

**THE ROLE OF NIGERIA IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN WEST
AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF COTE D'IVOIRE**

BY

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this work is the product of my research efforts undertaken under the supervision of Professor Mahmoud M. Lawan and has not been presented anywhere for the award of a degree or certificate. All sources have been duly acknowledged.

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CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the research work for this thesis and the subsequent write-up (Ismaila Ahmed Danjuma, Registration NO. SPS/09/PPS/00002) were carried out under my supervision.

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Ismaila A. Danjuma

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to Allah. Also, to the memory of my late father and late Dr Haruna Muhammad Salihi. I pray to Allah to grant them paradise, ameen.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AEC	-	African Economic Community
AFISMA	-	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
ANC	-	African National Congress
AU	-	African Union
BASA	-	Bilateral Air Service Agreement
BB	-	Barclays Bank
BNC	-	Bi-National Commission
BP	-	British Petroleum
CC	-	Constitutional Council
CCDS	-	Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff
CEAO	-	<i>Communaute Economique de l' Afrique Ouest</i> (West African Economic Community)
CEWR	-	Conflict Early Warning Response
CFA franc	-	Constituency for Africa
ECOMOG	-	ECOWAS Monitoring Group

ECOMICI	-	ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire
ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of West African States
ETLS	-	ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme
EU	-	European Union
FAN	-	Armed Forces of the North
FDI	-	Foreign Direct Investment
FN	-	<i>Forces Nouvelles</i> (New Forces)
FPI	-	Ivorian People's Front
FROLINAT	-	National Liberation Front of Chad
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
GNR	-	Government of National Reconciliation
GNU	-	Government of National Unity
ICC	-	International Criminal Court
ICJ	-	International Court of Justice
ICT	-	Information Communication Technology
IDPs	-	Internally Displaced Persons

IEC	- Independent Electoral Commission
IPCR	- Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution
LURD	- Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MFA	- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOU	- Memorandum of Understanding
MPCI	- <i>Movement Populaire de Cote d'Ivoire</i> (Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast)
MPIGO	- <i>Movement Patriotique du Grand Ouest</i> (Popular Ivorian Movement for the Great West)
MPJ	- <i>Movement Pour la Justic and Peace</i> (Movement for Peace and Justice)
MPLA	- <i>Movimento Popular de Libertacan de Angola</i> (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
NATO	- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDC	- National Defence College
NIIA	- Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
NPFL	- National Patriotic Front of Liberia

NTG	-	National Transitional Government
OAU	-	Organisation for African Unity
OPA	-	Oougadougou Peace Agreement
OPEC	-	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAC	-	Pan African Congress
PDCI	-	<i>Parti Democratique de Cote d'Ivoire</i> (Democratic Party of Cote d'Ivoire)
PSC	-	Peace and Security Council
R2P	-	Responsibility to Protect
RDR	-	Rally for the Republicans
RUF	-	Revolutionary United Front
SAP	-	Structural Adjustment Programme
SALWs	-	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SIC	-	Special Implementation Committee
SWAPO	-	South West African People's Organisation
UEMOA	-	Francophone West African Economic and Monetary Union

UK	-	United Kingdom
UN	-	United Nations
UNDPKO	-	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNMICI	-	United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire
UNOCI	-	United Nations Operations in Cote d'Ivoire
UNSC	-	United Nations Security Council
US	-	United States
USAID	-	United States Agency for International Development
USSR	-	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
WTC	-	World Trade Centre
YP	-	Young Patriots
ZANU-PF	-	Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front
ZAPU-PF	-	Zimbabwe African Peoples Union- Patriotic Front

ABSTRACT

This research study examined the role of Nigeria in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire in the West African sub-region. Specifically, the study investigated how Nigeria's engagement in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire led to the restoration of peace and stability in the country. Over the years, the promotion of international peace and security form part of the objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy process. The eruption of conflict in 2002 in Cote d'Ivoire led to the displacement and death of thousands of individuals in the country. The humanitarian situation in the country therefore called for the attention of Nigeria and other members of the international community to mediate. The engagement of Nigeria in Cote d'Ivoire has been investigated in this study against the backdrop of Nigeria's foreign policy and its geo-political strategic interests in the West African sub-region. Theoretically, the third-party theory was employed as a framework of analysis. Methodologically, qualitative method was adopted in data collection and analysis. For the primary data, interviews were conducted on respondents. The secondary data were gathered from documentary materials (textbooks, journals, magazines, newspapers, official documents and internet etc) and were analysed using content analysis. The study found that security and economic interests were the major factors that influenced Nigeria's engagement in Cote d'Ivoire. Also, Nigeria's leadership role in the West African sub-region and indeed African continent was one of the reasons for Nigeria's engagement in Cote d'Ivoire. Moreover, Nigeria's participation in peacekeeping operations through the deployment of military observers' mission in Cote d'Ivoire was an indication of its commitment to peace and security in the West African sub-region and the world at large. Nevertheless, in spite of the success of Nigeria's engagement in the promotion of peace and stability in Cote d'Ivoire, the country encountered some challenges- domestic and international. Domestically, the challenges of economic crisis and insecurity during the period of Nigeria's engagement affected the noble objective of Nigeria in the promotion of peace in Cote d'Ivoire. At the international level, the rivalry and the quest for leadership in Africa from countries like Ghana, Gambia and South Africa in particular affected Nigeria's diplomatic initiatives toward conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire. However, despite these challenges Nigeria was able to contribute to the restoration of peace and political stability in Cote d'Ivoire.

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Before the arrival of French colonialists, the country that is presently known as Cote d'Ivoire had diverse people and culture that were independent of one another. France not only amalgamated these diverse elements into one single country but also introduced the policy of assimilation. The policy not only granted French citizenship to some few educated African people but also allowed migrants from neighbouring countries to settle in Cote d'Ivoire and become citizens (Collier, 2010). After the attainment of independence in 1960, President Felix Houphouet-Boigny was able to hold the country together because of his policy of accommodation through the instrumentality of one party system or authoritarianism (Collier, 2010). Thus, according to Lokoson (2014: 404) "Houphouet-Boigny combined economic policies with shrewd politics that emphasised dialogue and compromise among Cote d'Ivoire's various ethnic groups." Immediately, after the demise of Houphouet-Boigny in 1993, Cote d'Ivoire witnessed series of political conflicts revolving around identity question.

The proximate cause of conflict in Cote d'Ivoire was President Henry Konan Bedie's 'Ivorite' policy (Oche, 2011). The main thrust of the policy is that

individuals that were perceived or considered as foreigners were prohibited from contesting elections in Cote d'Ivoire. In a simple language, Bedie introduced indigeneship into the politics of Cote d'Ivoire. In addition, Ivorian leaders like General Robert Guei and Laurent Gbagbo continued with this discriminatory policy. Consequently, some politicians in Cote d'Ivoire protested against the policy, which gave rise to series of clashes between the government forces and the rebel groups that emerged.

Like in many African countries, the Cote d'Ivoire's conflict had been protracted, complex and complicated. Thus, it has divergent consequences on the country's socio-political stability and economic growth and exhibited tendencies of spilling-over to neighbouring West African states. Accordingly, the conflict created tension, mutual suspicion, and open rivalry among top political elites (Nwolise, 2011). At the peak of the conflict, rebel groups not only threatened peace and development but seemingly challenged the authority of the state. To this extent, the political crisis led to serious humanitarian problems in the country. Series of attacks on innocent civilians led to injuries, death and displacement of several individuals (Onah, 2011).

It was under this condition that Nigeria and other members of the international community were attracted to mediate in the conflict. Nigeria supported the peace process in Cote d'Ivoire by playing different roles both at individual level and by

working with some international bodies in resolving the conflict. The country participated in different ceasefire negotiations aimed at settling the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. It also sent its troops to participate in peacekeeping operations in Cote d'Ivoire. Therefore, it is within this context that Nigeria's role towards the resolution of political conflict in Cote d'Ivoire in the West African sub-region can be situated.

1.2: STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM

At independence in 1960, Nigeria presented itself as a promising state in the international political and economic order. With potentials in enormous untapped oil and human resources, the country could aspire beyond being a 'middle power' state (Aribisala, 2012:29) to one that could compete with advanced industrial democracies. It was perhaps based on these extant realities that the country championed itself as the 'giant of Africa' (Osuntokun, 2008; Tyoden, 2012) principally anchored on its African centre piece foreign policy and championing the plight of other Third World states across the world. However, these extant realities, promises and potentials began to be shattered by the 1966 military coup d'état, the 1967-1970 civil war and other series of military rule and ethno-religious conflicts (Otunla, 2005: 325). This was simultaneously followed by institutional decay and economic downturn. The consequences of these problems have been

higher poverty rate, higher rate of unemployment, political instability and general social insecurity and uncertainty.

It has been within these contradictory realities that Nigeria continued to champion its Africa-centre piece foreign policy through primarily intervening in countries affected by conflicts and civil wars. These include Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire and others. Nigeria's foreign policy posture towards African conflicts presented divergent and often conflicting views and opinions. In other words, students and scholars of Nigerian foreign policy differ significantly on the activities of Nigeria towards conflicts in Africa against its extant domestic socio-economic and political realities.

Against this background Nigeria intervened in Cote d'Ivoire's conflict with a view not only to resolve it, but to provide a lasting peace in the country. The fundamental dimension of this conflict resolution intervention was for Nigeria to achieve its national interest vis-à-vis addressing its Africa-centre foreign policy orientations. Accordingly, the conflict situation in Cote d'Ivoire evidently demanded for formal international intervention to mediate and resolve. Cote d'Ivoire is a member of many international organisations, such as ECOWAS, AU, UN etc and principally engages into a sustained bilateral and multilateral relations with other sovereign states in the international system, especially its immediate neighbours. Also, Cote d'Ivoire like many of its former French colonial territories

or states maintain strong social, political and economic ties with France. Thus, its conflict provided a special sense of complexities as France ‘easily’ intervened in order to protect its national interests. This provided leverage for other countries to intervene in the country’s conflict in order to mediate, resolve and restore peace in Cote d’Ivoire, which Nigeria is a key stakeholder.

External interventions in a country’s conflict especially a former French West African state creates complexities and is often characterized by divergent dimensions and interests. It is within these theoretical narratives that Nigeria intervened in the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire with a view to resolving it and restoring peace in the country as a condition for stability, political and economic development and overall regional stability and security. This study therefore examines varied roles, processes and implications of Nigeria’s intervention in Cote d’Ivoire’s conflict. This is with idea of investigating Nigeria’s bilateral and multilateral dimensions of its intervention largely anchored within the divergent and often controversial views for the grounds of such interventions. Accordingly, the imperatives, strategies, outcome and challenges of such international engagement, perhaps anchored on the national interest debate are investigated.

1.3: OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This research study intends to explore Nigeria’s role in conflict resolution in Cote d’Ivoire. Specifically it wants to:

- i. Examine the role of Nigeria in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire.
- ii. Analyse Nigeria's diplomatic initiatives in its engagement in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire.
- iii. Find out factors that influenced Nigeria's engagement in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire.
- iv. Appraise the challenges Nigeria faced in its intervention in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire.

1.4: RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Basically, in the course of this study certain research questions were raised. These include:

- a. What role did Nigeria play in the resolution of the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire?
- b. How did Nigeria's diplomatic initiative support the enforcement of peace in Cote d'Ivoire as the final outcome?
- c. What were the factors that influenced Nigeria's role towards conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire?
- d. What were the challenges faced by Nigeria in its role towards conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire?

The above and other questions will be investigated in the course of this research work.

1.5: SCOPE OF THE STUDY

This research focused on the role of Nigeria in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire from 1999 to 2011. Specifically, this period coincided with series of political conflicts and military takeover of power in Cote d'Ivoire. In other words, during the time under review Cote d'Ivoire witnessed internal political instability as a result of violent clashes between the government forces and the rebel groups.

1.6: LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

As is common with most research works, certain limitations were faced in this study. The factor of language barrier was one of the limitations encountered by the researcher. Since Cote d'Ivoire is a French speaking country, majority of the literature on the conflict in the country were written in French and the study is being conducted in English language. Since the researcher did not have sufficient knowledge of French language it limits the researcher's ability to properly digest all the information available on the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. Hence, the researcher had to seek the assistance of translators to interpret the meanings of some of the available works.

Also, the study is limited due to official secrecy or classified information. As a result, the researcher was inhibited by lack of access to some official government documents on why certain foreign policy decisions on how to resolve the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire were taken at a specific time in point. This has prompted the researcher to use multiple sources of reliable information or data on Nigeria's engagement in the resolution of conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. This was done in order to ensure that the findings and validity of the research were not affected by the challenges.

Also, the study is delimited in the sense that some of the events of political unrests or conflicts that necessitate Nigeria's involvement in the settlement of political crises in some West African countries are still ongoing. As such, it is not going to be easy to critically assess or determine their outcomes.

1.7: JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

One of the significance of this study is that it will contribute to the understanding of the dynamics and dimensions of the conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire. The recent trends of internal political conflicts in a number of countries in West Africa have been generating serious concern in the academic circles. Therefore, this study was conceived in order to offer empirical analysis of the nature, dimensions

and impacts of external intervention in resolving these internal political crises in countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire.

The study will also be of some importance to policy makers in the sense that some of the suggestions on how to resolve the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire will help policy makers in dealing with similar conflict situations. Therefore, the research will be of immense importance to policy makers in Nigeria in the process of formulation and implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy towards conflict resolution in abroad.

Another justification of the study is that in spite of the rivalry and suspicion existing between Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire, the former decided to engage in conflict resolution in the later purposely to promote peace and stability in the country. Unlike the manner in which Cote d'Ivoire reacted and worked against the unity of Nigeria during the Nigerian civil war in 1967, by recognising the secessionist Biafran side, the Nigerian government demonstrated the spirit of good will and worked with other countries and some international organisations to resolve the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. To this extent, Nigeria did not take side in the conflict. Indeed, it can be said that Nigeria participated in the conflict as a neutral arbiter.

Furthermore, the study will add to future research as others may develop interest in the study area. The Nigeria's engagement in Cote d'Ivoire, which later led to the restoration of peace and political stability in the country, has been approached from different perspectives. To this extent, some of the writings on the role of Nigeria in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire in West Africa have generated debates. Therefore, through the process of thorough investigation the study will endeavour to put issues in their proper perspectives. Based on this, the findings of the study will be useful to students and practitioners in the fields of foreign policy and international relations to further dig into other areas of research on conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire.

Finally, the research is significant in that it would add to the existing body of literature on Nigeria's foreign policy of intervention in the resolution of conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. This is important because not much works have highlighted the role of Nigeria towards that direction. The successful conduct of the research will make a contribution to literature in addition to the existing works in the area. Therefore, the study will make a contribution to knowledge.

1.8: METHODOLOGY

In social sciences, different methods of research are employed. These are quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods approaches. The choice of which

approach to adopt largely depends on the nature of the research. Hence, given the nature of this study, qualitative method was adopted in data collection and analysis. Basically, qualitative method focuses on the notion that reality is a social construct. Based on this, Osuala (2001:172) maintains that:

Qualitative research has made social scientists realise that reality should not be taken for granted, considering that attention must be paid to the multiple realities and socially constructed meanings that exist within every social context, e.g classroom, hospital ward, and workplace.

In this regard, it can be said that a researcher in social sciences using qualitative method is concerned with the processes and identification of meanings to certain phenomena in a society. In addition, qualitative research emphasises on the validity of multiple meanings, structures and holistic analysis, as opposed to reliability and statistical method of quantitative research (Osuala, 2001). Thus, on the basis of this discussion, it can be said that the hallmark of qualitative method is that it is concerned with interpretative research. Here, the task before a researcher collecting qualitative data is to interpret the meaning of existing data.

Based on this, Creswell (2009:175) identifies some of the characteristics of qualitative researchers to include: i) Qualitative researchers tend to collect data in the field at the site where participants experience the issue or problem under study; ii) Qualitative researchers collect data themselves through examining documents, observing behaviour, or interviewing participants; iii) Qualitative

researchers typically gather multiple forms of data, such as interviews, observations, and documents, rather than rely on a single data source; iv) Qualitative researchers build their patterns, categories, and themes from the bottom up, by organising the data into increasingly more abstract units of information; and finally, v) In the entire research process, the researcher keeps a focus on learning the meaning that the participants hold about the problem or issue, not the meaning that the researchers bring to the research or writers express in the literature.

However, in carrying this study, the researcher observes and works within the frame of the above mentioned distinguishing features of qualitative method both in the process of data collection and analysis.

1.8.1: Instruments of Data Collection

This research study utilised both the primary and secondary data. While the primary data were sourced based on the conduct of specialised interviews, the secondary data involved the use of published and unpublished works or materials in books, journals, government official documents, seminar or conference papers, magazines, newspapers and internet sources on Nigeria's role in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire. In social sciences and especially in political science researches, the importance of secondary data cannot be overemphasised. This is

essentially because it enables the researcher to make use of data that are readily available. Based on this, Olorunfemi (2004:45) describes secondary data thus:

This is a kind of data that was not primarily collected for purpose of its present use. It is usually collected by someone else or other agencies. In other words, the source is not under the control of the researcher and in all cases, such data must have been collected for a more general purpose and often quite distinct from the objectives of the present user. One major problem with secondary data has to do with discovering what has been published and finding out where the relevant volumes can be consulted.

The above shows that secondary data can be sourced from diverse documents. The secondary data are also called qualitative documents (Creswell, 2009). At any stage of the process of research, the investigator can collect qualitative documents. Creswell (2009) classifies qualitative documents into two, namely, public and private documents. Accordingly, public documents include newspapers, minutes of meetings, official reports etc. On the other hand, private documents include personal journals, diaries, letters, e-mails etc.

Additionally, for the purpose of this study, specialised interviews were carried out. Here, individual experts in Nigeria who are knowledgeable and conversant with the field of international relations and foreign policy were contacted for the interviews. Also, the interviews covered some key government officials, who constitute the decision-makers in Nigeria's foreign policy. The individual respondents were drawn from the following institutions or organisations: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), research institutes, such as the Nigerian Institute of

International Affairs (NIIA), National Defence College (NDC), Abuja, and the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR).

In the first instance, interviews were conducted with five (5) officials from the MFA. These included three (3) Directors (Ambassadors) and two First Secretaries. They were chosen because they are part of the implementers of the country's foreign policy. Also, three (3) scholars from NIIA were interviewed. These included one Professor of research and two research fellows. The research fellows from the NIIA were chosen because they constitute the think tanks that have developed familiarity and knowledge on Nigeria's foreign policy process. Furthermore, two (2) respondents were gotten from the NDC. All of them are research fellows. They were chosen based on their experience on the fields as well as their knowledge on diplomatic settlement of crises and peacekeeping operations that Nigeria has participated.

Finally, five (5) respondents were interviewed from the IPCR. These included four Directors or Heads of Department and one Chief researcher. They were chosen in order to express their views on Nigeria's role in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire in the West African sub-region. At the end of the exercise, fifteen (15) experts and practitioners on Nigeria's foreign policy were interviewed. The overall purpose for this was to solicit their views or opinions on Nigeria's engagement in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire. The specialised interviews

involved face to face interviews with the respondents. These interviews also involved unstructured and open-ended questions that were intended to get information from the respondents.

1.8.2: Data Analysis

Essentially, data analysis employs descriptive and exploratory techniques to examine the nature and pattern of relationship in the data (Neuman, 2004). Therefore, in this study, all the data collected were analysed by using descriptive and narrative techniques or methods. There are different traditions and approaches to the analysis of qualitative data. Spencer et al (2005: 200) maintain that “unlike quantitative analysis, there are no clearly agreed rules or procedures for analysing qualitative data. Approaches to analysis vary in terms of epistemological assumptions about the nature of qualitative enquiry and the status of researchers’ account.” This means that a researcher using qualitative method has ample opportunity to manipulate data to suit a particular context.

For the purpose of this study, content analysis is adopted because it is one of the most appropriate methods of analysis. Content analysis is a systematic analysis of content of documentation. Also, content analysis is seen as a method or technique for describing in a systematic way, the content of communication, and more importantly for exploiting communication content of research objectives

(Creswell, 2009). In addition, Spencer et al (2005: 200) postulate that in content analysis, both the content and context of documents are analysed. They further maintain that themes are identified, with the researcher focusing on the way theme is treated or presented and the frequency of its occurrences. Thus, content analysis is useful in identifying specific characteristics of messages. This implies that content analysis is normally applied for making inferences and describing the attributes of messages.

At this juncture, it is important to state that the content analysis method has its limitations. For example, it has been identified that there is the problem of interpretation of data since operational definitions of constructs are often far removed from the constructs themselves (Creswell, 2009). However, despite its shortcoming (s), the content analysis still has its usefulness. As an unobtrusive research technique, content analysis ensures objectivity as it has no tendency to change the behaviour being observed. Also, it has little manipulation or control over the materials to be analysed, which is in the form of raw message because contact is required only with the message and not necessarily with the procedures of the message. In addition, it provides an opportunity for replication. Researchers can systematically analyse the data obtained from archival records, documents and the mass media etc and analyse them through the adoption of content analysis

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0: INTRODUCTION

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section is literature review and the second is theoretical framework of analysis. In the first section, a critical review of scholarly works was carried out. The aim is to identify patterns in different writings of scholars with a view to identifying and filling some gaps in the existing studies. Therefore, the review of relevant literature in this research examines the Nigeria's foreign policy in the trouble spots in the West African sub-region. This is particularly important because since the 1990s, the eruption as well as the escalation of internal political conflicts in West African countries have necessitated the attention of Nigeria to intervene and resolve them. The second section in the chapter focuses on the theory of third party intervention. This therefore, forms the basis of theoretical framework of analysis in the study.

2.1: NIGERIA'S ROLE IN SETTLEMENT OF CONFLICTS IN WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES

A lot has been written on Nigeria's engagement in the settlement of conflicts. For instance, it is the enduring desire by the Nigerian government to promote peace and order in the West African sub-region that necessitated the initiation of

ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping operations. Therefore, this section is meant to review some write-ups by scholars and experts concerning Nigeria's foreign policy towards that direction.

The major focus on Nigeria's role in international peacekeeping operations is premised on the achievement of certain fundamental objectives of the country's foreign policy. One of which is the maintenance of international peace and security (Sanda, 2012). The desire by the successive Nigerian leaders to play a leading role in promoting international peace has been underscored by its participation in world-wide international peacekeeping operations. Based on this, Onoja (1996: 11) maintains that:

Nigeria has since independence been actively involved in the management of international peace, either under the sponsorship of the United Nations or under the bold assumption of roles of certain specific responsibilities for the management of regional security concerns.

The statement above captures the strides that Nigeria has been making in the promotion of international peace by contributing troops to the various internationally organised peacekeeping operations. This started in 1960, when Nigeria sent its troops to the UN organised peacekeeping in Congo. Currently, Nigeria has been ranked as one of the contributing and promising nations in peacekeeping operations in the world. It is the second major contributor of troops to the various UN peacekeeping operations (Okoosi-Simbine, 2012). In some

estimation, Nigeria has participated in about fifty-four (54) different peacekeeping operations in various parts of the globe. In addition, owing to her substantial efforts in peacekeeping, Nigeria has at various occasions Chair the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping (Zabadi, 2004).

To this extent, Nigeria signed the UN Memorandum of Understanding on Nigeria's troop contribution to the UN's stand-by peacekeeping force (Akindele, 2000:96). Undoubtedly, Nigeria plays sensitive and vital role on the world stage. On record, the military and diplomatic contribution of Nigeria to global peace has been acknowledged. Based on this Ibeanu (2010: 426) maintains that "Nigeria's role in peacekeeping is easily its most outstanding role in the United Nations." One of the reasons for Nigeria's participation in international bodies is to promote peaceful co-existence among countries in the world. For all intent and purposes, Nigeria has always been cooperating with the key international bodies in the critical area of maintenance of international peace and security. This is being done so as to enhance the influence of the country in the comity of nations. Thus, the demonstration of commitment by Nigeria to the promotion of peace and security around the world has become an enduring principle in the country's foreign policy posture. Based on this, Agwai as quoted by Sanda (2010: 79-80) argues that:

The commitment to global peace has continued to define Nigeria's foreign policy since independence in 1960. And nowhere is it more evident than in Africa which has remained the cornerstone of her foreign policy. Today, Nigeria is the leading

peacekeeping nation in Africa and has shown tremendous leadership in all regional and continental efforts in conflict management.

In the the same vein, Dokubo (2012: 448) posits that “for Nigeria, the defence and promotion of world peace most probably ranks as one of its foreign policy objectives that are not particularistic.” Over the years, Nigeria has been consistent in contributing troops to settle conflicts in different parts of the world as a means of promoting peace. This implies that the Nigerian foreign policy is in tandem with the UN quest for the promotion of global peace and security. The unflinching support of Nigeria to global peace has made the country to be an exemplary in peacekeeping operations around the world.

In explaining the role of Nigeria towards the maintenance of peace in the world at large, Gambari (2005:190) stresses that Nigeria has a notable record in her overall involvement in the maintenance of international peace and security. For him, this is done through active participation in and enormous contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping operations especially in terms of troops and the country’s long service as Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, he maintains that over 200,000 Nigerians have served in one peacekeeping operation or another including those in this sub-region through ECOMOG. For Gambari, this level of involvement in the work of the United Nations underscores Nigeria’s capacity to fulfill its role under the

charter to contribute to the promotion of international peace and security. Therefore, Gambari suggests that this contribution by Nigeria earned the country the right to be called an international peacekeeping nation.

Similarly, Tyoden (2012: 263) categorically states that Nigeria has done well in the critical sphere of peacekeeping. For him, this is not limited to the African continent alone. According to him, the United Nations Organisation has expressed satisfaction with Nigeria's commitment to the issue of peace and security in African continent and beyond. In specific, Tyoden (2012: 264) highlights the contribution of Nigeria towards conflict resolution in Africa, thus:

Nigeria has made significant contributions to peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Cote d'Ivoire, Chad, and a host of others. Nigeria's leadership role in Africa is mostly appreciated in the context of peacekeeping and this is understandably so because of the strategic importance of peace and security to the enterprise of development in the continent. The sub-regional conflict management mechanism, Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) instituted in response to the Liberian civil war in the 1990s would not have been possible if Nigeria had chosen not to participate.

The statement above is particularly apt considering the commitment of Nigeria in the provision of funds and military troops for peacekeeping operations in different African countries that were engulfed in conflict. Since independence, Nigeria has been playing a leading role in resolving conflicts in Africa. The concern for African affairs in Nigeria's foreign policy objectives can be seen as part of the efforts of the country to ensure the emancipation as well as guarantee peace and

security in the continent (Lokoson, 2014). Nigeria's participation in resolving African conflicts was seen as an avenue to defend the interests of the people in the continent. It is on the basis of this type of thinking that Okolie (2010: 99) asserts that:

Nigeria's involvement in peacekeeping, especially in Africa, is a logical policy corollary to the commitment of its leaders to African independence from colonialism and foreign domination, its sense of itself as the regional power with a determination to keep other nations from exercising strong influence in what it considers its sphere of influence, and, above all, its national (especially national security) interest. This may explain why Nigeria's commitment to peacekeeping in Africa has hardly wavered even during severe economic and political strains under varying administrations.

Nigeria's intervention in the settlement of crises in some African countries is seen as a demonstration of the desire to proffer African solution to African problem. To some extent, this foreign policy stance has helped in reducing the influence of foreign Europeans from domination of affairs in the region. In addition, the concern for Nigeria to assist other African countries to overcome their challenges or conflicts could be seen as part of inward looking foreign policy direction. In another postulation, Sanda (2012: 411) argues that:

One outstanding feature of Nigeria's external relations is its commitment to international peace and security in its peacekeeping role, a role in which the country became increasingly active in the post –cold war era. The ECOMOG initiative was a definite watershed in this regard. Any study of continuity and change in the nation's foreign policy, therefore, must point to peacekeeping which has remained a constant feature in Nigeria's external relations since the country's independence in October 1960.

Undoubtedly, at the West African level, Nigeria is well known for its efforts in leading the various ECOMOG's peacekeeping operations in troubled spots in the sub-region. Nigeria's voice is important and influential in directing affairs and/or resolving knotty problems at the sub-regional level. The response of Nigeria to the various conflict situations in West Africa has been helping in dousing tension and halting catastrophe in the sub-region. Therefore, Nigeria has been bearing the heavy and difficult burden of maintaining peace and stability in West Africa at different occasions and places.

Even during the military era, when Nigeria was practically sanctioned and isolated from the international community, the country's political leaders were not deterred from carrying out peacekeeping operations in Africa. Thus, Oasghae (2010: 59-60) suggests that coming at a time when the country was already fully involved in the ECOMOG peacekeeping operations in Liberia and in the unravelling Sierra Leonean conflagration, one would have expected a reaction from Nigeria but instead the government of General Sani Abacha stepped up the ECOMOG operations, especially in Sierra Leone.

For him, the explanation for this unexpected response is that Nigerian leaders saw the roles the country was playing in conflict resolution in West Africa as a way of reasserting its influence. In addition, it is seen as a means of demonstrating the indispensability of Nigeria so as to persuade the Western powers in particular to

end the country's isolation in the comity of nations. According to Osaghae, the strategy worked fairly well to show the international community, initially reluctant to get involved in the complex West African conflicts, that no matter how bad the situation in Nigeria, its role in West African and African affairs could not be ignored. Furthermore, Osaghae maintains that it was for this reason that despite Nigeria's virtual pariah status, the United Nations joined forces with the Nigerian-led ECOMOG in peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Certainly, Nigeria's role in the management and settlement of political conflicts in West Africa is unparalleled. However, in advancing the argument that Nigeria's role in conflict resolution in West Africa is central in bringing peace, order and democracy to the sub-region, Ogunsanwo (2010: 515) argues that:

... Nigeria under General Abacha, utilised military force to restore the deposed democratically elected government of Tejan Kabbah in Sierra Leone in 1997, utilised the ECOMOG forces to implement the democratic arrangement in Liberia which brought Charles Taylor's government to power after a monitored elections, and also funded and encouraged the return of electoral democratic rule to The Gambia under Yayah Jammeh.

The statement above is particularly germane in highlighting the contribution of Nigeria in addressing the root of political crises in West Africa. It can be stated that the basis of most of the conflicts in the trouble spots in West Africa can be traced to the problem of succession to political leadership. Nigeria's role in spearheading ECOMOG peacekeeping operations in West Africa was geared

towards enhancing military and security cooperation in tackling conflicts in the sub-region. There is no doubt that Nigeria has the wherewithal to champion the settlement of conflicts in West Africa in the overall interest of progress and development. However, it can be said that for Nigeria to be taken seriously in its efforts to promote peace, stability and democracy in other countries in West Africa, it must lead by example.

As a demonstration of its commitment to the promotion of sub-regional peace, Nigeria has been expending resources in resolving crises in West Africa. Based on this, Iroh (2005: 346) posits that “Nigeria played a very prominent role in sub regional peace and security, especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The country played a leading role in the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) with cost often estimated at \$10 billion.”

Furthermore, in attributing the success of ECOMOG peacekeeping operations to Nigeria’s efforts of committing human and material resources to the exercise, Nwoke (2005c: 139-140) argues that “Nigeria’s initiative in instituting the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as well as ECOMOG’s impact in the resolution of the Liberian and Sierra Leone crises are well known.” Even with the criticism and reservation from some West African countries that ECOMOG was an instrument that Nigeria was trying to use to dominate affairs of other countries

in West Africa; the country's political leaders were undeterred from pursuing peace in the sub-region. Based on this, Agwu (2014: 546-547) argues that:

In the face of palpable abandonment of Africa to its faith – the scourge of wars and crises, between 1990 and 1991, Nigeria persistently resisted the stiff opposition of the Francophone West Africa, which initially contended that the ECOWAS was not meant to usurp the peacekeeping role of the United Nations Security Council – the UN agency which has the primary responsibility for such assignment. That line of thinking did not discourage Nigeria. In 1991, alongside few like minded West African States, she established the ECOMOG as a peace-monitoring group (agency) of the ECOWAS,. By that singular and audacious act, Nigeria contributed to the OAU and the rest of the world the ingenious notion of bringing peace to troubled countries.

Thus, from the 1990s up to date, the chances of Nigeria to play an active role in the affairs of West African countries has increased because of the declining interest of Western powers in humanitarian conditions in the sub-region. Nigeria has been consistent in filling the vacuum by responding to humanitarian crises in West Africa. Certainly, the commitment of Nigeria to engage in peacekeeping operations in West Africa is borne out of the need to protect the security posture of the sub-region. Thus, Nigeria's foreign policy of peace promotion in Africa is by extension assisting in the promotion of global peace.

On his part, Akinyemi (2001:15) offers some recommendations on how the Nigerian government should use the Nigerian troops for peacekeeping operations in West Africa. After a thorough analysis of the ECOMOG, he stresses that Nigeria should be prepared to regard ECOMOG as a tool of its foreign policy. He

further says that the use of troops abroad (outside United Nations Peace-keeping Operations) should be governed by the following guidelines:

- i. Nigerian troops should not be used to sustain a military dictatorship in West Africa;
- ii. Nigerian troops should not be used to sustain a civilian dictatorship in West Africa;
- iii. Nigerian troops should not be used to sustain a civilian democratic regime that is corrupt and that practices the politics of ethnic exclusivity;
- iv. Nigerian troops should be used to prevent the imposition of a non-West African power in West Africa, if it is within its power to do; and
- v. Nigerian troops should be used to defend democratic West African regimes from internal and external subversion (Akinyemi, 2001:15).

Given the position of Nigeria as a leading country in West Africa, the above recommendations are very useful and practicable. Certainly, it is important that Nigeria's contribution of troops to peacekeeping operations in abroad should be guided by some principles in line with international best practices. In a sense, the Nigeria's engagement in conflict resolution in any part of West African sub-region is supposed to enhance the credibility of the country. Thus, the peacekeeping operations by Nigerian soldiers in other countries should be based

on the promotion of such values like human rights, rule of law, equity, justice, free and fair elections etc. Also, by using the Nigerian troops to promote democratic principles in West Africa, the country is invariably promoting peace and stability in the West African sub-region. This is essentially because democracy ensures peaceful transition from one government to another under a free competitive electoral process.

Even as the search for peace in West Africa became a problematic issue due to the expenditure of huge resources, Nigeria has continued to play an important role in bringing political stability to the sub-region. Based on this, Yoroms (2014: 464-465) argues that:

Perhaps, the real watershed in Nigeria's peacekeeping initiative came in 1990 when Nigeria single-handedly mobilised West African member states to intervene in the Liberian crisis under the banner of ECOWAS Cease fire monitoring group (ECOMOG). ECOMOG was the most controversial operations engaged by Nigeria and her allies in the sub region to bring about stability not only in Liberia but the West African sub region. Nigeria's role in sub-regional peacekeeping began with Liberia spanning a period of 13 years (1990-2003), Sierra Leone and Guinea among others.

Traditionally, Nigeria normally intervenes to restore peace in trouble countries in West Africa. The move by Nigeria to champion the cause of the resolution and/or settlement of conflicts in West Africa has received favourable commendation around the world. It was also seen as the means to enhance the rating of the country in the international community. Perhaps, it is because of the need to

recognise Nigeria as a regional power in West Africa that its leaders have been settling conflicts in the sub-region. Based on this, Adebajo (2002a: 245) postulates that “Nigeria intervened in Liberia due to the image its military leaders have historically had of the country as a regional leader and their perception of the importance of their own place in Nigerian history.” Even though Nigeria is said to occupy an important place among West African countries sometimes its foreign policy is faced with challenges from its neighbours. This is because some of the countries that Nigeria had assisted to resolve their conflicts still prefer to deal with foreign powers on sensitive issues like trade, investment and some other matters of international relations.

It is on the basis of Nigeria’s commitment to the championing of world peace that the country has been playing a leadership role in West Africa in particular and Africa in general. In the analysis of leadership role in Nigeria’s foreign policy, Adetula (2005: 178) stresses that “in West Africa, Nigeria’s leadership role is very visible especially in promoting peace and economic opportunity. In the recent times it would appear that Nigeria’s efforts in promoting regional security are its loudest accomplishment in West Africa.” The role that Nigeria has played and is still playing in the areas of peacekeeping operations and restoration of stability in some African countries is seen as an avenue to enhance the standing and position of the country in the international community. To this extent,

Nigeria's contribution to the sustenance of ECOWAS activities is prominent. In another similar remark Alli (2012: 58) perceives that:

Generally, Nigeria's leadership has been very crucial in the conflict management and security policy of ECOWAS. Senegal and Guinea tried to intervene in Guinea Bissau but ended up complicating an already complex situation. Non-participation of Nigeria in the operation led to its premature termination. Obviously, Nigerian military and its financial logistical muscle in sub-regional peacekeeping are indispensable. This is why there is such a great demand for Nigerian troops because of their performance (*emphasis in the original*).

The above indicates that West African countries that are under the threats of internal political upheaval or insurrection always look to Nigeria for help. Certainly, leadership at both domestic and international levels goes with responsibility. For this reason, as a demonstration of Nigeria's leadership in West Africa, the country has been rendering assistance in the settlement of conflict in the sub-region. Therefore, the involvement of Nigeria's troops in the settlement of different conflict situations in West Africa and indeed in Africa shows that the country is a regional power. To this end, Nigeria's quest for the permanent seat of the proposed enlarged United Nations Security Council can be given a boost through its activities of maintaining peace and promoting political stability in African countries.

In reacting to the notion that Nigeria's role in peacekeeping efforts is not based on any calculated decision by the political leaders but rather based on reaction to certain circumstances, Yoroms (2004: 303) suggests that the grace to be at the

confluence of events therefore, tends to create circumstances for Nigeria to demonstrate her ability and be firm about it in order to avoid a shame based foreign policy. He further stresses that, on the surface, this may explain the fact of circumstantial turning point in Nigeria's foreign policy when she initiated, sponsored and led a multinational ECOWAS force to intervene in the Liberian crisis and subsequent conflicts, which had assumed sub regional dimension. This statement indicates that Nigeria is always and ever ready to intervene in any crisis situation in the West African sub region so as to assist neighbouring countries as well as protect its national interests.

Also, the contribution of Nigeria in peacekeeping efforts has been seen as an avenue to assert the influence of the country in the international community. Additionally, the manner in which Nigeria has always presented herself as disinterested intervener in conflict situations makes Owoeye (2002: 162) to describe the country as a "mediator-integrator" in several West African disputes. Nigeria's meaningful role in promoting peace in the West African sub-region is basically geared towards creating necessary conditions for integration and development in other spheres of human endeavours.

Given the position of Nigeria in West Africa as the most populous and wealthiest in the sub-region, nothing can be expected from its leaders but to help in stabilisation process. Based on this, Alli (2010a: 67) argues that "of course,

Nigeria should put its own house in order to have the moral authority to intervene in other countries. It is important to note that Nigeria's intervention is going to be sought in all crises situation in West Africa and indeed in other parts of Africa." This shows that Nigeria is a pivot state in resolving crises in West Africa. However, for Nigeria to be taken seriously by other African countries it must imbibe the ethos of equity, justice, transparency, rule of law, etc at home. Also, it would not be appropriate for Nigeria to be seen as exporting peace to other countries in Africa while at domestic level it is facing the problems of insurgency, youth militias' attacks, kidnapping etc.

In another instance, in explaining the reason why Nigeria was/is playing the role of conflict resolution through peacekeeping in West Africa, Dokubo (2010: 252) avers that:

The changing international environment after the Cold War has made the pursuit of a leadership role realisable. With the West engrossed with issues emanating from the Persian Gulf, and with less interest in African affairs, the Babangida regime intervened in Liberia, where previously American interest would have made it impossible.

Much as it is correct to say that there was a dwindling interest of Western powers in humanitarian crises in Africa since the 1990s, it is however not true to say that Nigeria's leadership role in West Africa began after the cold war. This is essentially because peacekeeping role is not the only yardstick to measure leadership role in a country's foreign policy making. During the 1970s and 1980s,

Nigeria had provided assistance to many West African countries in need. Indeed, Nigeria spearheaded the formation and even made the largest contribution of fund to the activities of ECOWAS in the 1970s and beyond.

In a related perception on Nigeria's role in peacekeeping operations, Okoosi-Simbine (2012:224) avers that Nigeria was assisting the UN by spearheading the formation of a military observer group referred to as ECOMOG. According to her, the military outfit has essentially helped to enforce peace in Liberia and later secure peace in Sierra Leone and the Mano River Union generally. Furthermore, she maintains that Nigeria assisted the world body at great cost, in its function of maintaining peace and security in all parts of the world. Okoosi-Simbine stresses that it was generally believed that the UN was overstretched in the 1990s with the former Yugoslavia as well as the US invasion of Iraq when conflict broke out in the West African sub-region where Nigeria was a major player.

Therefore, she suggests that probably in appreciation of Nigeria's efforts, ECOMOG was later supported by the UN as seen in the establishment of its own operations- United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) and United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Above all, Okoosi-Simbine says that the performance of Nigeria in peace keeping operations is out of the ordinary and commendable.

Similarly, in a related work, Okoosi-Simbine (1997) argues that “since independence, peace keeping seems to be an integral part of the philosophy of Nigeria’s foreign policy which stresses national interest, world peace, friendship and cooperation.” This statement is correct and can be attested to in the fact that Nigeria has participated in many UN organised peacekeeping operations around the world. In addition, Nigeria has never waiver in rendering assistance towards conflict resolution efforts in the trouble-spots in the West African sub-region.

In another postulation, Olawale (2004: 239-240) examines the political and economic factors that were involved in Nigeria’s role in spearheading the ECOMOG peacekeeping operations in Liberia. He stresses that Nigeria bore the burden of contributing the highest expenditure of resources and military troops to the first ECOMOG mission in Liberia. Accordingly, he asserts that:

At the outbreak of the Liberian civil war, prompted by the desire to extend his tenure as Chairman of ECOWAS, a considerable amount of Nigerian revenue from the Gulf War oil windfall was expended in bankrolling the longdrawn ECOMOG peacekeeping mission in Liberia. Not only this, Nigerian troops constituted not less than 60% of the entire military personnel that took part in the multi-lateral mission. It is worthy of note that despite bearing the greatest share of the cost of the mission, at its beginning, a Ghanian General was made the ECOMOG Field Commander in the name of good neighbourliness. This misguided decision was only reversed when the Ghanian General proved incompetent to command such a complicated mission thereby prompting his replacement with General Dogonyaro, a Nigerian who turned the tide of war against the intransigent rebel forces.

Essentially, the move by Nigeria to initiate ECOMOG was made possible simply because the then Nigerian President Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida was at the head of ECOWAS as the Chairman. General Babangida therefore used that opportunity to mastermind the formation and mobilise other West African countries to make contribution to ECOMOG, which later turned out to be an effective instrument for conflict resolution in the trouble spots in West Africa. The admirable performance of Nigeria in the promotion of peace, security and democracy as a leader in the West African sub-region has been highlighted by Almond et al (2008: 707) when they maintain that:

Nigeria has played a prominent role in the region through commitment of its military capacity, notably in supplying the leadership and the majority of troops for ECOMOG, the ECOWAS-sponsored peacekeeping force in Liberia. That operation was viewed as a success, with armed conflict halted and elections held.

Significantly, the ECOMOG peacekeeping operations in West African countries were able to record some modest successes due to the political will on the part of Nigerian leaders who facilitated the provisions of the highest number of military troops. In addition, in the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone, Nigeria supplied the larger chunk of resources needed for the various peacekeeping exercises. Based on this, Pogeson (2009: 68) avers that “Nigeria played vital roles in peacekeeping and conflict resolution in ECOWAS region.” This brings to the fore the notion

that without the Nigerian initiative and support the ECOMOG missions would have not been realised.

Similarly, in appraising the contribution and performance of ECOMOG in West African sub-region, General Victor Malu (1997: 19) the then ECOMOG Force Commander stresses that “ECOMOG has increased the security of the region and has definitely been a strong influence on the calculations of some dissident groups within the region” (cited in Yusuf, 1997: 12). This implies that the sustenance of ECOMOG as a coalition force by West African leaders is serving the purpose of both the instrument for conflict resolution and deterrence to trouble shooters in their various countries in the region. In this regard, as conflict arises in any West African country, the ECOMOG was there to respond to the situation.

The spates of internal political conflicts in some West African countries call for the urgent attention and support from well meaning political leaders to resolve them. Therefore, the quick response of Nigeria’s political leaders to conflicts in the sub-region is always required so as to mitigate the effect of catastrophic wars. It is perhaps on this basis that, Adeniji (2004: 424) suggests that the post Cold War epidemic of conflicts in Africa, particularly in the West African sub-region, called for even greater expenditure of resources by Nigeria for conflict resolution, notwithstanding that the economy was no longer buoyant.

He further maintains that an estimate of the expenditure by Nigeria in resolving the crises in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s was put at about 12 billion United States dollars. Based on the figure on the financial outlay as well as commitment of military personnel by Nigeria in peacekeeping operations in West African region, it can be said that the bearing of huge financial burden by Nigeria alone was uncalled for. This is especially the case when the domestic needs of individual citizens were neglected by the various governments in Nigeria.

Similarly, while commenting on the implications of peacekeeping operations on the finances and personnel costs on Nigeria, Ate (2001: 111) maintains that “Nigeria spent a total of about N 800 billion (\$ 8 billion) in Liberia alone in the prosecution of “Operation Liberty” from 1990 to 1997, and lost about 500 men, not including the wounded and those declared missing. The operation in Sierra Leone is estimated as costing Nigeria about \$1 million per day. Seen in historical perspective, this is a significant milestone in a number of respects.”

Even though there were differences in the figures supplied by Ate and Adeniji before him, about Nigeria’s expenditure in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, what they go to show was that the amounts were outrageous. In this regard, it means that due to the expenses involved in peacekeeping as well as the casualties in terms of loss of personnel that normally accompany the exercise, it would be difficult for foreign powers to come and undertake conflict resolution role in any

trouble spot in Africa. In one instance, Yoroms (2007: 355) identifies the difficulties that the Nigerian soldiers encountered in Liberia during peacekeeping operations. According to him:

Nigeria exercised tremendous influence in the ECOMOG ground operation. This was not without some herculean tasks as the troops were not familiar with the terrain. The initial operation saw the recce vehicles trapped and hit as they advanced towards Sierra Leone-Monrovia-Highway to secure the Springs Payne airport. Nigerian troops were killed at the Po River Bridge and Senegalese soldiers also killed in Vahun. The main rebel group, NPFL, recognised the firepower of the ECOMOG ground force and withdrew to its enclave.

It is certainly true that lack of adequate knowledge of geographical terrains of another country is a major challenge to the soldiers that were on peacekeeping missions. This explains why some of the soldiers were killed or captured. Even with the challenges in peacekeeping operations, the Nigerian political leaders still feel that the country should continue to play the role of conflict resolution in West Africa so as to enhance sub-regional peace and security.

For some writers, the Nigerian interventions in both Liberia and Sierra Leone went beyond humanitarian concern, sub-regional peace and security. More than any other reason, they describe Nigeria's intervention in these countries as being motivated by business and personal interests of Nigerian political leaders so as to assist political allies remain in power (Okoosi, 1997). Thus, instead of Nigeria to present itself as a regional hegemonic power with benign intervention, the leaders of the country were motivated by personal interests. This position is succinctly put

forward by Herbst (2000: 318-319) when he argues that and we would like to quote him in extenso:

Nigeria's interventions, first in Liberia (1990) and later in Sierra Leone (1997), present a more complicated case. The initial movement into Liberia was motivated in part by humanitarian concerns, especially worries over the fate of Nigerians residing in Liberia. The Liberian intervention also attracted several African partners, and the Nigerian forces in both Liberia and Sierra Leone were legitimated post hoc by the international community. However, the Nigerian interventions could hardly be considered disinterested. In addition to humanitarian concerns, then-Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida sent forces to Monrovia to help his ally and friend Samuel Doe stay in power. The Nigerian forces proved able to hold Monrovia but could not defeat the forces of Charles Taylor in the Liberian interior. Indeed, the pathologies of Nigeria's patron-client system soon translated to Liberia as some local commands in ECOMOG began to make significant money through mineral and logging concessions.

Indeed, much as the Nigerian military leaders that first undertook the responsibility of sending peacekeepers to crises-prone countries in West Africa maintained that their action was purely on humanitarian grounds, the later development proved contrary. For instance, in the case of Liberia, the first civil war would not have prolonged as it did if the Nigerian-led ECOMOG allowed Mr. Charles Taylor to assume the position of leadership when his rebel group had already captured about 75% of the land area of the country. Also, as Taylor was allowed to contest the 1997 presidential election and won was an indication that he had the support of the majority of Liberians. This means that ECOMOG should have not intervened in the country from the beginning.

It is on the basis of the need to avoid a situation where the Nigerian economy would be overstretched simply because the country is embarking on peacekeeping operations that the civilian government that came to power in 1999 maintained that certain grounds have to shift from the traditional ones. Based on this, Sanda (2004: 274-275) stresses that taking Liberia 1 (1990) and Liberia 11 (2001) as watersheds, we will consider the dimensions of this shifts as it relates to the specific activity of peace-making in Nigeria's foreign policy. She further maintains that there was a deliberate move towards multilateral action for two related reasons: burden and power sharing. For her, Nigeria has exhibited a definite reluctance to play superman, preferring instead to share the burden of leadership and funding not only at the continental level, but also globally.

Also, according to Sanda, Nigeria has insisted that the maintenance of international peace and security are the global responsibility. The above statement signifies that a developing country like Nigeria is not suppose to be left alone to bear the burden of peacekeeping operations in a sub-region. It is basically for this reason that during the second civil war in Liberia, Nigeria had to invite the UN to partake in the peacekeeping operation by providing financial and other logistical supports.

For all intent and purposes, the significant contribution of Nigeria in the settlement of conflicts in West Africa has been effective in preventing the

dismemberment and disintegration of a number of countries in the sub-region. In a compendium explanation of the emerging role of Nigeria in promoting peace and security in West Africa, Jega (2010: 5) argues that:

From the 1980s to the 1990s, however, Nigeria's foreign policy concerns shifted to a preoccupation with peacekeeping at the subregional level and economic diplomacy at the international level. Increased civil strife and military conflicts in West African subregion, especially in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire, gave rise to concerns with national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and possible spillover effect to the rest of the countries in the subregion. Good neighbourliness was threatened, and there were fears of the destabilising implications of massive inflows of refugees from war torn areas in the subregion. In spite of decreasing revenues and the onset of an economy crisis, Nigeria maintained peacekeeping operations at high costs.

Significantly, the concern by Nigeria to be involved in resolving conflicts in West Africa shows that charity begins at home. There is no doubt that the ability of Nigeria to maintain its presence in the settlement of conflicts in different troubled spots in West Africa has enabled the country to play the role of a big brother in the sub-region. It is on this instance that Pogeson (2011:37) suggests that "Nigeria can constitute a powerful force for stability in a region that has been devastated by endemic civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire."

Nigeria's peacekeeping role in West Africa ab initio could be considered as a right step towards the right direction of solving humanitarian crises. This has been contributing to the process of enhancing the peace of the sub-region. To this extent, Nigeria is seen as an important partner to the efforts of the various

international bodies that engage in the settlement of crises in West Africa. It is perhaps on this basis that Imobighe (2012: 252) maintains that:

Nigeria has in many other ways contributed to the UN efforts towards the promotion of world peace by playing leading roles in the settlement of various conflicts and crises in Africa, such as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Chad and Cote d'Ivoire among others.

The significance of the roles of Nigeria in peacekeeping operations in the West African sub-region is to highlight the country's relevant leadership position in the international political configuration, especially on issues affecting Africa. Certainly, the commitment of Nigeria to the promotion of peace and political order in some African states has made the country to be seen as the voice of Africa in the international community.

Obviously, Nigeria has been mediating in the settlement of conflicts in West African countries as a demonstration of its willingness to resolve crises and stabilise the sub-region. This is essentially because the atmosphere of conflicts does not augur well for development and prosperity to thrive in West Africa. Most of the conflicts in West African are associated with succession problem. The attempt by certain individuals or groups to use force to bring about change of government has been generating conflicts in a number of countries in Africa. Whenever, force is used to remove or deny a government from playing responsibility of office, it normally attracts the condemnation of outsiders like

Nigeria. It is perhaps for this reason that Ariole (2014: 309) stresses that “Nigeria has been able to restore the deposed President of Sierra Leone, Tejjan Kabba as well as a leader in restoration of Cote d’Ivoire’s Ouattara.” Certainly, it is on records that Nigeria spearheaded the re-installation of Sierra Leonean President, Kabba when he was overthrown by the soldiers in his country. In the case of Cote d’Ivoire, the Nigerian political leaders played a supportive role to the initiatives of world powers like France in up-holding the mandate of Ouattara.

Right from the start of the Ivorian conflict a more meaningful contribution towards its resolution was expected from Nigeria. Even though Nigeria did not relent in its efforts in providing assistance to resolve the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire, the role of playing second fiddle to others was least expected from the country. Thus, in appraising the role of Nigeria towards the settlement of first conflict in Cote d’Ivoire, Alli (2006b: 111) argues that:

Though the Nigerian President attended several meetings on the Ivorian crisis and even hosted the Ivorian leaders in Abuja, Nigeria’s leadership has not been adequately brought to bear on the Ivorian crisis, the way Nigerian troops, logistic support and financial assistance helped to sustain the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Even though, it could be argued that the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crises were more amenable to the Nigerian diplomatic style than the Ivorian conflict, her diplomatic intervention and more generous material assistance could have made a lot of difference.

From the above, it could be discerned that Nigeria’s role towards the settlement of conflict in Cote d’Ivoire was not as assertive as it was expected. Instead of

playing a leading role Nigeria only played a background role by supporting the initiatives of other countries like France as well as international bodies. This can be attributed to the past colonial link of Cote d'Ivoire to France. Also, Nigeria could not afford the economic costs of shouldering the responsibility of peacekeeping operation in the country at that time.

As the second conflict in Cote d'Ivoire deteriorated following the contestation over the 2010 presidential election results, Nigeria remained consistent in seeking the means of resolving it. Political leaders in Nigeria used both diplomatic process and military option to resolve the conflict. It is perhaps on this basis that Lokoson (2014: 401) posits that "as a committed member of the Mediation and Security Council of ECOWAS as well as a responsible member of the AU, Nigeria was once again saddled with the responsibility of leading the conflict resolution efforts in the political crisis in Cote d'Ivoire which began in 2002." This implies that Nigeria's intervention in the resolution of conflict in Cote d'Ivoire is part of the concern that the political leaders in the country have been showing to the issues of promotion of peace and stability in West African sub-region.

However, much as Nigeria's involvement in peacekeeping has been responsible for the attainment of peace, order and sustenance of democracy in West African countries, this foreign policy stance has been attacked from certain quarters. For example, Ukase and Onoja (2012: 326) argue that:

Be that as it may, the Nigerian Government has been criticised on account of her military and peace keeping profligacy of running a “father Christmas foreign policy.” This may be attributed to Nigeria’s cost in peace keeping, peace making, conflict resolution in regional Africa and the understood perception that all of that goodwill that have been extended to Africa have been undertaken without any foreign policy foresight, direction, and the need to understand that Nigeria in extending itself through its service will need to benefit in those countries that it had helped and propelled to better stability.

The above statement suggests that the Nigerian government has not been taking advantage of its participation in peacekeeping operations in some African states to corner some economic benefits for its own citizens. Therefore, the resources that Nigeria has been expending on such missions are seen as a colossal loss. It is perhaps for this reason that some commentators have observed that the role of leading peacekeeping operations in West Africa has done a lot of damage to the Nigerian economy. For instance, according to Bassey (2004: 23):

The Nigerian military intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone has been the most traumatic and economically wasteful experience in the forty three years of independence [now fifty years]. Against the background of collapsing industrial communication, infrastructure, moribund health delivery system and educational institutions, widespread poverty and rural anomie, cascading debt burden and prostrate manufacturing sectors, many Nigerians have wondered and shouted aloud in the electronic and print media how we got into the caldron of Liberia and Sierra Leone (cited in Ukase and Onoja, 2012: 329).

The debates on whether Nigeria has been benefitting from its efforts in peacekeeping operations in some West African countries have continued to dominate public discourses among the academics and other commentators on Nigeria’s foreign policy. On the one hand, some individuals perceive Nigeria’s

participation in peacekeeping operations as a means of promoting the country's national interests. While on the other hand, some people maintain that the country has not been receiving a reciprocal benefit from its intervention in settlement of crises in other countries. That even with the costs of peacekeeping operations both in terms of financial expenditure and death of some Nigerian military personnel, the business interests of Nigerian citizens are yet to be well entrenched in some West African countries that Nigeria has assisted.

In addition, some of the countries that Nigeria has assisted in resolving their political crises still prefer to deal with Western powers or former colonial masters instead of Nigeria on socio-economic matters affecting them. It is perhaps for this reason that Ukase and Onoja (2012: 330) further argue that:

Concomitantly, Nigeria needs a paradigm shift in her diplomacy given the cost attributable to her peace keeping activities, and the need for Nigeria to see those opportunities as a direct effect of globalisation trend that calls for an economic opportunity that Nigeria ought to tap into while it is keeping the peace in those troubled regions.

The calls by some individuals on the need to adopt calculated and cautious approach to Nigeria's interventionist role in crises spots have to some extent been responsible for the adoption of new orientation to diplomacy by the foreign policy formulators and implementers in Nigeria. It is on the basis of this that the former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hakeem Baba-Ahmed

(2006) maintains that “the mantra in the new foreign policy reform is to put Nigeria first in any relationship” (cited in Ukase and Onoja, 2012: 327).

During the Fourth Republic, Nigerian leaders have been careful to avoid bearing unnecessary burden or risk in the name of peacekeeping in any country. This is essentially the case when in recent time the Malian crisis started, the Nigerian government and some ECOWAS member states hesitated in sending troops to the country, until when France took the lead, and then other West African countries agreed to contribute troops to the endeavour, known as African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA).

In another development, Saliu (2006b: 65) explains the nature of peacekeeping embarked upon by Nigeria in some West African states. He postulates that however, both conceptually and practically, the security activities of Nigerians in Liberia and Sierra Leone do not fall into the category of peace-keeping as traditionally understood. According to him, neither of these missions qualifies as peace-keeping, unless the concept of peace-keeping is conceptually stretched to include coercion. This analytical perspective is developed based on the fact that the initial aim of ECOMOG in Liberia and some other countries was to carry out peacekeeping missions. However, when the ECOMOG troops were subjected to series of attacks because they did not receive the consent of the warring groups in

some of these countries, they strategically responded by assuming the role of peace enforcers.

In the literature, peace enforcement means a situation where peacekeepers repel the attacks coming from a warring group or groups with the sole objective of self defence. Additionally, peace enforcement relates to operations conducted to maintain a ceasefire where the level of compliance is uncertain and the threat is high. Here, enforcement actions can serve the purpose of enforcing the decisions of the United Nations or any regional body against erring group or groups (Jokotola, 2008: 22)

On his part, Ogunmola (2005: 158-162) maintains that in contrast to ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOMOG had the consent of warring factions in Cote d'Ivoire. This according to him informed the success of the peacekeeping operation in the country. Categorically, Ogunmola argues that "ECOWAS conflict management efforts doused tension and reduced to the barest minimum the drift into chaos and anarchy that Cote d'Ivoire embarked upon since the demise of Felix Houphouet-Boigny in 1993." This indicates that political leadership in Cote d'Ivoire during the reign of Houphouet-Boigny revolved around his personality and his demise created a power vacuum in the country. Thus, the subsequent power struggles among politicians that emerged after the death of post-independence first President in Cote d'Ivoire led to serious political

conflict that made the ECOWAS to engage in peacekeeping operations in the country.

Also, Ogunmola (2005) states that ECOWAS did not allow the civil war to linger on before it intervened promptly. He maintains that Article 52 (1) and (2) of the revised Treaty of ECOWAS provides not only for the prevention and resolution of conflicts, but also contains a clause on the establishment of a regional peacekeeping force for “the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states through the medium of a third party intervention organised and directed intentionally, using multi-national forces of soldiers, police and civilian personnel to maintain peace.” This suggests that ECOWAS as a sub-regional body has the power to organise a military body, comprising soldiers from member states and intervene in the settlement of conflict in any country in the sub-region. Furthermore, Ogunmola praises the ECOWAS leaders for obtaining the mandate of the UN before intervening in Cote d’Ivoire. Thus, he mentions that:

ECOMICI is a genuine peace keeping outfit according to the norms of the Charter of the United Nations. Credit must be given to ECOWAS leaders for forging a common front and also for seeking a political outcome to the crisis rather than giving blind support to the Ivorian government. It must, however, be acknowledged that ECOWAS insisted on the respect of legal and constitutional order in its approach to the crisis (2005: 158).

Meanwhile, Ogunmola stresses that ECOMICI was undeterred by the mutual accusations of violations of cease-fire agreements and skirmishes by the belligerents. Rather the body kept the peace while mediation proceeded unabated. Therefore, for the peacekeepers to achieve the desired success, it is essential to adhere to the general principles of peacekeeping particularly that of obtaining the consent of fighting parties or groups before venturing into peacekeeping mission. Importantly, it is by obtaining such consent that cease-fire can be maintained. In addition, the peacekeepers suppose to maintain neutrality so as to win the confidence of warring factions.

Finally, Musa (2010: 297) recognises the role of personnel in Nigeria's peacekeeping operations in West Africa, Africa and throughout the world. Thus, he maintains that:

Of the three services of the Nigerian Armed Forces, the Army has been more involved in international peacekeeping, under the United Nations, UN, the African Union, AU (formerly Organisation of African Unity, OAU) the Economic Community of West African States, (ECOWAS) or under some bilateral arrangements, which happened four different times. Some of these missions involved only the Nigeria Police Force, while most others involved the Nigerian Armed Forces especially the Nigeria Army, and the Police working hand in hand.

Much as the statement by Musa conceives that the military and the police are at the centre stage of peacekeeping operations in Nigeria's foreign policy, he fails to acknowledge the role of civilian personnel in peacekeeping operations. As a matter of fact, the civilians, such as doctors, aid workers etc are also working side

by side with the armed forces in peacekeeping operations. As such, the civilians are increasingly playing important functions in modern days peacekeeping operations, especially in post-conflict peace building process.

2.2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study adopted the theory of third-party intervention as a framework of analysis. As an approach, the third-party intervention theory is seen as one of the important mechanism for resolving conflicts. Third-parties play different roles in resolving different kinds of conflicts. Therefore, in this regard a combination of roles of third party intervener in the process of mediation, negotiation and peacekeeping operation will be the focus of discussion. The concept of third-party intervention in the field of international relations has been used as both theoretical and practical tool for resolving international conflicts. Many writers have contributed in explaining the theory of third-party intervention, such as Ronald J. Fisher (2011), Dean G. Pruitt (2005), William, I. Zartman (2000), Riemer et al (2003) and Emmanuel R. Aiyede (2006) etc. The basic assumption of the theory is premised on the role that a state or an international organisation plays in the process of mediation, negotiation and settlement of conflict between two or more parties or disputants.

Different scholars and practitioners in the field of international relations have offered to explain the concept of third-party intervention based on their perceptions. Fisher (2011: 158) for instance, maintains that:

Third-party intervention in situations of human conflict has a long history and a wide variety of forms and functions. Disputants in most, if not all, societies and at all levels of social interaction have had access to external actors to whom they can turn when they find they are unable to manage their differences by themselves. A common response to perceived incompatibilities in goals, methods or values between contesting parties is to enter into negotiation in order to reach a mutually accepted agreement. Negotiation appears to be a universal, human phenomenon, although it is of course expressed in variations that are appropriate to each other cultural context. Mediation, which is intended to facilitate the negotiation process, also needs to be practiced within the norms and assumptions of any given cultural or subcultural milieu.

The above implies that at all levels of conflicts in human societies, third-parties are always needed to separate or settle the fighting groups. This can be at the level of individuals (even at family level), communities and states. As an outsider, a third party can help to interpose itself in order to separate and settle the differences between the parties to a conflict. This is because the main objective of a third party has always been to make settlement between or among fighting groups. Essentially, the third-party actor in a conflict helps to create conditions for harmony, order and stability in any given political set up. Similarly, according to Riemer et al (2003: 361):

The third-party approach thus relies on content of Chapter VI of the UN Charter, “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” rather than on the essentially coercive means of Charter VII, Action with

Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression.” That is third-party intervention looks to such means as “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means.

This implies that the role of a third-party to a conflict is to work out an amicable means of settlement of conflict. Thus, intervention in the settlement of conflict always requires the presence and efforts of an unbiased third-party. Based on this, Dadson (2008: 1) posits that:

Conflict rarely involves two sides. There is usually support from third-party either by direct or indirect intervention. The third-party may then have a direct or indirect impact on and interest in conflict. More so, the majority of conflicts that have occurred have had the involvement of third-parties in resolving them.

Basically, conflict in human society is inevitable. However, as conflict occurs the third-party always comes in to resolve it so as to avoid escalation. This is particularly the case where the role of third-party mediator is relevant and useful. Thus, the possession of necessary skills of diplomatic settlement of conflict could assist the third-party mediator in separating fighting or warring groups. This will go a long way in bringing about harmony and end the conflict. For both theoretical and practical explanations, the role of third-party is very important in resolving a protracted conflict in human society. This is essentially because a long drawn war or conflict normally results to killings of humans and destruction of property. As such, third-party interveners display distinctive attributes. They may act formally or informally, they may act as individuals or as a representative of

some larger group, they may be invited to participate by the conflicting parties or they may intervene spontaneously etc (Aiyede, 2006).

In most cases, the third-party is expected to be impartial so as to have effective settlement of conflict. It is perhaps for this reason that Wehr (2005: 1) maintains that “most importantly, third parties bring additional minds and skills for problem-solving to the conflict. The contenders are no longer on their own.” Significantly, by initiating the process of settlement of conflict the third-party brings new alternative means of resolving it. At the end of the mediation and reconciliation, the third-party modifies the action or behaviour of the parties in dispute. Based on this, Dadson (2008: 2) avers that for the third-party to be successful in mediation process, the following points need to be considered:

- i. Be non-partisan;
- ii. The consent of the parties to the mediation process and appointment of a mediator;
- iii. Have in mind that conflict cannot be quickly and easily resolved;
- iv. The disputing parties must have ownership of settlement (which is one of the strong points when it comes to Cote d’Ivoire);
- v. The mediators must be flexible and creative;
- vi. Mediators must be cautious in applying punitive measures;

- vii. Have high level of empathy and sensitivity to maintain trust, confidence and control over meetings;
- viii. Range of distinctions with respect to nature, timing and purpose have to be carefully examined; and
- ix. Have methods of facilitating good listening and ensuring that conflicting parties talk to each other and not past each other.

The above implies that the intermediaries do not take side but assist the parties or disputants to reduce or resolve conflict. Fisher (2011) suggests that in the literature on third-party intervention not all conflicts at all points will be amenable to a single and unified method. For him, it is important to consider the defining characteristics of the conflict, particularly the stage of its escalation. This is to enable the interveners to determine the type of third-party intervention that will be effective.

According to Aiyede (2006: 20-21) nations decide how to intervene based on certain factors. The first consideration is that the intervening nation's capabilities and connection to the conflict. Second, they normally consider the status and ripeness of the conflict for resolution. Third, intervention is influenced by the characters of the parties and their decision making system. Fourth, nations normally compare the cost of intervention to the cost of doing nothing. Based on this, the intervention of Nigeria in resolving the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire can be

seen as an attempt by Nigeria to restore peace to the country as well as protect its security and economic interests in West African sub-region.

Moreover, Zartman (2000) develops the concept of “ripeness” to refer to the condition of conflict and the right time to intervene. According to him, ‘ripe moment’ and ‘mutually hurting moment’ refer to the time when parties to a dispute are likely to consider outside intervention because they have exhausted themselves to the point of costly deadlock from which they see no exit. He therefore, maintains that the parties must come to believe that negotiation, often assisted by mediation, can provide a way out of the conflict. This can be done through a cooperative solution, which can lead to a ‘mutually enticing opportunity.’ In another similar postulation, Pruitt (2005) broadens the motivational base of ripeness beyond cost-benefit analysis. He develops the concept of ‘optimism’ to explain the decision of parties to a dispute to move into mediated negotiations. For him, there are ripe moments in the life of destructive conflict. Instead of waiting for a mutually hurting stalemate to occur, the third party should look for ways to help create ripeness. This means that it is better for third party to intervene and settle conflict at any moment that seems practicable than being an onlooker.

Furthermore, Aiyede (2006) avers that third-party intervention can be military or diplomatic. For him, military intervention is not the most typically used form but

it may be called for when the need arises. On the other hand, diplomatic intervention according to Aiyede may be sustained and strategic or it may be episodic. He suggests that strategic diplomatic intervention remains fairly uncommon. Episodic crisis driven interventions are the most common form of diplomatic intervention. Therefore, he concludes that episodic intervention can be effective in containing violence but do not tend to produce settlement or resolution of conflicts.

Significantly, third-party diplomatic intervention also adopts the mechanism of mediation in the settlement of conflict. There are different postulations on the concept of mediation. Thus, according to Fisher (2011: 159):

Mediation is the intervention of a skilled and impartial intermediary working to facilitate a mutually acceptable negotiated settlement on the issues that are the substance of the dispute between the parties. Mediation is a pacific non-coercive and non-binding approach to conflict management that is entered into freely by the concerned parties, who at the same time maintain control over the substance of the agreement. Thus, mediation is primarily a task-orientated method directed toward solving a shared problem of the parties; it is not directly concerned with the nature of the relationship between the parties. Mediation can be directed toward disputes between two parties in its bilateral form, but can also involve multiple parties when it is called upon to assist in complex multilateral negotiations.

From the above, it can be stated that the third-party must have the opportunity to freely talk with both parties to a conflict. Also, it can be said that the process of mediation is the central role of third-party intervener. Since conflict takes place at all levels of human interactions, it means that mediation can find expression at all

levels of social functioning in a society. In addition, mediation as a form of third-party intervention takes place in different parts of the world. For instance, the UN had played the successful role of third-party to resolve the conflict in Bosnia in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s because it showed neutrality. Similarly, the impartial third-party role of Nigeria's led ECOMOG had succeeded in ending the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, the third-party effort of US led coalition in Somalia in 1996 was a failure because it was partial and motivated by selfish interests.

However, Fisher (2011: 165) succinctly explains that "mediation may be the most common form of third-party intervention, in theory and practice it is usually augmented by a number of other methods. Numerous terms abound in the third-party literature: conciliation, fact-finding, good offices, peer mediation, arbitration, facilitation, adjudication, mediation-arbitration, policy dialogue and consensus-building." All these terms indicate that mediation serves a common purpose of settlement of conflict.

Furthermore, Fisher (165-166) develops a six-fold typology of pacific interventions in both international and other forms of conflicts as follows:

- i. Conciliation- This is a situation where a trusted third-party provides an informal communicative link between the antagonists for the purpose of

- identifying the issues, lowering tension and encouraging direct interaction, usually in the form of negotiation;
- ii. Consultation- This is a situation where the third-party works to facilitate creative problem-solving through communication and analysis, making use of human relations skills and social-scientific understanding of conflict etiology and dynamics;
 - iii. Pure Mediation- Here the third-party works to facilitate a negotiated settlement on substantive issue through the use of reasoning, persuasion, effective control of information and the suggestion of alternatives;
 - iv. Power Mediation- This encompasses pure mediation but also moves beyond it to include the use of leverage or coercion on the part of the mediator in the form of promised rewards or threatened punishments, and may also involve the third party as monitor and guarantor of the agreement.
 - v. Arbitration- This happens when the third party renders a binding judgement arrived at through consideration of the individual merits of the opposing positions and then imposes a settlement that is deemed to be fair and just; and
 - vi. Peacekeeping- This is where the third party provides military personnel in order to monitor a ceasefire or an agreement between antagonists, and

they also engage in humanitarian activities designed to restore normalcy in concert with civilian personnel, who may also assist in the management of political decision making processes such as elections.

The above taxonomy clearly demonstrates that the third-party intervention in a complex conflict situation is not an easy task. It involves the adoption of different tactics and strategies so as to bring about conflict resolution. Since it is assumed that conflict resolution is difficult to achieve, it is important to always think about the means of preventing conflict from escalation. Based on this, Wehr (2005: 1) avers that “an important function of third parties in a conflict, particularly in its latent stage, is conflict prevention. At the international level, multinational peacekeeping has for almost forty years been a common way of preventing conflict and violence. Military forces and observers are placed between opposing sides; interposition is the term.”

The above implies that it is important for members of international community to always intervene in resolving conflict in any country or part of the world at its early stage rather than allowing it to escalate into violence level. Conflict in a society can be resolved either through peaceful settlement (non-violence) means or through the application of force (violence method) (Best, 2006). In most cases, in civilised societies it is when non-violence method fails to end a conflict that the use of force is considered as an alternative. In the case of Nigeria’s engagement in

Cote d'Ivoire, the government had to adopt both the diplomatic negotiations as well as sending military observers as part of peacekeeping operations to the country before the conflict was resolved. Essentially, the country played the role of third-party by being neutral in settling the conflict between or among the various fighting groups.

At this juncture, it can be stated that the theory of third party intervention suffers some criticisms. One of the criticisms is that third-party intervention in conflict resolution in another country can be exercised by different countries and international organisations with different motives. As such, differences in approaches and perspectives can scuttle the process of mediation, which may affect the settlement of conflict between the fighting groups or parties.

Also, it is not always all the time that the third party maintains neutrality or impartiality towards a conflict. The lack of neutrality on the part of third party can affect the negotiation process to a conflict. This may lead to a situation where a faction or factions to a conflict may be attacking the interveners. In addition, impartiality leads to loss of confidence on the part of disputants in the entire mediation process.

Furhthermore, the third party intervener is not always successful in bringing the conflict between fighting groups to an end. Despite the fact that the third party

may intend to be neutral, one or fighting group may be attacking or accusing its peacekeepers. Like in the case of Nigeria's intervention in Liberian conflict, its troops were attacked by some rebel groups demanding that Nigeria should leave their country. Based on this the third party nation may end up relying on the support of the UN.

However, in spite of the criticisms, the theory is relevant to this research in many ways. First, the Nigeria's intervention in Cote d'Ivoire was prompted by the invitation that the government of Laurent Gbagbo extended to ECOWAS to intervene and settle the crises in his country. Instantly, Nigeria was nominated into the ECOWAS contact group on Cote d'Ivoire. Also, when the conflict was degenerating into serious humanitarian crisis, Nigeria felt that it has both security and economic interests to protect in West Africa. Hence, Nigeria as a leading country in the sub-region had to intervene in Cote d'Ivoire so as to safeguard its strategic interests. Essentially, the role of Nigeria and other members of the international community as third-party interveners in Cote d'Ivoire were demonstrated by remaining impartial to the warring factions throughout the period that the conflict lasted.

Above all, the theory is relevant to this study based on the role that Nigeria played at different times in the resolution of the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. This means that throughout the period that the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire lasted, Nigeria played the

role of third party intervener in the process of resolving it. Therefore, the role of Nigeria included that of mediator, negotiator, enforcer, peacekeeper etc toward the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. Eventually, the conflict was finally resolved through the use of force on President Gbagbo by removing him from office and installed President Ouattara. Nigeria openly and clearly supported the use of force in Cote d'Ivoire. Indeed, Nigeria made a contribution of troops as part of UN observers mission to enforce the resolution of Ivorian conflict.

2.3: CONCLUSION

Since the decade of 1990s, Nigeria's foreign policy in West Africa has been dominated by series of conflict resolution in countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire etc. To this extent, it can be said that peacekeeping operations by Nigeria involved huge expenses of finance and deployment of military personnel. Significantly, the Nigeria's engagement in peacekeeping operations in West African countries has received both commendation and condemnation among writers and commentators. On the one hand, while some writers feel that the peacekeeping endeavour by Nigeria is worth venturing into based on humanitarian grounds, on the other hand some suggest that due to economic implications, it is better left for global body (UN) to shoulder the responsibility. However, it can be stated that the interventions of Nigeria in troubled spots in the West African sub-region had brought about relative peace

and stability to the countries affected by conflicts. In a fundamental sense, the task of conflict resolution in another country can be done by a nation individually or collectively.

In most cases, where a nation single handedly intervene in the settlement of crisis in another country, there may be some ulterior motives attached to it. In other words, for a nation or its political leader to go alone and intervene in another country may give the impression or is an indication of seeking certain political or economic gain. In some cases such endeavours hardly succeed. However, if a group of nations collectively intervene in another country based on certain acceptable principles to settle political crisis, such a move could be regarded as an act of altruism devoid of selfish motivation. It is on this basis that the impartiality of third-party intervener is supposed to be encouraged.

CHAPTER THREE

ROLE OF NIGERIA IN MEDIATION OF POLITICAL CONFLICT IN COTE D'IVOIRE

3.0: INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the role of Nigeria towards the settlement of political conflict in Cote d'Ivoire in the West African sub region. It also attempts to explain the various foreign policy initiatives undertaken by Nigeria toward the promotion of peace, order and stability in the study area. There is no doubt that since the late 1980s and early 1990s, Nigeria has been actively involved in the efforts towards the settlement of crises in some troubled spots in West African countries. The intervention of Nigeria in the settlement of political crises was meant to restore peace and security in these countries. In this regard, the chapter will analyse the underlying factors that precipitated the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire and demonstrate how its resolution ushers in peace and stability in the country.

Contrary to the widely held belief in certain circles that the end of the cold war would bring about peace and tranquillity in different parts of the world, the situation in Africa has seen the growth of internal political crises in a number of countries. In particular, the West African sub-region has been one of the regions of the world that is afflicted with endemic conflicts. This observation is based on the

political instability that has been occasioned by protracted conflicts, leading to several death and unmitigated hardship on the individual citizens in these countries.

A critical glance at the West African sub-region would reveal that a number of conflicts that occur were as a result of economic crisis, poverty, unemployment, transitions to democracy or in the process of entrenching democracy in these countries. The catalogue of countries that got enmeshed in protracted political conflicts that attracted world-wide attention include the civil wars in Liberia (1989-1997) and (1999-2003), Sierra Leone (1990-1997) and (2000-2002), Guinea Bissau (1997-1998) and (2012- 2014), Cote d'Ivoire (2002-2004) and (2010-2011), Mali (2012- 2013) etc. These crises have no doubt constituted serious draw-back to peaceful coexistence, economic development and democratisation process in these countries.

As for the situation in Cote d'Ivoire, the escalation as well as the spread of the conflict into a large scale political violence led some international organisations, such as ECOWAS, AU, UN and even countries like France, Nigeria etc to initiate negotiation of peaceful settlement. It is perhaps on this basis that Abubakar (2001: 2) maintains that “increasingly, there is a declining ability of many sovereign states to respond to global problems through national means. Consequently, states now resort to multilateral co-operative approaches under conditions of

interdependence.” This means that through collaborative and collective efforts the members of international community could help to resolve conflict in any part of the world. This became necessary because the search for peace and security were considered to be important ingredients for both economic development and political reforms (Konteh, 2006). The rationale behind the idea of Nigeria’s engagement in settlement of conflicts in Cote d’Ivoire and some other countries in the West African sub-region was to proffer African solutions to African problems. It is on the basis of this that this chapter examines the role of Nigeria towards conflict resolution in Cote d’Ivoire.

3.1: AN OVERVIEW OF NIGERIA’S AFRICAN POLICY

Discussion on Nigeria’s engagement in the settlement of political conflict in Cote d’Ivoire can be understood from the point of view of the country’s determination to assist any African state that is in need. Basic necessary foundation for the formulation and implementation of Nigeria’s foreign policy was laid down at independence in 1960. Since that period, Nigeria has shown commitment to African issues or problems in its international interactions. Based on this, the focus of Nigeria’s foreign policy has been described as Africa centre-piece (Asobie, 2010). Nigerian foreign policy makers have over the years attached much importance to Africa particularly on the central matters of promotion of unity and cooperation among African states.

Nigeria's pursuit of Africa centredness in its foreign policy was essentially based on preoccupation with African issues both within the continent and around the world. Based on this, Ibeanu (2013: 154) maintains that "successive Nigerian leaders professed Africa as the "centre piece" of Nigeria's foreign policy. Indeed, Nigeria sees itself and is seen widely as a leader of Africa and this has profoundly influenced her role perception, both in the continent and globally." To this extent, the core aspects of Nigeria's foreign policy of Africa centre-piece touches on matters of serious concern to African people, such as emancipation, development, unity, decolonisation of countries that were under the clutches of foreign domination and apartheid system (Adeniji, 2004).

It is against this backdrop that Nigeria has always been readily available to render help in terms of resolving intra and inter states conflicts, providing financial assistance to some African states in need etc. It is on this basis that Akinterinwa (2013: 150) avers that "thus, there is no doubt that Africa has always occupied a central position in the foreign policy calculations of successive Nigerian regimes. Indeed, Africa has been described as the cornerstone or centre-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy."

To this extent, each administration in Nigeria has in one way or the other touched or played significant role in resolving problem (s) in some African countries. Here, it suffices to enumerate some of the landmark achievements by the various

administrations in Nigeria in their endeavours to put African issues first before any other consideration in the world affairs.

Shortly after independence, the Nigerian political leaders demonstrated serious commitment to African issues in different ways. The Nigerian government under the leadership of Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa joined key international organisations like the UN, OAU, and Commonwealth etc and used the platforms of these bodies to champion the cause of promoting the interests and aspirations of not only Nigeria but other African states as well. For instance, in 1961, Nigeria's opposition to apartheid regime in South Africa led to the expulsion of the country from the Commonwealth during its Conference in London.

Also, during the early 1960s, Nigeria was vehemently opposed to the French Atomic tests in the Sahara. After three French nuclear tests were carried out in the Sahara, the Nigerian government decided in protest to break diplomatic relations with France in 1961. This led to the suspension of the tests by France (Akinrinwa, 1990). Additionally, in 1965, the government of Nigeria hosted the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference in Lagos, where the sensitive and controversial issue of Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) was tabled and discussed. At the end of

the Summit the UDI was considered illegal by the majority of countries, including Nigeria (Osuntokun, 2005).

When the military took over political power in Nigeria in 1966, there was no significant change in the country's foreign policy direction. The regime of General Yakubu Gowon showed commitment to the policy of decolonisation in some African countries that were under colonial rule. In particular, the regime provided assistance to the various liberation movements in Southern African sub-region (Asobie, 2010). At the West African sub-regional level, General Gowon was very much concerned with the issue of economic integration among West African states. It was for this reason that General Gowon and President Eyadema of Togo spearheaded the formation of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975. Nigeria as the leading economy in West Africa envisaged that through ECOWAS there would be economic integration and cooperation as well as increase in the volume of trade among the countries in the sub-region (Nwoke, 2005b).

The Murtala/Obasanjo regime pursued a radical foreign policy posture in Nigeria. The regime vigorously continued to pursue decolonisation policy in Africa. In a landmark foreign policy stance, the Murtala/Obasanjo government openly supported and recognized the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government as the legitimate representative of the people of Angola. The

action taken by Nigeria was against the wish of the United States and other Western powers (Osuntokun, 2005). In addition, the regime provided financial assistance and arms to the various liberation movements in Southern African region. These included organisations like Pan African Congress (PAC), African National Congress (ANC), Zimbabwe Africa National Union (ZANU-PF) Zimbabwe Africa People's Union (ZAPU-PF), South West People's Organisation (SWAPO), Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) etc.

Furthermore, when Nigeria realised that the British government was backing the Ian Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and apartheid system in South Africa the regime of General Obasanjo made use of economic leverage of the country against the British economic interests. This was done by nationalising the British Petroleum (BP) and Barclays Bank (BB). This was because of the allegations that the two companies were violating Nigeria's sanctions on South Africa and Smith regime in Zimbabwe (Akinterinwa, 2014). It is interesting to note that between 1975 and 1979, Nigeria adopted radical and adventurous foreign policy due partly to relative prosperity in the country as a result of money from petroleum resources (Osuntokun, 2005). Nigeria played a prominent role in the struggle against racism and apartheid system in Southern Africa. As a result, the Nigerian Permanent Representative to the United Nations was appointed as Chairman of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid.

Even the countries within the Southern Africa sub-region recognised Nigeria's activities in the struggle against colonialism and apartheid by having regular consultation with its political leaders. The consistency of Nigeria in giving support to the liberation movements in Southern Africa had earned her the position of being considered among the frontline states. As noted by Ogunsanwo (2013b: 27):

The states on the Frontline of the struggle in Southern Africa met on several occasions to coordinate their activities and responses to development in the sub region. In recognition of the role Nigeria was playing in the struggle for freedom in the sub region, these states decided to invite Nigeria to be part of the Frontline States. Though geographically in West Africa, Nigeria attended all the meetings of the Frontline States and contributed meaningfully to the struggle. The leaders of the liberation movements were free to consider Lagos their second home, with the freedom to come and go whenever events or desires dictated or demanded.

During the Second Republic (1979-1983), the elected civilian administration of President Shehu Shagari continued with Nigeria's African centre-piece foreign policy. The administration continued to support the liberation movements in Southern Africa. For instance, apart from providing all kinds of assistance to the freedom fighters, President Shehu Shagari played a significant role in the negotiation that led to the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement in London that finally led to the granting of political independence to Zimbabwe in 1980 (Ogwu, 1986).

Also, Nigeria under President Shehu Shagari sent its troops to Chad Republic as part of the OAU peacekeeping force to resolve the conflict between the warring

factions in the country. It was at this stage that the Nigerian government invited the two warring groups the government of Chad and National Front of Chad to Kano, Nigeria for reconciliation. This led to the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU), in which Felix Malloum was replaced by Goukonni Weddeye as President and Hissene Habre to hold the position of Defence Minister. This arrangement did not last long as fighting continued, which led Nigeria to leave the OAU to engage in peacekeeping operation in Chad. At the end of the day the OAU peacekeeping in Chad turned out to be a failure as the warring factions refused to stop fighting (Osuntokun, 2005; Sanda, 2013).

When the civil war broke out in Liberia in 1990, the military government of President Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida initiated the formation of ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Thereafter, Nigeria mobilized other West African countries to intervene by providing troops so as to settle the conflict. As the Liberian crisis escalated with several individuals killed, maimed and others displaced from their homes, the attention of members of the international community was attracted to at least do something to halt the conflict situation.

President Babangida had argued that “we (i.e the West African leaders) believe that it would have been morally reprehensible and politically indefensible to stand by and watch the citizens of that country decimate themselves and other citizens” (cited in Fawole, 2001: 13). From this statement, it can be stated that Nigeria and

other West African countries acted at the right time to save the Liberians from suffering by intervening in the Liberian crisis.

Throughout the eight years that the first Liberian civil war lasted, some rebel groups particularly the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) of Mr Charles Taylor were opposed to the involvement of ECOMOG in Liberia. He (Taylor) accused Nigeria of trying to take over Liberia and turn it into its sphere of influence. It got to the extent that NPFL launched series of attacks on peacekeepers, which led the ECOMOG to assume the role of peace enforcement in the crisis. As the ECOMOG transformed its strategies into peace enforcer, its mandate was enlarged to include among others disarming the various warring factions, restructuring and reforming the security forces, overseeing the transitional civilian authorities, conducting and observing elections etc (Adebajo, 2002b). After several peace agreements with the various factions involved in the crisis in Liberia, a cease-fire was achieved.

The aftermath of the Revised Abuja Accord of 1996 signed by the various warring factions led to the fixing of presidential elections in 1997. Mr Charles Taylor won the election and was subsequently sworn into office on 2nd August, 1997 (Saliu, 2006a; Iheme, 2006). However, by 1999 the second civil war broke out in Liberia when the Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) launched series of attacks on the central government from neighbouring Guinea (Adebajo,

2008). This called for the attention of Nigeria and other members of the international community to intervene and resolve it.

After series of agreements reached among the warring factions, Mr Taylor was persuaded to vacate his position in 2003 and was granted political asylum in Nigeria as a compromise means of ending the crisis. Thereafter, a businessman, Charles Gyude Bryant was appointed as the leader of National Transitional Government (NTG) in Liberia. By October 2005, presidential elections were held, in which Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was elected as the president of Liberia (Saliu, 2006b).

The regime of General Sani Abacha that came to power in 1993 in Nigeria also continued the foreign policy of intervention through the deployment of troops to settle crisis in Sierra Leone. The Nigerian government single handedly financed and provided majority of troops for the peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone. Although the civil war in Sierra Leone started in 1991, when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attacked the country from Liberia, the role of ECOMOG only became visible in the country in 1997. This was as a result of the military coup, which was staged by Major Johnny Koromah against the elected government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah (Saliu, 2006a).

In response to the situation, the former Nigerian Head of State, General Sani Abacha mobilised the ECOMOG troops to sack the coup leaders. Thereafter, the

elected government of Mr Kabbah was reinstated back to power. The event came as a surprise to some foreign observers because the autocratic Abacha regime in Nigeria was opposed to military rule in another country. This was seen as a contradiction of sort because the Abacha government was supporting democracy to Sierra Leone, while he was opposed to it in his own country at that material time.

Since the return to civil democratic government in 1999, the commitment to Africa centre piece foreign policy has remained. All the same however, the country appreciates the dynamics of international relations and growing economic liberalisation, globalisation, human rights, democracy etc (Adetula, 2005). Under the new democratic dispensation, the practice of Nigeria's international relations and operation of foreign policy are based on the Constitution. Essentially, chapter two section 19 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) states that the foreign policy objectives of the country shall be:

- a. Promotion and protection of the national interest;
- b. Promotion of African integration and support for African unity;
- c. Promotion of international co-operation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations and elimination of discrimination in all its manifestations;

- d. Respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as the seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication; and
- e. Promotion of a just world economic order.

From the above, it can be discerned that some of the aspects of the objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy directly focuses on issues relating to unity, solidarity and cooperation with African nations and indeed other countries around the world. The major challenges of internal political conflicts in Africa in general and West African sub-region in particular are pointer to the need for continued cooperation between Nigeria and other nations to solve them. It is on the basis of this that Africa has continued to remain very important in Nigeria's foreign policy. As a means of contributing to the promotion of international peace and security, Nigeria under the Fourth Republic has evolved a foreign policy posture that condemns any form of unconstitutional takeover of power in any West African country. Based on this, Asobie (2010: 19) observes that:

The key new element of the diplomatic framework was the setting of a new standard of political behavior for African states. It had several components: illegitimacy of military regimes; non recognition of regimes borne of unconstitutional means, reversal of any coup d'etat; and standards of democratic behavior for civilian regimes. These became the post-apartheid, post-cold war foreign policy for Nigeria as her leaders adopted them and strived to enforce them.

By attaching democracy as part of the condition for dealing or relating with countries in Africa, Nigeria is trying to stem the tide of crises in the continent. This is essentially because most of the conflicts in African countries emanate from some aberration in democratic governance. Democratic principles and practices if genuinely adopted in any given country can serve as remedy to political crises. Indeed, African states need peace for both political and economic development to thrive. Given the situation of political crises in some West Africa countries, Nigeria has continued to devote considerable time and resources to bring political stability, peace and security to countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali and Guinea Bissau.

3.2: BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT IN COTE D'IVOIRE

One of the causes of the crises in Cote d'Ivoire and some African states can be traced to the arbitrary demarcation of boundaries of African states by the colonial authorities. This was carried out without necessarily putting into consideration the differences in their ethnic or cultural background. Thus, according to Alli (2006b: 89) "the Cote d'Ivoire crisis is a typical African crisis, which usually involve the colonial past, problems of citizenship, power struggle and intra-elite squabbles, the impact of neo-colonial linkages and the dynamics of globalisation."

This means that in Cote d'Ivoire just like most other African countries resort to

ethnicity, regionality and religious differences are dominant factors in political activities. In the specific case of Cote d'Ivoire, the action of France during the colonial era of transferring the population of Burkina Faso (Upper Volter) colony to the territory of Cote d'Ivoire to supply labour force for cash crop production was seen as a grave mistake. This is essentially because most of the people of northern Cote d'Ivoire share common language and culture with the people of Burkina Faso and Mali. Thus, during the colonial era the migration of people from these countries to Cote d'Ivoire was not restricted. Due to this policy, Cote d'Ivoire became one of the economic hubs in West Africa as she developed as a regional growth pole with a flourishing plantation economy (Iwilade and Ukeje, 2011).

Indeed, the groups that made up the population of northern Cote d'Ivoire were mainly Muslims and many of them were associated with Mande language (Onah, 2011). Even when the country achieved political independence on 7th August, 1960, the migration of people from the neighbouring countries continued. In essence, the contribution of immigrants to the economy of Cote d'Ivoire was captured by Collier (2010: 156) when he states that:

Immigrants were welcomed to come and cultivate cocoa on unused land. This produced a tidal wave of immigration from Burkina Faso, the landlocked, resource-scarce neighbour. By the 1980s an outstanding 40 percent of the labour force was immigrant. Politically, the model worked because Houphouet-Boigny gave immigrants some political power and naturally

won immigrant support. The quid pro quo for native Ivorians was that cocoa was heavily taxed. The revenue financed jobs in the civil service, and these went overwhelmingly to locals.

Consequently, the immigrants or foreigners became important players in the socio- economic development of Cote d'Ivoire. As such, the progeny or children of foreigners that migrated to Cote d'Ivoire were given the right to become the citizens of the country under the 1961 code of nationality (Ogunmola, 2005). With this development the foreigners and their children were allowed to work in the Ivorian civil service and hold any position, including ministerial posts. However, in the 1980s, there was a change of policy by the government due to economic down-turn or declines occasioned by the collapse of world prices of cocoa and coffee. This forced the government to introduce Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) so as to address the economic defects or imbalances.

Also, it is noteworthy to state that by 1993 the country had accumulated foreign debt to the tune of \$15 billion (Collier, 2010). Even with the adoption of some measures to improve the economy, the issues of falling standard of living and unemployment persisted in the country. Based on this, the "Ivoirisation des Cadres" was introduced with the aim of filling some important government posts by the native Ivorians (Ogunmola, 2005).

When the long time Ivorian President Felix Houphouet Boigny died in 1993 and President Henry Konan Bedie assumed power, the ethno-regional division in the

country was deeply ignited. A new electoral law was enacted, in which only those Ivorians whose parents were born in the country could contest presidential election (Ogunmola, 2005). It was claimed in certain circles that President Bedie deployed the use of ethnic card simply to target Mr Ouattara who was seen as a threat to his continued stay in power (Adebisi, 2003).

Immediately, Bedie reversed the policy left behind by his predecessor so as to manipulate the country's political process. In addition, President Bedie, by sensing the weight or importance of using negative tendencies of ethnicity and religion in politics and that Ouattara being a Muslim from the north he could be considered as foreigner. In this instance, Bedie's administration laid the foundation for the political division of the country between the north and south by introducing the policy of "Ivoirite" (Ogunmola, 2005; Oche, 2011; Iwilade and Ukeje, 2011).

By "Ivoirite" it is meant that a presidential candidate must be Ivorian and must have been born by both Ivorian parents. Therefore, Bedie amended Article 11 and 35 of the constitution (Alli, 2006b). This was done purposely to prevent Ouattara, who served as former Prime Minister under the administration of Houphouet Boigny, from contesting the 1995 presidential election. Article 11 allowed the Speaker to succeed and even serve out the term of a deceased president. On the other hand, Article 35 outlined that a presidential candidate should: i) be of direct Ivorien parentage with a proof through presentation of the

original birth certificate of both parents; ii) Never have used any other nationality in the past; and iii) be living in Cote d'Ivoire for a minimum of five years continuously before the date of election (Alli, 2006b: 90). Incidentally, Bedie won the election, which was boycotted by prominent opposition leaders, such as Ouattara, Laurent Gbagbo etc (Collier, 2010).

Ethnicity and indeed ethnic consciousness has become part and parcel of today's political process in many African countries. It reflects the dynamic struggle over scarce state resources among different groups or sections of any given country. Where a law of a country openly proclaims or support ethnic identity, such a situation normally breeds the political exclusiveness of some groups in the political system. Based on this, Chazan et al (1999: 116) maintain that "even so, ethnic identity factors remained important for recruitment into high government and party positions, and continue to be important under Houphouet Boigny's successor, President Konan Bedie." The enactment of discriminatory laws aimed at marginalisation of political opponents in Cote d'Ivoire at that material time in point had succeeded in creating tension and political instability in the country. In addition, during the administration of President Bedie, Cote d'Ivoire witnessed economic mismanagement, corruption and falling prices of cocoa and coffee at the international market (Alli, 2006b).

The worsening socio-economic and political situation in Cote d'Ivoire led the

military under the leadership of General Robert Guei to overthrow the government of President Henry Konan Bedie on 24 December, 1999. The political situation in the country attracted the attention of Nigerian government, which has developed zero tolerance to take over of government through unconstitutional means. Thereafter, the Nigerian government demanded that the “Guei junta must return the country to democracy” within six months (Asobie, 2010: 19). In a dramatic twist, the military government under General Guei further divided the country by introducing a controversial Article into the constitution known as the Doctrine de L Ivoirite in 2000, the provision of which clearly distinguished Ivoriens and foreigners (Okereke, 2007).

As the political climate in Cote d’Ivoire got heated up, the opinions of people in the country were divided into two, namely, those who wanted Ouattara to contest and those who wanted Bedie to come back to power. However, the military regime disqualified both of them by securing injunction against them from the Supreme Court (Collier, 2010). In their place, Guei regime allowed those candidates it perceived as posing no serious threat to him to stand for election.

Incidentally, within a short period, General Guei planned the return of the country to a democratic rule by organising a presidential election in 2000. Guei contested the presidential election against Laurent Gbagbo and was defeated by him. Given the fact that Guei underrated Gbagbo, he refused to concede defeat to him. In a

rather dramatic move, Guei declared himself the winner and sacked the members of the country's Electoral Commission (Collier, 2010).

It was under such circumstance that Gbagbo mobilised his armed militia called Young Patriots (YP) to fight against the government forces. Consequently, the Youth Patriots were able to capture Abidjan and surrounding towns in series of fightings. During the ensuing fighting Guei was killed together with his wife and some members of his family. Also, Ouattara's house was destroyed. In addition, the fight resulted into the death and displacement of several individuals. For instance, in an estimation over 10, 000 individuals were displaced (Alli, 2006b).

As a result, Gbagbo captured political power in the country. Based on this, Collier (2010: 162) argues that "Gbagbo came to power through the mixture of an illegitimate election and a rebel uprising." Within a short period, another rebel group called New Forces (FN) emerged in 2002 to fight against the forces of President Gbagbo. The FN was a combination of the remnant of General Guei soldiers and fighters of excluded politicians in Cote d'Ivoire (Collier, 2010). They quickly moved and captured towns in the north and centre of the country. When Gbagbo realised that his youth militia could not withstand the FN in a fight, he decided to take some French citizens as hostages so that in exchange the French government would send its army to come to his defense and assistance. Within three days, the French army arrived to defend Gbagbo so as to protect its

investments and avoid the killing of French citizens (Collier, 2010). Significantly too, it can be noted that the arrival of French troops in Cote d'Ivoire in a short period when the conflict started was not based on any altruistic motive but to advance its interests. It is for this reason that Dadson (2008: 10) maintains that:

When the crisis broke out on 19th September of 2002, France sent her troops there to protect French and other foreign citizens. As the crisis became worse, it enforced its military presence with an order to fire at anyone who obstructs their mission.

The elected civilian government of Laurent Gbagbo, rather than solving the problem of ethno-regional division in the country, further abetted and aggravated the situation by marginalising political opponents, particularly from the northern part of the country. Thus, Mr Gbagbo played the card of excluding political opponents from the scheme of things by manipulating and creating tensions around the issues of nationality, citizenship and land rights in Cote d'Ivoire (Clark, 2011). Thus, the peace in Cote d'Ivoire was shattered by the adoption of identity politics by the various administrations to achieve an ulterior motive. It is perhaps on this basis that Alli (2006b: 106) argues that:

It is clear that the core issue in the Ivorian conflict is the politics of xenophobia, exclusion and victimisation, which has been adopted by successive political leaders in Cote d'Ivoire since 1993 when Le Vieux (the Old Man) Houphouet-Boigny died. Every one of the three Presidents that have ruled since then- Bedie, Guei and Gbagbo- has exploited this citizenship issue for political advantage.

Therefore, it can be argued that identity and citizenship politics were responsible for the heightened level of conflict in the country. In Africa, just like elsewhere, conflict has been taking different dimensions. This includes ethnic, sectional, religious, and political conflicts. Thus, conflict emerges as part of the dynamics of human interactions and relationships in any given country. Based on this, it can be said that conflict occurs at the levels of individuals, groups, nations or states. It is perhaps for this reason that Imobighe (2008:79) suggests that “conflict can be seen as a product of clash of interest between those involved in some form of relationship.” In recent times, intra-states conflicts have engulfed many African countries. Based on this, Egwu (2006: 406) maintains that:

One of the most central challenges of academic discourse in contemporary Africa today is to explain the endemic and protracted ethno-religious and political conflicts that engulfed the continent since the end of the cold war. In a radical departure from the inter-state conflicts of the cold war era, the present is characterised by internal conflicts, horizontally between different socio-ethnic and cultural aggregates within a national territory, and vertically, between groups who feel excluded and marginalised from existing power structures on the one hand, and the central authority on the other. These conflicts, characterised by genocide, “ethnic cleansing,” and unprecedented humanitarian tragedies in the form of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), have resulted in state collapse in countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia.

The above implies that most internal conflicts in African states were generated as a result of the inability of states to make necessary provisions to ensure the survival of individuals. Specifically, some writers have suggested that the pluralistic nature of African societies have been responsible for the spate of

conflicts in the region. It is perhaps on this basis that Alli (2006a: 329) maintains that “countries like Ethiopia, Sudan, Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Cote d’Ivoire have suffered greatly from widespread and intense internal conflicts.”

It was, however, the plural nature of Cote d’Ivoire that encouraged the resort to negative tendencies of ethnicity, region and religion in order to determine the political fortunes or otherwise of the individual politicians (Alli, 2006a). An attempted coup was staged against the government of Gbagbo by some section of army officers from the north called the Forces Armees Nationales de le Cote d’Ivoire (National Armed Forces of Cote d’Ivoire) (FANCI) also as known as Movement Populaire de Cote d’Ivoire (Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast) (MPCI) (Lokoson, 2014). However, this was subsequently quelled and subdued. It was under this circumstance that Nigeria offered to send troops and warplanes to Cote d’Ivoire, ostensibly to protect the government of President Gbagbo (Dadson, 2008: 7).

According to Sanda as cited in Alli (2006b: 99) “the Nigerian government hastily sent three military aircraft to Abidjan only to realise that the government wanted to use them for military operations. As a result the Nigerian government has taken a backstage, preferring instead a multilateral diplomatic approach.” Instead of taking side the Nigerian government preferred to settle the fighting groups in Cote

d'Ivoire. The despatched Nigerian Alfa fighter planes were later maneuvered to withdraw from Cote d'Ivoire (Alli, 2012). Thereafter, this led the government of Cote d'Ivoire to embark on massive killings of members of the MPCCI under the leadership of Guillaume Soro that sprang up in the north to fight the central government. Majority of members of the rebel group were mainly Muslims from the north who staged an insurgency against the central government dominated by Christians from the south.

As the rebels failed to capture power at the centre, in September, 2002 they established control in northern area of Cote d'Ivoire, including Bouake, the second largest city in the central region of the country (Okereke, 2007). The rebels who were about eight hundred also attacked military installations in Cote d'Ivoire (Musa, 2010). It was under this critical situation that the country was embroiled in violent conflict. This made the ECOWAS, AU, UN and even countries like France, Nigeria etc to decide to intervene so as to restore peace and order to the country.

3.3: COTE D'IVOIRE'S FIRST CONFLICT: ATTEMPTS BY NIGERIA IN PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

The eruption of civil war in Cote d'Ivoire in 2002 was a pointer to the fact that something was politically wrong with the country. The intractable political

problems in the country also attracted the attention of Nigeria and other members of the international community to mediate. The conflict was between the central government of President Laurent Gbagbo and the group of opposition parties mainly from the north who alleged the marginalisation of people of northern Cote d'Ivoire in the scheme of things in the country.

During the ensuing conflict many individuals were killed and about 750, 000 Ivorian citizens were displaced from their homes as refugees (Africa Recovery, July 2003). Therefore, ECOWAS decided to intervene with the aim of restoring peace to the country. In this regard, ECOWAS set up a contact group that comprised Nigeria, Ghana, Togo Niger and Guinea- Bissau to work out a cease-fire agreement for the parties. On 2nd October, 2002, at the level of ministerial meeting with President Gbagbo, the group got his agreement to negotiate with the rebels. It was at that instance that both the government of Gbagbo and the rebels agreed to sign the ceasesfire agreement (Alli, 2006b).

Subsequently, the ECOWAS Defence and Security Commission submitted a proposal to the Mediation and Security Council to deploy peacekeepers to Cote d'Ivoire. Thereafter, the Mediation and Security Council approved that 2380 troops be sent to the country based on the contributions from some countries as follows: Benin – 300, Gambia – 135, Ghana – 265, Guinea Bissau – 386, Mali – 250, Niger – 250, Nigeria – 250, Senegal – 250 and Togo – 300 (Alli, 2006b: 100). At

the end, less than these numbers were deployed by some countries. Even some countries like Nigeria did not initially deploy troops to Cote d'Ivoire. In the case of Mali, its contingents were not accepted because of the suspicion that the country was involved in the conflict, which may discredit the operation (Alli, 2006b). However, the deployment of ECOMOG Force in Cote d'Ivoire was based on the following objectives:

- a. To monitor the cessation of hostilities;
- b. Monitor and supervise the return of normal public administration service and the free movement of goods and services;
- c. Contribute to the implementation of the ceasefire agreement between the warring parties; and
- d. Guarantee the safety of the insurgents, observers and humanitarian staff (Alli, 2006b: 100).

During the extra-ordinary meeting of ECOWAS in December 2002 in Senegal the ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) was established to take charge of peacekeeping role in the country. As a result of this, troops numbering 1478 were deployed to the country (Omotola, 2008). The ECOMICI peacekeepers therefore, established a buffer zone between the MPCI, the government troops and two other rebel groups, namely, Movement Patriotique du Grand Ouest (Popular Ivorian Movement of the Great West) (MPIGO) and Movement Pour la Justice et la Paix

(Movement for Peace and Justice) (MPJ), with the aim of preventing the escalation of the conflict (Okereke, 2007).

However, it is instructive to note that Nigeria's approach to the resolution of the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire was based on minimalist involvement. In this regard Nigeria favoured the adoption of diplomatic means rather than the use of military force in bringing the conflict to an end. As such, Nigeria initially refused to send its troops to participate in the ECOMOG operations in Cote d'Ivoire. Based on this the countries that sent troops were Senegal, Benin, Niger, Ghana and Togo (Aworawo, 2011). Unlike what obtained in both Liberia and Sierra Leone where Nigeria was actively involved in sending the highest number of troops and contributing the largest share of fund to the various peacekeeping operations (Adebajo, 2008) under the democratic administration the country changed its strategies in Cote d'Ivoire and some other countries.

However, the situation in Cote d'Ivoire was different in several respects. In the first place, the civilian administration in Nigeria under President Obasanjo felt that there was the need to have a clear departure in policy from the approach of the military regimes that only relied on military solution or the use of force to resolve crises in other countries. Second, due to economic pressure in Nigeria, the leaders could not afford to bear the heavy burden of ECOMOG to commit its military personnel and resources to peacekeeping operation in Cote d'Ivoire at that

material point in time.

Third, the fact that France, the former colonial master of Cote d'Ivoire had already intervened in the country, the active participation of Nigerian troops in ECOMOG could be misinterpreted as renewed rivalry between the two countries for the control of sphere of influence. In spite of the stance taken by Nigeria, the country continued to participate and even provided support to the various international organisations that were involved in the negotiation for the resolution of the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire. It is perhaps on this basis that Aworawo (2011:20-21) maintains that:

Nigeria was actively involved in attempts to find solution to the Ivorian crisis throughout the decade that it lasted. The three Nigerian administrations during the period explored multilateral channels to promote reconciliation in Cote d'Ivoire. At the ECOWAS level, Nigeria's President Obasanjo worked with other West African leaders to broker peace and helps the Ivorian government and the various warring factions to conclude agreements aimed at bringing an end to the conflict in the country.

Significantly, ECOWAS was deeply committed to the resolution of the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire by working with members of the international community. By September 2002 ECOWAS convened a peace meeting in Accra, where it secured a ceasefire agreement between the government of Cote d'Ivoire and the rebel groups (Iwilade and Ukeje, 2011). It has been observed that ECOWAS took the initiative of peace process in Cote d'Ivoire so as to prevent the spill-over of the crisis to neighbouring countries just as it occurred during the Liberian and Sierra

Leone civil wars (Adebajo, 2002).

As some events surrounding the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire degenerated, Nigeria had a change of attitude and contributed troops to ECOMICI. Thus, according to Alli (2012: 53) "Nigeria was to contribute troops for the ECOWAS ceasefire monitoring assignment in the country in 2002. Throughout 2003, Obasanjo undertook several missions across West Africa to ensure a unified approach to the Ivorian crisis." It was at this point that Nigeria can be said to be actively involved in the efforts to resolve the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. Apart from the contribution of troops in Cote d'Ivoire, a Nigerian, Ambassador Ralph Uwechue was appointed as Special Representative of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary in Cote d'Ivoire. He was mandated to monitor and coordinate ECOWAS peace efforts in the country (Alli, 2012: 54). It was on this instance that the then ECOWAS Executive Secretary, Ibn Chambas (2005: 21) maintains that "also, the veteran pan Africanist and publisher Ambassador Ralph Uwechue, continues to play a vital role in our efforts to return Cote d'Ivoire to normalcy."

In 2004, President Obasanjo was the Chairman of the African Union (AU) and he used that opportunity to mediate the political crisis in Cote d'Ivoire. He convened what was called a Mini-AU-Summit in his farm, Otta on 4th November, 2004 to discuss the Ivorian conflict. Similarly, he convened another AU Emergency Summit on Cote d'Ivoire in Abuja (Alli, 2012). In several respects, throughout his

tenure, the Nigerian President Obasanjo continued to show serious concern on the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire. Based on this, Alli (2012:56) maintains that:

His involvement in the efforts to resolve the Ivorian crisis continued in 2005. President Obasanjo attended several critical meetings on the crisis including the AU, and ECOWAS Summits, the AU Peace and Security Council meeting in Gabon in January 10, 2005, the ECOWAS Extra-ordinary summit in September, 2005, while several diplomatic missions were sent to Cote d'Ivoire on November and December, 2005. Other diplomatic missions were dispatched to the AU and the UN to mobilise the international community and present the African position.

Nigeria was relentless in engaging the fighting groups in Cote d'Ivoire to work out amicable solution to the conflict. Peaceful negotiations became paramount in Nigeria's approach to the settlement of the conflict. Nigeria's commitment to the peace process in Cote d'Ivoire indicated its willingness to support the initiatives of different international organisations. For instance, Nigeria was keenly involved in all the ECOWAS activities to resolve the crises in Cote d'Ivoire.

As the conflict became worse in the country, France also intervened through its operation Licorne (operation unicorn). This was referred to the French Armed forces's peacekeeping operation in Cote d'Ivoire that was moved from Libreville in September, 2002. It was essentially put in place by France to protect its investments and safeguard its citizens from attacks. To this extent, on 4th February, 2003 the UN passed resolution 1464 by agreeing the deployment of ECOWAS forces and French troops for peacekeeping for six renewable months in Cote

d'Ivoire (Olufunmilade, 2011: 185).

The intervention of France clearly demonstrated the inability of ECOWAS to find lasting solution to the crisis. This is essentially because the peacekeeping operation by ECOMICI in Cote d'Ivoire was faced with the challenges of inadequate finance and logistics (Ogunmola, 2005). The deployment of 2,500 LICORNE French peacekeeping force also helped in facilitating an effective settlement of the crisis. Hence, the LICORNE troops made use of already existing French military base in Abidjan and worked closely with ECOMICI. Therefore, the LICORNE troops quickly created what is called a cordon sanitaire on the front line between the fighting groups particularly in Yamoussokro, the country's capital and in San Pedro, the location of the second Port in the country (Ogunmola, 2005).

In addition, France played an important role to broker the Linas-Marcoussis Accord signed in Paris in January 2003 by the government of Cote d'Ivoire and the warring groups (Okereke, 2007). Among the agreements reached in the Accord was that a Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) that would encompass all the political parties and former rebel groups, such as Forces Nouvelles (New Forces) (FN) should be established. Consequently, Seydou Elimane Diarra was appointed as Prime Minister and Head of the GNR (Okereke, 2007). This was referred to as second coup by some observers of events in the country because the

Accord sought to reduce the influence of President Gbagbo in the political equation in Cote d'Ivoire.

As a demonstration of its readiness to see that the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire was brought to an end, ECOWAS again convened a two day Summit in Accra in March 2003, in which the Accra II agreement was concluded by endorsing the French sponsored Linas Marcoussis Agreement (Iwilade and Ukeje, 2011). In addition, there was a follow-up in negotiation and monitoring of ceasefire by ECOWAS leading to the signing of the Accra III Agreement in July 2004 (Aworawo, 2011).

There was serious problem in the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement in Cote d'Ivoire as some incidents indicated. First, the government of Gbagbo continued to exclude the former members of rebel groups from the decision making process in the government. Second, President Gbagbo was said to be making some key appointments without consulting the ex-rebels. Third, the President continued to preside over a divided country by exercising much control in the south while the former rebels still controlled the north (Okereke, 2007).

As a demonstration of lack of readiness to peace process even on the part of the Ivorian government, on 6th November, 2004 an attack was carried out by government soldiers on French Military installations at Bouake. This resulted into

the killing of nine French soldiers and one American civilian. Immediately, the French retaliated and destroyed the small Ivorian Air Force and Presidential plane, which resulted into anti-French demonstration in different sections of Cote d'Ivoire (Alli, 2006b). Significantly, due to these attacks, both in the government and the public circles, there was loss of confidence on France to resolve the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. Based on this, Alli (2006b: 105) further maintains that:

The Cote d'Ivoire conflict is truly a challenge for French policy in Africa as it is for ECOWAS and the AU. Definitely, the bombing of the French in Bouake, was a great mistake by the authorities in Abidjan. But also was the excessive French retaliation, which destroyed the little that the Ivorian had for an Air Force.

As the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire continued to linger on, the United Nations also intervened in the country by passing resolution 1479 on 13th May, 2003. This resolution legitimised the establishment of a peacekeeping force called the United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (UNMICI) for six renewable months (Olufunmilade, 2011). The main aim was to monitor the peace process in Cote d'Ivoire. Following the signing of Linas-Marcoussis, the UN passed resolution 1528 that led to the creation of the United Nations Operations in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) on 27th February, 2004 to replace UNMICI.

UNOCI was charged with the responsibility of monitoring the 2003 Linas-Marcoussis ceasefire agreement, preventing the trans-border movement of arms, promoting law and order as well as providing support for the conduct of free and

fair elections (Iwilade and Ukeje, 2011). Therefore, it can be said that Nigeria engaged in the UN peace support operation in Cote d'Ivoire through the deployment of some troops. Meanwhile, Nigeria continued to play the role of maintaining peace and security in Cote d'Ivoire as part of UN mandate. The country engaged in sending troops for peacekeeping to Cote d'Ivoire through UNOCI which was multilateral. Based on this, Musa (2010: 300) maintains that "Nigeria contributed some military observers in Cote d'Ivoire." During the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) had a standing strength of 200 Military Observers in UNOCI from different countries. Nigeria's contingent to UNOCI was 67 personnel and they comprised a Level II hospital manned by 63 personnel, 3 military observers and one staff officer (Lokoson, 2014: 408-411).

It was reported that during the peacekeeping operations in the country that Nigeria lost seven soldiers, while on patrol in the town of Tai, near the border with Liberia in one day (Sunday, 2012: 2). The killings made the UN Secretary General to respond to the sad event by stating that "these brave soldiers have died in the service of peace." He further said that "I condemn this attack in the strongest possible term" (Sunday, 2012: 2).

However, in order to achieve the objective of maintaining peace in the country, UNOCI was directed to work hand in hand with ECOMICI, an outfit of ECOWAS

(Ogunmola, 2005). According to Alli (2006b:104) the multinational force, into which the ECOMICI was integrated into played a significant role of reducing the repercussions of the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. He further made reference to the statement of General Khalil Fall of Senegal, the Commander of ECOMICI between March 2003 and April 2004 that the force recorded success in the following areas:

- a. Shift the monitoring of the ceasefire line to the control of the zone of confidence pushing further away the spectre of direct confrontation;
- b. Restored dialogue between the belligerents which allows for the release of war prisoners and the development of joint DDR;
- c. Opened up trade and humanitarian corridors;
- d. Expanded the operations of impartial forces throughout the territory, thus restoring confidence and assisting the regrouping of combatants; and
- e. Provided food and free medical assistance to the population (Alli, 2006b: 104).

By March 2007, the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement (OPA) was signed between the warring parties. This was brokered by the ECOWAS mediator, President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso and it paved the way for real peace and the fixing of elections for November 2009. The peace deal touched on the sensitive issues of troop pull back from the war front, repackaging of the national identification

process and formation of a government of national unity (Onah, 2011: 171). It was under this arrangement that Mr Guillaume Soro was appointed as Prime Minister under the administration of Laurent Gbagbo (Oche, 2011).

3.4: COTE D'IVOIRE'S 2010 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND THE BEGINNING OF SECOND CONFLICT

For a proper understanding of the crisis of 2010 presidential election that led to the second civil war in Cote d'Ivoire, it is important to trace the history of elections in the country. This is essentially because most of the political gladiators that participated in the said election have been part and parcel of the political or electoral process in the country since independence. As it has been mentioned earlier, Cote d'Ivoire got its political independence from the French colonialist in 1960. During the period, Felix Houphouet Boigny became the first president and immediately introduced a one party system in the country. The only and governing party that was recognised by law was Parti Democratique de Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI). Boigny became life President and ruled Cote d'Ivoire until his death in 1993.

However, during the decades of 1980s and 1990s, some pro-democracy groups demanded and put pressure on the government to open up the political space by allowing more individuals to participate in the political process in the country. It was under such pressure as well as the wind of democratisation that was blowing

across the globe that led President Houphouet Boigny to welcome multi-party elections in 1990, in which he defeated Mr Laurent Gbagbo (Nwolise, 2011).

When President Houphouet Boigny died in 1993, a power vacuum was created in the country and as a result there was serious power struggle over who will succeed him. The struggle was between Henri Konan Bedie, who was then the President of Parliament and Alassane Ouattara, who was the former Prime Minister. Based on the provision in the country's constitution, Bedie became the president (Onah, 2011). By 1995, there was a presidential election, in which President Bedie introduced the enactment of new electoral law in order to disqualify or marginalise some political opponents, notably, Alassane Ouattara. This Act, which gave birth to the policy of "Ivoirite," specified that before a candidate could stand for presidential election, he must be an Ivorian by birth and parentage as well as live in the country for ten years (Nwolise, 2011).

At the end of the day, many candidates boycotted the election and Bedie won by 95% of the total votes cast. However, in 1999 just a year to the 2000 presidential election, Bedie was overthrown by the military under the leadership of General Robert Guei. Due to some pressure from the international community, Guei quickly returned the country to democracy and organised election, in which he contested. Guei also made use of discriminatory law to disqualify some candidates, particularly, Ouattara.

The presidential election was contested between General Guei and Mr Laurent Gbagbo on 22nd October, 2000. When the election result was announced, Gbagbo defeated Guei by 59.4% of the votes to 32.7% votes (Nwolise, 2011). Guei refused to accept the result and instead claimed victory for himself. Gbagbo relied on the mobilisation of youth militia groups to fight against the forces of the Guei government. This led to the eruption of serious violence as many people were killed in the country. By 2002, Gbagbo set up a government of national unity as a result of international pressure and restored to Ouattara his Ivorian nationality.

The March 2007, Ouagadougou Peace Agreement (OPA) paved the way for elections in November 2009. However, due to series of crises in the country, the elections were shifted to March 2010. It was during the time that Nigeria mounted pressure on Gbagbo to conduct the presidential elections (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). The UN Security Council in its Resolution No.1765 in 2007 directed the representative of UN Secretary General in Cote d'Ivoire, Mr Y.J. Choi to guarantee that there were free, fair and credible elections in the country. Then the presidential election was scheduled for 31st October, 2010 and the government established the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) under the Chairmanship of Mr Youssouf Bakayoko. In all about 5.7 million people registered for the election. There were 10,179 polling stations in the country and 66,000 electoral officials were recruited.

Also, due to the importance of the election, the UN peacekeepers provided technical and logistical support in terms of transportation, distribution of materials as well as security for electoral officials. However, to ensure effective coverage of the whole country, the UN sent additional 500 troops by increasing the number from 8,650 to 9,150 troops (Nwolise, 2011). International election observers from the EU, AU, ECOWAS, US, Japan etc were also allowed to monitor the conduct of the elections. Political campaigns for the elections began on 15th October, 2010 and were largely carried out by candidates along ethnic, religious and regional lines (Nwolise, 2011).

According to the Constitution of Cote d'Ivoire, a president would rule for a five year term, and is eligible to run for election for a second term. That is to say that the president can only serve for a maximum of two terms of ten years. However, to win a presidential election, a candidate must have absolute majority of the votes cast. In a situation where there is no candidate with absolute majority, a second round of ballot is required between the two candidates with the highest votes within four weeks of the first ballot (Onah, 2011). On 31st October, 2010 a presidential election took place in Cote d'Ivoire. The election recorded a very high turn out of 83.7% of voters, that is 4.84 million out of 5.78 million registered voters. The results of the first round are shown below in table 1 as follows:

Table 1**Results of the First Round of 2010 Presidential Election in Cote d'Ivoire**

S/No.	Candidates	Parties	Votes	%
1	Laurent Gbagbo	Ivorian People's Front	1,756,504	38.04
2	Alassane Ouattara	Rally of the Republicans	1,481,091	32.07
3	Henri Bedie	Democratic Party of Cote d'Ivoire	1,165,532	25.24
4	Albert Mabri	Union for Democracy and Peace in Cote d'Ivoire	118,671	2.27
5	Konan Gnamien	Union for Cote d'Ivoire	17,171	0.37
6	Francis Wodie	Ivorian Workers' Party	13,406	0.29
7	Simeon Konan	Ivorian Union (Parti pour la Cote d'Ivoire)	12,357	0.27
8	Jacqueline Lohoues	Independent Candidate	12,273	0.27
9	Pascal Togoua	Independent Candidate	11,674	0.25
10	Innocent Anaky	Movement of the Forces of the Future	10,663	0.23
11	Adama Dolo	Parti du Doromikan	5,972	0.13

12	N'Doula Enoh Aka	Independent Candidate	5,311	0.12
13	Felix Yao Akoto	Independent Candidate	4,773	0.10
14	Henri Tohou	Socialist Union of the people	2,243	0.05

Source: Nwolise, B.C. Osisima, 2011: 43.

The above table 1 shows that the then incumbent President Gbagbo of the Ivorian People's Front (FPI) came first and scored 1,756,504 votes (38.04%), Alassane Ouattara of the Rally of the Republicans (RDR) came second and scored 1,481,091 votes (32.07%), while the third place candidate, Henri Bedie of the Democratic Party of Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI) got 1,165,532 votes (25.24%). The other 11 candidates scored less than five percent of the total votes cast. Therefore, it can be seen that from the overall results, there was a need for second round ballot since no candidate met the constitutional requirement of absolute majority of total votes cast. The run-off or second ballot election took place between President Gbagbo and opposition leader, Alassane Ouattara on 28th November, 2010. During the time, Mr Henri Bedie had strongly appealed and requested his supporters to vote for Mr Ouattara. The results of the second round were indicated in table 2 below as follows:

Table 2

Second Round 28th November, 2010 Voting Results for the Two Top

Candidates

S/No.	Name of Candidates	Political Party	IEC Result		CC Result	
			VOTES	%	VOTES	%
1	Laurent Gbagbo	Ivorian People's Front	2,107,055	45.90	2,054,537	51.45
2	Alassane Ouattara	Rally of the Republicans	2,483,164	54.10	1,938,672	48.55
Turn out was 81.09%						

Source: Nwolise, B.C. Osioma, 2011: 44.

According to table 2 above, the then incumbent President Gbagbo was defeated as he scored 2,107,055 votes (45.90%) and the leader of opposition, Ouattara won the election by scoring 2,483,164 votes (54.10%). He was declared as the winner by IEC and was recognised by members of the international community as elected president. It then came as a surprise to everyone that President Gbagbo refused to

accept the result of the election. He quickly rushed to the Ivorian Constitutional Council (CC) to declare him as the winner. On 3rd October, 2010 the CC declared Gbagbo as the winner with 2,054,537 votes (51.45%) against Ouattara's 1,938,672 votes (48.55%). Following the announcement of the result of the globally acclaimed free and fair second round 2010 presidential election in Cote d'Ivoire, violent conflict erupted, which later grew to what was termed the second civil war in the country.

The political atmosphere became tense as the two political figures were sworn in as president at the same moment in an atmosphere of confusion. The violent conflict that erupted between the supporters of the two candidates claimed several lives of while and properties were destroyed. For instance, in a clash between the supporters of the two leaders in Duekoue on 27th and 28th March, 2011, it was reported that more than 1,000 dead bodies were discovered in hastily dug mass graves (Iwilade and Ukeje, 2011). Similarly, several individuals were reported dead in some other cities across the country. In some estimation about 3000 individuals were killed and several others injured or maimed (Nwolise, 2011). It was the problem of humanitarian crisis in Cote d'Ivoire that drew the attention of members of the international community to engage in efforts aimed at resolving the political stalemate that plagued the country.

Given the fact that Nigeria has been concerned with affairs of West African

countries, the political logjam in Cote d'Ivoire made the country to quickly move in and recognise the winner of 2010 presidential election. Nigeria's position was clear as she appealed to Mr Gbagbo to step down and hand over power to Allassane Ouattara. Based on this, the former Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Olugbenga Ashiru (2013: 97) maintains that:

...We were involved in Cote d'Ivoire, where President Goodluck Jonathan took that stance that "since an election has been conducted and a winner has emerged, the winner must be sworn in as president." We stood our ground, the US, France, EU came around to support Nigeria's position. Even the AU that was initially not sure where they will be, they came around to support Nigeria's position. That is why when President Ouattara came, he told me he had made a promise to himself that Nigeria must be the first country he would visit after his inauguration to come and thank the Nigerian people and government for the support they gave his country. He said if not for Nigeria's stance, the bloodbath in Cote d'Ivoire would have been unimaginable if the crises were allowed to linger.

From the statement above, it can be discerned that the complexities of the electoral crisis that later culminated into violent clashes in Cote d'Ivoire required the attention of members of the international community to mediate. Even though other countries, such as France, US, as well as some key international organisations played significant role, the engagement of Nigeria in the resolution of the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire was necessary. This is because the instability in Cote d'Ivoire would directly or indirectly affect the socio-economic and political fortunes of other West African countries. Based on this, Mu'azu (2011: 55) stresses that:

Apart from Cote d'Ivoire being a sister African country, it is geographically located in the same region as Nigeria and is also

a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In addition, it is a member of the African Union (AU) a body that Nigeria also belongs to. Nigeria has been playing a leading role in the affairs of these two bodies, with a higher degree of dominance in ECOWAS and a commanding presence in AU affairs. Thus, the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire is of necessary concern to Nigeria.

It was in an attempt to stop the killings of innocent citizens in Cote d'Ivoire as well as the need to forestall the spread of the conflict to other countries in West Africa that Nigeria decided to mediate (Aworawo, 2001). Nigeria made use of its leadership position in West Africa to work with the key members of the international community to find solutions to the lingering political conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. However, the various diplomatic initiatives undertaken by Nigeria towards the resolution of the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire will be discussed and analysed in the next section that follows.

3.5: PATTERNS AND DIMENSIONS OF NIGERIA'S DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES IN RESOLVING CONFLICT IN COTE D'IVOIRE

During the second crisis that followed the disputed 2010 presidential election in Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria played certain role towards its settlement. It is evident that during the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria clearly demonstrated its ability to engage in diplomatic process in resolving the conflict. Immediately, when the results of 2010 second round presidential election in Cote d'Ivoire were announced by the IEC, Nigeria did not hesitate to recognise the winner, Mr

Allassane Ouattara. Even as President Gbagbo also claimed victory in the said election, the Nigerian government mobilised international support for Ouattara as the legitimate winner. Based on this, Alli (2013: 135) maintains that “on the basis of the diplomacy for democracy principle, the government supported the globally recognised winner in the Cote d’Ivoire elections, Allassane Ouattara.”

It was on the basis of trying to avert continuous bloodshed in Cote d’Ivoire that the Nigerian government consistently called on members of the international community to support Ouattara’s mandate. Thus, as a result of the critical condition that the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire put the people, Nigeria decided to intervene. In commenting on the role of Nigeria in bringing about political stability in Cote d’Ivoire, the then Minister of State II for Foreign Affairs, Dr Nuruddeen Mohammed (2014: 31) expatiates that:

When Cote d’Ivoire was facing these challenges after the elections and President Laurent Gbagbo was defeated and rather decided to stay put, Nigeria was the chair of ECOWAS. President Goodluck Jonathan was the Chairman of ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government and that naturally came with a lot of responsibilities; coordinating and inviting meetings, chairing the meetings and interfacing between the larger world and ECOWAS block and I think partly that is what explains the success because of the decision taken by the Nigerian government that the sovereignty of Cote d’Ivoire remains sacrosanct and Nigeria mobilised the sub-region and the international community together with France to make sure that the political fisticuffs we are having that time do not degenerate into full-blown war.

It can be said that Nigeria’s engagement in the settlement of crisis in Cote d’Ivoire

was not based on rendering support to any individual politician just because of his personality or any other ulterior motive. Rather, it was purely informed by the need to promote peace, order and stability in Cote d'Ivoire. Basically, the position adopted by Nigeria in calling for the installation of the winner of the 2010 Ivorian presidential election yielded positive result because the members of the international community were convinced and backed the move. In particular, international organisations like the ECOWAS, AU, and UN who have direct responsibilities in maintaining peace and order in Cote d'Ivoire played significant role to settle the crisis. In addition, many other members of the international community, such as France, US EU and other stakeholders also played different roles toward the settlement of the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire.

It is important to note that while there were efforts by the international institutions to resolve the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire, there were areas of consensus and discordant views expressed by members of the international community. It is on this instance that we shall disaggregate the contributions of Nigeria in using the platforms of these international organisations towards the settlement of the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire.

Coincidentally, when the second crisis broke out in Cote d'Ivoire, the President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan was the Chairman of ECOWAS (Minstry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). In an effort to resolve the election crisis in Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria

played the role of hosting series of international summits towards that end. For instance, during the ECOWAS Extraordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government on Cote d'Ivoire, held on 7th December, 2010 in Abuja and attended by eleven Heads of State and the representatives of some governments or international agencies, the body endorsed the results declared by IEC and diplomatically appealed to President Gbagbo to accept the results (Oche, 2011). As Gbagbo refused to relinquish power, Nigeria imposed sanctions on Cote d'Ivoire in compliance with ECOWAS' directives (Sunday Tribune, 11 December, 2010).

In addition, following the electoral stalemate that continued to generate conflict in Cote d'Ivoire, the Chairman of ECOWAS, and at the same time the President of Nigeria, Jonathan decided to send a delegation to Cote d'Ivoire. The delegation comprised the Heads of States and Government of Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Cape Verde. The body was Chaired by President Jonathan of Nigeria and met with both presidential candidates and other stakeholders in the country. This was aimed at resolving the conflict (Mu'azu, 2011). After the meeting and the departure of the delegation, President Gbagbo still remained recalcitrant as he refused to concede defeat.

Subsequently, there was a follow-up of ECOWAS Summit in Abuja on 24th December, 2010. It was attended by ten Heads of States and Government, where a

decision was taken that the victory of Ouattara was “non-negotiable.” Also during the Summit series of additional sanctions were imposed on the government of Gbagbo by ECOWAS member-states, including Nigeria. These included the suspension of Cote d’Ivoire from all ECOWAS decision making bodies until further notice, non-recognition of the government of President Gbagbo, restriction on personal travel as well as financial sanctions against cabinet members of Gbagbo regime etc (New Nigeria, 8th December, 2010:1). At the end of the Summit a communiqué was issued where it was resolved that if Gbagbo refused to accept the results of the elections the body would consider the “use of legitimate force” to ensure compliance and at the same time resolve the crisis (Iwilade and Ukeje, 2011; Oche, 2011).

When diplomatic efforts failed to make President Gbagbo to yield to the calls on him to step down, two meetings of ECOWAS were held in both Abuja and Bamako on 28th and 29th December, 2010, respectively. During these meetings the Heads of State of the body through the initiative of Nigeria called for the “use of legitimate force” to remove Gbagbo from office (Oche, 2011). In addition, on 29th December, 2010, an emergency meeting of the Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS) took place in Abuja and chaired by the Nigeria’s Chief of Defence Staff. During the meeting a tentative plan was put in place to deploy the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) in Cote d’Ivoire at short notice. However, some other

nations that were to contribute troops to the task force declined to do so (Lokoson, 2014).

However, the threat of use of force by ECOWAS could not be implemented as there was no consensus among leaders of the body. Divergent positions were taken and discordant views were expressed by the ECOWAS leaders on the matter. Obviously, at that moment Nigeria declared support for the use of force and was ready to supply troops to resolve the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire. On the other hand, the Gambian President, Yahaya Jammeh, and former President of Ghana, Jerry Rawlings had questioned the position of ECOWAS to openly declare support for the winner of the elections. In his remarks, Rawlings suggests that "attempts to marshal support for a military intervention lack any justification and rather will expose the UN, ECOWAS and AU as being hypocritical" (Oche, 2011). In addition, in a categorical official statement, the President of Ghana at that time, John Atta Mills publicly declared that his country would not take part in any military intervention (Oche, 2011: 95).

The position taken by some members of ECOWAS of not supporting military action in Cote d'Ivoire left Nigeria with the options of either to go ahead with the threat alone or to implement it with some few countries. Of course, Nigeria has the capability of taking unilateral action in Cote d'Ivoire but refused to do that due to certain strategic reasons. Instead, the country adopted the use of the platforms

of international organisations, particularly the UN in resolving the crisis. This is because unilateral intervention requires the expenditure of huge financial resources as well as sending large military troops to resolve the conflict. Besides, when the crisis was brewing in Cote d'Ivoire it was also at that time that Nigeria was in preparation for the conduct of 2011 general elections. Also, it was at that moment the country was witnessing the rise of Boko Haram insurgency, which requires the services of Nigerian military to quench. Over all, at the sub-regional level, the push by Nigeria to maintain peace and security through the resolution of conflict in Cote d'Ivoire has been commended. It is perhaps for this reason that Alli (2012: 58) states that:

President Goodluck Jonathan, who also became **ECOWAS** Chairman, has also tried to follow the well beaten path of playing the big brother's role in subregional affairs generally and in its security policy in particular. Nigeria's voice was loud and clear in support of democratic rule. Its intervention in the crisis which engulfed Cote d'Ivoire following the Presidential elections of 2011, with Nigerian troops as part of the **UN** observer team, gained wide acceptance. The Abuja **ECOWAS** Summit on Cote d'Ivoire confirmed the constitutionality of the **UN** approved election results and the victory of Ouattara in the presidential elections, backing the use of force as resolved by the **UN** Security Council. President Jonathan adopted a principled approach in the crisis and continued to insist on constitutionalism and democracy in resolving all other lingering and emerging political crises in Niger, Mali and Guinea Bissau (*emphasis in the original*).

The stance of Nigeria at the ECOWAS level that Ouattara's mandate must be upheld did not change when the Ivorian disputed election matter was tabled at both

the AU and the UN levels. Nigeria also used the platform of the African Union (AU) to canvass for the use of military force to remove Gbagbo from office. In particular, the Nigerian government requested the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to approve an AU military intervention in Cote d'Ivoire (Adetula, 2013). On this issue, the South African government disagreed and took a different position. Here, the President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma reacted by stating that "we need to do something to help the situation and don't demand that one leader should go" (Oche, 2011). The stance of South Africa was to defend the government of President Gbagbo by whatever means. It was on this ground that South Africa was said to provide some military support to Gbagbo. According to Ogunsanwo (2012: 126):

During the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire in the early months of 2011, there was concern that a South African warship was in West African waters at a time that the South African government and Angola did not agree with ECOWAS leaders' position on the developments in Cote d'Ivoire, appearing instead to be backing Gbagbo.

Apparently, the action of South African government was meant to protect the administration of President Gbagbo. Even as no fighting took place with Nigeria as a result of the action of South Africa, it can be said that at the end it was the position of Nigeria that prevailed over the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. Basically, the Ivorian crisis generated controversy among the AU members, which led to lack of definite action on the part of the continental body over the matter. It is on this

instance that Yabi (2012: 4) states that “AU was divided along several fault lines, most notably there was conflict between Nigeria and South Africa regarding who should be the continent’s leading actor in the crisis.” Given the condition of political stalemate in Cote d’Ivoire, the Nigerian government continued to appeal to some other AU member states to support the use of ‘legitimate force’ to remove Gbagbo and install Mr Ouattara to power. Based on this, Onah (2011: 174) avers that:

Diplomatic efforts by President Jonathan, at the head of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), insisted on the principle that attempts to steal elections must be met with military force, if necessary, to install the rightful victor, a position also accepted by the African Union.

The lack of consensus among the African leaders at the AU level had made the body to be unable to decisively resolve the political crisis in Cote d’Ivoire. It was for this reason that Saliu (2014: 378) maintains that “Nigeria’s preference for the military intervention did not appeal to South Africa, Ghana, etc, and this became the position of the AU on Ivory Coast.” Consequently, the AU became inactive on the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire as the body continued to rely and back the UN and France initiatives. This was contrary to the new principle of the OAU/AU of seeking ‘African solution to African problem.’

The intervention of UN was decisive in resolving the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire. It is important to note that the United Nations through the United Nations

Operations in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) single handedly provided the bulk of the finance as well as other logistics to the IEC so as to hold the elections in the country. This was when President Gbagbo continued to shift the dates of elections on the grounds that the conditions in the country were not ripe for elections. The elections time tables were shifted at four different times, from 2005 to 2006, later to 2009 and March 2010. Eventually, they were finally held in October 2010 (Nwolise, 2011).

In addition, the UNOCI also provided security for the election officials and maintained election observers in all the polling stations and collation centres in Cote d'Ivoire (Iwilade and Ukeje, 2011). As a means of curtailing the political crisis in Cote d'Ivoire from escalating and spreading into other countries, on 30th March, 2011 the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1975 was passed by calling on Ivorian parties to respect the election of Alassane Ouattara as President of Cote d'Ivoire. In addition, it demanded an immediate end to the surge in violence against civilians, imposes targeted sanctions against former President Gbagbo and his associates. It also maintained that UNOCI could use "all necessary measures" in its mandate to protect civilians from threat of attacks (Iwilade and Ukeje, 2011).

Following the refusal of President Gbagbo to honour the mandate given to Mr Ouattara by the people of Cote d'Ivoire during the run-off of 2010 presidential

election, the UN was resolute and direct in declaring support for the winner. The world body was categorical in the condemnation of the action of President Gbagbo for his refusal to hand over power to the duly elected president in Cote d'Ivoire. This necessitated the passing of UN resolution 1962 on 20th December, 2010 urging the respect for the election outcome and condemning the attempts to usurp the will of the people. It also extended the UNOCI's mandate until 30th June, 2011 (Olufunmilade, 2011: 186). Therefore, it can be said that the stance of the UN on the electoral dispute in Cote d'Ivoire helped greatly in mounting international pressure on the administration of President Gbagbo.

After some months of negotiations, in which the political impasse could not be resolved amicably, the members of the international community were forced to seek a military option to the crisis. Streets fighting took place between the supporters of the two leaders. Several weeks of battle led to the death of many individuals with several others displaced from their homes as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) or refugees. Indeed, the conflict in the country was unabated as violence was directed at the innocent civilians. Under such circumstance, the UNOCI provided security for Alassane Ouattara in the Gulf Hotel where he set up his government machinery. President Gbagbo continued to hold on to power until the UN and French forces stormed the Presidential residence in Abidjan and attacked him (Onah, 2011). Based on this, Ogunsanwo (2012: 124) maintains that:

We were saved in December 2010 by the vigilance of officials after our President, Goodluck Jonathan, had accepted that ECOWAS would use military force to remove incumbent Laurent Gbagbo who lost elections in Cote d'Ivoire but refused to step down. By inserting the legitimate use of force, they ensured that the matter would have to go to the Security Council of the United Nations. After several months, a resolution backed by France and Nigeria was eventually passed by the Security Council under which decisive force was used to force Gbagbo to surrender. The decisive force was applied by France and the United Nations peacekeeping contingent. Nigeria was a moving force no doubt but only at the United Nations and not at local level a la Liberia and Sierra Leone.

The escalation of tensions in Cote d'Ivoire as a result of the attitude of President Gbagbo was roundly condemned by the majority members of the international community. This left the UN with no other option but to use force against the regime of Gbagbo. Subsequently, Mr Gbagbo was captured and arrested in April 2011 after an intense aerial bombing of his residential compound. He was later taken to the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Thereafter, the opposition leader, Alassane Ouattara was immediately sworn in as President of Cote d'Ivoire on 21st May, 2011.

3.6: FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE NIGERIA'S ROLE IN COTE D'IVOIRE

This section examines the factors that influence Nigeria's role towards the settlement of conflicts in Cote d'Ivoire and indeed other countries in West African sub-region. Basically, certain factors can be identified as responsible for Nigeria's engagement in conflict resolution in abroad. Since independence, Nigeria's

foreign policy has exhibited both the elements of change and continuity. The change element can be seen in terms of shifting of emphasis from pro-West foreign policy to the adoption of economic diplomacy in international relations. However, the element of continuity in Nigeria's foreign policy can be seen in terms of promotion of international peace and security. It is within this context that Nigeria's intervention in resolving the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire in West Africa fits.

There is no doubt that over the years, Nigeria has been a key player in the resolution or management of conflict in the West African sub-region. To this extent, there is hardly any conflict in West Africa that Nigeria did not directly or indirectly intervene to resolve. Therefore primarily, Nigeria's concerns for the promotion of international peace and security has necessitated that the country work with the key members of the international community to resolve conflict in West Africa in particular and around the world in general. It is perhaps on this basis that Sanda (2012: 411) avers that "one outstanding feature of Nigeria's external relations is its commitment to international peace and security as manifested in its peacekeeping role." With this development, Nigeria has participated in peacekeeping operations in some African countries. Nigeria's concern for peace and stability in Africa is invariably anchored on the belief that a

threat in any African country is a threat to the entire continent and the world at large.

There are quite a number of factors that influence Nigeria to engage in conflict resolution in West Africa. These include Nigeria's leadership aspiration in West Africa, being a signatory to ECOWAS treaties, spill over effects of conflict in West Africa, historical experiences etc. Undoubtedly, these factors and others predispose Nigeria to intervene in resolving conflicts in West African countries.

3.6. I: Nigeria's Leadership Aspiration in West Africa

Basically, the explanation on Nigeria's engagement in conflict resolution in West Africa and indeed Africa can be situated in the context of the aspiration of the country to play leadership role. Thus, since the attainment of Nigeria's political independence in 1960, the Prime Minister, Sir Tafawa Balewa maintained that Africa would remain the first priority area of Nigeria's foreign policy. As a result, in 1960, the Prime Minister enumerated the principles of Nigeria's foreign policy as follows:

- a. Good neighbourliness;
- b. African unity, and economic integration including enhanced inter-African trade rooted in regional cooperation arrangements;
- c. Reform of the UN involving increased African representation in the various agencies including an African permanent member status;

- d. Multilateralism in international politics as a check against power politics and domineering influence of the power;
- e. Pursuit of the welfare of the African people through a political culture of mutual respect; equality of states; non-interference in internal affairs of each other particularly subversion; and peaceful resolution of disputes; and
- f. A leadership role for Nigeria in Africa and about African affairs (Bukarambe, 2010: 69).

Quite obviously, since independence up till date, Nigeria's foreign policy principles revolve around the above core values. The most striking issue is the fact that some of the principles place emphasis on Nigeria playing important role in the affairs of African countries. Also, as a demonstration of commitment to African matters, the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria stipulates certain provisions on the promotion of African integration and unity as one of the Nigeria's foreign policy objectives (Tyoden, 2012).

An analysis of the leadership role that Nigeria has been playing in resolving conflicts in African states can be underscored through the basic principles of the country's foreign policy. Based on this, Fage (2002: 12) argues that "the assumption underlying Nigeria's Afrocentric principle is that the country is predestined and ably endowed to be the leader among African states. Hence, Nigeria must not abdicate such a role." Over the years, in Nigeria successive

administrations have made Africa as the centre piece of the country's foreign policy. To this extent, Nigeria has been rendering assistance to African countries in order to overcome some problems or challenges. It is on this basis that Adeniji (2004: 423-424) avers that:

An analysis of the current dynamics of international relations leads to the continued relevance of the importance of Africa in Nigeria's foreign policy. Looked upon as a regional important state, it is expected by the international community to be in the vanguard of actions, not only to resolve conflicts in Africa, but also to propel the continent out of its present economic slumber.

As a mechanism to make Nigeria to prioritise its areas of foreign policy preoccupation, the concept of concentric circles was introduced during the military regime of General Muhammadu Buhari. According to Adeniji (2004:423) "the concept placed Nigeria as the epi-central area of the circles with immediate neighbourhood and Africa as a whole coming closely thereafter." Therefore, the concern for the promotion of Nigeria's national interest forms the first priority, then its immediate neighbours and then follows by Africa as a whole. Nigeria attaches much importance to its immediate neighbours because they are members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). According to Alli (2012: 19), the features of Nigeria's West African policy both from the African Centre-piece perspective, the Concentric Circle model and Beneficial Concentricism include:

- i. Anti-colonialism, anti-apartheid and anti-racism;

- ii. Cooperation with immediate neighbours;
- iii. Cooperation with other ECOWAS states; and
- iv. Promotion of peace and security in the sub-region and across the world.

This means that West Africa occupies pre-eminence place in Nigeria's quest for peace and development. Both in the past and the present, Nigerian leaders have been shouldering the responsibility of maintaining peace and stability in West Africa. For instance, during the 2010 election crises in Cote d'Ivoire, President Jonathan demonstrated leadership display by making Nigeria to play the big brother's role towards its resolution (Alli, 2012). Certainly, the Nigeria's efforts to promote peace and security in West Africa are invariably meant to advance and protect the country from danger and uncertainty. This is because if Nigeria helps to deal with threats or danger from the neighbouring countries it is also assisting to reduce or ward off such threats from itself. It is perhaps for this reason that Ogunsanwo (2012: 122) argues that "proceeding from the perspective of the concentric circles, our immediate neighbours should be of concern to us. Their internal stability, progress, growth, good governance must continue to be seen as part of our primary interests."

Generally, leadership is very vital in carrying out foreign policy processes of a state. Also, leadership requires the effectiveness and efficiency in the management of the affairs of a state so as to achieve the stated goals. The quality

of leadership can impact greatly in enhancing the capacity of a country in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Central to the understanding of the core place of leadership in the power configuration of nation-states in the international environment is that it affects the kind of influence that a country has. It is perhaps on this basis that Yoroms (2012: 87) maintains that:

And though Nigeria may not be a superpower, the leadership it provides makes it a leading force in the sub-region. This has informed the series of interventions by Nigeria at diplomatic, military and economic levels. ECOMOG has been sponsored by Nigeria since 1990 to the tune of N12 billion.

In the same vein, Pogeson and Oshodi (2015: 193) maintain that “over the years, Nigeria assumed the role of a natural leader in Africa generally and West Africa in particular.” Certainly, leadership position goes with a responsibility. Nigeria has been showing its commitment to provide leadership example in the efforts to curtail the escalation of conflicts in West African sub-region. Since the 1990s, the country has been demonstrating its willingness to intervene and settle internal political unrest in West African countries. This is essentially because of the increasing security challenges within some individual nations in West Africa. In the absence of any powerful nation to play the role of settlement of conflict in West Africa, the Nigerian government is undertaking such responsibility. It is based on this reason that Lokoson (2014: 400-401) maintains that:

Indeed, it was under the leadership role of Nigeria that the first sub-regional peace enforcement force, the ECOWAS Monitoring

Group (ECOMOG) was established to stop the fratricidal war in Liberia in 1990 as well as in Sierra Leone in 1997. Nigeria subsequently led the Economic Community of West African States Military Intervention Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) in 2003 which stabilised the situation for the deployment of the United Nations Military Mission. These interventions demonstrated the efficacy of the ECOWAS protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security which is the organisation's constitution on collective security in the West Africa sub-region.

The various roles of Nigeria in peacekeeping operations in West Africa are meant to create stability and mitigate the suffering of ordinary people in the sub-region. Obviously, Nigeria has been showing concern to the plight of African people that are in need of assistance anywhere in the world. Based on this, Zimako (2012: 62) maintains that "Nigeria then has a significant role to play in world affairs, especially where black nations and populations are concerned. Nigeria has a duty to protect their interest but in doing that, she must recognize and protect her own national interest." In the efforts to enhance its influence, the Nigerian state has been concerned with maintaining peace in crises prone nations in Africa. Significantly, Nigeria has been cooperating with other nations to resolve conflict in Africa so as to promote peace. The ability of Nigeria to serve as a vanguard in resolving internal political conflicts in West Africa has been assisting a great deal in containing the spread of conflicts in the sub-region.

Therefore, it is held in certain quarters that the entire ECOMOG operations in West Africa are largely dependent on Nigeria's leadership initiatives and

directives. The untiring commitment of Nigeria to resolve some knotty political crises in West African countries can be seen as an indication that the country is playing a leadership role in the sub-region. Even when Nigeria spearheaded and bore the burden of shouldering the greater per cent of fund for ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the political leaders in the country believed that the country was capable and in a better position to act in that manner compared to other West African countries. Thus, the role that Nigeria is playing in the affairs of other West African countries is being determined by some factors. Based on this, Dokubo (2012: 449) argues that:

Nigeria has been successful in its role of maintaining peace and containing conflict because of her relative resource and leverage. The role of leverage is based on her clout, muscle and her ability to act as power-broker, leverage, however stems from resources, power and stature to reward or to punish the disputants for cooperative or uncooperative behavior. Furthermore, since most of the conflict Nigeria had intervened in are characterised by gross power asymmetries between incumbents and challengers, her relative clout had given her the ability to redress such imbalances through the creation of stalemates.

The above statement implies that Nigeria's role is central in resolving conflicts in West Africa because of immense capability that the country is endowed with. To this extent, Nigeria has been able to achieve modest success in its engagement in settlement of conflict in West Africa. This is because Nigeria is blessed with dynamic and educated people that can promote unity and integration in the sub-region. Also, the various political leaders in Nigeria have been demonstrating their

concern to the plight of people or citizens in neighbouring countries by providing assistance in resolving humanitarian crises.

Significantly, Nigeria has been acting as disinterested intervener in conflict situations in West Africa. This is done by maintaining neutrality between or among the parties to a conflict. The attribute of displaying neutrality in conflict reaffirms Nigeria's leadership role in the West African sub-region. Apart from assisting to maintain peace in trouble countries, Nigeria has no ulterior motive of establishing domination over any country in West Africa. It is perhaps for this reason that Nigeria is always sought for to resolve conflict in trouble spots in the sub-region.

Therefore, in the conduct of foreign relations, leadership quality is considered as an important element of state power. This is essentially because all other elements cannot be effectively put to use without good leadership. It is perhaps on this basis that Oche (2000:16) avers that "the government and leadership of a state should be able to mobilise and exploit the respective tangible and intangible elements of power at the disposal of the state towards the attainment of its pursuits." This shows that leadership is central to the achievement of state's domestic and foreign policy goals. The quality of leadership is germane in a state's engagements with other countries in the conduct of a nation's foreign policy in the international community. Based on this, Pogeson (2005: 381) argues that:

For a meaningful assessment of the actions of states in the international arena, it is important to understand that a major determinant of foreign policy is the character of the political leadership and the type of leadership provided determines the degree of dynamism of a state's foreign policy.

As it is identified that leadership is very central in charting the course of a country's foreign policy direction, it can be said that a firm and decisive leadership can make a difference by enhancing the position of a nation in the international environment. For instance, one of the important legacies left behind by General Ibrahim Babangida in Nigeria's foreign policy was the initiation of the ECOMOG peacekeeping operations in West African sub-region. The various peacekeeping efforts have no doubt led to the restoration of relative peace, stability and democracy in some troubled spots in West Africa.

Thus, as President Babangida demonstrated good leadership quality in mobilising other West African leaders on the need for the formation of ECOMOG, subsequent Nigerian leaders that came after him have remained consistent in using the platform of the body to project the country's foreign policy, especially on issue bordering on settlement of conflicts in the sub-region. Evidently, Nigeria has maintained its presence by sending troops to all ECOMOG peacekeeping operations in crises-prone countries in West Africa. Therefore, it can be stated that the entire ECOMOG operations in West Africa are largely dependent on Nigeria's leadership directives.

With respect to the Nigeria's engagement in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire, it was partly through the diplomatic initiative of Nigeria under the leadership of President Jonathan that the international community backed the mandate of President Ouattara (Onah, 2011). This is because Nigeria made effective use of the platforms of different international bodies to canvass for the installation of Ouattara to power as the legitimate winner of election in his country. The effort yielded good result because the combine forces of the international community forcefully removed Gbagbo from office.

3.6.2: Nigeria as a Signatory to ECOWAS Protocols, Conventions and Treaties on Peace and Security

One of the factors that influence Nigeria's intervention in the settlement of political crises in West African countries is that the country is a signatory to the various ECOWAS Protocols and Conventions. It is common knowledge that Nigeria is an active and influential member of ECOWAS. As a member of such an international organisation, there are certain international treaties on conflict resolution that the country is a signatory to and which ought to be adhered to. Therefore, it is within this context that one can appreciate Nigeria's role in conflict resolution in West Africa.

When the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire started in 2002, the ECOWAS had already developed a legal framework that allowed the body to intervene in resolving

conflict in any member state. Based on this, Alli (2006b: 87) argues that “the Cote d’Ivoire conflict which erupted in 2002 is the first major test for the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security adopted by the ECOWAS in 1999.” During the early 1990s when ECOWAS intervened in Liberia there was no strong legal backing for the exercise. The legal difficulty encountered by ECOWAS in Liberia made the body to adopt some treaties and conventions on conflict resolution in member states.

It is common knowledge to scholars and commentators on Nigeria’s international affairs that Nigeria spearheaded the establishment of ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to champion peacekeeping process in Liberia. It was as a result of the concern for the plight of Liberian people that during the Annual Summit of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS held in Banjul, Gambia in 1990 that the issue of settlement of Liberian crisis was tabled. President Babangida of Nigeria proposed the idea of setting up ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC), which comprised Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, Mali and Togo, to mediate in the Liberian crisis and other regional conflicts involving member states (Fawole, 2001). This was regarded as an innovation especially in an organisation that was established in 1975 for the purpose of economic integration and not for peacekeeping.

Some scholars have debated that the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states does not necessarily make ECOMOG intervention illegal. Based on this it is suggested by Iheme (2006) that a crisis situation like in the case of Liberia that not only resulted into the death of thousands of individuals but which was spreading to other neighbouring countries require the urgent attention of members of the international community, particularly the international organisations. It is perhaps for this reason that Saliu (2006b: 66) avers that “according to the legal instruments guiding the operations of international organisations, no state is permitted to intervene militarily in another state unless sanctioned by the international organisations.”

Therefore, it can be said that having been deliberated at the level of ECOWAS and having received the backing of the UN, the involvement of ECOMOG in Liberia cannot be seen as political interference but rather as military intervention that was intended to bring about peaceful settlement of crisis. It is at this juncture that one can point at two instruments that directly or indirectly prompted the ECOWAS to intervene in Liberia. They included the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence Matters (1981) (Fawole, 2001). The first instrument suggests the settlement of crisis between two or more member states. The second implies that in case of external attacks on a member state, the ECOWAS can intervene. Thus, it can be said that there was no clear cut legal

framework permitting ECOWAS to intervene in internal political crises in member states.

The lessons learnt about the problem of lack of legal framework for ECOMOG peacekeeping operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau during the 1990s were instrumental to the West African leaders' decision to introduce different protocols and declarations that were aimed at prevention, management and resolution of conflicts (Iheme, 2006). The first important step that the ECOWAS took was the adoption of 1991 Declaration of Political Principles, which set a broad framework for its programmes.

The Declaration of Political Principles enjoined ECOWAS member states to commit themselves to uphold human rights, democracy and rule of law as a means of preventing conflicts (Oche, 2010). Subsequently, on 24th July, 1993, in Cotonou, Republic of Benin, ECOWAS revised its 1975 Lagos Treaty. The Revised Treaty provides for the maintenance of regional peace, stability and security. In specific, Article 58 (2) of the Revised Treaty contains the pledge by the member states to support the prevention and resolution of both intra and interstate conflicts in the West African sub-region (Iheme, 2006).

Based on the various declarations, protocols, conventions and treaties, the Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS decided to have a single legal framework for conflict management and resolution in West Africa. The idea behind the

adoption of all-embracing legal framework was in reaction to the criticisms that trailed ECOWAS' response to conflicts and security problems in West Africa (Alli, 2012). The 1999 ECOWAS treaty therefore gives authority to the body to intervene in conflict situation in any member state. Thus, according to Iheme (2006: 259-260):

Consequently, the ECOWAS Protocol on the Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Resolution, Management, Peacekeeping and Security was signed in Lome, Togo on 10th December 1999. The Mechanism represents the most comprehensive and perhaps ambitious legal framework by any sub-regional organisation in Africa to guide its peace and security operations, which include conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping, humanitarian activities and peace-building.

Essentially, the new ECOWAS Protocol was designed to remedy the limitations of the ECOMOG based on its experiences in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau (Ate, 2001). In addition, the establishment of an ECOWAS' Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace Keeping and Security laid the foundation for collective security system in the West Africa sub-region (Adetula, 2006). In this regard, Article 3 (d) of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (CPMRPS) declared that ECOWAS was committed to "strengthening cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention, early warning, peacekeeping operations, the control of cross-border crime, international terrorism and proliferation of small arms and

anti-personnel mines” (Alli, 2012: 33). Therefore, the protocol provides three organs to implement security decisions. They are:

- i. The Mediation and Security Council;
- ii. The Defence and Security Council; and
- iii. The Council of Elders (Alli, 20012: 33).

Significantly, Nigeria has been playing important role in West African security issues because it is a member of the above named organs of ECOWAS (Pogason, 2011). In addition, the ECOWAS introduced another document essentially to address the limitations of the body. This Protocol is called A/SP1/12/2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (Alli, 2012: 33). The main objective of the protocol was to safeguard against unconstitutional takeover of political power in any country in the sub-region. Thus, the entrenchment of democracy in West African countries is important because its promote peace and development. Basically, Section 1, Article 1 of Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance established twelve core areas to which all member states must subscribe. These include: separation of powers between the executive, the legislative and judiciary; that accession to power must be made through free, fair and transparent elections; zero tolerance for unconstitutional change of power or maintenance of power by unconstitutional means; a political

armed forces; secularism and neutrality of the state in all matters relating to religion; freedom of the press among others (Alli, 2012: 33-34).

From the foregoing discussion, it is important to note that Nigeria was a signatory to all the Protocols and Treaties of ECOWAS. The country backed these initiatives on promotion of peace and security because of its commitment to sub-regional integration and development. It was on this basis that Nigeria's engagement in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire and other countries affected by conflict in West Africa can be understood and appreciated. In particular, the attempt by President Gbagbo to deny victory of Mr Allasane Ouattara during the 2010 presidential elections was strongly condemned by Nigeria because such action contradicted the above mentioned ECOWAS Protocols and treaties. Hence, Nigeria called for the ouster of Gbagbo since he was defeated by Ouattara in a free and fair election.

3.6.3: Spillover Effects of Conflicts in West Africa

Another factor that determines Nigeria role in conflict resolution in West Africa is the spillover effects of conflicts in the sub-region. Many conflict situations in West African countries normally generate the humanitarian problems of refugees, internal displacement of persons, exchange and proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) etc. It is in the efforts to prevent the spill over effects of conflicts in some West African countries on the security of the sub-region that Nigeria normally intervenes to resolve them. Based on this, Pogeson and Oshodi

(2015:208) aver that “the ongoing Cote d’Ivoire crisis has the capability to spill over into neighbouring countries owing to the ethnic spread in many countries in the region.” Nigeria’s engagement in Cote d’Ivoire could be said to be important. This is because of the nature of the conflict and that if it was allowed to continue without taking necessary actions it would affect the security of the whole West African sub-region.

When the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire was raging on, there was growing anxiety that it may constitute serious threat to Nigeria. This is because within a short time, there was the influx of about 16,000 refugees from Cote d’Ivoire to Ghana (Mu’azu, 2011). The fear was that if countries like Nigeria did not engage in conflict resolution in Cote d’Ivoire and they allow the conflict to spread, the problem of refugees would affect other West African countries. In a related development, when the violent conflict in Cote d’Ivoire reached a certain stage of uncontrollable violence, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) raised an alarm that both the crisis and the attendant effects of refugees may spill into Liberia (UNHCR, 2011). In particular, much as Nigeria was concerned about the dangers of conflict situation in Cote d’Ivoire, some of the immediate neighbours to the country, like Ghana, Burkina Fasso, Mali, Liberia etc had already witnessed some of the negative effects of the conflict. It is perhaps for this reason that Adetula (2005: 178) argues that “it is the conviction of the present

government in Nigeria to work toward ‘cooperation in building and strengthening sub-regional and capacities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict.’”

However, in another dimension, the interest of Nigeria and other countries in the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire was that it would not only affect its citizens but other foreign citizens residing in the country. It has become a common practice for responsible governments all over the world that when violent conflict is taking place in another country that they should quickly respond so as to avert humanitarian crisis. It is perhaps on this basis that Alli (2012: 15-16) maintains that:

Nevertheless, Nigeria’s role is determined by its interests which are strategic in nature. The interests are also linked to the fact that a sizeable number of its citizens reside in other African states. Nigeria is protecting the lives of her nationals anywhere as part of her defence policy objectives since regional crises impact directly on Nigeria and non Nigerians.

As it has been noted elsewhere, there were many Nigerian and other foreign citizens residing in Cote d’Ivoire for business transactions and other activities. In that case, they were directly or indirectly affected by the conflict in the country. This is because when the conflict intensified the disputants or warring groups to the conflict also targeted for attacks foreign nationals. Throughout the period that the conflict lasted many foreign nationals were forced to leave Cote d’Ivoire in

order to escape being lynched by mob actions. Based on this, Oluyemi-Kusa (2004: 289) maintains that “Cote d’Ivoire, for the first time in its history, is showing less tolerance to immigrants from neighbouring West African States.”

Just as the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire resulted into serious hardship to the individual citizens, foreigners were also greatly affected. Some foreign citizens were killed and in some cases their property destroyed during the conflict. It was under such condition that many foreigners, Nigerians included fled Cote d’Ivoire for the safety of their lives (Raji and Adebayo, 2009: 145).

Undoubtedly, the manner in which Nigeria has been responding to the settlement of conflict in other countries in West Africa not only help to restore peace but also help to safeguard the lives of Nigerian nationals from danger in the affected places. Based on this, Ashiru (2014: 6) avers that “with over 3 million Nigerians, the intervention in Cote d’Ivoire was in our national interest.” With the settlement of Ivorian conflict, some Nigerian businessmen have been courageous to relocate to the country. Therefore, more than anything else, the intervention of Nigeria in resolving external conflicts in West Africa and elsewhere also stands to benefits Nigerians residing in those countries.

3.6.4: Historical Experience/ Colonial Legacy as a Factor in Nigeria's Role in Conflict Resolution

Many countries in West Africa and indeed other parts of Africa share certain common historical experiences in three stages of their existence i.e pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods (Akinyemi, 1989). During the pre-colonial period, most African societies were co-habiting with each other. In addition, at that material time in point, they had developed relations on the economic, political, diplomatic and socio-cultural level (Fage, 2002). Although there were differences in languages among the people in separate communities, yet there were some similarities in their cultural outlook. These brought about cultural affinity and in some cases internecine wars among the people of different backgrounds.

The second stage was the period of colonialism, in which the majority of African countries witnessed foreign rule and domination. One of the devastating effects of colonialism was that it succeeded in separating people of the same cultural background into different countries and at the same time brought together people of different identities into one country. This later generates tension and instability in some of these countries. It was the nature of the composition of most African countries that has been responsible for the spates of conflicts that are witnessed in the continent today.

The third and final stage is the post-colonial period. In the decade of 1960s, many African countries emerged as newly independent nation-states in the globe. Therefore, the challenges before the post-independent African countries were how to tackle the problems of nation-building, underdevelopment, poverty, diseases etc. It was in the view of many African intellectuals and statesmen that these onerous tasks require the efforts of Africans themselves to solve. These problems were partly created by the colonialists. In an effort to tackle some of the challenges bequeathed to African states by the erstwhile colonialists, Nigeria's leaders since independence took it as their responsibilities to make necessary contributions toward addressing them. Based on this, one of the objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy since independence was to eradicate all forms of foreign domination from African continent. To that extent, Nigeria saw that a problem in any African country is part of the problem that the country should render a helping hand to resolve.

With regards to Nigeria's intervention in some West African countries, it can be adduced that historical experience or colonial legacy serves as an important factor that prompt the Nigerian leaders to intervene in order to settle conflicts and restore normalcy to the crises-prone states. It is believed in certain quarters that Nigeria's security is tied to that of other African countries because of cultural and historical experiences (Alli, 2012). Therefore, Nigeria has been intervening in the settlement

of conflicts in some African countries as a means of providing ‘African solution to an African problem.’ This became necessary so as to reduce the influence of foreign interference in African affairs. To attain this lofty goal, Nigeria needs to ensure that sub-regional interests are not left in the hands of outsiders (Ogunsanwo, 2012).

In another dimension, although good neighbourliness is one of the foreign policy principles of Nigeria in Africa, its adoption and application can be linked to historical factor. Based on this, Tijani (2010: 195) maintains that “Nigeria’s good neighbourly diplomatic posture is at once the product of historical affinity with its neighbours which by centuries had predated the colonially derived, disingenuously drawn boundaries.” Nigeria has taken it upon itself to resolve conflicts in West African countries as a means of ensuring the collective security of its immediate neighbours (Fage, 2002). Thus, the foreign policy of good neighbourliness as well as the need to be brother’s keepers has no doubt prompted Nigeria to intervene in resolving crises in some West African countries. The main aim was to restore peace and political stability in the sub-region.

3.7: CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it can be said that the genesis of the crisis in Cote d’Ivoire can be traced to colonialism and its manipulative tendencies. The creation of artificial boundaries in African countries by the colonialists only succeeded in reawakening

ethnic consciousness among the people of diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds. Therefore, it can be argued that the use of primordial attachments of ethnicity, religion, region etc in fueling political crisis in Cote d'Ivoire were typical of political practices in many African countries. Resort to ethnicity and religion in political relationships in Cote d'Ivoire brought about wanton loss of lives and destruction of property for a period of nearly a decade. Thus, the internal security problem in Cote d'Ivoire led to breakdown of law and order. It was when the humanitarian crisis in Cote d'Ivoire became worse and unbearable that the members of the international community took it as their responsibility to get involved in the mediation processes that led to the signing of series of peace agreements between the government and rebel groups.

Nigeria showed some level of support to the various peace agreements in order to end the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. The kind of support that Nigeria gave in the series of negotiations toward the resolution of conflict in Cote d'Ivoire is an indication of its commitment to peace in West Africa. In addition, Nigeria had to send its troops as part of military observer mission in Cote d'Ivoire to enforce peace in the country. Therefore, it can be argued that Nigeria supported the use of force by the UN to remove President Gbagbo from office simply because the former Ivorian President made a change of government so difficult. Nigeria's position on the Ivorian crises was also supported by the majority of ECOWAS

members so as to restore peace and order to the country. It is on this basis that Nigeria can be considered to be an important player in the resolution of conflicts in the West African sub-region.

Also, it can be said that the Nigeria's foreign policy of intervention in the settlement of conflict in West African countries has been influenced by the changing international environment. Externally, Nigeria's participation in peacekeeping operations in West Africa and around the world can be said to be conditioned by the fact that the country is a member of different international organisations that are committed to the promotion of international peace and security. It is common knowledge to the observers of international events that Nigeria has always been keenly interested in the promotion of global peace and security. As such, at the prompting of these international bodies, Nigeria normally contributes troops for peacekeeping operations in trouble spots around the world in general and Africa in particular.

In addition, the role of conflict resolution in abroad has been undertaken by Nigeria's political leaders largely because there is strong domestic base to support it. For all practical purposes, the effectiveness of a country's foreign policy depends on the ability of its leaders to deploy its capability. Therefore, Nigeria needs to always demonstrate its ability to lead other West African countries in finding solutions to their problems. Based on this, it can be stated that Nigeria

cannot afford to wait and see that conflict in countries like Cote d'Ivoire degenerate. This is essentially because Nigeria has all the capability needed to contribute towards the settlement of the crises in Cote d'Ivoire. In specific, Nigeria has the democratic institutions, military, infrastructures etc to deploy in the settlement of crises in Cote d'Ivoire and elsewhere in West Africa.

CHAPTER FOUR

NIGERIA'S ENGAGEMENT IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN COTE D'IVOIRE

4.0: INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the issues bordering on Nigeria's national interests in its engagement in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire. In every Nigeria's effort towards conflict resolution exercise in another country, there must be certain motives behind it. It is through the appreciation of the motives behind Nigeria's engagement in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire that one can be able to determine the success or otherwise of the exercise. Essentially, Nigeria's engagement in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire is significant in demonstrating the element of continuity in the country's foreign policy. Since the 1990s, Nigeria's conflict resolution role in West African countries has been taking different shapes and dimensions. Nigeria's engagement in Cote d'Ivoire was unique. This is because it was through the concerted efforts of Nigeria and other members of the international community that mediated the political crises in Cote d'Ivoire that peace, order and stability were restored to the country.

4.1: NIGERIA'S INTERVENTION IN COTE D'IVOIRE

Nigeria was instrumental in the creation of ECOWAS in 1975. Under the auspices of ECOWAS Nigeria has taken the lead in conflict resolution in several West African countries. In the specific case of Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria had worked in concert with other members of the international community to resolve the crises in the country. Since the start of the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire in 2002 the country was enmeshed in political instability. This pushed Nigeria to get involved in the series of negotiations to resolve it. In addition, in 2010 an election crisis took place in Cote d'Ivoire leading to breakdown of law and order and that culminated into the killing of individuals and destruction of property. Thereafter, Nigeria demonstrated leadership role in West Africa by working with members of the international community to do something about the situation in Cote d'Ivoire. During the ensuing crises, Nigeria as the chair of the ECOWAS mobilised the member countries of the organisation and the international community to ensure that the political crisis in Cote d'Ivoire was resolved.

A number of suggestions have been advanced or adduced to explain the involvement of Nigeria in the resolution of the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire. For instance, Nigeria's intervention in the Ivorian crises can be said to be appropriate and timely due to its complexity. Even then Nigeria had been cautious to intervene in the conflict but the country has a lot at stake considering the large number of its

citizens living in Cote d'Ivoire (Alli, 2006b). In this regard, Nigeria had to explore all the available necessary avenues in order to contribute to the resolution of the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. Based on this, Ibn Chambas (2005:21) stresses that "President Obasanjo has been untiring in his efforts in search of durable peace: be it in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau or more recently in Cote d'Ivoire." In the specific case of Cote d'Ivoire the intervention of Nigeria and other members of the international community during the first conflict made the warring factions to achieve ceasefire agreements. These led to the fixing of presidential election in 2010 in Cote d'Ivoire.

As the outcome of the result of 2010 Presidential election brought about renewed violence in Cote d'Ivoire the attention of Nigeria and other members of the international community were once again drawn to resolve the problem. It is on this instance that Lokoson (2014: 410) maintains that "the post-election crisis in Cote d'Ivoire presented a new dimension to conflict resolution in the continent which required a robust approach by key actors in the region. Nigeria led the diplomatic efforts to resolve the impasse." This implies that Nigeria as an important player in West African affairs the leadership in the country felt that it was important to contribute towards the restoration of peace and order in Cote d'Ivoire.

It was the concern for the destabilising effects or dismemberment of some countries affected by conflicts made Nigeria to resolve them. The tenacity of Nigeria in seeking the practical means of resolving the Ivorian conflict can be seen as a right step towards the right direction. It was on this basis that Adetula (2013: 216-17) maintains that

The resolution of many ranging conflicts on the continent of Africa is an important element in Nigeria's diplomacy. Nigeria sponsored resolutions 1962 (2011) and 1975 (2011), which ended the Ivory Coast conflict, worked for political and economic stability in Guinea Bissau through UN Office in West Africa (UNOWA), also the and renewal of the UN Integrated Peace Building Office in Guinea Bissau (UNIOGBIS). Nigeria has used the platform of the UN to solicit for an 'African solution' to conflicts in Africa.

The above statement indicates that the most effective means of resolving African problems is when Africans themselves decide to take charge and control their own affairs. This is where Nigeria has continued to play relevant role by always showing concern to the issues of peace and security in the continent of Africa generally. Nigeria's quick response to conflict situations in Africa is meant to carry other African countries along in improving the security of the continent. This is because security and stability are essential ingredients for development to thrive.

Similarly, Bakut (Interview, 2014) suggests that the Nigeria's intervention in resolving the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire was a necessary step in maintaining peace in the country. According to him, the Nigeria's foreign policy is based on Africa

as the centre piece. Therefore, anything that happens to any African country, it is in Nigeria's interest to intervene particularly with Nigeria's ambition of becoming one of the permanent representatives of Africa in the United Nations Security Council. For him, it is part of the concern of Nigeria to pursue the foreign policy of peace in West Africa. He adds that Cote d'Ivoire is in West Africa just like Nigeria and whatever conflict that happens to Cote d'Ivoire will have some impacts on Nigeria.

It is a matter of fact that if there is a crisis in any country, it is first the responsibility of the sub-regional organisation to act before other members of the international community get involved in resolving it. In the West African sub-region, Nigeria has been playing a leading role in resolving crises in other countries. Indeed, most of the ECOWAS initiatives on peace and security as well as other issues can be said to emanate from Nigeria. Even in some cases if they are not from Nigeria, they need the support of Nigeria to succeed. Based on this, Okpara (Interview, 2014) argues that Nigeria is not only a sub-regional leader in West Africa but that the country is also a regional leader in the continent. For him, as crisis brewed in Cote d'Ivoire it was important for Nigeria to quickly intervene so as to restore peace to the country.

Significantly, in situation where Nigeria moves to assist in resolving crises in African countries, it is doing that based on the notion that the country is a key

leader in piloting the affairs of black race due to its size and population (Okpara, interview, 2014). Okpara further cites the justification for Nigeria's involvement in the settlement of crisis in Cote d'Ivoire by stating that they are our brothers and neighbours. In addition to this, in making reference to the role Nigeria was expected to play in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire and other West African countries, Ogunsanwo (2012: 122) argues that "proceeding from the perspective of the concentric circles, our immediate neighbours should be of concern to us. Their internal stability, progress, growth, good governance must continue to be seen as part of our primary interests." This means that it is vital that Nigeria should continue to see the stability in West Africa as being directly or indirectly connected to that of this country.

On his part, Okereke (Interview, 2014) maintains that certainly, Nigeria had some reasons to engage in Cote d'Ivoire but not unilaterally but as a part of the multilateral peacekeeping engagement with support from the African Union and the international community. The benefit that is derivable when many countries under the umbrella of an international organisation come together to resolve conflict situation is that consensus is normally reached by member states before taking actions on issues. Also, in multilateralism no single nation will be blamed by a party or group to a conflict for any action taken to resolve the conflict.

In another perspective, Okereke sees regional economic community, especially the ECOWAS as the first contact point in resolving crisis in any member state. Accordingly, he maintains that Nigeria being the prime mover in ECOWAS was required to rally round ECOWAS members to find peaceful resolution of the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire (Okereke, interview, 2014). The resolution of political logjam like the one in Cote d'Ivoire inevitably requires the presence of international mediators to settle the warring factions. Nigeria, as the Chair of ECOWAS worked together with AU and UN to put pressure on President Gbagbo to cede power to the winner of the presidential election, Mr Ouattara (Zanna, interview, 2014; Sunsuwa, interview, 2014). The combined efforts of members of the international community to remove Gbagbo from office were significant in restoring peace and democracy to Cote d'Ivoire.

Where a state is no longer positioned for the protection of its citizens as well as social provisioning, such a state is collapsing or failing. Looking at the situation in Cote d'Ivoire from the perspective of preventive diplomacy, it was seen that Nigeria's engagement in conflict resolution or peacekeeping had helped to restore peace and order to the country (Ubi, interview, 2014). It is always cost effective to prevent the escalation of conflict into large scale violence either at domestic or international level. This is essentially because when a conflict is curtailed at the initial stages a lot of damages and casualties would be avoided. In a related

development, Alozieuwa (Interview, 2014) remarks that Nigeria's intervention in the settlement of conflicts in other countries either within the framework of ECOWAS or AU or UN is being acknowledged today. For him, the efforts of Nigeria and that of members of the international community were quite obvious and decisive in returning normalcy to Cote d'Ivoire.

According to Agbu (Interview, 2014) Nigeria has always had the disposition to work with other countries to settle conflicts in some African countries. Nigeria had shown commitment to the settlement of conflicts in Cote d'Ivoire and some African states simply to prevent humanitarian crises. Nigeria's engagement in Cote d'Ivoire was important so as to avert further chaos and bloodshed. Over the years, the dominant perspective is that the Nigeria's foreign policy is anchored on assisting African countries in need. Based on this, Kuna (2005: 4) argues that "an analysis of the role Nigeria has played in conflict management within and outside Africa must necessarily be situated historically and within the context of its foreign policy objectives." This shows that Nigeria cannot afford to be unlooker and allowed conflicts to destabilise any country in Africa.

In another development, Sanda (Interview, 2014) maintains that "Nigeria intervened in Cote d'Ivoire because she is a member of the United Nations. The country has not shied away in the UN peacekeeping operations in Africa and around the world." This implies that Nigeria has been fulfilling its obligations

under the UN to maintain international peace. Indeed, since independence Nigeria has the admirable record of sending troops to peacekeeping operations organised by such international bodies like the UN, AU and ECOWAS in different trouble spots in Africa and the world at large. Furthermore, Sanda (Interview, 2014) stresses that “Nigeria intervened in Cote d’Ivoire because it was interested in peace and security in its neighbourhood. This is a major plank of Nigeria’s foreign policy.” This shows that the matter of security in West Africa is paramount to Nigeria foreign policy. Therefore, it can be said that if not for Nigeria some countries in West Africa would have been battling internal insecurity as a result of conflicts of different dimensions.

Given the circumstance and the complexities of the crises in Cote d’Ivoire, Haruna (Interview, 2014) suggests that in order to avoid a situation of getting into a very long drawn war and to take side, it was essential that Nigeria had to work with other countries in its intervention in Cote d’Ivoire. For him, Nigeria cannot go unilaterally and deploy military capability for either regime protection or change. Specifically, Haruna maintains that the main purpose of Nigeria’s intervention in Cote d’Ivoire was to ensure that peace was restored back to the country.

4.2: NIGERIA AND THE PROTECTION OF STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN COTE D'IVOIRE

Basically, writers and experts in the field of international relations have established the connection or linkage between domestic environment of a state and external environment or forces in its interactions in the international system. Nigeria's security interests are attached to the prevailing security situation of its immediate neighbours. It is perhaps on this basis that Alli (2010b: 221) avers that "the key interest of states in the international arena which determine the content of foreign policy include the achievement of security, socio-economic welfare and power. These interests are always presented as national interests." Thus, it is important for Nigeria to always assist in protecting the security of African countries. As such, the stability of other African countries is in Nigeria's interests of continuous survival.

It is a fact that West Africa is increasingly becoming threatened by series of political crises. Over the years, Nigeria has been concerned with the security matters in West African sub-region for a number of strategic reasons. Based on this, Yoroms (n.d: 90) avers that:

... Nigeria has its geo-strategic interests in the West African sub-region. The security of the region is tied to Nigeria's geo-strategic (security) interest. Hence, whatever happens in the sub-region definitely affects Nigeria's economy, security, politics and foreign policy. Although Nigeria's domestic economy is too

overstretched to take care of the regional concerns, nevertheless Nigeria's domestic interests are tied up to her regional security interests. To meet these challenges, peace and security in Liberia, and indeed the entire sub-region, are paramount.

From the above, it can be said that the contribution of Nigerian troops to peacekeeping operations in West Africa is indispensable. There is no doubt that Nigeria is interested in the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. These have not only been embedded in the principles of Nigeria's foreign policy but have received practical demonstration in the country's international interactions. Based on this, Dokubo and Joseph (2011: 574) put forward that "since independence, Nigeria has accepted the UN as an important multilateral pivot, through which she could contribute to international peace and security." Certainly, Nigeria commands respects based on its activities in the world body. The country has been assisting the UN in various ways in building peace in trouble areas in West Africa. Through this effort, Nigeria is also benefitting in enhancing its own security interests.

Therefore, for a state to maintain and enhance its security posture in the international environment, it has to develop certain strategic plans on contingency matters. Based on this, Bassey (2010: 265) maintains that "the protection of the vital interests of a state (in terms of its core and context-specific values) is critical to its security calculation, discourse and planning in the contemporary global system." As such, the security of a state must take into cognisance the ability to

manage and control threats both from within and without. In an elaborate discussion on Nigeria security interest in West Africa, Alli (2012: 7) maintains that:

Nigeria's approach to sub-regional security has been largely influenced by the national role conceived for it in international relations by its leaders. This role conception has become the defining paradigm for foreign policy engagement. According to this paradigm, Nigeria is the "natural leader" of Africa with a "manifest destiny" and even with responsibility to promote and protect the interests of Africa and black people everywhere in all ramifications. They also believe that the country's security is tied to that of other African states because of cultural and historical experiences, and because of transnational security issues which are defined by the way in which the security of a nation is affected by what happens in contiguous countries around its neighbourhood.

The statement above implies that it is in Nigeria's interest to respond to the security challenges in neighbouring countries in West Africa in particular and Africa in general. Basically, Nigeria has been pursuing the role of settlement of conflict and peace building process in West Africa by sending its troops to the affected countries. The country has been expending both material and non-material resources to secure West African countries. Therefore, it has been further recognised by Alli (2012: 11) that "geo-strategic and endowment advantages give Nigeria a leadership role in West African security policy."

Obviously, for Nigeria to be internally secured, it must show adequate commitment to the security as well as protection of neighbouring countries. This can be attained through the mechanism of cooperation with other countries in

tackling threats to peace in the neighbourhood. It is on this basis that Kuna (2005: 6) argues that “Nigeria’s effort at peace building has been predicated principally on the pursuit of domestic security through the promotion of peaceful relations between herself and neighbours and between neighbours themselves.” This implies that the survival of neighbouring countries is inextricably linked to the survival of Nigeria. Based on this, it can be said that it is in Nigeria’s interest to champion the mobilisation of other countries towards the settlement of conflicts that frequently occur in West Africa in particular and Africa in general.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Document (2013a:4) highlights the role of Nigeria in ECOWAS thus “Nigeria has consistently played a leading role in the sub-region, in the maintenance of peace and security. Nigeria has taken it upon herself to see that there is peace and tranquillity in the sub-region.” This signifies that the role of Nigeria in conflict resolution in West Africa is central and unparalleled. It is unparalleled because Nigeria has the entire necessary wherewithal to resolve conflict in West Africa. Also, due to its strategic position the country can be said to be a pivot state in the task of promotion of peace and security in the West African sub-region.

The issues of maintaining peace and security in West Africa have been placed on an important level in Nigeria’s foreign policy. According to Sanda (Interview, 2014) “Nigeria was interested in peace and security in Cote d’Ivoire and other

neighbouring countries so as to enhance its own security.” Over the years, Nigeria’s involvement in the settlement of protracted conflict in other countries in West Africa is seen as a means of halting a drift to anarchy or disorder within the sub-region. Based on this, Eze (2010: 85) posits that:

The emergence of conflict issues in the West African sub-region had to be taken into cognisance in operationalising our foreign policy. To that extent the government came with concentric circle paradigm. The concentric circle paradigm refers to the operational environment of a country’s foreign policy. For Nigeria there are three circles. The inner circle refers to Nigeria, the middle circle refers to our neighbours while the third circle refers to Africa and the rest of the world.

This means that the concern by Nigeria on security matters both at domestic and international levels would ensure the protection of the country from threats. Thus, Nigeria must always be at alert to ensure that peace prevails throughout West Africa. By implication, if Nigeria’s neighbours are in peace then Nigeria will also rest and vice versa. It was the concern about the spill-over effects of conflict situations in West African countries that usually prompt the attention of Nigeria to immediately and quickly move in and resolve them. In this regard, Oche (2010: 170) states that “Nigeria has experienced effects of conflict spillover from Chad thereby emphasising the importance of containing and resolving neighbouring disputes.”

Strategically, Nigeria should be able to engage externally through the promotion of peace and security. By rendering assistance to contain and curtail conflicts in

neighbouring countries, Nigeria will also be enlarging the chances for its own security survival. It is perhaps on the basis of this notion that Okereke (Interview, 2014) maintains that the promotion of peace in Cote d'Ivoire is of strategic interest to Nigeria. This is because if the conflict was not controlled it would spread to neighbouring countries in the sub-region. In Cote d'Ivoire, it took the concerted efforts of Nigeria and some members of the international community to work together and find solution to the protracted political crisis before it was brought to an end.

Based on this, Okereke (Interview, 2014) further stresses that Nigeria's engagement externally in this peace process in Cote d'Ivoire was part of the country's credential which it's flaunt in her quest for a permanent seat of the United Nations Security Council. For him, Nigeria is seen as one of the leading nations that are committed to peace and at a point it is the fifth highest troop contributing country to the United Nations peace support operations around the world.

Nigeria's contribution to the UN peacekeeping operations in all parts of the world is remarkable. This is because the resolution of different conflicts in West Africa has never eluded the foreign policy calculation of Nigeria's political leaders. Therefore, the role of Nigeria in the settlement of conflicts in West Africa can be said to be contributing to the peaceful co-existence in the sub-region.

Accordingly, Okereke suggests that stability in Cote d'Ivoire meant much to stability in West Africa. This is because as there was crisis in Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana would not rest as well as other neighbouring countries in the region (Okereke, interview, 2014). It is perhaps for this reason that Nigeria's intervention in Cote d'Ivoire can be considered as part of efforts aimed at safeguarding its strategic interests. Therefore, it can be said that Nigeria is central or key to the stability of the West African sub- region through its numerous peace initiatives.

Since some internal conflicts in West Africa are fuelled by foreign powers, it is in Nigeria's security interest to curtail or reduce the influence of foreign powerful forces in the West African Sub-region. Thus, the intervention of Nigeria in conflict resolution in countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau etc was partly informed by the need to reduce external meddling into West Africa affairs. It is perhaps on this basis that Bassey and Nyong (2012: 279) maintains that:

As a driving power in the subregion, Nigeria's policy planners had an expressed objective of enhancing its economic and security interests through ECOWAS for the transformation of prevailing regional neo-colonial structures and power relations. The emergence of Nigeria as the regional power centre around which indigineous interests can coalesce in relative security will inevitably expedite the entrenchment of the French commonwealth and progressive development of autonomous systems of power in the "new sovereign region."

The above signifies that it is important for Nigeria and other West African countries to cooperate in developing security framework that would promote self

reliance on security matters in the sub-region. Certainly, Nigeria cannot afford to neglect the security challenges that internal political conflicts in some West African countries have been generating. It is imperative that Nigeria should engage in those countries so as avert destabilisation in the entire sub region. The decreasing presence of Western powers in West African humanitarian crises has made Nigeria to be playing dominant role in tackling security problems in the sub region. Based on this, one of the leading Africanist scholars, Alli Mazrui asserts that “in the 21st century, France will be withdrawing from West Africa as she gets increasingly involved in the affairs of Europe. France’s West African sphere of influence will be filled by Nigeria-a more natural hegemonic power” (cited in Dokubo, 2001: 201).

The above statement is apt in the sense that it partly explains the reason why Nigeria was able to engage in conflict resolution in Cote d’Ivoire from 2002 to 2011. Thus, the intensification of efforts by France to pursue dynamic role in the global affairs has made it possible and convenient for the country to work in concert with Nigeria and other members of the international community to resolve the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire. In spite of the commitment of Nigeria to enhance the security posture of its neighbours through constant engagements, some countries in West African sub-region are still bedevilled by conflicts. It is on the basis of the need to reverse the ugly trend of insecurity in West Africa that Golwa (2010: 131)

avers that “it has remained an issue of debate by scholars for Nigeria to redefine its strategic interest as regards her huge investment on the management of security in the sub-region.” Since the matter of security is all encompassing Nigeria’s efforts towards averting threats in West Africa is supposed to be total and comprehensive. This implies that the security situation in West Africa is inextricably linked to Nigeria’s security concern.

Over the years, successive Nigerian leaders have attached much importance on the need to address security challenges in West Africa. To this end, Nigeria has considered the problems of insecurity in some neighbouring countries as part of the problems that the country ought to render assistance in resolving. It is perhaps for this reasons that Nigeria normally feels compel to help in resolving political crises in West African countries. Based on this, Ogunsanwo (2012:123-124) argues that:

Just as we want progress, stability and development in Nigeria, our ECOWAS brothers and sisters pray for the same. The challenge for Nigeria in the future is how to ensure that sub-regional interests are not subordinated to the will and wishes of outsiders, whether an African tin god like Muammar Ghadaffi in whose deep financial pocket many African leaders found themselves or former colonial powers who still attach importance to the old concept of the spheres of influence.

From the above, it can be discerned that security issue is related to development. Therefore, for Nigeria and other countries in West Africa to achieve the lofty goals of economic cooperation, integration and development in West Africa the

security situation in the sub-region is supposed to be taken care of and improved. In this regard, Nigeria being the most populous country in the sub-region can be said to be in a better position to address the myriads of problems posing threat to peace in West Africa. It is in line with this thinking that Yoroms (n.d: 88) avers that “Nigeria has a leadership role in ECOWAS. It must be seen to be demonstrating this in West Africa. Following the Liberian crisis, Nigeria has for the past 15 years forged a peaceful coexistence in the region.” Generally, it is believed in certain circles that the intervention of Nigeria to resolve conflicts in some West African countries is informed by the need for the country to play a vibrant role in securing its sphere of influence.

4.3: ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES OF NIGERIA’S ENGAGEMENT IN COTE D’IVOIRE

It is pertinent to note that the idea of achieving economic integration and cooperation in West Africa was championed by Nigeria and Togo (Asobie, 2010). Since the creation of the common market in 1975, Nigeria has been showing commitments to the sub-regional economic grouping. Nigeria has been providing both material and non material resources to support and sustain the programmes of ECOWAS. It is perhaps on this basis that Ibn Chambas (2005:20-21) maintains that:

The special role of Nigeria in our integration process can be seen both in the history of ECOWAS and in the very size and resources that this country is endowed with. The size of Nigeria, its population, geographical spread and her human resource potential makes her strategic Member State in our region; a member destined to play a pivotal role. What happens in Nigeria is therefore of keen interest to the rest of the ECOWAS Community.

Essentially, the formation of ECOWAS was aimed at addressing the fundamental problem of underdevelopment among West African states. Also, the aim of ECOWAS was to boost trade and other economic activities among the member states. The eruption of political crises in some member states of ECOWAS has necessitated the intervention of Nigeria to resolve them. Nigeria realises that economic integration and development cannot take place under the condition of incessant insecurity. This is because according to Nwoke (2005b: 134) “the maintenance of peace, security and stability is imperative for attaining sub-regional cooperation and integration.”

Threats to security at sub-regional level can be counter productive to the process of economic development. To the extent that internal political conflict in one of the member states of ECOWAS can have adverse socio-economic effects on the entire or other members of the body calls for urgent attention and action. For instance, Bassey and Nyong (2012: 287) aver that:

The current crisis in Cote d’Ivoire has been dysfunctional to policy coordination not only in ECOWAS but also in the Francophone West African Economic and Monetary Union

(UEMOA) particularly because Cote d'Ivoire commands about 40 per cent of UEMOA's GDP.

The intervention of Nigeria in Cote d'Ivoire was motivated not only by the need to promote peace but help create the necessary stability for economic development to thrive in the entire West Africa. This is because the crises in Cote d'Ivoire had in one way or the other affected business activities in some West African states. In trying to explain the importance of Cote d'Ivoire to the Nigerian economy, Zanna (Interview, 2014) maintains "Cote d'Ivoire is an important market for Nigeria's business interests." Furthermore, Zanna maintains that prior to the Ivorian political crisis, Cote d'Ivoire was the acknowledged leader and wealthiest of the Francophone West African countries. For him, Cote d'Ivoire was also important as a trading partner with most ECOWAS countries.

From the above, it can be discerned that the Nigeria's engagement in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire was necessary so as to prevent the disruption of economic activities like trade, investment etc between the citizens of the two countries on one hand and other West African countries on the other. This is because given the economic importance of Cote d'Ivoire in West Africa the much needed economic integration in the region could only be achieved in an atmosphere of peace. Therefore, it can be said that the role of Nigeria in promoting peace in West African sub-region is very paramount for economic

development to thrive. It is on the basis of this that Ogunsanwo (2012: 123) argues that:

There is no doubt that the issue or problem of identity which up to this moment has constituted an insurmountable obstacle to Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire will still be around but in different and hopefully manageable proportion. This is one of the reasons why the integration process in the ECOWAS subregion needs to be pursued more vigorously, Nigeria of course being aware of the apprehension her sheer size causes in the subregion.

Nigeria, besides ensuring the maintenance of peace, security and concord in the sub-region, it is also providing necessary conducive atmosphere where trade within the sub-region can be encouraged or increased. It is perhaps for this reason that Agubuzu (2010: 368) suggests that “through ECOWAS which is growing from strength to strength Nigeria is positioned to play a critical role in continental integration in the next half century.” This shows that there are immense benefits to be gained by Nigeria in promoting sub-regional economic cooperation.

Basically, the search for economic development in a country or region depends largely on the prevalence of peace and security both from within and without. Therefore, the concern about the challenges to security of West African countries has been the main preoccupation of Nigeria in its quest to enhance economic integration. Based on this, Alli (2012: 77) argues that “Nigeria really has no choice but to invest its resources in the ECOWAS integration project generally and in the West African security in particular because they are tied together.”

This signifies that Nigeria's participation in conflict resolution in West Africa can help to promote economic prosperity in the sub-region. In addition, it is by deepening integration process in ECOWAS that the dependency of the countries in the sub-region on Western nations could be reduced. Based on this, Fage (1995:3) argues that:

Nigeria's vigorous campaign for regional economic integration is informed by two interrelated objectives: the desire to exert Nigeria's "predestined" leadership role in Africa in accord with Pan Africanist sentiment and the desire to undermine or erode French residual influence in the subregion.

Obviously, the task of achieving economic integration in a sub-region requires that certain policies are put in place so as to enhance favourable trade relations among member countries. Nigeria can be said to be committed to ECOWAS protocols on trade as a means of boosting trade relations with individual member states. It is on this basis that Orevba (Interview, 2014) states that Nigeria is committed to the execution of ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS) which is now the bedrock of the region's economic vision. It is through adherence to the principle of free movement of people and goods by countries in West Africa that economic activities can be boosted. Therefore, Orevba further maintains that the Common External Tariff has just been concluded where Tariff is harmonised against goods coming from the third states. Similarly, in acknowledging the central place of Nigeria in the ECOWAS integration process, Ibn Chambas (2005:22-23) remarks that:

Nigeria must lead the way in implementing and giving meaning to the ECOWAS Protocols on free movement of persons, goods, services and capital. Our goal of achieving a borderless West Africa can only be realised if our peoples are able to freely move about in West Africa as our fore-parents did before colonialism brought about the existing boundaries.

Significantly, Nigeria's engagement in Cote d'Ivoire was meant to promote peace so that business activities can continue to thrive between the country and other countries in the sub-region. Under the condition of peace in West Africa, the idea behind free movement of goods and people can be achieved in the sub-region. Obviously, the free movement of goods and people across different geographical boundaries in West Africa is imperative for economic integration and development to take place.

For quite a long time, the citizens of Nigeria and other West African countries have been engaging in free movements within the sub-region to settle and transact business. In the case of Cote d'Ivoire, there are about 2-3 million Nigerians living in the country (Ashiru, 2014). Certainly, the economic activities of Nigerian citizens must have been taken into consideration in Nigeria's engagement in Cote d'Ivoire. This is because if the crises in Cote d'Ivoire were allowed to linger for long period the Nigerian citizens would be affected in several ways. It has been documented that the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire even led to a situation where some Nigerian nationals were forced to leave the country for safety of their lives and property (Raji and Adebayo, 2009).

In another perspective, it can be said that the need to salvage the ECOWAS was the motivating reason for Nigeria to intervene in Cote d'Ivoire. This is because the emphasis in Nigeria's foreign policy has shifted towards economic diplomacy and the quest for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Based on this, Haruna (Interview, 2014) maintains that in the ECOWAS sub-region, Cote d'Ivoire is one of the significant economic hubs in West Africa. The push for the attraction of foreign investors to come and invest in the economies of West Africa requires that peace prevails in these countries. Also, the existence of economic policies that will further the integration process is necessary for development to take place in West Africa. Based on this, Oche (2010: 357) avers that:

With regards to foreign policy, perhaps the greatest challenge facing Nigeria with respect to West African regionalism is to ensure that ECOWAS succeeds as a unifying integrative force in West Africa. To this end, attention should be focused on the primary objective of the organisation, particularly now that the region is becoming relatively peaceful having almost surmounted the security problem engendered by the various civil wars that afflicted the region. Given the fact that there is no better alternative to the development of West African economies than through regional economic integration Nigeria and other ECOWAS members should unflinchingly support the organisation in order to enable it realise its fundamental goals and fulfil its noble commitment towards the establishment of Afrian Economic Community (AEC).

On a general note, it can be said that Nigeria's engagement in conflict resolution in West Africa was directed at creating an environment for peace to thrive. It is common knowledge that the prevalence of peace is essential for business transactions and economic activities to progress. Therefore, it could be stated that

the expenditure of huge resources by Nigeria on peace mission in West Africa would benefit the country both in the short and long runs.

4.4: NIGERIA AND EXTERNAL CHALLENGES IN RESOLVING THE IVORIAN CONFLICT

Generally, foreign policy practices or external orientations of a nation are bound to face with some challenges or constraints. This is essentially the case with Nigeria's foreign policy of settlement of crises in West African countries. Quite obviously this kind of foreign policy endeavour normally involves the expenditure of resources, time, and energy. In addition, it usually requires the deployment of military personnel or troops for peacekeeping operations. Therefore, the external challenges to Nigeria's engagement in Cote d'Ivoire can be looked at from the various limitations imposed by external forces in the process of resolving the conflict.

Even though it has been established that Nigeria did not do the work of settlement of crisis in Cote d'Ivoire unilaterally but due to the country's leadership role in West Africa a lot of responsibility is placed on it in the region. As it is well known, during the first conflict in Cote d'Ivoire that started in 2002, Nigeria was involved in the series of negotiations that led to the signing of ceasefire agreements between the various rebel factions and the government. Also, during

the time when electoral dispute erupted in 2010 that led to the second crisis in Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria was the Chair of the ECOWAS. Nigeria made use of that opportunity to champion most of the peace initiative processes by working with key international organisations to bring the conflict to an end.

Definitely, the Ivorian conflict had generated mixed feeling among West African and to a large extent African leaders. Different positions were taken by the leaders on how to resolve the crises. It was clear right from the beginning that Nigeria supported and got the support of some countries to back Ouattara, the winner of the presidential election. Throughout the period of the conflict Nigeria maintained this position. On the other hand, some other countries saw things differently and remained neutral or refused to back Ouattara. Accordingly, Onah (2011: 173) maintains that "throughout the Ivorian crisis, Gbagbo was supported by South Africa, as well as Angola, Zimbabwe and even Uganda. In the years of the cold war, these countries were in the socialist camp, a cause which Gbagbo espoused." Significantly, this implies that the basis for these countries to reject the position of Nigeria and other leading members of the international community was to protect an ally from losing power. As such, countries like South Africa did everything possible to oppose Nigeria's position on how to resolve the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire.

In another instance, Onah (2011: 173) maintains that some other countries especially Cote d'Ivoire's neighbours took the stance of anti-Gbagbo simply to protect their own interests. Thus according to him "for instance, a number of these countries, especially Cote d'Ivoire neighbours, were evidently less than altruistic in their positions and actions throughout the crisis. Some of them, like Burkina Fasso and Mali, obviously acted to protect their positions as the sources of most of the immigrants that were at the root of the trouble." This implies that while countries like Nigeria was supporting Ouattara mainly to restore peace and protect the sanctity of free and fair presidential election, some other countries like Burkina Fasso and Mali were backing Ouattara based on cultural affinity existing between those countries and northern part of Cote d'Ivoire.

When it became evidently clear that President Gbagbo was not willing to relinquish power after suffering defeat and Nigeria pushed for the use of force to remove him, there were certain countries in West Africa who surreptitiously supported him to hold on to power. Based on this, Oche (2011: 91) summarises the various positions of some of these African leaders and it is quoted in extenso:

There were some reservations among the West African leaders on the involvement of external actors in what would seem like a national issue. Both the Gambian President, Yahyah Jammeh, and former Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings had expressed reservations on the legality of the Commission's position to openly support the winner of the contested elections. President Jammeh had intentionally distanced himself from the ECOWAS position by not attending either of the summits on Cote d'Ivoire.

In a statement issued by his spokesman, Jammeh warned that ECOWAS had ignored the constitutional legality of Cote d'Ivoire's victory "because of pressure from some Western powers whose vested interests in the natural resources of Cote d'Ivoire is an open secret."

The above shows that lack of consensus among ECOWAS member states served as obstacle to peace process in Cote d'Ivoire. Even when some West African countries continued to back Gbagbo, Nigeria consistently called for his ouster from office after the outcome of the elections (Onah, 2011). It was based on this position that Nigeria canvassed and even supported the use of 'legitimate force' on Gbagbo's regime so as to end the conflict.

In another perspective, Lokoson (2014: 412-413) identifies three types of external challenges to Nigeria's role towards conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire. These include i) structural gaps in the AU Peace and Security Architecture, ii) external influence over member nations of ECOWAS and iii) limited capacity to implement conflict resolution mechanisms. According to him, structural gaps mean that the Nigeria's position to uphold the popular mandate of the people of Cote d'Ivoire was viewed differently by some other members of the AU. They saw the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire as a constitutional problem that required an internal resolution mechanism without the intervention of outsiders.

By external influence, it is meant that the events in Cote d'Ivoire exposed the problem of influence of major world actors in African affairs. Therefore, he says

that despite the agreement reached by the Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS) of ECOWAS to enforce the mandate of Ouattara, many member nations distanced themselves from the move to use force to remove Gbagbo from office, by citing insecurity of their citizens or nationals resident in Cote d'Ivoire as an excuse. In addition, some ECOWAS states were influenced by powerful external forces to oppose the use of military option in making Gbagbo to vacate office (Lokoson, 2014).

Finally, according to Lokoson, the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire highlighted the deficiency in capacity for conflict resolution in the AU and ECOWAS. For him, the institutions responsible for the peace and security mechanism in these bodies lacked adequate skilled manpower to appropriately manage the dynamics of the various regional and international interests that came to play in the conflict. It was for this reason that ECOWAS had to rely on the initiatives of other countries or bodies outside the sub-region on how to manage the conflict.

In another dimension, Okereke (Interview, 2014) suggests that even though some West African countries declined to back the use of force in Cote d'Ivoire there was some level of understanding among the members of ECOWAS to restore peace to the country. Therefore, Okereke states that at the heat of the moment when ECOWAS, AU and so on talked about military action or intervention in Cote d'Ivoire, former President Gbagbo took the election case to his country's

Supreme Court. The case was decided by the country's Supreme Court in favour of Gbagbo. This implies that since the Ivorian conflict had taken legal dimension the members of the international community suppose to apply caution in meddling into the internal affairs of the country.

Furthermore, Igwe (2013: 25) was critical of the position of the members of the international community for backing Ouattara. This is because according to him, President Gbagbo went to the Ivorian Supreme Court to challenge the victory of Ouattara, in which he (Gbagbo) was also confirmed as the winner of the said presidential election. Therefore, Igwe challenged the rush by members of the international community for supporting Mr Ouattara to assume power. In particular, Igwe maintains that Gbagbo was not in good relationship with France because he had wanted to withdraw Cote d'Ivoire from the French franc (CFA) currency zone. Thus, France was said to be against such policy proposal because any move by Cote d'Ivoire to backout of CFA zone will whittle down the economic and political influence of France in West Africa.

Basically, all the peace initiatives in Cote d'Ivoire were tabled and approved at the ECOWAS. Most ECOWAS members, such as Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Fasso, Togo, and Benin Republic etc were involved and supported the peace process in the country. While Ghana was said to maintain a neutral position, Gambia on the other hand was opposed to the peace initiatives (Onah, 2011).

However, at the level of AU, South Africa was said to subscribe to the idea that President Gbagbo should remain in office or that there should be power sharing arrangement in the country. For instance, President Jacob Zuma of South Africa did not take high profile decisions on Cote d'Ivoire but in reaction to the Nigerian government's request that the UNSC approve an AU military intervention, he responded by saying that "we need to do something to help the situation and don't demand that one leader should go" (cited in Oche, 2011: 92).

Similarly, former AU mediator in Cote d'Ivoire, Thabo Mbeki had also hinted or suggested that the AU and the international community were too quick to endorse Ouattara and stigmatise Gbagbo (Oche, 2011). However, the response of Nigeria to the purported power sharing arrangement formula in Cote d'Ivoire was clear as the country vehemently opposed to it. Based on this, Nigeria maintained that the victory of Ouattara was non-negotiable (Onah, 2011).

In the analysis of external challenges to Nigeria's engagement in conflict resolution, Alozieuwa (Interview, 2014) maintains that the challenge to Nigeria's foreign policy in West Africa is the lack of trust that Nigeria usually attracts from other African countries. According to him, some of them see Nigeria as a bully and that the country is seen as usually throwing its weight around. In addition, he states that there is Anglophone and Francophone dichotomy. That was there as the major challenging factor. For him, some of these French speaking West African

countries would always gravitate towards France on some important matters rather than to Nigeria. It is on this basis that Tijani (2010: 90) explains the reason behind the negative attitudes of neighbouring countries toward Nigeria. According to him:

It cannot be over emphasised that the attitude of the immediate neighbours to Nigeria cannot be unconnected with the disorientation they had suffered through their colonial domination of the colonial times, which is still being manipulated by their respective former colonial masters.

Certainly, the training that Africans received from the different colonial masters has affected the nature of their relations even after attaining independence. Therefore, as long as Nigeria's immediate neighbouring countries see themselves as belonging to the French speaking nations without consideration of African cultural affinity and historical legacies, the Nigeria's foreign policy in West Africa will continue to face challenges. Similarly, Alli (2012: 76-77) contends that:

At the sub-regional level, the main challenge which Nigeria faces in terms of its leadership role is the suspicion of other members of ECOWAS about its real intentions. There is the desire of other members to protect their national pride and the influence of extra-sub regional powers on some of the members to act in a certain way. Again and again some states question the legitimacy of Nigeria in sub-regional matters. Even some of the countries that have benefitted from Nigeria's sacrifices are not prepared to back Nigeria in critical situation.

The above indicates that the push by Nigeria to resolve conflicts in West Africa through ECOWAS has been affected by the negative attitudes of some countries in the sub-region. Of course the desire by Nigeria's neighbouring countries to

jealously safeguard their sovereignty has made some of them to prefer dealing with foreign powers or outsiders rather than Nigeria. This is because they normally entertain the fear that Nigeria may use its influence to dominate them both economically and politically in the sub-region.

4.5: INTERNAL REACTIONS TO NIGERIA'S ENGAGEMENT IN COTE D'IVOIRE

Since intervention in the settlement of conflicts abroad normally involves sending of troops and expenditure of economic resources, this would certainly attract some internal reactions. Looking at the whole issues of Nigeria's engagement in conflict resolution in West Africa, certain government policy choices have generated comments from both the academics and general public. In the first place, John Illife suggests that the difficulties encountered by Nigerian soldiers in both Liberia and Sierra Leone are enough to shape public opinion against the participation of Nigerian troops in Cote d'Ivoire. Furthermore, according to John Illife, "not only were such interventions unpopular with Nigerian public, but the failure to achieve swift success in Liberia and Sierra Leone" (cited in Aworawo, 2011: 23). The protracted nature of most internal conflicts in West Africa has been posing challenge to peacekeeping operations by nations. This implies that the deployment of troops by Nigeria as well as expenditure of huge

resources to settle conflicts in other countries have been affecting the country's domestic economy.

In a related development, Audu (2011: 1) avers that the resolution of conflict in Cote d'Ivoire is a challenge to the lean resources in Nigeria. According to him, "Nigeria has once again found herself in a very uncomfortable spot, not only because President Goodluck Jonathan is the ECOWAS Chairman, but also because ECOMOG has always been accepted as more of a Nigerian initiative. But worrisome however is the cost previous operations have had on the country's resources both financial and material." This suggests that peacekeeping operations or resolution of internal political conflicts in some ECOWAS states largely depended on Nigeria to provide finances and personnel. Therefore, it can be stated that for a successful ECOWAS peacekeeping operation to take place in West Africa, it needs the support of Nigeria.

Evidently, peacekeeping operations in West Africa have been undertaken with huge financial contribution from Nigeria. Based on this, in one instance, Alli (2012: 51) reiterated public opinion in Nigeria on the country's external engagement when he says that "over the years, there has been a national outcry over the way and manner the leaderships have waded into trouble spots in the sub-region without any tangible benefit." This shows that Nigeria is benefitting little or nothing from its engagement in peacekeeping operations in trouble spots in

West Africa. Similarly, Sanda (2010: 80) was critical about the economic burden that peacekeeping operations have been imposing on Nigeria. According to her:

While Nigeria's contributions have to a large extent been well received externally, on the domestic front there has been growing criticism or questioning of the rationale for such extraordinary human and material investment, particularly when the benefits accruable do not seem commensurable with that investment.

This means that in most cases Nigeria engages in conflict resolution in West Africa at the expence of domestic economy. Significantly, the deployment of military troops and the financial expenses involved in peacekeeping operations in West Africa have not been yielding sufficient benefit to the Nigerian economy. Also, apart from the casualties that the Nigerian soldiers usually suffer or encounter, in some cases the level of appreciations from countries that benefit from Nigeria's good will is not encouraging enough. Based on this, Yoroms (n.d: 87) argues that:

Since independence Nigeria has assisted other African countries in both internal and external conflicts. Those that have been supported by Nigeria in this regard are Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, South Africa, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, among others. Unfortunately, despite this assistance and support Nigeria has been faced with hostility and disdain. She has neither any influence on these countries nor has she been respected by them. It has become necessary for Nigeia, to begin to have an architectural design on how to resolve conflicts and maintain peace in the sub-region.

Despite Nigeria's efforts in managing conflicts in Africa some of the countries that have benefitted from this gesture still compete with Nigeria for influence in the region. In addition, the economic interests of Nigerian citizens in some of the

African states that Nigeria had assisted to resolve their conflicts are not safeguarded. As such, the business interests of Nigerians have not been well entrenched in these countries. Some Nigerians have been deported from some African countries without sufficient reasons to do so.

In another perspective, Okpara (Interview, 2014) maintains that the major challenges that Nigeria faced in its foreign policy of settlement of conflicts are domestic issues of insecurity, corruption, poor economy etc. For him, as long as Nigeria is confronted with internal challenges, there is no basis for the country to engage in settlement of conflict in another country. Furthermore, Okpara maintains that these problems would rather certainly be affecting Nigeria's foreign policy. This is because they would continue to serve as handicaps to Nigeria to render support to other countries in the area of peace promotion. Also, Bakut (Interview, 2014) sees the internal economic problem as a major obstacle to Nigeria's engagement in Cote d'Ivoire. For him, the money or resources that could have been used in Nigeria for development have been expended outside for peacekeeping in Cote d'Ivoire and other places affected by crises.

On his part, Okereke (Interview, 2014) maintains that there is public opinion or perception that Nigeria's record with the twin issues of security and democracy is not healthy enough. This means that as long as Nigerians have not been able to put their home in order politically, then it will be difficult to teach others how to

maintain peace and practice democracy. For Okereke, how do you export what you do not have? In this sense, the public perception about the state and practice of democracy as well as security of Nigeria is an important issue that need to be addressed first before venturing into promotion of peace in other countries. This kind of assertion is also in line with the thinking of Agbu (Interview, 2014) when he suggests that there are many problems in Nigeria that have been affecting its foreign policy of promotion of peace and security in abroad. It is on this instance, that Agbu (Interview, 2014) further posits that “for Nigeria to actually give peace and democracy in abroad it must have them.”

Certainly, the size as well as resources endowment in Nigeria has been making countries in West Africa to gravitate towards Nigeria to assist and maintain peace in their territories. Therefore, there is the challenge of placing burden on Nigeria to shoulder the larger part of the responsibility for the implementation of ECOWAS programmes. Based on this, Haruna (Interview, 2014) argues that most of the time the temptation is always there for other ECOWAS members to put Nigeria on the pedestal and expect it to play big brother role in the region. With this type of thinking some of West African countries tend to forget that Nigeria also has its own internal problems to contend with. Therefore, he suggests that the resources that would have been committed for the development of internal economy were diverted to the settlement of conflict in another country.

4.6: CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the chapter has been based on the analysis of Nigeria's national interests in its engagement in the settlement of conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. In this regard, it can be said that the promotion of peace in West Africa, Africa and the world at large is one of the major concerns of Nigeria's foreign policy for many years. In particular, the role of Nigeria in the negotiation of peaceful settlement of crises in West African countries has helped a great deal in bringing about relative peace and stability to the countries affected by crises. Obviously, due to certain factors the national security interest of Nigeria is connected to the security of other West African states.

Given this scenario of relationship of security interests, it can be stated that the emergence of threats to the security of any West African country would invariably affect the defence and strategic security interests of Nigeria. Hence, the imperative for Nigeria to rally other ECOWAS member states to make all necessary moves and effectively resolve the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. It is on the basis of this that one can say that Nigeria's propensity of using the ECOWAS as an instrument in the settlement of crises in West Africa is cost effective.

The role of Nigeria is central in maintaining stability in West Africa. Therefore, it can be argued that without Nigeria's efforts in the settlement of crises, some of the

West African countries would have disintegrated. Also, it can be said that the consistency maintain by Nigeria in the settlement of crises in West Africa has helped to prevent a situation where foreign European powers would under the pretext of assisting these countries embark on re-enslavement and re-colonisation of the people in the sub-region. Despite the domestic challenges that Nigeria was facing, the participation of the country in the settlement of the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire can be seen as part of the big brother role of the country in the West African sub-region.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1: SUMMARY

This research had demonstrated the role of Nigeria in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire in West African sub-region. In the introductory part of the study it was highlighted that the application of Ivorite policy was the immediate cause of the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. As a result of the humanitarian problem that the conflict generated, Nigeria and other members of the international community intervened to resolve it. Nigeria participated in the various ceasefire negotiations aimed at settlement of the conflict between fighting groups in Cote d'Ivoire. In addition, the country sent its military troops as part of peacekeeping operations in Cote d'Ivoire. Subsequently, the research work discussed other issues, such as statement of research problem, objectives of the study, research questions, scope of the study, limitations of the study, justification of the study and methodology of the study. For the purpose of achieving the objectives of the study and to critically answer the research questions, both the primary and secondary data were collected. Interviews technique with some individual respondents formed the main instrument used for the collection of primary data.

The respondents were drawn from the following institutions: staff of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja, the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja, National Defence College, Abuja and the Nigerian Institute for International Affairs, Lagos. However, it needs to be mentioned that a lot of obstacles or difficulties were encountered in the field work, especially in terms of getting access to the target respondents. That notwithstanding, the researcher was still able to conduct interviews with some individuals and experts on Nigeria's foreign policy. Therefore, all the data collected were analysed through the qualitative analysis.

In the study, review of literature on the role of Nigeria in settlement of conflicts in West Africa was done. In the plethora of literature reviewed in this study, discussions were centred on the relevance or otherwise of Nigeria's foreign policy of participation in peacekeeping operations in the West African sub-region. Also, it has been established that academic research of this nature is supposed to be based on the use of theory. Therefore, the theory of third party intervention provided the theoretical guide for this study. The usefulness of the theory is based on the fact that it places emphasis on the role of outsiders or foreign interveners in the process of mediation, negotiation, and peacekeeping in the settlement of conflict at both domestic and international levels. As such, according to the

theory a third party intervener plays an important role in separating two or more fighting groups.

Since the death of President Felix Houphouet-Boigny in 1993, Cote d'Ivoire had witnessed political instability. This was as a result of differences among the political elites in the country. However, between 2002 and 2011, Cote d'Ivoire was engulfed in political conflict. This led to injuries, death and displacement of many individuals in the country. In addition, property of both the government and individuals was destroyed during the conflict. The interventions of Nigeria and other members of the international community in the Ivorian conflict were meant to find effective means of resolving it.

Basically, Nigeria's engagement in the settlement of conflict in Cote d'Ivoire was seen as a right step towards the right direction. Nigeria's diplomatic initiatives had assisted in resolving the Ivorian conflict. Based on this, it can be stated that Nigeria's role in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire had led to the restoration of peace, order and stability in the country. The stability of Cote d'Ivoire was in the best interest of Nigeria and other West African countries. This is essential because it would bring about unhindered economic and business transactions among the ECOWAS members. Also, it would guarantee the process of effective cooperation and development in the sub-region.

Nigeria's engagement in Cote d'Ivoire was influenced by different factors. Externally, Nigeria as a member of international bodies has not shied away from the obligation of promoting international peace and security. Also, due to the aspiration of Nigeria to play leadership role in West Africa, the country has always been motivated to settle conflicts in the sub-region. Therefore, it could be said that Nigeria possesses the capability to engage in conflict resolution in other countries in general and in West African sub-region in particular. Finally, the aftermath of Nigeria's intervention in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire has seen the strengthening of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

5.2: RESEARCH FINDINGS

By undertaking an analysis of the role of Nigeria in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire, we seek to understand the basis of such engagement. In doing this, the study attempts to provide answers to the questions that were raised. Based on this, the research findings in this endeavour are basically aimed at verifying the research questions mentioned in chapter one of this study.

In the analysis of both the primary and secondary data collected, the issue surrounding Nigeria's engagement in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire can be said to be important because it helped to restore peace and political stability in the country. Significantly, recourse to peacekeeping operations in the settlement of

political crises in Cote d'Ivoire had produced favourable outcome. To this extent, the various warring factions were made to disarm and embrace the peace process.

Also, the manner in which the crises in Cote d'Ivoire were resolved has proven that the combine forces of members of the international community have the capacity to gang up against any autocratic leader from subverting the democratic or electoral process in his/her country. Certainly, the unequivocal condemnation of the recalcitrant attitude of former President Gbagbo of Cote d'Ivoire by the international organisations, such as the ECOWAS, AU and the UN for refusing to honour the mandate given to Mr Ouattara by the people of his country showed their real commitment to the promotion of peace, order and democracy in the African continent.

In addition, the study has found out that the national security interest of Nigeria was a major motivating factor in the country's engagement in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire. Significantly, the prevalence of peace and security in West Africa would help to promote and guarantee peace and security in Nigeria. This is particularly the case because the moment some countries in the West African sub-region are entangled in intractable crises, this will give foreigners, especially the European powers the chance to undermine the sovereignty of these countries under the pretext of settling their problems. In such situations where foreigners are

allowed to unnecessarily meddle in the affairs of some countries in West Africa, this will invariably affect the security interest of Nigeria.

Moreover, Nigeria has over the years experienced the effects of spill-over effects of conflicts from some neighbouring countries, such as Chad Republic, Liberia, and Sierra Leone etc. Therefore, it became imperative on Nigerian government to embark on the resolution of conflict in Cote d'Ivoire so as to avoid unnecessary spill-over effects. Hence, according to a popular saying, 'if you see a next door neighbour's house on fire, you must help to put it out, because you do not know when the resulting effect of the conflagration may spread to your home.'

As it has been put forward elsewhere, one of the findings in the study was that as a result of the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire there was massive influx of refugees to some West African countries. As is well known, refugees are usually subjected to harsh and unhealthy conditions. Also, the problem of refugees to the host countries is that of adding burden to their lean or meagre financial resources. This is because the refugees would always need essential items like food, clothes, mattresses, and drugs etc which have to be made available to them by both the host governments and some international donor agencies. It is because of the problems that are associated with refugees that Nigeria normally moves quickly to resolve conflicts in West African sub-region.

It was discovered in this study that the need to salvage ECOWAS was paramount in Nigeria's involvement in the settlement of various political crises in West African countries. Even as Nigeria is acknowledged to be the largest economy in the entire West Africa, the political leaders in this country cannot afford to neglect the huge potential that can be gained from the huge and expansive markets in other West African countries if the economic cooperation and integration in the sub-region succeed. Therefore, it was established that it is by ensuring adequate security in West Africa by the Nigerian leaders that the much needed economic growth and development can be achieved among the countries in the sub-region. Thus, the much taunted economic integration in West Africa can be said to be depended largely on the existence of adequate peace and security in the entire region.

Basically, it was assumed that the dominant role of Nigeria in the settlement of various political crises in trouble spots in the West African sub-region has been effective in sustaining the dreams and ambitions of ECOWAS founding fathers of achieving economic cooperation and integration process in West Africa. It is well known that trans-border or cross-border trading or commercial activities cannot be achieved among the people of West African countries in the absence of peace and security. Therefore, it has been found out in this study that it is imperative for member states of ECOWAS to put heads together in order to enhance the security

posture of the sub-region so as to achieve the lofty goals of economic cooperation and integration in West Africa.

Significantly, it has been established through the experience in Cote d'Ivoire that it is important that the members of the international community should continue to assist in putting pressure on reluctant autocratic leaders in Africa to uphold the verdict of free, fair and credible elections. This will serve as a panacea to the incessant political crises in several African countries. In many African countries, politicians have been subverting the basic democratic principles, thereby leading to the generation of conflicts.

In the specific case of Cote d'Ivoire during the period under review, the successive political leaders had constituted themselves as stumbling block to the practice of genuine democracy. These leaders have sometimes through their conduct undermined democratic governance. They seem to learn nothing from the past mistakes. Instead of embarking on certain democratic ethos, such as embrace of rule of law, acceptance of electoral defeat honourably, respect for minority rights, respect for basic freedom of association, religion and other civil rights, the reverse was the case. The flagrant disrespect for basic human rights was demonstrated in Cote d'Ivoire between 1995 and 2002, when the various political leaders in the country made the political career of Mr Alassane Ouattara to

oscillate between being banned and unbanned from political participation due mainly to citizenship or resort to identity issues.

It was assumed in this study that there was a working synergy among the members of the international community in conflict resolution in places affected by the problems. Based on this, another important finding of this study was the level of cooperation that existed among the various international organisations that contributed towards the mediation or settlement of crisis in Cote d'Ivoire. The manner in which the various international bodies had worked in cooperation with one another to mediate the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire has shown their continuous relevance and importance on the world stage.

These international bodies did not shy away from their responsibilities of bringing peace and security to Cote d'Ivoire. Importantly, during the political crisis in Cote d'Ivoire both the ECOWAS and the AU had channelled and directed their peace initiatives within the mandates of the UN. Therefore, it can be stated that this kind of working synergy that existed among the various international organisations that mediated the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire was significant in bringing peace and stability to the country. However, the main challenge to Nigeria's position on the enforcement of peace in Cote d'Ivoire came from some African countries like Ghana, Gambia, South Africa, and Angola.

It has been established that the participation of Nigeria in resolving the crises in Cote d'Ivoire was an indication that there is continuity and consistency in Nigeria's Afro-centric foreign policy. Also, under a democratic setting, Nigeria's engagement in the settlement of crises in Cote d'Ivoire was seen as credible and noble cause of promotion of peace and stability in abroad. The search for peace in Africa is sacrosanct. Since the last 20th century and up till date, Africa has been yearning for peace, growth and development. The efforts or struggles for the attainment of these noble goals of peace and security therefore, rest squarely on the shoulders of African leaders and their people. This is because it would be inappropriate and improper to continue to wait for outsiders to come and assist African people in solving all their problems. It is perhaps on this basis that Nigeria has been consistent in rendering assistance to sister African states so as to resolve their problems.

5.3: CONCLUSION

This research study has been concerned with the analysis of Nigeria's role in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire. It can be stated that Nigeria's participation in the settlement of political conflict in Cote d'Ivoire was based on the principles and objectives of the country's foreign policy. Thus, Nigeria's engagement in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire was a significant milestone in the country's foreign policy process. Over the years, Nigeria has been preoccupied with the role of

settlement of conflicts in the West African sub-region. Indeed, Nigeria had worked with various international organisations, such as the ECOWAS, AU, UN and even countries like France in the efforts to resolve the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. The main purposes were to maintain peace, order and stability in the country.

Therefore, it can be argued that the participation of Nigeria in peacekeeping operations as well as mediation process towards the resolution of conflict in Cote d'Ivoire was germane. Strategically, Nigeria's engagement in Cote d'Ivoire was informed by the need to forestall the killings of innocent individuals and to prevent the spread of the conflict into neighbouring countries. Also, as there were many Nigerians residing in Cote d'Ivoire, it is certainly in Nigeria's interest to protect them from harm or danger arising from the conflict.

Since 2002, Nigeria's efforts toward peace building process in Cote d'Ivoire were done by bringing both the government and rebel groups together to engage in series of negotiations. Also, Nigeria supported and even hosted international meetings aimed at proffering solution to the lingering political logjam in Cote d'Ivoire. In addition, it was through the pressure mounted on President Gbagbo by Nigeria and other members of the international community that led him to agree on the conduct of presidential elections in Cote d'Ivoire in 2010. After the conduct of the said presidential election, the country was again plunged into protracted

conflict due to claim and counter claim of winning by the candidates. The situation whereby President Gbagbo refused to relinquish power in Cote d'Ivoire after being defeated in an election became a source of worry to Nigeria. Indeed, Nigeria supported the application of sanctions on Cote d'Ivoire in line with the recommendations of ECOWAS and even the UN. In addition, there was wisdom in Nigeria's approach to support the enforcement of peace through military option in Cote d'Ivoire. This is essentially because after the removal of President Gbagbo from office relative peace was restored to Cote d'Ivoire.

Nigeria's commitment to the promotion of peace and stability through the use of its human and material resources is quite visible in West Africa and indeed Africa. This had been demonstrated in its role of participation in peacekeeping operations or negotiations of peaceful settlement of crises in countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali etc. In this regard, the Nigerian government paid particular attention to the political crises in these countries as part of the drive to promote and sustain peace and security in the West African sub-region. There is no doubt that Nigeria's efforts toward the restoration of peace in West African countries are commendable. Thus, the promotion of peace is seen as one of the planks of Nigeria's foreign policy in West Africa, Africa and the world at large.

For all intents and purposes, the concern by Nigeria to pursue the foreign policy of promotion of peace in the entire West African sub-region is a demonstration of its commitment to protect its security and economic interests in the sub-region. Definitely, both security and economic issues constitute the core values of Nigeria's geo-political engagement in the international system. Nigeria's survival depends extensively on the promotion and protection of its strategic interests on the world stage. It is perhaps for this reason that Nigeria cannot afford to allow conflicts and insecurity in some countries in West Africa to destabilise the sub-region.

Finally, it can be said that the political crises in Cote d'Ivoire had different ramifications and dimensions. While the first conflict was caused by identity crisis, the second conflict was as a result of succession politics. Therefore, due to serious violation of human rights by former President Laurent Gbagbo during the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire, it can be said that his action was condemnable. Also, he can be indicted for wrongdoing in the court of world public opinion. In addition, the deposition as well as the ongoing prosecution of former President Laurent Gbagbo of Cote d'Ivoire at the International Criminal Court (ICC) at Hague for war crimes and crimes against humanity can be seen as an important lesson to be learnt by other African leaders. This is because political leaders all over the world

are expected to uphold the principles of international best practices in their day to day political activities.

5.4: RECOMMENDATIONS

Basically, this study was conceived within the context of Nigeria's engagement in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire. Having analysed some of the major issues that concern the Nigeria's foreign policy of participation in the settlement of political crises in Cote d'Ivoire, it is pertinent at this juncture to offer some policy and research recommendations. The policy or research recommendations are meant to serve as useful guide to policy makers in Nigeria as well as opening for further research to the students and practioners in the field of international relations and foreign policy. Therefore, the recommendations are listed below as follows:

First, in the efforts to resolve conflicts in other countries in the West African sub-region, Nigeria should always works with other members of the international community. Here, it is imperative to say that Nigeria should not go alone. This is essentially because through the combined efforts of the members of the international community, effective and efficient conflict resolution mechanism could be worked out or implemented in any trouble spot in West Africa. Thus, it can be said that the resolution of an international conflict

through the process of multi-national means is cost effective. Also, by working with the members of the international community it has the tendency to reduce the burden of sending large military troops and the attendant casualties that usually accompanies it.

Second, the Nigerian government should improve the funding to its personnel embarking on peacekeeping missions in abroad. This is necessary because through adequate and timely funding the needed military equipment will be made available to the military personnel. In addition, adequate funding will ensure that the personnel on peacekeeping missions are paid their entitlements and allowances as and when due. Therefore, it has been observed in certain circles that adequate funding of military personnel on a peacekeeping mission can boost their morale and make them to discharge their duties effectively.

Third, Nigerian government should always consider domestic needs and/or interests whenever the country is to embark on peace support missions in other countries. Thus, it is important that Nigeria should always weigh the benefits that will accrue to its citizens before embarking on peacekeeping operations in other countries around the world. In this regard, Nigeria is not supposed to be seen as playing the role of Father Christmas by expending huge resources in the name of peacekeeping operations in other countries without thinking of

economic and other benefits that its citizens could gain even after accomplishing the tasks.

Finally, it can also be recommended that due to the manner in which the role of Nigeria in conflict resolution in places like Liberia, Mali etc is not globally acclaimed and was later hijacked by the UN, Nigeria should stop rushing or going into those countries affected by conflicts unless it is mandated by the ECOWAS or AU. Here, it is suggested that if it is on the invitation of sub-regional and continental organisations Nigeria can make meaningful contributions of troops and resources in resolving conflict in any trouble spot in Africa. This type of thinking is in line with the idea that Nigeria should always works with other members of the international community in resolving conflicts in other countries.

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Mr Haruna A. Adejoh (2014). Chief Researcher, Department of External Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution Plot 496, Agbogo Largema Street, Central Business District, Abuja. Interviewed by 12: 45 P.M. on 18th March.

Dr Ichimi, Godwin (2014). Research Fellow, Department of Research, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Kofo Abayomi Street, Lagos. Interviewed by 4: 20 P.M. on 8th April.

Barrister Jiya, Gabriel (2014). Director, Head of Department of Democracy and Development, Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Plot 496, Agbogo Largema Street, Central Business District, Abuja. Interviewed by 3: 16 P.M. on 12th March.

Dr Okereke, C. Nna-Emeka (2014). Research Fellow, Centre for Strategic Research and Studies, National Defence College, Central Business District, Abuja. Interviewed by 2: 30 P.M. on 12th March.

Mr Okpara, O. Peter (2014). Director, Head of Department of Internal Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution Plot 496, Agbogo Largema Street, Central Business District, Abuja. Interviewed by 10: 20 A.M. on 12th March.

Ambassador Orevba, O. Olutunde (2014). Director, ECOWAS Division, African Multilateral Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tafawa Balewa House, Central Business District, Abuja. Interviewed by 4: 30 P.M. on 20th March.

Miss Sanda, G. Julie (2014). Principal Research Fellow and Head of Department of Conflict, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Studies, National Defence College, Central Business District, Abuja. Interviewed by 2: 33 P.M. on 13th March.

Alhaji Sidi, A. Usman (2014). First Secretary, Office of the Honourable Minister of State II, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tafawa Balewa House, Central Business District, Abuja. Interviewed by 2: 30 P.M. on 17th March.

Mrs Sunsuwa, Esther (2014). First Secretary, West Africa Division, Africa Bilateral Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tafawa Balewa House, Central Business District, Abuja. Interviewed by 2: 15 P.M. on 19th March.

Dr Ubi, N. Efem (2014). Research Fellow, Department of Research, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Kofo Abayomi Street, Lagos. Interviewed by 2: 20 P.M. on 8th April.

Ambassador Zanna, Muhammed (2014). Director II, West Africa Division, Africa Bilateral Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tafawa Balewa House, Central Business District, Abuja. Interviewed by 11: 40 A.M. on 19th March.

APPENDICES

Appendix I: Instrument of Data Collection: Interview Guide

Preliminary Statement

As clearly stated in chapter one, the technique of data collection would be oral interview with respondents from amongst the staff of the following institutions: the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja, Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja, National Defence College, Abuja and Nigerian Institute for International Affairs, Lagos. Therefore, in this endeavour interview schedule was developed to serve as a guide to facilitate easy interaction with the respondents. Basically, the interview guide was drawn from the research objectives and research questions. The information gotten from the respondents and the documentary data from the secondary sources were used in making analysis of the subject matter in this study. For the purpose of uniformity, one set of interview guide was drawn for all the respondents in the institutions mentioned above.

Interview Guide

1. Nigeria's roles toward conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire.
2. Factors that influence Nigeria's engagement in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire.

3. Nigeria's strategic interests in its engagement in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire.
4. Nigeria's economic interests in its engagement in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire.
5. The effectiveness of Nigeria's foreign policy of promotion of peace in Cote d'Ivoire.
6. Effects of poor domestic economic condition, insecurity, corruption etc on Nigeria's engagement in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire.
7. External challenges to Nigeria's engagement in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire.
8. Domestic reactions to Nigeria's engagement in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire.
9. Reciprocity of Nigeria's gesture by the government of Cote d'Ivoire.
10. Nigeria's engagement in Cote d'Ivoire and the state of relations between the two countries.

**Appendix II A: Letter of Introduction to the Minisrty of Foreign Affairs,
Abuja**

Department of Political Science,
Faculty of Social and Magt. Sciences,
Bayero University, Kano.
14th March, 2014.

Dr. Nurudeen Muhammad,
Hon. Minister of State II,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Tafawa Balewa House,
C.B.D. Abuja.

Dear Sir,

Letter of Introduction

I hereby wish to write to your good office to seek permission to enable me conduct research interviews with some staff of the Ministry. My name is Ismaila Ahmed Danjuma, a Ph. D. Student of the above named institution, currently carrying out a research work titled “Multilateralism and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy of Support for Democracy: A Case Study of Cote d’Ivoire.”

The research is part of the requirements for the award of Ph. D. Degree in Political Science. The findings of this study are to be solely used for academic purposes and all information provided will be treated with utmost confidentiality. Therefore, it will be highly appreciated if you will assist to furnish answers to the interview questions attached to this letter.

Thanking you most sincerely for the anticipated cooperation, please.

Yours faithfully,

Ismaila Ahmed Danjuma

Appendix II B: Letter of Introduction to the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja

Department of Political Science,
Faculty of Social and Magt. Sciences,
Bayero University, Kano.
2nd March, 2014.

The Director General,
Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution,
C.B.D. Abuja.

Dear Sir,

Letter of Introduction

I hereby wish to write to your good office to seek permission to enable me conduct research interviews with some staff of the Institute. My name is Ismaila Ahmed Danjuma, a Ph. D. Student of the above named institution, currently carrying out a research work titled “Multilateralism and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy of Support for Democracy: A Case Study of Cote d’Ivoire.”

The research is part of the requirements for the award of Ph. D. Degree in Political Science. The findings of this study are to be solely used for academic purposes and all information provided will be treated with utmost confidentiality. Therefore, it will be highly appreciated if you will assist to furnish answers to the interview questions attached to this letter.

Thanking you most sincerely for the anticipated cooperation, please.

Yours faithfully,

Ismaila Ahmed Danjuma

Appendix II C: Letter of Introduction to the National Defence College, Abuja

Department of Political Science,
Faculty of Social and Magt. Sciences,
Bayero University, Kano.
2nd March, 2014.

The Commandant,
National Defence College,
C.B.D. Abuja.

Through,
The H.O. D of Centre for Strategic Research and Studies,
National Defence College

Dear Sir,

Letter of Introduction

I hereby wish to write to your good office to seek permission to enable me conduct research interviews with some staff of the establishment. My name is Ismaila Ahmed Danjuma, a Ph. D. Student of the above named institution, currently carrying out a research work titled “Multilateralism and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy of Support for Democracy: A Case Study of Cote d’Ivoire.”

The research is part of the requirements for the award of Ph. D. Degree in Political Science. The findings of this study are to be solely used for academic purposes and all information provided will be treated with utmost confidentiality. Therefore, it will be highly appreciated if you will assist to furnish answers to the interview questions attached to this letter.

Thanking you most sincerely for the anticipated cooperation, please.

Yours faithfully,

Ismaila Ahmed Danjuma.

Appendix II D: Letter of Introduction to the Nigerian Institute for International Affairs, Lagos

Department of Political Science,
Faculty of Social and Magt. Sciences,
Bayero University, Kano.
2nd April, 2014.

The Director General,
Nigerian Institute for International Affairs,
Victoria Island, Lagos.
Dear Sir,

Letter of Introduction

I hereby wish to write to your good office to seek permission to enable me conduct research interviews with some staff of the Institute. My name is Ismaila Ahmed Danjuma, a Ph. D. Student of the above named institution, currently carrying out a research work titled “Multilateralism and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy of Support for Democracy: A Case Study of Cote d’Ivoire.”

The research is part of the requirements for the award of Ph. D. Degree in Political Science. The findings of this study are to be solely used for academic purposes and all information provided will be treated with utmost confidentiality. Therefore, it will be highly appreciated if you will assist to furnish answers to the interview questions attached to this letter.

Thanking you most sincerely for the anticipated cooperation, please.

Yours faithfully,

Ismaila Ahmed Danjuma