economy. The book raises the poser why are the countries of the Southern hemisphere incapable of attaining the level of acquiring the above highlighted preconditions despite the so called opportunities the international environment has offered it to thrive? Ikoku contends that of course the answer can only be located in the nature of the exploitative international system that deliberately denies the weak states access to the opportunities of development. In this case the experiences of the countries of the South in their relationships with the agencies of globalization and 'development' like the IMF, WTO, World Bank and many more, whose policies and programmes have negatively smothered Third World systems.

The book, even though written close to five decades ago has remained useful and relevant in interpreting contemporary political economy perspectives. It has sufficiently delved into the historical and spatial model, especially with regards to its in-depth coverage of the Third World economic practices. In fact this is informing our preference for aligning ourselves with the views articulated by

Ikoku and other like-minded classicists like Gunder Frank, Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-1917), Romesh Chandra Dutt (1884-1899) and so on, especially with regards to their view that the underdevelopment challenge and the African conflict narrative could easily be connected with colonial history.

A commonly observable strength of the work of Ikoku is that it has successfully crafted a perspective that is unique in the sense that he aptly connects the two most affected peoples (Africans and Asians) in their resistance narrative which ascribes their failures to the incompatible innovations introduced by the colonial enterprise. It is important to state that in recent times, the World Bank (in Nnadozie, 2006: 271) has maintained that policies and institutions are core element to the development drive of any system. Both this view point and Marx's (in subsequent paragraphs) have been considered very contradictory indeed. Singh (in Ikoku, 1967: 23) explains the phenomenon of poverty in India, his home country, to the destructive interaction between Western institutions and India. He says:

The imposition of alien metropolitan institutions disrupted the normal development process of India. Thus, in order to solve the problems of poverty, squalor and ignorance, these institutional barriers must be eliminated because the process of development involved the mutual interaction between psychological and institutional factors (Singh in Ikoku, 1967).

Obviously, ‘the mutual interaction between psychological and institutional’ factors that should ginger the natural process of development as advocated by Singh is lacking with regards the Indian and by extension the Asian climes. This is obvious since the psychological aspect is sourced from the human evolutionary processes and the system of belief derived there from that ultimately shape these institutions. In this case, the west and its values which informs its psychological framework is distinctly different from those of the East, hence their incompatibility. Since the interaction between the psychological and the institutional are distinct in their non-mutualness, they could then not become agent of development in Asia, neither could they achieve the same result in Africa or any part of the Third World for that matter, thus establishing the culpability of the West in the stagnation of the development drive of the Third World. The west achieved this by scuttling the natural growth of the Third world systems and supplanted them with their own models.

On this matter, Ikoku has quoted the famous Pan Africanist, Kwame Nkrumah as saying;

In all his works, the late Kwame Nkrumah identified and linked Africa’s underdevelopment to the colonial situation. Colonial domination, argued Nkrumah, conditioned the immediate life of every colonized African and, not infrequently, and even the enlightened African servants of the colonial administration lost contact early in life with their traditional background. These people became prone to accept some vague theories of universalism, assumed attitudes

entirely at variance with the reality of their people and environment, began, instead, to fulfill the hopes and expectations of their guides and guardians- the colonialist patrons. Nkrumah maintained that the principles which form the basis of capitalism are in direct conflict with the socialist egalitarianism of the traditional African society. That is that African societies need social revolutions that must go with intellectual revolutions-the type in which our thinking and philosophy are directed towards the redemption of the African society. The philosophy of the emancipation of man must find its emancipation in the weapons in the environment and the living conditions of the African people.....

Thus, it is presumed that the aggressive and consistent arguments marshaled by development/liberal theoretical perspectives in western media and academia-forming its intellectual foundations-were conceived to give legitimacy to the moral burden in the conscience of capitalism as a system that deters the drive of Third World economies into breaking off their yoke of stagnation. On the other hand, the dependency theory is perceived as venting its perceived failings and frustrations of under-development on capitalism and vouching on mere rhetoric to promote socialist ideology in neo-capitalist states. Be that as it may, there cannot be a single generalization that could best explain the marginal position of Third World countries in the contemporary world economy. The failure and incapacities of the forces within Third World economies to trigger economic growth and sustainable development are manifested even in their socio-economic and politico-cultural systems. It is without doubt therefore that, human ingenuity required for 'take-off' are evidently lacking in the less developed countries. But

the fact remains that there are also the stinging fangs of colonialism and capitalism, whose unimaginably diabolical forces over the centuries have successfully stifled the processes of production and generally subjugated the already dominated people of this backland. This has caused a disequilibrium and disproportionate economic growth amongst competing regions of the world.

Without any doubts, Ikoku's views, though not pioneering, have further fortified the thrust of position held by underdevelopment scholars. The work by Ikoku has further revealed the fact that such remedial 'assistance' advanced to Third World countries in the form of Foreign Aids is nothing but a new initiative aimed at further enslaving and strangulating the economies of this already beleaguered region. The work too has lucidly exposed the weakness, in statical terms, of the assistance proffered for development and also poverty reduction.

Even though an old literature in development discourses, which is a major shortcoming of the work; this weakness obviously has however not diminished the strength of the perspective marshaled by the work. This is because humankind has continued to see the manipulation of humanity, especially the Third world geographical space by the industrialized regions of the world.

Ikoku is not alone in this radical thinking. He is joined by other classical adherent of the Marxist school like, Rajagopal Balakrishna (2000). In his 'Locating The

Third World in Cultural Geography’, Balakhrisna’s position has without any form of reservations ascribed the challenge(s) the countries of the third world countries are experiencing, including the issue of poverty, underdevelopment, disease, violent conflicts and the non-viability of the industrial sector to the bleak history of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism; phenomenon that are the direct creation of the western industrial powers of Europe and America. To express the grievousness of the matter, the author gives a picture of what he is making desperate effort to highlight. He thus states that, from the view point of an imagery of certain features of poverty and squalor, as against the most known models [Ideological, Geopolitical and Historical deterministic models] Rajagopal (2000: 2), in what he calls the popular representational model, has posited: “Poverty, squalor, corruption, disaster, violence, calamities, irrational local fundamentalism, bad smell, garbage, filth, technological ‘backwardness’ or simply lack of modernity” gives contextual meaning to the term “Third World”. The author has maintained that any attempt at unraveling the state formation experience and the abysmal failures it is transiting through could easily be found in the conquest and subjugation of the ‘primitive’ peoples of Africa and Asia.

This view, as highlighted above is the favoured thought amongst most African and Asian intellectual tradition, especially those inclined to the Marxist perspective as severally stated. Unfortunately, Marx, the Marxist school’s

greatest oracle and mouthpiece has in the most dialectical posture espoused something extremely contrary to the normative paradigm that has given relevance to Marxist scholarship. Marx had maintained in some controversial treatises that capitalism has done great good to the colonial Periphery. According to Karl Marx (cited in Chomsky, 1999). colonialism and the system that sustained it, has improved production and consequently reduced commodity prices. By this statement, he suggests that good life, ensuing on access to previously unreachable products has been attained and poverty greatly reduced in previously economically backward sections of the global South. Marx's view on the revolutionary role of capitalist or bourgeoisie imperialism in transforming traditional societies and integrating the world into an interdependent world economy is a benign one and therefore worth noting:

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication draws all, even the most barbarian nations into civilizations. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pains of extinction, to adopt the bourgeoisie mode of production; compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst. i.e. to become bourgeoisie themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image (Balakrishna, 2000: 29).

Thus, even Marx has fallen for the bourgeoisie propaganda garbage that acknowledges a people as civilized only when it (they) embrace(s) western consumer culture which oscillates around conspicuous consumption. Therefore,

in what appears contradictory, Marx is pitting for imperialism and colonial expansion for the ‘benefit’ of the dependencies; even though in his earlier treatises he had assumed the position of imperialism’s greatest critique. Furthermore, Marx vehemently rejects the thesis that the incorporation of Third World countries into the fold of global market is in any way a factor in explaining their backwardness – a position highly favored amongst under-development theorists. Marx’s compromising posture is especially relevant when his views on colonialism and imperialism are critically examined. Referencing colonial India, he is on records as having commended the British colonial enterprise and company’s Raj in their union in empire-making. Quoting him verbatim, Marx said almost immediately after Hegel’s disastrous “Africa has no history assertion” (Rajagopal, 2000: 7) and that whatever may have been the crime of England, she was the unconscious tool of history (Rajagopal, 2000).

The benefit of Rajagopal’s perspective is found in the historical depth that has illuminated the knotty question of whether colonialism is culpable in birthing a weak post colonial institutional framework upon which the state still subsists or otherwise. He is able to achieve this by giving the Third world a unique definition that is sharply different from what was the model in an intellectually incontestable manner – a departure from the use of geographical and economic

indices to the use of the tools of social and economic condition that are uniquely observable in the global South.

These are conditions that explain the obvious weakness of the state and hence her incapacity to tackle the myriad development challenges that easily constitute the common characteristics of a failed state. It is important to note that once a state fails or begins to fail, the process of disintegration immediately commences and important aspects that gradually begin to manifest is the emergence of elements within the state that eventually become actors in the violence that is bound to consume it.

Meredith (2011) on his part has beautifully crafted a causal nexus between the conflicts plaguing the Great Lakes Region (GLR) and the overall African conflict narrative with the history of colonisation. In this respect, he makes a classical case study of Burundi and Rwanda. These 'twin' countries represent a perfect model of the irrationalities that characterised the colonial experience, specifically with regards to its boundary delineation policies. The colonialist, the Belgians in this case created modern Burundi and Rwanda and exacerbated the existing sources of conflict. Again, they further entrenched the division existing between the two traditional belligerent groups - the Tutsis and the Hutu stocks. The Belgians, in an effort to perpetuate its national interest and economic and political hegemony, haphazardly lumped more Hutus in Rwanda and less of them in Burundi and

inversely placed majority Tutsi in Burundi and less of them in Rwanda. This demographic imbalance has continued to shape the pulsating tendency of irredentism and nationalism within these states, and which in turn imperils the process of the formation of an organic nation-state structure in the mold of the European model of the Westphalian state praxis (Meredith, 2011).

Historically, the German administration was established towards the end of the nineteenth century. This was replaced by the Belgian colonial system later at the end of World War I in 1918. It is on record that both of the colonial administrations took advantage of the hierarchical structural order of Rwandan to institute the indirect rule system. Under this system, the Tutsi were engaged as the proxies of the colonial ruling class (Meredith, 2011). In the northwest of the country, the Hutu kingdoms had lived in relative autonomy. But even these ones were subjugated and brought under the control of the Tutsi monarchy. This was achieved with the coercive military might of the German colonisers. Consequently, the Hutu chiefs throughout the country were replaced by Tutsi at the instigation of the colonial powers (Meredith, 2011).

Another important subject that faults the very foundation of colonial Rwanda is the revisionist 'literary construct' that has become Rwandan official history. This is a literary tradition that draws heavily from the Hamitic hypothesis which ascribes every major achievement to an 'outside influence'. Meredith beautifully captures

the essence of what we are making effort to establish. He posits. According to him, the Hamitic hypothesis was applied throughout Africa but especially in the kingdoms of the Great Lakes Region such as the Ankole, Buyoro and Toro in modern Uganda. He maintains that this fits with the fashionable nineteenth-Century European Concept of 'historic races'. However, in Rwanda, instead of the phenomenon fizzling away, it became, in the words of the historian Jean Pierre Chretien, 'ethno historic gospel' – "a myth incorporated into the history books and seized on by Hutu politicians for their own propaganda purposes" (Meredith, 2011).

Paul Magnarella's (2001) scholarly thesis concurs with Meredith's position with specific regards to the issue of the rigidity and non shifting colonial policies of post colonial Africa. According to Magnarella, this new thinking of a rigid policy is of course based on the conceptualization of myth as gospel (truth) that concerns the alteration of historical realities and replacing them with mythologies and presenting them as conventional wisdom purely based on their ontologically informed world view. He posits that "During their colonial tenure, the Germans and Belgians ruled Rwanda indirectly through Tutsi monarchs and their chiefs". The choice of the Tutsi aristocracy as the ones to govern the colonial principalities on behalf of the colonialists is informed by the emergent racial philosophy of Hamitic hypothesis that ascribes superiority status to one group over the other.

The hypothesis in this case had submitted that the Tutsi had built the empires of Central Africa due to their superior intellect and that this group had moved into the region from ancient Egypt or Abyssinia (Ethiopia). The Europeans regarded Hutu and Twa (about 3% of the population) as inferior to Tutsi (Magnarella, 2001). Thus, “the origin of the violence is connected to how Hutu and Tutsi were deliberately constructed as political identities by the colonial state, Hutu as indigenous and Tutsi as alien” (Mamdani, 2001).

On the same issue, the matter became most precarious and a source of constant challenge to the ethnic equation when the Hutu leadership bought into this philosophy and made it a central theme in the propaganda machinery of Hutu killing machine. For instance Gregoire Kayibanda, in 1959 went on to declare that “Rwanda is two nation in a single state...two nations between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy, who are ignorant of each other’s habits, thoughts and feelings as if they were dwellers of different zones, or inhabitants of different planets” (Meredith, 2011).

No wonder, with this open license to dissociate and estrange ‘the other’, in this case the Tutsis, the Hutu leadership and their followership embarked on a deliberate mission of extermination. What else is to be expected than what unfolded since the manipulation of national histories in Africa by bigots and demagogues like Kayinbanda. This historical narrative was complemented by the

colonial state which had earlier deepened the existent notion of different people within one single geographical space. The solution to this challenge lies simply in the fact that only a deconstruction of the earlier construction of the negative legacies bequeathed by a revisionist history could straighten relations between these highly antagonistic people. When Kayibanda made the provocative declaration that these ordinarily similar people were two nations and between whom there is no intercourse and no 'sympathy', he had already declared that war should begin between these groups.

The challenge one encounters in the study and ultimately the review of Meredith's work basically concerns the fact that in his analysis, he does not delve deeply into the history of Rwanda, with a view to establishing the fact that the dynamics characterizing its history are more complex than the simplistic narration he gives. This work did not do much in discussing in an analytical manner the lack of economic opportunities in Rwanda and the deep poverty that could be seen as the crux of the matter in the Hutu Tutsi contestation leading to the violent scenario in 1994. It is natural from the above perspective as articulated by Kayinbanda and the colonial regime that exacerbated it that this extremely distorted perception of history has resulted in the confusion that consistently directed the worldview and the cosmic understandings of the average Rwandan.

In this regards, Africa Rights (1995: 3) has again joined in the discourse by opining that two dominant and seemingly autonomous views subsists which attempts giving meaning to the evolutionary and racial character of the people of Rwanda. One of these views subscribes (as Kayinbanda had subscribed) to the thinking that there are two dominant peoples, races and ethnic groups in Rwanda. Accordingly, these people's interest cannot be harmonized or integrated for the formation of an organic state in the mold of the modern state system. On the contrary, a different perspective has origin in the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) machinery that insists that there are no significant differences between the two groups in question. This confirms the fact that from the different literature existing in this sphere of human knowledge, the fact remains that indeed the difference, if any at all cannot be said to be significant.

This work will concentrate in making effort to fill this obvious gap in Meredith's perspective by concentrating on the connection between the historical and the contemporary, thus presenting the larger picture that will give readers a better understanding of the entire thrust that had shaped the complex relations between the Hutu and the Tutsi stock across the centuries.

The referenced work by Paul Magnarella (2001) is considered classic because the analysis contained within its bowels is refreshingly revealing in the sense that it captures the core theme expected of a literature of this nature. This is apart from its

highly commendable historical and sociological depth. Issues covering important subjects like the frequently referenced Hamitic hypothesis are again brought to the fore to play a central role in the overall thematic thrust of the discourses. This situation created a condition wherein “Sixty years of such prejudicial ‘fabrications’ inflated Tutsi egos inordinately and crushed Hutu feelings, which coalesced into an aggressively resentful inferiority complex and its resultant consequence in genocide generation. In addition, another subject sustainably addressed by the author concerns the gruesomeness of the genocide, wherein upon eruption, culminated “into one of the most appalling cases of mass murder the world has witnessed since World War II”. This thesis finds the perspective covering the angle that determined to pursue the resolution of the Rwandan endless and perennial political question interesting and thus worthy of attention. This tells and confirms that all parties within the Rwandan territorial space wanted peace after all. This is true especially with the consistent attacks of the RPF on Rwanda.

Hence, in spite of vehement opposition from extremist Hutu Power movement, Habyarimana’s “government signed a series of agreements (including the Arusha Accords) with the RPF that called for a power-sharing government with the Tutsi, return of Tutsi refugees to Rwanda, and integration of Tutsi into the armed forces”. This concession by Habyarimana was seen as the height of compromise as the RPF with the Arusha Accord was to constitute 40% of the newly integrated military

forces and 50% of its commissioned officer corps. “For Habyarimana, the Accords amounted to a suicide note. Hutu Power leaders cried treason. If the Accords were implemented, many Hutu elite in the government and the military would lose their privileged positions” (Magnarella, 2001). A considerable number of high level administration officials of northern Hutu extraction directly related to or aligned with the powerful family of Habyarimana’s wife were amongst the potential victims of the Accord once it comes into effect. “Within days of the signing, Radio Milles Collines, a new, private station, began broadcasting anti-Accord and anti-Tutsi diatribes from Kigali. On April 6, 1994, as Habyarimana’s presidential plane neared the Kigali Airport on his return from Dar-es-Salam, it was struck by a missile and plunged to earth, killing the president and all aboard. Although the identity of his assassins is not publicly known, many foreign observers believe Habyarimana was killed by Hutu extremists in his own military.

From the above clear case of assassination, it is very apparent that Habyarimana was killed by people that were against the Arusha Accord that bore within it the potential to usher in a period of equity, just, fair and peaceful polity that had been beleaguered by the incidences of pogroms since independence. Obviously, from the above, the losers were, as mentioned above, the Hutu custodians of government bureaucracy and the military. If this is the case, these categories of people were likely the perpetrators of the assassination of a president they felt was anti Hutu.

This assertion is necessary in view of the then subsisting reality that at that particular point in history, the Tutsi had every reason to back Habyarimana and ensure his safety and not otherwise, since, if the accord had come through, they would have received much without any bloodshed in the form of the genocide.

2.8: THE ROLE OF CASTE SYSTEM IN THE GENOCIDE

A discourse covering the broad spectrum of the ethnic system, especially within the African continent has continued to elicit seemingly opposing positions. One of the views says that dissimilarity exists between the peoples of Rwanda. For instance, some scholars are of the view that race and ethnicity, more than all else is at the forefront of the underdevelopment challenges of African history (Africa Rights, 1995). Thus, while explaining the experience of human advancement with special interest to the advancement of African people, it has been maintained that some human groups are biologically endowed with natural abilities to rule over the affairs concerning their immediate communities (Africa Rights, 1995). But this has been proven to be a baseless assertion. For instance, classical anthropological scholars of the last Century (the 20th Century) like Evans Pritchard and Meyer Fortes (1940) in their celebrated work covering the “African political systems” have established what they considered the reality of the caste institutions amongst African groupings, including the Hutu Tutsi and Twa caste sub-divisions. This

assumption is at the foundation of what defined the favorist relationship between the colonialist and these ‘advanced races’ and inversely informed the disadvantaged positions of other peoples that spurred them to envies against the ‘elite caste’- note that this is one of the vexing questions of injustices that the Arusha Accord failed to address that led to the genocide. This situation as encouraged by the colonialist played an important role in spawning the violent conflicts that is characteristic of most states of Africa.

Historically, the colonial records reveal (as will be shown later) that the Germans and Belgians played a major role in aggravating the distinction between the nationalities of Rwanda. After the Berlin conference of 1884-5 and the allocation of Rwanda to the Germans to administer, they reinforced and subscribed to the existent traditional orientation that the Tutsi were superior thus, they were considered the natural leaders of the Rwandan geographical space. The above thoughts are corroborated by Nicasius Achu Check (2008: 252) in his work titled “Myth and Memory: The Construction and Deconstruction of Ethnic Ideology in Post-Colonial Rwanda”. The perspective lends credence and validates the assumption that a separate biological/physical qualities and features exist to distinctly separate one ethnic group from the other-in this case the Hutu, Tutsi and the Twa. Specifically, Check (2008: 259) asserts that “having observed the physical characteristics of the people of the region, it is fair to assume that the

Hutus are distinctively, at most physically, different from the Tutsi. Though it is illegal in Rwanda to publicly ascertain to which ethnic group one belongs”.

Apart from biological and physical distinction, another crucially important determinant defining the discourse including the Eurocentric mindset is the matter of property holding. In this case, cattle are used to ascribe superiority to the nomadic caste over the settled-farmer caste. It was issues like these that worsened the factors that led to the Rwandan genocide in the long run. White Mathews (2013: 108) in his manuscript “Atrocitology: Humanity’s 100 deadliest achievements” established that this system is known in Rwanda, Burundi and the eastern Congo as *ubuhake*. The Tutsi who comprises about 15% of the population of these areas were the ruling cattle-owning elite caste. Of course as has been generally shown, the groups immediately below the Tutsi were the Hutu farmers who constituted about 80% of the population. Fewer than 3% of the populations are Twa (Pygmies).

During the German suzerainty over Rwanda and Burundi, the authorities reinforced the system by employing Tutsis in hegemonic roles. The Belgian colonialists who succeeded them after World War 1 continued this policy, instituting 'ethnic' identity cards. After independence, tensions intensified. In 1972, Tutsis were responsible for a wholesale massacre of Hutus. In the 1990s, Hutus responded with counter-massacres

The French social geographer, Dominique Franche (in Usman, 1999: 13), has however illuminated the labyrinthine path of this subject of the racial superiority of

the Tutsis over all else. In the Le Monde of the 12th day of November, 1996. It is on record that

The Hutus and Tutsis do not form two different ethnic groups They speak the same language, share the same culture and religion..... The idea that Hutus and Tutsis were physically different was first aired in the 1860s by the British explorer, John Speke Anyone who attempts to pinpoint these differences is likely to get it wrong. The only accurate available data was gathered by a German anthropologist in 1907-08, who found a 12cm difference in average height between Hutus and Tutsis. Now that is exactly the difference that existed in France in 1815 between a Senator and a conscript. The difference in height can be explained by their different lifestyle and eating habit and by the fact that Tutsi noblemen, unlike Hutus, do not till the land The trouble is that all anthropological work on this issue used to focus solely on those Tutsis who belong to the court of the Rwandan King. They did not have the same physical traits as people living on the outer confines of the kingdom who are now also called Tutsis.

As Human Rights Watch also detailed, revisionist history was written by the Europeans:

Because Europeans thought that the Tutsi looked more like themselves than did other Rwandans, they found it reasonable to suppose them closer to Europeans in the hierarchy and hence closer to them in ability. Believing the Tutsi to be more capable, they found it logical for the Tutsi to rule Hutu and Twa just as it was reasonable for Europeans to rule Africans. Unaware of the “Hutu” contribution to nation-building, the Europeans saw only that the ruler of this impressive state and many of his immediate environment were Tutsi, which led them to assume that the complex institutions had been created exclusively by Tutsi.

Some scholars have argued that the social distinction between the Hutu and Tutsi stock was not a constant. According to them, before colonialism, it was a fluid

system, as a Hutu could move up the social strata and become a Tutsi, if through astuteness, hard work and industry, he becomes wealthy enough (Achua, 2003: 2). In the same manner, a Tutsi whom misfortune could overnight be transformed into a Hutu. In what seem contradictory, Achua (2003: 2) has also stated that,

Ethnic identity is not static but shifting and highly malleable. In Rwanda, for example, the 14 percent Tutsi minority dominated the Hutu majority economically and politically for four centuries, as a kind of cattle-owning aristocracy. But for most of this period the lines between Hutus and Tutsi were permeable. The two groups spoke the same language, intermarriage occurred, and successful Hutus could 'become Tutsi.' This was no longer true after the Belgians arrived and, steeped in specious theories of racial superiority, issued ethnic identity cards on the basis of nose length and cranial circumference. The resulting much sharper ethnic divisions were later exploited by the leaders of Hutu Power

Of course the determinants of who becomes what in Rwanda had already been specified through a 1926 Belgian policy. In this year, the Belgians established inflexible policies that sharpened class distinction between the Hutus and the Tutsis. Those who owned ten cows and above were designated the privileged status of Tutsis, while all others with fewer holdings were relegated to the Hutu category with no possibility of movement between the two groups. "What had been a fluid distinction developed over time and custom, was abruptly replaced by an inflexible, permanent categorization" (USIP 2000: 89). The Belgians worsened an already precarious situation by introducing an Identity Card system wherein the ethnic categorization of each societal member was codified either as a Hutu or a

Tutsi. A rather exasperated Lt. Col. Joseph Nzambawita, expressing his view on the rigidity that characterized the Hutu/Tutsi ethnic distinction says that the Hutu and Tutsi categorization in Rwandan society is (or was) not limited to the 'Hutu ethnic group and the Tutsi ethnic group'. These words also referred to the economic status of the Rwandan citizenry. If one was rich he was called Tutsi, because 'Tutsi' was a class, not a people (USIP: 2003 91). The flexibility of the system and the times ensured that a Hutu member could move from his class - in other words from a certain level of economic standing - to the much sought after privileged Tutsi class. However, the doctrinal orientation of the colonial administration altered this historical realism. The new thinking that evolved gave the impression that the reality was that socioeconomic, political and caste mobility was sacrilegious. Thus, a member of the Hutu ethnic group could never cross the line to become Tutsis and that those in the Tutsi ethnic group would remain permanently Tutsi. (USIP: 2003).

Thus, the Hutu/Tutsi classification initially started more as a class arrangement that was a social construct than the much talked about ethnic dissimilarity that is propagated as being a natural quality of a biologically distinct person from time immemorial. From the above, it is evident that the hypothetical assumption of two distinct nationalities existing side by side as constructed by the colonialist and later propagated by the disciples of violence is not only mythical but a fallacy that lacks

basis in any scientifically researched model. At best, this orientation could only be understood when looked at within the prism of the social structure of the mindset of the average Eurocentric scholar, especially in earlier epochs as we have made effort to establish severally. Throughout the history of relations between Africa and Europe, a deliberate effort to undermine the humanity and the contributions Africa has made to the preservation of the global heritage of mankind has subsisted. Thus, anything about the black African is viewed with contempt and disdain. This is the basis upon which the Hamitic hypothesis was founded. This is also the principle that birthed and gave legitimacy to the assimilation policy of the French in francophone West Africa. If a person or a group of persons are to be acknowledged as belonging to the universal family, they must subscribe to the assumptions of these theorists.

2.9: BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

The organization of African Unity (OAU) was the former international organization responsible for African regional affairs. It was informed by the theoretical and philosophical content of David Mitrany's functionalist principles that cooperation is the solution to major challenges confronting mankind-in this case Africans. Hence, cooperation amongst major states on the continent contributed to a large extent to the promotion of unity and the peaceful resolution of hazardous political issues that threatened relations amongst states while at the

same time promoting the overall developmental agenda of the African continent (Dede, 2001).

This regional hub for addressing continental challenges was founded in the 1963 at Addis Ababa, the capital city of imperial Ethiopia and 32 independent African nations established this body to; promote unity and development amongst members; defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of members; eradicate all forms of colonialism; promote international cooperation; and coordinate members' economic, diplomatic, educational, health, welfare, scientific, and defense policies. The Organization was the middle path that provided the compromise achieved between the stance of the radical Casablanca faction and the conservative functional pragmatism of the Monrovia group which defined the division of the countries constituting the continent immediately after their emergence from colonial history (Dede, 2001: 6).

The O.A.U. was the most prominent and real result of Pan Africanism in the sense that it successfully collected African peoples under a single Organization driven by shared dreams and aspirations anchored on freedom and development. The organisation mediated several internal disputes on the continent (the Chadian civil war, the Rwandan genocide and so on) and was instrumental in bringing about majority rule and the end of the apartheid system of racial discrimination in South Africa, which in 1994 became the 53rd nation to be admitted into this body

of African people and later the Republic of South Sudan has become the latest signatory, the 54th member. “The OAU Charter was adopted on 23 May 1963.

In addition, the OAU promoted unity, cooperation and assistance in technical areas of need of member states. Unfortunately, critics of the OAU sometimes go to the extreme to describe the organisation as a failed enterprise or worse still ‘a toothless bulldog’ that has not done much at the resolution or the prevention of violent conflicts that have plagued the continent throughout its political history (Durch, 1993). In order to aid our understanding of the operation of the OAU throughout its existence as a regional organization, it is imperative to highlight the six principal considerations that informed the decision of the African Heads of State and Government (AHSO):

1. The United Nations, with its cumulative experience, expertise and greater resources than the OAU, should clearly remain the pre-eminent international authority with the responsibility for dealing with international peace and security including internal crises which threaten regional stability in Africa (taking on board the fact that Africa is, indeed, a member of the UN).
2. The UN, together with regional and sub-regional organizations and arrangements, should form or maintain a partnership, and act decisively and

expeditiously in framing new approaches to crisis prevention, management and resolution in the post-Cold War era.

3. These new approaches to international or regional peace and security should be framed in a manner that transcends the traditional politico-military approaches, and embrace economic, environmental, humanitarian and human rights issues, as these tend to impact heavily on conflict situations on the continent.
4. Regional and sub-regional organizations on the one hand, and the UN system on the other, should endeavour to share proportionately the burden relating to the maintenance of worldwide peace, security and stability.
5. It is imperative for regional organizations, such as the OAU, to develop and maintain formal and explicit capacities with which to ensure that the UN Security Council remains focused on matters of concern to these regional organizations, such as democratization or the management of transition, socio-economic transformation, and regional integration (in order to avoid the marginalization of certain regions in the post-Cold War world)

Finally, as a regional organization, the OAU should realize the need for it to take primary ownership of its own problems, especially those relating to issues of peace, security and stability.

2.10: THE ROLE OF EARLY WARNING SYSTEM IN CONFLICT PREVENTION

Stanton (2001) explains why most of the early warnings were out-rightly ignored by international actors responsible for global peace and conflict resolution. He articulates the reasons thus:

Early warnings of the Rwandan genocide were ignored because policy makers perceived it as a “civil war”, denied the facts, and decided not to intervene, preventing US and UN lawyers from calling the killing “genocide.” Early reinforcement of UNAMIR could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives, but “group-think” precluded consideration of direct military intervention by the US and allied forces (Stanton, 2001: 19).

Stanton continues that this was the situation even though they were near Rwanda and had immediately moved in to rescue their trapped nationals. Unwilling to financially and militarily support a reinforced UNAMIR, the U.S., U.K. and U.N. Security Council ordered UNAMIR to leave Rwanda, because they did not consider Rwandan lives worth saving at the risk of their own troops (Stanton, 2001: 55). The fact that the world knew that genocide was brewing across the Rwandan landscape has never been disputed by either the African leaderships or their Western counterparts. All the interests upon who rests the moral burden of the ‘responsibility to protect’ knew that massive killings were underway. However, they failed to take the steps to prevent it from occurring. The result was massive

slaughter on a scale not witnessed since the Nazi extermination program against the Jews (Meredith, 2011: 487). The question is what went wrong?

As clearly established above, the fact that there were plenty of 'Early Warnings' of the Rwandan genocide which were systematically ignored abound. According to Linda Melvern's (2000: 13) in 'A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide'. 'where Western geopolitical interests are absent, Western morality and 'civilised' concerns are nowhere to be found'. Melvern (2000) revealed that in the few months preceding the genocide, General Roméo Dallaire, the erstwhile commander of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), had desperately warned the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) that organized gangs of Hutu Interahamwe had reached an advanced stage in its planning phase of a movement to exterminate the Tutsis minority population of Rwanda. In what has since become famous, Dallaire had sent a cable to New York on January 11, 1994, which DPKO authorized him to share with the governments of the U.S., French and Belgian Embassies. General Dallaire asked for authority to search for and seize the caches of machetes and other weapons that had been shipped into Rwanda for the Hutu militias, the Interahamwe. Infact, the same Dellaire, the Canadian General in charge of the Rwandan Mission had observed that 'there is irony here'. Dallaire had continued to insist that with an 'intervention force of 5,000 troops, he could have put a halt to the killing. But the world's power

brokers – chief among them the United States, Great Britain and France – used their positions on the United Nations Security Council to argue against intervention’ (Thomson, 2007: 14)

Iqbal Riza, deputy to then Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping, Kofi Annan, in a letter signed by Annan, denied him permission to act, as exceeding UNAMIR’s mandate, and instructed him instead to take the information to the Rwandan government, many of whose members were planning the genocide. DPKO’s refusal to authorize action was confirmed on January 14 by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali himself (HRW, 1999: 192).

It must be stated at this juncture that across the entire world debates have ensued immediately after the genocide in the attempt to say exactly what went wrong and what really hindered an early response. In spite of this effort, a general consensus has come to the fore, which leaves stakeholders in the state of perpetual confusion with regards to what could really have been done. However, all seem in agreement with regards to the well established fact that national governments, regional organizations and the international organizations seemed to have done little or even nothing in mitigating the genocide (HRW, 1999: 192).

Glenys Kinnock, MEP; Chair, Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) had observed in relation to Melvern’s work:

This (the book 'A People Betrayed') exposes a devastating account of lies, deceit, complacency and tragic neglect.... All we can hope is that this fine book will provide lessons for the future, because it provides all of us who lobby and campaign for early warning systems and conflict prevention with invaluable evidence. Looking around the world, you wonder what has been learnt since 1994. Linda Melvern deserves our thanks for investing so much in breaking the silence and revealing the truth.'

Another important work is the one by Philip Gourevitch. This particular work is as revealing as any in the field of the study of genocide. The work is an analytical compendium of the Rwandan question because Gourevitch went beyond the generalist model to specifics. He does this most succinctly with regards to the early warning components of the violence. For instance, while other reports highlight the entire population of the Tutsi stock, Gourevitch pointed out that a Tutsi family cried out that 'we wish to inform you that we will be killed with our families tomorrow'. Indeed following this, the Rwandan government had called on all Hutu Patriots to kill the "*inyenzi*" - cockroaches. The work goes ahead to establish in vivid details the implications of the genocide on the victim-population and the entire country as a whole.

This work, like others in its class has succeeded in confirming that the genocide even before its commencement, was known by even people on the streets; ordinary people who, in spite of their knowledge could not do anything. And that those they looked up to, and depended on, ruefully disappointed them. In fact, this work confirms the unambiguity of the genocide as a phenomenon that was hatched and

orchestrated by high level international conspiracies. The conspiracies manifested twofold. In the first instance, the Hutu, after planning the genocide for close to half a century began the killings on that auspicious April day. Another manifestation of the conspiracy could be located in the ‘evil silence’ of the international community and the international organizations they crafted for the purpose of conflict prevention, management and resolution. In this case, the UN which has the sole duty for mandating any international peacekeeping operation is undoubtedly culpable.

It is important to reiterate the fact that the moment preventive diplomacy failed, the killings began in earnest. It has been declared that, the presidential Guard in Kigali, the Rwandan Army and the *Interahamwe* (the government militia) began a methodical and unrelentingly attack on Tutsi civilians. In a carefully orchestrated set of military exercises, specific groups set up road blocks to close off escape routes. The bleak imagery of what ensued is better imagined as all went berserk. This is the verbatim account of the United States Institute for Peace on the bloody genocide.

Others went from door to door to flush the victims out. Extremist radio stations not only cheered the killers on but in some cases also directed their movements. Those bearing identity cards that said ‘Tutsi’ were killed. Those without identity cards were assumed to be Tutsi and killed. Politically moderate Hutu, those supporting power-sharing with the Tutsi were singled out and killed along with the Tutsi

as were Hutu who refused to participate in the killing, creating a climate of terror among Hutu and Tutsi alike (USIP's, 1996: 13).

2.11: THE MEDIA AND THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE

Puddephatt Andrew, in his April, 2006 work titled 'The Voices of War: Conflict and the Role of the Media' argues in very simple language and literary presentation that the Mass media at most times plays core roles in today's conflict relations. Another conspicuous strength of this work is equally located in its non-voluminous content; and yet in its ability to give an almost detailed narrative of the role of the media in either conflict generation or their mitigation, especially in contemporary times.

Essentially, according to Puddephatt (2006: 4) the role of the media could assume different and seemingly opposed forms. 'Either the media takes an active part in the conflict and has responsibility for increased violence, or stays independent and out of the conflict, thereby contributing to the resolution of conflict and alleviation of violence'. However, with specific regards to the genocide in Rwanda as globally recognised, the media was resolved in its negative intentions to participate in the bloodshed.

Another joint publication edited by Allan Thomson who notes that the Media as an institution was used in Rwanda to 'spread hatred, to dehumanize people, and even

to guide the genocidaires toward their victims. Three journalists have even been found guilty of genocide, incitement to genocide, conspiracy and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda'. In the same unpleasant breath, in the preface to 'the Media and the Rwandan Genocide' Allan Thomson (2007) had maintained that:

In the case of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the news media accomplished neither of Voltaire's admonitions. Confronted by Rwanda's horrors, Western news media for the most part turned away, and then muddled the story when they did pay attention. And hate media organs in Rwanda – through their journalists, broadcasters and media executives – played an instrumental role in laying the groundwork for genocide, then actively participated in the extermination campaign.

To achieve this infamous goal, ethnic bashings and scapegoating became key tools of the trade, and the mass media were employed in partisan and propagandist ways that further aggravated ethnic tensions. The actions of Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia stand out as other important case studies with regards the negative influence of the media in stirring conflicts and genocide according to Brown (1993: 10). Pudderphatt (2006: 5) has also agreed with the above position when he opined:

In both of these conflicts the media played a pernicious role – directly inciting genocide in the case of some Rwandan media, and organising it in the case of Radio Mille Collines, while acting as a vehicle for virulent nationalism in former Yugoslavia. This is not just a modern phenomenon – both the Nazis and the Soviet Union used the media to

create a hegemonic climate in which they could more easily exercise power

Stuart Kaufman (cited in Brown et al, 1996: xiii) corroborates this perception when he opines that, when belligerent leaders stoke mass hostility through propaganda in mediums of mass communication, hostile masses support belligerent leaders, and together they threaten other groups within the commonwealth. These elites spread stories which are half truths and allow these to mutate in transition until they eventuate in something sufficiently monstrous to achieve their aim, and at other times they present stories that are literally blown out of proportion. For example, they could give the figures or the condition of a refugee situation beyond what obtains in the real situation. Unfortunately listeners to these stations swallow hook line and sinker whatever is dished out because of the myth of their objectivity. Unfortunately too, many people especially the Hutus within Rwanda could not see through their original purpose, which is to pursue and actuate their political and economic interests. This is true with regards to what happened in the Rwandan violent conflicts. Here, the elites within the state manipulated the mass of the population and also greatly manipulated information to whip the sentiments of the ordinary people.

In Rwanda again, an important instrument that was manipulated to invoke anger and intense hatred was the radio waves (Puddephatt, 2006). With this medium, the

Hutus, using the propaganda machinery were mobilized to direct their attacks on the Tutsis who were painted as cockroaches. It was hoped that by describing them as such, their humanity would have been successfully stripped of them and thereby rendering them unfit to continue living. The same Hutu stock were made to see the Tutsis as their enemies; exactly the strategy employed by Hitler while mobilizing against Jews in the 1940s. This medium proved highly effective such that any non-participating Hutu in the genocide was tagged an enemy of the Hutu cause and was therefore considered only fit for death too (Puddephatt, 2006).

It was with the radio that the Hutu propagated its HUTU TEN COMMANDMENTS. This testaments and covenant of hate were thus,

1. Every Mahutu should know that a Matutsi woman, wherever she is, works for the interest of her Tutsi ethnic group. As a result, we shall consider a traitor any Mahuta who;
 - marries a Tutsi;
 - befriends a Tutsi Woman;
 - employs a Tutsi woman as a secretary or concubine

2. Every Mahutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and conscientious in their role as women, wife and mother of the family. Are they not beautiful, good secretaries and more honets?

3. Bahutu women, be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers and sons back to reason.

4. Every Mahutu should know that a Matutsi is dishonest in business. His only aim is the supremacy of his ethnic group. As a result, any Mahutu who does the following is a traitor;

- Makes a partnership with a Bututsi in business;
- Invest his money or the government's money in a Tutsi enterprise.
- Lends or borrows money from a Mututsi;
- Gives favour to a Batutsi in business (obtaining import licenses, bank loans, construction sites, public markets etc

5. All strategic positions, political administrative, economic, military and security should be entrusted to the Bahutu,

6. The education sector (schools pupils, students, teachers) must be majority Hutu.

7. The Rwandese Armed Forces should be exclusively Hutu. The experience of the October (1990) war has taught us a lesson. No member of the military shall marry a Tutsi.

8. The Bahutu should stop having mercy on the Batutsi.

9. The Bahutu, wherever they are, must have unity and solidarity, and be concerned with the fate of their Hutu brothers.

-The Bahutu inside and outside Rwanda must constantly look for friends and allies for the Hutu Cause, starting with their Bantu brothers;

- They must constantly counteract the Tutsi propaganda;

-The Bahutu must be firm and vigilant against their common Tutsi enemy.

10. The social revolution of 1959, the referendum of 1961, and the hutu ideology, must be taught to every Mahutu at every level. Every Hutu must spread this ideology widely. Any Mahutu who persecutes his brother Mahutu for having read, spread and taught this ideology, is a traitor (African Rights, 1995: 42-43).

The seeming weakness of this ground-breaking work is seen in his effort to balance the presentation in what he thinks is objectivity, thereby making attempt to conform to the western literary traditions. While in conflicts like those of the Balkans and the Rwandan debacle, the evidence exists clearly to indict the media of fanning the embers of war and destruction. But Puddephat (2006) has attempted to present the media as an agent of conflict resolution.

2.12: THE 1948 UN CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE

From 1939 to the year 1945, the world experienced the Second World War World War II (WW II). Amongst the atrocities of this period was the genocide against the Jews, an activity organized by the Nazi Third Reich. Consequently, violence against a particular human group resulted in the United Nation's conception of an instrument to deter future activities that may suggest the intent to commit genocide. This was the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide that was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on the 9th day of December, 1948. The instrument is exhaustive in its aim to address the most important issues that concern the overall question of the crime of genocide.

The convention lies within the domain of International humanitarian law (IHL) which has as objective the protection of soldiers, the civil populace, and all identified victims of armed conflicts occurring within and beyond the boundaries of states. IHL has as major goal the shielding and protection of vulnerable population during armed conflicts. A second goal of the instrument is to punish any identified breach to human safety, "and so devise specific rights and responsibilities for both states and individuals, in their joint efforts to 'humanize' war" (More, 2007: 2).

The two major universal instruments used are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG), both dating to 1948 (UN Doc. A/810, 1948). Yet, political, economic, social and ideological differences can combine to militate against compliance to the provisions of the ‘protection instruments’ and state sovereignty gives opportunity for contravention as well. “Over the last decade or so, we have seen the traditional practice of such laws increasingly challenged, demonstrating the global impact of intra-state conflicts and the difficulty of turning legal rhetoric into reality” (Clarke, 2001: 21). One such challenge arose in Rwanda in 1994.

Some of the most core subjects that the convention brings to the fore, apart from the preamble are issues like what constitutes genocide? But most importantly, the legal document is concerned mostly with the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide to be carried out by the signatories to the document. In this regards, the documents gives the spirit that informed the conception of the document in the following words;

having considered the declaration made by the general assembly of the united nations in its resolution 96 (i) dated 11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the UN and condemned by the civilized world; recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity; and being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required.

Specifically, Article I. of the treaty document indicates that “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which signatories to the agreement must agree to undertake to prevent and to punish perpetrators” (UN Convention on Genocide, 1951). By the 12th of January, 1951, 28 countries had deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations their instruments of ratification or accession to the treaty (United Nations, document A/64/Add. 1. 31 January 1947). Following to the above, Article II of the convention specifically deals with the concern of what should constitute genocide. In this vein, it states that within the present Convention, the term genocide shall imply any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to Bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Due to the above, the United Nations Convention on genocide of 1948 draws the attention of the members who signed the agreement that the following acts as defined by the convention shall be punishable:

- (a) Genocide;
- (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
- (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
- (d) Attempt to commit genocide;
- (e) Complicity in genocide.

Other relevant articles and legal provisions of the convention are;

Article IV

Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.

Article VIII

Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.

2.13: THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

Organization of African unity came into operation to achieve certain specific objectives. Some of these are:

Article II

- (a) To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States
- (b) To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa
- (c) To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and Independence
- (d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, and
- (e) To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

To these ends, the Member States shall coordinate and harmonize their general policies, especially in the following fields:

- (a) Political and diplomatic cooperation
- (b) Economic cooperation, including transport and communications
- (c) Educational and cultural cooperation
- (d) Health, sanitation and nutritional cooperation
- (e) Scientific and technical cooperation, and
- (f) Cooperation for defence and security

The Organization shall accomplish its purposes through the following principal institutions:

1. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government
2. The Council of Ministers
3. The General Secretariat
4. The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration

Despite the sovereignty proviso of the OAU charter, it is evident that the UN charter from where the OAU charter finds life and legitimacy is the supreme legal instrument that should determine the behaviour of states when confronted by challenges of this nature. More so, the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights do not mince words in justifying intervention. In addition, the OAU charter prescribes in its Article II (f), cooperation for defence and security which will entail not only national security but human security as well.

2.14: AFRICAN CHARTER OF HUMAN AND PEOPLES RIGHTS

“Recalling Decision 115 (XVI) of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its Sixteenth Ordinary Session held in Monrovia, Liberia, from 17 to 20 July 1979 on the preparation of a "preliminary draft on an African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights providing inter alia for the establishment of bodies to promote and protect human and peoples' right; Considering the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, which stipulates that "freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples".

Reaffirming the pledge they solemnly made in Article 2 of the said Charter to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa and to promote international cooperation having due

regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

In addition,

Taking into consideration the virtues of their historical tradition and the values of African civilization which should inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept of human and peoples' rights; Recognizing on the one hand, that fundamental human rights stem from the attributes of human beings which justifies their national and international protection and on the other hand that the reality and respect of people's rights should necessarily guarantee human rights; Considering that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the performance of duties on the part of everyone;

Furthermore,

The Rights:

Article 1

The Member States of the Organization of African Unity parties to the present Charter shall recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Chapter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them.

Article 2

Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status.

Article 6

Every individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security of his person. No one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. In particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained.

Article 12

Every individual shall have the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of a State provided he abides by the law. 2. Every individual shall have the right to leave any country including his own, and to return to his country. This right may only be subject to restrictions, provided for by law for the protection of national security, law and order, public health or morality. 3. Every individual shall have the right, when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other countries in accordance with laws of those countries and international conventions. 4. A non-national legally admitted in a territory of a State Party to the present Charter, may only be expelled from it by virtue of a decision taken in accordance with the law. 5. The mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohibited. Mass expulsion shall be that which is aimed at national, racial, ethnic or religious groups.

Article 18.

1. The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by the State which shall take care of its physical health and moral.
2. The State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in international declarations and conventions. The aged and the disabled shall also have the right to special measures of protection in keeping with their physical or moral needs.

Irrespective of the sex of the individual Rwanda during the genocide, their rights were denied them and in most cases abused. Thus, women and the girl child were raped and extremely abused deliberately as targets. The children were killed too as

a final solution to the ethnic question. According to the genocide perpetrators, only the killing of the children will bring to an end the threats they were perpetually confronted with by the Tutsi menace.

2. Article 19

All peoples shall be equal; they shall enjoy the same respect and shall have the same rights. Nothing shall justify the domination of a people by another.

Despite the clarity of this legal and ethical provision, the government never ensured its preservation. The end result was the conception of a policy that created a distinction between the Rwandan ethnic groups. The policy determined to make the 'other' the victim of its aggressive plans. In defiance of the above provision of the ACHPRs, the government of Rwanda and its supporters created targets out of those it considered its enemies including the Tutsi and the moderate Hutu. These people (especially the Tutsi) were denied 'equal rights', 'respect' and dominated throughout the period of independence Rwanda - actions that completely contravened the provisions of the Charter.

Article 20

1. All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have freely chosen.

2. All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the States parties to the present Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it political, economic or cultural.

A close examination of the above provisions exposes its content as a rhetorical document. Virtually all the aspects that concern human rights were significantly violated. People were marginalized and killed on the basis of their ethnic identity. The family, the aged and the most vulnerable human populations were not spared, despite the almost sacred provisions of the charter during the genocide. The highpoint of the charter is its Article 1 that states that the “Member States of the Organization of African Unity, ‘parties to the present Charter shall recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them’. By this commitment, the interpretation could naturally include the use of force to be deployed to enforce Article 4 that states that ‘Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right’; and Article 5 with the provision that every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.

The thesis will not rehash the basic issues covering the genocide because these have been exhaustively dealt with in the previous chapters. Thus, because the work is attempting an understanding of the overall issues of conflict prevention diplomacy, it will proceed to define what is meant by humanitarian intervention and why the international community should have responded to the call to either prevent or early management of the crisis. In this instance, the kind (intervention) inferred is the one that references *forced military incursion into a territory, sanctions by the United Nations in the affairs of a state that is recognized in international law as a sovereign entity in the world, based essentially on humanitarian consideration.*

‘There are two key elements to this definition. First, there is a clear lack of consent on the part of the target state and, second, the intervention is motivated by humanitarian concerns, such as human suffering or a threat to lives’ (Ludlow, 1999).

Some have argued for a wider definition of humanitarian interventions in order to understand the best ways to deal with the increasingly complex humanitarian crises in the world today. This thinking is premised on the assumption that humanitarian activities and international interventions today take many forms:

Foreign aid and development programs by individual states, the UN and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), diplomatic and economic sanctions or attempts at third party mediation are all to be considered humanitarian interventions in this broad context. While this may be a valid approach, many such forms of intervention do not

pose a direct challenge to state sovereignty and may be aimed at a variety of sources of human suffering ((Ludlow, 1999: 86).

The challenge to certain basic elements hence should warrant the intervention that is being proposed in this instance. Challenges to human rights are referenced here:

Human rights have two key elements associated with them. First, there is clearly a right to something. Human rights scholars have suggested a wide variety of approaches to defining the rights to which all humans are entitled. Clearly the consensus of all approaches is that the right to life must be considered foremost. Acceptance of the right to life necessarily implies others, such as the subsistence needs of food, water, shelter and security. Although scholars do not agree on a comprehensive or prioritized list of rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 is instructive in this regard. It lists, in order, the right to life, liberty and security of person, freedom from slavery or servitude and freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. While this list clearly does not reflect the rights that all people currently enjoy, they do represent an international consensus on the rights that all humans ought to enjoy (Ludlow, 1999: 87).

The above provision is similar to what obtains in the African Charter of Human and People's Rights. Article 4 in line with the UN charter states thus. Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right.

In this vein the adherents of the Solidarists school of international law point to certain specific provisions of the UN charter to justify their call for intervention in the case of human rights abuses. Let's take the following provisions into view;

Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides the needed locus for intervention in the event of crass human rights abuses. Note too that Article 42 of this chapter (VII) is the provision that permits and even out rightly authorizes the Security Council to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." (Ludlow, 1999: 23). Under Article 43, all members of the UN shall undertake to make available to the Security Council troops when the need arises (Ludlow, 1999) for the purposes of enforcement, although this task may be delegated to specific states to carry out on behalf of the UN.

Of particular note is the 1948 Convention on Genocide, which makes genocide a crime under international law and commits all members of the international community to "prevent and punish" it (Ludlow, 1999). The need to 'prevent and punish' the crime of genocide as admonished by the referenced convention is imperative when the Rwandan question is brought under examination. This conclusion is important because at the time the violence raged, Rwanda had become a failed state; more so, its government had become illegitimate and rogue by virtue of its culpability in stirring the human misery and in the same vein the perpetuation of the bloodshed. The state failure assumption finds legitimacy in the fact that by 1994, the international coffee market, the sole livewire of the Rwandan economy had collapsed. In addition, poverty and socio-economic and political

degradation had set in as a consequence of the devastating impact of the structural adjustment policies of the globalist Brettonwood system. This is apart from the equally biting dimension of the attack by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that coincided with the economic collapse and the accompanying failure of socio-economic infrastructure that welded the Rwandan state.

On the same human rights concern and what could easily be termed the failings of international and regional organizations, with particular reference to Rwanda, our referenced Solidarists have further maintained:

Human rights violations and widespread suffering cause instability and thereby threaten international peace. The authors of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights seem to acknowledge this in stating that "it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected. Since violent human rights abuses and large-scale human suffering threaten international peace and stability, the UN may intervene forcefully to preserve them.

From the above discourse, it is clear that the inability of both the UN and the OAU respectively to arrest the impending human tragedy was due to lack of political commitment and will on the part of these bodies that the world looked up to for benign intervention for the purpose of prevention and management of the humanitarian challenge. The assertion is informed by the fact that there are in existence ample legal framework to draw from to justify the intervention at that point. Furthermore, it is imperative to reiterate at this crucial juncture of the

analysis that, while it is correct to say that human rights are most realized within the territorial enclave of states, a state stands the risk of losing its status of a sovereign state once it abdicates its responsibility to protect its vulnerable citizenry. The Rwandan state failed to protect its citizens. In the actual sense, it exposed them to danger and destruction. The UN Security Council and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) were ‘justified and authorized’ at this juncture under international law, to intervene in a sovereign state to safeguard basic human rights. ‘The maintenance of order does not preclude the pursuit of justice in international society; the former does not and must not always "trump" the latter’ (Ludlow, 1999). This is the Solidarist argument in favour of humanitarian intervention’.

When the international institutions mandated to enforce international law failed, benevolent individuals arose to do the little they could to save some trapped victims of the genocide. In this respect, the world saw in Captain Mbaye Diagne □ ‘the Forgotten Angel of Rwanda’ □ a benevolent man who proved the purity and the triumph of the human spirit, once it determines to tow the path of good and the preservation of the human family. Mbaye alone saved the lives of hundreds of families. This African of Senegalese descent has confirmed to mankind that in a world that has gone amok for its perversity could be tamed once man chooses to live for the benefit of mankind.

While the countries of the west moved into Rwanda and rescued their citizens (Meredith, 2005: 504), having been motivated by their national interests, the integrity of people like Mbaye, Dellaire and others like themselves have established that the genocide was preventable. Mbaya Diagne died while attempting to escort thousands of victims of the Rwandan genocide to safety across the border. Captain Mbaye Diagne joined the UNAMIR as a military observer in 1993. Born in Dakar, Diagne went to the University of Dakar before enlisting into the officer cadre of the Senegalese national military (Doyle, 2015). Even while the genocide was in its embryonic phase, Diagne proved to be an enigmatic officer who was in the habit of perplexing his colleagues with mysterious manoeuvres. With unfathomable stealth, Diagne was in the habit of rushing from one military headquarter to the other (Doyle, 2015). His colleagues were to later learn that this humanitarian soldier was in the business of saving the victims of the genocide. Thus, the non-prevention of the violence was a matter of deliberate choice by those charged with the responsibility for preventing and managing international conflicts; a choice they have regretted since the unfortunate genocide. This thesis firmly submits hence that a combination of Mbaye and Dellaire would have altered the outcome of the genocide.

Finally, the moral and ethical conception has justified intervention in the face of humanitarian challenge—irrespective of the sovereignty statutes in international

law. (Caney, 1997) Simon Caney (1997) notes further that all human cultures irrespective of history and orientation, be they of the Abrahamic faiths or even of the Hindu or Buddhist value, the sanctity of human life is revered. In the same vein, it is nearly inconceivable to imagine any culture that welcomes drought, famine, disease, murder and malnutrition-all sources of human misery. “Consequently, cosmopolitan principles of humanitarian intervention that seek to eradicate these are not imposing values on societies which those societies reject” (Caney, 1997). In addition, Caney (1997) has also observed that to consider a situation in which a state (The Hutu genocide machine) is persecuting a cultural minority (in this case the Tutsi). In such a scenario, humanitarian intervention can be justified if it intervenes and protects the minority victim population.

This clear cut provisions within the charter that was not exploited to undermine Article 3 of the constitutive act of the OAU that indicates that no state should intervene in the internal affairs of member states is conceived as a major failing of the OAU (Caney, 1997). Caney (1997) sees this as an unpardonable weakness of the OAU, considering the heinous crime against humanity that resulted consequent on the non-exploitation of the Charter’s humanist provisions. On this same matter, a different view is also maintained. This view is to the effect that the mere existence of a legal instruments like the Africa Charter of Human and People’s Rights (ACHPRs) were not enough to prevent or spur rapid intervention in the

Rwandan genocide because of the OAU's core principles of respect for the sovereignty of member states and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states (More, 2007). These principles which were adopted by the OAU against the background of Africa's experience with colonialism and external interference in African countries, rather than ensuring African security, actually worked against the security of lives and property on the continent. As such the legal instruments mentioned above often played the role of the second fiddle as the OAU actually lacked the political will to enforce the legal regimes designed by the body (More, 2007).

On the whether the conflict and the resultant genocide were avoidable, considering the success of the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone posed, it was observed that based on the inkling of the weakness of most colonial states and hence their vulnerability and susceptibility to violent conflicts, it was imperative that the OAU should have sufficiently prepared to confront any likely outbreaks of these sort. If this had been done and functional machinery put in place, then it would have been safely concluded, of course with every assurance and certainty that the violence would have been prevented. The Rwandan genocide has been described by many as a preventable genocide and a scar on the conscience of humanity. It was a major failure on the part of the African Community for failing to protect their own. The developed countries, particularly the USA turned a blind

eye while it happened and only condemning the genocide after the harm was done. At the same time extra efforts on the part of the UN could have prevented the genocide. Instead the UN peacekeeper chose to stand by the specific mandates assigned to them, while whole human populations were being massacred. On the whole the Rwandan genocide was preventable.

However, even before now, other African statesmen, at the point of emergence from the colonial experience had subscribed to this viewpoint. In fact these had pioneered the recommendation as the only way to stabilize the continent when it became challenged by the question of insecurity. Kwame Nkrumah, a champion of Pan Africanism had maintained too in his political philosophies that if Africa's freedom and its political and economic unification are to endure, then a Pan African security force needs to be put in place. The ultimate objective of this mindset is the establishment of a unified Military Defense Strategy for the entire continent (Nkrumah, 1970: 219). Nkrumah's advocacies in these area is anchored in the understanding of the general perceptions that a post colonial African state will naturally face challenges that could end up in conflicts of the violent variation, hence the need to prepare for such precarious eventualities when they begin to unfold (Nkrumah, 1970). The same Pan Africanist, Dr Nkrumah, early in his tenure as Ghana's head of government maintained his famous revolutionary position when he asserted that African states had no justifiable business in

maintaining individual military forces in the face of increasing threat to continental stability, peace and development. Specifically, he observed that in the event of any major attack on any of the countries, their obviously weak and unorganized army will not be able to stand (Kum, 1996: 16). On the salience of the point at issue, Milton Obote, a former Ugandan president equally towed the path earlier charted by Nkrumah. He says:

.....I hold the view that however nice one may feel as complete master in one's own house, the time has come, indeed almost overdue, for African Independent states to surrender some of their sovereignty in favor of African Central legislature and executive body with specific powers over those subjects were divided control and action would be undesirable. I refer to such subjects as the establishment of an African Common Market, Economic planning on a continent-wide basis and collective defense security..... (in Woronoff, 1970: 85)

Subsequent African statesmen like Salim Ahmed Salim, the Former Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has joined others in the discourse. Particularly referencing Rwanda, he observes that the countries within the continent need to exhibit determination, commitment and a sense of purpose in managing their affairs. This according to him is imperative because the situation in Africa is too much of a shame. This obvious emotional outburst is informed by what he thinks is the nonchalance that resulted in the massacre. He feels if a little more had been done; the genocide would have been averted. Dr. Salim Continues,

(The UNAMIR withdrawal) will clearly not be understood by Africans who might interpret it as a sign of indifference or lack of

sufficient concern for African tragic situations. This is particularly so when account is taken of the fact that the United States is increasingly involved, and rightly so, in situations affecting peace and security in other regions (Africa Rights 1995: 1125) of the world.

Consequently, like other African leaders, he recommends that the leadership within the continent needs to begin a deliberately push towards investing on peace, stability and general continental order. The tool that should aid the achievement of this objective should be the mechanism that will facilitate the prompt response to conflict issues by the OAU.

Salim further stressed the need for the mobilization of troops that could be easily called upon to service, whether as peacekeepers or monitors during any conflict challenge that may rear its head at any time (West Africa: 1995: 1560). In addition, according to Salim, even the UN could utilize these troops when the need arises. This recommendation is probably hinged on the understanding that, after all, the countries of the developing world contributes the most troops during any peacekeeping operation. For instance, as at September 2010, the greatest troops-contributing countries (TCC) to the UN peacekeeping missions were Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Nigeria in succeeding order. In view of this reality, many African State men and political observers are building the consciousness that African interest must be giving preference during conflicts. They hinged this conviction on that the willingness of the African continent to contribute

sacrificially to peace support operations globally as recently demonstrated by the role played by Ethiopia, Nigeria and Uganda in different conflicts theatres across the continent and beyond (Obiozor, 2004: 239). However, the question that immediately arises is why the OAU and now the AU had not always considered the option of mobilizing these troops by itself for immediate deployment to the theatre of violent conflict. The answer is easily located in the lack of monetary resources that the continental union is always identified with and the equally important factor of non – political will of African leaderships since the post independence era (Oche, 2014: 22). Oche (2014: 24) opines that no matter the noble intentions and the proactive thinking of the OAU, she will always encounter dismal disappointments, because the lack of cash backing will permanently deny her opportunity to accomplish success in the pursuit of her socio-economic and political objectives. Oche (2014: 2) had referenced the Malian and Cote d’ Ivorian challenges and how a previously celebrated ECOMOG could not do anything towards intervening because of lack of funds to sustain the operations in these countries. Thus, according to him, the same impediment is a major bane of the OAU and now the AU in their attempt at conflict management and resolution.

It is necessary to mention at this point that the African pioneer leadership did not conclude that Africa needed a defence force out of a vacuum. They saw the necessity in the perceived threat the continent was going to be facing in the short or

even long term. These threats are categorized into three, namely: internal threats, inter-African threats and external threats as clearly articulated above. It is equally necessary to observe that the threat in question varies from one state to the other, just as the same is the case with regards sub-regional blocs within the continent. This reality has greatly shaped and informed the general attitude of each country and sub-region. Consequent on this fact, aggregating these threats for a joint military force to counter any perceived threat has over the decades remained almost elusive.

Beyond the OAU, other sub-regional organizations on the continent like the Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS) have keyed into this revolutionary orientation in the face of the threat of extinction its peoples are daily encountered with as the New World Order begins to gain momentum. Referencing the victories and triumphs of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group's initiative in Liberia and Sierra Leone – in restoring order to the beleaguered states - it has become evident that the best tool that will ensure the stability of the continent and the survival of its civilizational legacies is the collective security mechanism as demonstrated in the ECOMOG model. This position is arrived at with the knowledge that the ECOWAS' dream of economic integration and one market system cannot be achieved if other concomitant issues like regional politics and defense and security concerns are not central to the overall thrust.

Thus, acting on this conception, the Heads of States in 1978 unanimously agreed to modify the treaty that constituted the community, which previously did not accommodate any collective security provision. This time, the summit adapted within its protocols a non aggression component to its constitutive Act. The defense pact that was adopted in 1981, agreed to provide mutual assistance to signatories of the pact in the case of any external aggression and internal armed conflicts. This legal instrument gave legitimacy to the existence and operations of the ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone. This is what the OAU failed to exploit even though she had the mandate under the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights – apart from the OAU constitutive Act as amended. To this extent, the observers of trends and dynamics in African affairs had concluded that the OAU could not be considered as constituting anything other than a failure in Rwanda.

The successes recorded by the ECOMOG in her engagements in West Africa, according to Nigerian's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (because of the leading role played by Nigeria) have affected her global rating as a key model in regional conflict resolution efforts. For instance, the UN in its resolution 788 that was adopted in 1992 arrived at the consensual conclusion that the ECOMOG represents a good model of a systematic co-operation between the UN and regional organizations as conceived in chapter VIII of the charter of the UN. This should have been the posture of the OAU in Rwanda.

Despite the fact that it is possible for Africa to prevent and resolve her conflicts as clearly demonstrated by the ECOMOG's achievements, regrettably, as observed by Imobighe (1989), it took almost over three decades of deliberations by the OAU defense commission to arrive at a conclusion pertaining to the modalities for establishment of the OAU Defense Force (West Africa: 1995: 1559).. This is after violent conflicts and wars have ravaged the continent nearly beyond recovery from their bitter vagaries. In spite of this, the farthest the leadership of this potentially great organization has advanced so far is in the acceptance, albeit in principles, of the establishment of the force. In other words, no action has accompanied its establishment (West Africa: 1995: 1564).

A question arises as to what role the Nigerian government [as a strategic power in Africa] play before, during and after the genocide? Different perspectives were articulated by different scholars. Some of these advanced the strict conviction that Nigeria participated and contributed actively to the discussions, meetings and initiatives towards resolving the Rwandan conflict under the auspices of the OAU (Sanda, 2004: 269-273). A testimony to this fact is that, following the signing of the Arusha agreement on 22 July 1992, the OAU established a 50 member Neutral Military Observer group, which Nigeria contributed to. In addition, the group was also headed by a Nigerian – General Ekundayo Opaleye. This was before the genocide. After the genocide, Nigerian troops in the UNAMIR remained in

Rwanda (long after the departure of other global powers and conflict management institutions), playing major roles in ensuring the return of peace and security in Rwanda, and supporting the national healing processes.

On why Nigeria did not lead an intervention force into Rwanda when the threat became imminent, the Nigerian foreign policy establishment (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014) had revealed that there are in existence established protocols determining the procedure and factors that could warrant interventions. At that moment, Nigeria could not have entered Rwanda without a UN mandate; thus, the failure of the Nigerian government to move into Rwanda. However, contrary views emanated suggesting that Nigeria did not do much (considering her huge resources) while the ravaging phenomenon unfolded. However, this foreign policy decision was not a product of any failings to her Afro-centric foreign policy orientation from independence in the 1960s. This policy was pursued by Nigeria because of the fact that she was at that point a pariah state in the international committee of nations (Sanda, 2004: 269-273). Beyond her status as a military dictatorship, her human rights credential had taken a downward spiral. This position had jeopardized any intention to reach out to prevent and help in managing the violent conflict and genocide or participate in any form to the post conflict peacebuilding process afterwards.

2.15: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

One of the theoretical models available for explaining intrastate violent conflicts is the ‘Just Peacemaking Theory’. This is the theory that was deployed to analyze the tripartite dimensions that characterize the timeline element of violent conflicts - viz, the periods before, during and after conflicts (post conflict period). This theory is a response to the violent conflicts and the near absence of global order since the end of the Second World War. Accordingly, Just Peacemaking theory is the best tool to explain the violence in Rwanda. This conclusion is premised on the fact that the theory addresses the core issues responsible for causing structural conflicts especially in deeply divided societies. It addresses the question of injustices in the area of the appropriation and distribution of scarce resources, a major factor that led to the genocide in Rwanda.

The Just Peacemaking theory is therefore helping this study to understand that if ‘justice’ had defined relations between the Hutus and the Tutsis in Rwanda, acrimony between these groups would have been minimised or even completely overcome hence averting the bloodbath. It is important to note too that it was this realization that influenced the convening of the Arusha meeting and the effort to implement the agreement reached. It must be noted too that the Accord which sought the equal sharing of official positions in the civil service, the military and the school system all aimed at ensuring equity and fairness for the sake of peace. It

is important to also observe that the theory is apt in explaining the lack of justice in Rwanda from the colonial epoch which was a major reason for the violence. In addition, the theory is important in explaining the phenomenon of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons into Rwanda – to the government and the soldiers of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

A Major proponent of the Just Peacemaking theory, David Baer (2005: 1) has observed that the principles of the Just War are essentially about peacemaking; however, the dialectical nature of this reality is not evident to everyone. Many observers of the nature of International Relations easily “consider the theory to be concerned solely with questions of justification, i.e., when is recourse to war justified, and what sort of military measures are permitted”? (Baer, 2005: 2) This exclusive focus on questions of justification, however, inappropriately narrows the horizon of moral analysis. According to Baer (2005), an examination of the question of Just peacemaking should attend not only to questions about whether war is justified, “but also to broader political questions about the dynamics that lead to war and strategies for reducing war. A moral theory concerned only with questions of justification can never help us fashion a just peace” according to Baer.

A gathering of twenty-three Christian ethicists, international relations scholars, conflict resolution specialists, theologians, one New Testament scholar, and a

handful of Peace Action leaders had put themselves into a proactively driven team formed for a period of five years to conceptualize the new just peacemaking theory. According to Glen Stassen (1998),

we believe this may be a breakthrough time, after the Cold War and when people need a roadmap for peacemaking, and during the time when countering the threat of terrorism mostly by making war, and threatening war, against various Muslim nations, has dramatically increased anger against the United States, as shown in The Pew Global Survey, and dramatically increased recruiting to terrorism, as shown in the U.S. Counterterrorism Agency, U.S. Department of State, annual count of international terrorist incidents.

Those responsible for developing this theory of conflict resolution include Paul Schroeder, a historian of international relations; Bruce Russett of Yale University; the outstanding International Relations professor and advisor for the Catholic Bishops' pastoral letter; there was the main author of the church statements on peace in the 1980's, Steven Brion Meisels, chair of Peace Action, the Christian ethicists who wrote books arguing we need a just peacemaking theory, and others' (Stassen, 2004). In addition, major actors in global interfaith dialogue including leading Muslim and Jewish scholars have reached agreement that just peacemaking is the ethic they need (USIP, 2008: 1-7).

The theory propounds the understanding that there are a great many teachings and ethical imperatives within the different Abrahamic interfaith leanings - Jewish, Christian, and Muslim scriptures that promote peace and present the means and

methods to achieve it. These include the striving for political, social, and economic justice; tolerant inter-communal coexistence; and nonviolent conflict resolution.

The USIP notes that;

the three religious delegations that participated in the conference leading to this report presented slightly different and yet overlapping methods for peacemaking articulated by their sacred scriptures. The considerable overlap led the scholars to affirm the existence of a coherent “Abrahamic Just Peacemaking” paradigm, which began to take focus through their rigorous interfaith debate. Further work is needed to articulate fully this Abrahamic Just Peacemaking paradigm. The conference scholars committed themselves to continued development of this model in pursuit of a rigorous and effective faith-based program to promote alternatives to war (USIP, 2008: 9).

According to the builders of the Just Peacemaking theoretical architecture, the established ethical models that have governed perceptions and human consciousness on the question of war and its direct inverse, peace, are the twin theoretical models of Pacifism and the Just War concept. It has been stated that both constructs have as intent the moral/ethical goal of the ‘management of some wars or all wars, but neither focuses attention on how to prevent these wars’. “Each school focuses on whether war can ever be justified (USIP, 2008: 7). We believe debates between pacifism and just war theory, while needed, are insufficient responses to the problem of pervasive ‘injustice and violence’ which in most cases constitutes the root causes of structural violent conflicts. Debates need to focus not only on whether to bomb or whether to make a war, but on what initiatives should

be taken in order to avoid war and spread peace with justice (USIP, 2008: 7). If this condition were adhered to, it is the conviction of scholars and conceivers of the Just Peacemaking theory that wars, including their genocidal content will be reduced (USIP, 2008: 6). Thus, they contend that there is need for another paradigm in the debate. This should address the question: “What realistically could prevent real wars?” This question is working on the assumption that it is better to prevent war than manage them and eventually embark on post conflict peace-building processes that are expensive, time consuming, apart from the innumerable numbers of people that would have lost their lives whilst wars rage. However, in the case a conflict eventually erupts, the Peacemaking theory addresses or has conceived the best mechanism to manage them and ultimately how to rebuild the peace and the state that is emerging from this conflict especially in deeply divided societies.

Of course, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in partnership with the UN had a lot to do about the prevention and the management of the Rwandan genocide. We see ten pragmatic practices of peacemaking that have been developing (especially since World War II), working effectively here and there to eliminate potential wars and to forestall terrorism.

The Just Peacemaking theory has some of the following advantages that make it a choice theory for analyzing the response of the OAU in Rwanda: (1) Independent

of the slow process of negotiation and track one diplomacy; that is, if it was adapted in Rwandan, it would have eliminated any form of encumbrance and red-tapism, (2) Decrease threat perception and distrust but do not leave the initiator weak. If depended on, the theory would have assuaged the fear of each of the Rwandan groups with regards to socioeconomic and political domination (3) the theory makes every action verifiable (4) are carried out at the announced time, regardless of the other side's bluster. Irrespective of the level of preparedness of parties to the conflict, the process continues because it keeps to appointed time (5) Have their purpose clearly announced in order to shift toward de-escalation and to invite reciprocation and, (6) come in a series. Initiatives should continue in order to keep inviting reciprocation'. (7) It is very important to make the point clear that the theory is relevant because it emphasizes the theme of conflict prevention rather than Just War. (8). It emphasizes the question of justice in the distribution of resources thereby mitigating structural violence amongst human groupings (Stassen, 1998).

It is important to mention that the preference of this theory in the prevention, management and the resolution of conflicts have the potential for eliminating every tendency that slackens the drive towards peace-building, including conflict prevention and management. Time management is also evident due to the manner in which the theory is conceived and operationalized in the course of negotiations

and mediations. In addition, irrespective of the encumbrances that mar the achievement of stated objectives in the track one diplomacy, under this model, these setbacks are automatically eliminated. This and many more of the identified advantages make the Just peacemaking theory the preferred theory to govern our discourse.

In addition, other important aspects of the Just peacemaking theory that makes it seem the best option in any study of peace and war according to Stassen (2008) could easily be located in the fact that it promotes Cooperative conflict resolution (CCR) and also incorporates practices like: (1) Actively partner in developing solutions, not merely passive cooperation, (2) Adversaries listen to each other and experience each others' perspectives, including culture, spirituality, story, history, and emotion (Stassen, 2008). In this way, phenomenon of violent conflict could be properly forecasted. This way, it should give meaning to the diplomatic engagements between the Hutu and the Tutsi peace negotiations in Rwanda. (3) Seek long-term solutions which help prevent future conflict and (4) Seek justice as a core component for sustainable peace. A key test of governments' claims to be seeking peace is whether they initiate negotiations or refuse them, and develop imaginative solutions that show they understand their adversary's perspectives and can affirm their valid interests. Cooperative conflict resolution CCR could be

contrasted with competitive conflict resolution, which implies someone must lose (to some degree) in the process.

A not too emphasized aspect in conflict is the phenomenon of arms control and the phenomenon of Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation that is perceived as orchestrating conflicts including genocide. The theory has contended that violent conflicts around the world are orchestrated and sustained by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), especially with the end of the Cold war that opened the floodgates of previously secured armed depots in states controlled by organised power formation in the former USSR, Iraq, and Libya and so on. This is apart from the viciously organised mercantile economies of the industrialized military complexes of Europe and America that thrive in the mass production of arms sale to fragile states in Africa. The model argues that the serial violent conflicts plaguing Africa could be arrested only when proper mechanisms are deployed towards curbing the trade in illicit arms.

The case of small arms proliferation that the theory dwells on will greatly assist the study in appreciating the violent conflicts in Rwanda. On a broader scale, the study will also make prediction of violent conflicts easy the moment a particular state begins to receive illicit small arms to its territory.

A major challenge in the peacemaking theory could be located in the rather simplistic position of the theory that once the steps as highlighted are observed,

conflicts and wars could be eliminated. The theory does not seem concerned with the concomitant issues that generate structural conflicts like the laws that perpetuate injustices and unfairness, which ultimately results in violent outbreaks. To achieve objective of the pursuit of relative peace, the model has suggested the UN and other allied regional organisations like the OAU, the ECOWAS, and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and so on, need to be strengthened as weapons rapidly penetrate borders. However, despite this major challenge and short-coming of this model, it will serve as our preferred model.

CHAPTER THREE

3.1: OVERVIEW OF GENOCIDE IN HISTORY

Mamdani (2001: 8) in his usually illuminating style provides what could easily pass for a standardized narrative concerning the origin of genocide in human history. He argues, vehemently too, that the “the impulse to eliminate an enemy may indeed be as old as organised power”. This section thus purposes to present a narrative that subscribes to the understanding that contrary to the emotion that generally conditions human reactions in the face of extreme behaviors, the reality that genocide is a tendency that has governed the activity of war is as old as mankind itself. Thus, no human category must be identified as the originator or the sole practitioners of violence of the genocidal category.

Therefore according to Mamdani (2001: 11), God instructed His Old Testament Prophet, Moses, saying,

Avenge the children of Israel of the Medianites: afterwards shall thou be gathered unto thy people. And Moses spake unto the people and saying, Arm ye men from among you for the war, that they may go against Median, to execute the LORD's judgment on Median.....And they warred against Median, as the LORD commanded Moses, and they slew every male.....And the children of Israel took captive the women of Median and their little ones; and all their cattle, and all their flocks, and all their goods, they took for a prey. And all their cities in the places wherein they dwelt, and all their encampments, they burnt with fire. And they took all the spoils, and all the prey, both of man and of beasts.....And Moses said unto them, have you saved all the women alive? Behold these caused the

children of Israel, through the counsel of Balaam, to commit trespass against the LORD in the matter of Peor, and so the plague was upon the congregation of the LORD. Now therefore kill all the males amongst the little ones and kill every woman that has known man by lying with him. But all the women children that have not known man by lying with him keep alive for yourselves.

Mamdami (2001: 11) proceeds to argue in the same thesis that if the impulse to perpetuate the act of genocide is as old as the organisation of power as noted above, then one may be tempted to conclude that what has changed in the course of history is what he describes as the technology of genocide. Yet, it is not merely the technology of genocide that has changed; the Germans gassed the Jews while the Hutus macheted the Tutsi, but surely also how that impulse is organised and its target defined is a matter of interest to the study. Before an enemy is eliminated, this enemy must be identified and clearly defined according to his racial, ethnic or religious categorization based on what makes him a target. This is because the definition of the political self and the political other has varied through history and the history of that variation is the history of political identities, be this religious, caste, ethnic, national, racial, or otherwise (Mamdami, 2001: 11).

Just as the Germans played a role in the Holocaust during WW II, the Germans were also central to the genocide in the early 20th Century. The victims at this juncture were the Herero of South West Africa. When the German colonial system discovered that the resistance of the Herero against their land grasp and cattle theft

was becoming fiercer, they decided to put in motion a policy that will provide them a final solution to the menace (Mamdami, 2001). In the pursuit of this policy, General Theodor Luetwein had earlier proven a failure and was replaced by the German High Command with General Lothar Von Trotha whose decisive campaigns against German occupation of Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania had proven a huge 'success'. Trotha's strategy resulted in the extermination of over 80% of the total population of the Herero in 1904 (Mamdami, 2001). Trotha himself often enthused about his strategy to include a combination of violence with crass terrorism. Trotha had boasted, "I destroy the African tribes with streams of blood and streams of money. Only following this cleansing can something new emerge, which will remain" (Mamdami, 2001: 12).

Trotha wrote a letter that captures his victory in infamy and what he thought of the native peoples.

Now I have to ask myself how to end the war with the Hereros. The views of the governor and also a few Africa hands (alte Afrikaner) on the one hand, and my views on the other differ completely. The first wanted to negotiate for some time already and regard the Herero nation as necessary labour material for the future development of the country. I believe as such that the nation should be annihilated, or, if this was not possible by tactical measures, have to be expelled from the country by operative means and further detailed treatment. This will be possible if the available water-holes from Grootfontein to Gobabis are occupied. The constant movements of our troops will enable us to find the small groups of the nation who have moved back westwards and destroy them gradually.

Trotha pursued this blueprint to the letter in his campaigns against a defenseless people whose offences were, (1) Their racial identity, belonging to a detested racial stock, (2) Their strength in vehemently refusing the theft of their hereditary land and cattle holdings. Thus, Trotha hinged his decisions on the conclusions wherein he accords himself the place of an authority in understanding the psyche of the Negro. He posits that “my intimate knowledge of many Central African tribes (Bantu and others) has everywhere convinced me of the necessity that the Negro does not respect treaties but only brute force” (Mamdani, 2001: 11). This brute force made him do the unimaginable in annihilating an entire human group in the same manner Hernando Cortes, the Spanish ‘conqueror’ annihilated the Civilizations of colonial America (the Aztec, Maya and the Inca) in the 15th Century. All this was done for gold and the glory of the empire under Queen Isabella (Chomsky, 1999).

Trotha killed as many Herero as he could locate. For those that made effort to escape, all routes were blocked except the lone one leading Southeast to the dreary *omeheke*, a waterless sandveld at the heart of the Kalahari Desert. The terribly scared and fleeing Herero people were deliberately cut-off from their cattle holdings and these escapees were denied any access to any source of water. The option left these was to cross the desert into Botswana. In reality this was not practicable because of the wide expanse of sandy desert. However, in their

desperation to live, they trudged on. This was how many of the Herero perished consequent on thirst and excruciating dehydration. In their ‘triumph’ at having vanquished a detested enemy, the German High Command made a rather bizarre entry in their publication, *Dar Kampf*:

No efforts, no hardships were spared in order to deprive the enemy of his last reserve of resistance; like a half-dead animal he was hunted from water-hole to water-hole until he became a lethargic victim of the nature of his own country. The waterless Omaheke was to complete the work of the German arms; the annihilation of the Herero people (Mamdami, 2001: 10).

However, what is worth commending about Mamdami’s classic and graphic representations is his ability to establish the correlation between the Herero genocide and the Holocaust beyond the German genocidal instrument’s consigning of the Hereros and the Jews in concentration camps. It is noteworthy that it was amongst the Herero that the renowned German geneticist, Eugene Fischer began his experiments on race. He made samples out of the native Herero and their mulatto offspring of the copulation between Herero women and German men. Fischer ended up the Chancellor of the University of Berlin and a teacher of Medicine in the faculty where he taught Nazis physicians genetic medicine. Interestingly, one of Fischer’s most prized students turned out to be Josef Mengele. Mengele became notorious for his feat in genetic experiments on Jewish children in the concentration camp of Auschwitz. These millennial perversions—the

highpoint of German medical ‘ingenuity’ were duplicated in the Treblinka and later Riga camps of Hitler’s Third Reich.

3.2: BUILD-UP TO THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE

We will state from the outset that a crucial step in understanding any conflict is by learning about its history. Thus, colonial records have chronicled the details about the roles played by the colonial authorities in Africa. In Rwanda, these facts are clear in relation to the roles of the Belgians and the Germans. Because the records are as detailed as they are clear, the work will not rehash it further. Despite this resolve, it is imperative to make clear the fact that the colonial hegemony that presided over the affairs of Rwanda – Germany first and later the Belgians’ cultural orientation influenced their ascribing a superiority status to the Tutsi ethnicity over the Hutus. This was informed principally by the fact that the Tutsi were taller and lighter skinned. In short the Tutsi looked more like these European powers (Africa Rights, 1995; Orbis Agency, 1981).

The Rwandan genocide, unlike any other exposed the capacity of the human spirit to perpetuate evil in a scale that is previously considered unimaginable. Everywhere the colonial establishment went to, it practiced the system of divide and rule to achieve its interests (Orbis Agency, 1981). They used the tactics of divide and rule to control the land, the resources and the people. This strategy was

employed by the Belgian overlords to control Rwanda (Orbis Agency, 1981). In the heydays of colonialism, the Belgians favoured the Tutsi to stabilize their control so they could exploit the resources available. As indicated above, the departure of the colonialist tilted the balance of power in favour of the Hutu majority (Africa Rights, 1995). Unfortunately too, the advent of colonial conquest and ultimately governance of Africa in most cases distorted the ethno-cultural boundaries and consequently the geo-political structure of previously homogenous human arrangements. Adisa (1996:18) contends that the colonial establishment is more than anybody else responsible for the politicization of ethnicity within the Great Lakes region. He says:

Rwanda was transferred to the Belgian mandate by the League of Nations in 1918; Belgium was allowed to administer Rwanda and Urundi (Burundi) as part of the Congo Colony. Prior to colonial rule, the kingdom of Rwanda stretched across large areas of what is now the north Kivu province of Zaire (Goma, Masisi, and Rutshuru), south west Uganda (Kigezi) and parts of Northwest Tanzania. Thus hundreds of thousands of Kiryarwandan speaking peoples suddenly found themselves, without moving, outside the greatly reduced colonial territory of Ruanda-Urundi (Adisa, 1996: 18)

3.3: THE REMOTE FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GENOCIDE

According to the United States Institute for Peace “The end of the Cold War brought relief and optimism to people throughout the world. Former adversaries made major reductions in their conventional and nuclear arms”. The USIP

continues that world leaders found ways to cooperate on a range of international issues. As the spectre of nuclear confrontation began to fade, many held hope that this spirit of cooperation might set a precedent.....a new willingness to work together as an international community to resolve conflicts through peaceful negotiations and diplomacy. “Yet events over the next decade proved this optimism premature –nowhere more so than in Rwanda” (USIP, 2003: 219).

History establishes that the continent of Africa began experiencing stagnation and underdevelopment the moment contact was established between Africa and other exploiter civilizations. This contact occasioned the exploitative relations of slavery and the trade in Slaves as medium of exchange and later the equally grievous condition of colonialism and the theft of the natural resources of the colonies for the development of the colonial master. This linkage alone could explain the African dilemma in a global political economy (Chomsky, 1993).

Dealings between Europe and Africa have existed since the beginning of the 16th century (Chomsky, 1993). However, the disadvantage of Africa is most aggravated by the capitalist system and its attendant market oriented economy of free trade and profit motivated investments (Morley, 2016: 21). Pope Francis, the current Pontiff and head of the Catholic Order has stated specifically that”Africa is a victim. Africa has always been exploited by other powers.....there are some countries that want only the great resources of Africa....Africa is [a] martyr, a

martyr of the exploitation of history”. The exploitation of Africa has resulted in the smothering of an already strangulated African economy that has inversely helped in the development of Western countries through the grabbing of the wealth created by African labour (Morley, 2016: 21). This, coupled with the unfair restrictions meted out on these less-developed countries on access of their products to the markets of developed economies, is a further reason for the stagnation of the African world. Thus, the many centuries of interaction are laden with deceptive and downward notions of integration into the unfavourable capitalist system and led to a posture of dependence on developed economies by Africa. In addition, the combination of resource exploitation, coupled with poor pricing of primary commodities and high pricing of manufactured goods has led to lower and poorer income generation status amongst Third World peoples. The Third World had undergone so much impoverishment that it cannot initiate and sustain its industrial take off.

Like every African society and by extension the entire universal humanity, the experiences in Rwanda, including the experiences of genocide are laid in the history of its evolution across the centuries, first as unique individual human groupings existing in the spatial territory that later became Rwanda (Twa, Hutu and Tutsi), and later as an organic nation-state. To understand the issues pertaining to pre colonial developments that gave rise to the Rwandan conflicts, we must

resort to the same historical background of the country. Two debates dominate the controversy that seeks an understanding of the Rwandan conflict milieu generally. These are the essentialists and the instrumentalists (Meredith, 2005). The essentialists assert that identity is the irreducible cause of antagonism and eventually conflicts in Africa. Essentialism goes further to classify Rwanda as comprising three nationalist groups with different ancestry and occupational pursuits (Meredith, 2005). Despite the differences in their economic activities; land, the most important factor of production in traditional economy created serious competition between these groups.

The instrumentalists on the other hand advance a picture of a harmonious pre-colonial period between the diverse ethnic components as constituted the Rwanda state project. This school of thought traces the origin of Rwandan group antagonism towards each other to the seed of divisive practices to the colonial legacies of the Germans and Belgians (Meredith, 2005). Consider the following apt analysis of the early 1990s with the termination of the much talked about Cold War era. The United States Institute for Peace (USIP, 2003) observes that in the early 1990s, the statistics were not encouraging with 93 wars in 70 countries. The period from 1990-1995, was twice as bloody as any decade since World War II. In fact, of the estimated 22 million who have died in conflicts since 1945, one-quarter of those deaths occurred in the early 1990s". And Rwanda alone contributed 1 million

of the 22 million cited above in just one hundred days. In addition, the Rwanda genocide is a key factor as to why the early years of the 1990s were as bloody as described by the different scholars and institutions quoted variously above. What then could be said to be responsible for powering/energizing the intense hatred that culminated in the violence and killing spree as seen in 1994?

3.4: EVOLUTION AND STATE FORMATION: UNDERSTANDING THE CAUSES OF THE GENOCIDE

It is relevant to mention from the outset that throughout their postcolonial history, and even before, postcolonial African states have been typically beset by inter-group tensions, crises and violence. As Makau Mutua (in Obiora, 2011) has shown, viewed from the perspective of the “desirability of generally cohesive or widely accepted states with a reasonable chance of attaining effectiveness, the postcolonial African state never really had a chance in the first place”. The reason for this conclusion is obvious. After all, the amalgamation of dissimilar ethnic nationalities whose evolutionary trend differed resulted in national disharmonies. Different perspectives subsist to attempt giving meaning to the ethnic question in Rwanda. Although not clearly stated, these differences seem to be drawn on the basis of those that think no distinctions exist (racially speaking) between the different groups in Rwanda and those that believe a marked difference exist between the

Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. These conclusions seem common amongst anthropologist trying to understand Africa. The histories of the evolution of the communities in Rwanda are significantly similar with those of other countries on the African continent. This similarity draws from the marked nature of the migratory trend of early societies across Africa. This important factor in the ways nations are formed, shaped, structured and restructured is a universal experience enjoyed by the human species wherever it may have sprouted from and wherever it may have settled in. With regard to Africa, nations evolved independently, mostly along ethnic lines until the advent of colonialism. With the scramble and partition of Africa in 1884-1885, previously independent pre-colonial entities and principalities were coalesced into the nation state system along the Westphalia Anglo-Saxon paradigm. A common reality defining the character of discourses covering the themes of African migration has clearly and abundantly shown the fact that the subject of the origins of the nationalities constituting Rwanda and the entire regional space is still debatable and shrouded in controversies (Check: 2008: 252).

Some versions of the historical narrative however are of the view that the Twa, Hutu, and Tutsi nationalities migrated to the Rwandan mountains at different times in the history of the country. The Twa, pigmy hunters were said to have arrived Rwanda by penetrating the wooded mountains of the territory that is today called Rwanda in circa 6th century BC. It took some 1200 years, in the 6th century AD to

be specific that the Hutu began to settle in the land. The Hutus, unlike the Twas subsisted on farming. “In the 8th and 9th centuries, and later during the 12th and 13th centuries, cattle farming Tutsis started their migration into the area from Ethiopia (Africa Rights, 1995: 48). By the 14th century, these nomadic cattle breeders had begun to settle peacefully amongst their Hutu hosts; living in a symbiotic relationship” (Carrero and Cassoliva, 2001: 23).

From around the 16th century AD, the Tutsi military campaigns were aimed at symbolically asserting the subjugation of the Hutu nationality by their Tutsi neighbours. The narrative says that three hundred years later, precisely in the 19th century, when the Tutsi royal Nyinginga conquered and formally subdued the whole of Rwanda under its royal dominion, the Tutsi military offered its services to the monarchy as an important arm of the central authority. Naturally, the evolving class formation and the resultant hierarchical order that ensued guaranteed that the Tutsi military class became beneficiaries of this process. The said process was highly beneficial to the overall Tutsi nationality because they occupied positions at the apex of the state’s hierarchical arrangement. This gave them unlimited access to the factors of production including land and Hutu labour (Africa Rights: 1995). Unfortunately, the majority Hutu nationality were excluded from this emerging privileged social class structure. Thus, socio-political and economic dependency calculi were entrenched at the close of the 19th century.

According to these socioeconomic and political orders, the Hutu peasants must surrender over half of their crop to the Mwami (King)” (Carrero: 2001: 3).

A cross border spatial analysis of the composition of the Hutu/Tutsi ethnic groups is crucial if we are to grasp the picture of the states involved in the Great Lakes conflict. This is to appreciate the nature and even extent of external influence played by Rwanda’s contiguous neighbours. Even though other ethnic nationalities abound in the region, our focus will be on the Hutu and Tutsi and the primordial forces that have preserved their antagonistic and violent interface in a period spanning over four decades of their post colonial experiences (Briggs, 2001)

The ethnic distribution in Rwanda and Burundi is approximately 85% Hutu 14% Tutsi and 1% Twa. A sizable number of the two dominant nationalities can be located in the periphery of the border communities adjoining Burundi and Rwanda. Some 400,000 Tutsi trace their ancestry to Zaire’s North Kivu province (the Banyarwanda), or its South Kivu province (the Banyamulenge). About one million Hutus are located on the Tanzanian border with Rwanda and Burundi. Again tens of thousands of both Tutsi and Hutus reside along the Rwanda /Uganda boundary owing to the British negotiated 1910 cession of the Kisoro sub-district to Uganda (Briggs, 2001: 2).

On the evolution of a new power arrangement and the exploitation characterizing the social relations of these antagonistic principalities, C.M. Overdule (Cited in Briggs, 2001: 2) observes that, each Hutu adult has to work for the king twice in a five day traditional week. This service is to the Tutsi chief and it does not attract any form of remuneration or compensation. It is important to quickly mention that

this exploitative arrangement does not in any way affect the Tutsi no matter how down the social ladder they may be. This arrangement ensured that the Hutu hardly had time to work in their own farms and by implication this greatly affected the Hutu economy and overall means of survival. Another implication of the development is, it weakened the capacity of the Hutu majority to effectively compete with their Tutsi overlord nor make any positive contributions to the national economy. The feudal power arrangement instituted by the Tutsi monarchy subjected and legitimized the occasional deployment of Hutu women and Hutu children to serve in the homes of the Tutsi chiefs (Briggs, 2001: 3).

The twentieth century marked a turning point in the socio-economic and political history of Rwanda. It was a time Rwanda entered the phase of transition from the traditional monarchy to which it was accustomed, to the phase of Belgian colonial conquest. This development served to institutionalize the already entrenched hierarchical social order the feudal system had initiated in the preceding centuries. In the 19th century, during the reign of *Mwami* (king) Kigeri Rwabugiri, (1860-1895), he imposed a harsh regime on the previously independent Hutu lineages that were residents of the outer parts of the capital.

The reforms introduced in governance by Rwabugiri ensured the seizure of all factors of production, especially land and labour. “Henceforth, the Mwami became

the symbol and source of all authority as he (Rwabugiri) pursued two complimentary policies: the centralization of state power and the extension of central political structures to the peripheral areas of Rwanda” (Mamdami, 2000; Adisa, 1996). The Belgians, on becoming the political overlords quickly noticed the indicators of potential conflict in the existing arrangement as organized in the social, economic and political order. The Belgian colonial masters at this juncture responded by approaching the matter in a manner that sought to pacify the aggrieved Hutus by frontally addressing the injustice and exploitation meted to them. On the other hand, they commissioned the missionaries to preach the gospel of submission. Within a decade (1951-1961), something significantly epochal overturned the existing formation. This turning point was marked by the dismantling and subsequent abdication of over 150,000 Tutsi; these were mainly composed of chiefs and what could be considered sub-chiefs of the Rwandan Tutsi aristocracy. These were made to flee Rwanda to other lands across the border territories (Mamdami, 2001).

3.5: THE IMMEDIATE FACTORS LEADING TO THE GENOCIDE: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN HABYARIMANA'S DEATH AND THE GENOCIDE

The declaration of national independence of Rwanda in the year 1961 marked a watershed in the history of the newly born country. In that year, the United Nations organized and monitored a plebiscite (referendum) to determine the outcome of knotty issues concerning Rwanda's national question. Prominent amongst these is the subject of the preservation of the monarchy as system of government. The result recorded an 80% NO response to the Tutsi monarchy, the mechanism used to perpetuate the monarchy's and ethnic group's exploitation of the Hutu. This compelled many more Tutsi to flee the country (Meredith, 2005: 469). While some Rwandan Tutsi populations in very large numbers sought and found new lands across the nations within other contiguous countries within the Great Lakes region (and Central Africa as a whole), and to wield power and influence in the same vein, some members of the Hutu stock in the same manner also migrated en mass across the border for the purpose of seeking better life.

With independence, Gregoire Kayibanda, a Hutu breed became the first president of independent Rwanda. However, not long after, specifically in 1967, the Tutsis that left due to the Belgian policies (especially those in Uganda) launched an attack

against Rwanda. Unfortunately, this was foiled by the national military. For the first time in post independence Rwandan, the elitist government of Kayibanda became united in its goal of preserving its own and its people's (the Hutu) hegemony over Rwandan affairs. This unity resulted in a massive reprisal attacks on the Tutsis across different prefectures in the country. This resulted in the killings of many Tutsis (Africa Rights, 1995).

In 1972, the killing of some Hutus in Burundi by the government also generated anti Tutsi sentiment that led to the attacks and killings of hundreds of thousands of Tutsis in Rwanda. The disorder that characterized social relations in Rwanda led to the overthrow of the government of Kayibanda and its replacement with the government of General Habyarimana in July 1973 (Meredith, 2005: 464-485).

From the foregoing, it is obvious that there is something characteristically similar between Burundi and Rwanda. Of course, as severally established, the ethnic character defining the Great Lakes region sees the highly volatile region inhabited by the traditional Hutu, Tutsi and the Twa human groupings. In Burundi, just as in Rwanda, the Tutsi ascended and occupied the strategic corridors of socio-economic and political power in basically similar circumstances with what obtains in Rwanda. However, in Burundi, the domestic character of the Tutsi population was slightly different. Within the nation, there existed a tripartite interface of the Tutsi

clans of the Banyaruguru, the Bahima and the Baganwa which co-existed under conditions of bitter intra-ethnic rivalry. In Rwanda, the Mwami (King) and a majority of the Tutsi chiefs originated from the same root of the small Baganwa clan, which was pitted in war of domination with their rival and more powerful Tutsi clan of Bayaruguru. From the above conflict scenario, we notice the duality of the dynamics defining socio-economic and political relations amongst different ethnic groups within the Great Lake region. For instance, there was the intra ethnic conflict between the different Tutsi clans and the one between the Hutus and the Tutsis on the other hand. Thus, the strategy adapted by the Baganwa clan to survive the onslaught of the more powerful Bayaruguru clan leaned deliberately on a policy of divide and rule. In this case, the Baganwas formed an alliance with the Hutus, hence excluding the two other Tutsi clans. This greatly fortified the shield and the defence capacity of the much hated Baganwa human grouping (Carrero and Cassoliva, 2001: 212).

In a curious alchemy of the historical process unfolding within the complex dimensions of time and space, the Hutu ascension to power in Rwanda gingered the Tutsi minority leadership in Burundi to introduce series of repressive policies deliberately aimed at instilling fear in the hearts of the Hutus in Burundi against the likelihood of harbouring any form of rebellion against the state and the Tutsi leadership by extension. Thus, in 1966, Prime Minister Michael Micombero, a

Tutsi Colonel who had earlier staged a Coup d'tat, declared a Republic and formed a government (Meredith, 2005). The coming into power of Michael Michembero saw the unleashing of one of the worst purges in post independence African history which saw Michembero killing over two hundred thousand (200,000) Hutus and consequently orchestrating the massive dispersals of the Hutus (as refugees) across the Great Lakes Region (Meredith, 2005). It is very important to note that those killed were carefully selected by the extermination instrument of the Michembero government to include mainly those in the professional categories; the Crème de la crème of the Hutu stock like Teachers, Doctors, Engineers and Lawyers; those constituting the life, soul and essence of the Hutu humanity in the future economic and political contest in Burundi.

Other draconian measures followed these atrocities by the Tutsi ethnic group against the Hutus. Some of the effects of this policy of ethnic discrimination and segregation was a form of apartheid system that sought and ensured that the Hutus occupied a negligible space in both the school system (as students) and within the civil service (as workers) (Meredith, 2005). These policies were vigorously pursued in waves with each wearing a character that was worse than the previous one. Thus, towards the end of 1973, the refugee flow, ignited by more killings had increased. This killing spree between the Hutus and the Tutsis across Rwanda and Burundi continued for almost three decades spanning the 1970s through the 1990s

with the Rwandan genocide marking the anticlimax. It was in the heat of this development that Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, was elected to power as the first civilian president of Burundi. Unfortunately, Ndadaye was assassinated five years into this presidency on October, 1993.

It was this political confusion and crisis that culminated in Pierre Buyoya, the Tutsi loser of the election that brought Ndadaye in 1993 into political power. Buyoya hatched and prosecuted a military coup three years after Ndadaye's demise in 1996. Expectedly, because of the wave of democratization in the Post-Cold War era, Buyoya's Coup attracted international condemnation and embargo against Buyoya's government who had commenced the intensification of Hutu repression to stay in power. All these was to result in the multiplication of Hutu guerrillas in Burundi's interior and this precarious development implied the further escalation of the ethnic and political conflicts between the Tutsi and the Hutu in Post Colonial Burundi and the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa in general. It was in the midst of all these disorder and hate orientation that the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were killed. The killing resulted in an outrageous outburst against the Tutsi in Rwanda who were seen as responsible for this crime. Ethnic bashings and scapegoating are tools of the trade, and the mass media were employed in partisan and propagandist ways that further aggravated ethnic tensions.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ROLE OF THE OAU IN THE GENOCIDE

4.0: INTRODUCTION

In this section, the work will focus on the role played by the OAU in the Rwandan genocide. The role here infers what the OAU did to either prevent or manage the genocide as it unfolded. The discourse will be exhaustive because it is going to discuss a wide range of issues. Some of these will include the mediation role of the OAU, the overseeing of the Arusha peace Accord and why it could not achieve its objective of ensuring a ceasefire. In this vein, the work will factor-in several issues including the challenges that the OAU as a peacemaking organization was confronted with. The section will also focus on the specific roles played by external forces leading to the failure of the Arusha Accord. In this instance, the study will be specific in factoring the role of the French, the US, South Africa, Uganda, the Brettonwood system and so on in the exacerbation of the violence and the failure of the accord eventually.

4.1: THE OAU'S PEACEMAKING ROLE IN RWANDA

The OAU has been seen by different people differently. To some people, it was a toothless bulldog that lacked the capacity to either influence or enforce peace in conflict ridden parts of the continent (Dede, 2001). The former president of

Tanzania, Mwalimu, Julius Nyerere, has gone to the extent of describing the OAU as a “trade union” of heads of states (Africa Rights, 1995: 1122). Despite the aspersion cast at the OAU operations in the prevention and management of African conflicts, the organization has been commended as being a step further than the UN throughout the Rwandan genocide of 1994 (Africa Rights, 1995: 1122). The OAU was consistent in taking a diplomatic lead and negotiating a resolution of the genocide through negotiations.

It is on record that the OAU was proactive in organizing the series of negotiations and diplomatic agreements before the violence reached its climax. The critical role played by the OAU in the organization of the N’sele meeting in March 1991 and the equally important meetings in Arusha, Tanzania in August, 1993 has been appreciated by stakeholders (Africa Rights, 1995: 1122). It is necessary to acknowledge that these meetings created the prospect for a resolution of the Hutu Tutsi misunderstandings before the situation went out of control. At this juncture, it must be borne in mind that the OAU, following the N’sele meeting in March 1991 was the first “to put together a group of military observers to monitor a ceasefire” (Africa Rights, 1995: 1122).

Despite the existence of a peacebuilding infrastructure and power sharing agreement (the Arusha Accord) to which all parties to the violent conflict had apparently agreed to, the genocide took place. The Arusha Accord was an initiative

of the OAU which purposed to bring the belligerents together for a diplomatic resolution of the Rwandan question. Indeed, it is imperative to mention that the Arusha Accord was one of the greatest achievements of the OAU as a regional mechanism for resolving regional conflicts during the build up to the genocide.

This section addresses the inability of the Arusha peace and power sharing process to restore order and pacify frayed nerves and the tension that had characterised relations between the belligerents.

The Arusha process proved a failure in handling the grave challenges that bedevilled the Rwanda society at this point of its history. These challenges encompassed the heightened condition of chronic and increasingly worsening deprivation of economic opportunities in country. There was also the case of intensity in the oppressive presence of the state in all aspects of social life as severally highlighted in previous sections. This is what Uvin (1998) calls a situation of 'structural violence' – this is what certainly laid the foundation for mass participation in the violent conflict.

This work must reiterate the fact that one of the greatest and most functional regional organisations outside of the European Continent is the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). This rating is determined by her level of engagement in peacekeeping operations and other initiatives that aim at conflict resolution in its entirety. For instance, as at 1994, the OAU had been involved in observer missions

in over twenty countries of the memberships of the organization (Findlay, 1994: 45).

Because the OAU work in collaboration with the UN system in the search for peaceful resolution to violent conflict, in 1993, in a strategic partnership, the OAU and the UN had jointly facilitated a peace negotiation on the genocide in Rwanda. However, the greatest achievement ascribed the OAU in 1993 has to do with her successfully securing a peace deal (agreement) between the Uganda - based Rwandan Patriotic front and the Rwandan government, 'brokered with Tanzania's assistance and signed at Arusha on 4th August (Findlay, 1994: 45).

To achieve its mandate of conflict prevention, management and resolution, the OAU had in 1993, perhaps because of the increasing complexities of her conflicts, conceived and actually established an 'embryonic Conflict Prevention, Management Resolution Mechanism in Addis Ababa' (Findlay, 1994: 45). The mechanism comprises the following structural sub-divisions working in a complementary manner for the attainment of continental peace and security; a secretariat at the working arm level and a central organ with representatives of all Organization of African Unity's members meeting convened mostly at ambassadorial levels. 'It is intended at this stage to fulfil an early warning function as well as helping organize OAU offices and observer missions. Funding as in all OAU activities remains a critical barrier to successes (Findlay, 1994: 45).

The work has said at different times in the course of this dissertation that every regional effort at diffusing regional and global conflicts, wars and even genocides are pursued in collaboration with the United Nations or with its express permission. As a conflict resolution force, the OAU/UN mission attempted diffusing the genocide. A vital approach adopted by the organization of African Unity in diffusing the Hutu/Tutsi conflict was the call on the parties to abandon violence as an alternative and accepting negotiation as a viable option for the attainment of peace. In fact this was what gave birth to the Accord which had also enhanced the OAU's conflict resolution capacity. It is important to mention that the mandate and specific objective of the OAU were diverse in her Rwandan assignments. No wonder the challenges that confronted the organization were enormous as it dispensed its assignment.

Apart from brokering the Peace Accord, an initial interest demonstrated by the OAU in Rwanda was directed at the rescue of trapped civilian population. It is clear that the peacekeeping role of the OAU was just one of the many others it was expected to achieve as mentioned above. Unfortunately, the peacekeeping troops deployed to Rwanda became part of the conflict immediately it assumed duty. The deployment of troops in normal peacekeeping practice should mean the commencement of cease-fire between parties. Unfortunately, Rwanda was an extremely hazardous and notorious case where this practice could not be achieved

due to the many conflicting interests. In addition, by the time the OAU/UN intervention force arrived Rwanda, the conflict had assumed a destructive character and thus every agreement entered into, including the celebrated Arusha Accord was disregarded by the parties in the conflict.

Many thought that the Arusha Accord - because of the prospect it offered for a power sharing and the economic opportunities within it - was going to diffuse the over a century source of the conflict characterizing relations between the parties. The Accord insisted that a transition government should be instituted with cabinet seats to be allocated to the opposition. This decision was confirmed in the August 1993 agreement – It was agreed that the Transition government should be responsible for the management of power for a maximum period of twenty two (22) months until elections could take Place at a later date to be announced. (Melvern 2000: 53). The OAU was of the thinking that once elections were held, it was going to serve in soothing aggrieved minds and resolving the difficult issues constituting the country's national question. It should be borne in mind that democracy's inbuilt ingredients for giving every aggrieved group within a political environment the right to participate in national power sharing process is what makes it an important initiative in most conflict resolution processes.

The agreement also contained provisions for a merged national army made up of the existing Rwandan army. The agreed sharing formula was; the FAR (60%), and

the RPF (40%), with the officer corps to be split 50:50, and the right of return for all refugees accepted – a crucial demand of the Tutsi exiles (Mamdani 2001:210–211). There was no provision for any amnesty for human rights abuses (Melvern 2000:53). The Accords also covered a range of other areas, including the establishment of the rule of law and the creation of institutions to oversee the political transition. However, the desire for implementing the agreement was immediately dissipated and weakened by the assassination in October 1993 of Burundi's first Hutu president by Tutsi extremist soldiers. This development was subsequently followed by the massacres of the Hutus (minority) in that country. These developments were portrayed (rightly or wrongly) as confirming the dangers of allowing *any* Tutsi role in the government of Rwanda but most crucially, the national army (Kuperman 2004:76).

4.2: THE RPF: A REASON FOR THE FAILURE OF THE ARUSHA ACCORD

The activities preceding the high-point of the genocide featured the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) playing a major role. This role could be described as an uncompromising one in the sense that all that the RPF sought was its integration into the national army and the return of all exiled Rwandans. This policy formed an important part in determining the outcomes of both the Arusha Accord and the future of Rwanda. This has also made some analysts of the Rwandan genocide like

the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) (in More, 2007) to say that the Rwanda Patriotic Front cannot completely absolve itself from sharing in the blame of the genocides and the killings. Kuperman (2004) has also asserted that if the causes of the genocide are to be studied, the RPF will feature prominently. He suggests that it was these RPF that orchestrated and aided the sustenance of acrimony and distrust between the Hutu and the Tutsi parties.

Kuperman (2004) has also given the following as reasons for his conclusions: the RPFs invasion in the first place; the mobilization of fighting troops and subsequent launching of military offensives against the country during the period under review 1991 -1993; the outright stiff resistance and opposition to a compromise assumed by the RPF. This posture ensured that nothing concrete towards the resolution of the conflict during the peace negotiations in 1992 and 1993 yielded anything positive. In addition, there was also the classical case of the RPFs thwarting of the peace process through the deliberate and calculated breaking of the ceasefire agreement in early 1993, a situation that resulted in negative backlashes; the refusal to a renegotiation of Arusha Accord later in 1993; “refusing ceasefire offers at the start of the genocide in April 1994; and pursuing a military strategy during the genocide that prioritized military victory over the protection of ordinary Tutsi (Kuperman 2004: 62).

There are records of the genocide that confirms that the RPF is itself responsible for the killing of tens of thousands of civilians between April and September of the same year -1994 - (Reyntjens 2004:194). Kuperman (2004: 61) corroborates this position when he argued that, in the real sense, the rebels (RPF) pre-empted what the reaction to their invasion was going to result in. The RPF knew or expected their invasion to trigger a violent backlash against Tutsi civilians in Rwanda. But to the grand charge list may be added; “the (contested) claim that it was the RPF that shot down Habyarimana’s plane and directly triggered the genocide in April 1994” (Lemarchand 2006: 6). According to Robinson and Ghahraman (2008), the hard line posture of Kagame’s RPF was largely because of the support the RPF were receiving from the United States government. It has been generally concluded that there is circumstantial evidence that the RPF was backed by the US government (Herman and Peterson, 2010). Thus, in the context of the Accords, the “RPF – the most capable and determined party to the negotiations – pursued a non comprising agenda, especially with regard to the division of the military” (Storey, 2012: 37). In furtherance of the argument, a former US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Timothy Wirth (cited in Kuperman, 2004: 75), has stated that the “RPF demands concerning the future of the military were guaranteed to push the regime into a state of total paranoia” The firm insistence in the exclusion of the CDR in

the course of the negotiation may be seen as an apt example of this approach (Mamdani 2001; Melvern 2000).

The non compromising posture of the RPF was obviously informed by its massive arms build-up before the violence began. Even after the arms embargo was declared by western powers, the RPF seemed to be a special party that continued to receive arms. Therefore, when the Rwanda Army (the FAR) had become really exhausted by a combination of lack of arms and combat fatigue leading to its “retreat into the forests of the Congo in July of 1994; this after having run out of ammunition due to a Western embargo on arms supplies – an embargo not applied to the RPF” (Black, 2014: 2) the RPF nudged on until it had overthrown the Hutu government.

In spite of these challenges, it must be appreciated that after the RPF raid, the OAU focused its energies to peacemaking and attempts to arrest the violent conflict. Thus, it could be easily concluded that for the OAU in Rwanda in particular and the Great Lakes region in general, the 1990s were a time of well-meant initiatives; “incessant meetings, commitments made and commitments broken” (Thomson, 2007: 30). Ultimately, it became evident that the OAU suffered major challenges because it had only enough resources and power to bring adversaries together and hoped that they agreed and also prayed in the same vein that they did not violate their agreements (Thomson, 2007: 30).

However, in the defence of its action during the genocide, it presents the fact that just when the attacks of the *interahamwe* militia was beginning, the RPF anticipated that the major powers in the United Nations Security Council was going to be proactive in its response by moving immediately to help in defending civilians should killings be launched on a massive scale. According to the Human Rights Watch (1999: 6). When neither the UN nor any foreign government showed any inclination to intervene, the RPF on April 9th, 1994, proposed a joint operation with UNAMIR and the Rwandan army, with each to contribute 300 troops to end the slaughter. The RPF judged that the number would suffice to stop the massacre, most of which were being carried out by the Presidential Guard. The Rwandan army rejected the bid the next day and the UNAMIR refused to participate (HRW, 1999: 6) thereby establishing the unwillingness of the Rwandan state to curb the violence at the early stage of the genocide. It must be noted too that the UNAMIR had not received a clear mandate and requisite materials at this juncture (Meredith, 2005: 502-509).

In an immediate follow up to above claim, the Human Rights Watch in collaboration with the International Commission on Human Rights Abuse in Rwanda as observed in a study they carried out on the genocide, they observed that “RPF was responsible for a number of serious human rights violations in the early years of the war in Rwanda” (HRW, 1999: 10). This conclusion is arrived at

because of the statistics provided by the HRW which said that, within a period of three years, (1990 and 1993 when tension heightened), RPF soldiers killed and abducted civilians and plundered human holdings in the north-eastern part of the country. It is also on record that the RPF did not spare fragile targets like hospitals and displaced persons' camps in the periphery of Kigali (HRW, 1999: 10). These attacks compelled the forced displacements of human victims of the border area to flee either to Uganda as refugees or to IDP camps further inland of Rwanda.

While professing a policy of openness and commitment to human rights, the RPF hindered the investigation of the International Commission and made it impossible for its members to speak freely and privately with potential witnesses in areas under RPF control. The commission gathered most of its information from victims of RPF abuses who had sought refuge at camps in the zone controlled by the government. (Africa Watch, 1999: 37-39).

In concluding the issue of the role of the RPF in the genocide, the Human Rights Watch gives evidence that the RPF had in its drive for victory over its opponent had annihilated the lives of thousands of defenceless people as well as troops belonging to the government. In the drive to establish its hold and control over the local population, "they also killed civilians in numerous summary executions and in massacres. They may have slaughtered tens of thousands during the four months of combat from April to July" (HRW, 1999).

Yet other issues that caused the failure of the Arusha Accord could be easily connected to the OAU limited approach to the content of the Accord. Thus, despite

the vision and sense of nationalism sustaining the effort at constructing a formidable peace and security framework, the Organization failed to prevent or even manage the myriad challenges the OAU faced at inception as a regional body dedicated to the welfare and the unity of African people. For instance, OAU could not achieve its key agenda of uniting African people. The OAU was not vigorous enough in its effort to resolve the Hutu and Tutsi conflict during the genocide. Even though it oversaw the crafting of the Arusha Peace Accord, the OAU failed to include the most important issues to the conflict prevention and resolution processes. According to Uvin (1998: 45), the Accord concerned itself almost solely with the component that emphasized modalities for power sharing arrangement between the dominant actors in the violence. Unfortunately, the OAU ignored the most pressing challenges including the question of poverty, the highly stratified social and economic order, the contemptuous treatment reserved to the poor and the ever present presence of the instrument of government in public affairs which was always accompanied by an oppressive system (Uvin 1998:45). It was issues like these that greatly hampered the OAU from achieving its mandate of uniting African people at the intra and inter states levels. Therefore, dissatisfied with their conditions of poverty and lowliness, ordinary Rwandans saw no reason not to participate in this structural violence (Uvin, 1998).

4.3: FOREIGN INFLUENCE AS REASON WHY THE ARUSHA ACCORD FAILED

This part attempts an examination of the genocide in the light of its broad geopolitical context including the diverse roles played by different actors; western powers and even African states, multinational corporations and International Financial Institutions in either causing or aggravating the conflicts. The decision to tow this path is influenced by the conclusions earlier arrived at by our frequently referenced Yusuf Bala Usman (1999: 14) who had observed that: “Millions of Africans are being killed and devastated by wars and famine, ethnic conflicts and severe economic recessions. For the first time, it is being widely recognized that our very survival as Africans is threatened by powerful internal and external forces”. The thrust of the argument following has as objective the determining of the extent of the role played by these ‘internal and external forces’ in the genocide.

However it is crucial to state from the onset that in spite of the sensational misrepresentations in the media - both local and international - the violence that has remained an almost permanent feature of the political relations of the region is neither an ethnic nor a racial one in any meaningful sense of the term (Cooper, 2000). It is more an economic conflict – even though primordial forces like ethnicity were used to mobilise the belligerents - considering the contestation for power and resource control of one ethnic group over the other. This conclusion is appropriate considering the fact

that the Hutus and the Tutsis of Rwanda speak the same language, Kinyarwanda, with regional and not sub ethnic variations (Storey, 2012). In addition, apart from occupying the same territory, they belong to the same homogenous socio-economic and political systems (Storey, 2012). They are more or less social estates, with a certain level of occupational specialization in a richly fertile, but densely populated land of permanent cultivation and intensive pastoralism, containing all the ingredients for conflict once the political leadership decides to ignite it (Newbury, 1998; Usman, 1999; Cooper, 2002).

It is imperative to reiterate the fact that from a historical standpoint, the colonialists were responsible for heightening the traditional social distinction between the Hutu and Tutsi nationalities of Rwanda (Storey, 2012).

4.3.1: UGANDA

Within Africa, an important force that played a major role in the genocide was Uganda. It will be recalled that immediately after the attainment of independence and the control of power by the Hutu, the Tutsi migrated out of the country. Speaking in historical context, before, the coming of Europeans, Rwanda was a feudal kingdom ruled by a Tutsi minority over a Hutu majority as severally shown. However, as a result of the Berlin Conference of 1884 - 1885 Rwanda came under the suzerainty of Germany which was, itself, replaced as colonial overlord over

colonial Rwanda following World War 1(1914-1918) by Belgium. Rwanda's feudal order however remained intact despite the major political shake up until the mid twentieth Century and specifically in 1956 when the Belgians finally organized elections following a plebiscite. Then, in November 1959, the Hutu majority overthrew the Tutsi monarchy. Many Tutsis fled ending up in Uganda. "It was from this perch in Uganda that the exiled Tutsi aristocracy launched, between 1960 and 1973, a series of violent attacks against the Rwandan regime. These were repulsed and for the next decade and a half Rwanda enjoyed a period of relative peace" (Baffoe, 2000).

However, the 1990's were an entirely different period in the history of the country because of the intensity of political activities as the preparation for genocide gained momentum. It has been shown that Uganda was always behind these subterfuges that were focused on the displacement of the Hutu regime and their replacement with the Tutsi government. When Yoweri Museveni of Uganda assumed power – having been anointed by the US and their British allies to remove the socialist government of Milton Obote, a third or more of Museveni's army consisted of Tutsis including Paul Kagame who occupied strategic positions in the Ugandan military. However, even before now Kagame had been (and still remains) "an erstwhile client of Washington from well before he claimed to have 'saved Rwanda from further genocide' in 1994. Not only had he served as director

of Ugandan military intelligence in the 1980s, but he had also received training at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and had been the beneficiary of constant US material and diplomatic support from the moment he assumed control of the RPF” (Black, 2014: 2).

A clear instance of the role of Uganda in the genocide has been clearly captured by Antony C. Black in his ‘who was behind the genocide’ thesis. Black (2014: 2) had maintained that

On the evening of April 6th 1994 a plane carrying the Hutu leaders of both Rwanda and Burundi was shot down as it approached Kanombe airport. The assassins had little trouble targeting the flight as only one of the two runways was open, the other having been closed two months earlier on the orders of Canadian General Romeo Dallaire. Simultaneous to the shoot down, that is on the eve of April 6th, a 30,000 RPF (Tutsi) army based in Uganda invaded from the north. At the same time, hundreds of covert armed RPF cells came to life in and around Kigali and began attacking Rwandan government forces (FAR).

4.3.2: THE ROLE OF THE BRETTON-WOODS FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN THE GENOCIDE

The World Bank (WB) and the International monetary Fund (IMF) cannot be exonerated of blame concerning what is considered its role in the genocidal debacle in Rwanda in the period. The mainstay of the Rwandan economy was basically hinged on the coffee plantation economy (Woodward, 1996:19-21). This

happened the moment the Rwandan agro-economy was integrated into the colonial economic system. In the mid 1980s, this thriving agricultural and trade economies began to dwindle due mainly to the extreme challenges posed by “the system of quotas established under the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) started to fall apart and world prices plummeted (Woodward, 1996). Rwanda’s state controlled fund that promoted coffee price stabilization became massively indebted (Moise, 2007: 6). This development had as implication the damaging of the economy that motivated the invitation of the IMF/World bank bodies to chart the course of economic recovery. As is natural with these institutions, they laid out their stereotypical strategies which included the massive devaluation of the national currency under a Structural Adjustment Programme. The conceived Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) ushered a period of great stress and economic despair for the average Rwandese (Moodley, Gahima and Munien 2010). The despair was so deep-rooted that even the Hutu elites became grossly divided over the conditionality issued by these institutions. This situation became most severe in the 1990s. At this juncture, poverty and the attendant destitution had become more grievous such that more “than half of all Rwandan farmers occupied farms of less than one hectare, often on ecologically fragile soils, while up to 25 per cent of the population was landless” (Mullen 1995:23). In addition, “forty-three per cent of all farm households lacked enough land to subsist upon” (Uvin 1998:113). On

the implication on dietary regime, the tightening population-land pincer movement pushed people to switch production from cereal and bean cultivation towards the cultivation of carbon hydrate filled root crops, so that many people's diet became protein-deficient with its attendant malnourishment of an already impoverished human populations (Mamdani 2001:146).

In addition, the arrival of the AIDS virus in the early 1980s, drought (in 1984), excessive rain (in 1987) and plant disease (in 1988) all weighed in to contribute to declining production and food security levels. By 1989, an estimated one in six Rwandans was affected by famine, one quarter of all children was severely malnourished, and some 50 per cent of all children suffered from stunting. From October 1990 civil war was costing an estimated \$100 million per annum and was causing massive displacement and disruption, especially affecting the most fertile northern regions. This resulted in the displacement of 15 per cent of the population – 1 million people (Andy Storey, 2012: 13)

Furthermore, the attack on the country by the Tutsi guerrillas coincided with these economic challenges to the state under Habyarimana. Despite the political and economic stresses the polity was experiencing, the Bretton woods system went ahead to implement the contentious SAP. It is important to note that a requirement of a 50 percent devaluation of the Rwandan franc was carried out in November 1990. This was just about six weeks into the incursion from Uganda of the rebel army of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The economic shock-attack the country was exposed to consequent on this development exacerbated the civil war

and resulted in massive inflation and significant increases in the price of daily basic human necessities, fuel and food (Moise, 2000; Storey, 2012).

The onslaught on the economy by the plummeting coffee mono-economy and the misadventure of the Bretton woods system greatly weakened the fabric and core of Rwandan values and its structural base – the economy, political and social systems. The implication of the extreme posture of these globalisation institutions on the Rwandan economy set the tune for its degeneration into becoming a failed state on the one hand and prepared the ground for the outbreak of violence and ultimately genocide on the other. The disregard for human security by these financial systems with regard their treatment of Rwanda at the height of its national challenge is best depicted by the renowned conflict scholar, Chossudvski (2003: 107-109); State enterprises were pushed into bankruptcy and public services collapsed, including health and education. In 1992, during the height of the civil war, the IMF ordered a second devaluation, which led to further price increases-on goods and services. In a single year coffee production tumbled by another 25 percent. Because so much land was dedicated to coffee there was not enough available to produce food. If land spaces that should be allotted to food production are dedicated to cash crop production, the implication can only be imagined. Wherever this happened, hunger and starvation followed in its trail. In Rwanda, because of the same problem, many of the country's population died of malnutrition. Global politics is conducted on

the basis of achieving strategically outlined objectives. The questions that need answers at this juncture are: was it mere coincidence that the RPF assault on Kigali coincided with what is clearly an attack on the economy by the Bretton-woods system at exactly the same period? What did the countries of the west set out to achieve by orchestrating these events almost simultaneously?

A year after the genocide in 1994, the world Bank/IMF financial hawks approached the Tutsi-led RPF government regarding settling the debts of the former regime that had been used to finance the bloodshed. “The Tutsi-led RPF government, rather than demanding the cancellation of Rwanda’s odious debts, had welcomed them with open arms,” because, “they needed the IMF ‘green light to boost the development of the military,” which is exactly where the new loans went” (Madsen, 2006: 2). These received monies ended up paying up for military hardware from South Africa, Egypt and the countries of Eastern Europe. To conclude on this vexing and contentious question, it is important to reiterate as we have repeatedly maintained in the course of the discourse that Contrary to media and many government reports, the genocide was the outcome of Rwanda’s political and economic position in the capitalist economy. It involved such monetary factors as its colonial history, the price of coffee, World Bank/International Monetary Fund policies, as observed above. There is equally the matter of the global interests

of Western nations, particularly the US and France; the interests of international aid agencies, and Western attitudes towards Africa as a whole? (Shalom, 1996).

4.3.3: THE ROLE OF US IN THE GENOCIDE

The United States is often blamed as being most responsible for inaction in Rwanda. This is partly because since the end of the Cold War, “no international action can be taken without the leading role of the United States” (Destexhe 1995: 49). Thus, it is indeed ironic again that every time the Rwandan genocidal discourse comes to the fore, the blame is largely laid on the ‘ancient deep level hatred’ between the Hutu and Tutsi that has spanned centuries. With regards the violence, instead of speaking about genocide, the UN Secretariat repeatedly ‘reported about the breakdown of the ceasefire, which seemed to legitimize the great powers’ decision not to intervene’ (Wheeler 2000: 220-1). Thus, the place of the western powers in the entire Rwandan affair is either ignored or deliberately suppressed. Many are living the falsehood that is dished out by the media and academic communities. A desperate effort aimed at ‘totally absolving the west of its historic complicity in the tragedy that is African history has become paramount objective of these institutions (Alamu, 2013: 3) However, emerging facts about the violence in the annals points to the culpability of the west. In what he describes as the west’s military backing to the conflict, Wayne Madsen alleged in his book,

Jaded Tasks: Brass Plates, Black Ops, & Big Oil, that Madeleine Albright and even Kofi Annan “ignored evidence that the US backed Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was responsible for the April 6, 1994 terrorist missile attack on the aircraft carrying the Hutu president of Rwanda” (in Choddovsky, 2003: 107). In addition, Madsen explains that the initial RPF invasion of Rwanda from Uganda in 1990 enjoyed the support of the U.S military establishment under the first Bush administration (1989-1993), including Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. This was even when the strategic objective of the RPF was to overthrow Rwanda’s Hutu president, Juvenal Habryamana (Africa Rights, 1995). Madsen proceeds to expose how Paul Kagame, the RPF’s deputy leader received his military training at a U.S army installations and when the leader of the RPF was killed in 1990 during an invasion of Rwanda, Kagame was endorsed the leader of the guerilla movement and his ties with the U.S military organization □ the Pentagon, CIA, and State Department became closer. “Classified UN documents revealed that Annan and Albright were aware of this information” (Madsen, 2006: 2).

In addition, the shocking revelation was made at a French National Assembly inquiry that, the US government was responsible for making available the RPF with the Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles that were used to shoot down the Rwandan presidential aircraft (Africa Rights, 1995). A UN investigation team got hold of documents connecting “a company linked to the CIA leased the warehouse

used to assemble the missile launchers. However, the investigation was closed down once the relationship to the US was realized"(Madsen, 2006: 3). Furthermore, the primacy of how information was manipulated to stir the anger of individual groups, in this case the Hutu was manifest in the message of hate that was disseminated from the local radio station describing the Tutsi as cockroaches that should die (Africa Rights, 1995). This realization informed the decision of the UNAMIR to call on the UN to jam the waves of the said station. In response, the UN sought the assistance of the US in this area; a call to which the US declined under the pretext that the assignment was too expensive and she did not want to interfere in Rwanda's internal sovereignty. Note that the US power establishment had deliberately refused to call the violence genocide (Africa Rights, 1995). Still on the non-interference and general nonchalance of the State Department and US administration, the Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) strongly influenced US decision-making in April 1994. Unfortunately for the people of Rwanda, their country did not "qualify" for a US-sponsored peacekeeping operation under Presidential Decision Directive-25 (Maritz, 1998).

Even when the Rwandan government and army was suffering defeat which informed their call for a ceasefire, the RPF under US tutelage rejected the call. The government of Rwanda at this juncture sought the help of the UN to bring the situation under control. This request too was turned down. On the contrary, the US

influenced the withdrawal of the main UN force while all the while flying in men and material supplies to the RPF using C130 Hercules aircraft. “The Rwandan Army, short of ammunition and unable to contain the RPF advances offered an unconditional surrender on April 12th. The RPF rejected this offer and began shelling the Nyacyonga refugee camp, where the one million Hutu refugees were located (Black, 2014: 6).

A twist to the entire drama has to do with the intense competition between the US and France over Rwanda. These powers never wanted any compromise until the ultimate master of the region had been established. Thus,

The genocide was successful in its intentions, as the French-supported Hutu Habyarimana government was replaced with a US-supported Tutsi Paul Kagame government, with the aid of US Special Forces and CIA. The situation should in fact be viewed as an undeclared war between France and America. The aim was to install an Anglo-American protectorate in Rwanda, which enabled the US to establish a neocolonial foothold in Central Africa. This was successfully achieved, as the language of the private and government sectors switched from French to English. (Chossudovsky, 2003: 115).

Furthermore, Black (2014: 3) has better illuminated the argument linking the triumvirate of the US, the UK and Uganda to the Rwandan genocide when he maintained that;

Upon the collapse of the USSR in 1989/90 the US and the UK began a general militarist expansion which included the targeting of Yugoslavia and Rwanda; Yugoslavia as it was the last real bastion of working socialism in Europe, and Rwanda as it was a working model

of socialist development in Africa. In addition, the US had turned against Mobutu (of Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) as he was beginning to ally himself politically with China. The Rwandan president, Habyarimana, was subsequently approached by Washington to allow his country to be used as a staging ground for an attack on Zaire (to this day, a cornucopia of precious resources prized by the West). His refusal caused the US to look to other agents in furthering its strategic interests. They found the Tutsis in Uganda, ever thirsting for restoration of their hegemony in Rwanda. Furthermore, Museveni had begun to feel uneasy about the numbers of Tutsis in his ranks and was looking to be rid of them. The opportunity to satisfy these disparate desires soon came.

The above tells us clearly and coherently too that the deception and subterfuge that has defined the extant perspectives of the genocide question is not only misleading but immoral. Since 1994, the world has been made to hold on the erroneous view that the conflict sources could only be understood when situated within the purview of the African ethnic enmity that has characterized relations between groups. However, the thesis has made effort to establish a contrary perspective, one pointing at the culpability of the external forces to the violence. The existing narrative and normative interpretation of the genocide daily makes desperate effort to obscure the facts about the phenomenon (Allyn and Bacon, 1999, 2002: 269-274). The question here is if indeed the hatreds (as presented as the cause of the genocide) are historical as tenaciously held and liberally disseminated by western media and the academia, why is it just translating into a violence that is hitherto inconceivable in Africa's anthropological and social mindset?

Again, the above reveals that just as the case of many other African conflicts, Rwanda more than any other, was orchestrated, and sustained from the outset by western interest - represented by their foreign policy and intelligence establishments to have a grip and absolute control of strategic affairs in that sub region. The bloodshed in Rwanda, the strangulation of the Habyarima regime and economic policies, the killings, the harsh economic “recovery plan of the Brettonwoods systems” and ultimately the violence and genocide were all about the entrenchment of western hegemony in Africa. It was about the strategic pursuit of the West’s interest to recreate the Great Lakes Region in its own image.

It is necessary to mention here that the thrust of American/African policy as has always been; from the Gulf of Guinea to the Horn of Africa and from the Maghreb to the Cape is to be understood only when situated within its military interests as encapsulated in the AFRICOM. AFRICOM attempts to establish a large, permanent American military presence on African soil. In addition, beyond the African continent, the US now has a military installation in most nations of the world. It is not an accidental phenomenon that America’s military complex expends more, in military facilities and installations than all other nations combined together. This explains the triumphalism that accompanies the attitude of America’s foreign policy Think Tank that likes describing America as the ‘lone superpower’ and the ‘indispensable nation’ (Brian: 2001: 13).

Finally, the issue has been summed thus;

At the United Nations, the Security Council, led unremittingly by the United States, simply did not care enough about Rwanda to intervene appropriately. There were no economic or strategic interests at play. What makes this betrayal of their responsibility even more intolerable is that the genocide was in no way inevitable. It could have been prevented entirely. Even once it was allowed to begin, the destruction could have been significantly mitigated. All that was required was a relatively modest international military force, perhaps 5000 properly trained troops, with a strong mandate to enforce the Arusha agreements. Nothing of the kind was authorized by the Security Council before the genocide, and the force that was approved during the genocide was not permitted to intervene until the slaughter was over (Thomson, 2007: 43)

In addition, Thomson (2007: 43) has further maintained that;

The United States has formally apologized for its failure to prevent the genocide. President Clinton insisted that it was a function of ignorance. The evidence shows that the American government knew precisely what was happening, not least during the months of the genocide. Domestic politics took priority over the lives of helpless Africans. After losing 18 soldiers in Somalia in October 1993, the US was unwilling to participate in further peacekeeping missions and was largely opposed to the Security Council authorizing any new serious missions at all, with or without American participation

The claim of ignorance by President Clinton has been shown to be false. The American government under his watch knew everything about the genocide. In fact, the US government confirmed that she was 100 Percent responsible for everything that happened in Rwanda. Black (2014: 7) has revealed that;

Boutros-Ghali, It might be remembered, had come uncomfortably close to scuttling the entire US/RPF invasion scenario when, in May

of 1994, he acceded to a request by the Rwandan government to send 5500 UN troops to Rwanda to reinforce the 2500 already stationed there; this so as to stabilize the country at a time when reports of growing 'chaos' were issuing forth daily in the world press. These efforts were, however, categorically thwarted by the Clinton regime which used its influence to remove the proposal from the UN agenda. Instead, the UN troops already stationed there, far from being reinforced, were withdrawn. Later, Boutros-Ghali, in conversation with Rwandan expert Robin Philpot, would expand on these matters declaring that, "The genocide in Rwanda was 100% the responsibility of the Americans!" Hardly any wonder, then, that in 1996 US Ambassador to the UN, the ubiquitous Madeleine Albright, would veto his re-election making Boutros-Ghali the only UN Secretary General in history not to be granted a second term in office.

4.3.4: THE ROLE OF THE FRENCH IN EXERCABATING THE VIOLENCE

The controversies over who is responsible for what in 'manufacturing' the genocide, is an endless one since the US has also risen to defend itself against the accusation of the French. Janvier Afrika (in Wallis 2006: 57), a former Rwandan Hutu supporter, remembers French involvement in 1992 in Rwanda. He noted that they had two French officers who assisted in training the *Interahamwe*. He said the French military taught them how to catch people and tie them. Specifically, he recounts, "I saw the French show *Interahamwe* how to throw Knives and how to assemble and disassemble guns. These soldiers (French soldiers) continued to hand out firearms and train the militia. They even advanced beyond training into controlling check-points and demand to see identity cards; arresting Tutsi and

handing them over to the Rwandan army. The fact is whether it was the French or the Americans that caused (or perpetuated) the genocide, they all belong to the same civilization. Their orientations are shaped by the same historical and ideological mindset. Hence, deep into the genocide, Western countries were still delaying and unwilling to physically or monetarily donate such that the UNAMIR II could not be deployed up till the time the genocide was over (Maritz, 1998). It becomes clear from the above that the conflict was generated by the avaricious national interests of the two NATO allies and the pawn was naturally Rwanda and its people.

Just like the American authorities, the French government was also active in the geostrategic struggle for the soul of Central Africa with Rwanda as the base of operation. The authorities in Paris were throughout the period of the struggle consistently and conspicuously backing the Habyarimana government and the purely Hutu elite kitchen cabinet known at the time as the *akazu* (Prunier 1995:162–163). Without any doubt, the support of the French military was crucial deterring the initial onslaught of the Rwandan Patriotic Front on the national military and the Rwandan state in 1993. The French government had granted permission for the mobilization and deployment of over 300 new French troops that was rushed to fend-off the attack to the country.

In addition, apart from active participation in the civil war, French soldiers also served as military instructors deployed at this time to train the militias who would later become the main perpetrators of the genocide the year after - 1994 (Prunier 1995:164 - 176). “The French Secret Service spread disinformation about the RPF offensive (such as massacre allegations) to help justify further French intervention” (Prunier 1995: 176).

In the eve of the phenomenal mayhem, precisely in February 1993, the then French Minister for Cooperation, during a visit to Kigali, Rwanda had deliberately and passionately demanded non-MRND (D) parties to form a coalition thereby making a ‘a common front’ with Habyarimana in the effort to form a formidable opposition against the RPF (Prunier 1995:178), a direct undermining of the ostensible French commitment to inclusive negotiations at Arusha. “Though the French government did press Habyarimana to agree to the deal in July 1993, Habyarimana expected the French to back him in subverting the Accords after their signing” (Stettenheim 2002: 226).

However, the worst role played by France (as was the case with the US) in the bloody debacle bordered on the supplies of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) that was common after the Cold War to Rwanda in January 1994 in the contravention of the Arusha Accords (Stedman 1997:23). In fact French military assistance to the national military and the Hutu militia persisted even after the

genocide had started in 1994 and a UN Security Council arms embargo had been imposed (Andersen 2000:441).

4.4: CHALLENGES CONFRONTED BY THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) IN RWANDA

Some of the perceived weaknesses that hastened the transition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) was the provision in the OAU charter that gave undue recognition to the sovereignty of nations (hence no entity, whether states or organizations) could interfere in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state within the organization.

Another important impediment to the achievement of the objectives of the OAU in Rwanda was the fact that the members of the continental body (the OAU) were not united in their collective effort to end the violence in Rwanda. This non commitment to the Rwanda question ensured that irrespective of the importance of an issue, it always ended up dividing the position of the OAU. It was common to see the OAU sharply divided wherein some Heads of states were supporting the national government of a state in conflict, the other category of these Heads of states might be supporting rebel movement. A classical case in mind is the fact that while countries like Egypt and South Africa supplied arms to the government of Rwanda, Uganda and Zaire gave arms to the RPF (Africa, Rights, 1995). Only

countries like Tanzania, Nigeria and such others were genuinely committed to the search for peace and security in Rwanda.

Even though one of the most committed continental body in the world, the OAU lacked the much need financial support to engage in conflict theatres on the continent. Nowhere was this challenged proved more correctly than in Rwanda during the genocide. This non financial resource support posed one of the greatest threats to the attainment of the OAU objective of ensuring that Arusha pulled through to a logical conclusion. It is important to appreciate the fact that Peace Support Operations (PSO) is a very important but in the same vein very expensive enterprise that cannot be carried out without huge financial backing. The OAU membership has failed in meeting up its financial obligations and this has created a huge financial gap to the already lean purse of the OAU.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1: SUMMARY

Rwanda as a country is bordered by Uganda in the north and in the south, it is bordered by Burundi. Its easternmost border is Tanzania while its western border has Zaire and Lake Kivu. The history of Rwanda reveals a country with different ethnic groups constantly engaged in bitter competition for the control of political and economic power. The most dominant forces in this competition are the Hutus and the Tutsis groups. The Twa, even though the original inhabitants of the county, they are not really visible in this competition except for the fact that they occupy the lowest rung of the social ladder of the Rwandan society.

The history of Rwanda has established that about five hundred years ago, the Hutu ethnic group took over the control of the territory known today as Rwanda from the aboriginal Twa minority group. Some two centuries ago, the Tutsi moved into the same geographical space to gain dominance of the area. Considering the minority status of the Tutsi in relation to the Hutu majority group, historians of the early history of the country are confused with regards how the Tutsi were able to economically and politically overthrow the Hutu. Some are of the view that the Tutsi take-over was a result of diplomatic manoeuvre while others are of the

conviction that this came about as a result of military conquest. However, the thesis of military conquest has no basis in history.

The competition between these established rivals was further worsened by the country's colonial experience of the 19th century. On arrival to the country, the Germans and later the Belgian masters of the region on realizing that the Tutsi were distinctly different in terms of their physical features - tall, sharp featured, pointed nose and generally lanky visage; physical attributes the Tutsi share with Europeans, the Germans and the Belgians decided to patronise the Tutsi in line with the practice of divided and rule. The colonial overlords handed them the political leadership of the country. Thus, for many years, the Tutsi minority enjoyed unfettered control of Rwanda. The situation was so grievous that by the 1957 - at the dawn of national independence, the Hutu majority had 2 (two) representatives in the Supreme Council that had responsibility for the administration of local government while the Tutsi minority occupied 31 positions. It was situations like these that exacerbated the already tense competition between these traditional rivals.

But the worse in the relationship between these groups was to become more entrenched after the attainment of the country independence. On realizing the likelihood of the Belgian authority handing over power to the Hutu Majority, the Tutsi established a political party they christened the 'the Rwandese National

Union' (UNAR) and the Democratic Association of Rwanda (RADER) and started agitating for political independence in the hope that their agitations will make the colonial administration to hand over power to the Tutsi elite. This challenge to the Belgian authority and the decision to cater for its own interest made the Belgians to shift their favour to the Hutus. This change made the colonial government to make the Hutu to form their own political party, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Bahutu PARMEHUTU. With this party, the Belgians moved to crush the national liberation movement.

The history of Tutsi domination of the monarchy during the feudal era up to the influence they enjoyed when the Belgians took control of Rwanda further estranged the Hutu and the Tutsi. It was this scenario and the already worsened bitter rivalry between these groups that gave birth to the constant effort of one group to dislodge the other even in post independence Rwanda. Thus, in November 1959, the first act of Hutu government sponsored "terrorist violence" took place. In less than 15 months, the Tutsi were politically and physically liquidated. Thousands of them were killed as a result of state organized pogroms. Many fled to neighbouring countries. The government executed 23 UNAR members on the grounds that they had plotted against the Hutu government of Gregoire Kayibanda (Orbit Agency, 1981, 581). These series of massacres after massacres continued until the major one in 1994.

The thesis' argues that the violence took place because the OAU failed to do enough to respond to the early warning signals (EWS) received from different sector of the society. However, after a deep study and analysis of the literatures, it has become evident that the OAU did a lot of work to prevent the violence from occurring. Even after the violence had begun, the organization continued to work towards its amicable resolution. It is clear that the OAU intervened to begin a peace process that was favourably disposed to the diplomatic resolution of the violence. The Arusha Accord failed to achieve its objective of restoring peace to Rwanda obviously because none of the parties to the conflict seemed interested in the amicable management of the conflict.

The thesis has shown how the OAU had attempted to bring the challenge to an end through the effort to bring understanding to the belligerents by initiating a power sharing agreement in the occupation of political offices and most importantly the strategic space – the military. The Arusha Accord clearly had the key to the resolution of the genocide. Unfortunately, a combination of forces conspired against this noble cause. Some of these challenges as shown above included the non compromising posture of the elite *Akazu* power formation of the Hutu and the equally non compromising posture of the Rwandan Patriotic Front. This is apart from covert activities of the American CIA and the French secret services that were the real powers behind the Hutu and the Tutsi decision making chambers.

Another approach the argument took is its attempt to contextualize the connection between the international environment and the genocide. In this regard, the thesis has argued that more than the internal dynamics and the historical and cultural complexity of the Rwandan society, another equally potent causal factor is the role that Multinational Corporations (MNCs), the global financial systems and the Western nations, played in the reproduction of a revisionist history and shaping the direction of the socio-economic and political thrust of Central Africa in general and Rwanda in particular; one that worsened Rwanda's already bad social relations.

For example, the work has captured the different shades of opinion by scholars, which have informed contemporary world view regarding different aspects of Rwandan history and culture. This is from Meyer Fortes' perspectives that lend credence to the view of a unique caste existent in Rwanda, to the contrary perspective that rubbishes this assumption. Nzambiwita and other scholars of the genocide paradigm, for instance, have forcefully ascribed the term Hutu and Tutsi to an economic class categorization operating within individual and groups within society. In his effort to establish this historical narrative, they have maintained that in the real sense, Hutu and Tutsi in the Rwandan geographical space do not suggest the 'Hutu ethnic group and the Tutsi ethnic group' as they are generally conceived and propagated in the ethnicity literature of contemporary scholarship.

5.2: CONCLUSION

In conclusion of this thesis, it is imperative to reiterate some of the core issues raised in the discourse. We have made effort to ascertain the role, that is the extent to which the Organization of African Unity have contributed in the mitigation or otherwise in African conflicts. This is with specific reference to the genocide that threatened the stability of the Great Lakes Region. In this respect, it will be germane that the genocide found fertile ground for expression and thrived essentially because the institutions, including the OAU, saddled with the responsibility for managing or even preventing similar violent conflict challenges did not rise to the occasion to meet these expectations. This turned out to be a gross error that led to one of the most gruesome and catastrophic humanitarian disasters of the last -20th-Century. It has been maintained that, if a little effort had been made by the OAU, certainly, the calamity would have been averted. Unfortunately again, the countries comprising the continental body always approach issues that should be of common concern as individuals rather than on a collective basis. This explains the failure encountered in Rwanda.

However, the reason the OAU failed to achieve much in either preventing or mitigating the bloodbath must not be lost on us. This is because a deeper investigation into the event of the genocide easily reveals the sinister machinations of colonial and imperial forces manipulating the African states and their

socioeconomic development. Apart from the insignificant factors of scarce monetary resources and the lack of needed personnel and political will to pull through the process of instituting peace and stability to a beleaguered continent, a major challenge to the security of the continent lies in the interferences of major world powers like the USA, France, Britain and others in African affairs.

For instance despite the available provisions, the UNSC ignored Rwanda. Some of these mechanisms based on International Humanitarian Law (IHL) which includes the following:

- Actions defined by the framework of the United Nations Convention on Genocide
- The threat or occurrence of large-scale loss of life
- Different manifestations of “ethnic cleansing”
- Crimes against humanity and violations of the laws of war and
- Situations of state collapse
- Overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes (More, 2007).

Before bringing the discourse to a close, it is imperative to contextualize the situation that unfolded after the end of the genocide. The best way to achieve this is to situate the effort by the International Community to finally resolve the conflict in the right light. In this vein, it is noteworthy to say that the Security

Council of the UN (the UNSC) in the same year, 1994, constituted the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) with its Headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania. The ICTR began work (investigation) in 1995. The tribunal had jurisdiction over all human rights violations that took place during the period in discourse. The ICTR had the mandate to not only make arrests but also to prosecute any guilty official whether in government bureaucracy or the military that may have fled the scene of the crime after the violence. “It is interesting to note that the ICTR was the first International Court in the world to have convicted a case of rape as crime against humanity and crime of genocide’ (Outreach Programme on the Rwandan Genocide, <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/education/rwandagenocide.shtml>).

Despite the seeming effort of the ICTR, it became evident at a point that the real culprit of the genocide, the RPF was protected from prosecution by the US (Black, 2014: 9).

5.3: RECOMMENDATIONS

In view of the above, the thesis is advancing the following recommendations:

1. For Rwanda to survive the challenge of structural conflicts plaguing it as a country.

2. Furthermore, the government must consider institutionalizing the theory and practice of Transitional Justice System (TJS) to governance. This approach to governance will ensure that aggrieved parties are satisfied through the provision of certain palliatives aimed at achieving this goal.
3. To successfully address the question of the resolution of violent conflicts like the genocide in Rwanda, it is important to factor – in equity, justice and inclusive governance in the distribution of political power and economic resources.
4. The abolition of identity card system defining who a Tutsi or Hutu is by the government should be sustained in order to prevent the tendency towards a re-visitation of acrimonies.
5. The country should create a victims fund that should respond to and pay compensation to those who suffered due to the genocide
6. Space should be deliberately created for people who have fled the country since after independence to come back to their country.
7. Those who perpetrated the genocide must be punished according to the provisions of international humanitarian legal regime.
8. Democracy and the freedom of choice should be encouraged to ensure an inclusive politics devoid of political segregation of minorities. In other

words, minority groups should be protected and given a sense of belonging in the national project.

9. The strengthening of the national military to be able to tackle any rebellious tendency against the state is very crucial. In addition, the military should receive regular trainings on doctrinal issues especially in the areas of patriotism and love for the country over every other interest.
10. Religious and faith based organizations should play a more serious and committed role in uniting the different cultural interests in the country. This will help in harmonizing former adversaries.
11. The current continental body (the AU) should act with promptness and accompanying pro-activeness in responding to the challenge of the poor revenue accruing to it. It is imperative that the AU's weak revenue base should be immediately strengthened to respond to the threats to Africa's security and the wellbeing of its people. If this is achieved, the logistical aspect of peacekeeping operations that is very expensive could be better handled and any previous shortcomings associated with weak finances better managed. Therefore, members must be prevailed on to commit to paying all their dues and pledges.
12. Since the AU already has the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Standby Force (ASF) embedded within its

formational framework, this work will recommend its (the ASFs) immediate take-off and operationalization to tackle the insecurity challenging the continent.

13. In addition, to achieve the above identified solutions, it is important to also consider the empowerment of the Pan African Parliament in a manner that it will be central in taking major decisions concerning matters that cover the security of the states within the union.
14. A national Bureau of information management should be created to ensure that media practitioners adhere to laid down provisions for practising their profession so as to protect the people from the toxic campaign of hate.
15. The international community found culpable in the genocide must own up to their moral responsibility and pay Rwanda and its people indemnities for causing the genocide.
16. The laws by countries and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) for the curtailing of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons must be strengthened and reinforced to ensure compliance

REFERENCES

- Adisa, J. (1996). *The Comfort of Strangers: The Impact of Rwandan Refugees on Neighboring Countries*, Ibadan: Africa Book Builders Ltd.
- African Rights (1995). *RWANDA: Death, Despair and Defiance*, London: Africa Rights Publications.
- Africa Watch (1999). *Rwanda: Talking Peace and Waging War*; Report of the International Commission. New York: Africa Watch.
- Agbu, O. (2000). Human Rights Implications of African Conflicts. In the African Journal of Political Science, vol. 5 No 1.
- Ahmed, M.S. (2010). *Nigeria's Participation in Peacekeeping Operations: Peace Operations Training Institute*
- Ake, C. (1992). what is the Problem of Ethnicity in Africa. Presented as Keynote Address at The Conference on Ethnicity, Society and Conflict in the University of Natal; 14-16 September.
- Alamu, T. (2013). The Colonel in the Heavenly Cockpit. *The Nation on Sunday*, March 10th.
- Alan, J. (1990). *Peace-Keeping in International Politics*. London: Macmillan Press Limited.
- Aliyu, M. (2005). *Crisis and Conflict Management in Nigeria*. In Aliyu, M. (eds), *Conflict Resolution and Management in Nigeria since 1980*. Kaduna: Defense Academy Book Series.
- Anderson B. (1998). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origins and the spread of Nationalism*, London: verso publishing House.
- Andersen, Regine (2000). How multilateral development assistance triggered the conflict in Rwanda. *Third World Quarterly*, 21 (3).
- Asika, N. (2009). *Research Methodology in the Behavioral Sciences*. Ikeja: Longman Nigeria Plc.
- Azar, E.E. (1990). *The Management of Protracted Social Conflicts: Theory and Cases*. Aldershot. Pluto press.

Babalola, Dele (2013). *A Critical Re-Examination of the Ethnic Factor in African Conflicts: Contextualizing the Globalization Phenomenon in the Post Cold War era*. Mombasa: Tinga Press Ltd.

Baer, David (2005). *The Just War Theory of Peacemaking*. In the *Journal of Lutheran Ethics*.

Bakut, T.B (2008). *The Idea of “the People” and the Challenge of Conceiving Citizenship in Nigeria*. In Golwa, JHP and Ojiji, OO. *Dialogue on Citizenship in Nigeria*. Abuja: Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution.

Balakrishna R. (2002). *Locating the Third World in Cultural Geography*. In the *Journal of Third World Legal Studies*. Vol. 15, issue 1.

Balogun S.A. (1980). *History of Islam up to 1800*. In the *Groundwork of Nigerian History*, Ibadan: Heinemann.

Beyene Bezawit (2012). *Ethnicity, Ethnic Conflicts and Secessionism in Ethiopian Politics*. In Darwesh Marwan and Rank Carol (2012). *Peacebuilding and Reconciliation: Contemporary Themes and Challenges*. London: Pluto Press.

Briggs, R.A. (2001). *Geo-strategies in the Great Lakes Region and Spatial Design for Peace*. http://www.cwis.org/hutu3_1.html: Accessed on the 18th June, 2001.

Brown B. (2013). *Leaving the Black Race Behind: No Manufacturing no Prosperity: He Who Does not Recognize He is In a Race is Bound to Lose It*. In the *Nation* on Sunday, June 15th.

Bruno, K. (1946). *Defining Genocide*. In the *American Scholar*. Volume 15 no. 2.

Carrero, J. and Casoliva, J. (2001). *“The African Great Lakes Region: Ten Years of Suffering, Destruction and Death*.

<https://friendsofevil.wordpress.com/.../friends-of-evil-chapter-12-carrero>

Carter, A.B. (1991). *Chairman’s Note*. In the *Journal of International Security*, Vol. 15. No. 3-4.

Check, N.A. (2008). *Myth and Memory: The Construction and Deconstruction of Ethnic Ideology in Post Colonial Rwanda*. In the *Africa Insight* Vol. 37 (4). South Africa: Bhubezi Printing Press.

Chomsky, Noam (1999). *Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order*. New York. Seven Stories Press.

Chua, Amy (2003). *Review of World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability*. Accessed electronically at <http://www.neoeugenics.net/wof.htm>. 8th April, 2016.

Cilliers, J. (2008) *Africa in the New World: How Global and Domestic Developments Will Impact by 2025*.

Clarke, J.N. (2001). *A Pragmatic Approach to Humanitarian Intervention*. In the *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*. Available at www.jha.ac/articles/a146.pdf. accessed 8 May 2007.

Cohen, A. (1974). *Custom and Politics in Urban Africa*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Deng, M.F. (1991). *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, Washington: The Brookings Institutions.

Destexhe, A. (1995). *Rwanda and genocide in the twentieth century*, London: Pluto Press.

Dougherty, J.E. and pfalzgraff, R. A. (1996). *Contending Theories of International Relations*, 4th Edition. New York: Longman.

Dunmoye, R.A. (2001). *Nigeria and the Transition from the O.A.U to the African Union*. In the *African Union and the Challenges of Cooperation and Integration* Abuja: M.C.I.A.

Durch, W.J. (1993). *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*. New York: St Martin Press.

Ebo, F.A. (1994). *Collective Security as Selective Security: The Dilemma of the U.N. in a New World Order*. In the *ECPER Journal*, Vol. II No. 2.

Ezeani, E (2013). *In Biafra Africa Died: The Diplomatic Plot*. London: Veritas Lumen Publishers.

Findlay, Trevor (1994). *Multilateral Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution: In the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)*: Oxford University Press.

Fried, J.H.E. (1971). International Law-Neither Orphan nor Harlot, Neither Jailer nor Never-Land. In Karl W.D. and Stanley H. (Eds) the Relevance of International Law, New York: Garden City.

Fukuyama, F. (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. London: Penguin Group.

Fung, I.R. (1996). Security Strategies in Africa: Why Peace-Keeping? In Voght, M.A. and Aminu, L.S. (eds) Peace-Keeping as a Security Strategy in Africa: Chad and Liberia as Case Studies. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Company.

Gallie, W.B. (1969). Philosophy and the Historical Understanding, 2nd Edition, New York: Schocken Publishers.

Gregory H. Stanton (2009). The Rwandan Genocide: Why Early Warning Failed. In the Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Studies, Volume 1, Number 2.

Groom A.J.R & Margot L. (1994). Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory, London: Pinter Publishers.

Gurr, T.R. (1994). Peoples Against States: Ethno-political Conflicts and a Changing World System” International Studies Quarterly 38, September.

Hobbes, T. (1861) Leviathan. Glasgow: Fontana

Hollis, Martins and Smith, Steve (1990) Explaining and Understanding International Relations Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hintjens, Helen (2001). When identity becomes a knife: Reflecting on the genocide in Rwanda. *Ethnicities*, 1 (1), pp. 25–55.

Haas, E.B. (1986). Why we still need the United Nations: The collective Management of International Conflict, 1945-1984. Berkely: University of California.

Hobbes, T. (1861). Leviathan. Glasgow: Fontana press.

Hollis and Smith (1990). Explaining and Understanding International Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Human Rights Watch (1999). The Rwandan Patriotic Front (HRW Report - Leave None to ... <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-03.htm>. accessed electronically on 29th April, 2016

Huntington S. (1993). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking Of World Order*, London: Simon & Schuster.

Human Rights Watch (1994). *Arms Project*. London: HRW Publications

Ikoku, E.A.U., (1976). *African Development with a Human Face*, London: Africa Books.

Imobighe T.A. (1996). *Nigeria and Collective Defense in Africa*' In Imobighe T.A. (Ed) *Nigeria's Foreign Policy in the Eighties*, Ibadan: Vintage Publishers.

Ingiriis, M. H. (2016). *Somalia and Rwanda: The Psychology and Philosophy of African Conflicts*. In *Conflict Studies Quarterly Issue 14*.

Jim G. (1994). *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations*, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Kamani, M.J. (2015). *Protection of civilians in disarmament initiative within the context of the African Standby force (ASF)*. In the *African AMANI Journal*. Vol 1, 2.

Kapil, R.L. (1966). *On the Conflict Potential of Inherited Boundaries in Africa*. In the *Journal of World Politics* Vol. XVIII, No 4.

Kegley, C. & Wittkopf, R.(1995). *World Politics, Trend and Transformation*. London: Macmillan Press.

Kingdom, D. and Nnabuike C.A. (2013). *The Igbo Nation and the Struggle for Political Relevance in Nigeria*. In the *Journal of Nigerian Political Economy*, Vol. 2. Number 1&2.

Kolade, O.C. (2015). *Battles and the Voice of the Nigerian Military*. Abuja: Yaliam Press Limited.

Kum, J.L. (1996). *ECOMOG as A Catalyst for OAU Defense Force*, Abuja: National War College.

Kuperman, Alan (2004). *Provoking genocide: A revised history of the Rwandan Patriotic Front*. *Journal of Genocide Research*, 6 (1), pp. 61–84.

Lemarchand, Rene (2006). Consociationalism and power sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *African Affairs*, 106 (422), pp. 1–20.

Ludlow D.R.L. (1999). Humanitarian Intervention and the Rwandan Genocide. *The Journal of Conflict Studies*. Vol. 19 no 3.

Mamdani, M. (2000). African States: Citizenship and War: A Case Study. Delivered to the Annual Workshop of the Ugandan Parliament, held at the International Conference Centre, Kampala, August 25th.

Mamdani, M. (2001). Making Sense of Non-Revolutionary Violence: Some Lessons from the Rwandan Genocide. Being a Text at the Frantz Fanon Lecture Delivered at University of Durban, Westville, August 8th.

Mamdani, Mahmood (2001). *When victims become killers: Colonialism, nativism and the genocide in Rwanda*. Oxford: James Currey.

Mitchell C.R. (1985). Conflict, War and Conflict Management. In Light, M. and Groom, AJR (Eds) *International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory*. London: Pinter Publishers.

Morgenthau, H. J. (1985). *Politics among Nations*. New York: Knopf

Morley, R (2016). How Much Radicalism is in the Muslim Community? In the *Philadelphia Trumpet* Vol. 27. No 2.

Mbugua, K. J. (2014). The Changing Nature of Peace Keeping in Africa: International Peace Support Training Centre. In the *Africa Amani Journal*. Nairobi: International Peace Support Training Centre.

Melvorn, Linda 2000. *A people betrayed: The role of the West in Rwanda's genocide*. London and New York: Zed Books.

Meredith, M. (2005). *The States of Africa: History of the Continent since Independence*, United Kingdom: The Free Press Printers.

Mitchell C.R. (1985). Conflict, War and Conflict Management. In Light, M. and Groom, AJR (Eds) International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory. London: Pinter Publishers.

Moodley, Vadi, Alphonse Gahima and Suveshnee Munien 2010. Environmental causes and impacts of the genocide in Rwanda: Case studies of the towns of Butare and Cyangugu. African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 10 (2).

Mullen, Joseph (1995). From colony to nation: The implosion of ethnic tolerance in Rwanda. In: Igwara, Obi ed. Ethnic hatred: Genocide in Rwanda. London: the London Association (LA) for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism.

More, E. (2007). International Humanitarian Law and Interventions—Rwanda, 1994. In Genocide Studies and Prevention Vol. 2 Iss 2.

Nigeria Research Network (2012) Report of Conference on Interfaith Relations in Northern Nigeria: From Research to Policy and Practice, Abuja: Oxford Department of International Development.

Nkrumah, K. (1970) Africa Must Unite, United Kingdom: Panaf Books Ltd.
Woronoff, J. (1970). The Organizing of African Unity. New Jersey: Scarecrow Press.

Nnoli, O. (1998). Ethnic Conflict Management in Africa. Being a Paper Presented at the Scientific Seminar on Les Techniques Constitutionnelles Et Institutionnelles De Cohabitation Democratique Et La Gestions De Conflits Ethniques. Switzerland-- 9-12 March.

Obasi, I. N. (1999) Research Methodology in Political Science, Enugu: Academic Publishing Company.

Obiora C.O. (2011). International Law and the Challenges of Socio-Cultural Fragmentation in Post-Colonial African States such as Nigeria: Normative Frameworks, State-Building Praxis, and the Way Forward. Presented at the Quarterly Public Lecture of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja, Nigeria on the 29th March.

Ojo (1980). Public Administration in Africa: Seperate Area of Sub-Discipline? In Barongo Yolamu. Political Science in Africa: A Critical Review. United Kingdom: Pitman Press.

Orbit Agency (1981). The Non Aligned Countries. London: Orbit Press Agency.

Organization of African Unity Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), Human Rights Library, University of Minnesota, USA.

Ostien, Philip(2009). Jonah Jang and the Jasawa: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Nigeria. In *Muslim-Christian Relations in Africa* www.sharia-in-africa.net/pages/publications.php August.

Oxfam Report (2011). Land and Power: The growing scandal surrounding the new wave of investments in land, United Kingdom: Oxfam Publications.

Paige, G.D. (2009). Nonkilling Global Political Science, USA: Centre for Global Nonkilling, Xlibris Corporation

Paul Magnarella (2001).Explaining Rwanda's 1994 Genocide; A review of

Obiozor, G. (2004). Nigerian Foreign Policy and the Challenges of Unipolarity. In Akinterinwa, B. (eds.) Nigeria's Foreign Policy Thrust: Essays in Honour of Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, Ibadan: Vintage Publishers.

Pritchard, E. and Fortes, M. (1940). African Political Systems, London: Oxford University Press

Prunier, Gerard (1995). The Rwanda crisis 1959–1994: History of genocide. London, Hurst and Company.

Prunier, Gerard (2009). From genocide to continental war: The 'Congolese' conflict and the crisis of contemporary Africa. London, Hurst and Company.

Puddephatt, Andrew (2006) Voices of War: Conflict and the Role of the Media. Accessed electronically @ www.media.support.org/wp-content/.../ims-voices-of-war-2006.pdf. Accessed on January, 8th, 2015.

Rajagopal B. (2000). Locating the Third World in Cultural Geography Third World Legal Studies. Volume 15, Issue 1.

Richardson, R.L. (1951). Could an Arms Race End Without Fighting? In *Nature* Vol. 168 No. 12.

Robinson, Peter and Golriz Ghahraman 2008. Can Rwandan President Kagame be held responsible for the killing of President Habyarimana? *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 6 (5).

Rodney, W. (1976). *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Dar-es-salaam: Tanzania Publishing House.

Rueck A.V.S. (1985: 113). Power, Influence and Authority. In Light, M. and Sanda, J. (2004). *Peace Making in Nigeria's Foreign Policy*. In Akinterinwa, B. (eds.) *Nigeria's Foreign Policy Thrust: Essays in Honour of Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji*, Ibadan: Vintage Publishers.

Sanders, Edith (1969). The Hamitic Hypothesis: its Origins and Functions in Time Perspective, *Journal of African History*. Vol 10.

Schirch, L. (2004). *The Little Book of Strategic Peacebuilding: A Vision and Framework for Peace with Justice*. USA: Good Books Publishers.

Seligman, C.G. (1930). *The Races of Africa*. London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd. .

Smith, A. (1978). The Legend of the Seifuwa: A Study in the Origins of a Legend of Origin. In Bala Usman and Nur Alkali (eds), *Studies in the History of Pre-Colonial Borno*, Zaria: The Northern Nigerian Publishing Co. Ltd.

Stedman, John 1997. Spoiler problems in peace processes. *International Security*, 22 (2), pp. 5–53.

Stettenheim, Joel 2002. The Arusha Accords and the failure of international intervention in Rwanda. In: Greenberg, Melanie, John Barton and Margaret McGuinness eds. *Words over war: Mediation and arbitration to prevent deadly conflict*. New York, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.

Storey, Andy (2012). Structural violence and the struggle for state power in Rwanda: What Arusha got wrong. In the *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 12 (3).

Takeuchi, Shinichi 2000. Hutu and Tutsi: A note on group formation in pre-colonial Rwanda. In: Goyvaerts, Didier ed. *Conflict and ethnicity in Central*

Africa, pp. 177–208. Tokyo, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia.

Tandon, Y. (1999). *Root Causes of Peacelessness and Approaches to Peace in Africa*, Durban: Kelve press.

Thomson, A. (2007). *The Media and the Rwandan Genocide*. London: Pluto Press

UN Convention on Genocide, (1951). United Nations, document A/64/Add. 1. 31 January 1947)

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly Resolution 217(III), UN Doc. A/810 (10 December 1948), <http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm> (accessed 8 May 2007); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm (accessed 8 May 2007).

UHCR (1998). *A Re-examination of the Genocide Question*. Dresden: Pixtoria Press. Umoden, G.E. (1997). *Brief History of the Liberian crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peacekeeping*, Lagos: Gabuno Publishing Company Ltd.

Usman Y.B. *History and the Challenges to the Peoples and Politics of Africa In The 21st Century: A paper presented at the Dike Memorial Lecture, 44th at the Historical Society of Nigeria Conference in the University of Abuja, Nigeria.*

USIP (2008). *Abrahamic Alternatives to War: Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Perspectives on Just Peacemaking*. Accessed electronically at <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr214.html>. 8th April, 2016.

Uvin, Peter (1998). *Aiding violence: The development enterprise in Rwanda*. West Harford: C.T. Kumarain.

Van Hoyweghen, Saskia (2000). *From human(itarian) disaster to development success? The case of Rwanda*. Consortium for Political Emergencies (COPE) Working Paper No. 18, Centre for Development Studies, University of Leeds.

Waltz, K.N (1979). *Theory of International Politics*, New York: McGraw Hill Publishing Company.

Waltz, K. N. (1971). *The Stability of a Bi-Polar World*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Woodward, David (1996). *The IMF, the World Bank and economic policy in Rwanda: Economic, social and political implications*. Oxford: Report for Oxfam.

World Bank 1994. *Rwanda: Poverty reduction and sustainable growth*. Washington, D.C., Report No. 12465-RW.

Wittkopf R. E. and Kegley, W.C. (1995). *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* fifth Edition, London: Macmillan press.

Online Publications

Black, A.C. (2014). Who was behind the 1994 Rwanda Genocide? Accessed electronically at <http://www.globalresearch.ca/who-was-behind-the-1994-rwanda-genocide/5406344>. 1st June, 2016

Cecil, I. (2006). *The Role of Nigeria in Peace Building, Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960*. Available at: <http://www.academia.edu/>

Doyle, M. (2015). Mbaye, the Forgotten Hero of Rwanda www.internationalpolicydigest.org/.../captain-mbaye-diagne-un-forgotten-hero/. Accessed on the 17th May, 2015.

Gourevitch, Philip (1995). 'We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families'. In the *New Yorker*. www.newyorker.com/.../letter-from-the-archive-the-genocide-in-rwanda. Accessed on 27th September, 2014.

Lund, A. *the Genocide in Rwanda and the Conflict in Kosovo* accessed electronically at www.usip.org/training/online).

Maritz, MK (1998). *The Rwandan Genocide and its Implications*. www.e-ir.info/.../rwandan-genocide).

nigeriainpeacebuilding.org/resources. Accessed on 30th July, 2015.

UN Publications. What is Peacekeeping? Available at <http://www.un.org/en/>

USIP (1999). Genocides in Human History: A Reflection. www.usip.org/ng/training/online Accessed on the 21st march, 2012.

White, M. (2013). Atrocitology: Humanity's 100 Deadliest Achievements. In <http://www.dltobez.biz/ebooks/110556-AtrocitologyHumanitys-100-Deadliest-Achievements.html>. Accessed; 22nd April, 2014.

Rwanda and Poverty: Building an Equitable Society (2013). Accessed electronically at <http://web.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/topics/extpoverty>. Rwanda Poverty Note: Rebuilding an Equitable Society – Poverty and the Poverty Reduction after the genocide.

Outreach Programme on the Rwandan Genocide. Accessed electronically at <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/education/rwandagenocide.shtml>. 1st June, 2016.

<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR47/007/2004/en/53d74ceb-d5f7-11dd-bb24-1fb85fe8fa05/afr470072004en.pdf> page.

Appendix I

RELEVANT TREATIES/PROTOCOLS OF THE OAU CHARTER

Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty)
Adopted on 3 June 1991, entered into force on 12 May 1994. South Africa signed the treaty on 10 October 1997 and Parliament ratified it on 2 November 2000. The Instrument of Ratification was signed on 2 February 2001.

The constitutive Act of the African Union opened for signature on 11 July 2000 at the OAU/AEC Summit in Lome.

General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organisation of African Unity Adopted on 25 October 1965, entered into force on 25 October 1965.

Additional Protocol on the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organisation of African Unity Adopted in June 1980. Not yet entered into force.

Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism Adopted on 13 July 1999, not yet entered into force.

African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child Adopted on 11 July 1990, not yet entered into force.

African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights Adopted on 27 June 1981, entered into force on 21 October 1986.

Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights Adopted on 10 June 1998, not yet entered into force. Signed by South Africa on 9 June 1998. African Nuclear Weapons Free-Zone Treaty (The Treaty of Pelindaba) Opened for signature on 11 April 1996, not yet entered into force.

African Maritime Transport Charter Adopted on 15 December 1995, not yet entered into force.

Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa Adopted in January 1991, entered into force on 22 April 1998.

Agreement for the Establishment of the African Rehabilitation Institute (ARI) Adopted in June 1981, amended agreement adopted on 30 October 1989, entered into force on 2 December 1991.

Convention for the Establishment of the African Centre for Fertiliser Development Adopted in February 1981, not yet entered into force.

Pan-African Postal Union Convention Signed on 17 January 1980, entered into force on 1 July 1980. South Africa acceded to the PAPU Convention on 23 February 1999 and deposited its Instrument of Accession on 12 April 1999.

Pan African Telecommunications Union Convention Signed on 7 December 1977. South Africa deposited its instrument of accession to the PATU Convention on 30 June 1999.

Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa Adopted on 3 July 1977, entered into force on 22 April 1985.

Cultural Charter for Africa Adopted on 5 July 1976, entered into force on 19 September 1990.

Inter-African Convention establishing an African Technical Co-operation Programme Adopted on 1 August 1975, not yet entered into force.

Constitution of the Association of African Trade Promotion Organisations Adopted on 18 January 1974, not yet entered into force.

Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa Adopted on 10 September 1969, entered into force on 20 June 1974. South Africa ratified the convention on 15 December 1995 and deposited its Instrument of Ratification on 15 January 1996.

Constitution of the African Civil Aviation Commission Signed on 17 January 1969, entered into force on 15 March 1972. South Africa ratified the constitution on 17 January 1996 and deposited its Instrument of Ratification on 8 March 1996.

African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Algiers Convention) Signed on 15 September 1968, entered into force on 16 June 1969.

Photo-Sanitary Convention for Africa
Adopted on 13

(Organization of African Unity (OAU) / African Union (AU); international relations and cooperation, South Africa.