

**EVALUATION OF KADUNA STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY OVERSIGHT
FUNCTION:
A CASE STUDY OF EDUCATION, WORK AND HEALTH COMMITTEES 2011-2015**

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this work is the product of my own research efforts, undertaken under the supervision of Dr. Tafida lawal and Dr. Jacob Audu. The work has not been presented elsewhere for the award of a degree or certificate. All sources have been duly acknowledged.

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CERTIFICATION

This dissertation entitled “Evaluation Of Kaduna State House Of Assembly Oversight Function: A Case Study of the State House of Assembly, 2011-2015 by MUSA Hassan Jamila (P14SSPS8013) meet the regulation governing the award of M.sc Political Science of Post Graduate School, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

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This dissertation is dedicated to Allah (S.W.T), my parents, husband and my children.

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In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. All praises be to Allah for giving me the health and intellect to witness the actualization of this research work. I wish to render my humble salutations to the noble Prophet, Muhammad (S.A.W), members of his household, companions and to all those that follow their footsteps for their spiritual guidance.

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ABSTRACT

This study evaluates the Kaduna State House of Assembly oversight Functions of Education, Work and Health Committees from 2011-2015. The objectives intended to achieve include examining the extent to which legislative oversight function improved the efficiency of the government operation in Kaduna State; examining the extent to which Kaduna State House of Assembly legislative oversight function reduces to a large possible extent government waste and poor administration in the execution of government policies and programmes, and finally to examining the extent in which the legislative oversight function improve the performance of Ministries, Department and Agencies in Kaduna State. Relevant data were collected using interview and personal observation instruments. Purposive sampling technique was used to collect the data from the Kaduna State House of Assembly Committee Members, Ministries officials and head of MDAs. For the interview, questionnaires were administered to the members of the Kaduna State House of Assembly particularly membership to the house committees on education, works and health. The submissions of the members were manipulated by the data collected from the ministry officials' ministries of health, education and works as well as head of MDAs of the respective ministries largely to ascertain the reliability and the consistency of the data collected from the members. The study employed structural functional theory as postulated by Gabriel Almond and J.S Coleman (1960) which was fundamentally built on the assumption that every unit in a political system regardless of the type of the political system must perform a specific task in order to make the entire system work or function for the common good of all in the system. The study found among other things that the Kaduna State House committees on Education, Health and works pay regular legislative oversight visit to headquarter of their respective ministries devoid of the MDAs under the respective ministries. The visit emphasize on three fundamental issues; monitoring of budget implementation and budget defense; invitation for public or investigative hearing as well as engaging the top ministry official in interactive session. The study recommended that members of Kaduna State House of Assembly should always endeavor to visit ministries, departments and parastatals in order to ensure all the government policies and laws are well executed without hitches and within the limit of law.

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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The role of the legislators varies from one country to another and also from one system to another. Most importantly, the legislators irrespective of their names or place, provide a link between government and the people. The role of the legislators in policy making, at the Federal level, is primarily to collate the views, interests, demands and problems of their constituents, harmonize and translate them to policy proposal for legislature. Such proposals are subject to the entire legislative processes after which it is presented to the president for ascent. It is also obvious, that for democracy to grow, for the well-being of all, especially in the heterogeneous societies, there must be division of political responsibilities among policy makers which is geared toward effective formulation and execution of government policies and programmes. For instance, if only individual or arm of government constitutionally allowed and legally endorsed to exist, there could be possible trend for growing of the dictatorial or tyrannical tendency or gross abuse of power among the political class in the system. To avoid this however, there must be strong established institution that is set aside to check the growing power and unpopularity of the few for the common good of all. Akintola, (1999) fundamentally argued that the legislative oversight function of the legislature helps essentially for executives and their subsidiaries to remain on their feet by making sure everything is run well. Thus, the oversight function of legislative arm of government hence is necessary in the interest of good governance, social justice, accountability and transparency (ibid).

The legislators are meant to be the middle men between the government and the public. Their roles are central in policy making process as they hold the government accountable in whatever decisions they make. This is the oversight function which they play which is so useful to

government actions. They operate in a democratic system to make policies on national economy such as policy on education, housing, agriculture and security. They conduct “check and balance” function through which they ensure that programs and policies of government are carried out legally, effectively and timely for the purpose they were intended. For example, they hire the policy actors together and ensure they conduct their duties responsibly. At the stage of the policy design, the goals, priorities, options, costs and benefits of each option, externalities of each option are all discussed and analyzed. It entails identifying those who will be involved in the formulation of the policy, those that will be involved in the agenda setting of the policy, the participants in the adoption of the policy and those who will eventually implement the policy. The participation of all stakeholders in the policy process will determine the outcome of the policy

It is rather unfortunate to say that, in the recent past, the Kaduna State House of Assembly members were seriously accused of tribal and religious loyalty, collection of bribe from executive arm of government, gross incapacitation to perform their respected constitutional duties, personal ambition of the legislature, executive interference in legislative works, inexperience and lack of clear knowledge about legislative work and the politics of godfatherism (Muhammad, 2004). These challenges may in one way or the other affect the performance of Kaduna State legislative members to perform their duties of oversight function within the purview of law. It is against this background that, since May 2011, the education and health sectors have experienced disruption as a result of regular failure to release funds, confused priorities. Although the State Government claim to have spent billions of naira on the education and health sectors but there was no evidence on this, and there is still the predominance of dilapidated structure at all levels. Muhammad (2004) argues that “Kaduna State Government

claim to have spent the sum of ₦8788 million on capital project in education and health sectors in 2000 and 2001 respectively. But one can hardly see the impact of this expenditure because they are not visible for everybody to see.”

Furthermore, in Kaduna state, the composition of State House of Assembly from 2011-2015 was capable of making the executives and other government functionaries to remain on their feet for good governance. This is due to the fact that the then opposition party, CPC has 14 out of 32 members, a number that prevent the then ruling PDP to have comfortable majority to do without the input of Congress for Progressive Change (CPC). This according to Rufai (2014) could provide room for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of governmental operations; evaluate programmes and performance of MDAs; detect and prevent poor administration, waste, abuse, arbitrary and capricious behaviors or illegal and unconstitutional conduct; inform the general public and ensure that executive policies reflect the public interest; this composition with reasonable number of opposition gather information to develop new legislative proposals or to amend existing statutes legislatures can ensure greater accountability and transparency in issues of implementing national or public policies as this is in line with their three main functions which are – legislative oversight, representation and investigation. However, the focus of this study is on the performance of oversight functions by the legislators in the areas of education, health and works with empirical focus of Kaduna State house of Assembly.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Legislators oversee government affairs, making sure of the compliance of all agencies and the executive in accordance with the constitutional directives that will lead to successful implementation of all policies. There is a growing pessimism about the effectiveness of public policies in many of the African nations as most of the policies have not translated into progress

as these countries including Nigeria is faced with myriad of problems such as insecurity, poverty, unemployment, low standard of living among others. According to Ugwuanyi and Chukwuemeka (2013), over the years, Nigeria has formulated policies that appear to be brilliant on paper, however, the implementation had failed to redress the problems they set out to solve, serving as evidence of problem in the process. According to National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of February 2018, 33.3% of people in Nigeria are living under severe poverty while 52.0% are in poverty category as at late 2017. In addition, the unemployment rate increased to 18.80% in the third quarter of 2017 from 16.20% in the second quarter of 2017.

However, one can say it without fear of contradiction that lack of effective legislative oversight by the legislature may hamper the effective administration of democracy living the three arms of government in a perpetual disorganization, fight or disharmony. This is as a result of attempt by the executive arm of government to corrupt the legislative member to perform their constitutional role of legislative oversight function. It is against this background that this study examined the legislative oversight role of exposing inefficiency in government operation of Kaduna State House of Assembly committees of health, education and work.

1.3 Research Questions

From the above stated problem, the following questions then arise

- i. To what extent does the legislative oversight function improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the government operation in Kaduna State from 2011 to 2015?
- ii. How does the Kaduna State House of Assembly oversight function reduce government waste and poor administration in the execution of government policies and programmes?

- iii. To what extent does the legislative oversight function improve the performance of Ministries, Department and Agencies in Kaduna State from 2011 to 2015?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The broad objective of the study is to evaluate the performance of Kaduna State House of Assembly in the discharge of their legislative oversight function during the period of 2011 to 2015. Specifically the study was set to achieve the following objectives:

- i. To examine the extent to which legislative oversight function improved the efficiency of the government operation in Kaduna State from 2011 to 2015.
- ii. To ascertain the extent to which Kaduna State House of Assembly legislative oversight function reduces to a large possible extent government waste and poor administration in the execution of government policies and programmes.
- iii. To find out the extent to which the legislative oversight function improve the performance of Ministries, Department and Agencies in Kaduna State from 2011 to 2015.

1.5 Assumptions of the Study

The study was guided by the following assumptions

- i. That oversight legislative function is an effective instrument in checkmating the excessiveness of executive branch of government for good governance in Kaduna State.
- ii. That oversight legislative function improved the effective performance of the government in Kaduna State from 2011 to 2015.

iii. That Bribery and corruption hindered the effective legislative oversight function of the State House Assembly in Kaduna State

1.6 Significance of the Study

It is clear that a lot of literature have existed on the role of the legislature in promoting the overall interest of the general public, particularly at the national level. Similarly, empirical researches have been conducted by the scholars about the problems and limitations of the legislature in Nigeria and other developing worlds in Africa and beyond especially in law making process and representation of the interest of their constituents. But there is insufficient literature particularly empirical works that discuss the legislative oversight function in the state House of assemblies with the significant number of opposition members as in Kaduna State from 2011 to 2015. In particular, there is no empirical study conducted to investigate the role of legislative oversight function of the Kaduna State House of Assembly with empirical focus on Kaduna State House of Assembly committees on education, health and work which was largely to ascertain whether or not the oversight function is instrumental in the efficient running of government business. Thus, the significance of this study is to bridge the existing gap by empirically studying the legislative oversight function of Kaduna State House of Assembly with special focus on the House Committees on education, work and health and how this provide room for efficient running of the government activities in Kaduna State.

1.7 Scope and Limitation of the Study

The scope of this study is Kaduna State House of Assembly oversight function with special focus on Kaduna State House of Assembly Committees on education, works and health; aimed at improving efficiency and effectiveness in the formulation and implementation of government policies and programmes. The choice of the study area is justifiable, as Kaduna State being the

administrative centre of the North. Furthermore the heterogeneous nature of the State makes the findings of the study interesting, because it could possibly be applied to the entire Federation of Nigeria. The choice of the time is also justified, that is 2011 to 2015, being the period in which the opposition party of Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) got significant number of seats in Kaduna State House of Assembly. For the collection of the primary data, the researcher found it extremely difficult, as some of the government functionaries wanted to deny correct information to the researcher. This challenge was overcome when the researcher promised that, their identities will not be disclosed for whatever reason. Another limitation was the financial constraint which was why the study is restricted within Kaduna State of Nigeria.

1.8 Operational Definition of Key Concepts

In this section, the study provides the operational definition of some key concepts which includes; the concept of democracy, governance, and legislative oversight.

1.8.1 Democracy

Democracy is a complex and multidimensional concept. Therefore, there is no universal definition of the concept. However, attempt was made to define democracy in a way that it would suit the need of the study. In this study, democracy has been defined within the context of representation and accountability. The connection between democracy and representation is that under democracy governments are representative because they are elected: if elections are freely contested, if participation is widespread, and if citizens enjoy political liberties, then governments will act in the best interest of the people. In terms of accountability, elections serve to hold government responsible for the results of their past actions. This is because they anticipate the judgment of voters, governments are induced to choose policies that in their judgment will be positively evaluated by citizens at the time of the next election.

1.8.2 Governance

Governance refers to all process of governing, whether undertaken by a government, market or network, whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal organization or territory, and whether through laws, norms or language. Generally, governance can be defined as the exercise of authority, control, management, power of government. However, in this study governance is defined from the point of view of World Bank as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development. The Bank's concern with sound development management thus extends beyond building the capacity of public sector management to encouraging the formation of the rules and institutions which provide a predictable and transparent framework for the conduct of public and private business and to promoting accountability for economic and financial performance.

1.8.3 Legislative Oversight

Legislature is one of the three branches of government together with the Executive and the Judiciary. In modern democracy, the legislative branch is charge primarily for making laws, among other functions. Therefore, legislative oversight refers to the review and evaluation of selected activities, services, operations and the general performance of the executive branch of government by the legislature.

1.9 Organization of Chapters

The study is divided into five chapters. Chapter one is the general introduction which contains the general introduction, statement of the research problem, objectives of the study, significance of the study, scope and limitations of the study and definition of key concepts. Chapter two is the literature review which contains the conceptual literature, empirical literature and theoretical framework. Chapter three is the methodology which contains description of the methods used to

conduct the study. Chapter four is the presentation and analysis of the result; and finally chapter five contains the summary, conclusion and recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

In this section, the study reviewed the concepts of democracy and legislature and their historical origin. Democracy as a modern system of governance has been premised within the federal system. Legislature and its various functions, types and roles in democratic government have been discussed. Similarly, Locke and Montesquieu's theories of separation of power were employed as the theoretical framework for the study.

2.1.1 Concepts of Democracy

Democracy, governance and, the horizontal organs of government -Executive, Legislature and, Judiciary are the core concepts in this study. Thus, this section deals with the discourses of the concepts as the foundation of its analysis. This analytical orientation is compelled by the fact that the existential wherewithal of the legislature and its functionaries – the legislators which forms the focus of our thinking vis-à-vis the democratic governance process can only be meaningfully analyzed within the parameters of these conceptual pillars all of which have deep-seated historical roots.

The concept of democracy on its own has generated a lot of controversies, analytical disputations, ideological and philosophical camps. These have largely been engendered by the various scholastic and research attentions that have been focused on it in the course of pedagogical processes; concerns and determination to identify with clear precision the place of all political animals within the state and its various political terrains that have over the years concerned themselves with the determinism involved the dispensation and allocations of the scarce critical societal resources to the people. The various views though, not definitions on the

concept clearly drive home the complexities which have attended the efforts to find a mutually or universally acceptable conceptual unanimity on its subject matter over the years.

Democracy as a form of political organization, like other concepts of its caliber has not been easy to define without ideological equivocation (Akindele and Obiyan; 1996, Akindele and Olaopa; 1997, Akindele, 1995b; Akindele and Ajila, 1992; Akindele, 1992 and Akindele, 1993; Sunday., 2012). This notwithstanding however, from a concrete perusal of the tomes that have been written on it by scholars of repute, it is clear without equivocation that democracy had its first appearance in the fifth century B.C. This followed its coinage by the great historian-Herodotus. This historical initial effort catalyzed the genesis of democratic ideas in antiquity (Akindele, 1987). Democratic ideas in antiquity combined two Greek words, "demo", meaning people and "Kratein" meaning the rule. Thus, the original meaning of democracy was the "rule of (by) the people". At this time, Herodotus included among its specific features, "equality before the law and popular deliberations" (Akindele, 1987; Sunday, 2012). Greek discussion of democracy was followed by Rome's contribution to democratic ideas and government in antiquity. The hallmark of this contribution was Rome's development of the "idea of constitutionalism" and her emphasis on laws as the system of norms binding on both the "rulers" and "ruled").

However, the civilization of antiquity collapsed after a while. This collapse and the then increasing predominance of religion over all aspects of life led to the evolution of medieval democratic ideas. The medieval period was followed by the Renaissance which furthered optimism with regards to the future of man through its emphasis on the emancipation of man from medieval ties. The core of the renaissance was the discovery of man and the emphasis on individual self-expression, self-realization, glory and fame. After the renaissance era came the

17th and 18th centuries when John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau in addition to Thomas Hobbes popularized the concept of the "Social Contract which may be said to be the most rational of all the theories about the democratic origin of states and civil government (Khan 1972, Akindele, Obiyan, and Owoeye, 1998, Akindele, Obiyan, Owoeye, 2000; Akindele 2002; Sunday, Oluwatobi, and Oluwakemi, 2012).

In addition to Hobbes and Rousseau, John Locke also theorized about the concept of social contract. However, unlike Rousseau's views of the individual's incapability, John Locke believed that life in the state of nature was pleasant, but men were hampered by the absence of any socially recognized authority to adjudicate and settle disputes and conflicts between them hence the need for democratic government. As for John Stuart Mills, he believed in the welfare of the individual, as well as individual liberties. In his writings on democracy and liberty, he maintained that the only way power can be, or, should be exercised over any member in the society against his will, is when it can be established that, such individual intends to injure, or, do harm to other. He further emphasized the notion of liberty within the framework of representative government. Representative democracy has also been variously defined. In his book, Democracy, Burns (1935) defined representative democracy as a system whereby "all people elected a few to do for them what they could not do together". On the same token, John Stuart Mill concentrated a significant portion of his writing on representative democracy. While accepting the desirability of equal participation by everybody in the affairs of the government, he nevertheless claims that, it cannot be realized. Instead, he argued that representative government is the perfect form of government (Mill, 1962; Sunday, Oluwatobi, and Oluwakemi, 2012). However, Mill further argued that, for representative government to be democratic, it must be

accompanied by universal adult suffrage, free elections, short terms of office and individual liberty. Without these things, any government will, in Mill's view, cease to be democratic.

Contemporarily, and, in line with the “fight against system of economic exploitation, political repression, cultural oppression” and, their accompanying “moral, political, economic and social decay” (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2001; Sunday, Oluwatobi, and Oluwakemi., 2012), other scholars have increasingly paid attention to the issue of democracy and its propensity for good governance (Ade-Ajayi, 1982; Nzongola-Ntalaja and Lee, 1977; Omoruyi, 1993; Held, 1987; Olowu, Soremekun and Williams, 1995; Olowu, Williams and Soremekun, 1999; Wunsch and Olowu, 1990; Sartori, 1987; Olowu, 1995; Joseph, 1987, Chabal, 1992; Hyden, 1980, 1999; Hyden and Bratton, 1992; Olowu and Erero, 1997; Akindele and Ajila 1992, 1995, Akindele and Obiyan, 1996, Akindele and Olaopa, 1997, Enyinla, 1998; Bello-Imam, 1997; Obadan, 1998, Akindele, 1998, Peter Anyang Nyong, 1987; Sunday, Oluwatobi, and Oluwakemi, 2012). In fact, this explains why Olowu (1995) once opined that “democracy constitutes both the main buzzword and activity of these times” in most polities of the world.

According to Sunday, Oluwatobi, and Oluwakemi (2012) “democracy is a universal form of rule” which, even though, “may have variable manifestations in different historical and social settings”, have such manifestations tied together by a common thread”. Democracy in this sense according to him refers to “three basic ideas” which include “democracy as a moral imperative; democracy as a social process and democracy as a political practice or mode of governance”. This explains why Obadan (1998) opined that “democracy and good governance have, in recent years become increasingly important for efficient economic management and development”. It equally explains Omoruyi’s (1993) position that “both democracy and good governance are

necessary preconditions for development and should therefore, be incorporated into the political systems” particularly in the continent of Africa.

2.1.2 Democracy in Nigeria

Democracy and governance in today’s Nigeria is such that has revealed and presented a mockery of the widely acclaimed symptom of good governance; democracy the official governmental practice has been hijacked by military apologies to the extent that citizens now experience despair instead of hope, insecurity instead of security, tragic and untimely death instead of long life and high life expectancy, illusion instead of expectation, deficits instead of dividends, militarization instead of civility, dictatorship instead of rule of law, political selection instead of election etc (Ayoade, 2006). Thus, the Nigerian political landscape seems headed for disaster. Some of the country’s political leaders have stripped naked the rules of civil engagement, jettisoned the constitution and have allowed cacophony to hold sway (Ghali, 2015). The instructive statement by Lord Acton (1834-1902) that: “power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely” seem to have fallen on deaf ears with reference to the Nigerian polity (Falola, 1999)

The prolonged military rule resulted in the over-centralization and concentration of power in the centre and the personalization of political power. This has manifested significantly under civil governance. In fact, the shift in power from the military to the civilian rather than resulting in democratic governance is such that is best described as ‘authoritarian’ as elected leaders in the three tiers of government in the country exhibit military traits and values in governance. Most culpable in this regard is the former president (Obasanjo) who in power assumed the position of ‘Alpha and omega’ in administering the country. The ex-president was dubbed “impatient,

intemperate and very often dictatorial” (Cookey, 1987). Also in the words of Professor Wole Soyinka, democracy has been openly, blatantly and contemptuously rubbished by the president” (Soyinka 2005;1). Violence and political intolerance have now become the hallmark of politics. There has always been the use of violence or the threat of violence within and between parties and candidates. The ultimate prize is the capture and retention of political power at all costs. Thus, by implication the practice and nuances of democracy have never been allowed to germinate in the country. (Cookey, 1987) In a major documentation on the misuse of state power against opponents lamented as follows: In all the crises, all available state apparatus were employed by the power elite discriminately against their opponents....Not only to win and return power but to control the centre which though politically weak, had all the dominant resources. The phenomenon of godfatherism has come to assume a dangerous dimension as a consequence of the monetization of politics. Godfatherism is one of the biggest dangers to democracy today and paradoxically it only survives with government support. It produces an unresponsive leadership. It is in a broad sense, an ideology which is constructed on the belief that certain individuals possess considerable means to unilaterally determine who gets party ticket to run for an election and who wins in the electoral contest. Godfathers are men who have the ‘power’ and influence to decide both who gets nominated to contest election and who wins in the election. It in this sense means the practice of political office seekers getting connected to an individual who is believed to have the ability to deliver desired outcome in an electoral contest (Morgan, 1997). It is the intention of the godfather to rule by proxy. The relationship between godfather and godson is not free floating, it is contractual and the contract is sometimes written and even sealed spiritually with an oath, or at the extreme, in a shrine. Godfathers are merchants of fear. They

dispense violence freely and fully to those who stand in their way; in this they play the additional role

2.1.3 Democracy in Africa

Generally, African countries have had a less than satisfactory democratic record, essentially caused by both external and internal factors. In Egypt, British colonialism usurped the country's resources, and tolerated royal abuses. This eventually led to a revolution in July 1952, and a succession of authoritarian leaders. A popular uprising in early 2011 enhanced the departure of President Hosni Mubarak after almost 30 years in power. This scenario is similar to what occurred in Tunisia, where President Zein El Abidin Ben Ali left power and the country after 23 years of authoritarian rule (Ross, 2001).

Indeed paints a gloomy picture of democracy in Africa. Extreme as it sounds, there is some truth in this assertion. The political and economic cultures of many African countries are still underdeveloped and unstable. They lack the necessary conditions of instituting liberal democracy such as a strong and independent middle class, a competitive party system; constitutionalism and rule of law; a neutral bureaucracy and strong market economies. In such a setting, it is difficult to build liberal democracy. In the early 1990s when African countries are transiting *en masse* towards the so-called liberal democracy, Thomson (2004) wrote "it is difficult to discern what kind of democracy is emerging in Africa and what unique features will give it depth and sustainability in African conditions". Sagnic, (2010) explain on why African countries were facing difficulties in building liberal democracy:

In the first place, there is the persistent claim that multi-party elections are controlled and distorted, when not actually rigged, by incumbent regimes secondly, there is the nagging doubt that democratically elected regimes have every intention of subverting the momentum for political

liberalization by ruling much as the previous one-party regimes did. Thirdly, there are very obvious limits to the actual democratic nature of functioning multi-part systems, chief of which seems to be that such systems have no place for political opposition. Finally, and most ominously, there is the unavoidable fact that where multi-party elections have failed to bring about genuine improvements, Africans have begun to lose faith in “democracy”

In the first place, there is the persistent claim that multi-party elections are controlled and distorted, when not actually rigged, by incumbent regime Secondly; there is the nagging doubt that democratically elected regimes have every intention of subverting the momentum for political liberalization by ruling much as the previous one-party regimes did. Thirdly, there are very obvious limits to the actual democratic nature of functioning multi-party systems, chief of which seems to be that such systems have no place for political opposition. Finally, and most ominously, there is the unavoidable fact that where multi-party elections have failed to bring about genuine improvements, Africans have begun to lose faith in “democracy” (Tar, & Abba, 2010)

However, Absence of a strong opposition parties that can challenge the policies and programmes of the ruling party; absence of alternative policy programme choices required by electorate; zero-sum struggle for power. Likewise, Lack of strong, dense and vibrant civic groups who will act as a counterbalance to state hegemony; such groups are expected to resist cooptation by state but, instead, provide permanent independent check on state power; the weakness of civil society is often as a result of a lack of strong middle class with its own class interest and stake in society (Shin, 1994). Moreover, Productive economy needed to allow state to supply goods and service to electorate; scarce resources could persuade, even force, electorates to abandon democratic processes. At worse, citizens can be “bought” to vote for wrong choices (Schmitz, 2004). Ruling party dominate and manipulate the political process; constitutions are regularly amended to

retain power; state resources are ostensibly used to advance the interest of the ruling party; state security forces are used to coerce citizens and opposition group

Also, Politics and governance are in Africa mitigated by divisive sectarian tendencies; democratic process (voting etc) is held hostage by the sectarian sentiments and loyalties of political actors and voters; state policies are influenced by sectarian fragmentation and sentiments. There exist in African democracy high chance of military intervention as a result of any confusion created by political deadlock between parties. It is also serious impediment to African democracy ruling elites do not respect democratic values such as rule of law and human rights; opposition parties and pressure groups are forced or induced into abandoning their role checking the excesses of state officials; weak democratic structures and values such as participation, civil liberties, voting etc (Smith, 2003).

2.1.4 Concept of Good Governance

The concept of good governance has been defined in many ways. It has come into regular use in political science, public administration and more particularly development management. It appears alongside such terms as; democracy, civil society, participation, human rights and sustainable development. In the last decade, it has been closely associated with the public sector reform] (UNESCO, 2005). The concept has no single and exhaustive definition nor is there a delimitation of its scope that commands acceptance. As a matter of fact, “apart from the universal acceptance of its importance, differences prevail in respect of theoretical formulations, policy prescriptions and conceptualization of the subject itself (Abdellatiff, 2003). The multidimensionality of its definition and the “flexibility of its usage” even though advantageous have created some difficulties at the operational level thus, attempts have been made to redefine what it actually means (Johnson, 1997). In fact, many of the definitions of the concept, according

to Corbridge (2008) and Geiser and Rist (2009), include the demand for decentralization linking it with other demands for state reform such as; democratization, participatory development, accountability of public servants, professionalism as well as transparency, non-discrimination and efficiency". This explains why good governance continues to be based on the broad consensus among development circles that the state plays a key role in determining the rules of the game, enforcing those rules and in making its resources available to the entire population. It equally explains why Gaventa (2002), and Geiser and Rist (2009), noted that "good governance" has become "a key notion in which citizens can have a more active role" which should "increase legitimacy of the state in their views.

Commenting on good governance Esman (1997), argued that before governance can be considered good, government has got to be effective. It must first command the respect and allegiance of the people over whom it exercises governance and must satisfy certain basic collective needs. He went further to identify some minimal elements and/or essentials of effective (good) governance as inclusive of: provision of security for the people, defence of the territorial borders of the state, protection of lives and property, enforcement of laws to enhance predictability and economic development. According to this scholar, governance requires the ability to ensure the wherewithal of sustained government. He equally asserted that effective (good) governance requires that public authority be able to raise the revenues necessary to pay for services that must be provided. The essence of this argument is that, effective governance must be able to make possible the performance by the state of certain basic services – transportation, communication, education and health services –relatively cheaply and reliably (Erero, 1996, Sunday, 2012). This is more so, since effective governance means the capacity of the state, through its power of determinism or, authoritative allocation of scarce critical societal

resources –to deliver the basic necessities of life to the governed and equally facilitate the process of economic development.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2001), typology on good governance places emphasis on its measurements based on eight variables, viz: participatory, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, and consensus oriented, equity -inclusiveness, effectiveness - efficiency and accountability.

The foregoing put together, undeniably points to the fact that, there is a relational umbilical cord between governance and democracy vis-a-vis the governance process and the involvement of all relevant units in it most especially the horizontal organs of government particularly the Legislature and its functionaries.

2.1.5 Organs of Government

There are three organs of government which includes the legislative, executive, and judicial. Most governments around the world, though arranged differently, exercise these powers in one way or another. The legislature makes law, amends and replaces old laws, it controls, criticize, supervise and scrutinizes or oversee the administration or activities of the executive and influence the policies of the government. The legislature is also the representative for the people. In some countries, the legislature sometimes held the judicial function like they can prefer the charge of impeachment on their executives (that is, president or vice president), for example, United State of America. The legislature also has the power to elect the head of the state, India for example, the lower house and the upper house and the legislative bodies elect the president. Lastly, the legislature also control the national finance, no money could be spent or raised by the executive without the previous consent and approval of the parliament. The power of the

legislature includes granting of money for expenses on public services, impose taxes and authorize loans (Aisyah, 2011).

The executive branch is the enforcer of law, it enforces laws made or enacted by the legislature, it also held responsibility for the government administrative system. It has the authority to adjourn and dissolve the legislature. The formulation and execution of governmental policies are also the responsibility of the executive. It also directs relations with foreign governments despite of preparing the annual financial reports and proposal of the expenditure and taxes before presenting to the parliament or the legislature for approval (Aisyah, 2011). The executive branch issues regulations for the governance of the government departments. As the executive body including all the government servants, it held the responsibility for delivering services such as healthcare, welfare, protection of the state security, recommend legislation and issue ordinances.

The judiciary is a branch of government that is concerned with the administration of justice. It is the guardian of the constitution, if the laws are made by the judiciary or the states are conflicted with the constitution, the judiciary could declare the laws as invalid. The judiciary interprets laws, the constitutions and the statutes. It hears and decides disputes. The judiciary also makes law when the existing laws are blur or confusing or conflicting each others in some cases. The judiciary also functions as the advisory body which it held responsibility to giving advices when the government seeks for it (Aisyah, 2011).

2.1.6 Principle of Separation of Powers

Separation of powers is the division of powers and functions of government among the three broadly demarcated arms of government, that is, the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary.

In a federation, there is a further separation of powers between the national and sub-national governments (Angela and Emmanuel, 2015).

Theoretically, the doctrine of separation of powers is an attempt at allocating and making exclusive to each of the three arms of government specified powers and functions of government. This is a condition precedent for the supremacy of the rule of law in any society especially in a presidential democracy where, due to the enormous power given to the executive, it is necessary to check possible executive arbitrariness. Political philosophers in various parts of the world from ancient times recognized that in order to have an organized and well-ordered society where man is to enjoy his God-endowed attributes of freedom, governmental powers cannot be allowed to be concentrated in one body. Thus, the political philosophers highlighted the danger of over concentration of powers in one hand. The central objective is to assure to the individual of the maximum amount of liberty compatible with effective government.

The modern articulation of the doctrine of separation of powers is credited to John Locke whose work on the doctrine was further improved by Montesquieu. Montesquieu was concerned with the preservation of political liberty and he said:

Political liberty is to be found only when there is no abuse of power. But constant experience shows us that every man invested with power is liable to abuse it, and to carry this authority as far as it will go. To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the nature of things that one power should be a check on another ... When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body There can be no liberty Again, there is no liberty if the judicial power is not separated from the legislative and executive ... there would be an end of everything if the same person or body whether of the nobles or of the people, were to exercise all three powers.

For example, the Nigerian Constitution, following closely the United States arrangement, vests the legislative, executive and judicial powers on the three separate arms of government respectively. Under the 1999 Presidential Constitution, the three powers of government are vested in three different independent and co-equal bodies; the National/State House of Assembly, The President/Governors and the Federal/State Courts. The clear and accepted implication of this constitutional arrangement is that no level of government, and no organ of government at either level, may exercise any power or perform any function that is not assigned to it by the Constitution whether directly, indirectly, or by necessary implication.

However, in practice, there is no such pure separation of these powers. The separation of powers is a rather flexible and accommodating doctrine. In the modern state, there is no way in which all the functions of government can be shared out and put into mutually exclusive compartments and assigned to different segments of government. Some overlapping is bound to occur and often do occur at various points. The position was captured by the Supreme Court of the United State of America in the classic statement in *Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer* to the effect that “while the constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that the practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity”. Likewise, the three arms of government would have to co-operate to be able to operate a workable government (Angela and Emmanuel, 2015).

2.1.7 Theory of Representation in the Liberal Democratic State

Over the years, the idea of democracy has been a fundamental issue in political thought. Abraham Lincoln, the famous American statesman and President is credited amongst the earliest

political thinkers who defined democracy as government of the people by the people and for the people (Jacob, 2008). To him and others that shared his line of thinking, a democratic government is that which is made up of men and women that are elected by the people for the well-being of the generality of the people. Thus, democracy is basically a contract, an agreement between the ruler and the ruled to govern according to the rules; it represents a system of government that is meant to ensure good life for the people. Lincoln's line of thinking is shared by scholars like Price (2000), Chazzan (1992) and May (1976).

In his own treatise, Price (1985) felt that it is easy for a government to rule its people by coercion, issuing decrees and compelling the people by force to obey them, as is the case of Nigeria under Military regimes between 1983 and 1998. But, as the Nigerian experience has shown, this does not, in the long-run, lead to stability. A solution to this problem is the establishment of democracy (Jacob, 2008).

Democracy is derived from a Greek word and it means rule by the people. According to Jacob (2008), it is a system of government where the decisions on matters of policy and on the laws that are to put that policy into effect are made by the people themselves. According to Price (1985), and Chazan, (1992) the idea of democracy could be traced to ancient Greece where, in the democratic city-states of Athens, all the adult male citizens used to meet together in an assembly in which issues of policy were debated, decisions were taken, and laws were enacted. No citizen could thus claim that policies are foisted upon the community against his will. This practice has been adopted by modern great nation's states like Britain and the United States of America, among others. But because, in these states, distances between the various components parts of the states make it prohibitively expensive to bring all entitled citizens together in one place to discuss policy issues, an alternative approach was derived. This alternative approach to

the problem of ensuring that policy decisions were made as far as possible in accordance with the popular will of the people was, according to May (1976), developed in England roughly between A.D 1250 and 1650. This was the idea of ‘representative government’ where small local groups of citizens have the right to choose representatives of their own interests to sit together in a national assembly or parliament.

According to May (1976) it had been established that parliament was more powerful than the king himself, who was thus bound by the decisions of this representative body. The analysis so far indicates that central to the idea of representative governance (or democracy) is the rationale for “popular rule”. Price (1985), buttressed this contention through his identification of three essential preconditions for the satisfactory working of representative government as follows; that the assembly must be as truly representative as it is possible to make it, that members of the assembly must be free to discuss issues with complete frankness and to reach decision without hindrance; and that the assembly’s decisions must be binding and enforceable.

2.1.8 The Legislature and its Role in Democratic Governance

The term “legislature” has been given different names across nations of the world. It is referred to as “Parliament” in Britain, “National Assembly” (the central legislature) in Nigeria, “Congress” in United States etc. As noted by Lafenwa (2009), however, there is no serious contention about its definition. The legislature is seen as occupying a key position in the machinery of government and as the people’s branch with the singular purpose of articulating and expressing the collective will of the people (Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). As an organ of government, it is the forum for the representation of the electorate (Taiwo and Fajingbesi, 2004).

However it may be said, the legislature is the watchdog of the executive and, representative of the people for peace, order and development of the country at large.

Awotokun (1998), conceptualizes the term legislature from a functional perspective. He defines the legislature as the branch of government made up of elected representatives or a constitutionally constituted assembly (body) of people whose duties among other things are to make laws, control executive activities and safeguard the interest of the people. Following this functional definition, Anyaegbunam (2000), conceptualizes the legislature as having the role of making, revising, amending and repealing laws for the advancement and well being of the citizenry that it represents. Similarly, Lafenwa (2009), defines the legislature as an official body, usually chosen by election, with the power to make, change, and repeal laws; as well as powers to represent the constituent units and control government. Okoosi-Simbine (2010), also conceptualizes the legislature as the law-making, deliberative and policy influencing body working for the furtherance of democratic political system. He describes the legislature as the First Estate of the Realm, the realm of representation and the site of sovereignty, the only expression of the will of the people. It follows from this analysis that the authority of the legislature is derived from the people and should be exercise according to the will of the people who they represent. This seems to be the position of Bogdanor (1991), when he affirms that the authority of the legislature as a political institution is derived from a claim that its members are representative of the political community, and decisions are collectively made according to complex procedures.

Perhaps, it is in the light of this, that Smith (1980), sees the legislature as the symbol of power and legitimacy because its decision is based on the collective wisdom of men and women who enjoy the confidence of the electorate. Jewell (1997), on the other hand, identifies two features

that distinguish the legislature from other branches of government. The first feature, according to him, is that the legislature possesses formal authority to make laws, and secondly, members are normally elected to represent various elements in the population. Thus, Davies (2004), avers that representative liberal democracy cannot exist without a healthy, lively and credible legislature. He noted that the establishment of the legislature rests on the assumption that in the final analysis, political power still resides in the people and that the people can, if they choose, delegate the exercise of their sovereignty to elected representatives. Loewenberg (1995) and Okoosi-Simbine (2010), seem to concede to this important view of the legislature as the people's representative by viewing the legislature as assemblies of elected representatives from geographically defined constituencies, with lawmaking functions in the governmental process of a country. The fact that the legislature is an assembly of people elected to represent the citizens is perhaps, the reason why Awotokun (1998), notes that the legislature is an assembly of ambassadors who serve their constituencies in various ways as intermediaries between the citizens and government officials.

However, the operational definition of legislature in this study is that it the body of people elected by the electorates from their respective constituencies to represent them at the national assembly of at the State House of Assembly. The electorates expects the legislators to protect their interest at the national assembly or state house of assembly by initiating motions that will yields positive outcome to their constituencies, state or nation as a whole.

The strength and the state of the legislature have been identified as among the strongest predictors of a country's democratic development and survival (Poteete, 2010). As Lafenwa (1991) argues, the legislature is the central element of democracy. Democracy cannot exist in any country without a healthy and lively legislature (Taiwo&Fajingbesi, 2004). As noted by

Edosa and Azelama (2014), the nature of the legislature that is adopted determines whether a given political system is democratic or not. The centrality of the legislature to democracy is perhaps succinctly captured by Awotokun (1998), when he avers that the legislature is the pivot of modern democratic systems.

According to Okoosi-Simbine (2010), legislatures vary both in their design, structure, pattern of organisation and operational procedures, selection process as well as sizes, tenure of office and frequency and nature of meetings. The variation, Okoosi-Simbine (2010) posit, is contingent upon past traditions, theory of government, character of the regime and most importantly the nature of the society in question. They observe that a modern legislative procedure derive from British procedures and thus serves as a model for the development of legislature and legislative procedure for many countries around the world.

Edosa and Azelama (1995), traced the emergence of the legislature to the need for advisory bodies by the executive. In this perspective, the origins and the essential features of the modern legislature are found in the advisory councils which from ancient times were established to give advice to a ruler – king, chief emperor, oba, ovie, obi or sultan (Edosa and Azelama, 1995). According to this theory of the origin of the legislature, for the purpose of effective governance, rulers have had to surround themselves with advisers. Edosa and Azelama (1995), bring to the fore, the implication of this. According to them, firstly, it means that state power or governance was never monopolized but shared to some extent. Secondly, that rulers surrounded themselves with team of experts as advisers, which means that rulers from time past were inclined to effective governance which they believe, would be beneficial to all. The team of advisers could be in the form of a council of elders whose members were usually respected individuals of

certain military or economic groups or persons with expert knowledge of the times, custom and tradition of the community.

The method of constituting these advisory councils and their level of usage, however, depended on the character of the ruler, the historical period and the type of society involved (Nwabuzor and Mueller, 1985). According to Edosa and Azelama (1995), the ruler was usually left with the discretion of determining the mode of selecting members of the advisory councils, the content and use of their deliberation. They pointed out that the nature of the ruler, the circumstances of the period and the peculiarity of the society were the determinants of the relationship between the sovereign and his advisory council. They noted further that advisory councils were either permanent bodies or ad hoc bodies with members invited by the ruler when needed. In the situation when they are permanent however, they became known by the community as co-rulers and policy-makers with the king. It later became more possible to clearly define the relationship between the advisory council and the ruler, the conditions and qualifications for council membership, the tenure, and the working procedure. Edosa and Azelama (1995), in an interjectory manner, argued that the evolutionary development of African's indigenous legislature was distorted by the imposition of colonial rule of African kingdoms.

Edosa and Azelama (1995), seem to hold relevance going by the fact that government in the traditional African societies had their various defined and structured process of enacting rules which were seen as representative of the wishes of the people in the particular society.

2.1.8 Types of Legislature

Okoosi-Simbine (2010) identified two major types of legislature, one being bicameral and the other being unicameral. He further explained that some legislatures have two chambers popularly referred to as bicameral legislatures while some others have single chamber commonly known as unicameral legislature. Yugoslavia has, however, experimented with a five-chamber legislative assembly and South Africa, a three-chamber legislative assembly between 1984 and 1994 (Heywood, 2007).

i) Bicameral Legislature

In a bicameral type of arrangement two legislative chambers exist in a country; one chamber seems to dominate the other. This situation is noted by Nwabueze and Mueller (1985), when they viewed that in a bicameral legislature, there exist some forms of dominance of one chamber on the other, in respect of some legislation, tenure of office of members, size and importance of the constituencies represented. They, however, added that intricate rules are usually adopted to harmonize the legislation function of the two chambers. Furthermore, Nwabuzor and Mueller (1985), noted that federal political structures, such as those found in Nigeria, the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, Australia and Switzerland, often adopt bicameralism in order to protect the interests of the minorities. Some systems, such as Great Britain, the Third Republic in France and the former Nigerian House of Chiefs in the 1960s, adopt bicameralism to enable the upper house check against hasty legislations. In a similar argument, Edosa and Azelama (1995), averred that the bicameral type of legislative structure is more common with federal states stemming from the imperative of one house to protect the special interests of minority or regional groups in such states. They noted that some federal states such as Nigeria, United States, Switzerland, Canada, Germany and Australia have opted for bicameralism on this basis.

According to them, however, some countries such as Britain, second chamber is adopted to play a somewhat conservative role or to serve as a check on radical legislation of the lower house. The British House of Lords, according to them, has usually been disposed to delaying, moderating or out-rightly preventing fierce legislations of the lower house – the House of Commons. A similar situation is found in the defunct post-independence Nigerian House of Chiefs at the regions. France second chamber is made up of members who are elderly and are therefore, expected to be conservative and also moderate the activities of the lower chamber (Egwu, 2005). This double-chamber legislature is found in countries such as Nigeria, France and United States.

The Congress of the United States comprises the Senate and House of Representatives. Similarly, the National Assembly of Nigeria is made up of the Senate and House of Representatives. France legislative body also comprises of the Deputies and the Senate. In the case of Nigeria, the country had a unicameral arrangement at the federal level up to the 1954 Lyttleton Constitution. It however, adopted a bicameral structure at independence. This arrangement was maintained in the 1979 and 1999 constitutions. Ghana and New Zealand also adopted a bicameral legislature after attainment of independence. In France, however, bicameral legislature was not adopted until the third republic. France's second republic constitution provided for a unicameral legislative structure till 1952 when the republic was abolished. The Supreme Soviet of the former USSR comprised of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. The power of this legislative body was unrestricted including amending the constitution. China, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and other communist countries, however, have a different bicameral legislative arrangement in that legislature in these countries are closely linked with the state party. The two chambers though are supposed to act as checks on the other;

such checks are minimal because major debates on policy demands are done with the party rather than the legislature (Edosa&Azelama, 1995). In countries where bicameralism operates, however, the constitutions ensure that one chamber provides the opportunity for equal representation of the federating units while the diverse interests are represented in the other chamber. In addition, bicameral legislature makes it difficult for the legislature to be controlled by a despot or demagogue (Abonyi, 2006). It also provides opportunity for wider representation of various interests groups in the country. Furthermore, the arrangement serves as check against hasty passage of law and gives opportunity for division of labour between the two houses (Okoosi-Simbine, 2010).

ii) Unicameral Legislature

The other type of legislative structure is the single chamber legislature popularly referred to as unicameral. Abonyi (2006), noted that this type of legislative structure exists when there is only one legislative body in a country. This practice then is less common than the bicameral legislative structure. Countries that adopted unicameralism include China, Israel established a single-chamber legislature (the Knesset) in 1948, and the Second Republic Constitution of France had unicameral legislative arrangement which lasted between 1848 and 1952. Similarly, Nigeria had a unicameral legislature at the federal level up to the 1954 Lyttleton Constitution and changed to unicameralism at independence (Akinboye and Anifowose, 2011). New Zealand and Ghana also had unicameral legislature before independence. A two-chamber legislature was abolished in Denmark in 1954 and Sweden in 1970 (Heywood, 2007). For these countries the choice of a single-chamber legislature was predicated on the fact that unicameralism is more streamlined and more effective especially in terms of responding to the needs of small and

relatively cohesive and homogenous political societies (Abonyi, 2006). In addition, its structure is simple and less expensive to run and avoids delay in law making (Okoosi-Simbine, 2010).

Edosa and Azelama (1995) and Okoosi-Simbine (2010), in another dimension, see the legislatures as differing considerably in size, composition, operation, role, tenure of office and internal rules from one democracy to the other. Nwabuzor and Muller (1985), averred that such factors as the role of the presiding officer, the establishment of the order of business, legislation process, number and power of legislative committee, degree of intra-party discipline expected and manner of terminating debate on questions under consideration account for the differences among countries. They noted that while the size of the legislature in Iceland, New Zealand and some African countries are relatively small, the legislative body of the defunct Soviet Republic – Supreme Soviet, comprised of about 1,500 members. With respect to the term of office, the lower house of the legislature in Britain, Canada, France, India, Italy, Ireland and South Africa operates a 5- year tenure of office while in the United States of America, members of the legislature are elected every two years. In Nigeria on the other hand, the legislators are elected after every four years. In Britain, on the contrary, members of the upper house hold office for life and may even be succeeded by their heirs.

Nwabuzor and Muller (1985), however, noted that countries which operate short-term tenure for their legislature do so because of the need for the representatives concerned to reflect better the ever-changing currents of public preference regarding government policy. They argue that the longer term tenure is, however, to ensure the stability of national interests which do not have to be bent to constantly changing public opinion.

2.1.9 Legislative Oversight: Meaning and Legal Premises

Legislative oversight is an instrument employed by the parliament to undertake its constitutional function and roles of checks and balances, transparency and accountability in democratic governance(Adebayo, 2002). Legislative oversight henceforth denotes the legislature's assessment and evaluation of particular actions of the executive arm of government. After law making process, the legislature's central and foremost constitutional role and function is to oversee whether or not laws are efficiently applied and whether the laws take into cognizance the intent of their drafters. In fact, Legislative oversight as an idea, cannot be possibly captured in a single wording definition, as its scope that gives sense to it and offers way on what it intended to accomplish.Adebayo, (2002 p. 12) explains that

Oversight is defined as the process by which a legislative body monitors, scrutinizes, reviews and evaluates the performance of the executive arm of government or its agencies on a continuous basis to ensure effectiveness, efficiency and good performance

To Oyewo (2007, p.8), who defines oversight more elaborately as “the exercise of constitutional powers by the legislature to check or control the exercise of constitutional powers of other arms of government, and more specifically to check or control the exercise of executive powers or to make the executive accountable and responsible to the electorate”. The import of this, as Adebayo (2002:35) argues is that “oversight can be performed ex-ante or during the design and implementation of a programme or policy, as well as ex-post, after its implementation”. Hence, he defined oversight as follows “...it follows that oversight entails the informal and formal, watchful, strategic and structured scrutiny exercised by legislatures in respect of the implementation of laws, the application the budget, the strict observance of statutes and the constitution” (Uveges, 2003:34).

The use of the term ‘oversight’ is traced to Professor Woodrow Wilson who defined it as the “duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the voice and to embody the will and wisdom of its constituents” (Timothy, 1997). It has also been defined as “the review, monitoring and supervision of government and public agencies, including the implementation of policy and legislation.” Legislative oversight involves keeping an eye on the activities of government agencies especially the executive branch, on behalf of the Nigerian people. This process brings to the knowledge of the public what the executive branch is doing, and affords the electorate the opportunity to determine whether public servants are really serving their collective interest or not (Timothy, 1997).

Legislative oversight therefore denotes to the power, function and role of the legislature to evaluate, monitor, supervise and review government ministries, department agencies, programmes, actions and policy execution plan and strategies of the executive organ of government. This is largely to safeguard that the executive arm of government endures and sustain the principles and values of good governance accountability and transparency. The Committee arrangement of the House of Representatives and Senate is used to perform oversight role and ensure to the large possible extent that the official performance of the executive arm of government and its department and agencies are kept under regular control, regulation and scrutiny by the legislative arm of government (Timothy, 1997).

2.1.10 Oversight Functions in the Purview of Law

The investigative oversight powers of the National Assembly are enshrined in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, in sections 88, 89, 128 and 129. However, it must be noted that the power of the legislature to undertake legislative oversight is not absolute.

Sharma, et al (2011) captured the limits on the power of Legislative oversight when he stated thus:

The power of the congress to conduct investigation is inherent in the legislative process. The power is broad; it encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into department of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency and waste.

In addition, the Nigerian case of Tony Momoh v. Senate of the National Assembly (1982) NCLR, 105, the court said that the legislature is not given powers to usurp the general investigating functions of the executive nor the adjudicative functions of the judiciary. Therefore, any invitations by the legislature to any person outside the purpose defined in the relevant section are invalid. Also, the prosecution of persons found guilty of corrupt practices or gross inadequacies or misconduct in the discharge of the public office is left to the executive. Furthermore, any investigation which is sought to only exposes or ridicule persons, especially their private affairs, without any legislative intent, will not be entertained (*Research on Humanities*).

The exercise of oversight is also lawful by the numerous Standing Orders of Nigerian Legislative Houses. Sections 60 and 101 of the 1999 Constitution (as Amended) empower the National and State Houses of Assembly to regulate their own procedure, including the procedure for summoning and recess of the House. The Rules have also defined jurisdiction of all Special and Standing Committees over all legislative activities including oversight of MDAs under jurisdiction of a particular committee (*ibid*).

2.1.11 Significance of Oversight Legislative

The legislative arm of government is to make sure that prevailing governmental policies and programmes are implemented and applied proficiently, successfully and in a manner agreed and approved with legislative determination. For example, the budget oversight function includes several diverse facets because the National Assembly must consider the overall value of a program against the value of other programs competing for funding from limited state resources. It gives the legislature an opportunity to assert their independence and also provides an avenue for them to enhance their capacity to play a more active role in the policy making process. The Commonwealth (*ibid*).

Parliamentary Association (CPA) (2002) asserts that the principle behind legislative oversight is to ensure that public policy is administered in accordance with legislative intent. Legislative oversight can also be viewed as a strong weapon used by the legislature in checking executive tendency towards dictatorship. Therefore, the legislature oversees the affairs of government and consequently, holds the government responsible for its actions or omissions. Proper oversight function is of enormous benefit to the political system and it has encouraged international cooperation from different countries to strengthen the legislature as a means of enhancing democracy in developing countries. (Omeje, 2011)

2.1.12 Objectives of Legislative Oversight

According to Ocheoha, (2000) Legislative oversight seeks to:

- i. Protect the rights and liberties of citizens by curbing the excesses of the government.

- ii. Detect waste within the machinery of the government and public agencies, improve efficiency, economy and effectiveness of government operations by making the government accountable to the people.
- iii. Improve the transparency of government operations and enhance public trust in the government.
- iv. Ensure that policies announced by the government and authorized by the legislature are actually delivered.
- v. Determine the extent of compliance with constitutional, statutory and legislative directives.
- vi. Determine whether the right caliber of parties are in charge of administering programmes or policies of government.
- vii. Evaluate the impact of programmes on target and spillover groups.
- viii. Generate information to develop new legislative proposals or amend existing statutes.

Determine the impact of policies, programmes, laws on the society and life of the people to create opportunities for legislative intervention. . (Omeje, 2011)

2. 1 .13 Tools for Legislative Oversight

As Ocheoha (2000) argued; the common oversight instruments are oversight visits, committee hearings (public/investigative), hearings in plenary sessions of the parliament, the creation of commissions of inquiry, questions, the public account committees, auditors general, interpolation and ombudsman.

In particular, the legislative standing committees are responsible for continuous review of work of MDAs in their subject areas. Legislatures also have created special and standing committees to evaluate agency operation and performance. In addition, the National Assembly may review the rules and regulations developed by the executive. The personal qualities of competent and trained members of the legislature are of utmost importance in carrying out their legislative oversight functions. If there is no competent personnel, legislative oversight will fail. Therefore, it is imperative to have periodic training for the members of the legislature in order to equip them with the tools they need to be able to effectively conduct this duty (Ocheoha, 2000).

Committee hearings are avenues for citizens to become involved in the parliamentary business of legislative oversight. Experts can be heard in or become advisers; committees can invite interested parties to hearings or invite members via public hearings and so on. The floor of the Senate or House of Representatives is also a means of conducting legislative oversight because the legislature can hear ministers and government officials and discuss all aspects of government policy (ibid).

Also, section 89 of the 1999 Constitution provides a list of guidelines and powers that are to assist the legislature in carrying out this function. These include issuing summons, warrants and fines when its orders, as approved by the Constitution, are violated.

Other tools or ways the legislature can conduct oversight include the following:

- i. The legislature can simply ask the government for information.
- ii. The legislature can ask the government for public clarification of policy.
- iii. The legislature can obtain information from sources outside the government.

v. The legislature can express its view to the government and the public.

vi. The legislature can undertake informal meetings with executive officials. (Ocheoha, 2000)

In more drastic instances, the legislature has the constitutional power to recommend the removal of office holders whose appointments the legislature has power to confirm where it is believed that the office holder(s) is not effectively discharging his constitutional or statutory duties. (ADG 2009)

2.1, 14 Types of Oversight

In a more specific sense, this classification includes:

Routine oversight:

This is the regular oversight carried out by a legislative House either through committees or plenary. In order to ensure compliance with laws in conducting governmental activities by ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs), routine oversight is carried out by committees within their jurisdiction as provided in the Standing orders. It includes the regular visits to MDAs, screening and confirmation of executive nominations, committee hearings and inquiries or any informal meeting between members of parliament (MPs) and the executive in furtherance of a public concern. (Akintola, 1999)

Appropriation Oversight:

This relates to power of the legislature to consider, scrutinize and approve the budget. This form of oversight enjoys both constitutional and statutory flavor. The committee on Appropriation is

usually the lead committee while other standing committees become sub – committees for the purpose of consideration of the Appropriation Bill. This is one of the most important form of oversight as it empowers legislative committees to subject estimates of MDAs to critical scrutiny to facilitate further consideration and approval of the Appropriation Bill. (Akintola, 1999)

This form is conducted at the time of enacting the law which gives committees the opportunity of checking excesses and abuse through misallocation of funds. It is also conducted during the implementation phase of the budget cycle. (Akintola, 1999)

The success of a budget depends to a great extent on ability of a legislature to carry out oversight effectively. In particular, the legislature will be expected to ensure: Timely submission of the Appropriation Bill to the legislature. This however depends on the time line for submission / presentation provided by the Constitution. This area is one of the challenges that affects the timeliness of approval and extends also to affect implementation and outcome; Diligent and meticulous scrutiny; Compliance with rules of practice and procedure in the conduct of budget defence and other components of the consideration process; Timely and comprehensive reporting to the Appropriation committee and committee of supply or committee of ways and means depending on jurisdiction; Utilization of relevant apparatus such as Public Account Committee (PAC) reports in scrutinizing estimates timely; Effective and efficient oversight to monitor implementation; and, Timely and comprehensive submission of oversight reports. (Cameron, 2004)

Investigative Oversight

Under this classification, the legislature is empowered to conduct investigation into activities of government agencies either at plenary, or through standing or ad-hoc committees, depending on

the resolution of the legislative House. Section 88 (1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides the scope and rationale of this form of oversight. For the purpose of clarity, the following factors must be taken into consideration by a legislative House or committee in exercise of its powers under this classification: The subject matter of oversight must be within the jurisdiction of the legislative house, under Section 4, 58, 59 and 100 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) The focus of investigation by a legislative committee must be on conduct of affairs of any person or authority charged with the responsibility to execute or administer law and disbursing or administering moneys appropriated by the legislature. The philosophy of investigative oversight is to enable the legislature: **a.** Make laws on any matter within its legislative competence or correct defects in existing laws. Expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in public expenditure management (Cameron, 2004).

Public Accounts Committee Oversight

Public Accounts Committee is both a standing and special committee in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Its specialty originated from its being the only committee mentioned under Section 85 (5) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and recognized as a special committee in the Standing Orders of the two chambers of the National Assembly.

Unlike other committees whose jurisdictions are limited to specific subjects and jurisdictions, the Public Accounts Committee is vested with broad jurisdiction of examining the Auditor General's Report of audited accounts of MDAs in the federation under Section 85 (2) – (5) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) . In the exercise of its oversight powers pursuant to Section 85 (5) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the committee is obliged, subject to the provisions of the Standing Orders of the Senate or House of Representatives to: Subject the report to critical scrutiny to identify issues and queries against some MDAs; Communicate such queries and

demand response from the affected MDAs within a particular time frame; »»Invite MDAs whose responses require further clarification to the Committee, including those who did not respond at all or whose responses were either inadequate, contentious or unsubstantiated by documentary evidence. The Committee will engage MDAs in interactive session to verify, ascertain or establish unresolved issues in responses by the affected MDAs; and, Report the outcome of committees' findings to the plenary to validate and approve through resolutions, the recommendations contained in the report (Downer, 2000).

2.1.15 Forms of Oversight Powers

As indicated earlier, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 is the basis of legislative oversight powers of the National Assembly. Such powers are in the following forms:

i. Investigative powers: This power of investigation is conferred on the National Assembly by Section 88 (1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), wherein it is empowered (via Resolution published in its Journal or in the Official Gazette of the Government of the Federation) to direct or cause to be directed, an investigation into:

a. any matter or thing with respect to which it has power to make laws, and

b. the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry or government department charged or intended to be charged with the duty of or responsible for –

i. executing or administering laws enacted by the National Assembly, and

ii. disbursing or administering monies appropriated or to be appropriated by the National Assembly.

Investigation has been regarded as the most important power the legislature has in the exercise of control over the executive arm of government. It is only an aspect of oversight and one of the

means available to the Legislature to ensure compliance by the executive and to obtain certain crucial information that would assist in future legislation. One of the cardinal merits of investigative hearings or oversight is that it puts public officers on their toes, literally. This acts as a restraining influence on government action.

ii. Evidential Powers: Under Section 89 (1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), The National Assembly is empowered for the purpose of any investigation under Section 88 of the Constitution to:

a. procure all such evidence, written or oral, direct or circumstantial, as it may think necessary or desirable, and examine all persons as witnesses whose evidence may be material or relevant to the subject matter;

b. require such evidence to be given on oath;

c. summon any person in Nigeria to give evidence at any place or produce any document or other thing in his possession or under his control, and examine him as a witness and require him to produce any document or other thing in his possession or under his control, subject to all just exceptions; and

d. issue a warrant to compel the attendance of any person who, after having been summoned to attend, fails, refuses or neglects to do so and does not excuse such failure, refusal or neglect to the satisfaction of the House or the Committee in question, and order him to pay all costs which may have been occasioned in compelling his attendance or by reason of his failure, refusal or neglect to obey the summons, and also to impose such fine as may be prescribed for any such failure, refusal, neglect; and any fine so imposed shall be recoverable in the same manner as a fine imposed by court of law. A summons or warrant issued under this section may be served or executed by any member of the Nigeria Police Force or by any person authorized in that behalf

by the President of Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may require (Section 89 (2) of the Constitution).

iii. Control of Public Funds: This is referred to as the power of the purse which is about the most effective weapon in the hands of most legislatures across the world in checking recklessness in government.. In this regard, Section 80 (3) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) stipulates that: “No money shall be withdrawn from any public fund other than the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation, unless the issue of those moneys has been authorized by an Act of the National Assembly.”

In furtherance of the National Assembly’s power over public fund, Section 80(4) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides that: “No money shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund or any other public fund of the Federation, except in the manner prescribed by the National Assembly”. Since the return to democratic governance in May 1999, the power of the National Assembly to exercise control of public funds has often been misconstrued in various quarters as attempting to create conflict in a democracy. By the above constitutional provision, the executive is required to obtain approval from the legislature before any money is spent. This had been an age long practice and a universal tradition of governments all over the world. Through this power of control over the purse, lawmakers are able to exercise control over the activities of the executive branch. The executive arm prepares the Appropriation Bill and presents to the legislature for passage into law. The Appropriation Committees of the Legislature then go through each aspect of the Budget and invite the appropriate officials of the executive branch for clearance and or information as are thought necessary to guide the Committees in the discharge of their oversight functions (Duru, *et al* 2005).

iv. Removal and Confirmation of Appointments: The National Assembly is empowered by Section 143 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) to remove the President or Vice-President from office. Under this Section, the National Assembly is empowered to remove the President or Vice-President from office for gross misconduct, which is defined “as great violation or breach of the provisions of the Constitution”. This power of removal is popularly referred to as “impeachment powers”, which is the ultimate oversight power. Similarly, the Senate is empowered to confirm appointments of Ministers of the Government of the Federation for such appointments to be valid (Ibeogu, 2011).

Under Section 147(2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the President shall, if the Senate confirms the nomination of any person to such office, make any appointment to the office of Minister of Government of the Federation. In the same vein, an appointment to the office of Ambassador, High Commissioner or other Principal Representative of Nigeria abroad shall not have effect unless the appointment is confirmed by the Senate (Section 171(4)). Furthermore, Sections 231(1) and (2), Section 238(1), Section 250 (1), Section 256(1), Section 261(1) and Section 292(1) provide for the Senate to confirm and remove judicial officers and other matters of the Judiciary. Section 86 (1) and (2) provide for the Senate to confirm the appointment of Auditor General of the Federation, while Section 87 (1) for the removal of same.

v. Audit Queries: Under Section 85 (2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), “the public accounts of the Federation and all offices and courts of the Federation shall be audited and reported on by the Auditor-General who shall submit his reports to the National Assembly; and for that purpose, the Auditor-General or any person authorized by him in that behalf shall have access to all the books, records, returns and other documents relating to those accounts”. (Ibeogu, 2011)

This is a vital tool the National Assembly uses to ensure that there is compliance with the intention of the Legislature in appropriation matters. It should be noted that the Constitution does not expressly specify what the National Assembly should do with such report. However, it can be implied that since the Legislature appropriated the fund which the executive branch utilizes, the audit report would enable the National Assembly to see whether or not the executive has complied with the appropriate laws and the Appropriation Act. Audit queries have thus prodded the National Assembly to carry out oversight investigation of management of funds by some units of the executive branch. The National Assembly can also initiate audit investigation of activities of the executive. For instance in November 2000, the House Committee on Industries, pursuant to Section 88 of the 1999 Constitution, initiated an audit investigation of the Standards Organization of Nigeria (SON).

2.1, 16 Procedure for Oversight

The procedure to be employed in the conduct of oversight depends generally on the types of oversight. Generally, the procedure entails certain activities indicated by the Committee Secretariat on the authority of the Committee after its resolution to conduct oversight. These activities are required before, during and after the conduct of the exercise. For clarity, the procedure is as follows:

i. *Pre-Oversight* Development of agenda for oversight. This should be discussed and approved at committee meetings before the exercise. Committee meetings to consider agenda (subject) of oversight, logistics required, date, information or records/documents needed and any other issue that will facilitate a successful conduct of the exercise. Internal official communications to the President/Speaker and Clerk of the House. Communication to the MDAs to be over sighted. Any document or information needed should be reflected in this communication with a clear time line

for submission of such documents. Security arrangements depending on types, nature, location and time of oversight

ii. *During Oversight* Arrival, check-in and preparation for first meeting. Formal meeting to introduce committee members, MDAs management team and the subject of oversight.

- Inspection, visit, record checking, interactive session.
- Closing remarks (usually in a brief meeting or executive session)

iii. *Post Oversight* Development of report by committee secretariat.

Committee meetings to consider deliberate and make further recommendations in the report. Presentation and lying of report on the table Deliberation by the House and resolutions which may include investigative hearing, interactive session or any other legislative activity that the House may order

Public/Investigative Hearings

Public or investigative hearing is a major legislative activity conducted by a special or standing committee of the legislature based on a referral order. It may be conducted as a result of a resolution on a motion, public petition report, oversight report or a consideration of Bill (Nwosu et al, 1986).

2.1.17 Challenges of Legislative Oversight in Nigeria

The following are some of the motives why oversight function is not operative and effective in Nigeria:

Lack of Established Democratic Culture

The fact that Nigeria's democracy is nascent, democratic culture is a substantial factor militating against legislative oversight in Nigeria. According to Uveges(2003), the devastating consequence

of protracted military rule in Nigeria has created negative result that continues to disturb individuals and institutions in Nigeria. The legislature is not an excluded. The legislature today is truly not autonomous from Executive and thus, is repeatedly weakened from acting as the watchdog of executive activities. Thus, the inordinate ambition of members and leadership of the legislative houses often sees them hobnobbing with the executive such that valuable time for law-making is lost in the process of lobbying for juicy leadership positions and committees in the legislative houses (Uveges, 2003).

Corruption and Nepotism

Nigeria has unfortunate status on corruption and nepotism. This does not exclude the legislature, as members of the National Assembly have been all the times blamed of bribery and corruption in the exercise of oversight functions. An example is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation which was carried out by the House of Representatives in the 7th Assembly. Arising from the crash of the stock market and the concomitant loss of the several billions of Naira, the House of Representatives commenced a probe on the activities of the SEC which is the regulatory body of the stock market. In the course of the probe and while the then Director-General of SEC, Ms. Arunma Oteh, was testifying before the Committee, she forcefully accused the Chairman of the Committee of demanding gratification from her; a demand she stoutly refused to meet. She alleged that the hostile disposition of the investigating Committee towards her during the public hearing was due to her refusal to meet the demand of the Committee Chairman. The uproar generated by the accusation forced the Chairman to step down as Chairman and member of the Committee. The subsequent indictment of the Director-General and the House Committee's recommendation that she be removed from her position as Director-General did not therefore come as a surprise to many who concluded that the indictment was the

House's way of getting back at her for the embarrassment she caused to the House. Besides, the House refused to appropriate any amount to SEC in the 2013 budget, thus starving the body of funds (Timothy, 1997).

Personal Interests and Ambition of the Legislators

It has frequently been said that a good number of members of the National Assembly (including legislators at the State levels) pursue pure selfish interests that often hinder them from combating the challenges of law-making, representation and oversight. Many of them focus on obtaining contracts from the leadership of the houses and even from Chief Executives of the various MDAs their committees are to oversight. This personal interest serves as a challenge to the discharge of their oversight functions, thereby making them to easily compromise when it comes to contributing meaningfully to debates on the floor of the house. At times, some members resort to absenteeism from the floor of the house and do not participate at all in the proceedings (Timothy, 1997).

Docile citizenry

The people of Nigeria have the power under **S.69 & S.110** of the Constitution to recall a member of any legislative house who they feel is not performing well at the National Assembly. However, this power is hardly made use of. The effect is that the legislators become lukewarm in their oversight functions. (Timothy, 1997)

Executive Interference

As mentioned earlier, the Constitution empowers the National Assembly to do oversight role and act as watchdog over the executive. Likewise, the Senate must screen and approve certain appointees of the executive. This also happens at the State level. (See Sections 147, 154(1), 171(4), 231, 238 and 250 of the Constitution). This also includes power to remove the President, Vice President, Governor and the Deputy Governor through procedure provided for in the Constitution. (See Sections 148 and 188 of the Constitution). In the same way, the Legislature oversees MDAs. The unfortunate thing is that the executive often interferes with the above functions by ensuring that their cronies are elected as the leaders of the various legislative houses through excessive politicking orchestrated and funded by the executive. Again, where the legislature musters enough courage and ventures to carry out any of the oversight functions, the executive often resorts to the use of money to pursue a “divide and rule” agenda to break the rank and file of the legislators. The effect of this interference is sacrifice of good governance on the altar of personal and political interests (Timothy, 1997)

Ethnic Loyalty

Many a times, Legislators who belong to a specific ethnic group are habitually reluctant to accuse members of the executive who belong to the same ethnic group as they are. This is due to the fact that the legislators sometimes put their ethnic interests above national interests. (Timothy, 1997)

Lack of Solid Legislative Framework for Oversight

At any time oversight functions are carried out, most often than not, the legislature would pass a Resolution to that outcome. However, it should be noted that resolutions could be ignored by the

executive. Therefore it would be best if there were legislation making it obligatory for the executive to respond to resolutions and to give details for not applying them. (Timothy, 1997)

The increasing demand for good governance within the political framework of democracy by international organizations and the civil society make the oversight functions of the legislative arm of government imperative to the deepening of democratic governance. Legislative oversight promotes checks and balances; it instills fiscal discipline, good governance, accountability and transparency in public offices. It also serves a number of other objectives and purposes such as:

- i. Improve the efficiency, economy and effectiveness of governmental operations;
- ii. Evaluate programmes and performance of MDAs;
- iii. Detect and prevent poor administration, waste, abuse, arbitrary and capricious behaviors or illegal and unconstitutional conduct;
- iv. Inform the general public and ensure that executive policies reflect the public interest;
- v. Gather information to develop new legislative proposals or to amend existing statutes, ensure administrative compliance with legislative intent and prevent executive encroachment on legislative authority and prerogatives.
- vi. Hold the executive branch accountable by scrutinizing whether the government's policies have been implemented and whether they are having the desired impact.
- vii. Provide financial accountability by approving and scrutinizing government spending by highlighting wasteful expenditure within publicly – funded services.

In political systems where legislatures are able to accomplish these objectives, legislative oversight becomes not only an indispensable and powerful instrument, but also an indicator of good governance (Adebayo, 2002).

2.2 Empirical Literature

In order to empirically achieve the objectives of the study and compared with the empirical findings of other scholars, the study reviewed various works done by other scholars. Ejikeme (2014), investigated the activities of the legislature on its relation legislative oversight functions and the effectiveness of this organ in ensuring and sustaining good governance in Nigerian polity. Legislative oversight, a robust mechanism institutionalized to checkmate the excesses of the executive arm of government and government agencies to curb waste in governance, corruption and absolutism in the exercise of political power, has been under criticism as to its relevance in democracy. The study found that the legislative oversight, a critical aspect of the functions of the legislature other than law making, have been severally compromised and often misused as a hunting dog. The study uses system analysis theory to explain the argument raised in the work. In the study also, both qualitative and quantitative data were collected for analysis. Therefore, the study recommended that constitutional and/or legal teeth be structured for effective and efficient legislative oversight, as a watchdog on the executive arm and its agencies, to bite culprits as deterrent.

Sunday, Oluwatobi and Oluwakemi (2012), examined the challenges and impediments faced in Nigeria by the legislature over the years and concludes with the prescriptions for better legislative political terrains and the steps to be taken to make the Legislature in Nigeria more relevant to the sustenance of the ingredients and values of democracy and good governance. The study employed elite' theory to explain the variable investigates in the study. Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected James (2010), investigates how direct democracy affects substantive and symbolic representation the study use liberal theory of democracy to explain the variable investigate in the work. Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected for empirical analysis. The findings of the study are as follows: First, the 'voting correctly' model is

the ability of voters to ‘correctly’ select a candidate that best represents the voter’s policy positions. Second, there is a reoccurring pattern in how, why, and under what conditions men are favored over women. Men are viewed as better decision makers, while women are more open to their constituents and are favored for their perceived trustworthiness and honesty. Third, an increased incumbency advantage, in which those who hold office are more likely to win their next election, demonstrates diminished policy voting through constituent servicing. Fourth, as voters are expected to select candidates for their honesty, trustworthiness, and integrity, elected officials in initiative states ought to be less susceptible to corruption. Fifth, voters in initiative states are more sensitive to the personal attractiveness of elected officials, but voters in initiative states are less sensitive to how competent the officials look. There is need for a new approach to the measurement of representation, as well as how this can be accomplished. Therefore, the study concludes that that the initiative brings convergence between policy and preferences.

Jacob (2008), explored legislative behaviour, processes and organization, to determine whether the pace of socio-economic development in Benue State can be attributed to its legislature. The methodology employed by the study involved wide coverage of three senatorial zones by selecting six constituencies from each. The study employed both participant observations and interview methods of data collection, covering key informants/stakeholders. The systems theory of David Easton was used as the theoretical framework for the study. The major findings of the study are as follows: First, the Benue State House of Assembly is deficient in Law-making, Representation and Oversight functions. Second, instead of exposing ‘corruption, inefficiency or waste’ by government ministries and departments, the Assembly itself was enmeshed in corruption and ineptitude; most laws passed originated from the Executive. Third, the Assembly failed in its enormous responsibilities of enhancing ‘good governance’ and being a catalyst for

socio-economic development in the state because it is bedeviled by a poor resource base that bothers on inadequate support staff, lack of financial autonomy, absence of up-to-date equipment and, above all, members that are inexperienced on legislative matters. Therefore, the major recommendations of the study includes; that the establishment of a Legislative Training Institute, Assembly Commission and Legislation of Assembly Autonomy Bill. Based on the above explorations, the study is of the view that for good governance to prevail in the study area, the qualification for entry into the house must be raised to higher institution of learning, for them to be able to checkmate the activities of the executive especially in terms of legislative oversight.

According to Oni (2013), the study investigated the extent of legislature's independence in its constitutional processes in the face of the executive's influence in Lagos and Ogun States using primary and secondary data. The study employed both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection, well-structured, closed and open-ended questionnaire was administered on 300 respondents selected through a combination of simple random and purposive sampling techniques from the Legislature, Executive, Academia, Civil Society Organizations, Political Parties and Mass Media from both Lagos and Ogun States. In addition, in-depth non-scheduled structured interviews were conducted on selected political actors in the two states. Data gathered were analyzed using percentile, measures of central tendency and content analysis. The findings of the study reveals that a noxious pattern of legislature-executive relations conditioned by such socio-political and economic culture as rent-seeking, manipulations, impositions, patronage and political clientelism, among others, existed in Lagos and Ogun States. Therefore, the study recommends the need to address those factors that encouraged the subordination of the legislature under the executive. The study however is of the opinion that for better law to be enacted, legislative oversight and appropriation, special training and workshops should be

organize from time to time, so that the legislators can be reminded about the autonomous power they have to stand as one body against all odds so as not to be divided when it comes to their legislative duties.

Egobueze (2013), examined the role of the Rivers State House of Assembly in conflict management for the period 1999-2011 using both primary and secondary data. The study employed purposeful sampling technique and selected 250 respondents. In order to collect the data, both interview and questionnaire techniques of data collection were used. The study used both descriptive statistics and Chi-square test to analyze the data. The major findings of the study are as follows: First, the Rivers State House of Assembly has played the role of mitigation and reconciliation of parties. Second, the role of Rivers State House of Assembly in conflict management is very effective. Third, the Legislature in Rivers State has been actively involved in conflict management and its involvement has greatly enhanced political stability in the State. Therefore, the study made the following recommendations: First, conflict management requires critical and sensitive government policies, for which the accountability of executive decision-making and its impact on peace building is vital. Second, Executive resources tend to dwarf those of the legislature; the control over its own purse then, is a centerpiece of its independence. Third, Constituents must have confidence in legislators and the role of the legislature in the political system as the primary mode of communication and compromise between political forces. Fourth, strengthening the linkages between a legislature and the people is a necessary step for promoting peace and stability in a fragile democracy like Nigeria's. Fifth, The representative function of legislatures is especially important in countries polarized by ethnic chauvinism like

Nigeria, where certain minority groups and marginalized individuals are frequently excluded from the governmental process.

Jonathan (2011), explored the role democracy plays in regional governance bodies, focusing specifically on the European parliament. The study used both interviews and documentary evidence to present a thesis that has two main claims. Firstly, it argues that the European Parliament represents a new form of democratic regional structure that represents both states and citizens, and introduces an element of democratic accountability to governance above the level of nation states. Secondly, the thesis contends that the Parliament, as part of the wider Union, possesses the potential for greater democratic function. Therefore, the study recommends a range of practical ways to improve democracy and governance in the Parliament, and by extension in other similar regional political bodies. These include the introduction of greater democratic influence on decision making, increased transparency, dedicated European political parties, and a stronger role for civil society bodies.

Oni (2014), examined the nature of legislature-executive relations at the state level of Nigeria's presidential system and found that these two political institutions have been relating with each other under an atmosphere of mutual suspicion, acrimony and political rivalry orchestrated largely by local godfathers in alliance with the presidency. The study therefore recommends that while legislative-executive conflict may be inevitable in the presidential democratic government, mechanism for harmonious relationship between the legislature and executive is imperative for good governance in Nigeria.

Ola (2016), examines legislature and democratic sustainability in Nigeria. The study used secondary source of data collection by consulting textbooks, journal articles, internet and newspapers while the technique of data analysis will be qualitative and historical. The study historically put Nigerian legislature in perspective; it investigates the functions of legislature in Nigeria democracy; it examines the challenges of legislature in sustaining Nigerian democracy. Therefore, the study found that democratic sustainability in Nigeria is predicated on autonomous, enlightened, efficient and effective legislature.

Edet and Amadu (2014), assessed the role of Nigerian legislature in national development. Descriptive diachronic methodology was used in comprehending and interpreting the role of the legislature in national development. The study use group theory to explain major argument raised in the work. The study found that legislature is a veritable instrument and institution for national development whose effectiveness is determined by some local variables. Therefore, the study recommends that for Nigerian legislature to be instrument of national development there is the need for moral politicians.

2.3 Summary of the Literature Reviewed

The literature review was divided into two major sections which includes; conceptual and empirical. Under the conceptual literature, the study reviewed the concepts of democracy and good governance, principle of separation of powers and the theory of representation in the liberal democratic state, the legislature and its role in democratic governance, types of legislature, legislative oversight, legislature in a federal system, legislature in Nigeria, and the 1999 constitution and the functions of the State House of Assembly. Under the empirical literature,

related literatures by various researchers were reviewed. Under theoretical literature, the study uses Locke and Montesquieu theories of separation of power.

2.2.2 Gaps in the Literature

In order to identify gap in the literature, the study examines the theoretical framework and methodology used by other researchers. Most of the literature reviewed concentrated on the activities of the legislature at the national level. However, to fill this gap, the current study examined the legislative oversight function of the Kaduna state House of Assembly in the period 2011 to 2015.

In terms of methodology, most of the literature reviewed employed qualitative research design or a combination of both qualitative and quantitative research design. However, the current study employed quantitative research design. This is because; quantitative research is more reliable and easy to understand compared to qualitative research.

2.4 Theoretical Framework

In assessing legislative oversight function on good governance, this work employs structural functionalism theory as postulated by Gabriel Almond J.S Coleman (1960). The theory was fundamentally built on the assumption that every unit in a political system regardless of the type of the political system must perform a specific task in order to make the entire system work or function for the benefit of all. This theory was first developed in the field of sociology by Talcott Parsons, Robert Merton and Marion Levy. Gabriel Almond and his associates further developed as a tool for political analysis (Gaubu, 2007). As initially argued by Parsons (1960), structural functional theory sees society as a system of parts, all of which serve a function together for the overall effectiveness and efficiency of society, structural functionalism is a consensus theory; a

theory that sees society as built upon order, interrelation, and balance among parts as a means of maintaining the smooth functioning of the whole. Structural functionalism views shared norms and values as the basis of society, focuses on social order based on tacit agreements between groups and organizations and views social change as occurring in a slow and orderly fashion. Almond and Coleman (1960) identified four basic characteristics of the functional political system. They include

- i. All political system must have political structure
- ii. Every political unit is working to make the political structure functional
- iii. The same function are performed in all political system with different frequencies and different kind of structure
- iv. All political system are mixed, that is they are interrelated and interconnected with one another

Accordingly, Almond and his associates identified four input functions and three out functions of every functional political system. The input functions include among other

- i. Political socialization and recruitment
- ii. Interest articulation
- iii. Interest aggregation and
- iv. Political communication

The out functions of all functional political system include the followings

- i. Rulemaking
- ii. Rule application

iii. Rule Adjudication

Environment		Environment	
<i>Function</i>	<i>Structure</i>	<i>Function</i>	<i>Structure</i>
Politicalso- cialization	Family,peer group,school,	RuleMaking	Legislature
andrecruitment	churche.t.c.		
Interestartic ulation	interest groups	RuleApplication	Executive
interestaggre- gation	political parties	RuleAdjudication	Judiciary
political communication.	massmedia		
	Environment		Environment

POLITICAL SYSTEM

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Political socialization and recruitment: To Almond and Coleman (1960) for proper functioning of the system, there must be within the system a particular unit that performs the function of

political socialization and recruitment to every member of political system. This vital function normally performs by family, peer group, school, religious institution etc. this unit deal with training an individual within the political system on how to effective perform political role in order to make the system stable and functional to every political member in the system

Interest Articulation: this according to Almond and Coleman (1960) denote to the process whereby the opinion, attitudes, believes and preferences converted into coherent demand on political system. This function is usually performed divergent political structure but interest group is the most suited to perform this important political role. They normally converted the divergent interest of individual to policies, programmes (Gaub, 2007: Almond & Coleman, 1960).

Interest Aggregation: this has to do with the collation of divergent interest mainly to translate them into policies programme and concrete action. This function is largely perform by the political parties (Gaub, 2007: Almond & Coleman, 1960)

Political Communication: this is concerned with receiving and transmitting values, news and idea to every section of the society regarding the function of the political system. This role is always performing by mass media or the organization the media section in the society. (Gaub, 2007: Almond & Coleman, 1960)

Rule Making: This is one of the major segments of the output units that mainly concerned with law making, oversight function and representation of people interest in the government

Rule Application: this output unit concerned largely with the execution of policies and programme for the benefit of the political system(Gaub, 2007: Almond & Coleman, 1960)

Law Adjudication: this is another output unit that mainly perform the role of adjudicating the law for the peace, stability and tranquility of the political system (Gaub, 2007: Almond & Coleman, 1960)

2.4.1 Relevance of the Theory

It is apparently clear that the political system here in Nigeria was structured in such a way that every unit performs specific function for the system to grow and operate for the benefit of all. In Kaduna state, various units are performing their function for the stability of the system. One of this units in the state is the legislative arm. They are to a large possible extent engage in law making, oversight function and representing the interest and opinion of the people in the state. The basic perspective of structural functional point of view emerges in its prime emphasis on political system and on the interrelations of its institutions, rather than on the individual or groups such as family. Social life persists because societies find means (structures) whereby they fulfill the needs (functions) which are either preconditions or consequences of organized social life.

The structural functionalism primary concern of political system functionalism is the large social structure and institutions of society, their interrelationships and their constraining effects on actors. The major assumptions of Almond & Coleman, (1960) in explaining society are as follows;

1. Society viewed as an entity in itself, and as distinguished from and irreducible to its parts.
2. Parts of political system as fulfilling basic needs or requisites of the whole.
3. Basic needs of a political have to be fulfilled if 'abnormal' states are to be avoided, and
4. Political system has equilibrium states around which normal function occurs.

2.4.2 Limitation of the Theory

Despite the popularity of the structural functional Theory, the theory was criticized on the following grounds:

1. It is ahistorical.
2. It is unable to deal effectively with the process of change or conflict.
3. It is conservative.
4. It is viewed as ambiguous and lacking in adequate methods.
5. Structural functionalism inhibits certain forms of analyses such as comparative analysis.
6. Functionalists argue that the positions that are most highly rewarded are the most important for society. But critics argue that the most highly rewarded positions are not necessarily the most important.
7. Percy Cohen and Jonathan Turner see Teleology and Tautology as the two most important logical problems confronting structural functionalism. (Johnson, 1989)

The scope of this research has been carefully stated for the avoidance of contradiction. Therefore, the limitation of the theory will not prevent the assumption of the theory from explaining the argument raised in the work. This is so because in relating the models of systems analysis to the Legislature in the Nigerian political system, there is the requirement that we cannot analyze the totality of the complex structures of the political system, because of the inadequacies of time and space, this research, in looking at the Nigerian political system with focus on the legislative structure of the Nigerian state with empirical focus of Kaduna State legislature with reference to Kaduna State House of Assembly committee on Education, work

and health committees. Furthermore it will only consider the legislative activities of Kaduna State House of Assembly of the Nigerian legislature in the fourth republic, (2011-2015)

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter explains the method used in collecting the relevant data for analysis. It includes among others, research design, population of study, sample size, sampling technique, sources of data, categories of respondents and the methods of data analysis.

3.1.1 Research Design

Qualitative Method of data collection using interview instrument is employed on the basis that it endeavors to explore and describe the phenomenon that prompted the researchers curiosity (Marshal & Rossman, 1999) in this case Members of Kaduna State House of Assembly, heads of MDA particularly in ministries of Education, Health and works experiences and perception in oversight legislative function will be analyze. This will make us understand how legislatures perform their oversight function largely to improve efficiency in running the government business.

The selection of this research design has been justified due to the fact that it considered to be the most common data collection instrument for qualitative research, primarily because of its personal approach to get relevant data for analysis.

Sources of Data

For the purpose of this work, data was gathered from two major sources. These are secondary and primary sources. The secondary sources included literature documented in academic books, scholarly journal articles, magazines, newspapers and internet materials, edited works, conference papers. These materials were collected and assessed from the Kashim Ibrahim Library (KIL) ABU Zaria, Postgraduate Library of the Department of Political Science, Faculty

of Social Sciences, ABU Zaria, Library, Kaduna State, and Centre for Democratic Development Research and Training, Zangon-Shanu, Samaru, Zaria. Other sources of data include among others; qualitative data which were collected using instrument of In-depth interview:

Population of Study

Kaduna State House of Assembly being the case study area, the population of study comprises the Members Kaduna State House of Assembly and they are 34 and 3 permanent secretaries from the Ministries of Education, Health and Works. The heads of secondary schools and they are 720 and 24 Medical directors of Hospitals under Kaduna State and Kaduna State Public work Agency (KAPWA). Thus, the population of study is 784

Sample Size and Sampling Technique

The sample size of the study is 16 which is considered adequate for population of study that is less than 10,000 (Marshal & Rossman, 1999). Purposive sampling technique was used to select members from Kaduna State House of Assembly working in education, health and work committees, three permanent secretaries, director KAPWA and some schools and hospitals heads working in Kaduna State

Instruments for Data Collection

The following instruments were used to collect data from all the categories of respondents on legislative oversight functions for good governance particularly on the works that have been executed in the Ministries of Education, Science and technology, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Works and Transport

- i. In-depth-interview

- ii. Personal observation

Categories of Respondents

Relevant qualitative data was collected from the following target respondents:

- a) Members and chairmen of the following House Committees in Kaduna State House of Assembly:
 - i. Kaduna State House Committees on Education
 - ii. Kaduna State House Committees on Health matters
 - iii. Kaduna State House Committees on Works and Transport
- b) Head of Ministries Departments and Agencies (MDAs)
 - i) Heads of Educational Institutions.
 - j) Chief Medical Directors in Kaduna State General Hospitals
 - k) Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education Science and Technology
 - l) Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Health
 - m) Permanent Secretary Ministry of Works and Transport
 - n) Director KAPWA

Types of Data Collected

Qualitative data were collected using interviews and observations as instruments for the data collection. The interview and personal observation conducted were on information about the results of executed works or observations monitored through the legislative oversight visits. It could be linked to an eyewitness testimony at a trial which no one has tarnished or spun the information by adding their independent opinions or biases. Therefore, it can form the basis of

objective conclusion. Egobueze (2013), described primary data as data collected by oneself using such methods as direct observation, surveys, interviews and logs.

On the other hand, the secondary data were collected using both published and unpublished articles, journals, theses and dissertations, and so on. Egobueze (2013) refers to secondary data as data that has already been collected. Thus, the study makes extensive use of both primary and secondary data.

Methods of Data Presentation and Analysis

Data were presented and analyzed through one of the qualitative methods techniques which the narrative method. In the first instances, the interviews are presented in a narrative form and analyzed alongside one another. This is in a way that answers given by the legislative members and the permanent secretaries were first presented then interrogated by the answers given by the heads of the MDAs to ascertain whether or not the answers given by the members Kaduna State House of Assembly and the permanent secretaries from the respective ministries are correct and satisfactory.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 ANALYSIS ON THE LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT

4.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the presentation of data collected using the interview and personal observation as instruments for data collection. The data were presented to answer the research questions mainly to achieve the research objectives earlier presented in chapter one. The data collected from the members, Kaduna State House of Assembly was first presented and identified in the text as (Informant 1, 2019). This has been done to conform to the principle of anonymity. While the data collected from the permanent secretaries were identified in the text as (Informant 2, 2019). But the data collected from the head of the MDAs were identified in the text as (Informant 3, 2019). This is to conform to the principle of confidentiality of the respondents as we promised in the field during the conduct of interview (see Appendix).The interview data were also supported by personal observation.

4.2 Data Presentation

Efficiency

The informants to this question named three areas where they normally work or relate to the Kaduna State House of Assembly (KDSHA) i.e. budget, planning and implementation, seeking for more clarification about a project under our ministry and our financial spending;

We normally related and work with KDSHA mostly during budget planning and implementation. When we submit our budget proposal to the executive arm of government, if there is any need for more explanation, we use to receive invitation from either executive arm or legislative arm of government to give more clarification about any project under our ministry our spending” (Informant 2, 2019).

Informant 2 elaborated further

We work on several issues with KDSHA more recently we worked with them on Health Insurance Scheme which we call, Kaduna State Contributory Health Scheme, we travel together we mostly have interaction with them on several occasion” (Informant 2, 2019).

Another informant 2 disclosed that “We do relate and work closely with the KDSHA when they need more information concerning the implementation of budget submitted to them by the executive arm of government. They use to go to the field to assess the level of implementation (Informant 2, 2019). One of the interviewee further argued that,

all the relevant house committees usually go on oversight function mostly before and after the budget or if there is any project that is being undertaken by the ministry to see the progress of work doing e.g. last 2 weeks the committee on works went round the state mostly the local government to oversee what the contractors are doing and to report back to the house for legislative action.....” (Informant 1, 2019)

But, majority of informants lamented that they don’t work or have any relations with KDSHA member. “We only get them through news but they don’t normally visit us for any legislative work, our relation with them is unofficial and always on political matters in our various towns and villages” (Informant 3, 2019). “I don’t have any record on working with KDSHA” (Informant 3, 2019).

The above submission from both permanent secretaries and head of MDs revealed that, the legislative members frequently visit the headquarters of the ministries of education, health and work for their legislative function but ignored to a large possible extent the agencies and departments under the ministries.

Legislative and Ministries Official Roles

Interview 2 argued that they always participate in the interaction session when the need arise, make themselves available particularly during budget defense. One of the interviewee posits that “we normally supply them with information when they ask for and we also guide them on how to make contribution for the development of the government ministries” (Informant 2, 2019). Most oversight function is during budget planning and defense”

But for the interview 3 they maintained that they were never invited by Kaduna State House of Assembly. “We don’t use to receive invitation from any committee of the House or let me say it clearly they recognized us as important stakeholders that our inputs are needed for any developmental purpose in our sector” (Informant 3, 2019)

Informant 1 and 2 mentioned seeking for information and clarification about government activities, exposing inefficiency and corrupt practices, budget implementation, given valuable advice and recommendations on how to improve government operation. ” Our roles during oversight visit include among other things seeking for information and clarification about government activities, exposing inefficiency and corrupt practices, given valuable advice and recommendations on how to improve government operation” (informant 1, 2019). They normally seek for information concerning our work particularly our budget implementation and other government spending concerning their respective ministries

This shows that the major role of legislative members concerning oversight function include among others; seeking for information and clarification about government activities, exposing inefficiency and corrupt practices, budget implementation, given valuable advice and recommendations on how to improve government operation.

Relationship

Informants 1 & 2 described their relationship as cordial. They are working together hand in hand to help in the formulation of policies for the common good of all in the state. But respondent 3 submit that their relationship is yet to be established. Informant 3 further explained that by working harmoniously, it helps in the improvement of health, education and works in the state for instance one of the interviewee argued that our relation with Kaduna State House of Assembly is very cordial they normally work amicably with one another particularly during budget defense or during their legislative visit (Informant 2, 2019). “Our cordial relation with the house members is cordial and is instrumental in the success that the state is achieving” (Informant 2, 2019)

Some of the informants 2 argued that there is no any relation that exists between their department and the Kaduna State House of Assembly. One of them argued that “ we don’t have any working relation with the Kaduna State House of Assembly on any issue, since they are not coming to our working place for any reason”(informant 3, 2019).

This clarification shows that there is cordial relation between the Kaduna State House of Assembly and the informant 3. But due to the inability of the members of the Kaduna State House of Assembly to visit informant 2 working place there is no any working relationship that exists between them and the KDSHA.

Legislative Visitation

Informant 3 argued that “We are constantly being monitored by Universal State Basic Education Board (SUBEB) Zonal Educational inspectorate division, Kaduna State Ministry of Education Science and Technology, Kaduna State ministry of finance as well as Kaduna State Teachers’

Service Board” (informant 3, 2019). It is in record that our supervisors come from the ministry of finance and health, erstwhile from Federal ministry of health or professional body” (informant 3, 2019). We receive visitors from our mother ministry or from executive arm of government to supervise our official duties” (Informant 3, 2019)

From the above interview the government department or parastatals particularly schools and hospital use to be supervised by particular governmental agencies under executive control not Kaduna State House of Assembly

Informant 1 argued that they frequently visit government ministries, department and agencies, as one of the interview posits

.....all the relevant house committees usually go on oversight functions mostly before and after the budget or if there is any project that is being undertaken by the ministry to see the progress of work doing e.g. last 2 weeks the committee on works went round the state mostly the local government to oversee what the contractors are doing and to report back to the house for legislative action..... (Informant 1, 2019)

Another legislature also explain that

“.....Reforming of schools, building of so many schools, we go round schools to make sure projects are done. 34 committees were formed and every member is a chairman of a committee. We use to visit most of the schools, including Zonal Office of Education to take any complains if there are. Alhuda-huda College Zaria was renovated, Barewa College, Zaria was renovated, Government Day Secondary School Kofar Gayan, Zaria renovated and fenced because of encroachment. Government encroachment on private land was also taken into consideration (Informant 1, 2019).

“They regularly visit the ministries and also go to the field to oversee works executed” (Informant 2, 2019)“It is sorry to say our school has no any record of legislative visit and really reduce to the large possible extent the quality of many work executed by various government in my school” (Informant 3, 2019)

The truth of the matter is that the members of the Kaduna House of Assembly regularly visit or serve invitation letter to the officials working in the ministry headquarters, but rarely visit the Government agencies particularly the schools and hospitals; they only serve them with invitation letter to the schools, heads or chief medical directors for any oversight function. But the permanent secretaries and members of Kaduna State House of Assembly deny that in their attempt not to expose the government secret or their weakness as explained by the leading exponents of Organization Public Relations Theory that the top officials within the organization are mandated to keep the top secret of the organization particularly secret that has to do with the major weakness areas of the organization (Ferguson, 1984 & Ledingham 2001).

Respondent 2 revealed many of their experiences of legislative visit to their respective ministries. While head of the MDAs lamented of having no record of any legislative visit to their working place. “We do receive invitation from the house committee to go and give more light concerning the budget of our ministry” (Informant 2, 2019). It is sorry to say that our school has no any record of legislative visit (informant 3, 2019)

From the above data it can be deduced that legislative oversight visit start and end in the headquarter of the ministry in Kaduna State

Information on Government Priority

Informant 3 explained that their mother ministry use to supply information about the government to them not Kaduna State House of Assembly. It is normal to get publication about government strategies for action, priority or programme from our mother ministry (informant 3, 2019).

The above explanation indicated to us that the ministries of health, education and works use to give adequate information to their agencies and parastatals.

Informant 3 further explained that

It has been requested many times my humble self to appear before the house and make clarification on particular issue the members need clarification. One of the crucial one was the demand of the house for me to give more clarification on feeding not only me other ministry staff that have information on the issue were all invited to give explanation (Interview 2, 2019)

However another informant 2 submit that “yes we were requested to explain about many work executed by the state government under this ministry” (Interview 2, 2019). It has been requested for me personally to appear and give detailed explanation about budget implementation of this ministry (Interview 2, 2019).

This indicated that from time to time the Kaduna State House Assembly do requested clarification from the different ministries (informant 3).

Improvement of Financial Management

Informant 2 all agreed that the legislative oversight function could improve the financial management of their respective ministry. While the MDAs said no

As one informant 2 argued that “constant legislative visit will surely improve the financial management of every ministry” (Interview 2, 2019). Although, the Kaduna State House of Assembly are not visiting us but if they will strive to do that, it certainly will improve the financial spending of all government agencies in the state” (Interview 3, 2019). Oversight function really improve financial management of the state, because more recently we passed a law on Treasury Single Account mainly to stop leakages from our treasury (informant 1, 2019). The legislative oversight visit makes us to remain on our feet concerning financial management

(informant 2, 2019). We don't have any impact of oversight function, they do not visit us nor regulate our financial spending (informant 3, 2019)

The above explanation surely explain that if Kaduna State House of Assembly will strive to pay visit to all government parastatals and check about their financial spending the situation could possibly improve.

Majority of informants 2 and 3 believe that constant and regular monitoring of government programs and policies by visiting not only the ministries but also the departments and agencies under ministry can have significant effect. "The legislative oversight visit should be made to make more frequent" (informant 2, 2019). "Responsible and well-mannered politicians should be elected into legislative offices" (informant 3, 2019). "Legislative members must always create time to regularly visit the ministry programmes (informant 2, 2019). The legislative members should always engage themselves in workshops and trainings to upgrade their knowledge about legislative activities (informant 1, 2019). The legislative oversight function can be improved through regular monitoring, the house members should be more dedicated in promoting the overall interest of the state not their personal interest (informant 3, 2019)

This indicates that the legislative need to be given more training on legislative activities and they should endeavor to be up and doing in checking the government programmes not only at the ministry headquarter but at various parastatals and government agencies under their respective ministries.

Reduction of fund waste

Some of the respondents especially informant 2 fundamentally believed that the Kaduna State Legislative Oversight Function really add value to their work. While head of MDAs agreed that

the legislative oversight could have added value to their work if they remain committed to visit their place of work. “Their visits encourage us to do the right thing. Thus, things are now going normal” (informant 2, 2019). “Their inspections to our ministry certainly add value to our work” (informant 2, 2019). They normally don’t add value to our work that is why they don’t come down to the agency and schools (informant 3, 2019)

This indicates that the legislative oversight is instrumental in adding value to the workers in Kaduna State particularly if the legislatures could be determined to visit the government parastatals and agencies in the state.

Exposing Corruption and Inefficiency

All of the informants agreed that legislative oversight function has the capacity of exposing, corruption in government activities. A committee member of health explained that

We have seen so many attempts of corruption cases during our oversight visit, and it was so visible to the extent that we recommended taking action by the executive arm of government in order to deter future occurrence. Infact so many inefficiencies were also discovered that we had to correct the government officials and we warned them to make sure such situation doesn’t occur again (informant 1, 2019)

“If the legislative members have the political will and remain very skillful and dedicated, their sight visit could certainly expose scores of inefficiencies and corrupt practices in government agencies and departments” (informant 3, 2019). “Yes the legislative visit is an effective instrument of exposing corrupt practices in government departments and agencies” (Interview 2, 2019)

From the above submission one can deduce that legislative oversight function is an effective instrument of exposing inefficiency and corrupt practices in the government ministries

departments and agencies. This can be achieved if the legislative have the political will and remain dedicated to their duties.

Challenges Associated with Legislative oversight function

Many of the informants mentioned different types of problems associated with legislative function. “Nonchalant attitudes towards work, servicing personal interest constituted a major problem for the legislative members to embark regularly on legislative visit to government departments and agencies” (informant 3, 2019). Some respondents mentioned collection of bribes for their personal gain as the main problem of legislative oversight function (informant 3, 2019) “the feeling of superiority and lack of technical knowledge concerning the activities of the ministry they visit constituted a major problem (informant 2, 2019).

From the above available information, alleged collection of bribes, feeling of superiority and lack of technical know-how became a major stumbling block of the legislative function in Kaduna State

Invitation for Public Hearing

Informant 2 responded yes to this, while informant 3 responded no to this question. We normally receive invitations to deliver to KDSHA information particularly concerning some items delivered to this ministry” (informant 2, 2019) “ Yes there was a time that KDSHA invited me and some of my staff to give some information concerning feeding of the primary school pupils in our state (informant 2, 2019). Myself or any of my members of staff was never invited for any reason to KDSHA” (informant 3, 2019)

It can be deduced from the above submission that the Kaduna State House of Assembly restricted their invitation for any investigative inquiry to the ministry headquarters but does not normally go down to MDAs for more inquiry.

Legislature commitment

Informant 1 all agreed that they give report to the house, use to give them encouragement by ensuring their allowances are paid and sometime invite them to submit their report to the house. “We do encourage our members by making sure all their salaries and allowances are paid on time for them to carry out their duties diligently” (Informant 1, 2019). What really encourage us to go for oversight visit is that our house under the leadership of this vibrant speaker use to invite every committee to house (Informant 1, 2019)

“We normally consider experience and qualifications in the membership or leadership to any committee, this will enable them to deliver their best (Informant 1, 2019)

“We normally checkmate their activities by asking them to report their findings and recommendations to the whole house during the plenary session” (Interview 1, 2019) “we always ask the leadership of the house to report work to the house, sometimes the speaker can talk unofficial in other to give all kinds of encouragement needed for one to do the right thing” (Informant 1, 2019)

From the above submission it can be realized that the leadership of the Kaduna State House Assembly use to checkmate the legislative oversight work of the various committee by asking them to report their findings and recommendations to the whole house during plenary session

This explanation indicated to us that the members of the committee in the house are encouraged through paying their allowances and by asking them to submit their reports from time to time to the whole house.

Improvement of Performance

The informant 1 and 2 mentioned the following, as important legislative oversight functions; monitoring the ministries activities, ensuring proper budget implementation, regulating government spending, exposing inefficacy and corruption etc. As one of the interviewee argued essentially that

Legislative oversight function ensure general hospitals and Primary Healthcare (PHC's) are working well, the last bill passed by national health insurance scheme committee on health went round the state to make sure their staffs are doing their jobs and the hospitals are equipped.....”(Informant 1, 2019)

Another interviewee also asserts that

In Zaria, Gambo Sawaba was dilapidated but was renovated by Kaduna State Government and World Health Organization joint programme in taking care of all the general hospitals. It was fully equipped with modern equipments. It was formally Zaria General Hospital but renamed Gambo Sawaba General Hospital. In Jema'a, Turaki Buga Hospital was built by the then Local Government Chairman who is the present Kaduna State Deputy Governor. It was above the capacity of Local Government so the state government took over. That was how the hospital became a general hospital. In Kaduna North/Doka/Gabasawa, Barau Dikko General Hospital was upgraded to a teaching hospital from a specialist hospital (Informant 1, 2019)

“Legislative oversight could play vital role if to say they go down to schools and hospital to see their dilapidated condition (Personal observation See Appendix also) (informant 3, 2019)

It is true that they use to enact law to make sure the government institutions are doing well but they do not visit schools, hospitals and other sectors for project site assessment to see the dilapidated structure or sub-standard quality executed (Personal observation see Appendix)

The informants vary in their response. The ministries, top officials and the members of Kaduna State House of Assembly argued that legislative oversight function really improved the effectiveness of the capital project in the ministry, while the Heads of MDAs disagreed with their submission. For instance one of the legislators explained that

Our legislative visit do improve the effectiveness of the capital project, for instance, In Zaria, Gambo Sawaba hospital was dilapidated but was renovated by Kaduna State Government and World Health Organization joint programme in taking care of all the general hospitals. It was fully equipped with modern equipments. It was formally Zaria General Hospital but renamed Gambo Sawaba General Hospital. In Jema'a, Turaki Buga Hospital was built by the then Local Government Chairman. It was above the capacity of Local Government so the state government took over. That was how the hospital became a general hospital. In Kaduna North/Doka/Gabasawa, Barau Dikko General Hospital was upgraded to a teaching hospital from a specialist hospital (Interview 1, 2019)

It is true that the dilapidated structure of Gambo Sawaba General Hospital Zaria Local Government was reconstructed by the joint effort of WHO of UN and Kaduna State Government. The role of legislature in this work was approval of the executive submission in their budget proposal, but the legislature never pay any visit to assess the quality of the work.

Another legislator also explained that

In the area of health, hospitals across the state were renovated and new machineries were puts in place. These hospitals includes; Hajiya Gambo Sawaba, Giwa General Hospital, Hunkuyi General Hospital, Doka new hospital, Pambeguwa hospital, Yusuf Dan-Tsoho hospital. Every hospital in Kaduna state was renovated. Also, personnel/doctor, nurses were put in place; new school for health technology was erected and financed. Anti natal clinics were renovated during our time and Kafanchan nursing school was also upgraded and renovated.....”(informant 1, 2019)

It is also obvious that all these public institutions were all renovated, because they were all approved by the Kaduna state house of assembly as submitted by the executive governor of the state

Another legislature also posits that,

Health: the prison side near KASTELIA, there is a hospital. Workers were made available. It was first managed by Local Government but infusion by the state government. Workers, attendants, cleaners were all provided based on oversight function. We look at the entire manifest and compare with what is on ground and then talked to the executive. Kofar Gayan hospital was also renovated; the optical centre (unit) was equipped by the state govt (informant 1, 2019)

This was also appropriated by the Kaduna state house of Assembly and in most cases never visited by the members of the house to ascertain the quality of the project. “We have never seen them visiting our school to assess the quality of the project being executed in our school” (informant 3, 2019) it is true that many work that was executed due to absent of legislative visit t were sub-standard, because the building are now run-down (Personal observation, See Appendix). Likewise some roads that were constructed in 2015 are now in bad shape (Personal observation. See Appendix)

Respondent 2 argued that the legislative oversight function really add value to their work because they help in given them legal backing on their activities. But informant 2 argued that there is no any value added to their work as a result of legislative oversight. “We don’t see this people, how can they add value to our official assignment?” (informant 3, 2019)

From the above interview, one can realize that legislative oversight is still instrumental in adding value to top military officials because they always receive legislative oversight visit and also involve in interaction and investigative hearing with house members

The above submission indicated that, some schools, hospitals and other capital project in works were renovated but the only role of the legislature was approving the work in the budget submitted by the executive arm of government.

The informants also vary on their responses to the legislative commitment in law enactment. The legislative members mentioned many laws enacted by house of assembly members that are instrumental to good governance.

Since when we come on board May 2015 the Kaduna state government gave education priority. From the first budget, education has the highest budget in Kaduna state among the agencies or ministries. Recently the house passed a law on scholarship and loans for the indigenes of the Kaduna state students and teachers of who doesn't have the privilege to finance or sponsor their students. Education is of paramount importance to life of every citizen in the country. Quality assurance is another law to checkmate the quality of education, material conditions of school, how our students are being taught, how are teachers teaching, every law has a direct effect on our children as citizens of the state. School in all the zones, and in all the local government, school uniforms, feeding, boarding schools about 90% has been renovated in Kaduna state. For example; Technical School Malali, Queen Amina in Kaduna North, Barewa college in Zaria, and Kafanchan boarding school in Kafanchen. In both primary and secondary schools there are a lot of changes, free books, free uniforms, feeding programme furniture's and free chalks. In all aspects, 100% were being taken care of. Now the government is looking at how to take care of the welfare of the teachers..... (Interview 1, 2019)

This shows that relevant laws were enacted by the Kaduna State House of Assembly mainly to provide grounds for good governance particularly in the area of education. Another legislative member submit that,

.....for the general hospitals and Primary HealthCare's (PHC's), the last bill past national health insurance scheme committee on health went round the state to make sure the staffs are doing their jobs and the hospitals are alright.....(Interview 1, 2019)

This shows that relevant laws were enacted by the house of assembly mainly to provide a breeding ground for good governance in Kaduna State

1.5 Summary and Discussion of findings

From the data presented and analyzed above on the subject studied, the following deductions or findings are drawn:

- i. The research found that, it is obvious that Kaduna State House committees on Education, Health and works pay regular legislative oversight visit to headquarters of their respective ministry. The house committees on oversight visit largely on three fundamental issues; they are monitoring of budget, implementation and budget defense; invitation for public or investigative hearing as well as engaging the top Ministry officials on interactive session. This oversight visit to the ministry headquarters is instrumental in exposing corrupt practices and inefficiency in government operations. This is due to the fact that the three permanent secretaries of the three ministries posit that house committee members do engage them on interactive session, invite them for public and investigative hearing and in most cases visit their respective ministries for monitoring of budget implementation. Although, many of the legislative members do not have technical knowledge to make some complex issues but they do take the issue of legislative oversight function very serious (Ahmadu and Ajiboye, 2004). It is also within the premises of the basic assumption of structural functionalism that the legislature is one of the formal agency of government that make law, representing the popular will of the electorate and oversight function for the system to grow for the common good of all

ii. The research also found that members of Kaduna State House of Assembly restricted their duty of oversight function mainly to the headquarters of the ministries without going down to government departments under the agencies such as schools, hospitals and capital project site in works to determine the quality of the government projects executed in the agencies. This seriously diminishes to a large possible extent the quality of the capital projects executed in the various government agencies and departments. For instance, some of the schools, hospitals and sites that were renovated by the previous and the current administration are already in horrible need of reconstruction again, this is due to the sub-standard nature of the work. Additionally, some roads constructed by the present government in Kaduna State are already washed away by the running water due to the low-level standard of the roads (Personal Observation, see Appendix).“It is sorry to say the school I work has no any record of legislative visit and this really reduce to the large possible extent the quality of many work executed by the government in the school ” (Interview 3, 2019).

iii. The research found that, the legislative oversight function in Kaduna State has the capacity of exposing corrupt practices and inefficiency in the government operation particularly if it is made to be on regular periods. This is due to the fact that the public servant do their work diligently for fear of being expose by the regular visit of legislature. So also, the contractors also do their work efficiently for fear of being expose of inefficiency. An interviewee also posits that “the legislative visit really increase and improve the efficiency in government work “(informant 2, 2019). One of the cardinal merits of investigative hearings or oversight is that it

puts public officers on their toes, literally. This acts as a restraining influence on government action. (*Policy and legal Advocacy, 2016*)

iv. It was found that the major constrain of legislative function in Kaduna State is the legislative member attempt to service their personal interest, lack of technical knowledge and collection of bribes. Some of the legislative members use to partake in oversight visit mainly to collect bribes from the top government official or negotiate contract with members of the executive arm of government as *Policy and legal advocacy* (2016) explained that It has often been said that a good number of members of the National Assembly (including legislators at the State levels) pursue pure selfish interests that often inhibit them from combating the challenges of law-making, representation and oversight. Many of them focus on obtaining contracts from the leadership of the houses and even from Chief Executives of the various MDAs.

v. It was also found that electing responsible individuals to Kaduna State House of Assembly and the regular training and workshop, legislative members could be an effective instrument in the improvement of performance of the elected members to effectively carry out their respected duties of oversight function. Responsible and well-mannered politicians should be elected into legislative offices” (Interview 3, 2019). The legislative members should always engage themselves in workshop and training to upgrade their knowledge about legislative activities (Interview 1, 2019). Demonstration of patriotic and nationalistic will by legislators in the conduct of oversight and Development and utilization of workshop and oversight templates to guide effective conduct of the exercise and proper reporting; (*Policy and legal advocacy, 2016*)

vi. It was also found out that there is poor budget performance and inefficiency in the provision of infrastructure on education, health and works. This is due to the fact that despite the huge amount of fund incurred by the Kaduna State Government particularly from the oil revenue most of the capital project in state were abandoned. For instance, Governor Muktar Ramalan Yero in his 2015 budget speech, he declared that “However, as at 31st October, 2014 the sum of N62,521,223,880.34 was released for recurrent expenditure representing 82% while actual Capital Expenditure stood at N12,834,605,161.65 which represents 9.50%.” this is despite the ability of the state to incurred the sum of N44,734,049,665.07 against what the state was budgeted of N71,790,600,000. This shows there is drawback of 62.31% (Kaduna State Budget). In spite of this fall, government should have spent for capital project more than 9.50%.” as against the recurrent expenditure that consumed 82% of what has been already budgeted for.

vii. In the preceding years too, Kaduna State government was able to get more than the amount budgeted from the oil revenue. For instance in 2011, Kaduna State Government budgeted for N45, 580,438,679 to have gotten from the federal allocation but has gotten N60,069,858,870.84. This amounting to revenue performance of 131.79% from the statutory allocation of the federation account. But with all this development there was no evidence on ground. Muhammad (2011) argues that Kaduna State Government claim to have spent the sum of ₦8,788 billion on capital project in education sector in 2011 and 2012. But one can hardly see the impact of this expenditure because they are not visible for everybody

to see. For instance, in 2015 Kaduna State Government budgeted N4, 278000 for maintenance but the maintenance projects are not visible to be seen in the school in year 2015.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Summary

The study examines legislative oversight and democratic governance in Kaduna State for the period 2011 to 2015. The study was divided into five chapters, chapter one was the introduction which contains the background to the study, statement of the research problem, research questions, assumption of the study, significance of the study, scope and limitation of the study, definition of key terms, and organization of the study. Chapter two was the literature review and theoretical framework which contains the conceptual and empirical literature as well as the theoretical framework. Under conceptual literature, the study reviewed the concepts of democracy and good governance, principle of separation of powers and the theory of representation in the liberal democratic state, legislature and its role in democratic governance, types of legislature, legislative oversight, legislature in Africa, legislature in Nigeria, 1999 constitution and the functions of the State House of Assembly.

Under empirical literature, the study reviewed the works of other researchers related to the subject matter which includes; Ejikeme (2014) investigated the activities of the legislature on its legislative oversight functions and the effectiveness of this organ in ensuring and sustaining good governance in Nigerian polity, Sunday, Oluwatobi and Oluwakemi (2012), examined the challenges and impediments faced in Nigeria by the legislature over the years, James (2010) investigated how direct democracy affects substantive and symbolic representation, Jacob (2008) explored legislative behaviour, processes and organization, to determine whether the pace of socio-economic development in Benue State can be attributed to its legislature, Oni (2013), investigated the extent of legislature's independence in its constitutional processes in the face of

the executive's influence in Lagos and Ogun States, Egobueze (2013), examined the role of the Rivers State House of Assembly in conflict management, Jonathan (2011), explored the role democracy plays in regional governance bodies, focusing specifically on the European parliament, Oni (2014), examined the nature of legislature-executive relations at the state level of Nigeria's presidential system, Ola (2016), examined legislature and democratic sustainability in Nigeria, and Edet and Amadu (2014), assessed the role of Nigerian legislature in national development. Under theoretical framework, the study adopted structural functional theory as postulated by Gabriel Almond and J.S Coleman. Chapter three is the methodology of the study which contains the role of Kaduna State House of Assembly, research design, population of the study, population sample, sampling technique, types of data collected, instrument of data collection, and method of data presentation and analysis.

Chapter four is the analysis and discussion of the result which contains the demographic characteristics of respondents, relationship between legislative oversight of health committee and effectiveness of health policy in Kaduna State, relationship between legislative oversight of works committee and effectiveness of works policy in Kaduna State, relationship between legislative oversight of education committee and effectiveness of education policy in Kaduna State, and analysis of interview result. Findings of the study reveal that: first, there is significant relationship between legislative oversight of health committee and effectiveness of health policy under democratic governance in Kaduna State. Second, there is significant relationship between legislative oversight of works committee and effectiveness of works policy under democratic governance in Kaduna State. Third, there is significant relationship between legislative oversight of education committee and effectiveness of education policy under democratic governance in Kaduna State.

5.2 Conclusion

The major conclusion that can be drawn from the study is that the Kaduna State House of Assembly has performed well in its legislative oversight in Kaduna State for the period 2011 to 2015. The major findings of the study reveal that legislative oversight functions of Kaduna State House of Assembly is very effective in monitoring the activities of the of the ministry officials at the headquarter. Secondly, the legislative oversight function of Kaduna State House of Assembly has not gone down to the department and agencies under the ministries. These findings imply that the Kaduna State House of Assembly has through its various committees such as; health, works, and education, enormously performed its legislative oversight effectively in various government departments. However, this notwithstanding, the Kaduna State House of Assembly has some weaknesses particularly in collection of bribes and feeling of superiority.

From the available record there is poor performance of capital projects in education, health and works sectors, but this is as a result of fall in revenue particularly from oil revenue and internally generated revenue, couple with lack of legislative commitment to the extent that their oversight visit to state MDAs is neglected. The leadership of the Kaduna State House of Assembly should ensure through regular monitoring that the legislative oversight function should be carried out not only at the ministries but to the various government departments and agencies under ministries.

It is evident to say it here that the refusal of the legislative members to use their precious hours to visit the MDAs contributed to a large possible extent in the poorly executed capital projects in education, health and works sectors of the state. This is due to the fact that actual work is not carried-out in ministries headquarters but rather in schools, hospitals and roads, which implies that their oversight function in the real MDAs is instrumental in the enhancement of efficiency

and halting the corrupt practices in the execution of government projects in Schools, hospital and roads.

5.3 Recommendations

It is in the light of major findings of this study that the following recommendations are made.

- i. The members, Kaduna State House of Assembly should always endeavor to visit ministries departments and parastatals in order to ensure that all the government policies and laws are well executed without hitches and within the limit of law.
- ii. The electorate in Kaduna State should ensure that only the responsible and well-mannered individuals should be elected into the State House of Assembly
- iii. Government should provide avenue for ensuring that members of Kaduna State House of Assembly should receive adequate training on how to carry out legislative oversight function.
- iv. The leadership of the Kaduna State House of Assembly should ensure through regular monitoring that the legislative oversight functions are carried out not only at the ministries but also, the various government departments and agencies under ministries.

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APPENDIX 1

AN EVALUATION OF KADUNA STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY OVERSIGHT

FUNCTION: A CASE STUDY OF EDUCATION, WORK AND HEALTH

COMMITTEES

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS TO PERMANENT SECRETARY MINISTRY OF

EDUCATION

Could you be able to name some areas where ministry of education related or work with the Kaduna State House of Assembly Committee on Education?

- i. What are the roles of the ministry officials in the legislative oversight function?
- ii. How can you describe the relationship between the Kaduna State House of Assembly Committee on Education and your good office?
- iii. How could you describe in your own opinion the importance of legislative oversight function to the ministry of education?
- iv. How frequent does the Kaduna State House of Assembly House Committee on Education visit Education Ministry or any of its parastatals for the purpose of oversight visit?
- v. How in your own opinion does the legislative oversight function add value to your work?
- vi. Does the legislative oversight function improve efficiency, performance and transparency of government operation in the ministry?

- vii. Does the legislative oversight functions improve the effectiveness of capital project in the ministry?
- viii. Was there any time that the House committee on work and transport engage some of the ministry officials on interactive session?
- ix. Do you agree that legislative oversight visit is instrumental in exposing corruption, inefficiency or waste of public fund in the ministry?
- x. Have your ever or any of the ministry staff been invited by the Kaduna State House of Assembly for public or investigative hearing on any issue concerning the ministry?
- xi. Have you ever ask any staff of the ministry to deliver any information concerning the ministry to the Kaduna State House of Assembly?
- xii. Does the legislative oversight functions improve the financial management of the ministry?
- xiii. Do you know any problems associated with the legislative oversight functions in the Ministry of Education Science and Technology?
- xiv.** How in your own opinion can legislative oversight function improve and made more effective to the ministry?

APPENDIX II
AN EVALUATION OF KADUNA STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY OVERSIGHT
FUNCTION: A CASE STUDY OF EDUCATION, WORK AND HEALTH
COMMITTEES

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS TO PERMANENT SECRETARY MINISTRY OF
HEALTH

Could you be able to name some areas where Ministry of Health related or work with the Kaduna State House of Assembly Committee on Health?

1. What are the roles of the ministry officials in the legislative oversight function?
2. How can you describe the relationship between Kaduna State House of Assembly Committee on Health and your good office?
3. How could you describe in your own opinion the importance of legislative oversight function to Kaduna State Ministry of health?
4. How frequent does the Kaduna State House of Assembly House Committee on health visit Kaduna State Ministry of Health or any of its parastatals for the purpose of oversight?
5. How in your own opinion does the legislative oversight function add value to your work?
6. Does the legislative oversight function improve efficiency, performance and transparency of government operation in the ministry?
7. Does the legislative oversight functions improve the effectiveness of capital project in the ministry?
8. Was there any time that the House committee on work and transport engage some of the ministry officials on interactive session?

9. Do you agree that legislative oversight visit is instrumental in Exposing corruption, inefficiency or waste in the ministry?
10. Have you ever or any of the ministry staff been invited by the Kaduna State House of Assembly for public or investigative hearing on any issue concerning the ministry?
11. Have you ever ask any staff of the ministry to deliver any information concerning the ministry to the Kaduna State House of Assembly?
12. Does the legislative oversight function improve the financial management of the ministry?
13. Do you know any problems associated with the legislative oversight function to the ministry of health?
- 14.** How in your own opinion can legislative oversight function be improved and made more effective to the ministry?

APPENDIX III
AN EVALUATION OF KADUNA STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY OVERSIGHT
FUNCTION: A CASE STUDY OF EDUCATION, WORK AND HEALTH
COMMITTEES

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS TO PERMANENT SECRETARY MINISTRY OF
WORK

Could you be able to name some areas where Ministry of work related or work with the Kaduna State House of Assembly Committee on Work and Transport?

1. What are the roles of the ministry officials in the legislative oversight functions?
2. How can you describe the relationship between the Kaduna State House of Assembly Committee on works and transport and your good office?
3. How could you describe in your own opinion the importance of legislative oversight functions to ministry of work?
4. How frequent does the Kaduna State House of Assembly House Committee on work and transport visit education ministry or any of its parastatals for the purpose of oversight?
5. How in your own opinion does the legislative oversight function add value to your work?
6. Does the legislative oversight functions improve the efficiency, performance and transparency of government operation in the ministry?
7. Does the legislative oversight functions improve the effectiveness of capital project in Kaduna State Ministry of work?
8. Was there any time that the House committee on work and transport engage some of the ministry officials on interactive session?
9. Do you agree that legislative oversight visit is instrumental in exposing corruption, inefficiency or waste in public funding in the ministry?

10. Have you ever or any of the ministry staff been invited by the Kaduna State House of Assembly for public or investigative hearing on any issue concerning the ministry?
11. Have you ever ask any staff of the ministry to deliver any information concerning the ministry in Kaduna State House of Assembly?
12. Does the legislative oversight function improve the financial management of the ministry?
13. Do you know any problems associated with the legislative oversight function to the ministry of work and transport?
14. How in your own opinion does the legislative oversight function improve and made more effective to the ministry?

APPENDIX IV

AN EVALUATION OF KADUNA STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY OVERSIGHT FUNCTION: A CASE STUDY OF EDUCATION, WORK AND HEALTH COMMITTEES

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS TO INSTITUTION MDAs IN KADUNA STATE

Does your institution have any record of Kaduna state House of Assembly legislative oversight visit

1. What government agency frequently visit your institution for monitoring of your official assignment?
2. Name some areas that need the Kaduna State oversight visit for the improvement of the performance in your institution?
3. Have you ever requested any of your predecessor to deliver information to Kaduna State House of Assembly?
4. Which government agency play significant role in given your institution more information and knowledge about the government priority?
5. How in your own opinion does the legislative oversight function add value to your work?
6. Does the legislative oversight visit in your opinion improve efficiency, performance and transparency of government operation?
7. Does the legislative oversight functions improve the effectiveness of the capital project your mother ministry?
8. Was there any time that the members of Kaduna State House of Assembly engage you on interactive session for any investigative hearing in your official engagement?
9. Do you agree that legislative oversight visit is instrumental in exposing corruption, inefficiency or waste of public fund in the institution?

10. Have your ever or any of the ministry staff been invited by the Kaduna State House of Assembly for public or investigative hearing on any issue concerning official engagement?
11. Can you name any law enacted by the Kaduna State House of Assembly that is instrumental in the promotion of good governance?
12. Does the legislative oversight function improve the financial management of your mother ministry?
13. Do you know any problems associated with the legislative oversight function in Kaduna State?
14. How in your own opinion does the legislative oversight functions improve and made more effective to the ministries?

APPENDIX V

AN EVALUATION OF KADUNA STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY OVERSIGHT FUNCTION: A CASE STUDY OF EDUCATION, WORK AND HEALTH COMMITTEES

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS TO THE SPEAKER KADUNA STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY AND THE MEMBERS HOUSE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION HALTH AND WORK

1. What requirements really determine the chairmen, deputy chairmen and the membership into the various house committee leadership and membership in the Kaduna State House of Assembly?
2. How does the leadership of the Kaduna State House of Assembly checkmates and monitors the activities of its standing committees for oversight function?
3. How can you describe the relationship between the legislature and the executive arm of government in Kaduna State?
4. What in your own opinion could improve the performance of legislature for the legislative oversight function?
5. How could you describe in your own opinion the importance of legislative oversight function to the Kaduna state citizens?
6. How frequent does the house invite public figure for public or investigative hearing in the Kaduna State House of Assembly?
7. Do you agree that legislative oversight visit is instrumental in exposing corruption, inefficiency or waste of public fund in the institutions?
8. Does the legislative oversight visit in your opinion improve efficiency, performance and transparency of government operation?
9. What are the role of House members during oversight function?

10. What are the commitment of the Kaduna State House of Assembly in given encouragement to the committee to perform legislative oversight function?
11. Do you know any problems associated with the legislative oversight function in Kaduna State?
12. How in your own opinion does the legislative oversight function improved and made more effective to the government ministries?

APPENDIX VI

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY
ZARIA – NIGERIA.**

CONSENT FOR PATICIPATION IN A RESEARCH INTERVIEW

**RESEARCH TITTLE:AN EVALUATION OF KADUNA STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY
OVERSIGHT FUNCTION: A CASE STUDY OF EDUCATION, WORK AND HEALTH
COMMITTEES**

**NAME OF RESEARCHER: MUSA HASSAN JAMILA
REGISTRATION NO:P14SSPS8013**

I agreed to participate in the above-named research topic to be carried by Musa Hassan Jamila from Department of Political Science and International Studies Ahmadu Bello University Zaria-Nigeria. Purpose of this document is to specify the terms and conditions of my participation through being interviewed.

1. I have been given sufficient information about this research project and the purpose of this participation as an interviewee in this project has been explain to me and is understandable and clear.
2. My participation as an interviewee research project is voluntary and there is no explicit or implicit coercion of whatsoever to participate.
3. I have the right not to answer any of the questions if I feel in any way during the interview session. I have the right to withdraw from the interview
4. Participation involves being interview by **Musa Hassan Jamila** from Department of Political Science and International Studies Ahmadu Bello University Zaria I allow the researcher to take the written note during the interview
5. I have been given explicit guarantees that, the researcher will not identify me by name in any report using information obtained from this interview, and that of confidentiality as a participant in this study will be secured.
6. I have read and understood the point and the statements of this form and have given the answer to the best of knowledge.
7. I have been given a copy of this consent co-signed by the interviewer.

Name of participant

Signature & Date

Name interviewer

Signature & Date

Thank for your maximum cooperation