

**A STUDY OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY ON FARMING AND FARM FAMILIES
IN BORNO STATE, NIGERIA**

BY

YERIMA, Mshelia Godiya

MA/PCS/16/0933

SEPTEMBER, 2019

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE CENTRE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES,
MODIBBO ADAMA UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, YOLA, IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF
ARTS DEGREE IN PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, CENTRE FOR PEACE AND
SECURITY STUDIES**

SEPTEMBER, 2019

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis was written by me and it is a record of my own research work. It has not been presented before in any previous application for a higher degree. All references cited have been duly acknowledged.

Signature:

Date.....

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the Almighty God and my beloved mother Dr (Mrs) Ruth Mataba Gadzama.

APPROVAL PAGE

This thesis entitled "A Study of Boko Haram Insurgency on Farming and Farm Families in Borno State, Nigeria " meets the regulations governing the award of Master of Arts of the Modibbo Adama University of Technology, Yola and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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ABSTRACT

The incessant attacks of Boko Haram in northeast, Nigeria is frightening and disturbing. This is evident in the increase in death and casualties of citizens especially farmers and their families have suffered greatly because of the attacks of Boko Haram that are majorly conducted in remote villages with less security presence. Therefore, this study investigated the activities of Boko Haram insurgency on farming and farm families in Borno state. Five research objectives were developed to guide the study, descriptive survey design was adopted. A total of 204 farmers from Askira Uba local government area, Borno state were sampled through stratified sampling technique. Data was collected through questionnaire and key informant interview (KII). The data collected were analysed using percentage, mean and standard deviation and KII was analysed qualitatively. The study discovered that causes of Boko Haram insurgency were ignorance ($\bar{x} = 3.27$), unemployment ($\bar{x} = 3.43$), high level of poverty ($\bar{x} = 3.31$), bad governance ($\bar{x} = 3.38$), injustice ($\bar{x} = 3.13$) and corruption ($\bar{x} = 3.27$). The study also discovered that the consequence of Boko Haram insurgency on farmers was serious as majority of farmers have flee their villages ($\bar{x} = 3.49$), many farmers were killed and many discouraged from farming ($\bar{x} = 3.49$), some farmers could not cultivate land in the remote villages any more ($\bar{x} = 3.55$), majority of farm products were carted away by the insurgents ($\bar{x} = 3.49$) and some farmers could not wait to harvest their products as a result of Boko Haram attacks ($\bar{x} = 3.57$). Based on the findings, the study recommends that federal and Borno state government should try all their possible best to put an end to Boko Haram insurgency and relocate the farmers back to their land in order for them to continue their farming so as to earn a living and feed their family. The study also recommends that apart from putting an end to Boko Haram insurgency, all the remote villages should be comb in order to remove the remnant of land mines planted by the insurgents so as to guarantee the safety of the farmers that are returning to farmer to cultivate their land. The study concludes that there is urgent need for government to put an end to the activities of Boko Haram so that the farmers can return back fully to their cultivation of land in order to ameliorate the looming food insecurity confronting the nation.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Agriculture is the mainstay of Nigeria's economy before the discovery of oil and has contributed greatly to economic growth and development. Even now, it plays a crucial role in the production of food and employment of people in the country. It provides food for the increasing population; supply raw materials (and labour input) to the growing industrial sector; and it is a major source of employment; generation of foreign exchange earnings; and provision of a market for the products of the industrial sector (FAO, 2006). Nigeria is endowed with a huge expanse of fertile land, rivers, streams, lakes, forests and

grasslands, as well as a large active population that can support and sustain a highly productive and profitable agricultural venture.

According to CBN (2000), the enormous resource base in the agricultural sector is capable of ensuring self-sufficiency in food and provision of raw material for the industrial sector, as well as providing gainful employment for the teeming population and generating foreign exchange through export (CBN, 2000). Farmers and their families are the key elements in the agricultural sector. This is because of the nature of agricultural system being practised in the country. Farmers are the main food producers, as there are approximately 2.5 billion people involved in full- or part-time smallholder agriculture, managing an estimated 500 million small farms all around the world (IFAD, 2013).

Farming as an occupation contributes significantly to poverty reduction and food security. However, most of the farmers live in remote and environmentally fragile locations and are generally part of the marginalized and disenfranchised populations (Mohammed and Onwurah, 2016). During the colonial and post-independent eras, the country's economy rests largely on agriculture which represented a major if not the only source of capital accumulation. Most developed countries made their initial economic boost from the agricultural sector and this modernization project took many forms (Ellis and Biggs, 2001). For instance, farming is one of the areas that generate economic surpluses or net products over the cost of production in order to initiate economic growth, since the rate of growth of other sectors is dependent on the growth of the agricultural system (Ellis and Biggs, 2001).

Oluwemimo (2012) posited that the agricultural sector constituted the key to achieving a number of critical public policy goals in Nigeria. These goals include poverty reduction, employment generation, economic diversification and national food security. The national interest in using this sector for policy objective and achievement hinged on

the enormous agricultural potentials the nation is endowed with. These include an expansive land area of 923, 770 square kilometres or about 92.4 million hectares of land, and 80% of which is arable (FEPA, 2002). Currently, the agricultural sector employs over 60% of the active labour force, operating as small scale farmer. The bulk of the foods consumed in the nation are the effort of these small scale farmers; given high global food prices and negative developments on oil exports, the ability of the country to sustain its food imports is very doubtful. However, it is believed that during the periods of socio-economic uncertainties, the agricultural sector becomes the doyen of economic reconstruction. Not only does the current government intends to use the sector as the pivot for economic rejuvenation with farmers generating N300 billion, but also intends to create 3.5 million jobs in the sector in 2015 (Oluwemimo, 2012).

Farming, to be precise, is one of the major occupations in the north, especially in the northeast which has been described as the agricultural hub of the nation (Alegieuno, 2013). Farming is the main source of income to the rural dwellers in the northeast. The farmers and their families make immense contributions to the development of the societies by providing food and supplying raw materials for industrial uses both local and internationally, earning foreign income for the country. In northeast, farmers are known as suppliers of beans, millet, corn, yam, potatoes, rice, tomatoes onion and many more, which are consumed locally and equally they are involved in the production of cocoa, groundnut, cotton etc. which are sent out for foreign earning. Lately, farming, farmers and farm families in the northeast are experiencing difficulties, as a result of Boko Haram attacks; they have fled their farmland for the safety of their lives, abandoning their lands and their families are scattered all over the county.

The emergence of Boko Haram insurgency has affected farming, farmers and their family seriously since it went violent in 2009. Boko Haram insurgency has become a

cyclical problem in northeast and Nigeria in general. The Islamist sect formally known as *Jamā'a Ahl al-sunnah li-da'wa wa al-jihād* (Sunni Group for Preaching and Jihad), has been active in Nigeria since 2002, when it was founded by Muhammed Yusuf (Tonwe and Eke, 2013). The sect has been operating as a non-violent group, until 2009. According to Mohammed (2014), "Boko Haram was a fringe group under the leadership of Mallam Mohammed Yusuf, a fiery scholar resident in Maiduguri, who had not fully committed to violence before 2009. Through subtle and open harassment, Boko Haram was goaded into an open confrontation with the Nigerian state and violently suppressed in July 2009. The sect's uprising in 2009 brought about a reaction by the Nigerian state".

He further stated that the sect went underground, rebuilt, and resurfaced in October 2010 with a remarkable prison break at Bauchi and has since changed its tactics to targeted assassinations, drive-by shootings, suicide bombings, and massive deployment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), vehicle-borne IEDs, and, lately, kidnapping and hostage taking. Boko Haram attacks are majorly conducted in the rural areas which have affected farmers and their families more serious. Most of the farmers and their families have scattered all over the country. In fact, some are in one IDPs camps or the other in the county. More than 500, 000 people have been displaced as a result of the attacks, while a large number of people have also been kidnapped during the course of the attacks (Angus, 2015). In Borno state, which is the epicentre of Boko Haram activities, most of the people attacked were villager who depends squarely on farming as their main source of income. As a result of the attacks, the source of income of people has been destroyed; making life miserable for them. Providing for both individual and family needs have become a serious issue for the rural dwellers because of the level of displacement that occurred in villages in Borno state.

According to NEMA (2016), famine in Nigeria is now a possibility following massive displacements of small and large-scale farmers from the north-east region of the country. NEMA (2016) further reported that more than 65 per cent of farmers in Borno state have already migrated out of the state, fearing that the insecurity to both lives and property, including their farmlands and livestock, continues to persist for some years. Similarly, Amuwa (2015) reported that over the past two years, farmers in North Eastern parts of Nigeria, particularly Borno state are no longer able to farm for security reasons especially for fear of attacks by the dreaded Boko Haram sect who continued to unleash untold havoc in the country.

Furthermore, FAO (2016) reported that Boko Haram killed six farmers who were working on their land near the northeast Nigerian city of Maiduguri. At least 20,000 people have been killed, majorly farmers residing in remote villages. The activities of the insurgents have in turn affected food production and consequently caused an increase in the prices of foodstuff. In every nation, the availability of food at an affordable rate makes a nation partly secured, especially when issues of social security are being discussed. But the lives and livelihoods of people come under threat when that privilege is absent. Considering the above background, this study investigated the impact of Boko Haram insurgency on farming and farm families in Borno state.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Agriculture is the livelihood venture of people mostly in rural areas in Nigeria. During the 1960s, agriculture was the hub of economic activities in Nigeria. Its contribution was over 60% to the Gross Domestic Product of the country. According to Modebelu and Nwakpaolu (2003), Nigeria has a highly diversified agro-ecologic condition, which made it possible for the production of a wide range of agricultural

products such as cocoa, groundnut, palm produce etc. In Borno state, majority of the rural dwellers are farmers and they depend on farming as a source of livelihood for meeting individuals as well as family needs. The emergence of Boko Haram and consequently turned violent in 2009 made majority of the farmers and their families to flee their villages, abandoning their farmlands and farm products.

IRIN (2015) reported that the ongoing Boko Haram attacks have destroyed lands and killed thousands of young men since 2009, and in some cases, wiped out or displaced entire generations of farmers and herders. The future of many of the rural communities in north-eastern Nigeria is at best, uncertain or at worst, unsustainable. Thousands of farmers and their families from Borno were taken to IDPs camps. The people of this locality especially Askira Uba area depend on farming primarily to provide food for their families and to meet their daily demands. As a result of Boko Haram attacks the people flee their places of abode and their farmlands. This development put the people in serious security problem as they left everything to run away for their dear lives with their families. Based on this development, the farmers suffered seriously as well as their family members. Equally, their farmlands were abandoned to the extent that they could not farm for more than 4 years from 2013 to 2018. Their condition became miserable as their mass movement was without direction. Observatory analysis showed that some of them headed to camps in Adamawa state, some went to stay with their relatives in safer locations in the country. This condition put the farmers and their families into serious economic, social and security predicaments that made their situations very pathetic and worrisome. A lot of studies have been done on effect of Boko Haram but few of them considered the effect of the insurgency on farmers and their families. This findings of this study revealed the consequences of Boko Haram insurgency on farmers and their families and farming generally in Askira Uba and Borno state at large.

Against this background, this study examined the impact of Boko Haram insurgency on farming and farm families in Borno state.

1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Study

The aim of the study is to investigate the activities of Boko Haram insurgency on farming and farm families in Borno state. The specific objectives of the study are to:

- i. identify the causes of Boko Haram insurgency by the concerned farmers in Borno state.
- ii. identify the effect of Boko Haram insurgency on the farm families in Borno state
- iii. examine the consequences of Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in Borno state.
- iv. determine the effect of Boko Haram attacks on farming activities in Borno state.
- v. find out the coping strategies adopted by farmers and their families during the intense invasion of Boko Haram insurgency in Borno state.
- vi. determine the approaches adopted by government to help farmers build resilience against Boko Haram in Borno state

1.4 Research Questions

The following research questions were raised to guide the study.

- i. What are the causes of Boko Haram insurgency by the concerned farmers in Borno state?
- ii. What are the effect of Boko Haram insurgency on the farm families in Borno state?
- iii. What are the consequences of Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in Borno state?
- iv. What are the effect of Boko Haram attacks on farming activities in Borno state.

- v. What are the coping strategies adopted by farmers and their families during the intense invasion of Boko Haram insurgency in Borno state.
- vi. What are the approaches adopted by government to help farmers build resilience against Boko Haram in Borno state

1.5 Significance of the Study

This study is beneficial to farmers, their families and their association, the ministry of agriculture, government, non-government organisations, security agencies, and the general public. This study shall help farmers, their families and their associations to understand the nature of loss suffered by farmers and their families in the course of the incident and the approaches they employed to cope with the menace of Boko Haram. Also, this research work will make government to know how to help farmers to overcome their problem. The outcome of this study will enlighten federal and state government and the ministry of agriculture on the plight of the farmers which will make them to understand the urgent need of financial support for the farmers. This study also revealed the extent at which farming has been threatened to the ministry of agriculture, to enable the ministry to understand how they can be of help to the farmers as a matter of urgency in order to put a smile on the face of the farmers that have lost virtually all they have to Boko Haram insurgency. This study is vital to the government as it will reveal the activities of Boko Haram insurgents and its implication on farmers, their families and farm products in Borno state. It also reveal the level at which those farmers have been displaced and its effect on their livelihood. The study gave security operatives the picture of the causes and consequences of insurgency on agriculture and farming to be precise. It will equally make them to know why villages are being attacked. Also, it will serve as a valuable source of data to the non-governmental organization in policy making and control the problem of insurgency as it affects the agriculture which is the main source of livelihood of the rural

dwellers and the mainstay of the economy aside from oil. It also serve as a source of information to students in related discipline and many who are interested in related study.

1.6 Scope of the Study

This study investigated the activities of Boko Haram insurgency on farming and farm families in Askira Uba local government area of Borno State. This study used three major communities which are Askira, Uba and Lassa communities for sampling and collection of data. The communities were purely farmers and were seriously affected by Boko Haram insurgency between the periods of 2012 to 2016. Therefore, the returnees to the communities were used as samples for the study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

The review of relevant literature is organised under the following sub-headings:

- 2.1 Theoretical framework
- 2.2 Historical Overview of Boko Haram Insurgency
- 2.3 Causes of Boko Haram Insurgency
- 2.4 Consequences of Boko Haram Insurgency on Farming and Farmers

2.5 Efforts of the Government to Resuscitate Farming in Borno State

2.6 Boko Haram Insurgency, Farming and Farm Families

2.7 Summary of Reviewed Literature

2.1 Theoretical Framework

The theory that guided this study is Relative Deprivation Theory. This theory was propounded by Samuel A. Stouffer in 1949. The major assumptions of the theory was that a person's or group's satisfaction is not related to their objective circumstances, but rather, to their condition relative to other persons or groups. In terms of prejudice, relative deprivation theory postulates that unfavourable comparisons (the cognitive component of relative deprivation) can generate feelings of deprivation (the affective component of relative deprivation) that motivate outgroup hostility (Grant and Brown, 1995). Relative deprivation has consistently been identified as being a strong and robust predictor of intergroup attitudes in a variety of countries.

The theory posits unemployment as a predictor of terrorism attack increase. Academic debates continue on the correlation between deprivation and insecurity. Some scholars have argued that most of the conflicts in developing countries are caused by the prevalence of poverty and unemployment. There is causality from high poverty rate to conflict (Kanbur, 2007). Insurgency according to Lodge is an illegitimate means of attempting to effect political change by indiscriminate use of violence (Lodge 1988:5). Madunagu (2000) maintains that insurgency is the use of violence to achieve political objective. The bottom line of the above definition is that insurgency is an aspect of political violence. Ted Gurr (2011) deprivation theory subscribed to this assumption. The theory explains why the youths are always taking to violence. According to the deprivation theory, aggression is always a consequence of deprivation and frustration always leads to aggression (Leeds 1998). The poor are led to violence owing to their relative deprivation

and needs (Odumosu and Awojobi 2014). Frustrations, lack of income, unemployment have prompted the youths in northern Nigeria to become foot soldiers of Boko Haram (Awojobi, 2014). Insecurity, terrorism, conflicts and violence are caused by high poverty and employment rate in most societies (Gurr and Burton 1997). Ford (2007) indicated that unemployment and poverty was the major cause of conflict in Africa. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) examine insurgent activities in Africa from their findings, is the interface between income and conflict. Rice *et al.* (2006) subscribed to the notion that poverty helps to extend conflicts once it started. Evidence has shown that when income drops there is a tendency for conflict to surface or reignited. The Boko Haram insurgency has been blamed on the high rate of poverty in Nigeria. However, some security experts have debunked this assumption (CBN, 2010).

The most important of this is that we have to admit that even if the group has its antecedents in theology; its swelling rank is as a result of a huge reservoir of unemployed urban youths from many parts of the country. These youths who have completely become disenfranchised are ready to provide the group with foot soldiers who commit all manners of atrocities, including assassination and suicide bombings in the name of religion. An empirical study on why do youth join Boko Haram, the findings of the study indicated that poverty played a major role in luring the youth in joining Boko Haram (Onuoha, 2013). As a result of the deprivation of the unemployed youths, they gave in to frustration and later make themselves avail as foot soldiers for Boko Haram, with their base in the remote areas of Borno state, which is the areas where farmers and their families reside and engage in their daily activities as a result of vast land rich for farming the remote villages. The frustration of the Boko insurgents is evident in their attacks on farming, farmers and their families which has led to mass displacement of farmers and carting away of their harvest in order to provide food for the insurgents.

2.2 Historical Overview of Boko Haram Insurgency

Boko Haram is the product of history, though the precise date of its establishment still remains a contested issue. The exact date of the emergence of Boko-Haram sect is mired in controversy, especially when one relies on media accounts. Most local and foreign media trace its origin to 2002 when Mohamed Yusuf emerged as the leader of the sect. However, Nigeria security forces date the origin of the sect to 1995 (Adesoji, 2010). There have been different accounts scholars about the origin of Boko Haram, some scholars have linked it with maitatsine uprising of 1980 in Kano, while some perceived it to be a new upsurge in Islamic sect that sprang up as a result of failed state, bad governance and inequality among the rich and the poor (Aba, 2017). The northern segment of Nigeria has been experiencing insurgency for about three decades ago. The unfortunate history of communal conflicts and ethno-religious violence has been repeating it's self in the region. Most of these uprisings arise due to religious differences, tensions between blocs of Muslim and Christian inhabitants. There have been many outbreaks of bloody violence between different communities for several decades. There have also been riots in the urban centres of Kaduna and Kano, and district of Bauchi (Walker, 2012 and Adesoji, 2010).

The Maitatsine uprisings of 1980 in Kano, 1982 in Kaduna and Bulumkutu, 1984 in Yola and 1985 in Bauchi, marked the beginning of ferocious violent crises in Nigeria. This crisis was the first attempt at imposing a religious ideology (Abdi, Bello and Shittu, 2013). A brutal military attack was launched by the Nigerian government to wipe out the group scattered and was fully eliminated over the course of a decade (Adesoji, 2010). According to Ostebo (2012), the rise of Islamic militancy with the outbreak of the Boko Haram group since July 2009 marked another new phase in the recurring pattern of insurgent uprisings in northern Nigeria. The emergence of the Islamic militant group poses growing threats to the

regional stability till date. Angus (2015) pointed out that it was founded in 2002. He further reported that Boko Haram is an ultra-extremist Islamic cult focusing primarily on the edict that Western education is forbidden. They launched violent attacks in 2009 to support their cause in creating an independent Islamic state. It also has roots that can be traced to the northern part of Cameroon and parts of Niger. The Boko Haram leadership has international connections with Al-Qaeda. Suspected Boko Haram militants have killed dozens of Nigerians in recent times and there is no sign of the violence abating. In one attack, gunmen disguised as soldiers fired on a crowd in a church compound. The radical sect is known for attacking churches, schools, and police stations. Tourists are also considered fair game. Violence linked to the Boko Haram insurgency has resulted in an estimated 12,000 killings since 2002, although that figure has gone up considerably since 2009 when the group began to heavily arm itself as a militia.

According to Oladunjoye and Omemu (2013), *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad*, better known by its Hausa name Boko Haram, is a jihadist terrorist organization based in the northeast of Nigeria. It is an Islamist movement which strongly opposes man-made laws. Founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002, the organisation is a Muslim sect that seeks to abolish the secular system of government and establish Sharia Law in the country. The group was founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002 in the city of Maiduguri with the aim of establishing a Shari'a government in Borno State under former Governor Ali Modu Sheriff. He established a religious complex that included a mosque and a school where many poor families from across Nigeria and from neighbouring countries enrolled their children. The movement, whose name in the Hausa language, Boko Haram, translates as "Western education is a sacrilege" or "a sin" is divided into three factions, and in 2011, was responsible for more than 1000 killings in Nigeria (Zenn, 2013).

Though Olatunji (2013) observed that the group first became known internationally following sectarian violence in Nigeria in 2009, it does not have a clear structure or evident chain of command. Moreover, it is still a matter of debate whether Boko Haram has links to terror outfits outside Nigeria and its fighters have frequently clashed with Nigeria's central government (Olatunji, 2013). However, Adesoji (2010) and Osita-Njoku and Chikere (2015) argued that with time, the organization became increasingly militant and also engaged in the abduction of women and girls as wives and sex-slaves. The Nigerian government launched a violent attack on the group to stop its spread across north-eastern Nigeria in 2009. The uprising led to the death of 800 Boko Haram members, including Yusuf (Adesoji, 2010). Osita-Njoku and Chikere (2015) maintain that the Boko- Haram terrorist sect is motivated by the obnoxious philosophy-western education is evil and the groups' adherents appear to be thoroughly indoctrinated in the incomprehensible doctrine of the absurd. The terror group has embarked on heinous human rights abuses and war crimes: forced conversion of people of other faith to Islam; murder, torture and persecution of members of other religions; wanton attacks on churches and mosques and killing of women, children and civilian (non-combatant) populations (Human Rights watch News, 2013). Following the death of Yusuf, a man later known as Abubakar Shekau took control of the group. Authorities had previously believed that Shekau died during the violence in 2009. By mid-April, 2012, the group was responsible for over 1000 deaths (Baiyewu, 2013).

Olowoselu, Bello and Onuselogu (2014) further said that Boko Haram conducted its operations more or less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence. Due to public condemnation, the group withdrew from the society into a remote settlement in the outskirt of Borno state. The local government authority had repeatedly ignored warnings from the people on the chaotic militant character of the organization. Abiye (2011) noted

that domestic terrorism arose in Nigeria because emergent militant groups took advantage of government's inefficient action in dealing with the fundamental elements of nationhood. Such as internal security, resource control, injustice, corruption, ethnicism, sycophancy, favoritism and marginalization. These factors have made terrorism to be ethnicized in Nigerian. Currently, the nation is witnessing a high spate of insecurity, especially in northern Nigeria by a group of terrorists known as Boko Haram. The Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah lidda Awati Wal-Jihad popularly known as Boko Haram, this is a terrorist group which has its base in Yobe state, North-eastern Nigeria. This group was founded in 2001 in 'Maiduguri' the capital city of Borno State, north-eastern Nigeria by Mohammed Yusuf the pioneer leader and originator of Boko Haram group. Abiye (2011) stated that in 2004, Boko Haram moved to Yobe State where it set up a base. This base was used to attack nearby police outposts, killing police officers, burning Churches and schools with a vow that the war will continue as long as the political and educational system was not changed. The Boko Haram group want the Sharia Law to be applied all over the country and this will be difficult for the government of Nigeria to comply with. They vowed that they would rather have a separate Islamic state carved out of Nigeria, where they can practice their religion unhindered.

2.3 Causes of Boko Haram Insurgency

A recurring issue in the Boko Haram literature is the magnitude of relative poverty and inequality in the north and northeast to be precise. This has led to a situation where some researchers argued that underdevelopment is one of the major reasons why extremist groups like Boko Haram rebels. In the words of Kwaja (2011), he argued that religious dimensions of the conflict have been misconstrued as the primary driver of violence when, in fact, disenfranchisement and inequality are the root causes. Similarly, Mustapha (2012)

in his own argument posited that Boko Haram is the symptom of the failure of nation building and democratic politics in Nigeria. It is the misguided cry of a disgruntled youth crushed by the socio-economic system on the one hand and then repressed by the state on the other. Kukah (2012) observed a nuanced movement away from the poverty-conflict nexus to the bad governance-conflict nexus. He further argued that religion is used to mobilize against modernity, which is seen as the root cause of social anomalies.

Towing the same line, Kukah (2012) averred that Boko Haram perceived the persistence of corruption, collapse of public morality, injustice and so on could only be attributed to those who govern. In their reasoning, those who govern us (*Yan boko*) do so because they have acquired their tools by gaining Western education (*boko*). The frustration and desperation that daily torments the unemployed creates a fertile ground for crime to thrive. In recent times, there have been notable adverse social, economic and political developments in Nigeria, a consequence of youth unemployment and underemployment, particularly exemplified by increasing militancy, violent crimes, kidnapping, restiveness and political instability (Ajufo, 2013). The scariest undertone of Nigeria's socioeconomic underachievement, by far, is the steady rise in youth crime, nurtured in a climate of increasing national income and the simultaneous failure of employment-generation and poverty alleviation programmes. Armed insurgency and terrorism culminating in wanton destruction of lives and property by Boko Haram extremists in the Northern part of the country are now competing for space in international headlines. The season of discontent has special ramifications for a nation with unemployed millions, and the net effect has been a tragic precipitation of violent crimes: assault, burglary, extortion and kidnapping, etc. Meagher (2014) observed that while poverty and corruption have created a fertile recruiting ground for Boko Haram, the constant mutation and evolution of the sect has frustrated any clear assessment of its objectives and

membership, the shift to violent extremism, since 2010 has been accompanied by changes in both its objectives and recruitment tactics, as well as by a fragmentation of the group itself. Initially, Yusuf attracted followers through his fiery rejection of the corrupt secular state while building a community based on sharia principles and the provision of basic needs. Boko Haram offered one meal a day, arranged low-cost marriages, and provided loans for petty commercial activities, thus offering basic social dignity to the poor and unemployed.

International Crisis Group (2014) opined that following alleged links with Borno State politicians in the run-up to the 2003 elections, relations turned sour when the elected governor failed to follow up on promises to implement full sharia law, leading to increasingly vitriolic and bloody clashes with the state. A fairly equal proportion of Muslims and Christians in Nigerian society have fostered a competitive political brinksmanship between Christian and Muslim elites in struggles over control of the country's oil wealth, fostering rising Christian-Muslim violence since the 1980s. Religious polarisation between Christians and Muslims has exacerbated an internal dynamic of religious fragmentation and radicalisation in northern Nigerian Islam, manifested in growing religious intolerance, extremist views and discourses of violence among radical Muslim preachers.

Furthermore, Sanda (2014) and Meagher (2014) stated that security failure was another factor in the rise of insurgency in the northern part of Nigeria. Heavy-handed military tactics that fail to deal with the roots of the problem have proved counterproductive. The terrorist shift of Boko Haram began with the extrajudicial execution by police of the first Boko Haram leader and the destruction of its main mosque. Ongoing abuses— such as the arrests of families of Boko Haram members and the destruction of their homes, or the random arrests and killings of young northern men in

security raids –undermine cooperation with the military and foster radicalisation and bitterness against the state. The formation of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) that has helped to combat Boko Haram in the Borno State capital, Maiduguri and in Adamawa state emerged as an effort by civilians to protect themselves from the excesses of the military by rooting out and handing over Boko Haram members, at great personal cost to many civilians involved. In the process, the CJTF poses new problems of inadequate training and human rights violations, as well as the challenge of constructively reabsorbing CJTF members into society and the risks of their potential capture by politicians during the 2015 election campaign (Sanda, 2014).

Eze and Agwanwo (2014) pointed out that the 21st century creeping menace of Islamic sect manifesting into Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, has put the nation's security apparatus on the spot; opening to public doubt and scrutiny of an intelligence community that has enjoyed shadow coverage and handling since the nations return to democracy. According to Okujagu (2004) the prevailing era of insecurity to lives and property experienced so far cuts across many facets that include political, economic, social and even in the religious arenas. Also, Adamu (2009) saw the overwhelming challenge of the internal security in postcolonial Nigeria and averred that; Nigeria's national security is threatened by the problem of Inefficiency, collusion and despondency of its major institutions and structures as instruments of social action and rectification. This has ensured that the various governments and the state agencies have been unable consistent and institutionally to guarantee adequate protection, peace and wellbeing of the citizens. This lapse has occasioned serious conflicts, situations of uncertainty, helplessness and instability that have compromised the very territorial and national integrity of this nation.

Knight (2008) observed that several key factors have affected the way terrorists can operate today. Among them, urbanization and the resultant concentration of people,

government offices, businesses, and industrial facilities, facilitate the efforts of terrorists. Cities bunch people in confined spaces, usually providing them with fewer means of escape, while terrorists can find more places to hide and plan their violent activities. The media also has seemingly increased the payoff from terrorism, with rapid, widespread global reporting bringing to the world the fear and ever-present possibility of a local attack. The global reach of a message is now more easily achieved since television and other instant communications allow people worldwide to learn about a terrorist incident within minutes of its occurrence. Knight (2008) suggested competition among media outlets also encourages the broadcast of information that again facilitates diffusion of terrorist messages, sometimes inciting support that might not otherwise have eventuated. By putting terrorism on a global stage, the media also may provide the means to inspire and instruct other terrorist groups, leading to further or escalating terrorism. Knight (2008) noted that today, terrorist group members communicate with each other with great efficiency, using modern communications systems, such as international telephony and the Internet. They allow terrorists to plan and activate attacks with unprecedented efficiency and maximum impact. Alternatively, terrorists may circumvent detection by using primitive communications, such as runners or motorcycle couriers. Many communications between terrorists remain impervious to detection.

Furthermore, Osita-Njoku and Chikere (2015) stated that the absence of good governance was also one of the driving factor of Boko Haram insurgency. They further uphold that good governance as expressed by the World Bank entails the following: Efforts to create an enabling environment and to build human capacities. Ultimately, better governance requires political renewal. This means an attack on corruption from the highest to lowest the level. The absence of good governance therefore suggests that the socio-political environment is infested with administrative injustice, human rights abuse,

inequality and endemic corruption. A natural response to this unjust social formation is for the downtrodden to seek for redemption through membership of terror group. This is a sort of pay-back to the government that has failed to take care of them. As a result of this, the disgruntled youth, feel the only way to drive home their point is to take arms and rebel against the elites that have exploit them.

Meagher (2014) noted that poor governance and rampant corruption have pushed these social and religious tensions to the breaking point. Resource-curse politics and the opulent behaviour of northern elites amid mass poverty have fostered a deep sense of popular grievance. Boko Haram initially emerged as a protest against the poor governance and corruption of northern leaders, which the movement sought to remedy through demands for an Islamic state and strict adherence to sharia law. The charismatic founder of the movement, Meagher (2014) asserted that Mohammed Yusuf, was openly critical of northern leaders, but Boko Haram's move to terrorism only started after his death in police custody in 2009. Despite some sympathy among northern Nigerian Muslims with its critique of political misrule, there is little support for Boko Haram's violent tactics. It is expedient to note that Boko Haram did not have a single cause. Over the years, there have been growing numbers of, and development of feral children produced across the country without the corresponding care and upbringing. Consequently, these children who soon grow into adults lacked the needed qualifications and skills for meaningful and gainful engagements for survival. Because of this, they idle away which make them prone to rebellious tendencies. It is this condition that has enabled the mischief-makers to use them for evil activities. This is in line with the assertions of Murphy (2001), and Kristof (2002) who pointed that when a group is absolutely or relatively deprived of the necessities of life they rebel. Unemployment and zero opportunities for advancement have resulted in the Boko Haram to easily obtain a substantial and growing support base. Economic inequality

leads to political conflicts (Anton 2011). After the northern governors meeting, the chairman of the forum Dr. Babangida Aliyu of Niger State attributed the country's present challenges such as poverty, unemployment, youth restiveness and violence are manifestation of rejection of core values such as honesty, fairness and justice in their communities, societies and indeed the nation. And that they have allowed greed, corruption and incompetence to overwhelm them overtime (Nigeria Tribune, 2012).

Similarly, the Sultan of Sokoto Alhaji Muhammed Sa'ad Abubakar III, stated that insecurity and other associated challenges bedevilling the Northern region were self-inflicted by northerners. He said whatever that is happening in the North is our own doing because we did not do what we are supposed to do (Akhaine, Taiwo, and Akinola 2013). People without a meaningful source of livelihood usually lack dignity, confidence and self-esteem, and after a long time may be prone to aggressive behaviour and violent acts due to frustration. The government is out of touch with the plight of its citizens. A combination of factors such as untrained youth bulges, corruption and minuscule tax base has deprived the people of the necessary funds for the establishment of industries and other developmental projects. It sounds odd and strange that some people continued to blame and attribute terrorist activities, and why some volunteered to carry out suicide bombing against innocent citizens and destroying properties that a caused high degree of mayhem on unemployment (Udama, 2013).

The agricultural sector was the mainstay of Nigeria economy that could accommodate both skilled and unskilled persons such as that which produced the groundnut pyramids in the north, cotton, palm oil and cocoa in the south, west and east that were exported in the 1950s, 60s and 70s is still there and will do the same if given attention. However, the employment recognised today is politics. People contest and struggle for political offices to enjoy the free money while others suffer environmental

degradation resulting from oil exploration. People rather than developing their human capital base instead develop networks (powerful connections) that can create non existing jobs and offices without regards to self-worth and skills that can lead to productivity unemployment (Udama, 2013). It is difficult to rationalise that economic deprivations and grievances can propel any person or group to carry out extreme acts of violence against people they have lived together for so long.

In the same vein, Dele (2012) noted that people have made allusions to all kinds of problems that seem to suggest that the north has suffered more economic disadvantages than other regions in Nigeria. He pointed further that if the north suffers from massive unemployment and lack of opportunities in the north the problem is even more amplified in the south or other parts of the country. So it is far from the truth. In the north, south, east and west, there has been a significant growth over the years in the population of the underprivileged and have suffered from inequalities and lack of access to basic needs. However, they have been silenced by oppression and have not attempted to carry out bombings to drive home their plight. The issue of unemployment is a global phenomenon in recent times though it varies in degree from nations to nations and state to states. Nowhere in the world has this problem prompted the affected segment of the society to carry out such magnitude of violence and killing the innocent citizens' unemployment (Udama, 2013). The Taliban in Afghanistan and the Al-Shabba in Somali has not claimed so. So the case of Nigeria should not be an exception. There is unemployment problem in other political zones if not more. There is multitude of youth in the west, east and south that are not employed but have not resulted in suicide bombings and killing the innocent to attract attention or to address the problem. However, most of these unemployed youth have indulged in other forms of crimes such as arm robbery and kidnapping which in their own thinking can redistribute wealth into their hands and not killing innocent citizens.

Moreover, even if unemployment is particularly acute in the north, they have not asked the reason for this development. They are not unaware of the youth bulges in the region resulting from mass birth without corresponding care, training and human capital development unemployment (Udama, 2013). A situation where some men will have over seventy children does not augur well for the region or country. This has given rise to the Al-magiri syndrome, which produces the majority of the foot soldiers of Boko Haram. The Al-magiris can be easily brainwashed since they are not exposed to any form of formal education, they are just like a readymade tool in the hands of Boko Haram commanders, and they are ready to die for whatever they were is the truth without trying to verify if the teachings giving to them are true or not. A lot of factors was responsible for the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria which include bad governance, injustice, inequality, religious fanaticism, poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, ignorance and the phenomenon of “Alumanjiri” which serve as a viable source of foot soldiers for the sect, which are recruited to preach of false message and brainwashing of the vulnerable youth.

2.4 Consequences of Boko Haram Insurgency on Farming and Farmers

The impact of Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast of Nigeria is so devastating to the extent that no sector is immune to the consequences of the attacks. Michael (2009) stated that the specific aim of an insurgency is to disrupt and destroy the peaceful day to day activities of the populace in order to send a message to the government that they capable of wreaking havoc and challenge the authority of government in power. The frequent bombing towns and communities by Boko Haram and the combating effort of the security agents have led a situation where people were forced to flee their various

communities of Borno state and Askira Uba local government area to be precise. Generally, majority of the residents of Askira Uba local government area are farmers, where their source of livelihood and meeting the needs of the family majorly depend on farming.

Alimba, (2014), observed that Boko Haram insurgency in the northern Nigerian states, like Borno, Bauchi, Gombe, Yobe and Adamawa have forced both the indigenes and non-indigenes to relocate from their base in order to flee for the safety of their lives and survival. David (2012) averred that the activities of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has led to palpable fear among the citizens and high sense of insecurity due to regular loss of lives and damage to properties and infrastructures because of bombings and reported cases of assassination. Aba (2017) reported that Boko Haram insurgents haven't only killed thousands of people in its campaign to impose Islamic law or Shariah: it's wrecking agriculture in some of the country's main food-growing areas, where farmers afraid to go to their farms in Borno state and its environs. He further stated that rains that exceeded expectations fall and it failed to translate into a better harvest, as no one can move a kilometre, not to talk of going to villages to farm due to fear of the attack of Boko Haram. He further stated that more than 1.5 million people, mostly farmers, have been forced to flee their homes as Boko Haram intensified its insurgency in the past years, while Borno, Yobe and Adamawa are the worst hit states of the insurgency and farmers in the three states produce staple foods such as cowpeas, rice, millet, sorghum, corn and yams as well as tomatoes, onions, fish and livestock (Aba, 2017).

Similarly, IRIN (2015) reported that increases in the cost of food, which has the biggest weighting in Nigeria's consumer price index, have outpaced the CPI every month since 2013. Disruptions to food distribution because of the insurgency are among the largest inflationary risks faced by the economy. They further reported that agriculture

contributes about 24 percent of the gross domestic product, “near-term risks” to price stability include possible food-supply bottlenecks linked to insurgency and insecurity in some major agricultural zones of the country. The implication of this is that Boko Haram insurgency did not only affect the farmers at the state level alone, the impact of the insurgency has now been felt at the national level as the supply of food has reduced drastically which has led to a high of inflation as agriculture accounts for 24 percent of the gross domestic product. Towing the same line, IRIN (2015) further reported that Lake Chad borders four countries, including Cameroon and Niger. Out of more than 200 villages on the Nigerian side of the water body, about 140 have been ransacked by the Islamist militants. Most of the farmer in the area grew onions, watermelons, wheat, rice and cowpeas. The soil is very fertile but unfortunately, the farmers are in a state of fear. Where farmers are still able to plant and produce, they face difficulties moving their harvest to the towns and cities where they’re in demand because key bridges on important link routes have been sabotaged by militants, and vehicles travelling on remote roads risk being ambushed.

Furthermore, IRIN (2017) reported that families have been driven out of villages, farmers unable to tend crops, food stocks of entire communities raided during the attacks of Boko Haram and the impact of the attacks on the people lingers long after the rape and slaughter, as many families that total depend of farming as their only source of livelihood were forced to flee to safety of the lives and turned into beggars where they take refuge. IRIN further reported that farmers that recently returned to villages in northern Adamawa, only to find themselves unemployed and doing menial jobs to survive. Their fields have been burnt to the ground and they have no access to seeds, tools or fertilisers in order to embark on farming. OCHA (2015) reported that the ongoing insecurity in the northeast means that farmers cannot access their fields to plant and harvest crops, food and

productive assets have been lost due to attacks and displacement, and raids on farms for food by Boko Haram insurgents are still ongoing. This is a situation that is not just affecting the displaced people, but the whole population of northeast Nigeria, while host communities, in particular, are seeing their vulnerability to food insecurity increasing. Displaced families which are majorly farmers have already exhausted their own resources and with thousands of farmers not able to grow staple crops, the main harvest season that begins in October will be below average for the third consecutive year. OCHA further reported that as a result, much of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states could face a severe food crisis, while some areas, including Maiduguri, will experience emergency acute food insecurity.

Adelaja (2016) stated that terrorism has been linked to damages to homes, businesses and infrastructure; reduced investments, adverse impacts on tourism; reductions in the flow of goods and capital; reduced quality of life; government instability; increased government spending on defense and national security; slowdown in financial markets; negative impacts on supply chains; and human productivity losses. These general impacts are expected to also affect agriculture and food security, especially when terrorist activities occur in agricultural and food production areas. In relation to the above work, terrorists often have their base in the remote areas where the presence of government in terms of military and other security agencies are not strong, where they can easily commit their atrocities and wreak havoc on poor and defenceless citizens. This is the situation in the remote areas of Borno state and Askira Uba to be precise, where Boko Haram attacked farmers and killed them, steal all their farm products and stop them from harvesting those that are still on the farmland. Many families, especially farmers which are resident of this community have been displaced, struggling to meet their needs and that of their family.

Amaza, Olayemi, Adejobi, Billa and Iheanacho (2004) reported that livelihood strategies for most men and women in Borno State are based on agriculture. Farming is characterized by a variety of crop and livestock-based production systems. Crops are grown for home consumption as well as for local markets. In the south, maize, sorghum, and cowpea and, to a lesser extent, rice and soybean are major crops. Towards the north, sorghum and millet are the dominant crops. Livestock-small and large ruminants, as well as poultry-are an integral part of the farming system and provide income as well as safety nets. In many parts of Borno State, farmers have been obliged to diversify their livelihood with incomes from outside the sector. (Amaza *et al.*, 2004). That is, majority of the rural dwellers in Borno state are farmers, and their family depend on farming as their main source of livelihood.

2.5 Efforts of Government at Resuscitating Farming in Borno State

Apart from the fact that the government have increased military presence in Borno state in order to get rid of the insurgency for the farmers to have a conducive atmosphere for farming. The government have also try to relocate that farmers back to Borno with the provision of land and improved seedling from farming in conjunction with some organisations. Olugbode (2017) reported that as farmers return to their homelands in Borno State, concerted efforts have been put in place to boost agricultural production and clear farmlands of landmines. The Borno State Fadama Project in collaboration with the Food and Agriculture Organisation has commenced the distribution of assorted fertilizer and to improved seed varieties to internally displaced persons who recently returned back to their homelands in the troubled state. The Communications Officer of Borno State Fadama Project, Bulama Yerima, in a statement, disclosed that the distributions were made in Damboa, Jere and Konduga local government areas with 8,400 households benefiting (Olugbode, 2017).

Olugbode (2017) further reported that agricultural input support to the peasant farmers was aimed at restoring their livelihood activities as part of post insurgency support to returnees of liberated communities in the twenty four insurgency affected local government areas. This followed a Three Day Special Training for the beneficiaries on suitable irrigation land identification and preparation, manure and fertilizer application, environmental safety, use and maintenance of water pumps, sourcing and application of improved seed varieties and disease surveillance by experts in both Kanuri and Hausa (Olugbode, 2017). During the launching of the distribution in Dalori town of Konduga Local Government, the Borno State Fadama Project Coordinator, Bukar Talba said the items were meant to help peasant farmers across the state to restore their livelihood activities and start life afresh as worst hit victims of the insurgency. He revealed that 10,000 farmers in group of fives will be given two and half bags of fertilizers and five packets of assorted seed varieties comprising of Okro, Rossel, sorell Watermelon, Amaranthus, Cabbage, Carrot, Tomatoes, Pepper and Onion. He also said the project will provide them with boreholes for irrigation, food support and repairs of community infrastructure like market stalls, community well and farm roads to enable them to recover socially and economically (Olugbode, 2017).

FAO (2017) reported that a total sum of \$65 million has been set aside to help farmers who were displaced by Boko Haram return to business. The FAO further reported that farmers from the three states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe state who had lost their means of survival as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency would be assisted to get back on their feet (FAO, 2017). The organisation has put up a programme tagged “Restoring Agricultural Livelihood of IDPs, Returnees and Vulnerable Host Families in the North-East of Nigeria”, where more than 200,000 IDPs across the three states have been empowered. These farmers have been empowered to restart their livestock and fish

farming, as well as crop farming. Among those assisted so far are 48,000 displaced farming households in Borno State who had benefitted from the programme during the dry season while about 2,160 benefitted during the raining season. During the empowerment programme the implementing partners for this programme include the Borno state government, the National Program for Food Security (NPFS), World Food Program (WFP), and FADAMA III. The objective of the empowerment programme was to empower about 1.8 million farmers across states who lost their means of livelihood (FAO, 2017).

Similarly, IITA (2017) reported that the organisation has donated seeds for the farmers displaced by Boko Haram insurgency in Borno State. The donation is one of the largest quantity of seeds offered to Nigeria in recent times. This initiative is to address the humanitarian crisis in the region, a region once referred to as the breadbasket of Nigeria where majority of the grains in Nigeria are produced, but has turned to something else as a result of attacks on farmers by Boko Haram insurgency. The seeds were delivered to the Governor of Borno State by Kenton Dashiell, the IITA Deputy Director General, Partnerships for Delivery, representing Director General Nteranya Sanginga, said the donation is aimed at helping Nigeria to rebuild Borno in particular and the northeast in general. The seeds donated include improved varieties of cowpea, soybean, maize, millet, sorghum, and rice that are adapted to the climate of the region. “They are also high yielding and resistant to the major pests and diseases, and other biotic and abiotic constraints in the region,” Dashiell explained, adding that another 3000 bundles of cassava planting materials will be delivered to the state once the rains stabilize (IITA, 2017).

2.6 Boko Haram Insurgency, Farming and Farm Families

Aside from the oil sector, agriculture remains one of the most important sector of the Nigerian economy due to the fact that it plays a very important role in its

developmental process (Arifalo and Ayilaran, 2011). It constitutes a significant sector of Nigeria's economy. This is explained by its contribution to growth rates of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at 1990 constant basic prices (percentage points) to be 2.4 in 2010 (CBN, 2011) As a matter of fact, agriculture remains one of the major pillars of the nation as it produces food for the teeming population and raw materials for industries and for export. Farming in particular, is the dominant occupation of rural Nigerians and Borno state in particular. They practised farming under rainfed condition and irrigation; these farmers and their families rely on farming as the major source of their livelihood and they have been surviving with it since time immemorial. Not until the uprising of Boko Haram insurgency where farmers were forced to flee their farm due to the incessant attacks of Boko Haram.

According to Mohammed (2014), Boko Haram was a fringe group under the leadership of Mallam Mohammed Yusuf, a fiery scholar resident in Maiduguri, who had not fully committed to violence before 2009. Through subtle and open harassment, Boko Haram was goaded into an open confrontation with the Nigerian. It could be noted that Boko Haram was not violently not until the clash in Maiduguri in 2009. Even though after the clash, Boko Haram vexed their anger on security personnel and government parastatal. Adesoji (2010) posited that the Nigerian government violently opposed Boko Haram, but only temporarily, quashed an uprising by the group across north-eastern Nigeria. As a result of improved security in government owned establishment, the sects later turn the unarmed villages mostly farmers to their targets. Since their activities is facing stiff opposition in the cities and towns of Borno, the insurgents resolve to capture the village and declaring their caliphate in any captured village. This later led to the situation whereby farmers were killed and other flee for the safety of their lives.

Hassan (2017) reported that wheat farmers in Nigeria's northeast have abandoned their farms under the onslaught of the Boko Haram Islamist insurgency, a setback for the country's efforts to cut imports by boosting local production. He further reported that wheat production in the zone has declined to just 20 percent of what it used to be due to insurgency in the northeastern city of Maiduguri, the Borno state capital. Borno, which used to account for about a quarter of Nigeria's production, currently grows no wheat, while the farmers rely on donations from government and other humanitarian organisations in order to feed their family not to talk of meeting other basic needs. Furthermore, Nigeria produced an average of 80,000 metric tons of wheat a year for decades until the introduction of a new variety in the 2012-13 season that tripled the average yield to as much as 6 tons per hectare (2.47 acres), increasing output to 400,000 tons in 2015-16 as more areas were cultivated which has come down to nothing as a result of Boko Haram attacks on farmers and their families (Hassan, 2017).

Mustapha (2017) stated that Borno state is facing an elevated risk of famine, with the number of people affected forecast to roughly double to 115,000 in 2017 because the violence has forced people to flee their homes and farms. Majority of the farmers that should be in the farm planting new varieties are now at internally displaced camps depending solely on what is being provided for them. The implication of this is that it is not only a problem to the farmers and their families alone, but also a nationwide problem as the inability of the farmers to cultivate land has resulted in increase in prices of food stuff in the market with minimum supply. Similarly, Samuel (2016) stated that in spite of improved security in the northeast, particularly in Borno and Yobe States, farmers, who had returned home are still reluctant to go back to their farmlands they left in the wake of the Boko Haram insurgency for fear of landmines and further attacks by the terrorists. He further reported that the only places in these communities you see people farming are along

the roads, all within the heart of towns. The farmers did not go to the hinterlands of their communities to farm because they are afraid of landmines or attacks, so they restrict their farming activities to the peripheries of their communities. That is, despite the fact that there is military presence and the insurgents, the farmers are still reluctant to go to their farmland so as to avoid reoccurrence of attack and kidnap or been trapped by landmines. It could be noted that farmers and their families have suffered a huge loss ranging from loss of lives of relatives, loss of farm products and the means of meeting the livelihood of their families, which has also degenerated to a national problem with scarcity of food stuffs and increase in prices of commodities.

2.7 Summary of Reviewed Literature

This study examine the impact of Boko Haram insurgency on farming and farm families in Borno State. The study seeks to understand the varoius causes of Boko Haram insurgency, consequences of their attacks on on farmers and their families in Borno state. The following sub-topics were discussed; Theoretical framework, , historical overview of Boko Haram insurgency, cause of Boko Haram terrorism, consequences of Boko Haram insurgency on farming and farm families, efforts of the government to resuscitate farming in Borno state and summary of literature reviewed. Many authors have argued that causes of Boko Haram insurgency include bad governance, poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, religious extremist and fanaticism, religious intolerance and corruption among others.

The study gathered that Boko Haram insurgency in Borno state has led to high level of devastating consequences on farming, farmers and their families which rely on farming as their main source of livelihood in order to meet their needs and that of their families. This is evident in the drastically reduction of supply of food from the state, loss of lives of farmers and their families. The attack of Boko Haram on farmers has led to outright displacement of farmers in their communities and loss of farm products to the insurgents.

The study also gathered that the state and the federal government have been making frantic effort to relocate the displaced farmer to their communities in order to start planting so as to have means of meeting their needs after the liberation of the captured communities. Furthermore, the government and other local and international organisations have been of help to the displaced farmers with donation of grains and fertilizers in order to aid them.

Finally, the review investigated the impact of Boko Haram insurgency on farming and farming families in Borno state and Theoretical Framework was equally established.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

This chapter examined the methods and procedures that were employed in the study. It specifically covers research design, population of the study, sample of the study, sampling technique, instrument for data collection, validity of the instrument, methods of data collection and methods of data analysis.

3.1 Research Design

Research design that was adopted in this study is descriptive survey research. Descriptive survey design are those studies which aim at collecting data and describing in a systematic manner, the characteristics, features or facts about a given population. The choice of this design is informed by the fact that the study is interested in gathering data on Boko Haram insurgency, farming and farm families in Borno state. The collection and analysis of data is aimed at highlighting consequences of Boko Haram on farming, farmers and the state of their family.

3.2 Area of the Study

The area of the study is Askira Uba local government area in Borno state. The LGA was created in 1976. According to Census (2006), it has a population of 138,091. Askira/uba is one of the biggest Local Government Areas in Borno State. It has a land mass of 2,362 km² and a population of 138,091 at the 2006 census. It is dominated by Mostly the Chibok (Kibaku) and Marghi tribes, although different dialects and some Fulani in the upland areas. It is one of the settlement areas of the Christian Missionaries in Northern Nigeria. The main settlements in this area include Uba, Askira, Wamdeo, Lassa, Uvu, Mussa and Husara. It is the only Local Government in Borno State with two emirates. Askira Uba local government area was located in Latitude: 10.635816 and Longitude: 12.878197. In Askira Uba, the wet season is hot, oppressive, and overcast and the dry season is sweltering and partly cloudy. Over the course of the year, the temperature typically varies from 15°C to 39°C and is rarely below 12°C or above 42°C. The hot season lasts for 2.0 months, from March 9 to May 11, with an average daily high temperature above 37°C. The hottest day of the year is April 7, with an average high of 39°C and low of 26°C. The cool season lasts for 2.8 months, from July 4 to September 29, with an average daily high temperature below 32°C. The coldest day of the year is January 3, with an average low of 15°C and high of 31°C.

Majority of the population in Askira Uba local government are predominantly farmers while some of the population are cattle rearer. The local government was attacked by Boko Haram while majority of the residents flee until the presence of the military personnel.

3.3 Population of the Study

The population of the study is made up of farmers in Askira Uba local government area of Borno State. Therefore, the population of the study include a total number of one hundred and thirty-eight thousand, and ninety-one (138,091) residents of Askira Uba local government area of Borno State according to national population commission.

3.4 Sample of the Study

Based on the population of the study, the sample size of 204 selected for the study. The study will adopt Taro Yamane simplified formula in calculating the sample size of the study, with representative sample size of 95% confidence and precision of 0.07. The sample of the study was selected from total 138,091 population of Askira Uba local government area.

Table 1: Sample Distribution of the Study

S/N	Name	Sample
1	Bdagu	22
2	Wasada	22
3	Ngurhyangwal	22
4	Pumbum	23

5	Mussa	23
6	Lassa	23
7	Dille	23
8	Ngurthlafu	23
9	Maikadir	23
	Total	204

3.5 Sampling Techniques

Stratified sampling technique was adopted in the study. This was done in order to group the respondents into different strata, while simple random sampling was later used to select the respondents. This gave all the elements equal chance of being chosen.

3.6 Instrument for Data Collection

The instrument that was adopted in the study is questionnaire. The Structured questionnaire was titled Boko Haram Insurgency and Farming and Farm Families Questionnaire” (BHIFFFQ) and is design for this study to bring out information needed on research questions. The questionnaire was be divided into sections A to F; each section was be patterned to reflect one aspect of the research question of the study. Section A contained items that deal with the personal information of the respondents while section B contained items that will identify the causes of Boko Haram insurgency as perceived by farmers in Borno state. Section C contained items that ascertain the consequences of Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in Borno state, while section D contained items that determined the effect of Boko Haram insurgency on farming in Borno state. Section E contained item that found out the survival approaches adopted by farmers and their families during the intense invasion of Boko Haram insurgency in Borno state F contained items that will determine the approaches adopted by government to help farmers to overcome the challenges of the Boko Haram insurgency in Borno state. The response mode

for research questions is four (4) points likert rating scale: strongly agree (4 points scale), agree (3 points scale), disagree (2 points scale) and strongly disagree (1 point scale). While key informant question guide was also constructed to in order to guide the researcher on the questions to ask the key informants.

3.7 Validity and Reliability of the Instrument

The researcher gave copies of the questionnaire developed to three experts in the Centre for Peace and Security Studies and Department of Science Education Modibbo Adama University of Technology, Yola for validation.

3.8 Method of Data Collection

The researcher adopted questionnaire and key informant interview (KII) for the collection of data. A guide on the subject matter was developed to guide the researcher in framing questions for the potential informants. The researcher will visit the locations in Askira Uba local government area in conducting the KII and administering the questionnaire on the respondents for the study.

3.9 Method of Data Analysis

Data collected for this study was analysed using mean and standard deviation while the qualitatively data was content analysed.

CHAPTER FOUR RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter is based on the results derived from the respondents based on the questionnaires administered to them. Thus, the tables and explanations that follows formed the results of the study.

4.1 Data Analysis and Results

Table 2: Gender of Respondents

S/N	Sex	Frequency	Percentage
1	Male	118	57.8
2	Female	86	42.2
3	Total	204	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 2 showed the gender of respondents. Male were 118, representing 57.8% of the respondents, while female which were 86, constituted 42.2% of the respondents. Therefore, majority of the respondents sampled were male.

Table 3: Age of Respondents

S/N	Age	F	%
1	21-30	57	27.9
2	31-40	74	36.3
3	41-50	49	24.0
4	51-60	20	9.8
5	Others	4	2.0
	Total	204	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 3 showed the age brackets of respondents. Those respondents who are between 21-30 years were 57, which constitute of 27.9% of the respondents, 31- 40 years were 74, which represent 36.3% of the respondents. 41-50years were 49, which constitute a total of 24.0% of the respondents, while 51-60 years were 20, which represent 9.8% of the respondents. Also, respondent with other age brackets were 4, wish constitute 2.0% of the

respondents. Thus, the result revealed that respondents who were between the age bracket of 31- 40 years constituted the highest age bracket in the sample studied.

Table 4: Marital Status of Respondents

S/N	Status	Frequency	Percentage
1	Single	62	30.4
2	Married	93	45.6
3	Separated	31	15.2
4	Widow/Widower	18	8.8
	Total	204	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 4 showed the marital status of respondents. Single were 62, which constitute 30.4% of the respondents, while married were 93 which represent 45.6% of the respondents, while respondents that have separated from their husbands and wives respectively were 31 which constitute 15.2% of the respondents. Widow/widower were 18, which represent 8.8% of the respondents. Therefore, majority of the respondents were married with 45.6% of the respondents.

Table 5: Educational Qualification of Respondents

S/N	Qualification	Frequency	Percentage
1	Pry Sch Cert	38	18.6
2	Sec Sch Cert	101	49.5

3	OND/NCE	35	17.2
4	HND/B.SC/ B.Ed	27	13.2
5	Others	3	1.5
	Total	204	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 5 showed the distribution of respondents' educational qualification. Those respondents with Pry School Certificate were 38, constitute a total of 18.6%, those with secondary School Certificate were 101, which represent 49.5% of the respondents and those with OND/NCE were 35, which represent 17.2% of the respondents. Respondents with HND/B.Sc/ B.Ed were 27 which represent 13.2%, while those who obtained other qualification were 3 which constitute 1.5% of the respondents. Therefore, the result shows that those with secondary School Certificate were the highest in the sample studied.

Table 6: Number of years in farming business

S/N	Items	Frequency	Percentage
1	0-5years	29	19..2
2	6-10years	15	7.4
3	11-15years	94	46.1
4	16years and above	56	27.5
	Total	204	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 6 showed the distribution of respondents' years in farming business. Respondents that have spent 0-5years in farming business were 29, which represent 19.2%, those that have spent 6-10years in farming business were 15, which represent 7.4% of the respondents, those that have spent 11-15years were 94, which constitute 46.1% of the respondents while those that have spent 16years and above were 56 which represent 27.5% of the respondent. Therefore, majority of the respondents sample in the course of this study has spent 11-15 years in farming business.

Table 7: Types of crops farmed

S/N	Items	Frequency	Percentage
1	Rice	24	11.8
2	Millet	25	12.3
3	Beans	74	36.3
4	Soya Beans	31	15.2
5	Maize	39	19.1
6	Others	11	5.4
	Total	204	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 7 showed the types of crops planted by the respondents. Those that planted Rice were 24, which represent 11.8% of the respondents, those that planted Millet were 25 which constitute 12.3% of the respondents and those that planted Beans were 74 which represent 36.3% of the respondents. Those that planted Soya Beans were 31, which constitute 15.2% of the respondents, those that planted Maize were 39, which represent 19.1% of the respondent and those that planted others crops such as ground nut, sorghum,

tiger nut etc. were 11 which constitute 5.4% of the respondents. Hence, the result shows that the larger percentage of the respondents sampled planted Beans.

Table 8: Other types of business engaged in apart from crop farming

S/N	Items	Frequency	Percentage
1	Cattle Rearing	44	21.6
2	Sheep and Ram Rearing	49	24.0
3	Goat Rearing	45	22.1
4	Fish Farming	19	9.3
5	Others	47	23.0
	Total	204	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 8 showed other types of business engaged in by the respondents apart from crop farming. Those that engage in cattle rearing were 44, which constitute 21.6% of the respondents, those that are into sheep and ram rearing were 49, which represent 24.0% of the respondents, those that are into goat rearing were 45, which constitute 22.1% of the respondents, those that are into fish farming were 19, which represent 9.3% of the respondents and those that are into others businesses apart from those listed above were 47 which represent 23.0% of the respondents. Hence, the result shows that majority of the respondents engaged in sheep and ram rearing aside from crop farming.

Table 9: Plots of land cultivates per farming season

S/N	Items	Frequency	Percentage
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1	1-3	17	8.4
2	4-6	64	31.4
3	7-9	81	39.7
4	10 and above	42	20.6
	Total	204	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 9 showed the number of plots of land cultivates per farming season. Those respondent that cultivates 1-3 plots of land were 17, which constitute 8.4% of the respondents, those that cultivates 4-6 plots of land were 64 which constitute 31.4% of the respondents. Also, those that cultivates 7-9 plots of land were 81, which constitute 39.7% of the respondents and those that cultivates 10 plots of land and above were 42, which represent 20.6% of the respondents. Therefore, the result revealed that larger percentage of the respondents cultivates 7-10 plots of land in a farming season.

Table 10: Numbers of bags harvested per farming season

S/N	Items	F	%
1	Below 10 bags	23	11.3
2	11-20 bags	64	31.4

3	21-30 bags	34	16.7
4	31-40bags	31	15.2
5	41-50 bags	27	13.2
6	51-60 bags	13	6.4
7	60 bags and above	12	5.9
	Total	204	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 10 showed the numbers of bags harvested by the respondents per farming season. Respondents that harvests below 10 bags were 23, which represent 11.3% of the respondents, those who harvests 11-20 bags were 64, which represent 31.4% of the respondents, those that harvests 21-30 bags were 34, which constitute 16.7% of the respondents, those that harvests 31-40 bags were 31, which constitute 15.2% of the respondents. Also, those that harvests 41-50 bags were 27, which represent 13.2% of the respondents, those that harvests 51-60 bags were 13, which constitute 5.9% of the respondents while those that harvests 60 bags and above were 12 which represent 5.9% of the respondents. Hence, larger percentage of the respondents harvests 11-20 bags in a farming season.

Table 11: Percentage of harvested crops consumed

S/N	Items	Frequency	Percentage
1	10-20%	68	33.3

2	21-30%	44	21.6
3	31-40%	39	19.1
4	41-50%	22	10.8
5	51 % and above	31	15.2
	Total	204	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 11 showed the percentage of harvested crops consumed by the respondents. Those that consume 10-20% of their harvest crops were 68, which constitute 33.3% of the respondents, those that consume 21-30% of their harvest crops were 44, which represent 21.6% of the respondents, those that consume 31-40% of their harvest crops were 39, which constitute 19.1% of the respondents. Also, those that consume 41-50% of their harvest crops were 22, which constitute 10.8% of the respondents and those that consume 51% and above of their harvest crops were 31, which represents 15.2% of the respondents. There, majority of the respondents sampled consume 10-20% of their harvested crops.

Table 12: Percentage of harvested crops sold

S/N	Items	Frequency	Percentage
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1	10-20%	22	10.8
2	21-30%	55	27.0
3	31-40%	50	24.5
4	41-50%	50	24.5
5	51 % and above	27	13.2
	Total	204	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 12 showed the percentage of harvested crops sold by the respondents. Those that sold 10-20% of their harvest crops were 22, which constitute 10.8% of the respondents, those that sold 21-30% of their harvest crops were 55, which represent 27.0% of the respondents, those that sold 31-40% of their harvest crops were 50, which constitute 24.5% of the respondents. Also, those that sold 41-50% of their harvest crops were 50, which constitute 24.5% of the respondents and those that sold 51% and above of their harvest crops were 27, which represents 13.2% of the respondents. There, majority of the respondents sampled consume 10-20% of their harvested crops.

Research Question 1: *What the causes of Boko Haram insurgency as perceived by farmers in Borno state?*

Table 13: The Causes of Boko Haram Insurgency as perceived by farmers in Borno state

S/N	Item	SA	A	D	SD	\bar{x}	STD	Remark
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1	Ignorance contributed to the emergence of boko haram insurgency	104 (51.0)	68 (33.3)	12 (5.9)	20 (9.8)	3.27	0.974	Agree
2	Unemployed played a major role in the uprising of boko haram	92 (45.1)	105 (51.5)	7 (3.5)		3.43	0.578	Agree
3	Corruption equally contributed to the manifestation of boko haram insurgency	75 (36.8)	116 (56.9)	6 (2.9)	7 (3.4)	3.27	0.681	Agree
4	High poverty in the land is a major cause of boko haram insurgency	94 (46.1)	88 (43.1)	14 (6.9)	8 (3.9)	3.31	0.769	Agree
5	Inequality is also part of the problem that leads to boko haram insurgency	53 (26.0)	112 (54.9)	14 (6.9)	25 (12.3)	2.95	0.905	Disagree
6	Social injustice is an issue in the uprising of boko haram insurgency	58 (28.4)	130 (63.7)		16 (7.8)	3.13	0.765	Agree
7	Poor governance played a significant role in the emergence of boko haram	109 (53.4)	77 (37.7)	4 (2.0)	14 (6.9)	3.38	0.830	Agree

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 13 showed the causes of Boko Haram insurgency as perceived by farmers in Borno state. The item statement include Ignorance contributed to the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.27$), Unemployed played a major role in the uprising of

Boko Haram with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.43$), Corruption equally contributed to the manifestation Boko Haram insurgency with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.27$), High poverty in the land is a major cause of Boko Haram insurgency with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.31$), Inequality is also part of the problem that leads to Boko Haram insurgency with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 2.95$), Social injustice is an issue in the uprising of Boko Haram insurgency with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.13$) and Poor governance played a significant role in the emergence of Boko Haram with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.38$). Hence, all the item statements raised were agreed as causes of Boko Haram insurgency by the farmers in Borno state as they all cut across the cutoff point of 3.0 except inequality problem which did not cut across the cut-off point of 3.0.

In support of the above, majority of the key informants interviewed in Askira Uba local government area of Borno state unanimously agreed that:

“Ignorance on the part of the people contributed to the emergence of Boko Haram especially the youth, a large number of the have been brainwashed into pledging their allegiance to Boko Haram. They made them to believe that they are truly doing the will of God by killing innocent citizens that does not subscribe to their own belief system. Furthermore, they made those youths to believe that by doing so, they have great reward in heaven. Also, they stated the increase in number of unemployed youth also played a major role in the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency. This youths does not have any work to do and the insurgents lure them with money inform of loan and grant for business. They embraced it since they don’t have any tangible source of income and loan for business will go a long way in meeting their needs. By so doing, the leaders of Boko Haram got a lot of youths which they are using as foot soldiers.”

In the same vein, all the key informants interviewed collectively stated that:

“High level of poverty in the land contributed significantly to the emergency of Boko Haram in the sense that a lot of people does not have what to eat for the moment not to talk about how to secure that of the next day. Cost of living is very high, the little money they have couldn’t support their upkeep and that of their family which made most of them vulnerable to recruitment as members of Boko Haram. Majority of the youth willing join the sect just because they know that their feeding will be taken care of while they will also have access to little amount of money as well. Furthermore, some people join the group as a result of inequality in the society. They believe that the resources that belongs to them as masses are been taken over by the few elite in the society and the only way to pay the elite back is to join the sect in other to come and invade such people’s properties and loot them since the government cannot do the needful.”

Towing the same line, all the key informants interviewed unanimously stated that:

“Bad governance in the land played a major role in the emergence of Boko Haram due to the fact that the government has refused to play her major role which is the security of lives and properties of the citizens with special deficiency in ensuring the wellbeing of her citizens. The leaders at federal, state and local government are just there to harness wealth for themselves and their relatives without considering the wellbeing of the masses. This alone gave the leaders of the insurgents an edge in winning people, especially the youth to their group with the intention of fighting the corrupt government. They also feel with that, they can put their people in leadership position who will advance their course.”

Research Question 2: *What are the effect of Boko Haram insurgency on the farm families in Borno state?*

Majority of the farmers interviewed in Bdagu reported that:

“The farmers alone do not bear the brunt of the deadly attacks of Boko Haram on them, the members of their family also had their fair share of the brutal attacks. As I am speaking to you, a lot of

farmers are not with their wives and children due to the fact all of them fled through different ways at the height of the attacks. Also, those that were fortunate to be together with their families, some had to look for one job or the other in order to cater for the needs. This has brought about serious separation between some farmers and their families. Furthermore, a lot of girls were left without option than to go for early marriage since their parents could no longer farm and they saw marriage as an opportunity to shift provision of their needs to any man that seeks their hands in marriage since the parents can no longer cater for their needs.”

In support of the above, the farmers in Lassa reported that:

“As a result of Boko Haram attacks on farmers, a lot of young boys are now drug and alcohol addicts due to the fact that they don’t have anything to do and they feel taking drugs and alcohol may enable them to forget about their horrible past. Also, a lot of girls have become victims of rape and sexual harassment as a result of the place they now reside. It got to an extent, the fleeing farmers had to reside in uncompleted buildings without windows and doors which makes them vulnerable in the hands of miscreants that are looking for opportunity to take advantage of them due to lack of adequate security in such areas”.

Furthermore, the farmers in Pumbum reported that:

“A lot of girl child of the farmers are now into prostitute in their new environment as a way of making some money to provide for their needs and also support their parents that couldn’t farm since Boko Haram attacks on their villages. This has made a lot of girls to have unwanted pregnancies and series of sexually transmitted disease as a result of illicit sex for money that engaged themselves”.

Also, the farmers in Wasada reported that:

Some children and relatives of farmers that are in school have dropped out of schools as result of Boko Haram attacks on their villages. Some of them could not even afford to feed themselves not to talk of enrolling their children in school in their present location. The stress on the parents have made life so difficult for their family as all of them are frustrated.

Research Question 3: *What are the consequences of Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in Borno state?*

Table 14: Consequences of Boko Haram Insurgency on Farmers in Borno State

S/N	Items	SA	A	D	SD	\bar{x}	STD	Remark
1	Boko Haram attacks made majority of the farmers to flee from their villages	120 (58.9)	66 (32.4)	12 (5.9)	6 (2.9)	3.49	0.766	Agree
2	The attacks conducted by Boko Haram leads to the death of many farmers	4 (2.0)	103 (50.5)	93 (45.6)	8 (3.9)	3.49	0.608	Agree
3	Farmers were afraid to cultivate their lands due to the fear of being attacked by Boko Haram	117 (57.4)	83 (40.7)	4 (2.0)		3.55	0.536	Agree
4	Stored farm products of farmers were carted away by Boko Haram insurgents	115 (56.4)	77 (37.7)	8 (3.9)	4 (2.1)	3.49	0.669	Agree
5	Farmers could not wait to harvest their products due to fear of being attacked Boko Haram attacks	124 (60.8)	76 (37.3)	4 (2.0)		3.57	0.604	Agree

6	Farmers finds it difficult to meet the basic needs of their families since they couldn't farm anymore	115 (56.4)	77 (37.7)	4 (2.1)	8 (3.9)	3.49	0.753	Agree
7	The attacks of Boko Haram rendered farmers poor	98 (48.0)	99 (48.5)	3 (1.5)	4 (2.0)	3.43	0.627	Agree

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 14 showed the consequences of Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in Borno State. The item state include Boko Haram attacks made majority of the farmers to flee from their villages with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.49$), The attacks conducted by Boko Haram leads to the death of many farmers with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.49$), Farmers were afraid to cultivate their lands due to the fear of being attacked by Boko Haram with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.55$), Stored farm products of farmers were carted away by Boko Haram insurgents with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.49$), Farmers could not wait to harvest their products due to fear of being attacked Boko Haram attacks with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.57$), Farmers finds it difficult to meet the basic needs of their families since they couldn't farm anymore with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.49$), and The attacks of Boko Haram rendered farmers poor with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.43$). Therefore, all the item statements raised were agreed as the consequences of Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in Borno state as they all cut across the cut-off point of 3.0.

In support of the above, the key informants reported that:

The attacks of Boko Haram on farmers in Askira Uba have made a lot of farmers to flee the villages and move to the neighbouring villages in Borno and Adamawa state. For instance, a lot of them are in Daware in Girei local government in Adamawa state since they have access to land over there and they can move on with their farming. Also, those farmers that could not flee as at the time of the attacks were seriously injured due to bullet wounds. Some of them were taken to hospital while some died during that period.

They further stated that we have lost a lot of farmers to the due to the attacks of Boko Haram on our village.

Similarly, the key informants also stated that:

Majority of the farmers are afraid to go back to farm and cultivate their land due to the attacks of Boko Haram. Some of our, our farmlands are very far to the village and we can't take the risk of going to the place because the insurgents can attack us any time. Also, the beans, groundnut, millets and maize that we stored in our ban has been taken away by the insurgents which makes it difficult for us to have seed for planting in case we see any available piece of land to cultivate.

Furthermore, the key informant reported that:

The attacks of Boko Haram have resulted into a very serious problem for the farmers as they can't even meet the basic needs of their family which include food, clothing and so on. The farmers are now extremely poor due that the fact that for about two seasons now, they cannot cultivate the land the little food they have in the store have been carted away by the insurgents. Before now, no matter what happens, majority of farmers have what to eat and even excess which they can give out to people but the story is not the same now since they don't have a secure land to cultivate any longer.

Research Question 4: *What are the effect of Boko Haram activities on farming in Borno state?*

Table 15: Effect of Boko Haram Insurgency on Farming in Borno State

S/N	Items	SA	A	D	SD	\bar{x}	STD	Remark
1	Boko Haram attacks led to decrease in farming activities	99 (48.5)	88 (43.1)	13 (6.4)	4 (2.0)	3.38	0.695	Agree
2	The prices of grain/seedling for planting went up preventing effective farming	58 (28.4)	130 (63.7)	16 (7.8)		3.21	0.567	Agree
3	Farmlands were abandoned because of the attacks of Boko Haram	97 (47.5)	79 (38.7)	24 (11.8)	4 (2.0)	3.32	0.757	Agree
4	Fear of losing the farm products to Boko Haram insurgents made some to abandon farming	63 (30.9)	118 (57.8)	16 (7.8)	7 (3.4)	3.16	0.708	Agree
5	Some of the farmer could not access fertilizers in their remote villages due to Boko Haram attacks on the stores	80 (39.2)	91 (44.6)	23 (11.3)	10 (4.9)	3.18	0.819	Agree

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 15 showed the extent which Boko Haram insurgency has affected farming in Borno state. The item statement include Boko Haram attacks led to decrease in farming activities with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.38$), The prices of grain/seedling for planting went up preventing effective farming with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.21$), Farm lands were abandoned because of the attacks of Boko Haram with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.32$), Fear of losing the farm products to Boko Haram insurgents made some to abandon farming with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.16$) and Some of the farmer could not access fertilizers in their remote villages due to Boko Haram attacks on the stores with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.18$). Thus, all the item statements raised were agreed as the extent which

Boko Haram insurgency has affected farming in Borno state as they all cut across the cutoff point of 3.0.

In support of the above, the key informants that were interviewed reported that:

“Farmers cannot access their fields to plant and harvest crops, food and productive assets have been lost due to attacks and displacement, and raids on farms for food by Boko Haram insurgents are still ongoing. Even those farmers that tried to risk going back into farming are faced with the threat of land mines that are still in the ground planted by Boko Haram. This has made the prices of seeds for planting increase as few people that have the seeds are not ready to sell it for a cheap price just because of the stress they passed through before getting it. This has seriously decrease the number of people that participated in farming since they don’t usually buy their seed and they don’t even have the money to buy the seed now.”

The key informants also reported that:

“The fear of losing the farm products suffered for has made a lot of people to abandon farming and diverted their attention to other thing like selling food stuff. Also, some have left for neighbouring states like Adamawa and Gombe in search for any casual work they can do in order to sustain their needs. Furthermore, access to fertilizers and chemicals used in farming have also been difficult since the attacks of Boko Haram, no business man is ready to risk his money and open a store for chemicals and fertilizers. This has also made farming so difficult because some of our farm products need fertilizer in order to improve the harvest. Also there is no enough manpower to be employed in weeding the farm since we use chemicals majorly if we want to weed our farmland.”

Research Question 5: *What are the coping strategies adopted by farmers and their families during the intense invasion of Boko Haram insurgency in Borno state?*

Table 16: Coping strategies of farmers in Borno State

S/N	Items	SA	A	D	SD	\bar{x}	ST.D	Remark
1	Some of the farmers that have little money change their line of business in order to earn a living	96 (47.1)	82 (40.2)	16 (7.8)	10 (4.9)	3.29	0.714	Agree
2	Majority of the farmers flee to IDPs camps to escape from the attacks of Boko Haram	77 (37.7)	91 (44.6)	22 (10.8)	14 (6.9)	3.13	0.664	Agree
3	Involvement of farmers in casual labours in order to earn a living	84 (41.2)	89 (43.6)	14 (6.9)	17 (8.3)	3.18	0.787	Agree
4	Relocation to other safe places outside the state	115 (56.4)	77 (37.7)	4 (2.1)	8 (3.9)	3.29	0.768	Agree
5	Some farmers and their families resolve into begging as the only means of meeting their need		16 (7.8)	58 (28.4)	130 (63.7)	1.89	0.823	Disagree
6	Some farmers took refuge in the houses of friends and family outside the state in order to start petty farming that can sustain their feeding	115 (56.4)	77 (37.7)	8 (3.9)	4 (2.1)	3.45	0.768	Agree

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 16 showed the Coping strategies of farmers in Borno State. The item statement include Some of the farmers that have little money change their line of business in order to earn a living with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.29$), Majority of the farmers flee to IDPs camps to escape from the attacks of Boko Haram with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.13$), Involvement of farmers in casual

labours in order to earn a living with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.18$), Relocation to other safe places outside the state with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.29$), Some farmers and their families resolve into begging as the only means of meeting their need with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 1.89$) and Some farmers took refuge in the houses of friends and family outside the state in order to start petty farming that can sustain their feeding with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 3.45$). Therefore, all the item statements raised were agreed as the survival approaches adopted by farmers and their families during the intense invasion of Boko Haram insurgency in Borno state as they all cut across the cut-off point of 3.0 except Some farmers and their families resolve into begging as the only means of meeting their need as it did not cut across the cut-off point of 3.0.

In support of the above, the key informants reported that:

“Majority of the farmers that have little money on them have changed their line of business in order to earn a living. If you go to Adamawa state, a lot of farmers are their doing one form of business of the other. Some ventured into selling food, while some open shops to sell petty things in order earn a living. Also, some venture into sales of old clothes, bags and shoes in order to see what to depend on to sustain the upkeep of the family. Furthermore, a lot of farmers is into casual labour in building sites just to make some money for themselves since they already have wives and children and they need to carter to them.

Similarly, the key informants also stated that:

“Some of the farmers have fled to IDPs camps in order to escape the attacks of Boko Haram since the camps are perceived to be relatively safe compare to the village. Some have also relocated to the neighbouring states like Adamawa, Gombe and Taraba in order to escape the attacks of the insurgents.

In addition to the above, the key informants further reported that:

“A lot of farmers have relocated to the house of their friend and families in Maiduguri which is perceived to be safe to an extent

since there is a lot of military personnel there which makes it a bit difficult for the insurgents to launch serious attacks on the city.

Research Question 6: *What are the approaches adopted by government to help farmers build resilience against Boko Haram in Borno state?*

Table 17: Approaches adopted by Government to help farmers build resilience against Boko Haram

S/N	ITEM	SA	A	D	SD	\bar{x}	ST.D	Remark
1	Increase in military presence in Borno state in order to get rid of the insurgency to create stable climate	115 (56.4)	77 (37.7)	8 (3.9)	4 (2.1)	3.78	0.584	Agree
2	Distribution of assorted fertilizers in order to encourage farmers to go back to their land.	4 (2.0)	8 (3.9)	93 (45.6)	103 (50.5)	1.67	0.753	Disagree
3	Training of farmers on suitable irrigation land identification and preparation for farming		4 (2.0)	83 (40.7)	117 (57.4)	2.12	0.806	Disagree
4	Empowerment of farmers through FADAMA III project	6 (2.9)	12 (5.9)	66 (32.4)	120 (58.9)	1.84	0.475	Disagree
5	Distribution of improved seedlings to enhance farm production		4 (2.0)	76 (37.3)	124 (60.8)	2.14	0.615	Disagree

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 17 showed the approaches adopted by government to help farmers go back to the land in Borno state. The item statements includes Increase in military presence in Borno state in order to get rid of the insurgency to create stable climate with a mean score (\bar{x} = 3.78), Distribution of assorted fertilizers in order to encourage farmers to go back to their

land with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 1.67$), Training of farmers on suitable irrigation land identification and preparation for farming with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 2.12$), Empowerment of farmers through FADAMA III project with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 1.84$) and Distribution of improved seedlings to enhance farm production with a mean score ($\bar{x} = 2.14$). Therefore, all the item statements raised were disagreed as the approaches adopted by government to help farmers go back to the land in Borno state except Increase in military presence in Borno state in order to get rid of the insurgency for the farmers to have conducive atmosphere for farming as it is the only item that cut across the cutoff point of 3.0. Thus, the implication of this is that the only visible thing done by the government is increase military presence in Borno state in order to get rid of the insurgency all other things were not put in place to help the farmers.

In support of the above, the key informants reported that:

The only thing the government did was just to bring military men to our areas, they did not give us money nor rehabilitate our destroyed buildings. Not even seeds or fertilizer was supplied by the government. All the promises they made, they did not even give us a dime to support our farming activities.

4.2 Findings of the Study

Based on the analysis of the study, the following findings were made:

- i. The study discovered that the major causes of Boko Haram insurgency is the high level of social injustice in the country, while widespread of unemployed youth, high level of poverty rate in the north-east, poor response by the government, deprivation and inequality among the elites and the masses, ignorance of religious teaching opposed to violence and religious fanaticism and high level of corruption of the leaders are other factors that contributed to the rebellion and emergence of Boko Haram insurgency.

- ii. The study revealed that the effect of Boko Haram insurgency on the farm families in include separation from their parents, vulnerability to rape and other sexual violence, abuse of drugs and alcohol and dropping out of school.
- iii. The study revealed that the consequence of Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in Borno state include majority of farmers have flee from their villages, death of a lot of farmers, some farmers could not cultivate land in the remote villages any more, majority of farm products were carted away by the insurgents, some farmers could not wait to harvest their products as a result of Boko Haram attacks, Most of the farmers cannot provide the basic needs of their families since they couldn't farm anymore and Majority of the farmers live at the mercy of friends and families in other to feed their families.
- iv. The study discovered that the effect of Boko Haram insurgency on farming in Borno state include some of the farmers are finding it difficult to purchase grains/seeds to plant as a result of increase in price which reduce the capacity of their farm, few farmers that are ready to go into farming could not get enough land since they are afraid to go to remote villages as a result of Boko Haram attacks and fear of losing the farm products to Boko Haram insurgents has made some to abandon farming.
- v. The study found out that the survival approaches adopted by farmers and their families during the intense invasion of Boko Haram insurgency in Borno state include some of the farmers that have little money change to other businesses in other to earn a living and feed their family, some farmers flee to IDPs camp and depend on things provided by government and NGOs, some farmers and their families go into casual labours in order to earn their livelihood and some farmers

and their families relocate to the houses of their friends and families and start farming with the available land offered to them.

- vi. The study also discovered that the only approach adopted by government to help farmers go back to their abode in Borno state is increase military presence in Borno state in order to get rid of the insurgency for the farmers to have conducive atmosphere for farming.

4.3 Discussion of Findings

The discussion of findings was done using the following subheadings:

- i. The Causes of Boko Haram insurgency.
- ii. Consequences of Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in Borno state.
- iii. Effect of Boko Haram insurgency on farming activities in Borno state.
- iv. Survival approaches adopted by farmers and their families during the intense invasion of Boko Haram insurgency in Borno state.
- v. Approaches adopted by government to help farmers go back to their land in Borno state.

4.3.1 The causes of Boko Haram insurgency

The study discovered that the major causes of Boko Haram insurgency is the high level of social injustice in the country, while widespread of unemployed youth, high level of poverty rate in the north-east, poor response by the government, deprivation and inequality among the elites and the masses, ignorance of religious teaching opposed to violence and religious fanaticism and high level of corruption of the leaders are other factors that contributed to the rebellion and emergence of Boko Haram insurgency. This is in agreement with the findings of Bagaji (2012). The failure of the Nigerian leaders to establish good governance may have hampered national integration which has led to mass poverty and unemployment. This has resulted into communal, ethnic, religious and class

conflicts that have now characterized the entire Nigerian nation. Poverty and unemployment have therefore served recipe' for the emergence of Boko Haram insurgence because this has left the hopeless poor people to be used as mercenary fighters. What this means theoretically is that poverty and unemployment increase the number of people who are prepared to kill or be killed (suicide bombers) for a given course at token benefit. This explains why all the Boko Haram operations involving suicide bombing have a large turnout of under-aged, unemployed and illiterate people (including the under-aged) as fighters by the master minders and sponsors for a miserable price (Bagaji, 2012).

Similarly, it is in agreement with the work of Briscoe and Bibi (2013). They reported that one significant factor that has stimulated the drive towards violent extremism, recruitment and support for Boko Haram is economic deprivation. Abject poverty and economic dislocation of livelihoods have drastically reduced the options of many young Nigerians in the northern region. As highlighted above, deducing from the structural violence paradigm, individual and group grievances, such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic marginalisation, can be used as mobilising instruments by sinister groups to find support and recruits for terrorist violence. As this section will highlight, in the particular context of Nigeria, it is the combination of these factors that Boko Haram has exploited in a bid to gain support for its activities in northern Nigeria. According to Okemi (2013), the economic situations in many countries lead many individuals to seek refuge and comfort within the confines of a terrorist organization due to high level unemployment or low employment. In order to provide a stable home, many people turn to terrorist organization as the only source of funding the food, shelter and consistent income for their families. This is in addition to inequality and bitter polarization between the haves and the have nots. This extreme poverty leads to vulnerability and insecurity and while poverty does not always lead to terrorism, terrorism does take

advantage of misery, knowing that despair creates favourable conditions for terrorist projects and action. Towing the same line, Nnodim (2014) reported that the absence of good governance also contributed to emergency of insurgence terror group in Nigeria. Absence of good governance therefore suggests that the socio-political environment is infested with administrative injustice, human rights abuse, inequality and endemic corruption. A natural response to this unjust social formation is for the down-trodden to seek for redemption through membership of terror group. This is a sort of pay-back to the government that have failed to take care of them.

4.3.2 Consequences of Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in Borno state

The study revealed that the consequence of Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in Borno state include majority of farmers have flee from their villages, death of a lot of farmers, some farmers could not cultivate land in the remote villages any more, majority of farm products were carted away by the insurgents, some farmers could not wait to harvest their products as a result of Boko Haram attacks, Most of the farmers cannot provide the basic needs of their families since they couldn't farm anymore and Majority of the farmers live at the mercy of friends and families in other to feed their families. This is in agreement with the work of Aba (2017). He reported that Boko Haram insurgents hasn't only killed thousands of people in its campaign to impose Islamic law, or Shariah: it's wrecking agriculture in some of the country's main food-growing areas, where farmers afraid to go to their farmers in Borno state and its environs. He further stated that rains that exceeded expectations falls and it failed to translate into a better harvest, as no one can move a kilometer, not to talk of going to villages to farm due to fear of the attack of Boko Haram. He further stated that more than 1.5 million people, mostly farmers, have been forced to flee their homes as Boko Haram intensified its insurgency in the past years, while Borno, Yobe and Adamawa are the worst hit states of the insurgency and farmers in the three

states produce staple foods such as cowpeas, rice, millet, sorghum, corn and yams as well as tomatoes, onions, fish and livestock (Aba, 2017).

Similarly, IRIN (2015) reported that increases in the cost of food, which has the biggest weighting in Nigeria's consumer price index, have outpaced the CPI every month since 2013. Disruptions to food distribution because of the insurgency are among the largest inflationary risks faced by the economy. They further reported that agriculture contributes about 24 percent of gross domestic product, "near-term risks" to price stability include possible food-supply bottlenecks linked to insurgency and insecurity in some major agricultural zones of the country. The implication of this is that Boko Haram insurgency did not only affect the farmers at the state level alone, the impact of the insurgency has now been felt at the national level as the supply of food has reduced drastically which has led to a high of inflation as agriculture accounts for 24 percent of the gross domestic product. Towing the same line, IRIN (2015) further reported that Lake Chad borders four countries, including Cameroon and Niger. Out of more than 200 villages on the Nigerian side of the water body, about 140 have been ransacked by the Islamist militants. Most of the farmer in the area grew onions, water melons, wheat, rice and cowpeas. The soil is very fertile but unfortunately the farmers are in a state of fear. Where farmers are still able to plant and produce, they face difficulties moving their harvest to the towns and cities where they're in demand because key bridges on important link routes have been sabotaged by militants, and vehicles traveling on remote roads risk being ambushed. Furthermore, IRIN (2017) reported that families have driven out of villages, farmers unable to tend crops, food stocks of entire communities raided during the attacks of Boko Haram and the impact of the attacks on the people lingers long after the rape and slaughter, as many families that total depend of farming as their only source of livelihood were forced to flee to safety of the lives and turned into beggars where they take refuge.

IRIN (2017) further reported that farmers that recently returned to villages in northern Adamawa, only to find themselves unemployed and doing menial jobs to survive.

4.3.3 Effect of Boko Haram insurgency on farming activities in Borno state

The study discovered that the effect of Boko Haram insurgency on farming in Borno state include some of the farmers are finding it difficult to purchase grains/seeds to plant as a result of increase in price which reduce the capacity of their farm, few farmers that are ready to go into farming could not get enough land since they are afraid to go to remote villages as a result of Boko Haram attacks and fear of losing the farm products to Boko Haram insurgents has made some to abandon farming. This is in line with the findings of Margarita, (2013). He reported that recently, the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria, the insurgency has negatively affected farming and the availability and affordability of food items in these areas. Many rural farmers have been displaced while others are restricted from going to their farms because of security checks and the militaristic counter-terrorism approach of the government (Dabugat, 2013).

A lot of farmers in the region have been forced to immigrate with their families to different location. With insurgents terrorising the citizens in the north, there are fears that even higher levels of the population will take to emigration to ensure their livelihoods and safety. Although there have been no reports of a major attack on the northern state of Kano in recent years, violence in neighbouring states continue to negatively affects its commerce. Closures of northern borders have decreased trade in Kano by half, thus increasing regional food shortages and poverty levels. As such, the National Emergency Management Agency estimates that over 152,000 people have been internally displaced mostly farmers due to attacks on more than 100 communities in north central Nigeria alone, and are unlikely to return to their homes anytime soon (Usman, 2006). Violence in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states gained momentum with the emergence of

President Goodluck Jonathan in May 2011. Over 1.5 million people have fled their homes and at least 13,000 people mostly farmers have died in these states due to violence killing and gun shots (Mustapha, 2015). Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state had witnessed multiples of bombing explosion making the town very insecure for farmers and other businesses. Major markets in the town have become ghosts' area due to insurgency. It is on record that among the six geo-political zones in Nigeria, the North-east and North-west are the poorest zones and these are the zones where Boko Haram originated from and very active (Adebayo, A2014).

The bombing of bridges and roads have made land transportation risky and difficult. Movement of goods and man have hence been restricted. Farming business in the north especially crop farming who have to move from very remote villages in order to bring their farm product to market. The closing of borders have affected more than just the Nigerian population. Cameroon has been negatively affected by this closure, especially communities closest to the Cameroon-Nigerian border. With no movement between states, there has been a sharp fall in food exports to Nigeria and in commodities such as oil to Cameroon. The border closure has had disastrous consequences for both merchants and residents of Northern Cameroon. Such consequences are seen through these merchants' and residents' dependence on oil and Nigeria as an export community for their produce. With closed borders, the price for commodities has skyrocketed, while transport fares increased by 70%. For these reasons, many of these citizens are unable to export their goods to Nigeria, leaving them to stockpile large quantities of produce. The town of Amchide has been reported to have taken the hardest hit. Amchide has become a ghost town, where the merchants who formerly constituted 90% of the population have left. Also, the houses and barns have been burnt down as a result of explosives devices and they have no access to seeds, tools or fertilisers in order to embark on farming. In addition,

farmers that have been cultivating 7-10 plots of land and harvesting 50 -60 bags hardly cultivate 2-3 plots of land due to the fact that most of the fertile land are close to the route of Boko Haram insurgents and their hide outs. They are also afraid of planting in such areas whereby Boko Haram insurgents will invade and purse them during the harvest time. This has seriously affected the farmers and their families as they find it difficult to meet their needs.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

The study investigated the impact of Boko Haram insurgency on farming and farm families in Borno state. The study summarized that the activities of Boko Haram insurgency in north eastern Nigeria and Borno state to be precise. The attacks of Boko Haram have caused serious havoc which is not only felt in Borno state alone, but across the country. The incessant invasion of the insurgents on remote villages that are predominantly farmers has really affected farmers, farming and production of food. OCHA (2016) reported that for a third year in a row, farmers have been unable to return to the land for planting season, adding to food insecurity. Physical insecurity and ruminants' of land mine planted by the insurgents has prevented farmers returning back to their villages. This development is predicated on the fact that farmers and their families were practically drove out of their communities, preventing them, from farming and its sundry activities in the northeast and Borno state in particular. The study examined Askira Uba where majority of the residents are farmers who depend on farming to provide the needs of their families. As a result of Boko Haram attacks, majority of the farmers have fled and abandoned their farm lands, while the sects carted away their farm products making life difficult for the farmers and their families. As a result of the effort of government to relocate the farmers that deserted their land back to Askira Uba in other move on with their lives and stand cultivating land, many farmers who returned home are still unable to cultivate their fields due to landmines. The implication of this is evident in the increased in prices of food stuff in the market and its relative scarcity.

Furthermore, the study was divided into five chapters. The study reviewed literature on insurgency and Boko Haram insurgency, causes of Boko Haram insurgency,

effect of Boko Haram insurgency on farmers and farming and the approaches adopted by government to return the victims of the attacks back to their land. This was done in order to have a better understanding of the subject matter and to put it in a better perspective. The study adopted survey design and population of the study comprises of the people of Askira Uba local government area, Borno state. 204 respondents were drawn as the sample, while stratified sampling technique was used to select the sample for the study. This was done in order to group the respondents into different strata, while simple random sampling was later used to select the respondents. Questionnaire and key informant interview (KII) were used for data collection. Data collected for the study was analysed using, frequency, percentage, mean standard deviation and bar chart, while the qualitative data was content analysed. Findings of the study were made based on the results obtained from the analysis of data.

5.2 Conclusion

Boko Haram insurgency has remained a scourge in Nigeria's national security and development. The spate of suicide bombings targeting soft places represent a major advance in Boko Haram capabilities and have continued to undermine Nigeria collective entity. The activities of Boko Haram have wreaked havoc of various degrees on north eastern Nigeria, the consequences has resulted in devastating situation ranging destruction of lives and properties. The agricultural businesses and farming to be precise has seriously been affected the Borno state. This has been evidenced in the reduction of people that involved in farming in insurgency ridden area and the skyrocketing increment in the prices of agricultural product and food stuff. Evidence has also shown that the activities have disrupted the agricultural output and economy of the people living in the Northern states as most inhabitants and farmers have migrated to a better and safer place. In addition to revamping and controlling the country's agricultural business sector as it was in the 1960s,

the government should take drastic action to stop this unbearable act of Boko Haram. The implication of the attacks of Boko Haram on farmers has led to a high level of food insecurity in the county. The federal and state government should as a matter of urgency device means to stop the incessant attacks of Boko Haram in the country and on farmers in order to avoid a great loom of hike in food stuff prices and food insecurity in the country.

5.3 Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations were made:

- i. The study recommends that the leaders should try as much as possible to enthrone good governance in the society, with fairness to all and sundry, social justice and equity should also be ensured as well. The study further recommends the government should create job opportunities for the unemployed youth bulge in order to reduce their susceptibility to violence. Furthermore, the religious leader should endeavour to preach the religious truth and tolerance.
- ii. The study recommends that federal and Borno state government should ensure security of lives and properties for the farmers in order for the to return to their villages to embark on farming which is their major source of livelihood which will enable them to cater for the needs of their families.
- iii. The study recommends that federal and Borno state government should try all their possible best to put an end to Boko Haram insurgency and relocate the farmers back to their land in order for them to continue their farming so as to earn a living and feed their family.
- iv. The study also recommends that apart from putting an end to Boko Haram insurgency, all the remote villages should be comb in order to remove the

remnant of land mines planted by the insurgents so as to guarantee the safety of the farmers that are returning to farmer to cultivate their land.

- v. The study further recommends that the government should make provision for how to return the farmers back to the villages and try as much as possible to build moderate structures for those that their houses have been completely destroyed and rehabilitate those that are still available in order to make life conducive for the farmers.
- vi. The study also recommends that apart from increase military presence in Borno state in order to get rid of the insurgency for the farmers to have conducive atmosphere for farming, the government should provide improved seedlings and fertilizers for the farmers in order for them to have something to start up with, which will enhance their productivity.

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